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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P(M) (17 Jul 67) FOR OT 
27 July 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 13th Battalion, 3rd Artillery (1)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Operational report for period ending 31 Jan 67.

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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The Adjutant General

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198th Infantry Brigade
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HEADQUARTERS
7TH BATTALION, 13TH ARTILLERY
APO 96368

AVFA-AT-7/13-S3

4 Feb 67

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION 1. SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. Activation

   a. This battalion was activated under TOE 6-405D on 1 June 1966 at Fort Irwin, California. At that time the battalion had almost a full compliment of officers and lower ranking enlisted personnel. Most of the noncommissioned officers were not programmed to start arriving until the 15th of June.

   b. Upon activation there was no TOE equipment on hand. This was of grave concern as training was scheduled to commence on or about 13 June so that the Equipment Readiness Date (ERD) of 10 September could be met.

2. Training

   a. Section and battery level training began on 15 June with emphasis on classroom instruction and cannoneer's drill. This continued until 27 June when the firing batteries moved to the field with equipment borrowed from the Fort Irwin Training Equipment Pool for RSOP's. On 5 July these dry firing exercises turned into intensive FTX's with live fire. During this phase of training each firing battery planned and conducted each of their exercises. The battery training was climaxed by an evaluated FTX during the week of 29 July. The evaluation was conducted by the battalion staff and administered to each battery individually. Each battery completed this evaluation satisfactorily.

   b. Upon completion of the battery level training phase the battalion training phase started. However one week was granted each battery for the purpose of maintenance. On 4 August extensive battalion FTX's commenced. This type training continued until 18 August when an evaluated FTX was conducted by personnel from both Fort Irwin and Fort Ord, California. At the completion of this FTX the battalion was declared Combat Ready.

Regraded FOUO When Separated
From Classified Inclosures
c. During all of this training the battalion tried to anticipate the needs in Viet Nam as depicted in Lessons Learned. The assumption was that, for the most part, the batteries would be operating independently. For instance, the battery FDC's were given the choice personnel and the battalion FDC took what was left. During Battalion FTX's a base camp area was established and the batteries were sent daily on independent missions outside the base camp area. So far the assumptions in training have been correct.

d. Throughout the training phase, borrowed equipment was utilized. Such items were howitzers, obsolete vehicles and the old family radios. While the battalion had completed its training cycle, little confidence had been gained in the TOE equipment. This was because the men had not had the opportunity to work with the items.

3. Preparation for overseas movement.

a. The battalion began preparation for the POM/POR inspections to be conducted by various agencies from the 6th Army Area upon completion of training. The equipment was prepared according to the regulations and other publications available. However, it was found that each inspector, even within the same field, had different criteria and ideas as to how the equipment should be. However, the ERD date was met in spite of the many delays caused by the inconsistencies in the criteria.

b. Packing the equipment presented another problem. Trying to keep the equipment going general cargo, red circle and yellow TAT all separated was a continuous problem. Here again there was time lost when the amount of each type cargo was changed by the port authorities. Compounding these problems was the fact that TOE equipment was still arriving as the packing was going on. Time had to be taken to issue equipment, process vehicles and then pack. However, on 29 September the equipment moved to Long Beach and loaded aboard the John C. This ship departed Long Beach on 4 October.

c. During this period the personnel were also being made ready for movement. Special classes were given on such subject as Malaria Control, Field Sanitation, Mine and Booby Traps and Lessons Learned. Immunizations were also given to each man. On 7 October the main body moved by bus to San Diego and departed the United States aboard the USNS Barrett on 8 October. The advance party consisting of 36 persons departed George AFB on 10 October by C-130 and arrived in Qui Nhon on 13 October. They were met by the host unit, the 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery, and were moved to the 30th Artillery base camp location.

4. Arrival in-country

a. Upon arrival of the advanced party more problems were encountered. The site for our base camp was not as yet firm. The guidance at that time was it would possibly be at Hammond Landing Zone. After several trips to the area by the Battalion Commander, a location was selected and approval given to locate the base camp on the north end of Hammond. The advance party then moved
to this location and began erecting tentage for the main body, which was scheduled to arrive in four days. The tents were erected and floors made out of 105mm ammunition boxes. Then on 28 October the main body landed and moved to our present location.

b. Off loading of equipment began on 1 November and was completed by 10 November. The movement of all equipment from the port to the base camp some 35 miles away was accomplished by this unit.

