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AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learnt, Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General
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HEADQUARTERS
3D BATTALION, 18TH ARTILLERY
LPJ 46490

30 Oct 1966


TO: Commanding Officer
52nd Artillery Group
APO 96295

SECTION I: Significant Activities

1. The battalion continued to support the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery. On 3 August 1966, "E" Battery (155mm towed) moved to LZ Oasis (BR 119264) by motor convoy in support of Operation Paul Revere II. On 6 August 1966, Battery "E" was airlifted by CH-54 Skyrunes and CH-47 Chinooks to LZ Juliet (YA 975053). On 11 August 1966, "G" Battery (8" How SP) replaced Battery (8" How SP) on Highway 19 (via BR 236527) in support of Operation Benning. On 16 August 1966, "F" Battery was airlifted to LZ Sat (YA 948398). On 17 August 1966, "D" Battery (175mm gun SP) moved to LZ 430400 on Operation Steel Horse IX in conjunction with "A" Battery, 2/19th Artillery. This Steel Horse was a recon by fire in BR 4435. On 21 August 1966, LTC Richard L. Livermore assumed command of the 3rd Artillery. On 23 August 1966, "E" Battery moved to LZ 489446 to support sweep operations in BR 4635. On 25 August 1966, "E" Battery returned from Paul Revere II. During this operation the battery fired 5,983 rounds and were credited with 180 VC KIA. The battery incurred no losses.

On 26 August "D" Battery returned to base camp. On 30 August "D" Battery moved to LZ 495577 to provide support to CIDG Camp in Song Cau Valley (BR 614611). On 3 September 1966, Camp Edelweiss received an intensive mortar attack for about 20 minutes. No battalion personnel were injured. During this period the battalion participated in the counter-mortar "quickfire" platoon and fired 221 HE rounds. On 7 Sep 66, "E" Battery moved to LZ 419646 to support sweep operation in BR 3079. On 9 Sep 66, "F" Battery returned to LZ 495577 and resumed the mission of supporting the CIDG Camp. On 10 Sep 66, "D" Battery moved to LZ 621558 to support CIDG activities in BR 6590. On 13 Sep, "F" Battery moved to LZ 621558 and "E" Battery moved to LZ 612625 to support CIDG activities. Also on this date, two 155mm tubes from "E" Battery were airlifted to LZ Pony (BR 795835) in support of Operation Thayer.

