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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
5TH HOWITZER BATTALION, 27TH ARTILLERY
APO 96316

AVFA-AT-27-C

12 November 1966


TO: See Distribution

SECTION I (U)

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (U) Intelligence:

a. Throughout the reporting period this unit coordinated and received intelligence information from the following units:

   (1) 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division
   (2) 47th Infantry Regiment, Army Republic of Vietnam
   (3) 21st Koran Marine Brigade
   (4) 28th Republic of Korea Regiment
   (5) Sector Operations and Intelligence Center, Tuy Hoa,

b. The intelligence received was used to prepare harassing and interdiction fires on suspected enemy locations and avenues of approach. Aircraft were used daily, when available, to conduct registrations.

2. (C) Operations and Training Activities:

a. Operations:

   (1) During the reporting period the 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery (-) participated in the following operations:

   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>DATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JOHN PAUL JONES</td>
<td>24 July to 5 September 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMAIRO</td>
<td>6 September to 25 October 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADAIR</td>
<td>26 October to present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERONIMO I</td>
<td>31 October to present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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12 November 1966
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(2) Operation JOHN PAUL JONES:

(a) Operation JOHN PAUL JONES commenced on 24 July 1966 and ended on 5 September 1966, during the initial period of the operation, the 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery (-) received the mission of general support to the 47th Army Republic of Vietnam Regiment. Both Battery B and Battery C remained in the Tay Son area vicinity CQ138471 and CQ133527 respectively.

(b) On 28 July 1966 Battery C, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery while in support of operations conducted by A Troop, 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and Republic Forces, Republic of Vietnam. Battery C, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery fired at coordinates CQ109524 from which United States Forces were receiving automatic weapons fire. Subsequent surveillance revealed 5 VC killed in action by body count.

(c) On 28 July 1966 Battery C, 5th Amphibious, 27th Artillery in support of operations conducted by the 47th Regiment, Army Republic of Vietnam in the Tay Son Valley, fired missions at coordinates CQ109524 resulting in 6 VC killed in action by body count. An additional 15 VC killed in action (estimated) were reported during the operation.

(d) On 30 July 1966 Battery C, 5th Amphibious, 27th Artillery displaced to CQ235274 with the mission of direct support to the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry on or near, direct support to the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry in preparation for Phase II, Operation JOHN PAUL JONES.

(e) On 29 July 1966 Battery C, 5th Amphibious, 27th Artillery while in support of operations conducted by the 47th Regiment, Army Republic of Vietnam, fired missions at coordinates CQ130455 from which United States Forces were receiving automatic weapons fire. Subsequent surveillance revealed 5 VC killed in action by body count. An additional 15 VC killed in action (estimated) were reported during the operation.

(f) From 1 August 1966 to 29 August 1966 Battery B, 5th Amphibious, 27th Artillery received the mission of direct support to Task Force "B" which had the mission of defending and protecting vital terrain and installations in the Vinh, Ro Bay and Pass area.

(g) At 171000H August 1966 Battery C, 5th Amphibious Battalion, 27th Artillery received the mission of direct support of Task Force "B" which had the mission of defending and protecting vital terrain and installations in the Vinh, Ro Bay and Pass area.

(h) On 30 August 1966 Battery C, 5th Amphibious Battalion, 27th Artillery was relieved of its direct support mission by Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery. Battery C, 5th Amphibious Battalion, 27th Artillery displaced to CQ196434 with the mission of general support 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

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Page 2 of 12 pages
At 021300H September 1966 Battery C, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery displaced to CQ35528 and returned to CQ197433 at 021955H September 1966. During this time they fired in support of the 47th Army of Vietnam Regiment on a platoon size VC ambush. Surveillance on this target was 10 VC killed in action (estimate).

At 031600H September 1966 Battery C, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery displaced to CQ35528 with the mission of general support reinforcing 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

Extensive harassing and interdiction fires were planned and fired during the operational period. The following missions by type were fired:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harassing and Interdiction</th>
<th>1,378</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registrations</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illumination</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will Adjust</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Concentrations</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparations</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL ROUNDS EXPENDED................. 12,488

Results:

Friendly Losses: None

Enemy Losses:

11 VC killed in action (body count)
37 VC killed in action (estimate)
3 VC wounded in action (estimate)
9 buildings destroyed
4 bunkers destroyed

Operation SEWARD:

(a) Operation SEWARD commenced on 6 September 1966 and terminated on 25 October 1966. The concept of this operation was to conduct operations to protect the rice harvest in the SONG DAI GIANG - TUY HOA area. The 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery (-) mission was general support.