5. Operations and training activities.

a. This battalion was attached to the 52d Artillery Group and given the mission of General Support of U.S., ARVN, and Free World Military Forces. With this mission coupled with our location within the Korean Capitol Infantry Division TAOR, the battalion was not surprised when it was included in Operation Meng Ho 7 commencing on 11 Nov. Two firing batteries were moved into positions to reinforce the Korean Artillery. Forward observers were committed to the ground forces. Eventually eight of the nine observers were committed. Liaison was established at both Division Artillery and at the 61st Artillery Battalion where all fires were controlled. Participation in the operation consisted mostly of H&I's and preparations. Not one target of opportunity was fired upon during the entire operation. Meng Ho 7 ended on 25 November.

b. Upon completion of Meng Ho 7 one of the batteries returned to base camp and the second battery was attached to the 3/6 Arty and displaced on 6 Dec 1966 into position to support the highway 19 security mission. During this period the battalion received the mission of base defense artillery coordinator for LZ Hammond from the 1st Cav Div. On 15 Dec 66 B Battery on the highway 19 mission was relieved by A Battery so that B Battery might return to base camp. On 30 Dec 1966 the battalion was relieved of the mission on highway 19 and A Battery returned to base camp.

c. On 31 Dec 66 the battalion headquarters with C Battery 1/30 Arty, located at Bong Song, attached and A Battery 7/13 Arty became OPCON 1st Cav Div with a mission of GSR 1st Cav Div in support of operation Thayer II. B and C Batteries 7/13 Arty were attached to the 1/30 Arty with a mission of GSR Capitol ROK Infantry Div. B Battery remained in position at Hammond and C Battery displaced on 2 Jan to an area just north of Qui Nhon. B Battery 7/13 Arty was detached from 1/30 Arty on 15 Jan 67 and returned to parent unit control with a mission of GS 1st Cav Div and remained at LZ Hammond. The missions and location of this units organic batteries was not changed any further through 31 Jan 67.

d. On 5 Jan 67 this headquarters and all organic batteries were detached from the 52d Artillery Group and attached to IFFV Arty.

e. Since 14 Nov 66 this headquarters has furnished a minimum of 1 LNO team and 2 FO teams to GRID regardless of whether in support of the division or a ROK operation.
f. The first round was fired in Vietnam by A Battery of this battalion on 9 Nov 66. From that date until 31 Jan 67 a total of 28,907 rounds have been fired by batteries of this battalion. Results of all missions fired are as follows: 38 enemy KIA (body count), 5 enemy WIA, one weapons cache destroyed, 28 huts destroyed, 8 sampans destroyed, one VC base camp destroyed and 4 bunkers destroyed.

g. The following is an approximate breakdown of missions fired since 9 Nov 66:

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<tr>
<td>H&amp;I</td>
<td>92.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutralization</td>
<td>01.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Tgts</td>
<td>05.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Registrations</td>
<td>00.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illumination</td>
<td>01.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>00.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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h. Since the arrival of the equipment the battalion has been training continuously on the howitzers and in the Fire Direction Center. Test missions are sent to the batteries by Battalion Operations and times are kept on each mission. This keeps each section alert at all times for any target which may develop. Training was also accomplished in direct fire procedures for close in defense of position areas. One battery has completed air mobility training.


a. This unit is supported by the Qui Nhon Support Command for all classes of supply. Because of the distance involved and equipment available arrangements have been made to draw class I, III and V supplies through the 1st Cavalry Division supply sources located at Hammond LZ. Class II and IV supplies still must be obtained from Qui Nhon. In this case valuable time is lost while the vehicles are on the road. Extra maintenance problems arise in the supply vehicles because of the rough roads traveled and the frequency of the trips.

b. This unit’s WABTOC arrived in country on 28 Dec 66. Since that data a total of 87 WABTOC units have been erected by members of this battalion.

7. Civil Affairs.

The Battalion Surgeon with several aidmen go to the local dispensary and administer what medication is possible. This program is coordinated with the USAID representative in this area.
SECTION 2, COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Personnel

   a. Item: MACV, USARV, IFFV, IFFV Arty and other higher headquarters regulations, circulars, directives and forms.

      Discussion: The above items were provided to this unit on or about 11 November 1966. The unit arrived in-country on 28 October 1966. The burden imposed by the necessity to become familiar with these administrative and operational documents and forms while involved in establishing the unit base camp and bringing the status of the unit up to operational readiness was unacceptable.

