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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (29 Mar 68) FOR OT RD 681075 3 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

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4th Brigade, 6th Infantry Division
1st Battalion, 82d Artillery
2d Battalion, 17th Artillery
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2D HOWITZER BATTALION, 17TH ARTILLERY
APO 96294

WA2FAA

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

THRU: Commanding Officer
41st Artillery Group
ATTN: AVGC-C
APO San Francisco 96368

TC: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I: SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OF UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General:
   a. 1 November 1967 through 19 January 1968 the battalion had the
      mission of reinforcing the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery with addition-
      al mission of direct support of Camp Radcliff Base Defense Maneuver Battalion.
      Provided Artillery support for the 1st Air Cavalry Division Replacement
      Training Center for the following:
      (1) Artillery demonstrations.
      (2) Artillery preparations for Infantry combat assault demon-
         strations.
      (3) Artillery demonstrations on the defense of a fire base.
   b. Provide Artillery support of the IFFV Artillery Forward Observer
      School.
   c. D Battery (Provisional), 2d Howitzer Battalion, 17th Artillery
      had the additional mission of general support reinforcing the 1st Battalion,
      77th Artillery.
   d. 19 January 1968 to present the battalion had the mission of
      direct support, 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry, and to continue support of the
      1st Air Cavalry Division Replacement Training Center.

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WA2PAA

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

2. (C) Intelligence:

a. The majority of the Viet population within the TAOR is under
government and favors the South Vietnamese Government. To the south and
northwest there are an unknown number of montagnard tribes. These tribes-
men do not like Vietnamese, VC, or GVN. At present, the VC control most
these people. They use them as agricultural site workers and bearers,
trail guides and watchers.

b. During the past quarter, activity and sightings increased with
33 reported incidents of mining on Highway 19 west and Highway 3A. The
majority of VC activity was directed against PF units and local government
officials. Two incidents of planned kidnaping have been reported by MCV
Sub-Sector, against local government and security officials, however, the
plan failed. OB indicates that VC and local guerrilla forces are reported
to be operating in the vicinity of Cu Lien Village and the hamlet of An
east of Cu To Village in the mountains northeast of Camp Radcliff.
In addition, numerous sightings have been reported of VC platoons armed
with 60, 81, and 82mm mortars, and light and heavy machine guns, southeast
of An Khe. Popular Forces have reported several incidents of VC platoons
using An Binh Hamlet as a base of operations and rest area. This hamlet
has been subject to repeated propaganda indoctrination by a VC group from
Tan An District. Propaganda leaflets have shown an increase in the villages
to the northeast during the past month.

c. In addition to local and main force VC units, in early December
NVA units conducted ambushes on Highway 19 west. These units suffered heavy
American casualties and have not been heard of since 4 December 1967. Current intel-
ligence indicates the presence of the 407th Sapper Battalion in the north-
west portion of the TAOR. The 5th Battalion, 95 B Regiment, which has been
involved in ambushes along Highway 19 west, is believed to be operating
southwest of Highway 19.

d. An increase in enemy contact began on 4 January 1968, with an
82mm mortar attack on Camp Radcliff during the early morning of 4 January
1968. On 5 January the An Khe police station and jail was attacked with
mortars and satchel charges, completely destroying the police station and
jail, and killing three National Policemen. On 26 January the An Khe Air-
strip at Camp Radcliff was attacked by an estimated VC Company, believed to
be the H-15 Sapper Company, which is a VC unit made up of NVA members.
This unit is believed to be operating out of Pleiku. On 28 January, base
camp was again mortared, receiving an estimated 100 rounds of 82mm mortars.
The attack was believed to be conducted by a local force of VC.

e. As of 31 January 1968 the 320th VC Battalion has been reported
5 to 6 kilometers southeast of An Khe and the 320th Sapper Battalion 8 to 10
kilometers southeast of An Khe.
SUBJECT: Operation Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities:
   a. Operations:
      (1) The battalion conducted 92 days of operations, 12 days of training and 2.5 days of movement.
      (2) From 1 November 1967 through 31 January 1968, firing batteries of this battalion spent a total of 274 days out of Camp Radcliff participating in tactical operations. The following operations were supported:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>DATES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pershing</td>
<td>1 November - 21 January 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPUM DAZZLEM (Highway 19)</td>
<td>1 November - Present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) In addition to participating in operations listed above, this battalion continued to furnish two supervisory NCO's to the Vinh Thanh Special Forces Camp.

(4) The battalion continued to meet requirements for defense of Camp Radcliff and security of Highway 19, with the mission of direct support of the Base Defense Maneuver Battalion. The battalion had all the responsibilities of fire support coordination center for Camp Radcliff. A forward observer has been furnished to each of the three provisional rifle companies manning the perimeter of Camp Radcliff, a liaison party to Camp Radcliff Tactical Operations Center, and a six man guard detail to augment the perimeter defense. During the reporting period the battalion had operational control of up to five firing batteries, a platoon from A Battery, 2/20 (Aerial Rocket Artillery), one search light from B Battery, 2/29 Artillery, two to three counter mortar radars, two twin 40mm Dusters, and one M55 Quad 50 from 41st Battalion, 60th Artillery.

