**UNCLASSIFIED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AD NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD389325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIMITATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 03 DEC 1967. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 20310.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED**
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Adjutant General School
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chemical School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Missile and Munitions School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Security Agency School
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
The Surgeon General
The Provost Marshal General
Research Analysis Corporation (Library)
Dr. Martin J. Bailey, OSD(SA)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Joint Action Control Office
Defense Documentation Center
Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
Commanding Generals
1st Infantry Division
5th Infantry Division (Mech)
US Army Weapons Command
Commanding Officers
4th Brigade, 6th Infantry Division
1st Battalion, 82d Artillery

This report, received at Hqs, Department of the Army without complete indorsements, is published as received to preclude further delay in benefits gained from the lessons learned herein.
AVDB-TT (MHD)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
AFO San Francisco 96345

3 December 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period 1 August - 31 October 1967, (RCS CSPOR-65)

THRU: Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam
ATTN: G3 Analysis
AFO 96266

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

The inclosed Operational Report-Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with AR 1-19 and USARV Regulation 1-19 dated 3 November 1967.

FOR THIS COMMANDER:

[Signature]

This document regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosures.

FOR OF RD
T674246

CONFIDENTIAL
I. Significant Organization and Activities

A. Introduction ....................................................... 1
B. Organization ......................................................... 1
C. Intelligence .......................................................... 2
D. Combat Operations ................................................... 7
E. Training .............................................................. 12
F. Psychological Operations and Civic Action, Revolutionary
   Development Support ............................................... 14
G. Personnel and Administration ....................................... 15
H. Logistics (See Support Command ORLL, Inclosure 7)

II. Commanders Observations and Recommendations

A. Observations (Lessons Learned) ..................................... 17
B. Recommendations ...................................................... 22

III. Department of the Army Survey Information

A. Organization and Tactical Employment of the Long Range
   Patrol Platoon/Company .............................................. 22

Inclosures

1. Organization Structure

Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

2. List of Key Commanders

3. 1st Brigade Operational Report-Lessons Learned
4. 2d Brigade Operational Report-Lessons Learned
5. 3d Brigade Operational Report-Lessons Learned
6. Division Artillery Operational Report-Lessons Learned
7. Support Command Operational Report-Lessons Learned
8. Division Chemical Section Operational Report-Lessons Learned
9. 1st Aviation Battalion Operational Report-Lessons Learned
10. 1st Engineer Battalion Operational Report-Lessons Learned
11. 121st Signal Battalion Operational Report-Lessons Learned
12. 1st Military Police Company Operational Report-Lessons Learned
13. Commanders Notes Nos 8-19 (Nos. 8 and 17 withdrawn, Hqs, DA)

Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

14. After-action Reports-Operation Portland

15. Map of 1st Infantry Division Tactical Area of Interest

I. Significant Organization and Activities.

A. Introduction.

1. This Operational Report-Lessons Learned covers the reporting period 1 August-31 October 1967. During this period the 1st Infantry Division continued to conduct combat operations designed to locate and destroy Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces and installations in the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). AO STRIKE operations continued in this period with the division employing four battalions on a rotational basis under the OPCON of the 1st Brigade and the overwatch of VIETNAM Marine Corps (VMC) Task Force operations in the area of operations (AO) until the AO was released to the 9th Infantry Division on 1 September. Operation PORTLAND, a search and destroy operation, was conducted from 12 August to 21 August in response to intelligence information indicating concentrations of VC/NVA forces in the area northeast of MINH THANH and in the area west and northwest of LAI KHE. No significant contact with the enemy resulted, however, recently occupied base camps were discovered. Operation BLUEFIELD II conducted 23 September to 28 September, opened Route 301 and cleared the jungle 100 meters on both flanks of the road from BO LA to BAU BANG, without significant enemy activity. Operation SHENANDOAH II was initiated 29 September and continues. Intelligence indicated the 9th VC Division elements were operating in BINH DUONG Province and the northern BINH LONG-PHUOC LONG border area. During October battalions of the 1st Infantry Division had significant activity with the 271st VC Regiment in the LONG NGUYEN area and with the 272d and 273d VC Regiments in the LOG NINH area. The activity in the LOG NINH area continues at the close of this reporting period, with the 9th VC Division elements suffering heavy casualties.

2. The indirect support of the Government of VIETNAM (GVN) Revolutionary Development Program by the 1st Infantry Division's Operation LAM SON 67 was continued during the reporting period by the 2d Brigade. Operation PAUL BUNYAN, a Jungle clearing operation begun in July and terminated in September, denies the VC base camp areas in what was formerly the ONG DONG Jungle and along Route 13 north of PHU CUONG.

3. Base camp security continued with emphasis being placed on improving the camps' security and fortifications. Resupply convoys were conducted daily between DI AN and LAI KHE without a major engagement. Resupply convoys were conducted between IAI KHE and PHUOC VINH from 16 through 22 September. Snipers and mines continued to be a major road hazard.

B. Organization.

1. The 1st Infantry Division continued to occupy four major base camps, at DI AN (XT695045), PHU LOI (XT851160), LAI KHE (XT765330), and PHUOC VINH (XT763430), and a forward base area at QUAN LOI (XT818905). On 14 August the division established a forward command post at LAI KHE.
and in October IAI KHE became the permanent base for the division headquarters.

2. On 28 September 1967 the Long Range Patrol Detachment was assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Infantry Division at IAI KHE and placed under the operational control of the G2. The detachment includes 16 six-man Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRP) and augments the division's tactical strength by a total of 4 officers and 114 EM. See Section III for report, subject: Organisation and Tactical Employment of Long Range Patrol Platoon/Company.

3. During the reporting period two combat tracker teams, each consisting of 1 officer and 9 EM, were assigned to the division. US Army Combat Tracker Team No 5 (Provisional) was assigned to the division under the operational control of Commanding Officer 2d Brigade. This team had been attached to the division on 15 March 1967 by authority of USARV General Orders 1237, dated 21 March 1967. On 16 October 1967 US Army Combat Tracker Team No 13 (Provisional) was assigned to Headquarters 2d Brigade by authority of USARV General Orders 5351, dated 19 October 1967. Each combat tracker team is formed of ten men, with a team commander, an assistant team commander, two tracker dog handlers with dogs, two visual trackers, and four cavorons. One cavoron is the team RTO. All personnel, except the dog handlers, are trained as visual trackers. Experience in the field has shown that employment of five-man teams is practical and most effective. This concept provides two teams from the original one and allows two separate actions to be supported or the relief of one team by the other. The mission of the CTT is to re-establish contact with the enemy after initial contact is broken, either by the friendly or enemy troops. Other probable missions include intelligence gathering while on track, investigating local terrorist incidents, and training lead scouts, IRRP members, and other selected personnel in the art of visual tracking.

C. Intelligence.

1. Enemy Order of Battle.

a. The total estimated strength of the enemy military units operating in the 1st Infantry Division Tactical Area of Interest and its periphery is approximately 20,900. This figure represents a combat strength of 18,700 and 2,200 personnel providing administrative services support.

b. Specific reinforcements available from outside the division area of interest from the west are the 101st and 111st NVA Regiments; from the southwest the DLA Local Force Battalion; from the south the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Battalions subordinate to Military Region (MR) 4. Of these battalions of NVA the 2nd, 4th and 7th are of the most immediate concern. From the south and east reinforcements could come from the 274th VC Regiment and the DONG NAI VC Main Force Battalion, respectively.

c. The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units within the 1st Division TAD and along its periphery are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>EFFECTIVENESS</th>
<th>LOCATION (PROVINCE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd VC Div</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>PHUOC TUY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NQ &amp; Spt Units</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>PHUOC TUY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274th VC Inf Regt</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>CHT EFF</td>
<td>PHUOC TUY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### UNIT STRENGTH COMBAT CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION (PROVINCE)

| **68th NVA Regt** | 1,500 | CBT EFF | PHUOC TUY |
| **275th VC Inf Regt** | 1,600 | CBT EFF | PHUOC TUY |

| **7th NVA Div** | **Hq & Spt Units** | 2,200 | Unk | TAY NHIN |
| **16th NVA Inf Regt** | 1,700 | CBT EFF | BINH LONG |
| **111st NVA Regt** | 1,700 | CBT EFF | Northern TAY NHIN |
| **101st NVA Inf Regt** | 1,800 | CBT EFF | Western TAY NHIN |

| **9th VC Div** | **Hq & Spt Units** | 950 | Unk | Northern BINH LONG |
| **271st VC Inf Regt** | 1,500 | Marginal | Northwestern TAY NHIN |
| **272d VC Inf Regt** | 1,700 | CBT EFF | Northeastern BINH LONG |
| **273d VC Inf Regt** | 1,300 | CBT EFF | Northwestern BINH LONG |

| **65th VC Arty Cmd** | **Hq & Spt Units** | 400 | CBT EFF | TAY NHIN |
| **52d VC Arty Bn** | 320 | CBT EFF | TAY NHIN |
| **56th VC AA Bn** | 450 | CBT EFF | TAY NHIN |
| **58th VC Arty Bn** | 420 | CBT EFF | TAY NHIN |
| **64A NVA Arty Regt** | 1,200 | CBT EFF | PHUOC LONG |
| **1st VC Guard Bn COSVN** | 100 | CBT EFF | Northern TAY NHIN |

| **66th VC Base Security Regt** | **75th NVA Sapper Bn** | 500 | Unk | Northern TAY NHIN |
| **DONG NVA Sapper Bn** | 970 | Unk | Unlocated |
| **81st Rear Svc Gp** | 500 | CBT EFF | Western LONG KHANH or Eastern BINH DUONG |
| **82d Rear Svc Gp** | 2,300 | CBT EFF | BINH DUONG |
| **83d Rear Svc Gp** | 1,000 | CBT EFF | BINH DUONG |
| **84th Rear Svc Gp** | 180 | CBT EFF | BINH DUONG |
| **85th Rear Svc Gp** | 500 | CBT EFF | BINH DUONG |
| **86th Rear Svc Gp** | 500 | CBT EFF | BINH DUONG |

### ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE UNITS

| **UNIT** | **STRENGTH** | **CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION (PROVINCE)** |
| **76th Replacement Regt** | 500 | Northwestern TAY NHIN |
| **46th Trans Bn** | 400 | TAY NHIN |
| **81st Rear Svc Gp** | 2,100 | War Zone "D" |
| **82d Rear Svc Gp** | 1,000 | War Zone "C" |
| **83rd Rear Svc Gp** | 1,800 | PHUOC TUY |
| **84th Rear Svc Gp** | 180 | BINH LONG |
| **85th Rear Svc Gp** | 500 | Northern PHUOC LONG |

**Moved from II Corps to III Corps**

**Possible new unit (See paragraph f below for discussion)**
d. Main Force Combat Units within 1st Division TAOI.

(1) The 7th NVA Division consists of the 165th NVA Inf Regt, the 101st NVA Inf Regt and the 102nd NVA Inf Regt. Though the 52d Inf Regt which was formerly part of the 7th Division is still considered to have been deactivated, there have been a few recent reports to the effect that this unit now operates in War Zone "D". It is not possible at present to evaluate these reports. For most of the period under consideration the 7th Division headquarters has been located around the "Fish Hook" area (X2090).

(a) The 165th NVA Regt was identified as being involved in the attack on TONG LE CHON on 7 August. From that time until very recently the unit was unlocated. Documents captured at LOC NINH indicate that personnel of the 165th may have been involved in the attack there on 29 October as fillers for the 273d VC Regt.

(b) The 101st NVA Regt, as a unit, was not in contact during the period; it has probably been in northern TAY NINH Province (X2090). Evidence indicates that fillers from the 101st NVA Regt may have been involved in the 30 October attack on LOC NINH to assist the 273d VC Regt.

(c) Captured documents placed the 102nd NVA Regt near TONG LE CHON on 7-8 August. Since that time it is believed to have been located in Northwestern TAY NINH Province just outside the 1st Division TAOI.

(2) The 9th VC Division, which consists of the 271st, 272d and 273d VC Regts, has moved about considerably during the period in question. The division headquarters was for months located in the upper central part of War Zone "D", however, in the period from early September to 31 October, the headquarters moved gradually all the way up to the Cambodian border region in PHUOC LONG and BINH LONG Provinces, and probably supported the attacks on LOC NINH beginning 28-29 October. The 9th VC Division headquarters was accompanied in this shift to the north by the 273d VC Regt and probably elements of the 84A NVA Arty Regt.

(a) The 271st VC Regt also moved during the latter part of the period, but in a different direction from the rest of the 9th Division. In mid-September this unit moved from its position in upper War Zone "D" over to the LONG PHUOC Secret Zone in BINH DUC Long Province. From there, after being involved in a series of contacts with 1st Division elements during the first three weeks in October, the unit dispersed and moved out of the area. Some elements moved west outside the 1st Division TAOI where they remained as of 31 October. Other elements may have returned to the northeast. According to a captured letter, this move of the 271st Regt was made because of a supply shortage in War Zone "D". Its combat losses in the LONG PHUOC area were between 400 and 600.

(b) The 272d VC Regt showed little movement during this quarter, remaining around the northern BINH LONG-PHUOC LONG border area for the entire period. However, it is significant that the movement of the other elements in effect reunited the 272d VC Regt with the main part of the 9th Division.

(c) As has been mentioned, the 273d VC Regt moved in a pattern somewhat paralleling that of the 9th Division headquarters. This regiment, too, was involved in the attacks on LOC NINH beginning 28-29 October.
(3) The primary independent Main Force Battalion operating in the 1st Division area is the DONG NAI Battalion (subordinate to M1). This unit was estimated to be located on the periphery of the 1st Division area, and there was no confirmed contact with it during the present quarter. However, documents captured on 21 October vicinity XT998362 after a contact indicate that the DONG NAI Battalion may have been involved. They also indicate that the battalion may now be part of a new DONG NAI Regiment. See paragraph f below for further discussion of this possibility.

e. Local Force Units.

(1) The primary local force units in the 1st Division area are the PHU LOI Battalion and the district companies subordinate to the districts of BINH DUONG Province. These units have engaged only in small scale raids, mortarrings, mineings, propaganda and other harassment type activities during the period considered. From the testimony of FW’s, ralliers, and documents captured it appears that the strengths and dis-positioning of the units restrict them to this kind of activity. US/ARVN operations, including jungle clearing operations, have removed many former safe areas, and the units are now forced to operate in very small groups. Information provided by FW’s captured recently from the 063 LAI THIEU District Company gives some indications of the problems confronting the local force units. 063, which has at times attained a strength of 90, apparently now has been reduced to one platoon of 26 men. According to the FW’s, this came about in part because the unit was forced to split up in order not to be detected by US/ARVN forces; but also many have been killed or captured. The prisoner also stated that supplies are insuf-ficient. There are also some indications that local force units are being used to strengthen the village and hamlet guerrilla structure.

f. New Units in the 1st Division TACI.

(1) PHU LOI Battalion II. Evidence pointing to the existence of a PHU LOI Battalion II includes information provided by FW’s, ralliers, and captured documents. This unit was first mentioned by NGUYEN VAN XQAI, a member of a BINH DUONG Province quartermaster unit, who rallied on 27 July 1967. According to XQAI, the PHU LOI Battalion II consisted of 500 combat troops that infiltrated into SOUTH VIETNAM in June 1967. FW PHAN VAN NHHON, a company commander from the other PHU LOI Battalion, related in early September that he knew of such a second PHU LOI Battalion and that it had infiltrated in July 1967. Finally, FW NGUYEN VAN HA, who claims to be from the 5th Company of the PHU LOI Battalion II, was captured on 2 October. According to HA the infiltration occurred from May to August 1967. As can be seen, the frame mentioned in these reports is generally the same. The sources mentioned also agree that the unit is made up almost entirely of North Vietnamese. One point on which there is disagreement is in regard to the CO of the new battalion. All agree that the CO is South Vietnamese, but each source gives a dif-ferent name for him. Several documents which were captured recently tend to confirm the reports in question. One of those is a letter which was captured on 7 October at XT706524; this is very close to the location where NGUYEN VAN HA was captured. The letter, dated 30 July 1967, appears to have been written by the CO of the PHU LOI Battalion II and is addressed to the CO, DONG NAI Regiment, Military Region 1. The letter is a general status report which discusses the experiences of the PHU LOI Battalion II since it was separated from the DONG NAI Regiment at the end of May 1967 and moved to TCU DAI MOT Province. The DONG NAI Regiment mentioned is also a new unit. Documents captured on 21 October 1967 vicinity XT998362 also refer to a DONG NAI Regiment subordinate to M1 and to the PHU LOI Battalion II as subordinate to this unit.
The information in this second group of documents also seems to coincide with that presented in the IPW reports already mentioned. For example, one of the documents mentions BA QUANG as XO of the PHU LOI Battalion II. Rallier NGUYEN VAN IQAI gave this same information in one of his interrogations. (In another interrogation IQAI said that BA QUANG was CO). All of the above affirms that a PHU LOI Battalion II does exist and is subordinate along with the DONC NAI Battalion to the DONC NAI Regiment. The locations of the prisoners and documents which have been captured suggest that the regiment's area of operation is probably THU DAU MOT Province or some more general area of MiL.