      Observation: Publication peculiar to the above headquarters should be provided to units scheduled for Vietnam movement while the unit is still in CONUS. Sufficient lead time is thereby provided for review of the publications and preparation of reports that will fall due upon or soon after the arrival of the unit in-country.

   b. Item: Stockage of Field Medical Kits and Field Surgical Kits.

      Discussion: These kits are not stocked adequately to permit the operation of a unit dispensary. Stockage criteria appears to be formulated on providing adequate response to immediately aid injured or wounded personnel prior to evacuation to clearing type medical facilities. Because of the fact that the batteries of this battalion are widely dispersed, the unit aid station seldom functions in that capacity. Rather it functions as a dispensary in the battalion base camp area. In this capacity, more extensive care could be provided to patients if more drugs and equipment were on hand.

      Observation: Medical sections of units departing CONUS for service in Vietnam should anticipate the probability that they will operate a unit dispensary in-country. To this end, medical supplies and equipment normally found in a CONUS dispensary should accompany the unit. A 60 day supply is recommended in order to permit operation while initial in-country requisitions are being processed.

   c. Item: Dental Care

      Discussion: Routine dental care facilities in-country are not adequate to meet the demand for such care.

      Observation: Units and individuals being assigned to Vietnam should establish priority programs for accomplishment of routine dental care prior to departure from CONUS.
d. **Item**: Deployment Strength

**Discussion**: This unit deployed from CONUS at approximately 89% strength with a promise that replacements would be available four days after arrival in-country. The first replacements did not start coming in until approximately 60 days after the unit arrived in Viet Nam and the unit has never attained 100% strength, current strength is 95.4%

**Observation**: Every attempt should be made to deploy units at 100% strength. If the unit can see that it will not deploy at 100% strength it should immediately notify the next higher headquarters in Viet Nam so that headquarters can initiate action to obtain replacements and avoid the 60-90 day delay.

2. Operations

a. **Item**: Platform for howitzers

**Discussion**: 105mm howitzers M101A1 when positioned in wet muddy areas become very difficult to maneuver when a mission requires the section to shift trails. The piece also has a tendency to sink into the mud after sustained firing.

**Observation**: By placing the howitzer on a platform, the trails can be shifted with ease. The platform can be easily constructed from 105mm ammunitions boxes. It is circular with a circumference of 85 inches. A retaining ridge is built around the outer edges of the platform to prevent the vehicle running off the platform and to guide the wheels when shifting trails. The platform may be constructed in sections to facilitate displacement. The aiming post displacement is also kept to a minimum when shifting trails.

b. **Item**: Foggy Panoramic Telescopes

**Discussion**: With the long monsoon season, high humidity and frequent weather changes many of the panoramic telescopes for the howitzer became foggy and thus unserviceable. Additionally, a compound should be made available that will completely seal the interior of the pan tel from the elements of weather.

**Observation**: Extreme care must be taken to protect the sight from the elements as much as possible. When not firing the sight should be covered.

c. **Item**: Bunkers and parapits

**Discussion**: Bunkers and parapits which are constructed below the surface of the earth will fill with water and collapse during the monsoons. Even with adequate drainage these fortifications do not withstand the erosion.
Observation: By constructing these fortifications on top of the ground utilizing sandbags and timbers this problem is alleviated. Adequate drainage is still necessary.

d. **Item:** Firing from a congested area.

**Discussion:** In many cases an artillery battalion will be located in an area where there is an airstrip. The battalion will have the responsibility of issuing artillery advisories and insuring that no aircraft are in the way of firing. This process can seriously hamper the timely delivery of fires when supporting an operation and each mission must be cleared with the airfield control.

Observation: When it is known that firing will take place in one general area for an extended period of time a blanket clearance should be obtained for that area, thus eliminating the requirement for clearing each mission with the tower and saving valuable time.

e. **Item:** Forward Observer equipment.

**Discussion:** The forward observer must decide what equipment he will require prior to departing on an operation. He will in all probability support the operation on foot, so anything he takes will have to be carried on his back. The observers of this unit were in for quite a shock when they went on their first mission and their vehicles were left behind and were not seen until two weeks later when the operation was over. The observer and his team must be very careful in his selection of items to carry on an operation. The days of remoting a radio from a jeep to the OP on the hill are nonexistent in Viet Nam.