(5) The battalion was attached to the 41st Artillery Group during the reporting period.

(6) A summary of Task Organization is attached as inclosure 1.

(7) A summary of ammunition expenditure is attached as inclosure 2.

(8) Artillery moves have been conducted by elements of this battalion in the TAOR and 10 as listed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION PR</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TYPE MOVE</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D 2/17</td>
<td>628 632</td>
<td>5 Nov 67</td>
<td>CH 47 &amp; 54</td>
<td>3 hours 50 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B 2/17</td>
<td>943 397</td>
<td>7 Nov 67</td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>4 days</td>
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</table>

3
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION BR</th>
<th>D/TE</th>
<th>TYPE MOV</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C 2/17</td>
<td>900 320</td>
<td>9 Nov 67</td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>72 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 2/17</td>
<td>500 364</td>
<td>9 Nov 67</td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>7 hours 10 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 2/17</td>
<td>410 530</td>
<td>24 Nov 67</td>
<td>CH 47</td>
<td>10 hours 10 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D 2/17</td>
<td>629 631</td>
<td>25 Nov 67</td>
<td>CH 47</td>
<td>4 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 2/17</td>
<td>410 530</td>
<td>25 Nov 67</td>
<td>CH 47</td>
<td>10 hours 45 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 2/17</td>
<td>333 373</td>
<td>27 Nov 67</td>
<td>CH 47</td>
<td>11 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 2/17</td>
<td>455 408</td>
<td>26 Nov 67</td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>2 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 2/17</td>
<td>448 410</td>
<td>30 Nov 67</td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>8 hours 58 min</td>
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<tr>
<td>B 2/17</td>
<td>523 461</td>
<td>2 Dec 67</td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>10 hours 30 min</td>
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<tr>
<td>A 2/17</td>
<td>336 376</td>
<td>26 Dec 67</td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>9 hours 30 min</td>
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<tr>
<td>A 2/17</td>
<td>CH 105 237</td>
<td>10 Jan 68</td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>30 hours</td>
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<tr>
<td>C 2/17</td>
<td>850 498</td>
<td>10 Jan 68</td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>3 days</td>
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</table>

(9) D Battery, 2/17th stationed at the Vinh Thanh Special Forces Camp (Happy Valley). Perimeter at the camp is provided by CIDG. The security is inadequate for the following reasons:

(a) Will not build defensive bunkers.

(b) Stationed where observation is impossible.

(c) Are frequently found asleep on guard.

(d) Supervisory personnel are not present on the perimeter with the CIDG. Attempts to properly deploy the CIDG on the perimeter have been hampered by the lack of interpreters.

(10) This unit is presently experiencing difficulty in resupplying D Battery with 155mm ammunition, as only 500 to 600 rounds may be moved by each resupply convoy due to limitations of available vehicles and personnel. Restrictions on this battalion are as follows:

(a) Resupply by CH-47's will be provided as an infrequent relief for vehicle convoys.

(b) During part of the reporting period a maximum of two trips a week could be made by direction of Commanding Officer, 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery.

(c) Each convoy must be preceded by a mine sweeper. (See inclosure 3, record of mining incidents.)

(d) The road must be secured by CIDG prior to each convoy.

(e) At the present time the battalion ammunition section is making an ammunition resupply every two days.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

31 January 1968

(RCS-GSFOH-65) (U)

DISCUSSION: Assault Fire

(a) C Battery, 2d Howitzer Battalion, 17th Artillery fired one gun, assault fire, in support of NVA ground operations in conjunction with NAPC Company of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The following minimum equipment was required:

1. M-10 or M-16 plotting board.

2. Protractor, with a string attached in the center hole for a means of locating the azimuth to the target from the gun position to the nearest ten mils.

3. TFT and GFT's (the GFT's are only used to determine the 100/R factor for the prescribed range). It is as accurate as arithmetic computations until the fire is in close proximity to the target.

4. Smoke and WP rounds in addition to the prescribed number of HE ammunition.

5. Aiming circle.

6. A howitzer to include complete section equipment, test target and direct fire scope.

7. Maps and SOI.

8. A deflection board, as illustrated on page 30 of "Notes for the Battery Executive", should be attached to the near aiming post if the time and situation permits.

(b) The first rounds to be fired from the howitzer were ranging rounds to give both the observer and the OIC a chance to see a 100 meter range change. The same was done in deflection. This was done primarily because the Infantry and mechanized forces were to later advance in front of the howitzer, and if the need should arise, the howitzer could have been quickly adjusted by the observer in the lead element without requiring a "safe distance" round. The commander of the Infantry unit requested fire in trenches that were partially concealed by trees and rolling terrain. To obtain the desired effect, fuze time was used and it proved successful in getting "steel" into the desired area without trying to pinpoint the fire which would have proved to be time consuming. The time settings were tested prior to firing over the heads of the friendly troops.

