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Best Available Copy
IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (10 May 67) FOR OT

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3rd Battalion, 14th Artillery

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

(Continued on page 2)
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National Aeronautics & Space Administration, Office of Defense Affairs
Commanding Officer, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery
AVFA-AT-6/14-0

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(TCS CSFOR-65)

TO: See Distribution

SECTION 1 (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (U) General: The battalion engaged in combat operations throughout the ninety-two day reporting period except for two forty-eight hour cease fire periods observed during Christmas and New Year. All operations were conducted in northwestern Khe Sanh province in support of Operations PAUL REVERE IV and SAM HOUSTON. During the month of November, the battalion conducted its heaviest firing since arrival in country while supporting operations north and west of the Plei Djereng Special Forces Camp. The battalion remained attached to the 52d Artillery Group, and worked closely with the Div Artys of the 4th Inf Div and 1st Air Cav Div. Calls for fire were answered for all ARVN, CTDG, and Free World Military Assistance Forces within range.

2. (U) Intelligence: Target intelligence was obtained primarily from direct support artillery battalions whose fires this battalion reinforced. An additional source continued to be the Special Forces A detachments. The firing batteries were collocated with these detachments during almost the entire period, and placed observed and unobserved fires on targets located by their patrols. Forward observers were committed during a major portion of the period, operating with the Special Forces, and with ARVN and US units. The battalion provided aerial observers to participate in visual reconnaissance missions with the 219th Avn Co an average of three to four times each week. Target intelligence was obtained from those and other flights flown by the 219th. Limited target information was also received from ARVN II Corps, direct from their CSOC through either 52d Art Group or 4th Inf Div Artys.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities:
   a. Plans: No significant report.
   b. Operations:
      (1) During the past quarter, artillery support was provided to the 4th Inf Div, the 2d Bde 1st Air Cav Div, Special Forces operations in Khe Sanh and Kontum provinces, ARVN task forces, and to FAC and reconnaissance aircraft receiving ground fire.
      (2) The inherent flexibility of artillery employment was again demonstrated, as firing batteries were placed under CCA of other battalions on numerous occasions, while their batteries were attached or placed CCA of this headquarters. All attachments and control changes were
made smoothly and without difficulty.

(3) The metro section continued to provide support to all artillery units in the area. Balloon releases were made four times daily, and messages broadcast on FM and AM radio. The section was located at Folei Djereng (TA856532). It was fully operational for fifty-five days, non-operational for lack of expendables for twenty-four days, and operational with a visual capability only for an additional thirteen days.

(4) The battalion survey section continued to extend control throughout the area. Temporary loan of tellurometers by the 4th Inf Div allowed the completion of long traverses placing batteries in field locations on a common grid with the base camp near Folei. The section also was employed to accurately locate vital installations in the Pleiku defense area.

(5) A chronological list of significant operational activities during the period follows:

1 Nov: Bn(-) CCA 2d Bde 1st Air Cav Div, with Btrys B and C at Due Co (TA842249) and Folei Me (ZA165067) Special Forces Camps, GS 1st Bn 77th Arty. Btry A, CCA 4th Inf Div at Folei Djereng Special Forces Camp, GS 4th Inf Div. HQ and F/C Btrys remained at Artillery Hill base camp via Folei (ZA229534).

2 Nov: Btry C 3d Bn 18th Arty (175/Sw SF), atched less admin, and dispatched from An The to vic Oasis (ZA120248).

3 Nov: Btry C 3d Bn 18th Arty, detached. Battalion Forward Operations Center displaced from LZ 3G (TA866458) to Oasis where it collocated with Forward Operations Center of 1st Air Cav Div Arty.

7 Nov: Btry B firing from Due Co received credit for a body count of forty WIA.

20 Nov: Btry C 3d Bn 18th Arty, located at Folei Djereng, attached less administration, GS 4th Inf Div.

22 Nov: Btry A firing from Folei Djereng received credit for a body count of nineteen WIA, and destruction of numerous automatic weapons and machine guns.

26 Nov: Btry C 3d Bn 18th Arty (105 SP) attached. Located near check point 8 (ZA090450), DF 1st Sqdn 10th Cav.

29 Nov: Btry C displaced to check point 8 (ZA090450), CCA 4th Inf Div, GSR 2d Bn 9th Arty. Btry C, 3d Bn 18th Arty, displaced to Artillery Hill (ZA229534). One five ton and one one-quarter ton vehicle of Btry C 3d Bn 18th Arty hit mines with two WIA resulting.

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (cont'd) 1 February 1967

1 Dec: Bn(-) CCA 4th Inf Div, GSR 2d Bn 9th Arty. Btry B continued CCA 2d Bn 1st Air Cav Div, GSR 1st Bn 77th Arty.

12 Dec: Btrys A and C firing from Polei Djereng destroyed a large bunker complex. Blood, bandages, and other signs of extensive casualties found in area.

