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C. A. STANFIEL
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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Commanding Officers
198th Infantry Brigade
Hq, 54th Artillery Group
Army Attaché, London (Thru ACSI)
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14 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operation 1 Report for Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1967,
Reports Control Symbol CSFO-65

THRU: Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery
ATTN: AVFB-PAC
APO 96266

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVC-DH
APO 96307

Commander-In-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GPCP-CT
APO 96556

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
ATTN: COSPON, DA
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT HEADQUARTERS OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) Administration and Personnel.

a. This headquarters remains assigned to United States Army Vietnam (USARV) and operates as a major subordinate command of USARV. Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery retains operational command of the 54th Artillery Group.
SUBJCT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967,
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b. Activities of the SI during the period 1 February through 30 April 1967 included:

(1) Exchanging 100 men from the 9th Infantry Division Artillery with 100 men from the Group to alleviate rotational hump problem.

(2) The beginning of large numbers of rotatees departing the 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery on 13 April 1967. Departures will continue through 31 May 1967.

(3) The receiving of numerous replacements for the 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery since 1 April 1967. Replacements are still arriving as of the end of this reporting period.

(4) A courtesy inspection by a HJRN inspection team of the Group Consolidated Personnel Section. No numerical rating was given but the discrepancies were minor and are being corrected.

c. Personnel strength of the command as of 30 April 1967 was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>WO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHB, 54th Arty Gp</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn, 9th Arty</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d How Bn, 35th Arty</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 83rd Arty</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Overage due to replacements arriving prior to departure of men who are to rotate in May 1967.

d. Personnel changes during this quarters include:

GAIN:    LOSS:
OFF   WO   EM    OFF   WO   EM
7     2     174    5     1     112

e. Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in action</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in action</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non battle dead</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
f. Awards and decorations presented to members of this command:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (V)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal (V)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam Gallantry Crosses</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. R & R program schedules include the following:

(1) The group received 20 quotas per month for in-country R&R to Vung Tau where troops stay for three days.

(2) The out of country R&R included the following five (5) day quotas for the three-month period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF QUOTAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. Unit mail clerks pick up and deliver mail at the nearest APO as follows:

(1) HOB, 54th Arty Group - APO 95376
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1967,

Reports Control Symbol C.P.A. 65

(2) 7th Bn, 9th Arty
(All Batteries)
- AFO 96370

(3) 2d How Bn, 35th Arty
- AFO 96376

Hcs Btry - AFO 96376
B Btry - AFO 96376
C Btry - AFO 96376
A Btry - AFO 96291
Spc Btry - AFO 96491

(4) 1st Bn, 83rd Arty
- AFO 96291

Hcs Btry - AFO 96291
A Btry - AFO 95291
C Btry - AFO 96291

i. Judicial and Non-Judicial actions by units included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ART 15</th>
<th>SCM</th>
<th>BCH</th>
<th>GCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHB, 54th Arty Gp</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn, 9th Arty</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d How Bn, 35th Arty</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 83rd Arty</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

j. Reportable accidents included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>VEHICLE</th>
<th>INJURED</th>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHB, 54th Arty Gp</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn, 9th Arty</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d How Bn, 35th Arty</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 83rd Arty</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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k. Special Services: Three separate accounts are operated by the Group on an area basis:

(1) HHB, 54th Artillery Group account with Saigon SS.
(2) 24 How Bn, 35th Artillery account with Saigon SS.
(3) 1st Bn, 83rd Artillery account with Vung Tau SS.

1. Religious Services are held each Sunday at base camps by both Catholic and Protestant Chaplains assigned to the Group, Australian Task Force and the 9th Infantry Division. Group Chaplains visit field locations and conduct services and counselling during weekdays. The chapel at the group base camp has been erected and pews are now being installed. Interior work on the chapel is continuing.

m. Unit Funds:

Unit funds have been established for all batteries in the Group.

n. The morale of the Group is excellent.