Observation: Attached as inclosure 1 is this unit's solution to this problem. For units in CONUS preparing for deployment to Vietnam, observer training should be conducted with the thought in mind that the use of a vehicle will be impossible. By so doing experience will be gained prior to arrival in-country as to what is necessary and what is not.

f. **Item:** Investigation of incidents.

**Discussion:** During an operation in which this unit was supporting the Korean Army, artillery type rounds fell on elements of the supported unit causing several casualties. Since one of this unit's batteries was firing in that area, the accusation was made that friendly artillery had caused friendly casualties. The forward observer party from this unit was among those elements that received the incoming rounds. Fortunately the forward observer, even though wounded himself, examined one of the craters and found an 81mm mortar tail fin. Further investigation revealed another mortar tail fin and a crater analysis revealed an azimuth of fire that could not have been this unit's battery. A determination was made that the incoming mortar rounds were VC. This action saved this unit's reputation and re-established the trust of the supported unit.
Had the observer not found the tall fin and no further investigation made the units reputation would have been marred.

**Observation:** Artillery battalions and batteries must always be prepared to defend themselves. In the event of an incident of any type an immediate investigation must be made and all the facts recorded as they occur. This must be accomplished immediately while the facts are still clear and available.

**g. Item:** Perimeter defense.

**Discussion:** A problem arises on the perimeter when the unit is located within a pacified area. The problem is when to shoot and when not to shoot. This is because of friendly civilians and friendly patrols in the area. Just because something is moving in front of the perimeter does not make it a Viet Cong.

**Observation:** Extreme caution must be exercised before firing. One must be sure prior to firing. This unit's solution to the problem in the base camp area is to fire only when fired upon or when persons are in the perimeter barrier.

**h. Item:** Journals

**Discussion:** A daily journal is a must for all staff sections. It gives a running account of the unit activities on a day by day basis and serves as a ready reference for items of business which transpired in the days past. The journal is also an important source for material for the unit history and lessons learned.

**Observation:** All units must be prepared to maintain a journal upon arrival in Vietnam. The journal required is not the typical duty officer journal for a battalion but a 24 hour journal maintained by each staff section.

**i. Item:** Initial operation.

**Discussion:** Upon arriving in Vietnam there is much work required by the new unit. However once the equipment arrives it is important to get into an operation as soon as possible.

**Observation:** The only way to gain the necessary experience and confidence in combat is during an operation.

**j. Item:** Language barrier between friendly nations.

**Discussion:** With the number of troops in Vietnam from countries other than the United States, the possibility of supporting one of these countries is ever present. The first problem which arises is that of language. Often one of these units have a man who can speak fairly good English however this is not necessarily so. In spite of this language problem fire coordination must go on.
Observation: Extreme care must be exercised in these situations so as to prevent a misunderstanding and possible firing into friendly areas.

3. Training and Organization.

a. Item: Battery FDC

Discussion: The battery Fire Direction Center is not adequately manned for 24 hour operations when the battery is on an independent mission. Battery FDC's can operate for limited periods for 24 hours but during extended operations it must be augmented. For 24 hour operations there is a need for one additional computer and two additional chart operators. In addition to 24 hour operations it is sometimes necessary to split the firing battery and place them at two locations.

Observation: Current Firing Battery TO&E's should be augmented to facilitate 24 hour operation. As an interim measure battalion FDC's should be prepared to augment the firing batteries.

b. Item: Claymore Mines

Discussion: Units deploying to Vietnam should have training in the handling and use of the Claymore Mine prior to departure from CONUS. This mine is a very important part of the defense of the position and personnel handling the mine should be thoroughly familiar with its operation and all safety factors. This unit has had one accident and one near accident resulting in one man losing part of one hand.

Observation: A minimum of two trained personnel should be in charge of emplacing and removing Claymore mines. No untrained personnel should be allowed to handle this weapon at any time.

c. Item: Air Mobility

Discussion: The type operations conducted in Vietnam require that every light artillery unit be capable of conducting airmobile operations. This requires training in the use of slings and procedures for air movement. The slings and nets that are needed for airmobile operations are not readily available from in-country supply sources. The CH-47 aircraft in Viet Nam are continually involved in operations and consequently are not readily available for training purposes.

Observation: Training in air mobile operations should be a part of the preparation for overseas movement. Each section should have completed the training to include actual airlift and have on hand the required slings and nets to conduct this type operation prior to departure from CONUS.
d. **Item**: Beehive ammunition  

**Discussion**: The beehive round is an important factor in the defense of an artillery position. Because this round is relatively new most individuals are not familiar with its use and its capabilities.