(b) At the commencement of this operation Battery B, 5th Howitzer Battalion was located at CQ03463 with the mission of general support reinforcing Army Republic of Vietnam Artillery. Battery C, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery was located at CQ35528 with the mission of general support 101st Airborne Division.

(c) On 21 September 1966 Battery A, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery was attached to this battalion with the mission of general support, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

(d) On 21 September 1966 Battery B, 5th Howitzer Battalion 27th Artillery fired a mission in support of the 47th Army Republic of Vietnam Regiment on VC firing at coordinates GQ048429 which resulted in 12 VC killed in action by body count.

(e) On 22 September 1966 Battery A, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery displaced to GQ375528 with the mission of general support 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

(f) At 1040 hours on 22 September 1966 the forward observer party of Battery C, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery captured 3 VC with weapons, 1 grenade and 30 rounds of small arms ammunition at coordinates GQ053438.

(g) On 26 September 1966 Battery A, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery displaced one 8" howitzer section to GQ571775 for the purpose of firing an experimental destruction mission on a captured VC cave and tunnel complex. A total of 26 rounds were fired by the 8" howitzer and 23 rounds by the 175mm gun from the main battery position. Numerous direct hits were obtained on the cave but negligible damage was achieved in the extensive underground tunnel complex.

(h) On 28 September 1966 Battery A, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery displaced to GQ079350 with the mission of general support 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and to support the CIDG complex at Cung Son.


(j) On 1 October 1966 Battery C, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery fired 2 missions at coordinates GQ053474 on an estimated VC platoon which resulted in 6 VC killed in action (estimate) and 6 structures destroyed.

(k) On 1 October 1966 the 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery (--) was released from attachment to the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and was attached to I FFORCE V Artillery with OPCON of the battalion remaining with the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

(l) At 0014 hours 10 October 1966 Battery C, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery received a hand grenade attack. 11 grenades were thrown into their area of which only 3 exploded. There were no US casualties or equipment damage. 2 Regional Force personnel were wounded as a result of the attack.

(m) On 10 October 1966 Battery C, 5th Howitzer Battalion displaced to GQ081351 with the mission of direct support 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry.
(N) On 13 October 1966 Battery B, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery fired missions at VC in the open at coordinates CQ058493 which resulted in 3 VC killed in action (estimate) and 3 VC wounded in action (estimate).

(o) On 14 October 1966 Battery B, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery fired a mission at a VC squad, coordinates CQ056421 which resulted in 2 VC killed in action by body count and 3 VC killed in action (estimate) and 1 enemy occupied building destroyed.

(p) On 14 October 1966 Battery B, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery displaced to CQ235274 with mission of general support reinforcing 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery.

(q) On 15 October 1966 Battery C, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery displaced 2 platoons to CQ006356 with the mission of direct support to the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry.

(r) On 19 October 1966 Battery C, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery commenced displacement to CQ195435, mission general support 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Due to heavy rains and road conditions this movement was not completed until 1440 hours 20 October 1966.

(s) On 20 October 1966 Battery B, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery displaced to CQ195435, mission general support 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

(t) On 21 October 1966, Battery A, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery displaced to CQ17433, mission general support 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

(u) Effective 2200LT hours October 1966 the designation of Battery A, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery became Battery M, 3rd Battalion, 18th Artillery. Personnel were exchanged between these 2 units over a period of 2 days.

(v) The following missions by type were conducted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Type</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harassing and Interdiction</td>
<td>1,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registrations</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will Adjust</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Concentrations</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illumination</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparations</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ROUNDS EXPENDED</td>
<td>12,860</td>
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ANFL-12-27-C
12 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

(w) Results:

Friendly losses: None

Enemy losses:
- 24 VC killed in action (body count)
- 27 VC killed in action (estimate)
- 3 VC wounded in action (estimate)
- 3 VC captured
- 3 rifles captured
- 1 hand grenade captured
- 30 rounds of small arms ammunition captured
- 6 buildings destroyed
- 1 village destroyed

(4) Operation ADAMS:

(a) Operation ADAMS commenced on 26 October 1966 and is presently in progress. Concept of operation: One Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, with approximately three battalions, in coordination with 47th Army Republic of Vietnam Regiment, conducts search and destroy and rice harvest protection operations in designated area of operations and protects engineer reconnaissance parties conducting survey of highways 1 and 6 within the area of operations. Duration of the operation is approximately 100 days. Mission of the 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery is general support.