(2) Group 309. The only specific reference to a Gp 309 appears in a captured resolution of the Military Staff of NAI Headquarters; the resolution is dated 12 May 1967. Among the topics included are: guidance for activation of a new regiment and training and assignment of missions to Gp 309 and new battalions of various provinces. (The new regiment mentioned could be the new DONC NAI Regiment discussed above.) Gp 309 is only mentioned in passing, and no description of the unit or its area of operations can be derived from the document. However, since Gp 309 is for some reason mentioned separately from other new battalions subordinate to province, it would seem that Gp 309 may have some kind of special area of responsibility. At the same time, captured documents which have been mentioned in relation to the PHU LOI Battalion II allow for one other interpretation regarding Gp 309. Captured infiltration passes of members of the PHU LOI Battalion II indicate that the men in question were members of an infiltration group with the designation D 309 D. Assuming that this designation is the same as Gp 309, it is probable that Gp 309 became the PHU LOI Battalion II when it moved into THU DAU MOT Province. This proposition is given added credence by the letter already described from the CO, PHU LOI Battalion II, to the CO, DONC NAI Regiment. The letter implies that the battalion has changed its designation since moving to THU DAU MOT. The evidence available thus strongly suggests that Gp 309 and the PHU LOI Battalion II are the same unit; but the evidence is not conclusive.

(3) 88th NVA Regiment. The evidence for accepting this regiment as a new unit to the Division area is a FW captured on 27 October, when his unit attacked the 3/9 ARVN CP vicinity TU198050. There is a record of an 88th Regiment which was engaged in PLUSIKU Province in June 1967. This is presently considered to be the same unit which has now moved southward.

g. Character of Enemy Threat.

(1) Main Force Units. The VC have not employed any new tactics or weapons during the period under consideration. They have, however, demonstrated the capability and desire to continue to use those which have been used before. In the last GILL the 122mm rocket was discussed in some detail. This weapon has been used at least once in the 1st Division area during this quarter, though not on a large scale. The incident referred to occurred on 31 October at LOC NINH. That this weapon was still in the area was shown by a large weapons cache found on 24 October vicinity XT682529. The cache included five 122mm rocket motors and two fused rocket warheads. Also the first 122mm rocket launcher discovered in South VIETNAM was found on 26 October vicinity XU866 by a CIDG patrol. By repeated mortarings of Special Forces camps, ARVN installations, towns and US positions, the VC have demonstrated that they do still have the capability to hit priority targets while standing off at a distance. At the same time, the ground attacks at LOC NINH show that assaults against fixed positions will also still have to be dealt with. On the other hand, the serious
personnel losses sustained by the 271st Regiment in the LONG NGUYEN area, and the 272d and 273d Regiments in the LOG NINH area have significantly weakened the military capabilities of these units. NVA replacements will probably be forthcoming, but they will not have the expertise of the VC cadre killed during the engagement. They will also be less able to elicit support from indigenous South Vietnamese than the VIET CONG whom they replaced.

(2) Local Force Units. There continue to be indications of a weakening of the structure of the local forces including the village and hamlet guerrillas. There are some indications that the VC may be attempting to strengthen local forces by the infusion of personnel from the next higher echelon (e.g., province battalion to district company, district company to village/hamlet guerrillas).

D. Combat Operations.

1. General. During the reporting period the 1st Infantry Division continued military operations to extend and to consolidate the Government of VIETNAM's control and influence in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Six operations were conducted in the division's Tactical Area of Responsibility (TACR). These operations were: an unnamed operation in AO STRIKE that continued into this reporting period; PORTLAND; BLUEFIELD II; PAUL BUNYAN, an operation within LAM SON 67; and SHENANDOAH II. Increased attention was given to the overwatch of Special Forces camps and friendly military installations within the 1st Division's Tactical Area of Interest (TAO). In reaction to VC activity against the US Special Forces/Civilian Irregular Defense Group (USSF/CIDG) camp at TONG LE CHON (XU6296E9), the 1st Infantry Division repositioned units to reinforce the Special Forces. Again, at LOC NINH (XU7306), in reaction to VC attacks on the USSF/CIDG camp the 1st Infantry Division repositioned units in conjunction with Operation SHENANDOAH II.

2. Operation LAM SON 67. Beg: 080701H February 1967, the operation continued through this reporting period under the control of the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. The brigade coordinated and conducted joint operations with elements of the 5th ARVN Division, BINH DUONG Sector, and BIEN HOA Sector. Continued emphasis was placed on strengthening local defenses, extending developmental projects, elimination of VIET CONG infrastructure, winning the support of the local populace, and operations to kill, capture or cause defection of VC forces within the LAM SON AO. As a part of LAM SON 67, Operation PAUL BUNYAN was initiated in July and terminated in September; see paragraph 3 below. For a summary of operations see 2d Brigade QRLL, Inclosure 4. No significant contact occurred during this reporting period in the operation. US losses during the period were 9 KIA and 116 WHA. VC losses were 57 KIA (BC), 51 FW, 6 CHIEU HOI, 49 weapons, 2,720 tons of rice, 240 bunkers, 63 tunnels, 58 military structures, and 102 pounds of salt. Operation LAM SON 67 continues.

3. Operation PAUL BUNYAN.

a. The 1st Infantry Division initiated at 191000H July a significant land clearing operation, in two phases, in order to reduce the VC capability to establish base camp facilities in the ONG DONG Jungle (Phase I) and along Route 13 north of PHU CUONG (Phase II). Intelligence indicated that there were probably enemy base camps in these areas and that contact could be expected with local force companies C61 and C62, and possibly elements of the PHU 101 Battalion. The 1st Infantry Division tasked the 2d Brigade to control the operation. A detailed account of the operation is distributed separately in After Action Report - Operation PAUL BUNYAN, dated 9 Nov 1967. During
Phase I the 2-2 Inf (Mech) provided the security necessary for the operation, supported by A/5-2 Arty (-) and B/2-34 Armor. Clearing operations were conducted by H/1st Engr Bn and A/168th Engr Bn. A base camp was established at XT91921D, and the jungle clearing task began 20 July, 1,000 meters south of the base camp after a 31 minute artillery preparation. Twenty-two Rome plows and eight bulldozers began clearing operations and cleared a total of 300 acres of medium jungle the first day. Minor enemy harassment activity caused insignificant interruptions. On 24 July, two personnel were wounded when an armored personnel carrier (APC) activated a booby trap. On 26 July, 2-2 Inf (Mech) and B/2-34 Armor conducted security resulting in 1 KHA and 8 WHA for 2-2 Inf (Mech). Two of the WHA became KHA. On 28 July B/2-34 Armor escorted bulldozers and plows from Base Camp 1 to Base Camp 2 (XT930270). One Rome plow activated a pressure mine resulting in 2 WHA with minor damage to the plow. Minor damage also resulted when a tank of B/2-34 Armor hit a mine. On 30 July an APC struck a mine, blowing off two road wheels and one track. On 31 July one tank was damaged and the driver wounded when a 135mm bomb hit a mine. On 6 August units moved to Base Camp 3. On 9 August 1.4 tons of polished rice was captured as 450 acres of light jungle were cleared. A total of 200 acres of jungle were cleared on 12 August and completed the ONG DONO Jungle area. A total of 7,726 acres of jungle was cleared during Phase I. On 13 August, TF PAUL BUNYAN I terminated with 2-2 Inf (Mech) and B/2-34 Armor moving to PHU LOI and the Rome plows and bulldozers on lowboys to DI AN. The period 13-15 August was used for maintenance by all units concerned.

b. Phase II of Operation PAUL BUNYAN commenced with movement from PHU LOI, 160702H August. The task organization included 2-2 Inf (Mech), A/168 Engr, A/5-2 Arty, and 1-4 Cav (-). The movement to the base camp (XT92206) concluded without incident, and the units closed at 0855H. Land clearing operations were initiated on arrival, resulting in 150 acres of light jungle cleared the first day. The operation continued through Phase II without significant contacts. There were however, 49 booby trap and mine incidents and 15 enemy initiated contacts of harassing mortar, RPG, and small arms fire. Phase II of the operation terminated on 10 September with a total of 6,940 acres of jungle cleared. Units departed the area 11 September. Total jungle cleared during Operation PAUL BUNYAN was 12,666 acres.

4. AO STRIKE. Interest in AO STRIKE continued into this reporting period with the 1st Brigade employing four battalions of the division on a rotational basis for at least seven days each through 16 August and overwatching the VNMC TF operation in the AO through the end of August. AO STRIKE was released to the 9th Infantry Division on 1 September. No significant action occurred in the AO during the period. However, from 1-4 August Rome plows cleared 50 meters on both sides of the road from XT97297 to XT987269. Division forces destroyed several base camps of varying size to include 1 battalion, 3 company, and 2 platoon size base camps. Among the items captured were 15 individual weapons, 3 US Claymores, 16 grenades, 21 tons of rice, 1,250 pounds of salt and 160 pieces of tin.

5. Operation PORTLAND. On 10 August 1967 a US potential source reported that at 091900H August 1967 an unidentified NVA unit consisting of between 1,600 and 2,000 men was located in an area bounded by the following coordinates: XT607080, XT607500, XT707500, and XT650760. This unit was still in place at 100400H August 1967 and could have been the main body of the 162nd NVA Regiment that attacked the TONG LE CHON USSF/CDC camp on 7 August 1967. Operation PORTLAND was initiated on 120600H August 1967 with the 1st Engineer Battalion conducting maintenance on Route QL 13 between LAI KHE and CHON THANH in
support of search and destroy operations to be conducted in areas adjacent to the highway. On 13 August the 3d Brigade established fire support patrol bases (FSPB's) vicinity XT7721817 and vicinity XT7758873 and conducted air mobile assaults with two battalions occupying landing zones (LZ's) vicinity XT720760 and vicinity XT720733. The two infantry battalions conducted company size and battalion (-) size search and destroy operations in the AO resulting in no US losses and the destruction of the following: 3,000 lbs polished rice, 35 cans evaporated milk, 24 cans cooking oil, 650 lbs rock salt, 1 old base camp, 1 bunker; and 10 graves were located. The two battalions were extracted from their AO northeast of MINH THANH on 13 and 14 August. Contact with the enemy, though anticipated, never resulted. It appears that the enemy force, badly beaten at TONG LE CHON, had moved through the area but had not stopped. On 18 August the 1st Brigade joined Operation PORTLAND by establishing a FSPB vicinity XT771426 and inserting two battalions into LZ's vicinity XT883401 and vicinity XT663433. Employing D/1-4 Cav as a mobile screening force to the north, the infantry battalions conducted search and destroy operations in this area west and northwest of LAI KHE until 21 August. There were no US losses. Enemy losses to the 1st Brigade were (a) personnel: 23 suspects detained; (b) equipment captured: assorted medical supplies, 1 CHICOM rifle, 1 old .30 caliber rifle, various documents, and 2 civilian rations; (c) equipment destroyed: 24 tons of rice, 325 lbs salt, 5 lbs of .30 ammo, 35 chickens, 1 pig, 420-lb anti-tank mines, 85 bunkers, 36 military structures, 13 bicycles, 150 rifle grenades, 7 CHICOM grenades, 1 well, and various gardens. Although there were no significant enemy contacts, VC operations and plans for this area have probably been disrupted for several months. Operation PORTLAND terminated at 212400H Aug 67.

6. Operation BLUEFIELD II. On 230600H Sep 67 the 1st Infantry Division initiated Operation BLUEFIELD II with the mission of conducting operations to destroy VC/NVA forces/installations in the vicinity of Route 301 and clearing the route from BO LA (vic XT883387) to BAU BANG (vic XT791462) to include clearing jungle 100 meters off the flanks of the road. The 1st Brigade deployed three infantry battalions to field positions within the AO to conduct search and destroy patrolling, to provide security for FSPB's at XT887374 and XT7946, and to conduct a seal and search of BO LA. In addition, the 2-2 Inf (Mech) (-) established a night defensive position (NDP) at XT886402, conducting search and destroy operations and providing security for engineer elements conducting Rome plow operations along Route 301. The operation terminated 280400H Sep 67. There was no significant enemy contact during the operation. Engineer elements cleared 555 acres of jungle adjacent to Route 301, thereby reducing the enemy threat to users of the road. US losses were 1 KIA, 18 WHA. Enemy losses were 2 KIA, 1,850 lbs of rice, 23 bunkers, 18 foxholes, 5 military structures, and various explosives, mines, and booby traps.

7. Operation SHENANDOAH II.

a. On 29 September 1967 Operation SHENANDOAH II was initiated by the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, with the insertion of 1-28 Inf into the vicinity of XT728602 and 1-2 Inf conducting a search and destroy mission in the vicinity of XT7454. Prior intelligence indicated that elements of the 271st VC Regiment were located in the brigade AO. On 30 September 1967 the 1st Brigade moved its tactical CP from PHUOC VINH to FSPB CAISSON III South (XT790335). Light contact and sniper activity was encountered through the early part of the operation. On 4 October, 1-2 Inf made moderate contact with an unknown sized unit. US forces sustained 4 KIA and 26 WHA. Enemy losses were 12 KIA (BO). In reaction to the contact, 1-18 Inf, the division rapid
reaction force (RF) at PHUOC VINH, moved to CHON THANH in preparation for an air assault at 1500H into an LZ in the vicinity of XT692541. A large 271st VC Regiment base camp was located 500 meters west of the LZ consisting of bunkers and tents. Seven airstrikes in the vicinity of XT687542 resulted in 19 VC KBA (BC). A light fire team UH-1B gunship (LFT) expended into the vicinity of XT878557 resulting in 11 VC KIA (BC). The battalion established its NDP at XT698534. Only light contact was made on 5 October. At 061855H October, a 1-18 Inf ambush patrol was fired on by an estimated VC squad while moving into position approximately 1,000 meters from the NDP at XT699537. Artillery and illumination were called in, and the ambush patrol was extracted. At 1915H the 1-18 Inf NDP came under mortar fire followed at 1932H by heavy automatic weapons fire and probing from the south. At 2116H VC attacked all sides of the perimeter. Artillery and TAC air support were called in. The VC broke contact at 2145H but continued to move around the NDP. At 2317H the VC again launched an attack on the NDP preceded by a mortar barrage (60-70 rounds, 60 and 82mm). The attack was broken at 2334H. US losses were 2 KIA and 17 WIA. Enemy losses were 59 KIA (BC). Enemy contact continued and many fighting positions were discovered and destroyed until 11 October. At 111002H October B/1-18 Inf, while conducting search and destroy operations to the northeast of the NDP, came under sniper fire. The company deployed and engaged a battalion (-). Artillery and TAC air supported. Contact was broken at 1040H. This action resulted in 21 VC KIA (BC). US losses were 1 KIA and 4 WIA. The 1-18 Inf was extracted from the NDP 13 October and assumed the division RRF mission at PHUOC VINH.