15 Dec: Btry C (155 FF) (YA860529) and Btry D (6in SP) (YA856522), 5th Bn 16th Arty, CCA 6th Bn 14th Arty, GSR 2d Bn 9th Arty. Btry C displaced to vic Floc Prone Special Forces Camp (ZA108681), CCA 5th Bn 16th Arty, GSR 2d Bn 9th Arty.

22 Dec: Btry C 5th Bn 16th Arty displaced to ZA055440.

23 Dec: Btry C displaced to Artillery Hill (ZA229534), G1 4th Inf Div.

24 Dec: Btrys C and D, 5th Bn 16th Arty released CCA. Btry A mission changed to GSR 4th Bn 42d Arty.


1 Jan: PAUL REVERE IV terminated and SAM HOUSTON began.


4 Jan: Btry A released CCA 5th Bn 16th Arty, CCA 4th Bn 42d Arty.

9 Jan: Searchlight section at Duc Co from Btry B 29th Arty CCA 6th Bn 14th Arty.

16 Jan: Bn mission changed to G1 4th Inf Div. Btry A released CCA 4th Bn 42d Arty and reverted to battalion control, GSR 4th Bn 42d Arty.

C. Training: Section training and team drill were held daily except during movement. Rotation of trained personnel and the necessity of enlarging sections to maintain twenty-four hour a day operational capability required particular emphasis on training of FDC personnel. Formal classes were taught by battalion staff officers in firing battery positions, and
battery commanders personally conducted training and drill for their sections. A course of instruction was presented to selected cannonners and wiremen in the battalion base camp to qualify them as back-up FDC men. Familiarization and zero firing was conducted by all batteries during the quarter.

d. Chemical: No significant activities.

e. PSYWAR: No significant activities.

f. Other: No significant activities.

4. (C) Logistics:

a. Class I, III and V supplies continued to present few problems. Forward Support Areas operated during the quarter at Polei Djerenz, LZ 3G (YA866456), and Oasis, and these facilities were used to the maximum. In addition, Service Battery sent thirty-eight large convoys carrying 2151 tons of ammunition, food, potable water, and expendables to field locations. Security for these movements was provided by the 4th Inf Div and 2d Bde 1st Air Cav Div. CH-2 and C-123 aircraft were also scheduled twice weekly to supply Battery B at Duc Co. UH-1 aircraft from the 52d Avn Bn were used occasionally for rapid delivery of parts needed to remove mission essential equipment from deadline. CH-47's were used for resupply on a very limited basis.

b. Six new cannon carriages for M107 guns and M110 howitzers were received during the period.

5. (U) Civil Affairs: No significant activities.

6. (C) Personnel:

a. Casualties:

(1) KIA: None.

(2) WIA: Two (attached personnel).

b. During the period the following personnel actions occurred:

(1) Personnel Losses: 155

(2) Personnel gains: 69

(3) Present for duty strength at close of period: 29 Cff

400, 419 K

(4) Promotion allocations:

(a) E-4: 72

(b) E-5: 31

(c) E-6: 18

(5) Mail: Support on mail delivery was particularly outstanding during the Christmas period. The battalion utilizes all available transportation to get mail to firing batteries as often as possible.

(6) R and H quotas during period:

(a) Out of country: 80

(b) In country: 3

(7) Pay has been timely and accurate.

7. (C) Artillery: Rounds expended during period:

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DTP 5200.10
**CON F I D E N T I A L**

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report on Lessons Learned (cont'd) 1 February 1967

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<td>FD</td>
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8. (U) Other:
   (1) The battalion aviation section consisting of one C-1A and one H-13S was used for observation and adjustment of artillery fire, registration, command and control, and immediate delivery of parts and personnel to repair deadline guns and other critical equipment.

   (2) Available time of aircraft:
      (a) C-1A  65%
      (b) H-13S 40%

   (3) Number of hours flown:
      (a) C-1A  167.7
      (b) H-13S 123.5

   (4) Parts supply to remove aircraft from deadline continues to be a problem. The H-13S is the only one in this area, and repair parts frequently must be obtained from distant locations. The C-1A will be replaced in early February by a later model.

**SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Part 1, Observations (Lessons Learned)**

1. (U) Personnel: None.

2. (C) Operations:
   a. Item: Survey Capability

**Discussion:** Firing batteries are widely separated in field locations, and reliable survey control in this area does not exist. The 175mm guns in particular require accurate directional control because of their great range. A large part of the battalion's fire is unobserved and consists of fire for effect missions. Therefore for maximum effect, battery locations must be accurately located.