2. (U) Intelligence.

a. The 54th Artillery Group conducted a one hundred per cent semi-annual inventory of classified documents during the month of April. There were no shortcomings.

b. During the reporting period the O-1 aircraft support for the Group increased from three (3) to five (5) aircraft daily. This enabled the Group to intensify its visual reconnaissance program and to continue to use aerial observers to adjust artillery, conduct registrations and provide convoy coverage. In the month of April an average of 50 visual reconnaissance missions were flown each week and the average flying time per day was 25-30 hours. A total of 97 "adjust" missions and 130 registrations were fired during the month. Approximately 12 hours of convoy cover missions were flown each week.

c. Visual reconnaissance missions continue to be the most significant source of intelligence throughout the Group area, providing an average of ten (10) usable sightings per day. These, when correlated with other local intelligence sources, were the principle source of "H"I targets, and targets of opportunity. A continuing problem is the difficulty of obtaining any surveillance of artillery fires directed into heavy jungle. In most cases it was impossible to assess enemy casualties from the artillery fire.

3. (U) Training.

a. The following periods of mandatory training were conducted by Headquarters & Headquarters Battery during the reported period:

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(1) Character Guidance 2 hrs
(2) Area Security 1 hr
(3) First Aid 2 hrs
(4) Communications Security 1 hr
(5) Weapons Safety 1 hr
(6) Weapons Familiarization 4 hrs

b. The following Command Information Classes were held:

(1) Postal Privileges 1 hr
(2) Black Marketing 1 hr
(3) Personal Spending Reduction 1 hr
(4) Health Hazards in Vietnam 1 hr
(5) The Enemy/Friendly Situation 5 hrs
(6) R & R Program 1 hr
(7) Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program 1 hr
(8) The Soldier as an Ambassador 1 hr

4. (C) Operations.

a. During the reporting period units of this command participated in Operations in support of the 9th Infantry Division, 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, and 1st Australian Task Force. The Operations were: Colby, Junction City, Manhattan, Port Sec, Camden, Tarlourine, Bell River, Delby, Bribie, Nambucc, Kirrihilli, Boston Tea Party, Pomona, Ayr, Big Spring and Newark. The Operations are covered in detail in the Operational Report - Lessons Learned from each battalion.

b. During reported period the total rounds fired by units of this command were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>105</th>
<th>155</th>
<th>8&quot;</th>
<th>175</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>91,339</td>
<td>65,107</td>
<td>12,506</td>
<td>13,110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. 54th Artillery Group HNB moved to 11th ACR base camp during the reporting period and conducted a one day OCB.

d. Permanent liaison sections were positioned in the fire support coordination center of the 18th ARVN Division Tactical Operation
Subject: Operation-1 Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

The 54th Artillery Group organized a provisional artillery control headquarters to be assigned to the 11th ACR during Operation Junction City. The Hq, as originally envisioned, was to perform tactical fire direction, to obtain fire clearance, to give aircraft warnings, and to control operations of the howitzer batteries of the 11th ACR. The OIC of the headquarters acted as the artillery staff officer for the Regimental CO. The control headquarters was named Redhorse. During Operation Junction City firing elements under the headquarters fired 340 support missions and 1,834 H&I missions expending 14,139 artillery rounds. During the operation, 161 VC were killed by maneuver elements of the 11th ACR or its support arms, also 3 PW were captured and 8 persons were detained.

It became apparent as the operation developed and the 11th ACR became OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division that this Redhorse element was considered a Direct Support Bn headquarters in all its aspects. The headquarters performed in a commendable manner throughout operation Junction City, coordinating the massing and timely delivery of artillery fires of artillery units assigned to the 11th ACR and reinforcing units.