**Observation**: Each section should be thoroughly familiar with this round prior to the unit's departure from CONUS and artillery schools should include instructions on the round in their POI's.

e. **Item**: Training in preparation for deployment to Vietnam.

**Discussion**: The type war being fought in Vietnam is completely different from the Army Training Programs currently being used in CONUS. In order to train the unit must gear their training to fit the conditions which exist in the area to which they are going.

**Observation**: By studying the Lessons Learned and setting up a training program based on Lessons Learned, the unit will be prepared physically and mentally for any mission received.

f. **Item**: Liaison Requirements

**Discussion**: Units that have only one liaison team authorized will often find themselves short handed. This unit has had a requirement to furnish Capitol ROK Infantry Div two liaison teams since being in country regardless of other commitments. Additional liaison is also needed when the battalion is supporting separate missions.

**Observation**: Battalions should be prepared to provide liaison teams with equipment over and above TO&E allowances.

g. **Item**: Maintaining efficiency in firing and computation of firing.

**Discussion**: When a unit is saddled with a mission such as base defense, a program of some type must be established in order for the Fire Direction Center and the individual howitzer sections to maintain and/or improve their proficiency and efficiency. A unit in a static position that does not do much firing tends to become inefficient.

**Observation**: A program of initiating periodic live test missions must be affected. These missions should be timed, and should occur on no set schedule. Such missions can very easily be integrated into the nightly H&I program. The use of this procedure has definitely improved the reaction times and efficiency of the firing batteries in this battalion.

h. **Item**: Survey requirements

**Discussion**: Because of the lack of survey control the requirement for survey is almost nonexistent.
Once the base camp area is surveyed, from assumed survey control in many cases, the section has very little to do within the survey field. When the firing batteries move out of base camp on a mission they are often spread far apart or located in an area where access is by air only, making it impossible or not feasible to bring control to the position.

Observation: By conducting section training from a preplanned training schedule, the proficiency of the section can be maintained.

1. Item: Army aviation for artillery battalions.

Discussion: Because of the terrain and the nature of the war in Viet Nam one of the primary means of target acquisition is by aerial observation. A unit without aircraft is seriously hampered in its target acquisition capability. Because of a lack of survey control and sufficient visibility, registrations are almost non-existent without aerial observation. For the most part batteries are often sent on independent missions and at times are accessible only by air. When access can be made by road often the time required to travel by road is prohibitive. Lack of aircraft hampers command and control, resupply of critical items and the accomplishment of personnel actions that need immediate attention.

Observation: Each separate artillery battalion should be augmented with an aviation section.

4. Logistics

Lessons Learned

a. Item: Carpenter Tools

Discussion: There is a great demand for carpenter tools, nails, and lumber for base camp construction. If generators are available for use, power tools come in handy.

Observation: Units should be encouraged to bring a large supply of nails, hammers, saws, and a power saw with plenty of blades.

b. Item: 6400 Mil Capability

Discussion: Units that do not have the collimator cannot maintain a 6400 Mil firing capability with one set of aiming post and lighting devices. With one set of aiming post and shifting of trails there are areas where the aiming posts cannot be seen because of the recuporator.

Observation: Units should obtain the collimator or a second set of aiming posts and lights prior to employment.
c. **Item: Perimeter Defense**

**Discussion:** The absence of firing batteries from the base camp removes most of the firepower and presents difficulties in establishing an effective perimeter defense.

**Observation:** Units should obtain authorization for additional automatic weapons, particularly 50 caliber machine guns, to offset the loss of firing batteries from base camp.

d. **Item: Ammunition Serviceability**

**Discussion:** During the monsoon season it is very difficult to keep ammunition and powder bags dry. If the ammunition bunker is below the surface it is almost an impossibility no matter how extensive the drainage system.

**Observation:** All ammunition bunkers should be constructed above ground with an abundance of dunnage. A minimum number of rounds should be removed from the fiberboard containers.

e. **Item: WABTOC**

**Discussion:** The unit WABTOC contains items which improve the health, welfare and moral of the troops. It is very important that such items be requested so as to arrive shortly after the troops arrive, in Vietnam. By so doing the requirement for barrier material and sandbags is filled and construction on the tent frames can commence.