(b) At the start of this operation Battery B and C, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery were located at Tuy Hoa South with the mission of general support. Battery B, 3rd Battalion, 18th Artillery was located at CQ17433 with the mission of general support.

(c) On 29 October 1966 Battery B, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery displaced to BQ44425, mission general support 47th Army Republic of Vietnam Regiment.

(d) On 30 October 1966 Battery C, 5th Howitzer Battalion 27th Artillery displaced to BQ44426, mission reinforcing 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery.

(e) Total missions fired and surveillance to date is as follows:

Harassing and Interdiction: 40
Registration: 13
Will Adjust: 1
Preparations: 1

TOTAL ROUNDS EXPENDED: 403
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AVFL-AT-27-C
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(f) Results:

Friendly losses: None

Enemy losses: 3 buildings destroyed
2 buildings damaged

(5) Operation GERONIMO I: This operation commenced on 31 October 1966 and is presently in progress. This battalion is currently participating in both Operation ADAMS and GERONIMO I. Concept of Operation GERONIMO I is for the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, in coordination with 2 Army Republic of Vietnam Battalions, to conduct search and destroy operations within AO to destroy VC/NVA forces. Duration of operation is approximately 30 days. The mission of this battalion is the same as that designated for Operation ADAMS.

(6) Battery A, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery (-) remained in Phan Rang with the mission of defense of the Phan Rang Complex, during the reporting period Battery A (-) participated in the following operations:

(a) On 31 July 1966 a platoon of howitzers from Battery A departed base camp at Phan Rang to provide Artillery support for a sweep and destroy operation by the 23rd Army Republic of Vietnam division. The platoon moved by road to coordinates H750705 in the vicinity of Van Lam. The platoon was co-located with four 105mm howitzers of the 23rd division. The platoon fired a total of 303 rounds during the operation which terminated 1530H 1 August 1966. An unofficial count of enemy losses for the operation revealed 4 VC KIA and 4 VC captured.

(b) On 20 September 1966 a platoon of Battery A, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery departed base camp at Phan Rang to support a search and destroy operation controlled by the 23rd Army Republic of Vietnam division. The platoon joined Army Republic of Vietnam elements in Phan Rang and convoyed south and occupied a position at coordinates H715878 in the vicinity of Ho Nhan. The platoon was co-located with 2 105mm howitzers from the 23rd Division. There was no contact made with hostile forces. The platoon fired a total of 20 rounds on suspected enemy positions. The platoon closed back at their base camp at 1415 hours 20 September 1966.

(c) On 23 September 1966 a platoon of Battery A, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery dispersed to coordinates H687664 in the vicinity of Than Vo Man to support search and destroy operations conducted by a battalion size task force of the 23rd Army Republic of Vietnam Division. The platoon fired a total of 286 rounds during this operation which terminated at 1630H 23 September 1966.

(d) At 0600 hours 11 October 1966 a platoon from Battery A, 5th Howitzer Battalion dispersed from base camp at Phan Rang to coordinates H681955 to support elements of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in a recovery and investigation operation of a downed C-130 aircraft in the vicinity of H693967. Five bodies of US personnel were recovered from the downed aircraft.
During the operation the platoon expended 100 rounds, destroyed 1 VC structure. The operation terminated at 1230H 12 October 1966 upon which time the platoon returned to base camp.

(7) One platoon of Battery A, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery is positioned in Nha Trang with the mission of defense of the Nha Trang Complex. The platoon is attached to the 5th Special Forces Group and receives its logistical support from the 1st Logistical Command. During the reporting period this platoon fired in excess of 6000 rounds of ammunition. This platoon fired 178 registrations, 2100 harassment and interdiction fires and numerous service practices for 5th Special Forces Group.

b. Training: During the reporting period the battalion instituted and continued to conduct many programs oriented to increase the efficiency of this command and enhance our operational capabilities. Preparation for the battalion wide Gunners Test commenced during the reporting period. All personnel who had not fired their individual weapons received training and fired a familiarization course with their weapon.