After-action reports considered the Redhorse element highly successful in its conception and implementation. This control headquarters was necessitated by changes in the normal tactical deployment of the 11th ACR caused by the insurgency environment in Vietnam. The successful operation of this provisional headquarters has underscored the requirement for centralized artillery control in some regimental operations and the requirement for artillery officers at regimental level.

f. The 54th Artillery Group was allocated two UH-1D helicopters daily and one additional helicopter for 1/2 day during the reporting period. These craft were used to transport command and staff personnel, perform liaison, move personnel replacements, transport critically needed repair parts and perform courier missions. An average of 40 persons per day were moved among the Group base camps and an average of 20 persons were moved between base camps and field positions.

g. 54th Artillery Group units furnished forward observer teams to United States Special Forces and Civilian Irregular Defense Group units for two operations during the reporting period.

h. The 54th Artillery Group has been continuing a program of providing artillery support to 12/FF outposts within range of Group artillery. With the cooperation of the 12/FF advisor to the 18th ARVN Division an SOP has been drafted to coordinate this program within the 33d Division Tactical Area.

(1) Establishing liaison with the outposts.

(2) Insuring that adequate communication means are available for the outposts to call for artillery fire.
SUBJECT: Operation-l Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967,  
Reports Control Symbol CSFOH-65

(3) Teaching a basic system of artillery adjustment to outpost personnel.

(4) Plotting and firing in (if possible) defensive fires for each outpost.

5. (C) Logistics.

a. During the period 1 February 1967 to 30 April 1967 the acquisition of all classes of supplies was excellent. The Group experienced temporarily a shortage of TA 50-901 equipment. This was caused by a large number of personnel replacements arriving while the rotating individual was still in country. This situation required the unit to hand receive field equipment from base camp units to insure that all personnel in the field were fully equipped.

b. Maintenance support for the Group has been good. The supporting units have established an adequate CSL and artillery down time has been significantly reduced. The ordnance contract maintenance team continues to operate at the Group level under the direction of the Group SL, and is dispatched promptly to the battery experiencing maintenance problems. The team is also being used on the Group OML team. The Group has been allocated a Department of Army Civilian representative from United States Army Weapons Command. This individual is used in an inspecting capacity as well as an advisory and repairmen role. With maximum use of the outlined personnel resources, the maintenance and maintenance management posture of the group has steadily improved.

c. Engineer construction of permanent type buildings in base camps is progressing at a satisfactory pace. Temporary overhead bunkers have been completed in all base camps and permanent bunkers are now being erected.

d. The acquisition of 60 and 100 kw generators remains a problem. This headquarters and subordinate units TOE generators are of the 3 kw and lower variety and do not provide adequate electricity for mess hall refrigerators, refrigerators and lighting. Additional electricity is needed to power the VHF stations, operations and fire direction centers. The local P&L Contractors have been approached on the problem and advise that this problem will be eliminated with the arrival of adequate generators in country on or about 15 May 1967.

e. During the period a permanent wooden dispensary was completed at the 1/83rd Artillery. With the completion of this dispensary all medical units within the 58th Artillery Group now operate from wooden buildings and have the capability of providing overnight care of patients, normally assigned to quarters.

f. During this period all the battalions were under hostile fire. The action of all medical personnel was outstanding without exception.
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h. Preventive medicine activities have continued to receive emphasis, and in the low incidence of disease within the command shows the effectiveness of these activities. Lectures have been given at all levels of the command covering field sanitation, first aid, heat injury, venereal disease. These lectures are part of a continuing program to distribute medical information at all levels.

h. All medical units have continued to participate in MEDCAP activities, and have maintained effective and beneficial liaison with Vietnamese, ARVN, and Free World medical personnel.

6. (C) Civil Affairs.

"The Group has assigned a major with primary duty of S5. Each battalion has S5 duties assigned to an officer as an additional duty. Civil affairs have been coordinated with the following units and/or officials throughout the Group's "area.