**Observation:** The great distances plus the problem of providing necessary security for parties virtually precludes taping and traversing to battery locations. Triangulation is nearly impossible because of the terrain and the thick undergrowth. Tellurometers were obtained on a temporary basis from the 4th Div Arty, and used to extend control many thousands of meters, a 123,000 meter traverse to Foli Djereng closed with an accuracy of 1 to 15,300, and a slightly shorter one to Foli Franke closed at 1 to 15,700. Distance measuring equipment has been requested in an TCE submitted during the quarter. Directional control has been transferred during the predominantly cloudless dry season by simultaneous sun shots.

   b. Item: Semi-Permanent Gun Pads.

**Discussion:** There is no requirement for a specially prepared
firing pad for the M107 and M110 weapon systems during the dry season or
during periods of light rain. During the monsoons, however, the shock of
recoil causes the track to sink into the mud and to displace so rapidly that
it must be relaid after firing a small number of rounds.

Observation: Gun pads have been prepared at Duc Co and at
the New Poled Djoring Special Forces Camp; a test pad has been prepared at
base camp. Pads in the field locations have been constructed with Tee
layered on a solid base of late-rite. "Trail Logs" on which the spade is
placed surround the pad. Extensive firing from the pads at Duc Co showed
them to be generally satisfactory, but indicated that the logs should be
raised approximately nine inches above the level of the pad to keep the
length of exposed spade cylinder down to eighteen inches. The pads are
being rebuilt accordingly and will be ready before the monsoon season. The
pads at New Poled Djoring were constructed with raised trail logs, and will
be put into use during the first part of February. Test firing from the pad
on Artillery Hill indicated that a pad using a concrete retaining wall to
enclose a gravel base covered by a double layer of 4"X6" boards was very
effective. Trouble was encountered with a concrete back stop intended as
a spade rest and the engineers are redesigning this portion.

3. (U) Training and Organization: None.

4. (U) Intelligence: None.

5. (C) Logistics.
   a. Item: Expendables for Metro Section.
      Discussion: The Battalion Metro Section releases four balloon
      flights daily. Electronic operations are completely dependent on a reliable
      source of balloons, radiosondes, and a means of inflating the balloons.
      Observation: Metro supplies continue to be a critical problem.
The section was non-operational 24 days during the quarter because of a
lack of expendables. Unfilled requisitions date back to the first quarter of
1966. Additional requisitions have been submitted and follow-up action has
been taken, but the shortage remains serious. Because of the existing low
density and high temperatures, range corrections for the 175mm guns often
exceed 1500 meters. Therefore, it was necessary to compensate for these
two factors. Accordingly, during periods when the section was non-oper-
atal, four "standard" metros were compiled by an averaging of noted
messages from the past month. Satisfactory results were obtained with the
standard metros with all observed first rounds hitting within 400 meters
of the target, and frequently hitting much closer.

      Discussion: The system is a complicated one and difficulties
have been experienced in the past with high deadline rates.
      Observation: The deadline rate has dropped sharply during the
past quarter. The rate during November was 21.7%, during December 11.8%,
and during January only 0.8%. The decline can be attributed to the following
factors:

      (1) Delivery of six new carriages to replace weapons that had
been in constant combat operation for over a year.
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (cont'd)  1 February 1967

(2) A vastly improved supply system that provided the parts necessary to remove runs from deadline.
(3) Increased emphasis on crew training in proper maintenance and operational procedures and techniques.
(4) A battalion urgent parts request system which assured rapid delivery of parts to batteries in field locations.
(5) Improved support by ordnance personnel.

c. Item: Rectifiers for Battery FDC's and AM Radio Sections.

Discussion: FP-34 Rectifiers can be used to power 28V DC radios with a 110V AC source. This eliminates the need for constant operation of DC generators.

Observation: All firing batteries have operated in positions where AC generators have run constantly to provide necessary power. Lacking rectifiers, the FDC's and AM sections have also had to use a 28V DC generator to operate their radios. Difficulty has been experienced in keeping these generators operational. Procuring the rectifiers would allow the DC generators to be used for emergency stand-by only.

Part 2, Recommendations

1. (U) Personnel: None.

2. (U) Operations:

a. Firing batteries continue to be widely separated, and at great distances from accurate starting control for survey. Recommend that distance measuring equipment, which has been requested in a recently submitted ITC and E, be issued to this battalion as soon as practicable.

b. Experience gained thus far with specially constructed gun pads has been favorable. Recommend that in the future engineer support be provided to assist heavy artillery units in preparation of positions to be occupied for longer than a few days.

3. (U) Training and Organization: None.

4. (U) Intelligence: None.

5. (U) Logistics: Expansible supplies for the metro section continue to be critically short. Recommend that increased command emphasis be placed on timely delivery of the necessary items.

6. (U) Other: None.