(c) CONCLUSIONS: An FDC is not required if the OIC understands the M-16 or the M-10 plotting board and "hipshoot" procedures. Due to low elevations, and the use of arithmetic, rather than graphic computations, the advantages of using an FDC is negated. The howitzer section
should have the required slings and other equipment for moving the howitzer out of position, if the tactical situation requires the need. Smoke should be included in the ammunition taken as this battery was called upon to be ready to provide close support fires for friendly troops. The capabilities and limitations of assault fire must be explained to the supported unit to preclude misunderstanding and misuse of the weapon. This didn’t occur in this case, but as it is a seldom used technique, an explanation of the principles is recommended. Once the maneuver element is committed, rapid reaction is the key to successful use of the assault fire technique. More use could be made of the assault fire technique in Vietnam, and additional training should be conducted in the principles involved.

(12) DISCUSSION: Quick Fire Targets

(a) One organic and one attached battery of this battalion are normally located within Camp Radcliff. Each battery is assigned six Quick Fire targets each evening. These targets are located within 400 to 600 meters of the defensive barrier in an area that is normally designated a free fire area during the hours of darkness. Each afternoon after the targets are cleared, data for each target is computed and set on each howitzer. This data is kept current throughout the night. In the event Camp Radcliff receives a mortar attack, the Battalion FDC immediately announces Quick Fire to the batteries. Each howitzer engages the assigned target, zone fire 5 miles. The three HE rounds (fuse quick) are followed by an illumination shell. This Quick Fire procedure provides a large volume of fire immediately, as the average reaction time for a battery to have rounds “shot” after receiving the command is approximately 15 to 20 seconds. Each battery is also assigned secondary Quick Fire targets which are within 100 to 300 meters of the barrier. These targets are fired only on order from the Battalion Commander or the S-3 due to their close proximity to friendly troops. The targets are based on the terrain, an analysis of previous enemy mortar attacks, and their established pattern of positions of mortar or other positions in the immediate area. As soon as the enemy positions are reported by personnel manning the barrier, by radar or aerial rocket artillery aircraft flying mortar patrol, the fires of the batteries are shifted. The fires are also shifted to likely routes of withdrawal. Reaction tests are also conducted in the form of Quick Fire tests. When Quick Fire tests are announced by battalion FDC each howitzer fires one round (HE) at the target. This serves as a means of testing the reaction time of each battery, and ensuring that Quick Fire data is set on the howitzers at all times during the hours of darkness, except when they are actually firing another mission, as sighting and/or shell reports are determined the fires are shifted to other targets.

(b) CONCLUSIONS: The use of Quick Fire targets have proven to be worthwhile during previous mortar attacks. After the attack on Camp Radcliff on 3 April 1967, unused mortar rounds were found in the firing position and it was concluded that, due to artillery fire, the enemy
force withdrew prior to expending the planned number of rounds. This system is deemed more satisfactory than firing a "battery one round" at different locations because it provides fire immediately on many targets, and it is safer. Due to the physical arrangement of the defensive forces around Camp Radcliff, the Quick Fire targets are located in an area that extends out 1000 meters from the manned barrier around Camp Radcliff. Short of and beyond this 1000 meter area there are friendly troops. Firing a battery one round with a deflection and range spread within this area and under combat conditions could prove to be an unnecessary safety risk.

(13) 7 November 1967 - B Battery, 2d Howitzer Battalion, 17th Artillery, stationed in the Pershing AO, was ordered to move to vicinity HR 943 397 to participate in a joint 3 nation operation (Hanh Quan 623) which included ROK, SVN and U.S. troops. The battery operated as the fire support element for a major portion of the area and operated independently from any other headquarters. During this 5 day period the battery had one problem; because of the typhoon Freda which left the area in a condition similar to the rice paddies surrounding the battery. All missions were accomplished without much delay due to the muddy conditions.

b. Training:

(1) Training emphasis continued on orientation of incoming personnel and included air movement, physical fitness, rules of engagement, weapons familiarization, safety and accuracy of fires.

(2) The battalion continues to send new replacement to the 1st Air Cavalry Division Replacement Training Center. The four day orientation has continued to be of assistance in preparing incoming personnel for combat duty.

(4) The battalion supported the 1st Air Cavalry Division Replacement Training Center by providing instructors, forward observers, coordination of Artillery and conducting Artillery demonstrations every four days.

(5) During the reporting period the battalion expended 14,961 rounds in support of the Division Replacement Training Center.

(5) The battalion conducted nine forward observers schools, training 82 officers in the following subjects:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Duties of the Forward Observer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio Telephone Procedures</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Observation</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Air Support</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(SUBJECT) HOURS

Aerial Rocket Artillery 5
Naval Gunfire 1
Lessons Learned 5
Service Practice (Subjects Listed Below)
  Ground Observation 12
  Air Observation
  Aerial Rocket Artillery
  Suppressive Fires
  Targets of Opportunity
  Firing of Defensive Targets
  Adjustment by Sound
  Close Support Fires
  Recon by Fire
  Techniques of Night Firing 6
  Naval Gunfire Service Practice 4

(4) The Forward Observer School responsibility was assumed by IFNV Artillery on 1 January 1968. The battalion continues to support the school with Artillery support, one NCO and one driver and equipment.

