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Best Available Copy
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery for quarterly period ending 30 April 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
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Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
The Surgeon General
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The Provost Marshal General
Commanding General
US Army Weapons Command
Commanding Officer
1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
Joint Action Control Office
Security Officer
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
Research Analysis Corporation
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
ATTN: Office of Defense Affairs
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
APO 96289

AVGB-T5

SUBJECT: Operational Reports—Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

THRU: Commanding Officer
23d Artillery Group
APO 96289

Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam, Artillery
ATTN: AVFB-FA-3
APO 96266

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVC-DH
APO 96307

Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-IH
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 20310

19 May 1967
SIGNIFICANT HEADQUARTERS OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) Administration and Personnel.

a. The 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery was activated at Fort Sill, Oklahoma as a deployable unit on 5 October 1966. The unit was assigned to the 214th Artillery Group (later redesignated 1st FA Brigade) from activation to deployment. Upon arrival in-country on 14 April 1967 the unit was assigned to the 23d Artillery Group.

b. The battalion was reorganized from the "D" series TOE to the "E" series on 15 February. This reorganization resulted in a change of authorized strength from 35 officers, 4 warrant officers, and 577 enlisted men to 33 officers, 4 warrant officers, and 509 enlisted men.

c. Personnel strength of the command on 30 April 1967 was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOE AUTH</th>
<th>ASIGNED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Battery</td>
<td>22 1 149</td>
<td>21 1 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Battery</td>
<td>3 0 94</td>
<td>3 0 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Battery</td>
<td>3 0 94</td>
<td>3 0 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Battery</td>
<td>3 0 94</td>
<td>3 0 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Battery</td>
<td>2 3 78</td>
<td>2 3 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>33 4 509</strong></td>
<td><strong>32 4 507</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. A large number of personnel changes were required immediately prior to deployment, most of which were a result of reorganization. Personnel changes were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GAINS:</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>LOSSES:</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. (C) Intelligence

a. The largest task faced by the battalion S-2 was the processing of security clearances to support a special weapons training program. A total of 265 clearances were processed during the pre-deployment training period.

b. Prior to deployment the classified documents and material pertaining to the nuclear weapons system were turned over to a custodial unit at Fort Sill.
3. (c) Training

a. Training under an 8-week Intensified Combat Training Program started on 24 October 1966. In early December, based primarily on personnel shortages, the readiness dates were changed from an Equipment Readiness Date (ERD) of 16 January 1967 and a Personnel Readiness Date (PRD) of 31 January 1967 to an ERD of 1 March 1967 and a PRD of 16 March 1967. The training program was adjusted to coincide with the revised readiness dates and an Army Training Test and Nuclear Capability Exercise were administered in January 1967. A rating of satisfactory was received in both areas.

b. During February 1967 all assigned personnel fired the newly issued M16A1 Rifle for FOR qualification.

4. (c) Operations

a. Upon receipt of the equipment in-country in late April 1967 the howitzers were calibrated by the 177th Ordnance Detachment.

b. From 26 to 30 April 1967 the battalion conducted operational training at Phu Loi firing under control of the 2nd Battalion 13th Artillery.

c. The following number of missions were fired with total amounts of ammunition listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NO OF MSNS FIRED</th>
<th>AMMO EXPENDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Battery</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Battery</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>1255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Battery</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>3910</td>
</tr>
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5. (c) Logistics

a. Initial requisitions for TOE equipment were prepared and submitted by USAMC, Fort Sill, Oklahoma prior to formal activation of the unit. This equipment began to arrive shortly after activation and receipt of supplies and equipment continued until two hours prior to departure of RED TAF cargo.

b. The unit was given a FOR inspection by USAMC in early February 1967, followed by a Final Operational Readiness Command Inspection conducted by the 1st Field Artillery Brigade.

c. The reorganisation of the battalion on 15 February 1967 required many expedited supply actions by the battalion and USAMC. With the exception of the cannon, cargo, M548 all major items were on hand in time for shipment of vehicles and general cargo on 6 March 1967. The M548 cargo tracks were replaced by 5 ton trucks on a one for one basis pending availability of the M548 vehicles in-country.
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d. Movement of the battalion was as follows:

(1) Vehiculars and general cargo were shipped from Beaumont, Texas on 6 March 1967, accompanied by one warrant officer and one enlisted man, and arrived in Saigon Port on 18 April 1967.

(2) The main body departed Fort Sill by air and rail on 22 March 1967, embarked from Oakland, California on 24 March, and arrived in-country on 14 April 1967.

(3) The advance party of 10 officers, one warrant officer, and 17 enlisted men departed Tinker Air Force Base by C141 on 30 March 1967 and arrived at Bien Hoa Air Base on 2 April 1967.

(4) WAHTOC packages accompanied by one non-commissioned officer, were shipped from Oakland, California, arriving at Saigon Port on 20 April 1967.

(5) All equipment and cargo arrived in-country undamaged.