b. On 8 October 2-28 Inf was placed under the operational control of the 1st Brigade, and from LAI KHE as division RRF, the battalion conducted an air assault into an LZ in the vicinity of XT699557 and established an NDP at XT660535, where it remained until a new NDP was established in the vicinity of XT684590 on 14 October. On 17 October heavy contact was made with an estimated two battalion force by 2-28 Inf (-). The battalion (-) was conducting search and destroy operations in the vicinity of XT684596 with A/2-28 Inf, the battalion command group, and B/2-28 Inf in a battalion column. B/2-28 Inf was securing the NDP, and C/2-28 Inf was securing FSPB CAISSON V (XT736530). At 0925H in the vicinity of XT685596, A/2-28 Inf had a meeting engagement with elements of the 271st VC Regiment. A/2-28 Inf undertook to disengage so that TAC air and artillery could be placed on the enemy. At approximately 1013H the command group and D/2-28 Inf received sniper fire from both flanks. Enemy fire increased to a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire as well as rockets and claymores. Early friendly casualties in A/2-28 Inf included the company commander, his artillery FO, both of his RTO's, and his three platoon leaders. Shortly thereafter, casualties included the battalion commander, his 32, his sergeant major, and both of his RTO's as well as D Company's CO, his First Sergeant, and two platoon leaders. At 1120H contact was broken, and the battalion (-) began a withdrawal to the NDP. At 1135H fire was again received on the flanks of the column, and sniper fire was received in the vicinity of the NDP. At 1221H D/1-16 Inf was put on standby at LAI KHE. At 1220H the brigade commander assumed command of the battalion and the assistant division commander assumed command of the brigade. The battalion S3 was killed as he and a small party attempted to reach the wounded. At 1326H C/2-28 Inf was inserted to reinforce the 2-28 Inf NDP. B/2-28 Inf moved south from the NDP to secure the casualty evacuation point. At 1545H D/1-16 Inf was moved from LAI KHE, closing into the 2-28 Inf NDP at 1605H to provide additional reinforcement. At 1815H dustoff aircraft, LFT's, and the 1st Aviation Battalion CO's aircraft received ground fire causing 2 WIA, to include the 1st Aviation Battalion CO. At approximately 1830H evacuation of wounded was accomplished, and all elements closed.
into the NDP at approximately 1900H. 2-28 Inf losses were 57 KHA and
75 WHA. VC losses were 106 KIA (BC) and 55 possible KIA. The Ist
Brigade turned over operational control of the area of operation to the
3d Brigade on 30 October 1967.

c. At 290100H October the USSF camp, CIDG compound, and
District Headquarters at LOC NINH (XU738097) came under a mortar attack
followed by a ground attack at 0310H. The attack was conducted by the
273d VC Regiment. In reaction to the attack, 1-18 Inf conducted an air
assault under the OPCON of 3d Brigade into the vicinity of XU697102 at
0630H to block enemy escape routes and destroy enemy forces in the area.
C/2-28 Inf, A/6-15 Arty, and C/1-7 Arty were moved to the LOC NINH
airstrip to provide fire support. At 1215H while moving north to
reinforce a CIDG company, lead elements of the battalion (-) encountered
a VC company located in trenches (XU695095). Artillery fires were called
in, and IFT's were fired to the flanks of enemy positions. A/1-18 Inf
moved to join the fight. When TAC air arrived on station, artillery was
shifted to block escape routes. CBU's and napalm riddled the enemy
positions. Contact was broken at 1305H as the enemy retreated to the east.
Enemy losses were 12 KIA (BC) with 13 probable KIA. Nine individual
weapons and three crew served weapons were captured. US losses were
1 KHA and 9 WHA. Other forces moved in reaction were 1-26 Inf from
PHUOC VINH to QUAN LOI and 1-28 Inf from field positions to QUAN LOI;
also 1/2-33 Arty from LAI KHE to QUAN LOI.

d. At 301230H October in the vicinity of XU695094 1-18 Inf
(-) (Cos A and D and a CIDG Co) conducting a search and destroy operation
to the south of the NDP made contact with an estimated VC battalion of
the 273d VC Regiment. 1-18 Inf (-) deployed and returned fire immediately
with Co A on the right (east) flank, Co D in the center, and the CIDG
Co on the left (west) flank. Artillery was called in on the VC positions,
and, on arrival of TAC air, artillery was shifted to block the escape
routes to the rear. IFT's opened both flanks of the enemy positions.
Contact was broken at 1325H as the VC retreated to the southeast.
Enemy losses were 83 VC (BC) and 72 probable KIA. Weapons captured
consisted of 27 individual and 5 crew served. US losses were 4 KHA and
5 WHA.

e. At approximately 301751H October the Ist Brigade assumed
responsibility for all units north of the 655 east-west grid line. At
310055H October, the USSF/CIDG camp and 2-28 Inf FSPB at LOC NINH came
under mortar attack followed by a ground attack at 0407H by an estimated
VC regiment (272d VC Regiment). The VC attacked (west) across the
runway from an assembly area in the rubber on the east side of the air-
strip. The attack consisted of three waves with the final wave reaching the
inner wall of the USSF/CIDG compound before being repulsed. The
2-28 Inf FSPB fired down the runway (north) into the attacking VC,
lowering 105mm tubes for direct fire. IFT's were called in to the east of
the airstrip, and artillery fire was adjusted to within 75 meters of the
2-28 Inf FSPB. When TAC air arrived on station, the artillery was
shifted to the east to block routes of reinforcement. The attack sub-
sided at 0535H. Sporadic small arms fire continued until 0903H. Contact
was broken at 0915H when the VC withdrew to the east. VC losses were
82 KIA (BC), 120 KIA (possible), 31 individual weapons, 13 crew served
weapons and 600 grenades. US losses were 26 WHA. Operation SHENANDOAH
II continues.
E. Training.

1. For the period 1 August to 31 October 1967 the following is the breakdown of battalion days which units spent in training, troop movements, and operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LAM SON 67</th>
<th>PORTLAND</th>
<th>PAUL BUNYAN II</th>
<th>BLUEFIELD II</th>
<th>SHERMAN-DOAH II</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>153</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>171</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>408</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Listed below is a breakdown of battalion days by mission:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>search &amp;</th>
<th>route</th>
<th>base</th>
<th>seal &amp;</th>
<th>en</th>
<th>airmobile</th>
<th>route</th>
<th>jungle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>destroy</td>
<td>acly</td>
<td>acly</td>
<td>search</td>
<td>route</td>
<td>assault</td>
<td>cil</td>
<td>cil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The training posture of the division remained excellent during the reporting period. The major training activities conducted during the period were as follows:

a. Replacement Training. This consists of a 61 hour course, 75% of which is practical work. Approximately twenty per cent of the training is conducted at night (firing, patrols and ambushes). At the end of the quarter, the POL was under revision to place greater emphasis on weapon training and firing, particularly the M-60, and on mandatory subjects such as Laws of Land Warfare. The following number of men attended replacement training during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>835</th>
<th></th>
<th>250</th>
<th>706</th>
<th>175</th>
<th>965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bde</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div Arty</td>
<td>175</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt Cml</td>
<td>965</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,931</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Fourth Rifle Company Training. Training of the fourth rifle company packets was completed by the last half of September. The 56 day cycle (environmental, squad, platoon and company training) was culminated by a 48 hour Combat Readiness Test. The test included an airmobile assault, search and destroy operation, NDP and airmobile extraction. All companies passed this test successfully. By the end of the reporting period all Delta companies were fully integrated with their units and combat operational.

c. Mobile Training Team. The division organized this team in May 1967 to train small unit loaders. The HTT conducts training at
CONFIDENTIAL

battalion locations during periods of stand down. One ox-company commander and 5 NCO's, all combat experienced, conduct this training, which consists of three days of lectures and practical work. Subjects covered are: ambush, patrolling, weapons, defense, movement and inspection techniques as applicable to a junior leader's responsibility to his men, mission and equipment. During the reporting period each Inf/Mech battalion has been visited one or more times by the MTT, and a total of approximately 900 junior leaders received this training. This program has been enthusiastically received by commanders, staffs and men.

d. ARVN Battalion Refresher Training. This is a major training program conducted by each US division/separate brigade in the III CTZ. The Ist Division has 17 ARVN battalions to train (12 Inf, 3 Arty, 1 Engr and 1 Armored Cavalry). Each battalion is given 6 weeks of refresher training by a US team consisting of 2 officers, 3-4 NCO's and 3-4 interpreters. Emphasis is on improving the operational capabilities of these ARVN units by concentrating on fundamentals of leadership and professional knowledge for officers and NCO's. Staff procedures and training management are also emphasized. The technique used is to present instruction first to ARVN leaders and then assist them to plan, prepare and conduct training for their own troops. Highlights of the training program are CPX and a 3 day combat exercise. During the reporting period, two infantry battalions completed the training cycle, and 7 more (4 Inf, 1 Arty, 1 Engr and 1 Cav) began the training program. Cooperation from ARVN has been excellent, and results so far are encouraging.

e. RF Company Training. Under the direction of III CTZ and II Field Force Vietnam an experimental training program is being conducted by this division for a newly formed Regional Force Company. The 17 week cycle of formal training had one more week to go by the end of the reporting period. Following the formal phase of training, the US cadre will remain with the RF Company for a period of 2-5 months until it is fully operational. Formal training was conducted at the 5th ARVN Division Training Center at PHU Van by a cadre consisting of 2 officers, 6 NCO's (US) and 6 interpreters. US training methods were followed and US standards maintained. That the Vietnamese soldier can and will respond to such methods is shown by the fact that 95% of the RF Company recruits qualified on the M-1 rifle. The effectiveness of the training program will be evaluated during the forthcoming operational phase.

f. Mobile Advisory Teams. This program is also organized under III CTZ and II FFV. 1st Division has provided 6 MAT teams to the program, each consisting of 1 officer, 2 NCO's, 1 medic and 1 RTO. Each team is co-located with an RF/PF unit, usually for a 2-3 month period, and has the mission of providing a broad range of advisory assistance, including training, in order to improve the effectiveness of the unit and the security of the RD effort.

g. IMPACT Teams. This is a 1st Division initiated program which has the same basic mission as MATS: improving RF/PF effectiveness. The organization and working method of the team is different, however. The team consists of a nucleus of one officer, one NCO and one interpreter, plus on-call specialists in many fields: medical, signal, small arms repair, engineer, artillery, etc. The team's composition is tailored to the needs of each particular outpost visited; visits are of short duration and emphasize high impact-low cost projects, with a maximum of Vietnamese self-help. Again, the assistance rendered is across a broad spectrum, including training (formal and informal) in the above subjects as necessary.
CONFIDENTIAL

h. TDY schools in and out of Vietnam. Schools and number of personnel attending are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number in attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MACV Recondo</td>
<td>NHA TRANG</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAMTAP</td>
<td>VUNG TAU</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEST</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i. Other Ist Infantry Division training during the quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Number in attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter sling load</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Counter II</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines and booby traps</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop ladder (helicopter)</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTT (Chain saws)</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sniper</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F. Psychological Operations and Civic Action, Revolutionary Development Support.

1. General. During the month of August, September, and October, division efforts were divided between support of tactical operations, support of revolutionary development, conducting long range psychological campaigns, reorganizing the G5/S5 organization within the Division, and support of Operation DOI MOI. Special emphasis was placed on publicizing the Chieu Hoi program, exploiting road clearing operations, exploiting tactical successes, and publicizing the division volunteer informant program. Special support was also given to the GVN national elections held during this period.

2. Psychological Operations. During the quarter over 60,959,900 leaflets were disseminated and over 470 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts made. This represents a sizeable increase over last quarter, reflecting the continued emphasis on the division psyop effort. Of special interest during this period was Operation DOI MOI. A copy of the final after action report will be submitted. This operation was experimental and the greatest lesson learned by the participants was capabilities of psychological operations and their limitations. In September the division G5 section organized a Hoi Chanh propaganda team. The team consists of ten Chieu Hoi ralliers. The team has been tasked initially to elicit information pertaining to the attitude of villagers concerning the Chieu Hoi program, MEDCARS, DENTCAPS and self-help. In addition, they conduct psyop using face to face persuasion. To date the team has participated in 14 operations, and has proven to be a valuable information gathering source. It is anticipated that in the near future the division will expand this program. Although many attempts were made by the division to obtain the necessary equipment the division light mobile printing set is still non-operational due to non-arrival of the platomaker and expendable printing supplies. Several fine psychological opportunities were lost because no quick reaction capability existed at division level.

3. Civic Action.

a. During the past quarter Civic Action activities were concentrated in the 2d Brigade area in conjunction with Operation LAM SON 67. Among the projects were hamlet festivals, MEDCARS, DENTCAPS and self-help. Over 40,000 people were entertained at the festivals.
b. A dispensary at the RIVIV hospital was started as a self-help project. In PHUOC VINH, a new market place was built as a joint US - Vietnamese effort.

c. Over 40,000 MedCAP/DENTCAP patients were treated this last quarter.

d. Over 4,000 people were given classes in English.

e. More than 50 tons of commodities consisting of canned goods, rice, wheat, oats and cooking oil were distributed by the division to orphanages and schools, refugees, needy families and in support of the hamlet festival program.

f. The division came to the aid of a large number of refugees created by the battle of LOC MINH in October.

G. Personnel and Administration.

1. Personnel

a. Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized 1 Aug 67</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>15421</td>
<td>16598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized 31 Oct 67</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>16019</td>
<td>17215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned 1 Aug 67</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>17412</td>
<td>18494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned 31 Oct 67</td>
<td>1074</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>16311</td>
<td>17539</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Gains, qualifications and status

(1) Gains

(a) There were 2956 replacements to duty during the quarter.

(b) There were 698 persons returned to duty during the quarter.

(2) Qualifications: A significant number of replacements in grades lower than those requisitioned are being received. Lieutenant fills are being received for requested Captain requirements, particularly in Infantry and Artillery.

(3) Status: Replacements being received in the lower enlisted grades are in excess of requirement.

c. Losses

(1) There were 3682 losses during the quarter due to reassignments within Vietnam, rotations, ETS, and board actions.

(2) Losses due to casualties were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>AGC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KHA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Discipline, Law and Order.

a. The discipline in the Division has been excellent the past quarter. There were no stragglers apprehended. There were 31 serious incidents and 41 AMOLs reported to the PM during the period and 30 apprehended.

b. There was 1 General Court-Martial tried during the quarter. A total of 112 records of trial for Special Courts-Martial and 16 records of trial for Summary Courts-Martial were received for review.

3. Graves Registration: During the quarter there were 131 remains processed and evacuated.


a. Chaplain: During the quarter there were 1542 religious services conducted with a total attendance of 46,965.

b. During the quarter 4,094 out-of-country H&R allocations were utilized.

c. Awards and Decorations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medal of Honor</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier's Medal</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star/Valor</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star/Merit</td>
<td>1059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal/Valor</td>
<td>2166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal/Merit</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal/Valor</td>
<td>1861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal/Korit</td>
<td>1861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 7527

5. Civilian Personnel

a. As of the end of the quarter the Division employed 1500 temporary hire local nationals.

b. There were 1390 permanent hire local nationals employed at the end of the quarter.
II. Commanders Observations and Recommendations

A. Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Personnel
   a. Item: Personnel shortages

Discussion: "Liberalization of promotion policies which became effective in August 1967 has thus far not measurably alleviated the problem of shortages of middle grade NCO personnel. There has been a paucity of replacements in the 13 career group (Artillerymen) during the past 60 days. If a large input is not received during November 1967, all artillery battalions except the 6th Bn, 15th Arty will be drastically understrength because of high personnel losses. Informal information was obtained from HQ USAV on 23 Oct 67 to the effect that artillerymen will begin to arrive in large numbers during the month of November 1967.

Observation: The shortage of middle grade NCO personnel, particularly in combat MOS, continues to be acute.

b. Item: Problems concerning classification, assignment, and management of personnel.