**Observation:** The unit must know what ship the WABTOC is on, when it is expected to arrive, and when it will be unloaded. Guards must be present at the unloading so as to prevent some of the items from disappearing. Arrangements to move the items to the unit location as soon as possible should be made.

f. **Item: TO&E Equipment**

**Discussion:** A newly activated unit scheduled for deployment must begin training immediately after deployment. This unit went through its entire training phase with borrowed equipment most of which was obsolete. Training was interrupted to receive and issue equipment. The first time that all of this unit’s equipment was available was in Vietnam.

**Observation:** TO&E equipment must be utilized in training in order to gain confidence in the equipment, and to avoid delays in training to receive and issue equipment.
g. Item: WD-1 requirements

Discussion: A unit deploying to Vietnam will be required to establish a base camp area. Within this area permanently installed telephone communications area necessity. The only wire immediately available for this is out of the unit basic load. Time may not warrant picking up the wire prior to an operation, consequently a unit may find itself deploying on an operation with insufficient wire on hand.

Observation: Units should deploy with a 50% overage of WD-1. If the 50% overage cannot be obtained prior to deployment, provisions should be made to allow a unit to draw WD-1 wire over and above TO&E allowances for base camp communications.

h. Item: Barrier Material

Discussion: This unit when initially setting up camp at Hammond had to beg, borrow, or steal sandbags and barrier material to construct a defensive perimeter.

Observation: A new unit arriving in Viet Nam should have sandbags and barrier material immediately available for perimeter construction.

5. Communications

Item: Radio Frequencies and Call Signs

Discussion: In Viet Nam all units do not change frequencies and call signs at the same time and some of them have not changed in three months. This unit has been changing frequencies every month and invariably winds up sharing a frequency. The first ten days of each month have been spent trying to obtain a clear frequency.

Observation: All units should change frequencies at one time. Responsible staff sections at each level should monitor the assignment of frequencies to avoid the dual assignment of a frequency. There is also a lot of "bootlegging" of frequencies.

6. Other

a. Item: Control of sensitive items

Discussion: In the event a man becomes a casualty or is wounded, sensitive items such as his SOI or personal weapon are vulnerable to loss or theft. This unit had a Recon Sergeant KIA and with no procedure set up for the collection of sensitive items, the SOI was evacuated with the body and never recovered.

Observation: A procedure must be established for a member of the element receiving casualties to collect all sensitive items. If no member of the element is physically able to do this then the first individual on the scene should take care of these items.
b. **Item:** POM Instructions

**Discussion:** This unit encountered many problems in POM. Instructions furnished were not timely nor were they free of conflict. Changes were still being made up to the date of departure.

**Observation:** One set of POM instructions should be made available to a unit as soon as an ERD is established. These instructions should be followed closely and a minimum number of changes should be made.

c. **Item:** Disposal of human waste.

**Discussion:** Because of the water table in Vietnam the use of latrines dug in the earth are not acceptable. A latrine of this type will eventually contaminate the area and could cause disease.

**Observation:** The use of 55 gallon drums cut in half as a container for the waste is a good solution to the problem. The waste must then be burned at least once daily with diesel. This practice should be adopted in training in the CONUS.

**Part II Recommendations**

1. **Personnel**
   a. Publications needed by units should be made available prior to departure from CONUS.
   b. Unit Medical Sections should deploy with a 60 day supply of medical supplies normally found in a CONUS dispensary.
   c. Routine dental care should be taken care of prior to deployment.
   d. Units should deploy at 100% strength.

2. **Operations**
   a. All bunkers should be constructed above ground.
   b. Units should support an operation as soon as possible after arrival in Viet Nam.

3. **Training and Organization**
   a. Firing battery TO&E should be modified to include sufficient FDC personnel for 24 hour and split battery operations.
   b. Light artillery units should have air mobility training in CONUS and deploy with the necessary equipment for air mobility.
c. The beehive round should be included in POI's at artillery schools.

d. Lessons Learned should be made available to a unit as soon as it is known that it will deploy to Viet Nam.

e. Each separate artillery battalion should be authorized an aviation section.

4. Logistics

a. Artillery should deploy with the collimator or two sets of aiming posts and lights.

b. Artillery Headquarters and Service Batteries should be authorized the 50 caliber machine gun.

c. Technical services should make equipment available upon activation and not at ERD.

d. Provisions should be made for a unit to draw WD-1 wire above TO&E allowances for base camp communications requirements.

5. Communications

Responsible agencies should be required to exercise the necessary control to prevent bootlegging frequencies and the assigning of the same frequency to two units in the same area.