On 16 Sep, "D" Battery moved to LZ 875942. On 17 Sep, "E" Battery joined Battery at Hamond LZ (BR 875942) to support Operation Thayer. On 19 Sep, 3/18th assumed the mission of fire support coordination for the Hamond Area. LZ Hamond was a complex which included one Forward Support Element of the Division Support Command, two brigade trains, an engineer battalion nucleus, a troop of the air cavalry squad, one assault helicopter company, a medical company, and one rifle company. One counter-mortar platoon, two ground surveillance teams and one field artillery searchlight unit attached to the battalion. The fire support coordination included aerial weather artillery and USAF flares aircraft. "F" Troop, a 40 man platoon, was organized from survey, communications, and maintenance personnel to augment the Hamond area.
defense. On 22 Sep, two 155 mm tubes from "E" Battery were airlifted to LZ two-bits (BR 850946). On 23 Sep, the battalion came under an intensive mortar, recoiless rifle, and small arms attack. The battalion suffered 2 KIA, and 33 WIA; the Hammond area suffered 4 KIA and 71 WIA. During this attack the batteries and F Troop responded with heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire, and "D" Battery engaged the enemy with 175 mm direct fire at ranges from 300 to 500 meters expending 46 rounds. Enemy personnel captured later indicated that the VC had planned a ground attack on Hammond but were disrupted by the intense direct fire. Reconnaissance the following day discovered mortar positions and 3 recoiless rifle positions, some containing unexpended ammunition apparently abandoned during a hasty withdrawal. Graves containing 20 VC killed by large fragments were found. On 26 Sep, "E" Battery closed with all four tubes in LZ Uplift (BR 925755). "C" Battery 6/16th Artillery (155 mm towed) was airlifted into LZ Hammond and attached to the battalion. On 30 Sep, "B" and "C" batteries exchanged missions with "C" battery moving to Hammond and "B" Battery moving to vic BR 370460 to provide artillery coverage of Highway 19 and Camp Radcliff in support of Operation Benning. At this time the battalion had a battery of 8" how reinforcing the 1/77th Artillery, a 155 mm How battery reinforcing the 2/19th Artillery, and a battery of 155mm How reinforcing the 1/21st Artillery. On 1 October, the Bn was detached from the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery and attached to 52d Artillery Group. The battalion was given the mission of GSR the 1st Cav Div Arty for Operation Thayer. On 2 Oct, the Bn (-), "C" Battery and "C" Battery 6/16th Artillery moved to LZ Crystal. On 7 Oct, Colonel Blinn, acting I Field Forces Victor Artillery Commander visited LZ Crystal. On 10 Oct, BG Becker, ADC 1st Cav Div, visited the "B" Battery area to fire the 25,000th round from that unit in the Republic of Vietnam. "C" battery, 6/14th Artillery (formerly called "D" battery 3/18th Artillery) less equipment, was released from attachment 3/18th Artillery, effective 10 Oct 66 and returned to its parent unit. Also "A" Battery, 3/18th Artillery (formerly called "C" battery, 6/14th Artillery), less equipment, was released from attachment 6/14th Artillery and returned to parent unit. The Bn now consists of "A" Battery (175mm SP), "B" and "C" batteries (8" How SP) and "E" Battery (155mm towed airmobile). On 12 Oct, "A" Battery moved to LZ Uplift (BR 925755). On 20 Oct, the battalion fire direction senter ceased technical fire direction and distributed battalion fire direction specialists among the batteries. The batteries check their own data. During this operation, two of four organic batteries were always a considerable distance from the battalion headquarters and the battalion headquarters usually had no more than two batteries in the same landing zone. Wire communication between landing zones is not feasible. Checking firing data of several batteries, frequently firing simultaneously and two batteries reinforcing other battalions, by radio is not practical. The battalions, retained sufficient personnel to conduct tactical fire direction and fire support coordination. On 22 Oct, "B" Battery moved to Tuy Hoa (vic CQ 116438) and attached to the 5th Bn, 27th Arty (105mm How towed) with the mission of GSR 2d Bn, 320th Arty, 101st Abn Div. This displacement involved the transfer in place of battery equipment between "B" Battery 3/18th Arty and "A" Battery, 6/14th Arty. "B" Battery is now a composite battery consisting of two tubes each of 175mm and 8" How. On 24 Oct, Col Boatwright, I Field Force Victor Artillery Commander, conducted
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1966 (Cont'd)

an inspection of the battalion elements in LZ Crystal and LZ Uplift. Colonel Tobiason, Commanding Officer 52nd Artillery Group, was in his party. During Operations Thayer and Irving, the battalion metro section provided four messages daily for use by artillery in the area (12 US batteries, 4 ARVN batteries, and the Capitol ROK Division artillery in the area).

2. During the reporting period a total of 283 firing battery days were spent away from base camp.

3. During the reporting period the battalion fired a total of 10083 missions (60 Preparations, 23 TOT, 87 will adjust, 9639 H&I's, and 274 others), with a total expenditure of 28050 rounds. Since firing its first mission on 21 Nov 65, the battalion has fired a total of 27332 missions and expended 74570 HE rounds, 477 WP and 542 ILL. Fuze utilization has been 70504 FB, 2289 CVT, 1382 M7SQ, 1412 Delay and 2 CP.

4. During the period of this report units were encouraged to take advantage of every opportunity to complete training requirements such as weapon familiarization, hand grenade training, crew served weapons firing, direct fire training and crew drill. The "Steel Horse" Operation mentioned in Section I, paragraph 1, is a training vehicle devised by this battalion to further train the batteries in artillery fundamentals. They consist of occupation of position, firing observed and unobserved missions, security, fire direction procedures, communications, and road marches. When possible, these operations are conducted in conjunction with infantry unit operations. They have proven a very successful and worth while project.

5. During the period of this report "B" Battery, under the command of CPT Floyd J. Allen fired its 25,000th round while in country. This represents approximately 5 million pounds of steel, and is equivalent to approximately 176,800 105mm How rounds.

SECTION II: Commanders Observations and Recommendations

PART I: Observations

1. As mentioned in the narrative, distances between batteries, communications, and operations of separate batteries make battalion check charts impractical. Additionally, the TOE authorization for battery fire direction staffing is inadequate for combat operations. The distribution of battalion fire direction personnel has eased this problem.