SECTION II

PART I, OBSERVATIONS

1. (U) Personnel and Administration

a. ITEM:

(1) DISCUSSION: The administrative burden of establishing an entire battalion is staggering and defies accurate description. This battalion started its training program eight days after the Personnel On Station Date (POSD). Although the unit was activated ten days prior to the POSD, the majority of the officers and non-commissioned officers available were primarily involved in caring for some 300 men that arrived early from the Artillery Training Center. This situation was aggravated by a lack of many key personnel such as supply sergeants, motor sergeants, mess personnel, and the personnel sergeant.

(2) OBSERVATION: An orderly transition from zero strength to a full strength functional unit requires time, equipment, and an advance cadre of key personnel.

2. (U) Intelligence

NONE:

3. (C) Training and Organization

a. ITEM: Reorganization

(1) DISCUSSION: The battalion was reorganized from the "D" series TOE to the "E" series TOE on 15 February 1967. This reorganization took place after the POSD inspection and at a time when the battalion was packing for overseas movement.
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The "E" series TOE is dated 15 August 1966 but did not become available to the battalion or USAAMC until December. The last minute reorganization precluded training under the current organization prior to deployment.

(2) OBSERVATION: Aggressive action by the unit and/or higher headquarters could have resulted in this reorganization either before activation or much earlier than actually took place. Reorganization at an earlier date would have allowed the unit to train under the same organization as that with which it deployed.

4. (U) Operations

NONE

5. (U) Logistics

a. ITEM: Palletized Loading:

(1) DISCUSSION: A substantial portion of the RED TAT cargo was shipped in CONEX inserts as loose tonnage. The containers, pallets, and banding material provided were found inadequate for the handling of this type of cargo. Although no equipment received damage in shipping, many of the palletized containers were broken open prior to arrival at the final destination.

(2) OBSERVATION: Cargo shipped as loose tonnage should be packed in sturdy containers on rugged pallets and banded with heavy gauge steel bands.

b. ITEM: Packing CONEX Containers.

(1) DISCUSSION: CONEX containers can be packed to a gross weight of 10,500 pounds. This was found to be a heavier load than the organic equipment was able to off-load at the final destination.

(2) OBSERVATION: Units must exercise care in packing CONEX containers to insure that off loading can be accomplished with organic equipment upon arrival in-country.

SECTION II
PART II, RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) Personnel and Administration: That a minimum of two weeks be allowed between arrival of an initial cadre and the POSD, and that two weeks be provided between the POSD and the start of the training program.

2. (U) Intelligence

NONE

3. (U) Training and Organization: That aggressive command action be taken at all headquarters to insure that the latest TOE is used to activate units for deployment, or that units be deployed under the TOE organization with which they have trained.
4. (U) Operations
   NONE

5. (U) Logistics
   NONE

WALTER G. KENNEDY
LTC, Arty
Commanding
AWGE-C

1st Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEADQUARTERS, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96289,
22 May 1967

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96277

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery is approved.

2. (U) Section II, Part II, paragraph 1. Concur. It is necessary that a cadre be established prior to the arrival of filler personnel for the organization of a new unit to be conducted in a smooth and orderly fashion.

3. (U) Section II, Part II, paragraph 3. Concur. Changes in organization for a unit in the midst of training for expected deployment to a combat area creates severe problems and adversely affects that unit's preparedness unless additional training time is allocated after reorganization takes place.

ROBERT J. WESS
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

AYFB-VAC (19 May 67)  2d Inf
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

Department of the Army, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery,
APO 96266    9 JUN 1967

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266
       Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVMG-DEH,
       APO 96307
       Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-OE,
       APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery ade-
quately reflects the operations and lessons learned during the reporting
period.

2. (O) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph b, Packing CONEX Con-
tainers. Additional equipment is available at debarkation ports for off
loading CONEX containers or other material which cannot be removed by or-
genic equipment. These arrangements should be made by sponsoring units.

3. (U) Concur with other comments, recommendations, and observations
in basic document and first indorsement.

RAYMOND P. MURPHY
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBHC-H (19 May 1967)  3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Battalion, 27th
Artillery, 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, HQ II PPOROFW, APO San Francisco 96266 18 JUN 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHOC-DH, APO 96307


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The inclosed report is forwarded.

2. (U) Concur with all comments and recommendations in the report
and two indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JAMES A. ULVENES
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (19 May 67) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RECS GSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 JUN 21 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GCP-O, ATTN: GCP-O,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion,
27th Artillery as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Training and Organisation, page 5:
Concur. Changes in organisation should be scheduled in time to permit
completion of the Unit Training Program prior to deployment. Recommend
that USCOMARC make this an item of Command interest.

b. Reference item concerning arrival of initial cadre and the
FOSD, page 5: Concur. The actions to ensure: that a minimum of two
weeks be allowed between arrival of an initial cadre and the personnel
on station date (FOSD); and that two weeks be provided between the FOSD
and the start of the training program, are beyond the scope of USARV.
Recommend this be studied by DA.

FOR THE COMMANDER

C. L. Kennedy
Cpt, AGG
Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 for HQ, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 26 AUG 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

HEAVY SNIDER
CPT, AGO
Asst AG

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