(1) 18th ARVN Division
   (a) G-5
   (b) G-5 Advisor

(2) Long Kinh Province
   (a) Province Chief
   (b) Office of Civilian Operations Province Chief
   (c) Sector Advisor
   (d) Sector S-5 Advisor
   (e) United States Aid to International Development
   (f) Revolutionary Development Advisor
   (g) Xuan Loc District Chief and his Sub-sector Advisor

(3) Phouc Tuy Province
   (a) Province Chief
   (b) Sector Advisor
   (c) Office of Civilian Operations Province Representative

(4) Bien Hoa Province
   (a) Office of Civilian Operations Province Representative

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(b) Long Thanh District Chief and his Sub-sector Advisor

(5) Civil Affairs Platoon Leader, 11th CBI

(6) G-5, 9th Infantry Division

(7) Civil Affairs Officer, 1st Australian Task Force

b. During the reported period the Group has been active in supporting self-help projects in the following areas:

(1) Two (2) hamlets in the 9th Infantry Division T/O
(2) Tan Lop hamlet (YT3908)
(3) Binh Loc hamlet (YT4513)
(4) Soul Chen hamlet (YT4611)
(5) Bo Long hamlet (Phouc Tuy Province)

c. The Group has supported the Medical Civil Action Program extensively throughout the Group area. During the reported period the Group has made 44 KEDCAP visits treating a total of 2335 local nationals. The Group Surgeon and the Battalion Surgeon of the 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery have continued their work in the Long Thanh Province Hospital assisting in numerous surgical operations. They have also been active in a program to provide school physicals for the Kurn Loc public schools.

d. Three English language classes were taught each Monday, Wednesday, and Friday at the Long Thanh public school by officers of the Group headquarters. A weekly class was also taught at the Catholic Church on Saturday afternoon.

e. During the reported period the Group has employed an average of 188 Vietnamese workers daily.

7. Communications.

a. During this reporting period the Group has experienced a high percentage of drowned M/GRC-6 K/C radio. The most common deficiency occurs in the T-195/GRC transmitter. The excessive dust and humidity of the climate causes the blower motors and dynamos in the transmitters to malfunction. Once one of these components has been turned into direct support it is usually necessary to evacuate it to a general support command. This increases the length of down time on the equipment. The average deadline rate in the group has been:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ON HAND</th>
<th>AVERAGE DEL</th>
<th>DEADLINE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. In accordance with II FFORCEV message dated 040835Z April 1967, a program of all future VHF circuit requirements has been submitted to II FFORCEV. This programming reflects the sole and common user circuits between this headquarters and two new battalions to be assigned in June and July 1967. Planned sole user and common user circuits have been requested for use between Group operations and En operations, and between Group switchboards and En switchboards respectively. Programming was also submitted for circuits between En headquarters and displaced batteries. A request for a sole user circuit between 54th Artillery Group Operations and 11th ACR TOC was submitted to meet operational requirements. The support requirements by the 11th ACR from this headquarters require a sole user VHF circuit between the operations centers.

c. During this reporting period a 200 pair cable (telephone) has been erected in the Xuan Loc area. Each major unit in this area, both ARVN and US, has been allotted at least 25 pair from this cable. Coordination between MACV advisor team 87, the responsible unit, and this headquarters has been initiated to tie in all units in Xuan Loc through this cable. Connections may be made directly through the Xuan Loc switchboard or bypass the switchboard to any unit on the cable system.

d. AN/GC-17 has been installed for use in the communication center. This equipment is on loan from II FFORCEV ARTY. The equipment has been used for secure teletype to II FFORCEV ARTY: by superimposing the teletype on an existing sole user VHF circuit between group operations and II FFORCEV ARTY operations, we have been assured of a dependable secure means to submit our daily INTSUR reports and any other classified messages.
PART I, OBSERVATIONS (C)

1. (C) Personnel and Administration.

   a. INT: Personnel Infusion

      (1) DISCUSSION: An infusion program between an Infantry Division Artillery and the 54th Artillery Group was initiated on or about 10 April 1967 to reduce mass rotation in both units. The goal for the month was to have 200 men infused between the two units. Criteria was established to prevent the exchange of men who had court martial records over two Article 15's or were in the process of getting out of the Army.

      (2) OBSERVATION: From the outset problems were encountered by personnel not meeting the criteria. Other problems were as follows:

         (a) Switching of personnel after orders had been issued.