2. The TOE provision of only three officers in a firing battery is insufficient, whether or not a battalion fire direction center is used. The three officers and the Chief of Firing Battery cannot adequately supervise the FDC and guns and perform other functions around the clock.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lesson’s Learned for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1966 (Cont'd)

SECTION II: Observations: (Cont'd)

3. An artillery support team from the 618th Heavy Equipment General Support Company, 5th Maintenance Battalion, Qui Nhon Support Command has attached to the battalion for several months. The team consists of one officer and several enlisted specialists. The team has provided valuable on the spot support and has kept the weapons and vehicles operational most of the time. If the battalion had to depend upon on call service either at the gun position or at the support unit, the down time of weapons would be considerably greater.

4. The USA Artillery and Missile School 175 mm gun instructional team provided extremely helpful guidance to gun sections and battery and battalion maintenance personnel. Additionally, the team appears to have profitted from visiting units in combat. The team remained with each battery for one day.

5. Due to the requirement of 24 hour operations of a battalion tactical fire direction and coordination center, and the proposed plan of widely distributed batteries, an additional assistant 8-3 is required.

PART II: Recommendations

1. That TOE provide for a combat augmentation to add enough enlisted men and officers to provide two shifts, each consisting of one officer, one Chief computer, two chart operators and one RTV.

2. That one additional assistant 8-3 be added to the battalion staff when the battalion is in combat.

3. That attachment of ordnance support teams to heavy artillery battalions in combat be mandatory.

4. That more doctrinal, and instructional and technical personnel visit artillery units in combat. The visits should be of a duration long enough to permit observation of organizational operations over at least a 24 hour period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ WILLIAM H. SYLVIA Jr.

4 Incl
1. Statistical Summary
   Artillery Ammunition
2. After Action Report & dtd
   5, 6, 24, Sep 66
3.

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### STATISTICAL SUMMARY

### ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

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### ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

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**NOTE:** If more than one Phase in an Operation, data will be submitted by phase.
## Statistical Summary

**Artillery Ammunition Expenditures**

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*Notes: If more than one phase in an operation, data will be submitted by phase.*
### Artillery Ammunition Expenditures

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**CONFIDENTIAL**
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer
   1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery
   ATTN: S-3
   APO 96490

1. NAME OF OPERATION: Benning (Quick Fire).

2. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 1st Cav Div Arty.

3. DATE OF OPERATION: 032155 Sep - 032340 Sep 66.

4. LOCATION: BR 463 486 (Camp Radcliff).

5. INTELLIGENCE: N/A

6. MISSION: Conduct counter mortar/counter recoilless program.

7. EXECUTION: N/A

8. REPORTING OFFICER: Lt Col. Richard L. Livermore, Commanding, Captain Maurice Myles, E Battery Commander, Captain Howard E. McCreary, D Battery Commander.

9. TASK ORGANIZATION: N/A

10. NARRATIVE SUMMARY: Instructions to implement quick fire program were received by this unit at 032155 hours. First round from "E" Battery (155mm How) were "on the way" at 032156. 30 hours. In the next twenty-five (25) minutes "E" Battery fired one-hundred-sixty-eight (168) rounds on four (4) Counter-Mortar concentrations. At the completion of their missions "E" Battery fired thirty-six (36) rounds on four (4) additional Counter-Mortar concentrations. Finally "E" Battery fired sixteen (16) rounds on four (4) suspected VC locations. "D" Battery (175mm gun SP) attempted to engage one counter-mortar target, and fired one round. However, due to excessive minimum range "D" Battery was unable to engage.
AVCDAR-J-3

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Cont'd)

11. SUPPORTING FORCES: N/A

12. RESULTS:
   a. Enemy Losses: Unknown
   b. Friendly Losses: None

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: None

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: None

15. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:
   a. Clearance to fire was a problem. Missions were received by telephone from Div Arty but clearances were given over FM by the DS battalion. This could have created a serious problem.
   
   b. When Division Artillery assigned missions to specific units, other units requested permission to fire also, thus overloading the circuit.
   
   c. The FD sole-user circuit was sometimes ineffective. Improper telephone procedure and non-operational message complicated the circuit. On several occasions incoming calls for the Div Arty S-2 were switched into the FD circuit.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS:
   a. That missions and clearances should originate at the same headquarters.
   
   b. That the hot loop be reserved for fire direction.
   
   c. That battalions be required to guard the FD circuit with a qualified officer other than the S-3.
   
   d. Minimum range for the 175 mm Gun is 4000 meters and that it not be considered for counter-mortar role.