Discussion: A large scale program has been initiated to reclassify personnel to make MOS coincide with DOS unless reassignment is appropriate. The relative number of replacements received having physical profile "C" has increased, particularly in the senior enlisted grades. We have, thus far, received excellent cooperation from USAV in reassigning these personnel where they cannot be utilized effectively in the division.

Observation: The continuing reduction in strength which this division has been experiencing has reached the point where more internal adjustments must be made in order to make optimal utilization of available personnel.

2. Operations
   a. Item: Jungle clearing

Discussion: Jungle clearing of areas close to population centers has denied sanctuaries to and interdicted infiltration routes of VC/NVA main force units, forcing them to limit operations to less populated areas. Local VC units have been forced to break up and operate in smaller groups. In addition much of the VC controlled jungle area was heavily mined and booby-trapped, denying the populace any use of the area. Cleared areas now can be used as farm land and eventually greater agricultural production will result.

Observation: The Rome Plow is one of the most effective "weapons" at our disposal.

b. Item: VC use of mines

Discussion: One of the VC's most effective tactics, in terms of US losses in vehicles and personnel, has been the extensive mining of roads. Clearing these from roads and shoulders is still a time consuming and dangerous process.

Observation: An effective vehicle-mounted mine detector/destroyer is an urgently needed item. Better means of protecting vehicle drivers/crew members need to be developed. Techniques of securing and maintaining 24 hour surveillance of roads which have already been cleared need to be improved, in order to prevent their being re-mined.
c. Item: Fighting positions

Discussion: Many lives have been saved by the way in which the 1st Division fighting position is constructed. The position has several features which give the occupants additional protection against direct hits by mortar and RPG rounds as well as direct fire weapons. The position is dug deep enough so that a man standing can rest his elbows comfortably at ground level while firing. Full overhead cover consisting of logs and two layers of sandbags plus dirt is put on the position before the occupants sleep the first night on position. The firing apertures face at 45 degree angles from the front of the bunker and bunkers are placed so that they support each other by fire and in depth.

Observation: Such positions have repeatedly withstood direct hits from mortar and RPG rounds and the direct fire of an assaulting enemy with few if any casualties. They are worth all the extra time and effort it takes to construct them.

d. Item: VC tactics

Discussion: In several recent meeting engagements the VC, once initial contact has been made, have slipped past the point of the US column and raced down the flank and then turned to deliver close and effective fire on the US position.

Observation: The most effective way to prevent such tactics is to place marching fires to the front and flanks of an advancing column, and if contact is made, to bring the artillery in close immediately on both flanks.

e. Item: Seal and search of villages

Discussion: Generally, large villages with a high population density are sealed with poorer results than when a small village is sealed. Apparently the VC are confident that they can hide more easily or blend with the population in a large village and so do not try to break the seal and risk being shot or captured. Small villages offer fewer hiding places and it is difficult to blend with the population, and so the VC usually will attempt to break the seal.

Observation: Seals of small villages offer proportionally greater opportunity for getting VC, providing ambushes and seal forces are properly positioned and alert. The lack of success in larger villages can only be overcome by more thorough search techniques and questioning of suspects.

3. Training and Organization

a. Item: Mobile training team (see paragraph I B 3c)

Discussion: Due to combat casualties and the continual rotation of personnel, every infantry unit is faced with a constant shortage of qualified and experienced squad leaders and fire team leaders. It is not unusual for an SP/4 with less than two years' service to be a squad leader. The pace of combat operations does not allow much time for additional training of such men in the responsibilities and techniques of leadership and to increase the depth of their professional knowledge. To meet this situation the 1st Infantry Division has developed a Mobile Training Team to give such instruction to junior infantry leaders. The course of instruction is three days long (can be compressed by elimination of practical work, if necessary) and covers the following subjects:
C.O.N.F.I.D.E.N.T.I.A.L

(1) First Day - General Subjects:
- M16 Care and Cleaning
- Claymore
- Road Clearing
- Map and Compass

(2) Second Day - Offense:
- Squad Movement
- Overwatch
- Cloverleaf
- Base Camp Search
- Patrolling

(3) Third Day - Defense:
- Defensive Positions
- Conduct of Defense
- Ambush
- Counter Ambush

This instruction is presented to the junior leaders of infantry battalions at their base camps during periods of stand down between combat operations. On occasion, the instruction has been presented in the field at NDP positions. The Mobile Training Team rotates continuously among the infantry battalions conducting training for newly promoted or replacement NCOs, as well as a refresher course for those personnel who have previously received the training.

Observation: This is an effective and efficient method of upgrading the professional competence and leadership ability of inexperienced junior leaders in a combat situation.

b. Item: ARVN battalion refresher training (See par I & 3d)

Discussion: During the course of giving refresher training to several ARVN battalions, several widespread ARVN weaknesses have become apparent to the 1st Infantry Division personnel conducting the training. Accordingly, the POI for ARVN Refresher Training emphasizes corrective training in these areas especially for ARVN leaders. None of these weaknesses are peculiar to ARVN but they are prevalent enough to warrant comment and to provide the basis for designing a training program to improve ARVN combat effectiveness. These weaknesses are:

- (1) Failure of commanders to use staff properly
- (2) Failure of staff to coordinate
- (3) Inadequate prior planning for operations and training
- (4) Reluctance of NCOs to assume responsibility
- (5) Lack of follow through and supervision of all echelons
- (6) Lack of technical and tactical proficiency of NCOs
- (7) Poor dispersion during movement
- (8) Reluctance to use air, artillery and mortars
- (9) Overdependence on map reconnaissance

CONFIDENTIAL
(10) Reluctance to construct adequate fighting positions - and begin construction during daylight hours

(11) Inexperience in planning, organizing and conducting own training

(12) Logistical system functions poorly - lack of confidence in it

Observations: An effective training program to counteract the above weaknesses should include the following:

1. Heavy emphasis on training of leaders. Officers and NCOs should be taught subjects first, in separate classes and then required to organize and present this training to their troops with only US advisory assistance.

2. Staff training to include classes, discussion periods, exchange visits with US units and a CPX emphasizing staff estimates and coordination.

3. Close supervision and correction of NCO performance

4. Emphasis in field training on control, dispersion, use of fires, construction of good fighting positions and provision and planning for resupply.

4. Intelligence

a. Item: Intelligence overlays for OPORDs

Discussion: In the last three months the 1st Infantry Division G2 (Operations) initiated a new form of overlay to go with the Intelligence Annex of Operations Orders for brigade or larger operations. Formerly a series of overlays was attached to the Intelligence Annex showing different phases of the total intelligence picture, e.g., confirmed base camps, movement patterns, recent S/LR activity, etc., leaving it up to the brigade commander and his S2 to determine the total intelligence picture.

Observation: The G2 (Operations-Order of Battle Section) now prepares an overlay which takes all intelligence factors into consideration and comes up with "goose eggs" of VC active areas. Also shown are all confirmed VC base camps and any other special information that might be helpful for that operation. The degree of activity of the base camps and "goose eggs" are indicated as: formerly active as of some date, possibly active now, or probably active now. By the means of this overlay a much clearer, definitive statement of the considered judgment of the G2 is presented to the commander in the field.

5. Logistics (See Support Command OOD, Inclosure 7)

6. Other

a. Item: HOI CHLU propaganda team

Discussion: CHLU HOI ralliers have proven to be extremely valuable when utilized in propaganda teams. They tend to strengthen the credibility of the CHLU HOI program since they can relate their own personal experiences with the program.
Observation: The employment of CHLW MOI psyop teams should be intensified throughout the division TAOR.

b. Item: Psychological operations equipment

Discussion: Because of the increased emphasis on psychological operations in Vietnam, many special items of equipment have either been issued to units or programmed for issue. This will provide increased capabilities for expansion of psyops. Much of this equipment is non-standard and, therefore, not carried in Army supply channels. This has led to logistical problems when repair parts or additional expendable items are required for this non-standard equipment. In some instances because of the non-availability of these items, units have found it necessary to cannibalize in order to remain operational. Units still have not received some items of equipment which was initially projected for issue nearly a year ago.

Observation: Psyop equipment should be integrated into normal supply channels in order to insure availability through standardization.

c. Item: Inter-division coordination of psychological operations

Discussion: A Psyops Control Center was established to coordinate operations of psyop units of the 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 246th Psyop Company, and Province Advisory. The Psyop Control Center functioned exceedingly well and proved that this type of establishment is both feasible and desirable. The control center is able to operate on a day-to-day basis and does produce profitable results.

Observation: Consideration should be given to the establishment of a similar coordination center on a permanent basis.

d. Item: Inadequate aircraft allocations for psychological operations

Discussion: A critical weak point in the DOI MOI Campaign was the lack of aircraft availability. In a number of instances, aircraft which were allocated for a psyop mission were either provided only at the last moment or did not materialize at all. It was, therefore, extremely difficult to plan missions which involved the use of aircraft.

Observation: In future operations adequate aircraft resources should be allocated, and a high operational priority should be assigned for completion of these missions.

e. Item: Stockage of commodities for use in Civic Action/Civil Affairs

Discussion: Because of the emergency nature of a refugee crisis timely reaction is mandatory. Supplies and equipment must be immediately available and prepared for shipment. Transportation for emergency relief must also be given a high priority.

Observation: The G5 will have a "refugee kit" set aside, consisting of commodities applicable to refugee relief. These items will be ready to move on call.

f. Item: Immediate payment of relief to Vietnamese civilians

CONFIDENTIAL
Discussion: On an occasion where friendly fire kills or wounds a Vietnamese civilian during a tactical operation it becomes necessary to pay solatun on the spot while the area is secured.

Observation: It is recommended that a solatun payment officer of the unit have sufficient piasters in order not to delay the payment.

B. Recommendations: None

III. Department of the Army Survey Information

A. Organization and Tactical Employment of the Long Range Patrol Platoon/Company

1. Organization and Training

a. The 1st Infantry Division Long Range Patrol Detachment is organized with a Detachment Headquarters, Operations Section, Communications Section and two platoons of eight six man patrols each with a platoon leader and platoon sergeant in each platoon. The basic unit, the six man patrol is composed of a patrol leader, ass patrol leader, MED and three other members who perform duties as point man, compass man and security.

b. The LRP is in the fifth week of a six week intensified training program. Individual training has been completed and basic team training has commenced. The team training consists of each team making a 12 hour daylight area reconnaissance and a 12 hour night trail monitoring mission, followed by a 24 hour mission combining the two, for each team. To date the training missions have accomplished the following:

1. Located a new base camp under construction.
2. Located an old base camp being repaired.
3. Accounted for three VC KIA and two VC KIA Poss.

c. Two operational teams have been utilized on trail monitoring and area recon missions. Both have had successful missions in that the information sought was brought back and six VC KIA and seven VC KIA possible were recorded with no LRF casualties.

2. Techniques of Tactical Employment

a. Long Range Patrols are normally inserted into the operational area by one of two means, by helicopter or by stay behind in conjunction with other US units and are extracted either by helicopter or by link up with other US units. It is desirable to infiltrate a team just prior to large scale operations in order to locate specific targets and to assist in planning thorough reconnaissance of the area. On receipt of the warning order the alerted teams prepare to recon the operational area. On the day prior to infiltration, an overflight of the area is made by the team leader, the CO and operations officer. Check points and possible LZ's and PZ's are selected. The pilot of the recon helicopter is normally the same one who will pilot the insertion aircraft if helicopters are to be used. Once reconnaissance is complete a detailed plan is formulated and the patrol order issued. A briefing for the CO and operations officer is scheduled just prior to insertion. On helicopter infiltration a minimum of five UH-1s or UH-1Ds are required to support one team. These ships include, a C&C ship, infiltration ship, a recovery ship which is rigged with a rope ladder for emergency extraction and an LFT. A FAC is on call and artillery support coordinated.
for the duration of all operations. If the team is compromised upon
insertion it will immediately be extracted either from the primary LZ
or from a selected alternate and the mission aborted. During insertion
the C&C ship and IPT will move to a preselected orbit area away from
the area of operations and orbit until the team reports they are in position.
The pickup ship and recovery ship remains on call until released.

b. Exfiltration takes place when the recon team has
completed its mission. The pickup LZ is normally preselected. Upon
arrival the team makes a thorough recon of the LZ and insures that it is
secure. Once this is complete the team calls for pickup. During this
phase of the operation continuous communications between the team leader
and pickup ships is by use of a signal mirror with panels and smoke as
alternates. The team leader talks the ship into the LZ and stays on the
radio until the ship is clear of all hazards on the LZ.

c. Emergency exfiltration takes place when the team
has been compromised to the extent that the mission cannot be continued.
The decision for emergency exfiltration is made by the CO or by the
team leader. Exfiltration may be made from an LZ or by means of a
rope ladder should the ship not be able to land. The team makes every
effort to break contact before calling in the pickup ship. If it is
not possible to break contact to the extent that it would be reasonably
safe for a helicopter to land the team may be forced to walk out to a more
secure area before pick up can be made. In some instances it may be
desirable that the team exfiltrate by walking out. In this case
coordination is effected with friendly units operating in or near the
area and a prearranged rendezvous point selected for the two units to
meet. Once link up has been accomplished both units return to friendly
lines and the team returns to base.

3. Lessons Learned and Problem Areas

a. The coordination necessary for all operations must
be accomplished at least two-three days prior to infiltration and must
be accomplished personally by a representative from the LRP, this
includes, operational areas, artillery and air support, airlift support
and RRF.

b. It is felt that the LRP is indeed an elite part of
the division due to the nature of the mission and the hazards involved.
For these reasons the LRP must be strictly a volunteer unit. In this
manner only the personal having a sincere desire to be members of the
unit are assigned but only after personal interviews and a careful
determination of the individuals capabilities.

c. Due to commitments of the division, aircraft support
has been and will continue to be a major problem. It is difficult to
obtain aircraft even for area reconnaissance. One mission already has
been aborted because of non-availability of aircraft. If the mission
is to be conducted properly aircraft must be allocated and should remain
under operational control of the LRP commander for the duration of the
mission. This is a problem which can only be solved by command emphasis
being applied.

d. Obtaining equipment prescribed by TO&Es continues
to be a problem. The main area of interest being that of communications.
At present the only communications available to the LRP are ten AN/PRC 25
radios. These have proven to be effective up until now but it is foreseen that as operations progress better radios will be needed. These radios are on requisition but there is no indication of when they will become available.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM E. JENKINS
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General
CONFLICTUAL

1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (UIC-WDFU TO) (U)

DA HQ II FORGEX, APO San Francisco 96266 25 DEC 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.