4. (c) Logistics:

a. Delivery of Supplies: The S4 section has initiated a daily delivery of Class I, III, and V supplies. So far this has proven to be satisfactory. There have been no problem areas found to prevent these deliveries, even to the battalions forward positions. The deliveries release the batteries organic vehicles to perform other functions than resupply of their units. This increases the flexibility of movement for the supported batteries.

b. Direct Exchange of clothing: At present the 1st Logistical Command does not have existing facilities to DX clothing in the Tuy Hoa area. We expect that this problem area will be resolved in the near future. The problem on clothing is known and action is being taken to recommend the establishment of a clothing Direct Exchange at class II and IV in the Tuy Hoa area.

c. Maintenance: A review of the maintenance operations reveals 2 problem areas. The most serious problem has been the non-availability of repair parts resupply. During the past 3 weeks we have received only 2 repair parts through normal supply channels. Every other item needed had to be cross leveled. The second problem area is the extremely slow rate of flow of replacement vehicles. This unit presently has twenty six 2½ ton trucks on requisition number 6178-002. These vehicles are replacement vehicles for M211 and M35 series trucks which now meet the criteria for replacement. The battalion is presently physically short five 2½ ton trucks which have been salvaged. We are in the process of completing the consolidation of battery PLL into a battalion PLL. This project will be completed not later than 10 November 1966. It is considered that under a combined PLL tighter control and supervision will be achieved and the overall PLL status will improve. A more efficient operation
with a smaller down time rate should be achieved by the consolidation and central management of PLL resources.

d. Signal: A review of the signal operations and maintenance during the past three (3) months revealed a significant potential for the development of supply and maintenance problems. During the period the battalions signal repairmen were restricted by our supporting element (initially the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division) on the magnitude of 24 echelon maintenance that could be performed within the battalion. As a result, it was necessary for this battalion to turn in each item of equipment that became inoperative. In addition, the time lapse between initial turn-in and the return of the repaired equipment to the using unit has remained excessive. The problem has been alleviated somewhat through coordination with the new supporting element (the 136th Light Equipment Maintenance Company (DS)) which allows more latitude at the battalion level. However, the scarcity of repair parts and the limited signal PLL still pose special problems which are being actively worked on by this battalion and its Field Maintenance Support.

e. Recommend that command effort be directed toward reducing the delay of issuing repair parts to the using units and an increased emphasis be given to logistics management problems at the battalion level. It is expected that more specific matters requiring command attention and correction will be pointed out in future reports.

f. The following active programs have been implemented at the battalion levels:

(1) A continuous and up to date program to maintain current status on TA 50-901 equipment. This program is a chain of command responsibility in which current status and follow-up action is taken at each level within the battalion. Where personal negligence is involved immediate action is taken to initiate a statement of charges for items lost through carelessness.

(2) Maintenance of a consolidated PLL for repair parts at the battalion level. Again this has been implemented as a chain of command responsibility. Maintenance management is being integrated into current combat operations to assure that recurring demands and the backlog of deferred maintenance is made known to supporting maintenance facilities. Within the battalion realistic and actual demand data is maintained. Each responsible individual in the chain of command is charged with appropriate follow up actions for deferred maintenance items.

(3) Supply management principles are also applied to assure the maintenance of OWM items and section equipment. This program has also been established as a chain of command responsibility. Follow up supply action is initiated at each level of command within the battalion to assure that consolidated requisition lists are accurate and submitted for timely supply action. All levels of supervision are taking an active part to assure sound supply management at each level of the chain of command within the battalion.
5. (U) Civil Affairs: The civic action program within the battalion continues to give medical aid to the Dong Tac Refugees village. The battalion surgeon has treated 323 people for various ailments within the previous quarter.

6. (C) Personnel:

   a. During the reporting period the battalion continued to lose personnel thru expiration of term of service and rotation with replacements arriving to take their place. The loss of the battalion personnel warrant officer and the battalion personnel sergeant simultaneously on 5 October 1966 created a definite strain on personnel functions. The battalion received a personnel sergeant on 5 October 1966 and a personnel warrant officer on 1 November 1966. The battalion experienced almost a complete turnover of staff officers in the month of October 1966. The changeover of officer personnel did not disrupt the battalion operations as most of the replacement officers were experienced captains. The battalion presently has a shortage of enlisted personnel in the MOS's 13B40, 36K40, and 36K20. Breakdown is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASG</th>
<th>SHORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13B40</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36K40</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36K20</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Headquarters I Field Forces Vietnam has been informed of the above shortages and assistance has already been given this unit in obtaining some enlisted personnel possessing the MOS's needed.

   b. The battalion changed administrative and personnel channels from 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to Headquarters I Field Forces Vietnam when this unit was released from the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and attached to Headquarters I Field Forces Vietnam, effective 1 October 1966. This change produced a temporary administrative burden on the personnel section in the establishment of R & R allocations, promotion allocations, DEDS flight allocations and reconciliation of officer and enlisted personnel requisitions with Headquarters I Field Forces Vietnam.