A TRUE COPY
/s/ William H. Sylvia Jr.

WILLIAM H. SYLVIA Jr.
Captain    Artillery
Adjutant

s/Richard L. Livermore
t/RICHARD L. LIVERMORE
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

#2
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

To: Commanding Officer
1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM)
ATTN: S-3
APO 96490

1. NAME OF OPERATION: Paul Revere II
2. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 2nd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division.
3. DATE OF OPERATION: 3-25 August 1966
4. LOCATION: Ia Drang Valley and Chu Phong Mountain area
5. INTELLIGENCE: FO's and Infantry Surveillance
6. MISSION: GSR 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery units
7. EXECUTION: Battery E (155 mm How Twd) departed base camp at 0700 hours on 3 August 1966, by motor convoy, to OASIS, Southwest of Pleiku, coord ZA 119 284. On 6 Aug 66, Battery "E" was airlifted by CH-54 (Skycrane) and CH-47A (Chinook) to LZ Juliet, coord YA 973 053. On 16 Aug 66, Battery "E" was airlifted to LZ CAT, coord YA 946 898. On 24 Aug 66, Battery "E" was airlifted back to OASIS. On 25 Aug 66, Battery "E" returned to base camp by motor convoy closing Camp Radcliff 251306 Aug 66.

8. REPORTING OFFICER: LTC Richard L. Livermore, Commanding, and CPT Maurice Myles, E Battery Commanding.
9. N/A
10. NARRATIVE SUMMARY: Battery "E" provided general support for the division artillery and reinforcing fires for the 1/21st and 1/77th Artilleries. 833 Missions were conducted with an expenditure of 5,983 rounds Battery "E" had the tactical mission of General Support Reinforcing (GSR) the 1/21st Artillery from 3-8 Aug 66. On 8 Aug 66, the battery was attached to the 1/77th Artillery.

Incl #3
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Cont'd)

On 8 Aug 66, 222 rounds were fired in support on coord YA 996 093. Observation was provided by 1/21st when the area was cleared surveillance revealed ninety (90) BC. Total casualties were estimated at 190. Other batteries firing this mission were C Battery, 1/21st Artillery, and C Battery, 1/77th Artillery. On 14 Aug 66, 101 rounds were fired in preparation of landing zones in the Chu Phong mountain area, coord 854 016. An additional 628 rounds were fired into the area during the period 14-15 Aug 66. Surveillance reports from Infantry Tac Air, and ARA indicated 150 BC. No other units were firing in this area during this period. Additional surveillance reports gave additional body count in areas of H&I fires. Timely and accurate fire was the order of the day.

11. SUPPORTING FORCES: Infantry units from the 1/7th Cav and 2/12th Cav provided position area security. Cooperation and protection provided by those units were outstanding.

12. RESULTS:

a. Enemy Losses
   (1) KIA - 180
   (2) Equipment - Unknown
   (3) Structures - Unknown
   (4) Secondary Explosions - none

b. Friendly Losses: None

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Supply: During period of GSR, resupply of ammo, water, and rations was sometimes very slow.

b. Maintenance: Support was required from many sources as 155 mm Howitzer parts were not readily available.

c. Communications: Organic

d. Medical: Received from supported units.

e. Transportations: Organic, and 478th and 228th Aviation Companies.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer
   1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery
   ATTN: S-3
   APO 96490

1. NAME OF OPERATION: VC attack of Area Hammond

2. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 1st Forward Support Element, Support Command, 1st Cavalry Division (Air)

3. DATE OF OPERATION: 230050 - 230400 Sep 66.

4. LOCATION: LZ Hammond (BR878543)

5. INTELLIGENCE: Reconnaissance of suspected VC locations subsequent to the attack revealed that attack was mounted by an estimated 50 VC utilizing 60 and 82 mortars, 57 mm recoilless rifle, rifle grenades (M-26), and small arms. Firing positions for mortars and recoilless rifles were found 300 - 700 meters from the perimeter.