2. (C) This command has reviewed the attached report and concurs with the comments and recommendations with the following exceptions:

a. p 3, para I,C,(1),(c), II FFV OB confirms the presence of the 86th NVA Inf Regt in III CTZ, but cannot confirm its subordination of the 5th VC Inf Div. Units subordinate to the 69th VC Arty Command are the 52d, 56th, 56th Bn, and 64A NVA Arty Regt. The 1st Guard Bn and 566 Base Security Regt are both subordinate to COSVN. II FFV OB resubordinated the DONG NAI Bn and PHU LOI Bn II to the DONG NAI VC MF Inf Regt/MR 1 as of 21 Oct 67. These units were no longer carried as separate battalions as of that date. The Regt had an estimated strength of 700 at that time, was considered Not Combat Effective, and was located vic X998362. Subsequently captured documents indicate that the actual strength in late October was 2260, rendering the unit Fully Combat Effective.

b. p 2 and 3, para I,C,(1),(c), II FFV OB carries the following unit strength, combat effectiveness, and location:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Strength</th>
<th>Combat Effectiveness</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th VC Div</td>
<td>4,525</td>
<td>Marginal Combat Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271st VC Regt</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Combat Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273d VC Regt</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Not Combat Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn/MR 4</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Combat Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn/MR 4</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>Combat Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275th VC Regt</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Phuoc Long Prov</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Inclosure 5, para 3,a,(2), II FFV carries as follows:

7th NVA Division
165th NVA Regt
141st NVA Regt
101st NVA Regt

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Confidential
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10
Infantry Division

Hq and Hq Co

Avn Bn

Engr Bn

Armd Cav Sqdn

Spt Cond

MP Co

Sig Bn

Bde Hq & Hq Co

Div Arty

* 8 Infantry battalions and 1 infantry battalion (mechanized)

ASSIGNED UNITS

Hq & Hq Co

1st MP Co

1st Avn Bn

1st Engr Bn

121st Sig En

Spt Cnd

242d Chem Det

266th Chem Plat

1st Adm Co

1st Med Bn

1st S & T Bn

701st Maint Bn

1st Sqdn, 4th Cav

1st Bde

Hq & Hq Co

1-2 Inf

1-26 Inf

1-28 Inf

2d Bde

Hq & Hq Co

5th CTT (Prov)

13th CTT (Prov)

2-16 Inf

1-18 Inf

2-18 Inf

3d Bde

Hq & Hq Co

2-2 Inf (Mech)

1-16 Inf

2-28 Inf

Div Arty

Hq & Hq Btry

294th Radar Det

1-5 Arty

8-6 Arty

1-7 Arty

2-33 Arty

ATTACHED UNITS

1st MI Det

340th Avn Det

35th Inf Plat, 2nd Dog

41st Inf Plat, 2nd Dog

43d FI Det

44th FI Det

17th MI Det

1st Plt, I Btry, 29th Arty

6-15 Arty

OPCON UNITS

H/2-24 Arm

A/5-2 Arty

Incl 1
TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
APO San Francisco 96345

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (RCS) (CHGO-2)

1. (C) INTRODUCTION:
   a. During the previous reporting period, 1 May 67 - 31 July 67, the
   1st Bde participated in three Brigade-level operations: Operation Dallas,
   Operation Billings, and Operation AO Strike. The Bde closed the reporting
   period with S&D operations still conducted in AO Strike.
   b. Principal Headquarters and Commanders of the Task Force during
   this reporting period were: (1 August 67 - 31 October 67):
      (1) Operation AO Strike (ORDD 17-67), Headquarters, 1st Bri-
          gade, Colonel William B. Caldwell, III (1 Aug - 18 Aug).
          (a) 1st Bn, 18th Inf, LTC Richard E. Cavacos.
          (b) 1st Bn, 26th Inf, LTC Joseph H. Hoffman.
          (c) 2d Bn, 18th Inf, LTC James F. Irice.
          (d) 1st Bn, 5th Arty, LTC Joseph E. Spitler, Jr.
          (a) 1st Bn, 18th Inf, LTC Richard E. Cavacos.
          (b) 1st Bn, 26th Inf, LTC Joseph H. Hoffman.
          (c) 2d Bn, 28th Inf, LTC Terry D. Allen.
          (d) 1st Bn, 5th Arty, LTC Joseph E. Spitler, Jr.
      (3) Operation Shenandoah II (ORDD 22-67) (29 Sep - 31 Oct 67)
          (Cont'd)
          (a) 1st Bn, 2d Inf, LTC Joseph R. Stauffer.
          (b) 1st Bn, 16th Inf, LTC Calvert Benedict.
          (c) 1st Bn, 28th Inf, LTC James F. Murphy (29 Sep - 12 Oct)
              - LTC James F. Cochran, III (13 Oct -
              31 Oct 67)
          (d) 2d Bn, 2d Inf (KERR), LTC Henry L. Davidson.
          (e) 1st Sqdrn, 4th Cav, LTC John H. Seigle.
          (f) 1st Bn, 5th Arty, LTC Joseph E. Spitler, Jr.

2. (C) TACTICAL OBSERVATIONS:
   a. Elements Affecting the Operations:
      (1) Effectiveness of Intelligence: Aviators familiar with
          the operation areas resulted in increased effectiveness of aerial reconnaissance
          in the Rochester, Bluefield, and Shenandoah areas of operation. SBK and EBK
          returns in addition to SBK information were successfully used for target
          acquisitions in the areas of operation. Contact w.s made by units under

Incl 3
CONFIDENTIAL

operational control of the Brigade with VC/NVA main force units that were expected to be in the outposts AO. Local force units encountered proved to be well armed and trained. No main force units were engaged until Operation Shenandoah when contact was made with units of the 27th VC Regiment. Prior to this engagement enemy units had avoided major contacts, resorting to sniper tactics, dueling, and small unit actions.

(2) Nature of Terrain: The terrain in the areas of operation varied from heavy jungle with trees estimated to be 50-125 feet tall to dense secondary growth areas. The entire area afforded both friendly and enemy forces excellent concealment. The terrain had normal effect on the operations.

(3) Rainfall was moderate to heavy throughout most of the reporting period. Ground fog was frequently present during the early morning hours usually dissipating by 0900H. The weather had no significant effect on the operations other than to cause occasional delays or loss of airstrikes.

(4) Attitude of the civilian population: Attitude of the people to civic action operations in the Phuoc Vinh area, shows the attitude of the people to be cordial and receptive with no appreciable change from the last reporting period.

b. Combat Actions: Operations during the period consisted of:

(1) Operations in AO Strike (2901D 17-67) (1-18 Aug 67). A multi-Battalion search and destroy operation in AO Strike, employing the battalions of the Division on a rotational basis, employing each battalion for at least 7 days.

(a) The mission as stated in the order was: 1st Bde continues to secure the Phuoc Vinh Base Camp; continues tactical overwatch of the TDOI and WDO operations in AO Strike; and conducts operations in AO Strike.

(b) Concept of operations: 1st Brigade conducts air assaults and search and destroy operations in AO Strike employing Divisional battalions on a rotational basis. Employing each for at least 7 days.

(c) Operations Summary: During the period 1-16 August, 1st Bde conducted operations with 1-19 Inf., 1-18 Inf.; 1-26 Inf.; 2-18 Inf., 1-4 August.

(d) Results:

(1) Friendly Losses: (Total for operation)
   a. Personnel: 7 KIA, 28 WIA.
   b. Equipment damaged: None.
   c. Equipment destroyed: None.

(2) Enemy losses: (Total for operation)
   a. Personnel: 6 KIA (12 KIA, 12 KIA (prob)
   b. Equipment damaged & destroyed: 2-12 gauge shotguns, 3-11916 rifles, 1-7.62mm sub MG, 1-81 grenade launcher, 1-rifle grenade.

(c) Operation Fortport. (2901D 21-67) (18-22 Aug 67). A multi-battalion operation to the West and North of IZ to in response to intelligence reports indicative of enemy activity in the area.

(a) The mission as stated in the order was: 1st Bde conducts air-mobile assaults into multiple IZ's within the AO and continues security of Phuoc Vinh and maintains tactical overwatch of the DDO TDOI.

(b) Concept of the operation: The insertion of three infantry units into AO Fortport, supported by artillery located in a fire support patrol base secured by a fourth infantry Plt. The units were further instructed to search out and destroy enemy units reported to be in the area.

(c) Operation Summary: The operation was initiated on 18 August with 1-25 Inf, 1-18 Inf., and 2-25 Inf, air assaulted into AO Fortport where numerous recently occupied base camps were discovered. Upon being inserted into the IZ, 1-18 Inf captured a total of 53 VC. The operation was...
terminated on 22 August. The Jdc returned to Phuoc Vinh and began preparations for future operations.

(d) Results:

(1) Friendly Losses:
   a. Personnel: None.
   b. Equipment damaged: None.
   c. Equipment destroyed: None.

(2) Enemy Losses:
   a. Personnel: 272 KIA, 92 (prob), 210 WIA.
   b. Equipment captured: 9 chicom light MG’s, 8-75mm mortars, 2-30 cal belt action rifles, 1 HMG launcher, 5-122mm rockets, 1 bayonet, 24-120mm mortar rounds, 92-90mm mortars, 21-81mm mortars, 5-60mm mortar rounds, 15-75mm mortars, 754-96mm rounds, 160-155mm rounds, 251 bunkers, 73 military structures, 87,000lbs salt, 166 tons of rice.
   c. Equipment destroyed: 2 trucks, 6 bicycles, 150 rifle grenades, 4 AT mines, 1 rice sled, 75lbs salt.

(3) Operation Sunandoah I (31 Oct - 2 Oct 67), a multi-battalion search and destroy operation in an 80 north of Lat 20 and West of Highway 13. (Operation continues next reporting period.)

(a) The mission as stated in the order was; the 1st Bde continues to secure Phuoc Vinh and the assigned area of operation, to search out and destroy the 271st VC Regiment.

(b) Concept of operation: 1st Bde conducts air assaults and search and destroy operations in the assigned area employing organic infantry battalions and cavalry units.

(c) Operations Summary: The operation was initiated on 29 September 1967 with the insertion of 1-2 Inf and 1-28 Inf into LZ in the AO. Light contact and sniper activity was encountered through the early part of the operation. On 4 Oct, 1-2 Inf made moderate contact with an unknown size unit. US forces sustained 4 KIA, 1 WIA, 1 man. Enemy losses were 12 KIA and 3 WIA. Contact continued throughout the operation and VC activity was very high in the area. On 7 Oct, heavy contact was made with an estimated 2 BM’s force by 2-28 Inf, resulting in 7 KIA and 18 WIA. VC losses were: 272 KIA (body count) and 92,924lbs (probable) large amounts of rice and salt were discovered by US forces in the latter stages of the operation. The mission closed out the operation on 30 Oct with the area of operation over to 3d Bde control.

(d) Results:

(1) Friendly Losses:
   a. Personnel: 71 KIA, 114 WIA.
   b. Equipment damaged: 2 M2C, 1 VH-1D.
   c. Equipment destroyed: None.

(2) Enemy Losses:
   a. Personnel: 272 KIA, 92 (prob), 210 WIA.
   b. Equipment captured: 9 chicom light MG’s, 8-75mm mortars, 2-30 cal belt action rifles, 1 HMG launcher, 5-122mm rockets, 1 bayonet, 24-120mm mortar rounds, 92-90mm mortars, 21-81mm mortars, 5-60mm mortar rounds, 15-75mm mortars, 754-96mm rounds, 160-155mm rounds, 251 bunkers, 73 military structures, 87,000lbs salt, 166 tons of rice.

3. (c) Intelligence:
   a. Effectiveness of Intelligence: C-22, C-23, C-24, S-221, S-222, S-223, S-224.
   b. Reports were successfully used for target acquisition and as indicators of enemy activity in the areas of operation. The increased use of LCH’s from the 3d Bde Aviation section greatly aided to the VC capability normally provided by the air force. No significant VC/NVA contact was made by units under
operational control of the 1st Brigade during O Strike and Operation Portland. Intelligence provided by ROK sources prior to Operation Shenandoah II, indicated that elements of the 271st VC Regiment were located in the Brigade AO. Documentary evidence captured during the operation established a high degree of assurance that the 271st Regiment moves from war zone "D" to Long Nguyen because Group 81 (Near Service) was not capable of meeting its logistical requirement, being especially deficient in its ability to supply adequate amounts of rice. GP 83 (Near Service) was tasked to support the 271st in its base area. Contacts was made with elements of the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 271st Regiment during Operation Shenandoah II as identified by documents of KHQ and on FOX. The interception of a second FOU established a high degree of probability that elements of the Phu Loi Brigade were also based in the Brigade AO. The VC normally chose to break contact quickly and avoid major engagement. However, on several occasions major engagements did occur. During Operation Shenandoah II 247 VC were killed before count and another 92 possibly killed. These are considered minimum estimates of real enemy casualties. In addition over 164 tons of rice were captured and a large amount of enemy equipment including crew served and small arms and ammunition were captured or destroyed. A significant number of enemy installations were destroyed.

6. (c) Individual:

a. Strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>2252</td>
<td>282b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>2913*</td>
<td>2825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>2913*</td>
<td>2825</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Increased in authorized strength was due to arrival of Delta companies and M2ES.

b. Replacements:

(1) Received: Aug 58th
Sep 333
Oct 172

(2) Replacements received have generally been well trained. All replacements below E7 or E9 attend the 1st Bde Jungle Training School. 747 students attended this school during the 3d quarter.

(3) There is a continuing problem in obtaining sufficient replacements in grades E5 and E6. These grades are not available and the experience level of the NCO Corps suffers proportionately.

c. Discipline: No major problems.

d. Enemy Forces Captured and/or Detained:

(1) KJW's: 8
(2) Civil Defenders: 0
(3) Detained: 86
(4) Draft Dodgers: 1
(5) Deserter: 1

e. Burial and Graves Registration: All such matters were handled through division channels.

f. Civil Assistance:

(1) Under the MEDC-II Program a total of 5, 181 SVN patients were treated by medical personnel of the 1st Brigade. This includes all patients at the Phuoc Vinh Dispensary, Company D 1st Medical Battalion, and unit dispensaries in the Phuoc Vinh area. This total figure also reflects patients treated on NAPAL's in Phuoc Vinh, Phuoc Hao, Van Gia II, Lo Yang, Sa Thai Hung.
(2) *Total of 10,604 local nationals were hired during the reporting period. 12,093 local nationals were hired under Division appropriated funds.*

(3) The following relief commodities were distributed during the reporting period:

- Rice - 27,370 lbs
- Salt - 11,040 lbs
- Soybean Oil - 34 cases
- Iodized Salt - 47 cases
- Fresh Milk - 6 cases
- Corn Meal - 2,100 lbs
- Flour - 150 lbs
- Sugar - 1,000 lbs
- Canned Goods - 1,268 cases
- Candy - 300 bars
- Clothing - 54 boxes (2,000 lbs)
- Shower Shoes - 430 pair
- Friendship Kits - 30
- Recreation Kits - 9
- Tin - 120 bgs
- Scent - 120 bgs
- Lumbar - 82 tons
- Culvert - 30 ft.
- Latices - 37 (5 ton truckloads)
- Bolts - 2 boxes
- T-Shirts - 250

(4) *Psychological Operations:*

- A total of 5,634,000 leaflets were dropped over the Brigade TAC and in forward areas of operation.
- A total of 57 hours and 45 minutes of tape broadcast were used to support tactical operations in forward areas. Subjects were: Chieu Ho; Chief of Staff Message; 1st Div Flavor (G271); Clearing Area; Rally Instructions; Search & Destroy; Weapon's Reward; Curfew Tape; GVN verses VC; Sandbags.

(5) *Revolutionary Development Districts:*

- Thu Dao District, Binh Duong Province is not a major priority area for Revolutionary Development, and as a result, little or no support is provided to the district for Civic Action. Little or no voluntary support is received from civilian agencies. The Revolutionary Development program is jointly sponsored and conducted by 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division and the GVN Advisory Team. The KO program consists of a lecture program, the employment of over 500 Vietnamese nationals to include those hired by F & B, the improvement and maintenance of schools, improvements of drainage and sanitation conditions, and the improvements of existing road networks. Considering the close proximity of over 50 percent of the district's population to Phuoc Vinh, the revolutionary Development program in this area has done much to improve the standards of living of the people and made them loyal to the Government of South Vietnam. The attitude of the people to our US troops in the district can best be described as friendly and warm.

(6) *Claims and Solicitation*

- There were no claims filed against the 1st Brigade during the reporting period.
- An agent of four claims filed in previous reporting periods were paid by acting Brig. Go. 3-5. Claim number 366-67, 366-68, 366-69, 366-70 were paid in an LOC, and claim number 4193-66 was paid in Tan Toon.

(7) *Civil Works Information:*

- Coordinating with Vietnamese Public Works section to install culverts, and increase quantity and quality of drainage ditches. About 100 meters of culvert were installed by the public works section in coordination with the Civil Affairs platoon. The culvert was provided by the Brigade C-5 section, and labor done by public works personnel. Approximately 1,500 meters of ditches was completed, and Vietnamese are now installing culverts. (5)
brick sides to prevent erosion. Installation of brick was recently begun, and about 50 meters had been completed. In conjunction with this project, sidewalks are being built after bricks are installed.

(b) During the rainy season, large portions of the roads were washed, and the culvert and ditching were designed to eliminate a recurrence next year. Large sections of the road were rendered impassable or almost impassable, and, in conjunction with the hamlet chief and 168th Engineers, work began to fill-in and grade all unsatisfactory sections. Approximately 37 five-ton truck loads of laterite were dumped in these sections, and Vietnamese labor, or a grade whenever possible, leveled the laterite to make the road possible. About 3,000 meters of road was improved in this manner.