         (b) Personnel not being available on date of transfer because of P&R, TDY, etc.

         (c) Inability on the other major command's part to provide personnel for those returned as unqualified. This fact caused the Group to require return of some of its people that had already been infused.

         (d) Hidden causes for unqualified personnel were numerous. Two examples are:

             1. A section chief, MOS 13B40, who had a hearing profile and had not worked in his primary duty for approximately 14 years.

             2. An EM that was waiting action on a request for transfer to Saigon following a Congressional Inquiry.

2. (C) Intelligence.

   a. INT: Variations in Harassing and Interdiction Fires

      (1) DISCUSSION: Target acquisition and target surveillance is a major problem in the triple canopied jungle covering most of the Group area. Although the experience of AO's and pilots offset the problem to some extent, the most fruitful acquisition comes from intelligence agent service. Some of the sources are consistently reliable and when a promising target is developed from a reliable source the target is attacked with intensive heavy artillery. Targets of lesser importance are attacked in a routine H&I program.
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(2) OBSERVATION: Intelligence should be realistically evaluated and intensive artillery fire directed into the most promising targets. It is believed more fires into fewer of the more reliable targets on some occasions will produce a better H&I program result than few rounds on many targets.

b. ITJ: Need For Counter-Mortar Radar

(1) DISCUSSION: The most effective enemy tactics against artillery positions have been short, intense mortar attacks. During the past year a total of 14 mortar attacks have been made on units of this Group, and the majority of Group casualties have been resulted from mortars. The ability to retaliate against such attack has been severely limited because the Group has no organic or attached counter-mortar radar to locate enemy position. The attachment of four sections of AN/KPQ-4A radar would greatly enhance the ability of the Group to protect its own base camp and field positions as well as other friendly units in the immediate area.

(2) OBSERVATION: Counter-mortar radar would greatly increase the Group's ability to effectively react to mortar attacks and would improve the security of all positions.

3. (U) Training and Organization (None)

4. (C) Operations.

5. ITE: Safety Hazard in Firing Illumination Missions

(1) DISCUSSION: With the disposition of troops and populated areas in VN there is an added problem of safety in firing artillery illumination missions. The trajectory from desired point of burst to projected point of impact is an unsafe area. If the illumination round is a dud a trajectory can be plotted and a point of impact determined, however if the round functions properly an empty casing flight cannot be computed. This constitutes a safety hazard for friendly elements on villages from desired point of burst to projected point of impact.

(2) OBSERVATION: To minimize the safety hazard due to erratic casing flight the FDO must plot the line of flight for all illumination missions. If friendly elements locations plot between the desired point of burst and the projected point of impact the requesting unit must be notified of the hazard of falling casing and request determination if the tactical requirements override the safety hazard. To partially reduce the hazard this headquarters has published the following instructions to all firing units:

(a) Plot the desired point of bursts and the projected point of impact on the line of flight.

(b) If a friendly force is located between the two points there is a safety hazard.
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SUBJECT: Operation Report for Quarter ending 30 April 1967

1. Lower the height of burst to reduce the elevation to a point where the projected point of impact will not reach the friendly location.

2. Make a deflection shift to move the line of flight away from the area in question.

(c) Notify the requesting unit of the hazard and request determination by that unit if the tactical requirement overrides the hazard.

b. ITEM: Lack of Organic Aircraft

(1) DISCUSSION: Lack of assigned aircraft remains a serious handicap to mission accomplishment. (See previous operational reports on lessons learned. MTO dated 7 May 67 has been submitted by this Hq).

(2) OBSERVATION: Observation aircraft and OH-1 type aircraft are urgently needed by artillery units in South Vietnam.

5. (C) Logistics
e. ITEM: TA 50-901 Equipment for Replacement Personnel

(1) DISCUSSION: TA 50-901 field equipment is not issued personnel arriving in country by replacement centers. The releasing unit is responsible for providing this service. The unit is authorized only 10% of the equipment above TO. strength, therefore no provision has been made for a unit replacing 10 to 30% of their personnel while the replaced individual is still in unit.