4. (U) Logistics:

   e. Supply:

   (1) The following major items of equipment were turned-in by the battalion during the period of 1 November 1967 to 26 January 1968.

      (a) Generator Set, 0.5 KW 23 volt - 1 each
      (b) Receiver-Transmitter RT-524 - 1 each (Report of Survey)
      (c) Truck, cargo 2½ ton M35A1, w/m - 1 each
      (d) Telephone set TM-43/pt - 1 each

   (2) The following mission essential items were received during the period of 1 November 1967 to 26 January 1968.

      (a) Aiming Circle, M-2 - 1 each
      (b) Truck, Pktn, utility ½ ton M274A3 - 1 each
      (c) Truck, 2½ ton M35A2, w/m - 1 each
      (d) Test set radio AN/VRM-1 - 2 each
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

(3) The following mission essential items are still due out "A" or "B" priority.

(a) Generator set, 2.5 KW AC 120 volt - 1 each
(b) Generator set, 1.5 KW 28 volt DC - 1 each
(c) Radio set AN/PRC-25 - 1 each
(d) Radio set AN/VRC-46, mtd in trk 1/2 ton - 3 each
(e) Radio set AN/VRC-46, mtd in trk 3/4 ton - 2 each
(f) Receiver-Transmitter RT-524 - 3 each
(g) Telephone, T-312/pt - 4 each
(h) Theodolite, T-16 - 2 each
(i) Truck, utility 1/4 ton M151AL - 1 each

b. Support:

(1) The battalion provided logistical support for B Battery, 2/19 Artillery and B Battery, 1/77 Artillery during the reporting period.

(2) Class I support of the Division Artillery Provisional Platoon occupying positions on the Camp Radcliff barrier was continued by the battalion. A Battery, 2/17 Artillery was given the responsibility of requisitioning, preparing and transporting rations to the Provisional Platoon.

(3) Vehicle and equipment support for the Provisional Platoon on the greenline remains unchanged with 3/4 ton trucks with radios.

(4) Normal logistical support of all classes of supply was maintained for organic batteries at Camp Radcliff, Highway 19 and Vinh Thanh throughout the period.

(5) Aerial resupply of unit operations in the TAOR, local Artillery raids and Vinh Thanh area was accomplished during the reporting period. Airlift sorties used for lift and resupply, including movement of batteries to and from AO were:

(a) 62 UH-1D Sorties
(b) 210 CH-47 Sorties
(c) 5 CH-54 Sorties
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
(RCS-CSFOR-68) (U)

c. Ammunition: The following quantities of ammunition were drawn, unpackaged, transported and issued to organic and attached batteries during the reporting period:

1. 105mm
   (a) HE - 48,410 Rounds
   (b) WP - 5,212 Rounds
   (c) SMK - 1,250 Rounds
   (d) ILL - 4,400 Rounds

2. 155mm
   (a) HE - 29,324 Rounds
   (b) WP - 424 Rounds
   (c) SMK - 140 Rounds
   (d) ILL - 137 Rounds

d. Base Development:

1. Buildings and Building Pads: During the reporting period a new battalion maintenance building, 30 X 105, and a new battalion communications building, 20 X 40, were erected and completed.

2. Construction Completed to Date:
   (a) Battery Mess Halls - 5
   (b) 20 X 80 Buildings - 22
   (c) 20 X 40 Buildings - 2
   (d) 20 X 40 Orderly/Supply Rooms - 5
   (e) 20 X 40 Operations Bunker - 1
   (f) 20 X 20 Maintenance Office - 1
   (g) 12 X 22 Battery Latrine/Shower Units - 5
   (h) 15 X 30 Officer's Latrine/Shower Unit - 1
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WA2FAA
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

   (i) 40 X 80 NCO Club - 1
   (j) 30 X 105 Battalion Maintenance Building - 1
   (k) 20 X 40 Battalion Communications Building - 1

5. (U) Civil Affairs:

   a. The battalion has a sole civic action project consisting of a
   Chieu Hoi Hamlet, it is a self help project, with our unit furnishing some
   of the construction material and guidance on how to improve it. During
   this past month the families kept working on improvements of their houses
   and lots. Two Vietnamese advisors visit the village frequently to discuss
   village problems.

   b. Sick call activities were conducted weekly to Chieu Hoi refu-
   gees at Kim Dong Village and Tu Long Village in the area of Civic Action
   responsibility. The average number of Chieu Hoi patients treated each sick
   call was 27 and at Tu Long the average was 16.

   c. Current Projects:

   (1) Weekly English classes are conducted by one of our officers.
   There are around 30 children who attend these classes.

   (2) B Battery sends laundry twice a week.

   (3) Village playground.

   (4) Furnishing paint for quarters beautification.

   d. Projects completed to date:

   (1) Village gate constructed,

   (2) Road around village,

   (3) Family plots and houses.

   (4) Village wells.

   e. Proposed projects:

   (1) Distribution of pigs and construction of pig sites.

   (2) Construction of village aid stations.

   (3) Construction of a community bulletin board.