   c. The morale of the troops continues to be high even though they often live under adverse conditions. One item that does have an adverse affect on the morale is the shortage of STARS AND STRIPES. We have not received any since the middle of October. Correspondence was forwarded twice to MACV requesting this unit be placed on the free distribution list. As of this date we have not received any free copies of the STARS AND STRIPES
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AVFA-AI-2T-27-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966,
Reports Control Symbol CSFAR-65 (U)

SECTION II

COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I

Observation (Lessons Learned)

(C) Operations

a. ITEM: Reconnaissance selection and occupation of position
during Northeast Monsoon Season.

DISCUSSION: This battalion has been operating in the Tuy Hoa
valley for several months. All battery commanders have become minutely fam-
filiar with all available artillery firing positions. Consequently when a
movement was scheduled to a known location previously occupied, no reconnaiss-
ance party was sent out. As a result ground which had been firm, and still
appeared firm did not hold vehicles and weapons as they moved into position
because of saturated ground caused by heavy rains since the position had been
last occupied.

OBSERVATION: Wherever grass grows high the ground is usually
soft. Two and one half ton trucks loaded should never be driven off the road
without thoroughly testing the ground for firmness. Three quarter ton trucks
should be utilized to emplace the howitzers and each section should have
several pieces of planking or pierced steel plank to provide a relatively
stable howitzer platform which will prevent sinking into mud causing excessive
displacement during fire missions.

b. ITEM: Security of artillery positions.

DISCUSSION: No artillery battery should be employed without
additional ground security. Frequently it is not tactically sound for security
forces to establish defensive positions in the battery location. Rather the
security forces should be established on avenues of approach and key terrain
features surrounding the battery area.

OBSERVATION: Each battery should establish outposts regardless
of local security means that are provided. Trip flares and claymore mines
should be placed out at night and removed before daybreak. The location of
outposts, claymore mines, and trip flares should be changed every night.
An understanding with units in front of the battery position must be reached
so that no one will attempt to pull back through an artillery position at night.
Coordination with security forces is the key to the successful defense of
artillery positions.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966,
Reports Control Symbol CEFOR-65 (U)

Part 2
Recommendations

C) Logistics

a. Modified TO&E:

(1) Expedi tious processing and approval of a Modified Table of Organization submitted by this battalion on 24 July 1966 would vastly improve the capability of this battalion to provide fire support to maneuver elements. The battalion is organized and equipped under TOE 6-405D dated May 1961, which has not proven satisfactory in the counterinsurgency environment in Vietnam. Augmentation has been requested for six (6) forward observer parties and three (3) liaison teams for a total of nine (9) forward observer parties and four (4) liaison teams. This augmentation would give the battalion the capability to support a three (3) battalion brigade or regiment.

(2) Included in the modified TO&E is a request to augment the battalion with an aviation section. These aircraft are indispensable as a supplement to observers on the ground, as a backup for communications, for visual reconnaissance of routes and position areas, column cover as a counter ambush tactic and logistical resupply. With the batteries of this battalion spread from 10 to 50 kilometers apart and making frequent moves, it has become increasingly difficult to maintain effective command and control. Highways are closed at night and are seldom opened until approximately 1000 hours in the morning, following mine sweeping operations. Aircraft augmentation would greatly facilitate the combat capability of this battalion.

b. Logistical Support: The lack of logistical support as outlined in section I, para 4d, 4e, and 4f above is of great concern to me in that it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain TOE levels authorized, keep individual soldiers in serviceable clothing in the quantity required, and to maintain vehicles and equipment in an operational status. The backlog of deferred maintenance in the battalion continues to increase because of a lack of responsive repair parts support. It is essential that a logistics base be established in the Tuy Hoa area which can provide adequate logistical and maintenance support to the using units.

JOHN E. MUNNELY
LTC, Arty
Commanding

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AVFA-AT-D (12 Nov 66) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 October 1966, RGS CSPOR-66, (5th Bn, 27th Art) (U)

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350 3 DEC 1966

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-CO-Q&T
APO 96350

1. (U) Concur in findings and recommendations contained in basic letter.