(2) OBSERVATION: It is desirable to have an overlap of seven to ten days in rotating personnel in order that the replacement can be briefed and receive OJT by the individual he is replacing. However, both individuals need field equipment while on operations.

6. (C) Civil Affairs
e. ITEM: Artillery Support to RF/FF Outposts

(1) DISCUSSION: RF/FF outposts continue to be attacked without requesting artillery support even though RF/FF and/or NF/FF artillery support is available. A JGS Directive entitled "Basic Directive of RF/FF Military Outposts", prepared by a combined group of JGS and MACV staff officers, was distributed to all advisors working with RF/FF and RF/FF commanders in December of 1966. Emphasis was placed on timely implementation of the directive. Sector and subsector commanders, with the assistance of the advisor concerned, were directed to:

(a) Direct the preparation of the outpost operation plan which embraces the coordination of fire support, the establishment
of routine and emergency liaison system, the mission of the local reaction forces and the coordinated employment of non-local reaction forces.

(b) Establish a continual advanced training program in liaison and fire support procedures in order to further the personnel's capabilities.

(2) The Group has established a program to help support this program. Coordination has been made with appropriate sector and sub-sector advisors and the RF/PP and artillery advisor to the 16th ARVN Division. To date the program has not been particularly effective due to the following reasons:

(a) Lack of support by ARVN

(b) Lack of support by province and district officials.

(c) Lack of aggressiveness on the part of advisory personnel.

(3) OBSERVATION: A program of artillery support to RF/PP outposts, to be effective, must have the active support of ARVN, Province and District Chiefs, and their advisors. The emphasis on the program must come from the Province and District Chiefs. Sector and Sub-sector advisors must insist to their counterparts that an aggressive and continuing program of providing support to RF/PP outposts must be established. Coordination between sector advisory personnel and the artillery advisor to the ARVN Division must be established. Group personnel must be responsive to the respective sector advisors and artillery advisors to assist in the program by providing technical assistance, instruction personnel, and artillery support.

7. (c) Communications.

a. ITEM: Deadline Rate of AN/VRC-12 Radios

(1) DISCUSSION: Since the last reporting period the deadline rate of radio sets AN/VRC-12 series has greatly improved. Deadline caused by careless handling or improper operation of the RT-52/AN/VRC has been reduced to a small percentage of the overall deadlines. Most malfunctions are due to faulty modules or transistors. In these cases the RT-52/AN/VRC can usually be repaired quickly by support maintenance.

(2) OBSERVATION: Due to close supervision by qualified communications personnel and instructions in the operation and handling of the AN/VRC-12 radio, the number of operational malpractices by the operator has been reduced.

b. ITEM: Alternate Metallic Telephone Lines

(1) DISCUSSION: During a recent terrorist attack in the Xuan Loc area, some primary telephone lines to subordinate units were
lost. Although the attack was not directed at the communications lines, the claymores used by the Viet Cong did cut several lines that were in the path of the explosion. Radio had to be used to contact units located as close as 300 meters to our own area.

(2) OBSERVATION: Since the time of the attack wire lines have been laid over alternate routes to subordinate and adjacent units in the Xuan Loc area. Should another loss of wire communications occur the alternate lines may be used, allowing the radios to be used for long range and priority communications.

c. ITEM: High Deadline rate of AN/GRC-46 Radios

(1) DISCUSSION: It has been discovered that units in 54th Artillery Group experience a high rate of malfunctioning of transmitter T-195/GRC, with the prime cause being the blower motors failing. With the unavailability of parts at direct support maintenance, the item of equipment must be evacuated to depot support for repair.