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(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

(4) Construction of a village flag pole. The fund has $418.70.

6. (U) Personnel:

a. General: Liaison and working relationships continued with IFFV, 41st Artillery Group and 1st Air Cavalry Division in the transition from detachment from 1st Air Cavalry Division to attachment 41st Artillery Group.

b. Personnel Status:

(1) During the reporting period the battalion had a net gain of 92 personnel.

(2) Gains and losses for 1 November 1967 to 31 January 1968:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GAINS</th>
<th>LOSSES</th>
<th>NET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>137</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Morale:

(1) Morale continued to be high. Personnel engaged in combat operations were especially well motivated.

(2) During the reporting period, the battalion received and filled 101 out-of-country rest and recuperation quotas, and 6 in-country allocations.

(3) Awards and Decorations:

(a) Silver Star - 1
(b) Bronze Star - 1
(c) Air Medal - 2
(d) Army Commendation Medal - 2

(4) Religious services continued to be available at Camp Radcliff.

d. Discipline, Law and Order: Normal activities.

e. Medical:

(1) Malaria: There were two cases of malaria during the quarter, which represents a 33% decrease from the last reporting period.
WA2FAA

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (RCS-CSFOR-65) (3)

(2) Venereal Disease: A minor problem area, instructions by the Chaplain and the Battalion Surgeon are instrumental in educating the troops in this area.

(3) Sick Call:
   (a) Sick Call Patients: 615
   (b) Deaths:
      (1) Killed in action: 0
      (2) Death due to injury: 0
   (c) Wounded: 1
   (d) Injured: 32

SECTION II: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned)

Item: Aircraft Support.

Discussion: The need for organic aircraft exists for visual reconnaissance of the TACR, daily registration and command control of the batteries. A minimum of two aircraft are required. Presently one OH-13 is made available through 41st Artillery Group. One OH-13 helicopter and one OH-13 aircraft are required for command liaison visits to batteries and for observation.

Observations: A minimum of two aircraft are essential for this battalion to fulfill the assigned tactical missions. The system of assigning aircraft from supporting units is not feasible due to maintenance down time. Organic aircraft would be a more effective solution.

Part II: Recommendations: Recommend that one OH-13 and one OH-13 be assigned or attached to this unit.

Incl
1. Task Organizations
2. Record of Ammunition Expenditure
3. Mining Incidents
4. After Action Report - Mortar Attack (Camp Radcliff)
   5. After Action Report - Mortar Attack (3 Btry)

13
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGK-CO (31 Jan 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 41ST ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96368, 14 February 1968

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350

(C) The Operational Report Lessons Learned for the 2nd Battalion, 17th Artillery is approved and forwarded with the following comments.

a. Reference section I, par 3a (9) and (10). Battery D was displaced from Vinh Thanh Special Forces Camp on 7 February 1968 and inactivated on 9 February 1968.

b. Reference section II, parts I and II. A second OL aircraft will be made available to 2nd Battalion, 17th Artillery on a daily basis beginning February 14th.

MARHL L. WELCH
LTC, Artillery
Acting Commander
AVFA-AT-D (31 Jan 68) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
(RCS-CSPOR-65) (U)

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350, 28 February 1968

THRU: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GG-CT, APO
96350

TO: Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Washington, D.C., 20310

Concur with observation and recommendation contained in basic communi-
cation and preceding indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

LOUIS W. MITERA
2d LT, Arty
Assistant Adjutant
AVFA-QC-OT (31 Jan 68)  3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968  RCS CSFOR-65  UIC WAZFA  2d Bn 17th Arty (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 1 FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350  10 MAR 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHQC-DST,
APO 96375

Concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ROBERT C. GABBARD
ILT; AGC
ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copy furnished:
HQ IFFORCEV Arty
AVHGC-DST (31 Jan 68) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 14 MAR 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (WA2FAA) as indorsed.

2. Concur with report as indorsed. Report is considered adequate.

3. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ, I FFORCEV
HQ, 2d Bn, 17th Arty
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 2d Bn, 17th Arty (WA2FAA) for Period Ending 31 Jan 68

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco  96558  21 Mar 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.  20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

CL SHORT
CP, AOC
Army AG
## SUMMARY OF TASK ORGANIZATION FOR NOVEMBER 1967

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Incl 1

CONFIDENTIAL
## SUMMARY OF TASK ORGANIZATION FOR DECEMBER 1967

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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATES AND TASK ORGANIZATION</th>
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</thead>
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| 2/17 Arty (-)         | 1 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 67  
Attached 41st Artillery Gp  
Base Defense Artillery on  
OPL/N Dazzlem  
Camp Radcliff                                      |
| A 2/17 Arty           | 1 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 67  
Parent Unit Control  
OPL/N Dazzlem  
Highway 19                                              |
| B 2/17 Arty           | 1 Dec 67 - 2 Dec 67  
Attached 1/77 Arty  
Pershing  
Binh Dinh Province  
2 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 67  
Parent Unit Control  
OPL/N Dazzlem  
Camp Radcliff                                              |
| C 2/17 Arty           | 1 Dec 67 - 2 Dec 67  
Parent Unit Control  
OPL/N Dazzlem  
Camp Radcliff  
2 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 67  
Attached 1/77 Arty  
Pershing  
Binh Dinh Province                                      |
| D 2/17 Arty           | 1 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 67  
Parent Unit Control  
Pershing/Haugen  
Binh Dinh Province                                      |
| B 7/7 Arty            | 1 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 67  
Attached 2/17 Arty  
OPL/N Dazzlem  
Camp Radcliff                                            |
| B 7/19 Arty           | 1 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 67  
Attached 2/17 Arty  
OPL/N Dazzlem  
Camp Radcliff                                            |
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SUMMARY OF TASK ORGANIZATION FOR JANUARY 1968