6. Other

The responsible agency in CONUS must make one set of instructions for POM and make them immediately available to a unit scheduled for deployment.

1 Incl
Minimum essential equip
for FO's

DONALD J MAJIKAS
LTC Arty
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION
4-CG, I FFORGEV Arty
2-USARPAC
3-HQ, USARV
1-File

15
Minimum Essential Equipment for Forward Observers

Prior to departure on any operations the Forward Observer will insure that his party has the following minimum equipment:

a. AN/PRC-25 w/battery BA386
b. Map
c. Compass M2
d. Binoculars
e. Plotting Scale
f. OF Fan
g. 2 grease pencils - red and black
h. Pocket notebook
i. Ballpoint pen
j. Current SOI
k. Individual weapons w/basic load of ammo
l. 2 hand grenades each person
m. Helmet w/liner
n. 1 Bayonet
o. 1 entrenching tool
p. 1 machete
q. Individual webbing equipment w/combat pack.
r. 1 Poncho each person
s. Water purification tablets
t. 1 can foot powder each
u. 1 bottle salt tablets
v. 1 bottle APC's
w. 1 bottle Dapsone tablets
x. 1 bottle Clarouin tablets
y. 1 bottle insect repellent each
z. 2 canteens each person*
aa. 1 blanket each person*
ab. 1 flak vest each person**
ac. 3 C Rations each and heat tablets
ad. 1 extra BA 386
ae. 1 change of underwear each w/socks
af. 1 towel each person
ag. 1 towel each person
ah. 1 razor each person
ai. 1 bar soap each person
aj. 1 toothbrush each person
ak. 1 tube toothpaste
al. 1 pack matches each and/or lighter w/fluid

* If in mountainous terrain

** If not in mountainous terrain
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AVFA-AT-D (1 Feb 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
        Ending 31 January 1967 (RSS O3FOR-65)(7th Bn, 13th Arty) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96350 24 February 1967

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, Attn: AVFA-GC-O&T,
    AFO 96350

1. (U) Concur with observation and recommendations contained in
   basic communications except as indicated in para 2b below.

2. (C) The following additional comments are submitted:
   a. Reference Section 2, Part I, Para 1a:

      USARV is now forwarding necessary directives to units
      scheduled for deployment to USA.

   b. Reference Section 2, Part I, Para 3b:

      Non-concur in statement, "because of the lack of survey
      control the requirement for survey is almost non-existent." Although
      capability for establishing control at Corps artillery level has been
      limited until Jan 67, control should have been established by organic
      survey capability.

   c. Reference Section 2, Part II, Para 3a:

      Augmentation to battery fire direction centers will be re-
      quested by an FTOE.

   d. Reference Section 2, Part II, Para 3b:

      Towed light and medium artillery alerted for deployment to
      Vietnam and assignment to I FFORCEV are being advised, in advance informa-
      tion letters, of the need for air mobile training and procurement of
      special equipment prior to deployment.

   e. Reference Section 2, Part II, Para 3d:

      Non-divisional artillery units programmed for I FFORCEV are
      sent information packets containing "Lessons Learned" by 2d, I FFORCEV
      Arty

   f. Reference Section 2, Part II, Para 3f:

      Aviation sections of non-divisional combat support units
      in Vietnam have been deleted by DA msg 763119, from AMS for AV, dtd
      22 Apr 66.
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AVFA-AT-D (1 Feb 67)

e. Reference Section 2, Part II, Para 4a:

This recommendation will be incorporated in the logistic portion of Letter, this HQ, subject: "Helpful Hints in Preparing for Deployment," which is sent to new units before they depart CONUS.

h. Reference Section 2, Part II, Para 4b:

Units will be advised to request issue of the .50 Cal MG utilizing USAV Form 475, "Request for Equipment in Excess of Authorized Allowances."

i. Reference Section 2, Part II, Para 4d:

USARV Reg 735-4, dtd 16 Dec 65 provides instructions to units having permanently installed wire on means of obtaining relief from accountability. Once relief from accountability is obtained, units are directed to promptly requisition replacement wire.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LEO E. ELLIS
LtCol, Arty
Adjutant

Incl
nc
AVFA-GC-OT (4 Feb 67)  2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIEID FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350  16 MAR 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96307

1. (U) Concur with the contents of the Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 of the 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery, and the preceding indorsement with the following comments:

2. (C) Reference Section 2, Part II - Recommendations.