(c) On 27 July 1967 the village of Le Trang received light damage from mortars fired by the Brigade. There was no casualties, and the following commodities were given to the priest for distribution:

- 20 bags of cement
- 20 sheets of roofing tin
- One 24 truck load of lumber

(d) Civil affairs Ton in coordination with Phu Giao Sub-sector advisor coordinated all details to bring the movement of eight families living within the District Headquarters perimeter to another area. This move was made to make real estate available to the 1st Brigade for base camp expansion. Coordination for the land was accomplished by the Brigade S-3 office working with the Phu Giao and Binh Long Province Chief. Each family received cement, roofing tin, and lumber for the construction of their new homes. This project started in the month of July and the houses completed in the latter part of August.

(e) Following a claymore incident, five homes were destroyed in Vinh Hoi. The Brigade S-5 in coordination with MCV Subsector advisor assisted in relocation of families by providing necessary materials for construction of new homes.

(f) In conjunction with the Phuoc Vinh hamlet chief, work has begun to improve the market place in Phuoc Vinh. Ten 5-ton truck loads of laterite were dumped in the market to provide a foundation for cement which will be provided and poured. Boy scouts and local Vietnamese under the supervision of the 3 Ton expanded the foundation. In addition to providing a cement floor for the market, this project will also provide new sidewalks around the market and complete a new road along one side of the market.

(g) A hovering aircraft destroyed the roof of a school in Thoi Hung village, and forty sheets of tin were provided to repair the damaged roof. The repair was done by local Vietnamese.

(h) Approximately 2,000 pounds of clothing (54 large boxes) were collected in an Air Force captain's home town, and they were distributed in Vinh Van II on 11 Sept 1967. A haircut and dentistry were held in conjunction with this, and several commodities, e.g., shoes, shoes, foodstuffs, balloons, furnished by the Civil affairs Ton were distributed. The district chief, village chief, hamlet chief and MCV subsector advisor assisted in the distribution.

(i) In conjunction with Children's Day on 18 Sept 1967, MCV Volleyball and soccer kits were given to seven villages near Phuoc Vinh. This was done in cooperation with subsector which provided cookies for children in the area.

(j) The following listed items were received on a supply convoy from Phuoc Vinh to Di An during the period of 15-17 Sept 1967:

- One barrel of nails
- 24 ton truckloads of lumber
- 300 feet of culvert
- 191 bags of cement
- 81 sheets of roofing tin
- The items of friendship kits
- Six volleyball and soccer kits
- One meditation kit
- 300 T-Shirts
- 3000 Balloons
- 300 bags candy

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

1. 2 boxes soap
2. 6 bags of t-bacco
3. 300 shower shoes (Childrens)
4. 300 hand towels

(k) In conjunction with 6/27th artillery, medcaps have been conducted on a weekly basis in the village of Nuoc Vang. This program has been very successful, and the results have been extremely gratifying. Due to the program's success, plans are being made to expand and include the hamlets of Van Giang II and Linh IV on a bi-weekly basis in addition to the weekly visit to Nuoc Vang. Also, medcaps have been conducted in conjunction with the Brigades Surgeon in the villages of Ta Thai Hung and L. Trang.

(l) In coordination with the Phu Giao District Senior advisor, foodstuffs and clothing have been provided to war widows and other destitute families in the district. Primary items furnished were rice, corn meal, bulgar wheat, canned goods and clothing.

(m) Teaching guides for basic, intermediate and advanced instruction in the English language were given to the English teacher in Phuoc Vinh.

(a) ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE:

(a) Based on Civic action programs and projects conducted by the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division and the Civic Affairs Team in the Phuoc Vinh area during the last quarter it is sincerely felt the attitude of the people is most receptive, cordial and warm.

(b) Medcap:

(a) Radioteletypewriter set AN/USC-2 was used by this brigade for the first time during Operation Shambles II. This set is considerably lighter, more powerful, and easier to place in operation than the AN/GRC-46 which it replaces. In general this equipment gave excellent results. Three defects became apparent during the course of the operation:

1. No tape-printing/transmitting equipment is provided with the set. The lack of punched-tap capability results in slower transmission of messages and greater possibility of errors, which in turn wastes valuable net time.

2. The combination of 24-hr/day operation and the high temperatures and humidity encountered during this operation caused failure of the power amplifier section of the AN/GRC-106 radio.

3. The exhaust pipe of the vehicle used to transport the AN/USC-2 is located directly under the mount for the associated teletypewriter security equipment. Heat from this source combined with the high temperatures encountered caused several security equipment failures.

(b) Radio equipment (AN/USC-12, 43-49 series) performed well throughout this reporting period. Several equipment failures were attributed to excessive heat. In most cases the equipment was found to be fully operational after removal from service for several hours.

(c) Lessons Learned:

1. Operation of the AN/USC-2 radio teletypewriter set can be greatly improved by the development of a recording system which will permit the use of tape printing, sending equipment with installed security equipment. Net schedules should be devised which will permit the equipment to be turned off periodically for cooling. Operations from vehicle power should be confirmed to short periods only to avoid overheating and damage to security equipment. Radio sets in the AN/USC-12, 43-49 series should be shielded from the direct rays of the sun and for circulation of air around the sets provided at all times. Radio sets should be allowed to cool for several hours and then tested for satisfactory operation prior to evacuation to higher echelon repair shops.

6. (c) CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS:

CONFIDENTIAL

b. Operation Portland: 18-22 August 1967

c. Operation Shemesh II: 29 Sept - 31 October 1967

7. (c) LOGISTICS:

a. Logistics situation: Not used

b. Supply

(1) Class I
   (a) B Rations: authorized 15 days, on hand 11 days
   (b) C Rations: authorized 5 days, on hand 3 days

(2) Class II & IV
   (a) Critical shortage items are as follows:
      (1) Compass magnetic
      (2) Alani set AN/G9
      (3) Wrist watch
      (4) Starlight scope
      (5) Radio AN/G88 & 74

(3) Class III
   (a) 100% stockage objectives: 30,000 gal, on hand 38,650 gal.
   (b) Diesel stockage objectives: 30,000 gal, on hand 23,450 gal.
   (c) JI-4 stockage objectives: 50,000 gal, on hand 79,000 gal.
   (d) Avgas stockage objectives: 10,000 gal, on hand 14,650 gal.

(4) Class V.
   (a) No shortage exists in this area.

(5) Miscellaneous.
   (a) During past quarter battalion's assigned to this brigade
      have returned in excesses to conform to newly published "T.O.E.'s.

(6) Evacuation.
   (a) Excellent medical evacuation was provided by all
      medical units during reported quarter.

(7) Transportation.
   (a) Route Zinc was used as LZ for the 1st Brigade.
   (b) Supplies transported during the quarter totaled
      approximately 23,880 tons in all classes of supply. (This includes air).
   (c) 6,003 tons of supplies were moved by air during the quarter.

7. (c) DEFENSE AND NON-MILITARY ASPECTS

a. Close coordination of air and arty support is a vital re-
   quisite for a successful operation. A F.C.L. must be established in order
   to effectively exploit air & arty simultaneously if possible.

b. In an emergency situation, with proper security, medical
   evacuation may be accomplished with a 1 ship LZ.

For the COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Maj. D. [Signature]
Major, Arm. Adj.
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division

1. (C) General: During the months of August, September and October, the 2d Bde continued Operation LAH SON 67 to secure selected areas of BINH DUONG and BINH HOA Provinces. The Bde coordinated and conducted joint operations with elements of 5th ARVN Division, BINH DUONG Sector, 18th ARVN Division, and BINH HOA Sector. Continued emphasis was placed on strengthening local defenses, extending developmental projects, elimination of Viet Cong infrastructures, winning the support of the local populace, and operations to kill, capture or cause defection of VC forces within the LAH SON AO.

2. (C) Summary of Operations: In order to accomplish its mission, the Brigade conducted Jungle clearing operations, search and destroy operations, cordon and search operations, night ambushes and saturation bombings; provided security at the Rock Quarry and for the Village Chief of TAN PHUOC KHU and for engineer units; provided convoy escorts and RIF along Rte BRONZE and Rte IRON; conducted Revolutionary Development Projects which included psychological operations, MEDCAPS and distribution of foodstuffs, clothing, soap, paint, etc; established Mobile Resource Control Checkpoints; conducted visual reconnaissance, starlight and firefly missions; directed airstrikes and placed artillery concentrations on VC Base Camps, supply areas, suspected VC locations and MACV Targets; and provided basic, advanced and unit training to Regional Force Company this period are attached as inclosures 1-5.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ROBERT L. MORRIS
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incl</th>
<th>Lessons Learned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1—51</td>
<td>Lessons Learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2—52</td>
<td>Lessons Learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3—53</td>
<td>Lessons Learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4—54</td>
<td>Lessons Learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5—55</td>
<td>Lessons Learned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20-23
1-1-18 Inf
1-2-18 Inf
1-2-16 Inf
1-2-16 Inf (Mech)
1-2-28 Inf
1-1-26 Inf
1-1-16 Inf
1-1-16 Cav
1-HHC, 2d Bde
1-1-7 Arty
1-B-1 Engr
1-A-169 Engr
1-B-701 Maint

[Inc 4]

35

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

3 November 1967

3 INOVER REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED (RCS CGG PU-25) (RI) (U)
Inclosure 1: 31 Lessons Learned

1. (C) Present Strength: The assigned strength of the Brigade at the beginning of the reporting period was 120 Officers, 7 Warrant Officers, and 2529 Enlisted Men. The strength of the Brigade at the end of the reporting period was 156 Officers, 11 Warrant Officers, and 2768 Enlisted Men.

2. (C) Replacements: The Brigade received 380 Personnel Replacements and lost 101 personnel during the reporting period, resulting in a net gain of 279 personnel.

3. (C) Military Discipline: Military Discipline has been excellent. There were no unusual problems concerning law and order.

4. (C) Burials: All grave registration activity is handled by the Forward Supply Section, 1st Supply and Transportation Battalion and also the 506th Quartermaster Company. All deceased have been evacuated through channels with no burials in the Field.

5. (C) Civilian Employees: At the present, the Brigade hires 200 unskilled laborers for each day, under the temporary hire program, for tasks such as clearing fields of fire, filling sand bags, drainage ditches, and leveling ground for foundation pads. 178 Local Nationals are employed under the permanent hire program for jobs as kitchen police, waitresses, carpenters, automotive mechanics, gardeners, and janitors.

6. (C) Morale and Personnel Services: Morale of this Brigade continues to be excellent. The brigade is receiving adequate quotas for out of country R&R. Red Cross support for personal problems has been timely and excellent. This Brigade has processed 775 Awards during the reporting period.
Inclaur 2: 52 Lessons Learned

1. (C) There were 103 enemy initiated incidents during the month of August. Of these, 57 were the detonation of mines and booby traps during jungle clearing operations; 2 were perimeter probes; 20 were harassment of NDP’s; 12 were in reaction to friendly operations; 6 were harassment of convoys; 5 were mortar attacks on NDP’s; and there was one terrorist incident. The increase of incidents during this month was largely due to increased friendly operations in the 2d Bde T/OOR. The VC were expected to increase their terrorist activities to counteract the success of the RD program being carried out in the BINH HOA and BINH DUONG Provinces, which they continue to be highly vulnerable to, and to disrupt the elections of 3 Sep 67 and the celebration of the VC holiday on 2 Sep (Vietnamese Independence Day). It was also expected that the rate of incidents following the elections would abate and consist mainly of continued harassment of convoys and jungle clearing operations. There was a total of 8 VC KIA (1 of which was a Possible KIA) and 7 VC captured during the month of August.

2. (C) There were 75 enemy initiated incidents during the month of September; a decrease of 28 incidents from the previous month. Of these, 56 were SA, AW and mortar fire directed at NDP’s, base camps, and during friendly operations. These were harassing maneuvers by the VC, who were not in sufficient strength to make a sustained attack against friendly elements. 17 incidents were the detonation of mines and booby traps by Home Flews and AFC’s. There were 2 incidents of sniper fire directed at vehicle convoys. The expected increase of enemy initiated incidents and terrorist acts during the early part of the month to disrupt the VN national elections and the celebration of Vietnamese Independence Day was not as numerous as expected and did not have a telling effect on the elections. There were a total of 16 VC KIA and 17 VC captured during the reporting period.

3. (C) There were 57 enemy initiated incidents during the month of October; a decrease of 18 incidents from the previous month. Of these, 23 were SA and AW fire and the detonation of mines and booby traps directed against units on search and destroy missions. 6 were SA and AW fire and detonation of mines directed at vehicles, both in convoy and travelling singularly. There were 2 incidents of harassment of DI AN Base Corp perimeter defenses and 26 incidents of harassing fire directed at NDP’s, AF, and LP of field units. Conspicuously absent from the enemy initiated incidents of this month was the lack of mortar fire being used as either harassment or full scale attack of NDP’s. In addition to the 57 enemy initiated incidents there were a total of 31 reported incidents involving the detection of movement on the periphery of NDP’s and AF positions. These were probably perimeter reconnaissances of possible diversionary tactics to cover for movement of major force movements or the movement of supplies. On 25 October, an AF engaged several VC on highway 2A at XT823314. Immediately after engaging the VC, the AF was subjected to a heavy volume of SA and AW fire from a VC force that had surrounded the position. The VC were expected to continue to conduct harassing type operations against friendly units during field operations but will not conduct a ground attack against a large size force. Rather, they will attempt to isolate and cut off small size AF and units as in the incident of 25 October. The VC continue to be highly vulnerable to the RD program being carried out in the BINH HOA and BINH DUONG Provinces. Captured documents reveal the C1 and C3 of the FNU 101 BN are at nearly 2/3 of their previously estimated strength. Also, an agent report received from a reliable source indicates that C63 had disbanded all but one platoon due to the demotion of the company by friendly operations conducted during October and because of desertions and defections. The C63 strength is now at a total strength of 26 men, an 8 man squad is located in AN SON Village, LE THI district and the remainder at XT779265. There were a total of 39 VC KIA (12 of which were Possible KIA) and 18 VC captured during the month of October.

Inclosure 4
Inclosure 3: 53 Lessons Learned

1. (C) During the period 13 Sep 67 to 15 Nov the 2d Brigade conducted numerous cordon and search operations in BINH CAT, HU GIAO, & CHAU THANH Districts of BINH DUONG Province. The degree of success of these operations varied from village to village. Generally, the large villages with a high population density were sealed with negative results. This can be attributed to the fact that the VC are confident that they can hide in the village or merge with the population and they do not attempt to break the seal. The village of CHAN LÜU, population 5130, (XT825315) is an example of a village that has been sealed with negative results.

2. (C) More successful seals have resulted when a seal was applied to a village that offered relatively few hiding places. In this type village the VC have little or no confidence in their ability to hide or blend with the population and attempt to "break" the seal during the hours of darkness. The seal of TAN BINH West (XT855360) on 18 Oct is an example of a successful seal. Ambush patrols were placed on the routes of egress at 0000H. At 0200H the seal was successfully completed without alerting the VC in the village. At 0300H the seal message was played. Shortly thereafter the seal forces received fire from the village. This fire continued until 0640H. Four VC attempted to break the seal. Results: 4 VC KIA, 4 vns captured. Troops VC triggered the ambush covering the route of egress.

   a. The seal was effected between 2400 & 0400 hrs. Experience indicates that the VC come into a village after dark and leave prior to 0700 hrs. They do this to avoid being caught in a village during daylight. Thus, the utilization of helicopters to conduct a daylight cordon seal is negated.

   b. The seal forces were pre-positioned within 5000 meters of the seal village several days prior to the seal. Prepositioning of forces is extremely important. The ideal situation is one in which seal forces are pre-positioned in such a manner as to enable them to approach the village from two different directions. On numerous occasions when forces were not properly positioned for a seal, (example, approach village from one direction only) the VC would slip out in one direction as the seal forces approached from another direction.

   c. Light conditions contribute to a successful seal. The optimum time to execute a seal is when the moon is in full or 3/4 phase. If this is not possible artificial illumination should be used at irregular intervals.

   d. One technique used with success has been the "false seal". Ambushes are positioned on the routes of egress around a village and a seal message is played. The VC who are unaware that a seal has not been effected attempt to leave the village. Usually the ambushes will intercept them.