UNIT

DATES AND TASK ORGANIZATIONS

2/17 Arty (-)

1 Jan 68 - 31 Jan 68
Attached 41st Arty Gp
Base Defense Arty En
OPLAN Dazzlem
Camp Radcliff

A 2/17 Arty

1 Jan 68 - 8 Jan 68
8 Jan 68 - 10 Jan 68
Parent Unit Control
OPLAN Dazzlem
Highway 19
Camp Radcliff

G 3/319 Arty

1 Jan 68 - 21 Jan 68
21 Jan 68 - 31 Jan 68
Attached 2/77 Arty
Pershing
Binh Dinh Province

B 2/19 Arty

1 Jan 68 - 21 Jan 68
Attached 2/17 Arty
OPLAN Dazzlem
Camp Radcliff

C 3/319 Arty

10 Jan 68 - 21 Jan 68
Attached 2/17 Arty
OPLAN Dazzlem
Camp Radcliff

D 2/17 Arty

1 Jan 68 - 31 Jan 68
Parent Unit Control
Pershing/Dazzlem
Binh Dinh Province
# CONFIDENTIAL

## RECORD OF NED EXPLOSIONS

**PERIOD 1 Nov 67 - 31 Dec 67 OPERATION PERSHING/DAZZLE**

### SHELL

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<tr>
<th>FIRE UNIT</th>
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<th>ILL</th>
<th>SMK</th>
<th>BEEHIVE</th>
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<td>C</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>10,491</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>3,856</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31,129</td>
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**PERIOD 1 Jan 68 - 31 Dec 68 OPERATION PERSHING/DAZZLE**

### SHELL

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<th>HE</th>
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<th>ILL</th>
<th>SMK</th>
<th>BEEHIVE</th>
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<td>A</td>
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<td>155</td>
<td>125</td>
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<td>636</td>
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<td>5,889</td>
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<td>C</td>
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<td>235</td>
<td>747</td>
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<td>D</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,686</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>28,183</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>608</td>
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<td>29,394</td>
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**PERIOD 1 Jan 69 - 31 Dec 69 OPERATION PERSHING/DAZZLE**

### SHELL

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<th>FIRE UNIT</th>
<th>HE</th>
<th>WP</th>
<th>ILL</th>
<th>SMK</th>
<th>BEEHIVE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>5,135</td>
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<td>202</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11,184</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>680</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28,087</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Incl 2**

## CONFIDENTIAL
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MINING INCIDENTS HIGHWAY 723A 1 NOV 67 TO 31 JAN 68

1. 2 Nov 67 - ER 637 513 - Mine, TNT
2. 4 Nov 67 - ER 623 556 - Anti-personnel mine, 5 lbs TNT
3. 11 Nov 67 - ER 639 503 - 1-105mm projectiles found
4. 20 Nov 67 - ER 637 510 - Anti-personnel mine
5. 20 Nov 67 - ER 635 525 - 105mm pressure released mine
6. 22 Nov 67 - ER 634 473 - 105mm pressure release mine
7. 22 Nov 67 - ER 638 477 - 105mm pressure release mine
8. 26 Nov 67 - ER 641 506 - Mine, type unknown
9. 6 Dec 67 - ER 643 480 - Mine, type unknown
10. 15 Dec 67 - ER 633 533 - 105mm dud found
11. 30 Dec 67 - ER 632 542 - Mine, type unknown
12. 15 Jan 68 - ER 633 542 - Mine, type unknown
13. 23 Jan 68 - ER 629 549 - Mine found, blown in place
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2D HOWITZER BATTALION, 17TH ARTILLERY
APO 96490

8 January 1968

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (U)

TO: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam Artillery
ATTN: S-3
APO 96350

1. (U) Reference verbal request from CG, IFFV Artillery on 7 January 1968.


3. (U) Reporting headquarters: 2d Howitzer Battalion, 17th Artillery

4. (U) Reporting officer: LTC Marth L. Welch, Commanding Officer, 2d Howitzer Battalion, 17th Artillery.

5. (C) Intelligence:

a. Weather: The weather favored the enemy from the standpoint of visual observation. The weather at 040230 January 1968 as recorded by the USAF Weather Detachment at Camp Radcliff was 2000 feet broken clouds, visibility 6 miles.

b. Terrain: The terrain in the area where the two enemy mortars were located favored the enemy. The positions were approximately 150 meters north of tower 17, in partial defilade and relatively immune to automatic weapons fire from tower 17. If the tower personnel had detected the mortars they could have engaged with M-79's.

c. Light data: Sunset 1833, EECT 1858, EENT 1922, moon rise 0950, moon set 2140, PMI 10.

d. Incidents prior to the attack.