6. MISSION: Conduct countermortar/counterrecoilless programs.

7. EXECUTION: N/A


9. TASK ORGANIZATION: N/A

10. NARRATIVE SUMMARY: At approximately 230050 Sep a coordinated attack by an estimated 50 VC was begun on Area Hammond. This was a carefully planned and executed attack by mortars, recoilless rifles, rifle launched grenades, and small arms fire. The fire was intense, well directed, and of short duration. The attack was consummated in approximately 20 minutes. During this period, an estimated 58 57 mm recoilless rifle rounds, 30 60 and 82 mm mortar rounds, 7
rifle grenades, and uncounted small arms fire was received in the battalion position. Other units at Hammond also received numerous rounds. Upon receipt of first rounds battalion guard personnel gave the alarm and battalion personnel moved to foxholes or duty positions. Fire was returned by small arms, automatic weapons, artillery direct and indirect fire. As this unit had operational control of a searchlight from B Battery, 1/29th Artillery (Searchlight), this instrument was used as a means of illuminating the area of operations, and also as a means of directing aerial rocket artillery from 2/20th Artillery. A forward observer party from D Battery had been placed on Red Hawk Ridge (BR 876543) and this element was instrumental in locating four mortar locations, and in directing ARA countermortar/counterrecoilless strikes. Conventional artillery from C Battery, 1/30th Artillery was directed on suspect locations until ARA arrived. The attack on this unit was generally from the northeast (AZ 0400), with RR firing from approximately 400 meters from the perimeter, 60 mm mortars firing from approximately 500 meters, 82 mm mortars from approximately 700 meters, rifle grenades from 200 meters, and small arms from ranges up to 300 meters.

During this attack unit personnel responded in an exemplary fashion. Most of the personnel of the battalion are newly assigned so this was their first occasion to be under enemy fire which was obviously directed toward them. Despite relative inexperience there was little or no confusion and they went about their tasks of returning fire in a professional manner. Personnel who particularly exemplified themselves were SP4 Ronald W. Boston, medical corpsman attached to Service Battery; 1LT Bobby D. Holder, Executive Officer of D Battery; SSG Pearlise J. Breaux; SSG Noah Meeks; SP5 James Theis; SP4 Clyde Connor, and PFC Juel V. Cotton, Hq Btry. Many of these individuals will be recommended for appropriate awards.

11. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. 1 Searchlight section, B Battery, 1/29th Artillery (SLT)
b. C Battery, 1/30th Artillery
c. Elements of 20th Artillery (ARA)
d. 15th Medical Battalion (Medivac)
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

12. RESULTS:

   a. Enemy Losses: Unknown. However, the presence of unexpended recoiless and mortar ammunition at the firing positions indicates that unit fire caused early termination of the attack, and rapid retreat from prepared positions.

   b. Friendly Losses: 2 KIA and 31 WIA. Of those personnel wounded only nine (9) required medical evacuation. Equipment damaged but repaired included two (2) 3/4 ton cargo trucks, four (4) 2 1/2 ton cargo trucks, one (1) M-543A2 5 ton wrecker, one 1/4 ton, and one (1) one (1) M-332 ammunition trailer were salvage.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: None

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: A Searchlight from B Battery, 1/29th Artillery (SLT) was used to guide ARA onto suspect mortar and recoiless rifle positions. This searchlight section was commanded by Sgt William Lawson, and under the guidance of 2LT Charles W. Huskins, D Battery. They proved extremely satisfactory and effective.

   Due to the lack of adequate infantry security elements this battalion formed a security element to cover approximately 1,200 meters of the Hammond perimeter. This element consisted of survey, communications, ammunition and mess personnel. The unit called themselves "F" Troop.

15. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:

   a. As always the enemy had made a careful analysis of the terrain and friendly troop dispositions and attacked during the darkest part of the night.

   b. The degree of success of this attack was increased by (1) the lack of adequate countermortar/counterrecoiless weapons in this area and (2) the lack of sufficient infantry to adequately secure the positions and patrol the area.

   c. Coordination and conduct of countermortar/counterrecoiless operations must have precedence over all other radio traffic. These operations must be controlled locally, and administrative radio traffic must be curtailed.
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AVDAAR-J-3

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

24 September 1966

16. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That the capability to conduct countermortar/counterrecoilless operations be considered when formulating the order to battle.

b. That adequate infantry support be provided to permit aggressive patrolling in the area of operations to preclude infiltration of VC to within mortar and recoilless range.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM H. SYLVIA Jr.
Captain Artillery
Adjutant

CONFIDENTIAL
AVFA-AT-52-66 (30 Oct 66) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
        ending 31 October 1966

Headquarters, 52d Artillery Group, APO 96295 4 November 1966

TO:  Commander, Officer, I ARTCCY Artillery, APO 96295

1. Forwarded herewith is the Operational Report, subject as above,
   for 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery.

2. Concur in observations and recommendations contained in basic
   communication except that it is believed Tdo provides for enough enlisted
   fire direction personnel. The need for the additional assistant 3d data
   exist.

C. L. TuHju
Colonel Artillery
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-AT-D (30 Oct 66)  2d Ind
SUBJECT:  Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 October 1966, (3d Bn, 18th Arty) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96350 - 3 DEC 1966

TO:  Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-047
APO 96350

1. (U) Concur with recommendations contained in basic report as
amplified in first indorsement.

2. (U) Action has been initiated by this headquarters to provide
a draft TOE which will reflect the composite nature of the 3d Bn, 18th
Arty. This draft will incorporate the following organisational changes:

a. An additional officer in each firing battery.

b. An additional Assistant S3 at battalion headquarters.

c. An ordnance maintenance support team augmentation.

3. (U) Ordnance maintenance support teams should be authorized and
assigned as augmentations to heavy artillery batteries. Advantages of
this augmentation include:

a. Ability to respond rapidly to unit requirements. With
ordnance support personnel available in the battalion or separate battery
area there is no travel time to delay the return to action of deadline
weapons. This delay can be further compounded with late evening and
night-time breakdowns when road travel is curtailed. The contact team
keeps a stockage of high mortality rate repair parts on hand. In addition,
a rapid system of parts supply can be established between the contact
team and its parent unit. Only constant association can develop coopera-
tion of this type.

b. Improvement of system maintenance and training. The close
association between organisational maintenance and field maintenance
personnel acts as a training vehicle. The organisational maintenance
personnel receive the benefit of the field maintenance team's more intense
schooling while the contact team personnel achieve experience with equip-
ment in its operational environment.

4. (U) Pending approval of a TOE incorporating changes specified
above, recommend that an ordnance maintenance support team be attached
to each heavy artillery battalion during operations in a combat theatre.
Contact team composition, as a minimum, should include one officer,
AVFA-AT-D (30 Oct 66)  2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 October 1966, (3d Bn, 18th Arty) (U)

one artillery mechanic, one fire control mechanic and a tracked vehicle
mechanic.

Ashley A. Blinn
ASHLEY A. BLINN
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL
AVFA-00-HIST

34 Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966, ROK GFOR - 65(I)

Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, APO US Forces 96350 1 DEC 1966

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307

Concur with comments in basic report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

William James
WILLIAM H. JAMES
Colonel, CEC
Adjutant General
AVIICC-DH (30 Oct 66)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 31 DEC 1966

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOV-CT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery as indorsed.

2. Reference Paragraph 3, Part I, Section II; Paragraph 3, Part II, Section II; and Subparagraph 2c, 3, and 4, 3d Indorsement, as pertain to ordnance maintenance support teams: Ordinance maintenance support teams (contact teams) are currently in support of all Field Force Vietnam US Army Artillery units. All these contact teams are under control of their parent maintenance organization. Nonconcur, for the following reasons, with unit's and indorsing headquarters' recommendation that these teams be attached: A paucity of skills throughout RVN required for effective artillery contact teams makes their attachment an uneconomical use of personnel. Loss of logistic control over an attached team by its parent organization would interfere with the rapid maintenance response presently enjoyed by the above artillery units. Contact teams are designed to "float" so that they may best advise, perform maintenance, and expedite the flow of repair parts/end items. In addition, a tendency for attached contact teams to become merged with organizational maintenance further hampers their mission capability.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. J. THORNTON
Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

4 Incl
nc
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GFOR-OT (30 Oct 66)  5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS GFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558  14 JAN 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L. L. CHAPPELL
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

4 Incl
nc

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLUSION(S)