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ANDREW PANSINNE JR
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEAR.
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Period Ending 31 Jan 67

HEADQUARTERS, 52D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96318, 3 Feb 67

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350


2. Spelling errors have been corrected with pen and ink.

3. The information is current and appropriate.

4. Approval of the submitted HTOL will permit the battalion to obtain requested rectifiers and distance measuring equipment.

5. The lack of supplies for the metro section has been a matter of command interest. The battalion has a list of 86 due-out requisitions. The battalion prepared a command letter on 4 December 1966, subject: Expendable Supplies for the Metro Section, which was forwarded to I Field Force Vietnam Artillery by 1st indorsement dated 7 December 1966. The situation has not improved and the station is able to provide only visual nets with sufficient supplies to last for two weeks.

6. Daily formal training is held in all units in fire direction and firing battery procedures to ensure individual and unit proficiency and accuracy of fires.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

HENRY H. PLITERS
LTC, Arty
Adjutant

1 Incl

as
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AVFA-AT-D (1 Feb 67)  2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
ending 31 January 1967 (RCS 0SPOR-65) (6th Bn, 14th Arty) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96350, 28 Feb 67

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OScT
APO 96350

1. (U) Concur in observations and recommendations contained in
basic communication as indorsed.

2. (C) The following additional comments are submitted:

a. Reference Section 2, Part 2, para 2a: Arrival of HBB,
8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 26th Artillery in Jan 67 with three
survey parties equipped with Electronic Distance Measuring instruments,
will serve to alleviate problem cited.

b. Reference para 5, part 2, section 2, page 7: USASC,
QUI NHON was notified by message on 3 Dec 66 of the urgent need of six
different types of expendable items for radiosonde systems operating in
11 CTZ. Notification was made by USAWECOM msg, EFTE-1-56E-32-1, dtd
231655Z Jan 67, subject: Shortage of Radiosondes, AN/AKT-4 and AN/AKT-12,
that depot stocks of these items are presently depleted and all re-
quissions have been placed on back order.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
LEO E. ELLIS
LTC, Arty
Adjutant
Subject: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CPOR-65) (U)

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 13 Mar 1967

To: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96307

1. (U) Concur with the contents of the Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 of 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery, and the preceding endorsements with the following comments.

2. (C) Reference Section 2, Part II - Recommendations.

   a. Reference paragraph 2a: Distance measuring equipment requested in MTOE change will be issued upon approval of MTOE change, as soon as the equipment is available. It is anticipated that the newly assigned target acquisition battalion will serve to improve the problem of extending accurate control.

   b. Reference paragraph 2b: Normal engineer combat support is available upon request.

   c. Reference paragraph 5: Follow-up action will be taken by this headquarters to expedite release of the items when they become available.

For the Commander:

[Signature]

1 Incl

[Name]
GPT, AGG
"and ASG"
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AVHGG-DH (1 Feb 67)  4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS GSPC-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY WESTERN, APO San Francisco 96307 4 APR 1967

To: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPCP-LT

APO 96556

1. (c) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—
Lessons learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters,
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery as indorsed.

2. (c) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Paragraph 5a, Part 1, Section 2, Page 6; Paragraph
5, Part 2, Section 2, Page 7; Paragraph 5, 1st Indorsement; Paragraph 5b,
2d Indorsement; and Paragraph 5c, 3d Indorsement: This headquarters is
presently engaged in a detailed investigation concerning the shortage of
meteorological expendables. Results of the investigation and information
as to action taken will be forwarded to USARPAC and artillery units upon
completion.

b. Reference Paragraph 5c, Part 1, Section 2, Page 7; Paragraph
2a, Part 2, Section 2, Page 7; Paragraph 4, 1st Indorsement; and
Paragraph 2a, 3d Indorsement: MACV, including the requirements stated,
has not been received at this headquarters.

AT THE COMMANDER:

JERRY VAN HORN
2LT, AGC

Ant: AG
CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-OT (1 Feb 67) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 6th Bn 14th Arty

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 28 APR 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

2. Reference paragraph 5, Part I, Section II.

   a. A study is being conducted by this headquarters, in concert with DA actions on a worldwide Army basis, to ascertain the maintenance problems encountered with meteorological equipment in the command. Maintenance status, to include supply problems has been requested from all USARPAC subordinate commands. This information will be provided DA to assist in formulating plans to resolve meteorological problems on a worldwide basis.

   b. It appears that necessary actions are being taken in-country to follow-up and expedite supply of the Radiosondes AN/AMT-4 and AN/AMT-12, which are expendable items. This headquarters is determining the in-theater stock status of these items and if assets are available for redistribution, will expedite shipment of available Radiosondes to Vietnam.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

KOVALY
CFO, AGC
Asst AG