(1) 022030 December 1967, OP Harry, BR 549 516, reported 3 explosions 100 meters outside perimeter, 2 possible mortar rounds, 1 possible claymore mine.

(2) 030921 January 1968, Division Training Center reported at

Incl 4
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AVGK-iJ
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (U)

8 January 1968

BR 412 483 estimated platoon size camp site used night of 2 to 3 January 1968. Searched area and found fresh foot prints, did not pursue. 030925 January 1968, same location, observed an enemy 200 meters to north. Engaged, negative assessment.

(3) During the month of December enemy activity increased with the exception of the cease fire periods in the Dasalam AO. There was only one violation reported during the Christmas cease fire and one during the New Years cease fire, both resulted in negative casualties.

e. Units responsible: It is suspected that the mortar attack was conducted by local Viet Cong in conjunction with NVA cadre. Prior to the attack local Viet Cong had boasted of an attack planned on Camp Redcliff and local government agencies.

f. Searchlights: One searchlight was integrated into the base defense plan and it was operational. During the attack it was located at BR 478 484. It is used as a roving searchlight and is available for use anywhere around the barrier.

g. Radars:

(1) Two counter mortar radars, AN/MPQ4A and AN/MPQ10A, were integrated into the base defense plan, however, only the AN/MPQ4A was operational. Their locations were as follows:

(a) Radar, 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery, BR 475 486, AN/MPQ4A.

(b) Radar, 8th Battalion, 26th Artillery, BR 474 447, AN/MPQ10A.

(2) The coverage capabilities of the radars are graphically depicted in enclosure 1.

(3) As in previous attacks on base camp, the counter mortar radars failed to produce accurate target information. Enemy mortars were located in the AN/MPQ10A sector, which was nonoperational during the mortar attack due to mechanical failure of the transmitter.

h. Visual sightings: The following was a visual sighting reported during the mortar attack.

Observer sighting: Tower 17 observer, mortar flashes at grid BR 475 495 at 0313 hours, however, it wasn’t reported to Battalion FDC until 0333 hours. Artillery fire was delivered in that area at 0335 hours.

i. Shell reports:

CONFIDENTIAL
AVGK-LJ
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (U)

8 January 1968

(1) At 0345 hours CPT Williams, S-2, arrived at Golf Course (helicopter revetments). Several craters were analyzed and it was determined that the rounds came from a direction of 0300 mils (see inclosure 3).

(2) At first light, a more detailed analysis was conducted and confirmed the back azimuth of 0300 mils. A total of 83 craters were counted and all plotted back to the mortar position located at BR 470 497.

j. Confirmed enemy locations:

(1) Two 82mm mortar positions were located by 2/17 observer at 0910 at grid BR 470 497.

(2) The following items of equipment were found at the above location:

(a) 8 baskets (for mortars)
(b) 2 fuzes (for 82mm mortar rounds)
(c) Several powder increments

k. Conclusions:

(1) An estimated platoon size force launched the mortar attack on Camp Radcliff.

(2) The platoon was made up of local Viet Cong supported by NVA cadre.

(3) The attack was probably launched for the following reasons:

(a) To destroy personnel and equipment, primarily the CH-47 helicopters, at Camp Radcliff.

(b) To serve as a political victory for local Viet Cong forces in order to gain the support of the civilian populace.

(c) To fulfill the threats that had been made concerning an attack on Camp Radcliff.

6. (C) Friendly situation:

a. At the time of the attack all elements of the 1/12 Cavalry were located either in base camp, in strong points on the Y ring outside base camp or in positions along Highway 19.

26
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGK-AJ
8 January 1968

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (U)

b. (1) Location of searchlight: See paragraph 5f.
   (2) Counter mortar radars: See paragraph 5g.
   (3) Personnel radars: Not controlled by this unit.
   (4) Starlight scopes: N/A

c. Disposition of forces on the barrier perimeter. Three Provisional Companies manned the D ring.

d. Location of mines and anti-invasion devices (IN/PSR-1). The information is not available to this unit.

e. Status of ARA aircraft: There were no airborne ARA ships at the time of the attack. Both aircraft were airborne by 0316 hours after receiving alert of incoming mortar rounds. The scheduled time during which ARA flew mortar patrols for 3 to 4 January 1968 were as follows: 2315-0015 and 0100-0215 hours.

f. Tube artillery support: At the time of the attack two batteries were positioned within Camp Radcliff. Battery B, 2/17 at grid BR 455 480 and Battery B, 2/19 at grid BR 473 490. Battery A, 2/17 was located at LZ Schueler (BR 363 457) on Highway 19 and was in position to provide support for the base defense. Quick fire was initiated by one battery within 20 seconds and the second battery in less than one minute, in addition to counter mortar targets. Immediately after the conclusion of the attack, possible routes of escape were engaged for approximately one hour. A listing of targets engaged is attached as inclosure 2. A record of ammunition expenditure is attached as inclosure 3. A graphical portrayal of the scheduled counter mortar targets for the night of 3 to 4 January 1968 is attached as inclosure 4.