2. (C) The following additional comments are submitted:

   a. CAM RANH Bay Support Command has current plans to establish a
clothing direct exchange point at the TUY HOA Sub-Area Command within the
next thirty to forty-five days.

   b. In order to improve the supply and maintenance support of all
units in the TUY HOA area, CAM RANH Bay Support Command assigned the 136th
Light Maintenance Company to the TUY HOA Sub-Area Command since the closing
date of this report. The company, totalling 254 personnel, closed at TUY
HOA during the latter part of November, replacing a detachment of approxi-
mately forty personnel. CAM RANH Bay Support Command is shipping required
repair parts and equipment to support units in the TUY HOA area as rapidly
as available transportation allows.

   c. CAM RANH Bay Support Command reported that some M35 series
2½ ton trucks, designated to replace the M211 and older M35 series vehicles
had already been received. Two of these vehicles have been issued to the 5th
Battalion, 27th Artillery. Additionally, the support command expects a
considerable quantity of replacement vehicles in the immediate future. The
support command acknowledged the shortage of repair parts for the M211 and
M35 series vehicles presently on hand in using units. Although a limited
supply of repair parts is available, these items have been deleted from
the support facility ASL because of the new series truck replacement pro-
gram.

   d. The 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery is presently performing all
authorized 2d echelon repairs on its signal equipment. CAM RANH Bay Support
Command reported the availability of an adequate supply of repair parts,
especially for the AN/VRC-47 radio, the primary radio for this battalion.
Stockage of signal repair parts at the TUY HOA Sub-Area Command is steadily
reaching an acceptable level and is dependent primarily upon the availa-
bility of transportation between the support command and the sub-area command.

   e. Coordination effected by HQ, I FFDRCEV Arty has resulted in
resumption of Stars and Stripes distribution to 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery.
This battalion is presently receiving 120 free copies each day.
f. Additional observers and liaison officers are essential for all non-divisional light field artillery units (105-mm). These units are nearly always deployed with a mission equivalent to direct support and the observer/liaison requirements are, therefore, similar to those for a divisional battalion. This situation was adequately predicted and provided for in the case of 3d Bn, 6th Arty and 7th Bn, 13th Arty, which were deployed with observer augmentations. The 5th Bn, 27th Arty was deployed to RVN early in the build-up of US Forces and was not provided with this augmentation. Ltr, AVFA-AT-27C, HQ, 5th Bn, 27th Arty, Subject: Modification of TOE, dated 21 January 1966, to CG, USARV, ATTN: AVC-O&T was forwarded to obtain authorisation for additional observers and liaison personnel. The last endorsement on this letter was dated 21 July 1966 and the best information available to this headquarters is that the request is presently at USARPAC for approval.

g. The request for augmentation of this battalion with an aviation section has been forwarded to HQ, USARV, (Ltr, HQ, 5th Bn, 27th Arty, AVFA-AT-27C, dated 15 October 1966, Subject: Augmentation of Aviation Section to CG, USARV, ATTN: AVC-O&T). Aviation support for non-divisional artillery units in I FFORCE has been, and continues to be a serious problem. Separate correspondence will be submitted on this subject.

3. (U) Recommendations:

a. That the request for additional observers and liaison officers be approved.

b. That the request for augmentation with an aviation section be approved.

Ashley A. Blinn
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding
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AVFA-OC-HIST (14 Dec 66)  2d Ind
SUBJECT:  Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
RCS CBFOR - 65 (a)

Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, APO US Forces 96350  15 DEC 1966
TO:  Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307
Concur with comments contained in basic report and 1st indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
WILLIAM H. JAMES
Colonel, AGO
Adjutant General

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15
AVHGC-DH (12 Nov 66) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 20 DEC 1966

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: G-3/OP-OT

APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 5th Howitzer Battalion, 27th Artillery as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

a. Reference Paragraph a(1), (2), Part 2, Page 12 and 2a, 1st Indorsement: It is recognized that preparation and processing of MTOE's require an excessively long period of time until final D4 approval. The MTOE submitted by the 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery contained numerous administrative errors. Corrections were made by a representative of the unit while the document was being staffed at this headquarters. The corrected MTOE was subsequently forwarded to USARPAC on 5 October 1966.

b. The aviation assets requested by the 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery and indorsed by I Field Force Vietnam are a valid requirement. Based upon USARV established priorities, MTOE augmentations which require aviators and aircraft will not be filled until all required TOE aviation units are deployed to RVN. Personnel and aircraft fill for the 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery will not be available until the 3d quarter, CY 1968.

c. The MTOE for the 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery appeared on the SECDW deletion list and was not reinstated by MACV/USARV.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

[Name]

Asst Adjutant Gen.
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GPOP-OT(12 Nov 66) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)
HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 13 JAN 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

G. L. McMullin
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

[signature]

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