(2) OBSERVATION: Recently the 79th Maintenance Rs (GS) in Saison has been able to provide DX T-195/GRC components to supported units. If repair parts are not readily available to repair the component within a reasonable period of time, the unit may draw one of these "float" transmitters. This has greatly reduced the amount of downtime experienced in the AN/GRC-46 radio. All battalions in the 54th Artillery Group have been encouraged to provide overhead and enclosed shelters for the AN/GRC-46 vans; also to provide fans necessary to keep the operating temperature as close as possible to the recommended 72°. A lower deadline rate has resulted from these measures.

SECTION II

PART II, RECOMMENDATIONS (C)

1. (C) Personnel and Administration.

   a. If infusion is to be programmed between major commands, a three-man liaison team from each major command should interview personnel selected for infusion from the other major command prior to departure of the personnel to their new unit.

2. (C) Intelligence.

   a. That harassing and interdiction programs be varied for best results. On some occasions many targets should be hit with few rounds; on others, many rounds should be placed on a few of the most promising targets.
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4. (C) Operations.

a. The caution be used when firing illumination in friendly populated areas so as to avoid injuring friendly civilians.

b. Early reorganization of Artillery Group Headquarters & Headquarters Battery under TDG 6-401G to provide organic aviation section.

5. (C) Logistics: That Class II supply points be required to stock sufficient TA 50-901 equipment to allow supported units to handle receipt of equipment as needed.

6. (C) Civil Affairs: That US advisory personnel strongly encourage sector and sub-sector chiefs to train their personnel in the proper use of artillery for defense of RDF/FPF outposts.

7. (C) Communications.

a. That supervisory communications personnel conduct per diem refresher classes in the operation and handling of the AN/VRC-12 radio.

b. That all units have alternate telephone lines to insure landline communications.

c. That all AM/VRC-16 radios be provided with sufficient shelter whenever possible to help maintain proper temperature.

Chung H. Myeul
Cheif W. Myeul
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding
AVFB-FAC (14 May 67)  1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

DA, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266  7 JUN 1967

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96307
Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 54th Artillery Group adequately reflects the operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

2. (C) a. Reference Section I, paragraph 5d. The 54th Artillery Group has received 60 KW generators for XUAN LOC, NUI DAT and BEAR CAT. Additional generators for backup purposes are expected in the near future.

b. Reference Section I, paragraph 7a. The deadline rate for the radio set AN/GRC-46 has been high throughout the command. The age of the radios and the lack of spare parts have contributed to the problem; however, the major factor is overheating. Suitable cooling equipment should be provided for the Electronic Equipment Shelter S-89C/G and the issue of the new radio sets AN/GRC-142 and 122 should be expedited. This recommendation was included in the operational report of this headquarters for this reporting period.

3. (C) Reference Section II, Part II

a. Paragraphs 2a, 7a and 7b. Actions recommended are being taken by the 54th Artillery Group. No action by higher headquarters is required.

b. Paragraph 4a. Concur. As prescribed in USARV Regulation 614-9, dated 12 November 66, subject: "Reduction of Rotational Humps", the 54th Group is responsible for conducting its own infusion programs with other major commands. The solution appears sound and no action by higher headquarters is indicated.

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AVFB-FAC
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

   c. Paragraph 4a. Concur. This headquarters published a message dated 27 May 1967, subject: "Firing of Illumination Rounds", requiring that subordinate artillery units review their procedures and safety requirements involved in firing illumination rounds. Action by higher headquarters is not indicated.

   d. Paragraph 4b. Concur. This headquarters realizes the lack of adequate aviation resources throughout USARV. When additional aviation assets become available, artillery groups and battalions should receive priority high enough to satisfy their minimum essential requirements.

   e. Paragraph 5. Concur. Units procure TA 50-901 equipment from Class II supply points by requisition. Though stockages have increased, shortages of certain items of equipment (flak jackets) do exist during periods of high personnel turnover. All efforts should be made to insure Class II supply points are furnished adequate stockage of TA 50-901 equipment in order that unit requisitions are filled as needed.

   f. Paragraph 6. Concur. As evidenced by frequent attacks on RF/PF outposts during this reporting period, the importance of coordinating the use of available artillery cannot be overly emphasized. Letter, Headquarters, II FFORCENV, dated 29 May 1967, subject: "Tactical Areas of Interest", requires US Artillery commanders to coordinate artillery support for RF/PF outposts in their areas of responsibility. Personnel from this headquarters conduct an active program of instruction for RF/PF personnel in observed fire procedures. Recommend continued emphasis by all concerned, particularly US advisory personnel, on the importance of coordinating the use of available artillery.

   g. Paragraph 7c. Concur. See paragraph 2b above.