7. (C) Summary of actions (all entries are from the 2/17 Artillery Daily Journal):

a. 0308 - Camp Radcliff receiving incoming mortar rounds.
b. 0309 - All batteries engaging quick fire targets.
c. 0316 - Incoming rounds stopped.
d. 0317 - B 2/19 fired on BR 518 538, suspect mortar locations.
e. 0333 - Tower 17 reported seeing flashes at 0313, approximate grid BR 475 495.
f. 0335 - B 2/17 firing secondary quick fire targets.
g. 0336 - CPT Huff (FDO) plotted possible avenues of withdrawal to north, east and west of camp.

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SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (U)

8 January 1968

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h. 0345 - B 2/19 firing secondary quick fire targets.

i. 0347 - 1/77 radar sent sighting, grid BR 455 487 (inside camp).

j. 0350 - Tower 13 reported mortar flashes earlier, approximate grid 449 498.

k. 0354 - CPT Huff plotted targets of withdrawal for A 2/17.

l. 0355 - CPT Williams, S-2, reported shellrep, azimuth 6400 mils.

m. 0359 - CPT Williams reported additional azimuth 0300 mils.

n. 0400 - Tower 35 saw flashes to left front, range 1000 meters.

o. 0420 - CPT Williams has 82mm mortar fins at 1st Cavalry Division DTOC.

p. 0421 - CPT Towler called AFVN radio station An Khe to broadcast people to leave mortar duds and fins alone and report to higher up.

q. 0458 - Wildcat Twist (Terminated general alert)

8. (C) Results of the attack:

a. Friendly

   (1) Personnel: KIA - 0  
                   WIA - 1 (very slight)  
                   MIA - 0

   (2) Equipment:

       (a) Aircraft: 4 CH-47 chinooks received major damage  
                   and 3 CH-47's received minor damage.

       (b) Other: 1 building near the Golf Course received  
                   minor damage and 8 runway panels damaged.

b. Enemy: Unknown

9. (C) Commanders conclusions and analysis:

   a. Conclusions: The artillery delivered rapid and accurate fires,  
      however, since the enemy mortar locations were not detected, it was impossi-  
      ble to deliver fire on the positions. If ARA had been airborne at the time  
      of the attack, the pilot would probably have been successful in detecting  
      the mortar positions, therefore enabling him to attack the position and to  
      adjust artillery fire on the enemy force. With only one section (two air-  
      craft) of ARA available at Camp Radcliff, it is impractical to fly a contin-  
      uous mortar patrol each night and fulfill daylight tactical commitments.
The AN/MPQ4A radar was not oriented in the direction of the attack, and subsequently, during searches of the remainder of the suspect mortar locations, it was unable to detect any enemy mortar rounds. The primary scan sector for the AN/MPQ10A radar included the enemy mortar positions, and if the radar had been operational, it would have been searching in this sector. Therefore, it must be assumed that the enemy rounds would have been detected and the location could have been determined.

b. Recommendations:

1. A minimum of four ARA aircraft be available for support of Camp Radcliff.

2. Two additional AN/MPQ4A radars and one AN/MPQ10A radar are needed to provide the proper coverage of Camp Radcliff. The proposed scan sectors of these additional radars and the presently assigned AN/MPQ4A and AN/MPQ10A radars are indicated in enclosure 5.

Incl
1. Sector of scan for the counter mortar radars
2. Targets fired on 3 to 4 Jan 68
3. Record of ammo expended
4. Counter mortar target overlay
5. Proposed radar sectors of search

CP:
ADC-B, 1st Cav Div, APO 96490
CO, 1st Cav Div Arty, APO 96490
CO, 41st Arty Gp, APO 96368
NOTE: AN/MPS-10A was non-operational during the attack.
### Targets Fired on 03 to 04 January 1968

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**Incl 2 to Incl 4**
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### Record of Ammo Expended

**01.0300 Jan 68 to 01.0600 Jan 68 Operation Fire Support Attack**

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*Incl 3 to Incl 4*
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A TOTAL OF 83, 82mm MORTAR ROUNDS LANDED ON THE GOLF COURSE HELIPAD FROM A BACK AXIAL OF 0300M.

+ = QUICK FIRE TARGETS
X = MORTAR LOCATION

Incl 4 to Incl 4
PROPOSED SECTORS OF SEARCH FOR 1 AN/MPQ10A AND 3 AN/MPQ4A RADARS

Incl 5 to Incl 4

CAMP RADCLIFF BARRIER

Y-RING

CONFIDENTIAL
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 17th Artillery (U)**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 67-31 Jan 1968

CO, 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery

**Report Date**
31 January 1968

**Total No. of Pages**
35

**Originator's Report Number**
681075

**Distribution Statement**

**Supplementary Notes**
N/A

**Sponsoring Military Activity**
OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**Abstract**