3. (C) The proper selection and utilization of search forces is all important in cordon and search operations. The weakest link in this type operation is the lack of trained search forces. Since policy precludes the use of US search forces, GVN personnel must be used. Thus for the 2d Bde has been unsuccessful in developing a trained search force. Habitually the forces provided by District/Province/LNNW are unsuccessful in village searches. Until a trained, motivated search force can be provided this aspect of cordon and search operations will be unsuccessful.

Inclosure 3 to Inc 4
Inclosure 4: S4 Lessons Learned

1. (C) During August, logistical transport was provided by both helicopter and vehicular means. Delivery of FOL, particularly in the instance of 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized), was accomplished by CH-47 sling loads rigged and flown from LAI KHE. When possible, resupply of FOL was effected by road to the above unit. B/701st Maintenance Battalion rendered maintenance support to the Brigade and ONCOM units. The 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) provided a contact team from B/701st Maintenance Battalion. The existing shop facilities at DI AN were used by the 3/C/1-4 Cavalry Squadron. The 168th Engineer Battalion supported their own land clearing team except when the road access into the area was nonexistent. Then the 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) handled the fuel resupply. Logistical bases were maintained at DI AN, LAI KHE, and FHU LOI. Class I, II, and IV was available at each location, but II and IV only in limited amounts at FHU LOI. Class III was available in sufficient quantities at all locations, however, fuel for aerial delivery was flown from LAI KHE. Class V was available from both LONG BINH and LAI KHE ASF's.

2. (C) During September, the logistical requirements increased considerably for both helicopter and vehicular means. The fact that the two battalions OFCON to the 2d Bde were established in static NDF's initially increased the requirement for CH-47 sorties. Also the numerous seal and search missions conducted by the 2-16 Infantry increased the number of extractions of equipment and again the insertion of the equipment the next day. Once the battalions established the NDF's, the requirement for CH-47 support stabilized. The requirement for water trailers in the NDF's likewise increased the number of sorties. The 2-16 Infantry was located in three NDF's necessitating additional sorties to fulfill the battalion requirements. The support from ACC was satisfactory, but through experience and the disposition of forces, the battalions determined that they could not be adequately supplied by the arbitrary number of four CH-47 sorties per Battalion. The overall aircraft support from division was adequate. The 2-16 Infantry operated three mess halls in their NDF and 2-16 Inf operated one mess hall. "B" Company, 701st Maintenance Battalion continued to provide support maintenance for the units operating with the 2d Brigade. The 701st Maintenance contact team provided support for the 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) and "B" Company, 2-34 Armor from LAI KHE during operation FAUL BUNI. Logistic bases have been maintained at DI AN and LAI KHE. Classes I through IV were available at these locations. Class V was obtained from LONG BINH or LAI KHE ASF.

3. (C) Logistical requirements for helicopter and vehicular means were normal for October. Both 2-16 and 2-16 required four CH-47 resupply sorties daily, augmented by one to two UH1D sorties. Resupply of DODGER Forward was accomplished mainly by vehicle, augmented by one to two UH1D sorties daily. Due to tactical operations, the total number of daily resupply UH1D sorties was limited. The 2-16 Infantry operated two mess halls at NORMANDY I and 2-16 Inf operated one mess hall at NORMANDY II. During October, both 2-16 Inf and 2-16 Inf maintained their logistical bases at DI AN. Classes I through IV were obtained at DI AN and Class V at LONG BINH ASF. Task Force Steel required minimal support. Most of the Task Force logistical requirements were provided by the company that was OFCON to Task Force Steel at the time. During the first three weeks, Company F 701st Maintenance Battalion maintained a contact team at 2d Bde Fwd. All 2d Bde units completed replacing M-16's with new buffer groups. The IMPACT and the MAT teams were organized and the 2d Brigade supplied all necessary equipment and vehicles, and will continue to support them. No unusual logistical problems were encountered.
Incloure 5: 55 Lessons Learned

1. (c) Medcaps in this quarter were expanded in scope and magnitude with a tripling in number of hamlets visited and number of patients seen over the last quarter. 112 separate Medcap operations in 27 different hamlets treated 23,765 medical and 3,096 dental patients for a total of 26,861 patients seen. August, September and October in turn showed increases due to the experience gained and the concurrent emphasis given this valuable program. An organised system of surveying the villagers was implemented and the results indicate that the villagers appreciate the Medcap effort and interpret them as signs of the goodwill of the United States. They also contradict the Viet propaganda effort against the US. The operation of the ZAM RAIN (1) Dispensary by 2d Bde medical personnel continued on a reduced scale as the VN nurses became more skilled. From a daily visit basis, we dropped down to weekly visits. This program of running the dispensary and training a nurse was very successful and the pattern will be repeated in other dispensaries. The most significant change in Medcap operations was the inroads made into the northern LAN SON area. This program must be sustained, i.e., repeat visits must be planned to insure continuity of treatment for the villagers. The following specific lessons were learned as a result of Medcap's conducted:

a. Medcaps can be increased in scope by requiring Battalion Commander to run Medcaps in operational areas where situation permits.

b. Medcaps should always seek to integrate Pay Ops by distributing leaflets, showing films and displaying banners. One banner reading "Rally Here" resulted in the defection of a Hoi Chanh at a Medcap site. Entertainment and gifts can also be used to advantage.

c. Repeat visits at least monthly to the same area are a must provide continuity of treatment.

d. Medcaps held over siesta hours are successful if the villagers know a Medcap is in progress.

e. A trained agent should accompany Medcaps to ask about local conditions, VC activities and other information.

f. Repeat visits increase confidence of villagers. Program should be planned beginning at Province level and coordinated through district & village Chiefs with the CORDS/KACO Advisors.

g. Trained interpreters are a must for an effective Medcap, for a large operation (200 to 500 patients), two interpreters are needed - one at admissions and one with doctor.

h. Engineer tape is a must for control of line. VN nationals do not understand the idea of lining up and will mob the doctor if not controlled.

i. A dentist should always be requested for Medcaps. Many are available from base camps who are not organic to the division medical battalion.

j. It is essential that printed directions for taking medicine will be issued with prescriptions. The death of one child was reported as the result of an overdose administered by a parent who did not understand the directions.

k. Medcaps conducted in conjunction with search operations were very successful in controlling personnel removed from the search area. In addition, VN wounded sometimes are brought for treatment and hence easily captured.

l. A very successful approach to Medcap location is the use of existing VN dispensaries which invariably welcome the additional support. The VN personal profit by the experience of working with highly trained physicians.
CONFIDENTIAL

m. Road blocks or check points should not be established between the Medcap site and the area being serviced. The check point tends to discourage patients.

n. Frequently, requests are made for the doctor to make a house call for someone unable to come to the Medcap site. These requests should be honored whenever possible - perhaps during the lunch break or slack period.

o. If a serious case refuses evacuation, it is essential that name and address be obtained so that the local health personnel or the advisory team radio can pursue the case.

p. Attempts should be made for the integration of ABVN Medcap teams with US teams on large operations. Both will profit from the exchange and an excellent frame of cooperation will be imparted to the populace.

q. Medics stationed with NATO, 1-318CT and other teams should run miniature Medcaps in their areas. They can detect trends which may require a larger effort by the Brigade Medcap team.

r. All personnel connected with Medcap operations should cultivate a knowledge of the basic Vietnamese greetings. A polite greeting to the villagers encountered during the day works wonders in developing rapport.

s. In areas that are not secure and where security forces are not available, it was found that establishment of a Medcap site outside of the hamlet limits still drew a good turnout. The people will walk miles to see the doctor.

2. (C) Self Help Projects are an integral part of the Revolutionary Development Program. During this quarter a modern 5 room dispensary was built in LAT THIEN District. This project was a well coordinated effort involving private donors, COMS, District and Province Officials, VN National and US Forces. Work progressed steadily without interruption of materials, labor and supervisors all arrived at the proper time as needed. Work was begun on the construction of 15 playground sets for schools in the area. The 18 unit PHU CUONG HF housing project remained a bone in the throat of civic action as labor and material problems continued. It was decided to have the brigade engineers complete the roof without VN participation in order to get the project completed before it drags on any longer (six weeks to date). Valuable lessons were learned in this project and they are enumerated below.

The following lessons were learned on Self Help Projects:

a. Construction projects should never be started without prior coordination on the following:

(1) Who will provide labor?

(2) Who will provide material?

(3) Do the VN people want it?

Any one of the three items listed, if unanswered ahead of time, can doom a self-help project to oblivion and will generate more harm than good.

b. All major construction projects must have the blessing of the Province Chief. Without his prior support, many obstacles are created. The VN officials should be encouraged to initiate requests for self help projects. If a detailed analysis of the project indicates its feasibility, then a firm no with the reasons is far better than any evasions.

c. US supervisors on self help projects must adjust to their thinly and pace to VN standards. Speed is not paramount. Pride in self accomplishment is important.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

d. An excellent fringe benefit in self help projects is the training in skills acquired by the workers. US supervisors should understand they are training as well as building.

e. The unavailability of lumber for civic action projects is the biggest bar to the self help construction program. If a supply of lumber could be made available through civic action channels, the program could easily be doubled in this area.

f. Unit commanders should be encouraged to enter the civic action program. This can be done effectively by:

   (1) Command emphasis through chain of command.

   (2) S-5 staff supervision for control of unit participation.

3. (G) The Pey Ope effort hit a snag in August when the availability of CH-1D was rare for psyops missions. The availability rate increased steadily over September and October. Hours of Pey Ope Broadcast: August, 69 hours; September, 105 hours; October, 153 hours. The leaflet effort expanded dramatically as follows: August, 2,066,000; September, 9,043,000; October 30,412,000. The results of the October leaflet offensive should be evaluated at this time. Results will carry over to the next several months. A joint Pey Ope Center was established in BINH DUONG for the purpose of coordinating, the Pey Ope effort of 1st Div, 25th Div, 5th ARVN Div, BINH DUONG and Hau NOI Provinces. This Center was closed out upon termination of operation DOW NOI. It was extremely successful in integrating all the effort and accelerating the entire program for all concerned. The number of ralliers steadily increased during the quarter as follows: August 38, September 40, October 50. Most of October's 50 were reported over the two week bonus period when the joint psyops center was in operation. The following lessons were learned as a result of Psychological Operations.

   Close coordination among US, Prov Space and ARVN psyops personnel will result in a more efficient program in a given area. In addition, the establishment of a joint psyops center will result in a better program for all. The Pey Ope center should be reconstituted on a weekly basis.

a. As psyops becomes more important and receives greater emphasis by commanders, a tendency arises for untrained personnel to interject their own pet ideas (contrary to established principles) into the program. Trained personnel should be consulted before decisions on specific programs, leaflets or broadcasts are made. A shortage of experienced psyops personnel does exist.

b. When broadcasting directions from an aircraft, use familiar landmark for reference (e.g., market place, cross roads, rubber trees, etc) instead of compass points. North and South, etc mean nothing to the average VN.

c. As an area becomes pacified the psyops effort must be shifted to put greater emphasis on appeals to VC families. The families must be bombarded with loudspeaker and leaflet appeals, but, more important, with personal visits by former Hoi Chinh extolling the virtues of the Chieu Hoi Program. A good technique is to provide a cook's tour for VC families of the Province Chieu Hoi Center.

d. Mobile Resources Control Teams, Medcaps, Hamlet Festivals and Check Fouts are excellent opportunities for disseminating psyops material.

e. The Audio-Visual Jeepster and accessories currently in count are not rugged enough and spare parts are in very short supply. A 1,5 to 2,5 kW generator should be used as a backup for movie projector power when the Jeepster alternator is not functioning.

f. Pey Ope personnel showing movies should understand the various themes for various target audiences. One projectionist was discovered playing a sophisticated propaganda appeal as entertainment for children.
b. The remote control boxes can be removed from the aerial mounted amplifiers as they serve no useful purpose.

c. The tape cartridge recorder is unreliable under dusty conditions. Standard radios have been used without difficulty.
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE AND LAI KHE BASE
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

1 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (RCS GSGPO-28 (R))

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-WB-C
APO US Forces 96345

1. (C) PART I. INTRODUCTION:
   a. During the previous quarter three major unit operations were conducted. Major engagements were fought on 14 June and 17 June. Two major unit operations were conducted during the current reporting period, August thru October. No major engagements occurred during the current reporting period.

   b. Component Units and Commanding Officers:
      1-2 Infantry: LTC John D. Pelton, 13 August 67 - present
      1-2 Infantry: LTC Henry L. Davidson, 29 May 67 - 13 Sept 67
      1-2 Infantry: LTC Calvert P. Benedict, 15 Sept 67 - present

2. (C) PART II. NARRATIVE OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS:
   a. Major operations conducted by the IRON BRIGADE during the reporting period include the following:

      (1) Operation FUGGLAND (13-21 August 1967), the IRON BRIGADE mission was to conduct airmobile assaults with two infantry battalions, conduct subsequent S & D operations in objective area and establish a FSPB at Dutchman and a FSPB at An Loc; to kill and capture VC/NVA forces and militarily significant installations in objective area. The 3d Brigade concept of operation was as follows: The 3d Brigade secures and occupies FSPB WHISKER (Dutchman) with 1-28 Infantry and a FSPB at An Loc with Company B, 2-28 Infantry conducts airmobile insertion with 1-2 Infantry L2 SAM (XT710760) at 131100H August 67 and with 1-16 Infantry immediately following on the same L2 moving southwest to secure L2 MAX (XT700755). The 1-16 Infantry

        DOWGRADIN IN 3 YR INTERVALS
        DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS
        DOD DIR 5200,10

CONFIDENTIAL

Incl. 5
CONFIDENTIAL

secures Quan Loi and provides forces for Brigade ERF. Intel reports indicated a large NVA unit consisting of between 1600 and 2000 men were in an area bounded by the following coordinates: XT670780, XT730750, XT720730 and XT650760. This unit was believed to have been the main body of the 165th NVA Regiment that attacked the Tong Le Chon USSF camp on 7 August 1967. The terrain was generally flat with broad leaf evergreen forests, some swampy areas and thick bamboo forests. Weather was characterized by occasional rain but did not impede the operation.

The 3d Brigade began Operation PORTLAND by inserting the 1-2 Infantry into LZ SAM (XT712767) at approximately 1100 hours on 13 August 1967. The 1-2 Infantry then secured the LZ for the 1-16 Infantry (-) who then moved Southeast to LZ MAX (XT700755). Both battalions immediately prepared night defensive positions. There was no significant enemy contact during the operation.

Operation PORTLAND was officially terminated at 212400 hours August 1967.

(2) Road clearing operation (20 Aug-10 Sept 67) (unnamed). The road clearing operation was conducted along Hwy 13 from Lai Khe to Quan Loi. The mission of the 3d Brigade was to clear and secure Hwy 13 from Lai Khe to Quan Loi, control resupply convoys in sector and conduct S & D operations along the route. The concept of operations was to position units along Hwy 13 and conduct road repairs (20-25 Aug). PHASE III (26-27 Aug) was the movement of resupply convoys between Lai Khe and Quan Loi. PHASE IV (28 Aug-3 Sept) consisted of S & D operations by the infantry battalions as directed by Division. PHASE V (3-10 Sept) consisted of reopening Hwy 13 and then the extraction of units from along route 13. Participating units were: 1-2 Inf, 1-16 Inf, 1-26 Inf, 1-28 Inf, 2-16 Inf, 2-18 Inf, 1-A Cav (-), 2-33 Arty, 6-6 Arty, 5-15 Arty, and supporting units. Intelligence sources had indicated a larger unit of main force VC on either side of Hwy 13 along with local force units and guerrillas, all of which had the capability of rapidly dispersing to attack convoys or locations all along route 13.