   a. Reference paragraph 1a: Action has been taken by USARV to provide required directives to organizations programmed for RVN.

   b. Reference paragraph 1b: The decision as to whether to expand an aid station into a dispensary should be made after an organization has arrived in-country, and after the medical mission has been defined based on the tactical situation. In some instances, several aid stations have been consolidated. To anticipate the type of medical service to be rendered might lead to a waste of material.

   c. Reference paragraph 1c: If the demand for dental care has not been adequately provided, the matter should be brought to the attention of the area dental surgeon.

   d. Reference paragraph 1d: With minor exceptions, all units are planned to be deployed at 100 percent strength.

   e. Reference paragraph 2a: Construction of bunkers above ground is dependent upon the terrain and nature of the soil in the area, regardless of the season of the year.

   f. Reference paragraph 2b: Units should not be employed prior to completion of an in-country orientation, unless the tactical situation necessitates earlier employment.

   g. Reference paragraph 3a: The organization should request an appropriate MTOE change with full justification.

   h. Reference paragraph 3b: All light and medium artillery organizations alerted for deployment to RVN should be advised of the requirement for airmobile training, and the need to obtain special equipment prior to deployment.

   i. Reference paragraph 3c: It is anticipated that the beehive round will be included in the program of instruction at Artillery and Missile School in the very near future.
Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967,

j. Reference paragraph 3d: All units alerted for deployment to RVN should be provided packets of lessons learned.

k. Reference paragraph 3e: Aviation support for artillery observation is provided by allocation of available assets to the maneuver unit being supported by the artillery. Aviation support for resupply, and command and control should be obtained by coordination with the maneuver unit, for use of aircraft organic to or allocated to that unit.

l. Reference paragraph 4a: Tactical requirements fully justifies this request. Appropriate action should be taken by the organization to request FTOE change.

m. Reference paragraph 4b: Artillery headquarters and service batteries should be authorized additional machine guns to provide base camp security, because of the tactical employment of firing batteries away from the base camp areas. The organization should submit request for temporary loan under the provisions of paragraph 22e, AR 310-34, dated 22 September 1966.

n. Reference paragraph 4c: Every effort should be made to provide all equipment to a unit scheduled for deployment to RVN in sufficient time to facilitate training.

o. Reference paragraph 4d: The procedure for obtaining relief from accountability of wire which is used to establish base camp communications is as outlined in USARV Regulation 735-4, dated 16 December 1965.

p. Reference paragraph 5: The senior US commander in each corps area is responsible for assigning frequencies and resolving any difficulties that may arise.

q. Reference paragraph 6: Army area commanders are responsible for implementation of POM instructions as established by Department of the Army. There are necessarily, variations in procedures in each Army area.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CHIEF, G-4

CPT, AGC

Asst AG

1 Incl

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TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Paragraph 1d, Part I, Section 2, Page 6; and Paragraph 1d, Part II, Section 2, Page 14: Concur that every effort should be made to deploy units at 100 percent strength. Deploying units are required to submit requisitions to cover personnel shortages to DA. As the replacements become available, they are provided by DA on a unit-to-unit basis. As of 22 March 1967, the 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery present for duty strength was 19 EM above authorized. The unit has reported no critical MOS shortages to I Field Force Vietnam.

b. Reference Paragraph 2f, 2d Indorsement: Concur with recommendation. Change 1, USARV Regulation 350-1 outlines current policy and procedure for replacement training.

c. Reference Paragraph 2m, 2d Indorsement, concerning the need for additional machineguns for artillery headquarters and service batteries: Nonconcur. The requirement appears to be valid and recurring and should be submitted without delay as an MTDA.

d. Reference Paragraph 2n, 2d Indorsement, concerning procedures for equipping units scheduled for deployment: Concur. AR 220-10, Preparation for Overseas Movement of units explains in considerable detail the procedures to be followed and the responsibilities pertaining to equipping units scheduled for overseas deployment.

e. Reference Paragraph 2o, 2d Indorsement, concerning relief from accountability of wire: Concur. The procedures for relief from

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AVHGC-DH (4 Feb 67)
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

Accountability of wire are outlined in USARV Regulation 735-4 dated 16 December 1965.

f. Except as noted above, this headquarters concurs with the basic report, as modified by 1st and 2d Indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JERRY VAN HORN
2LT AGC

1 Incl
nc

Regarded Unclassified When Separated From Classified Inclosures
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 7th Bn, 13th Arty

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

1 Incl

nc

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