RAYMOND P. MURPHY
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 54th Artillery Group, 30 April 67 (RCS GSFOR-65)

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96207


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The enclosed report is forwarded.

2. (C) Reference Para 6, Civil Affairs, Pg 14 of the report and Para 3f, 1st Ind. US Commanders and advisors at all levels are vitally concerned with the effective integration of US artillery supporting fires in the defense of RF/PF Outposts. Additional training programs have been initiated since the submission of the enclosed Operational Report. This training program is designed to teach members of the RF/PF Outposts how to prepare an artillery fire plan and how to call for and adjust supporting fires.

3. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the comments and recommendations in the report and 1st indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

1 Incl

EM McGrath
CFA AG

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AVHGC-DST (14 May 67) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CGFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375
29 JUL 1967
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 54th Artillery Group as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning shortage of TA 50-901 equipment, paragraph 5a, page 8; paragraph 5, page 14; paragraph 3e, 1st Indorsement and paragraph 5, page 17: Concur with action taken in paragraph 3e, 1st Indorsement. However, TA 50-901 items are stocked at Class II and IV supply points for replacement purposes. The 10 percent overage is adequate to provide equipment to newly assigned personnel under normal rotational conditions.

b. Reference item concerning safety hazard in firing illumination missions, paragraph 4a page 13; paragraph 4a page 17 and paragraph 3b, 1st Indorsement: Concur. Safety procedure will be published in "Summary of Lessons Learned".

c. Reference item concerning infusion between major commands, paragraph 1, page 12; paragraph 1, page 16 and paragraph 3b, 1st Indorsement: Concur. USARV Regulation 614-9, Reduction of Rotational Humps, has recently been revised. The previously permissive aspects of this regulation have been eliminated. The new regulation requires the appointment of infusion project officers to coordinate the transfer of personnel as required. It further establishes definitive responsibilities for infusion at each echelon of command. In the future all major infusion programs will be controlled by this headquarters. An infusion project officer has been appointed to monitor the entire program and to assist all units in obtaining maximum benefit from the infusion program.

d. Reference item concerning artillery support for RF/PF outpost, paragraph 6a, page 14; paragraph 6, page 17 and paragraph 3f, 1st Indorsement: Concur. Actions being taken by 54th Artillery Group and II PROFORW Artillery are adequate to improve artillery support to RF/PF outposts.

e. Reference item concerning high deadline rate of AN/GRC-146 radio, paragraph 7c, page 16; paragraph 7c, page 17 and paragraph 2b, 1st Indorsement: The AN/GRC-142 and 122 are scheduled for issue starting 1st Qtr FY 68.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

f. Reference item concerning early reorganization under TOE 6-4016,
paragraph 4b, page 17: Concur that a requirement for an organic aviation
section exist. The comments furnished for the 2/35th Artillery Battalion,
54th Artillery Group, ORLL of 1 February 1967 are still appropriate, as are
the comments of USARV CofS letter, 14 May 1967, subject: Aviation Support
for the 54th Artillery Group and USARV letter, 27 May 1967, subject: Problem
Area AGI, FY 67, 54th Artillery Group. No further action by this headquarters
is considered necessary at this time.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R.L. KENNEDY
Cpt
Asst Adjutant General
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GPOP-DT (14, May 67)  4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
         from HQ, 54th Arty Gp (RCS CSFOR-65)
HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558  3 OCT 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
   Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

   This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
   indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

   FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

   [Signature]
   K. F. OSBOURNE
   MAJ, AGC
   Asst AG
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