The area was covered predominately with broadleaf, evergreen secondary forests and rubber plantations.

The following FSBH's were established to support the operation:

(a) Quan Loi (XT8190) 6-15 Arty (-), C 1-7 Arty, LHABB 6-6 Arty, LHABC 8-6 Arty, A 6-27 Arty (-).
(b) Caisson I (XT77587) 6-6 Arty, C/6-15 Arty.
(c) Caisson II (XT7381) B/1-7 Arty, C/2-33 Arty, Fitt A/6-27 Arty.
(d) Caisson III (XT7661) 8-6 Arty (-), B/8-6 Arty, A/1-5 Arty, D/1-5 Arty.
(e) Caisson IV (XT7854) A/6-15 Arty, B/2-33 Arty.
(f) Lai Khe (XT7637) 2-33 Arty (-), A/2-33 Arty, D/2-33 Arty, A/8-6 Arty.

The operation commenced on 21 August with 2-18 Infantry and 2-16 Infantry making air insertions and 2-16 Infantry securing a portion of route 13. On 22 August the road was secured with one (1) minor contact (recon platoon) 1-16 Infantry. Similar actions continued thru 27 August. During the period numerous mines, booby traps, tunnels, etc., were found; however, none was of any major significance. During the period from 28 August thru 6 September 1967 activities consisted of mostly securing Lai Khe, Quan Loi, and the FSBH's; S & D operations; and several small seal and searches. None of these operations had any significant contact or findings. On 7 Sept 67, units were again inserted into LZ's along route 13 and prepared to open the road the following day. From 8 thru 10 Sept 67 the road was opened for convoy passage, and on 10 Sept 67 all units moved either by air or repair, to respective base camps. No significant contact or findings were made during this period. Brigade headquarters returned to Lai Khe on 10 Sept 67. The road clearing operation was officially terminated 102400 Sept 67.

CONFIDENTIAL
(3) Operation SHENANDOAH II (30 Sept-29 Oct 67), the IRON BRIGADE mission was to clear and accomplish limited repairs on Rte 240 from Ben Cat (X771330) to Vinh (X786445) to kill, capture and destroy VC/NVA forces and militarily significant installations within the operational area. The 3d Brigade concept of operations was as follows: The 3d Brigade employed 2-2 Inf (Mech) (-) with C/1 Engr to clear and accomplish limited repair of Rte 240 from Ben Cat (X771330) to Vinh (X786445); 1-16 Inf conducts airmobile assault into LZ Goliath (X769445); 2-28 Inf conducted airmobile assault into LZ David (X713146). Units would then secure their portion of Rte 240 and conduct search & destroy operations in their AO.

Intelligence sources had reported numerous VC sighting in the area. Of main concern were the 271st VC Regt, Minh Loi Bn, and elements of the 9th NVA Division. Guerrilla activity in the form of sniping, sniper fire, booby traps, and other such tactics could be expected throughout the area. The terrain was generally flat with all types of vegetation in the area. Obstacles existed in poorly drained areas and along streams. Weather was characterized by intermittent rain but did not significantly impede the operations.

The Brigade began Operation SHENANDOAH II 300637 Sept 67 with 2-2 Inf (Mech) (-) and C/1 Engr departing Lai Khe Base Camp to begin clearing and sweeping Rte 240. The operations continued until the insertion of 1-16 Inf in LZ Goliath (X659445) on 1 Oct 67 and 2-28 Inf into LZ David (X713146) on 2 Oct 67. Operations from 1 Oct 67 through 16 Oct consisted of A & D operations by 1-16 Inf, 2-2 Inf (Mech) (-), and 2-28 Inf and road clearing and plow operations along Route 240 by 2-2 Inf (Mech) (-) and C/1 Engr. 2-28 Inf extracted to Lai Khe (OT61245) hrs to become Div REF. On 8 Oct 1-16 Inf moved to and secured FSPB LORRAINE I (X769445) and secured Rte 240 and plow ops in sector. Concurrently 2-2 Inf (Mech) (-) secured FSPB LORRAINE II and Rte 240 in sect. The most significant contact was between C/1-16 Inf and an unknown VC force on 13 Oct 67 via X769742. Sporadic small arms contact began 1010 hrs and was broken finally at 1700 hrs. The action resulted in 5 US KIA, 4 US WIA, and unknown VC casualties.

On 16 Oct the 3d Brigade terminated its portion of SHENANDOAH II and conducted small unit activities through 22 Oct. A total of 1075 Acres of jungle was cleared along Rte 240 by the 1st Engr Bn.

On 29 Oct the IRON BRIGADE resumed participation in SHENANDOAH II with the airmobile assault of 1-26 Inf into LZ RED via X165445. B/1-26 Inf and a pat of B/2-2 Inf (Mech) also secured and reopened FSPB LORRAINE I. The operation continued through 27 Oct with 1-26 Inf and 2-2 Inf (Mech) conducting search and destroy operations in assigned AO's through 27 Oct 67.

On 28 Oct, 1-26 Inf (-) was air extracted from their NDP via X165445 to Lai Khe and Phuoc Vinh. On 29 Oct, 2-2 Inf (Mech) and B/1-26 Inf moved by road from FSPB LORRAINE I and LORRAINE II to Lai Khe Base Camp closing 1620 hrs.

Operation SHENANDOAH II was officially terminated at 291620 hrs Oct 67.

3. (c) PART III. INTELLIGENCE (Enemy Order of Battle):

a. Enemy activity during the reporting period was characterized by mortar and recoilless rifle attacks on base camps, road blocks, tax collection points, harassing and terrorist attacks on villages. The VC increased their propaganda and terrorism against unprotected villages and lightly defended villages during the month of August and first part of September. The increase of activity was caused by the National Election held on 3 September.

During October Special Forces Camps were selected targets of special interest to the enemy during the reporting period. The increased offensive action is believed to be the beginning of the Full-Winter campaign. There was a decrease in terrorism, harassment, tax collection, road blocks, and propaganda by local VC forces. The decrease in activity is probably a result of local forces being used to carry supplies and recon areas of interest for attack.

Principle units in the area of interest to the 3d Brigade which could influence any battle situation include the following units:

1. 9th VC Division
   a. 271st Regt
   b. 273rd Regt
   c. 274th Regt

2. 9th NVA Division
   a. 271st Regt
CONFIDENTIAL

(a) 135th NVA Bn
(b) 125th NVA Bn
(c) 61st District Company Ben Cat District
(d) C-45 Duc Trang District Company
(e) C-61 District Company
(f) C-64 Duc Trang District Company

A brief summary of enemy activity for each of the major operations and major attacks or engagements during the reporting period.

(1) Operation FORTLAND:

(a) Intelligence prior to the operation: The operation area covered approximately 775 sq. km and was bounded by the following coordinates: X0002, Y0200, XP0010, YP0010. The area is divided approximately in half by Route QL11, which runs North to South. Other prominent terrain features are the Song Saigon which flows across the northwest corner of the area and the Song Be, which flows across the southeast corner. Both rivers are fed by numerous streams which flow throughout the area. The area is generally flat with relief under 105 m in elevation and slope varying 0-3%. There are sizable plantations in the northern portion of the area and in the southeast near Minh Thanh. The remainder of the area is covered by secondary forests and scattered large patches of bamboo. In addition to Route QL11, main avenues of approach into the area are L0/13, which runs NE/SW in the SE section of the area and several secondary roads which run throughout. There had been several recent contacts and incidents between FNSF and VC/NVA elements in the area of interest. The latest significant contact was the attack on Tong Le Chon USSF/CIDG camp (11623010) by the 165th NVA Regiment.

(b) On 10 August 1967 a potential source reported that at 051000H on August 1967 an unidentified NVA unit consisting of between 1600-2000 men was located in an area bounded by the following coordinates: X0002, Y0200, XP0010, YP0010. This unit was still in place at 100000H on August 1967. The unit was divided into two forces, half on the west side of Highway 245 and other half on the east side of Highway 245. The unit had shallow foxholes around the above coordinates and apparently was in a defensive position. The members of this unit wore black clothing, rubber sandals, and hard helmets. Each man in this unit was carrying between five and ten kilo's of rice. The unit was armed with at least twenty 50 caliber machine guns mounted on tripods, seven 75 mm FA, and unknown number of individual weapons including the Soviet 7.62 mm assault rifle model AK47. The unit was scheduled to stay in the above location until the morning of 11 August 1967. The unit would then depart for an unknown destination. This unit was the subject of an artillery and/or airstrike between 0400 and 0500 hours 10 Aug 67, and suffered an undetermined number of casualties (End of Agent Report). The above mentioned unit could have been the main body of the 165th NVA Regiment that attacked the Tong Le Chon USSF camp on 7 August 1967.

(c) The most serious threat to brigade operations in the area were the 7th NVA Division and its subordinate elements. The 165th and 161st NVA Regiments posed the most immediate threat. Reinforcements would most likely come from the 271st and 272d VC Regiments both of whom could reinforce within 24-48 hours.

(d) During the operation no contact was made with the enemy. The 1-2 Infantry located and destroyed 2 huts, 3000 lbs of polished rice, 36 cans of evaporated milk and 24 cans of cooking oil. The old base camp with 20 foxholes and 12 sets of cooking utensils were located and destroyed. On the 17th of August 1967 the same unit found 9 open graves and one bunker that were destroyed.

(e) The terrain was generally flat with broad leaf evergreen forests, some swampy areas and thick bamboo forests. Weather was characterized by occasional rain but did not effect the operation.

(2) Operation SHENANDOAH II:

(a) There had been numerous reported VC sightings in the area of interest.

(b) The units listed as probably in the area of interest were those whose operational areas were believed to include the area of interest and whose present locations based on CB holding fell within the area.

CONFIDENTIAL
The most serious threats to brigade operations in the area were felt to be the 271st VC Bdg and the Phu Loi Eta operating in the Bde IAQR, with the 273rd VC Bdg and 165th NVA Bdg operating in the Bde TAOI.

Reinforcements would likely come from the 9th VC Div or the 7th NVA Div. Further support could come from the local force companies located within the area.

Engagements during operating period:

(a) Co. C 1st Bn 16th Inf engaged unknown size force vic XT67469 at 131040 Oct 67.

(b) 1st Bn 16th Inf received 75-80 rds of mortar fire XUL40070 at 270043 Oct 67.

(c) Phouc Qua XIII57036 received mortar fire 270100H Oct 67.

(d) Song Be village XIII30060 came under attack by an estimated 2 battalions. Resulting in 134 VC KIA (BO).

(e) Lai Kho (XT763853) 270153H Oct 67 received 12-15 rds mortar fire.

(f) Ban Cai (XT744336) received fire from 57mm recoilless rifled, small arms, B-40 and M-79 rds 270135H Oct 67.

(g) Co. B 2d Bn 2d Inf (Mech) received mortar and sniper fire XU64494 at 272358H Oct 67.

(h) 1st Bn 16th Inf engaged an unknown size VC force XU658096 at 291220H Oct 67. Result 12 VC KIA (BO).

(i) Loc Ninh XU738097 received ground attack at 290123 Oct 67. Attack was with rocket, mortar and coordinated ground attack. Result 83 VC KIA (BO).

(j) Between 30 Sept and 29 Oct the following material was captured or destroyed by 3d Brigade Operation SHENANDOAH II: 50 huts, 166 bunkers, 12 chickens, 3 pigs, 1600 rds 81mm, 16-75mm RR rds, 240 grenades, 31 individual wps, 5 crew served wps, 28 claymore mines, 1 box detonating cord, 95,265 lbs of rice, 24 foxholes, 9 desks, 5 ox carts, 9 bicycles, cooking utensils and pots, 35 sets of fatiques, 700 m of trench, 19 RPG rds, 30 lbs of sugar, 15 lbs salt, 16 protective masks, and 4 US mines.

The terrain was generally flat with broad leaf evergreen forests, some swampy areas, thick bamboo forests, and some rubber plantations. The weather was hot and humid throughout the operation with occasional periods of rain. The weather did not impede the operation, however.

(c) PART IV. PERSONNEL

a. Strength:

(1) Authorized: Officers: 147 WOs: 12 EM: 2737
(2) Assigned as of 31 Aug 67: Off: 138 WO: 9 EM: 2889
    Assigned as of 30 Sept 67: Off: 150 WO: 10 EM: 2840
    Assigned as of 31 Oct 67: Off: 147 WO: 12 EM: 2737
(3) Replacements gained during the period 1 Aug 67 thru 31 Oct 67: 1011
(4) Hospital returnees during the period 1 Aug 67 thru 31 Oct 67: 102

Other troops authorized and assigned as of 31 Oct 67: One (1) Liaison Officer (ARVN), one (1) Liaison NGO (ARVN) and 18 interpreters (ARVN).
CONFIDENTIAL

b. Replacements: Presently this Brigade is short approximately 925 noncommissioned officers in the grades of E-5 and E-6. All newly assigned EM in the grade of E-7 and below and officers in the grade of O-1 and O-2 attend the Combat Induction Course conducted by the Brigade.

c. Discipline: During the period 1 Aug 67 thru 31 Oct 67, no EM were tried by Summary or General Court Martial. During this period seven (7) EM were tried by Special Courts-Martial.

d. Prisoners of War: None

e. Burials and Graves Registration: None

f. Morale and Personnel Services: Morale of the brigade continues to be high. Four (4) Silver Stars, four (4) Distinguished Flying Crosses, 60 Bronze Stars, 2 Army Commendation Medals (merit), 8 Army Commendation Medals (merit), 1 Air Medal w/VM, 87 Air Medal (merit), and 3 Soldiers Medals have been recommended for awarding to members of the Brigade. Radio Lai Khe operates from 0600 to 2400 hours daily, for the enjoyment of the troops garrisoned at Lai Khe. ARC continues assisting members of the Lai Khe Base in an outstanding manner. Chaplains attendance is high and all units have assigned chaplains.

g. Personnel Management: Assignment of newly assigned replacements has been altered whenever necessary to allow an equalization in the redistribution of personnel within the battalions. No major personnel management problems exist.

h. Civilian Employment:

(1) A total of 1534 Vietnamese are employed within Lai Khe perimeter. (PA&E 307, individual clubs and concessions 704, non-appropriated funds, etc permanent and temporary 507).

(2) Additionally, there are 25 Koreans, 8 Filipinos and 8 US citizens employed within the camp.

i. Civil Assistance:

(1) Psychological Operations: During the months of August, September, and October, one (1) leaflet drop mission was conducted, which accounted for a total of 275,000 leaflets being dropped. Nine (9) loudspeaker missions accounted for a total of fourteen (14) hours of loudspeaker operations. All REM/OPS missions were conducted in coordination with the Brigade S2.

(2) Civic Actions:

(a) During the reporting period 2600 pounds of rice, 1000 pounds of rolled oats, 500 pounds of clothes and assorted other items, including thongs, health kits, school kits, toys, tea, sugar, coffee, jelly and beans were distributed to the Ben Cat Refugee Center. Twenty-three (23) cases of canned foods were distributed to the Ben Cat Orphanage. One (1) Midwife kit and two (2) replacement kits, plus various medical supplies were issued to the Ben Cat and Lai Khe Hospitals. Additionally 1000 ammo boxes were given to the Ben Cat Subsector for use in construction of ballot boxes for the Vietnamese National elections on 3 September 1967.

(b) One-hundred-fifty (150) feet of culvert was issued to Lai Khe Village to improve road drainage. Production of bricks during the quarter was limited. Prime factor which limited production was continuous rain.

(c) During the reporting period 9952 people received treatment under the Brigade MEDCAP program. Most serious cases treated included injuries.

(d) Eight (8) Solatium Payments were made during the reporting period.

CONFIDENTIAL
5. (C) PART V LOGISTICS:

a. The operations during the reporting period were resupplied from either Lai Khe or Quan Loi. The majority of resupply was affected by helicopter, although resupply convoys did travel the roads. No significant problems were encountered.

b. Supplies:

1. Supported strength: 6800 average.

2. Supply levels
   - Class I: 15 days
   - Class II & III: draw as needed
   - Class V: 3 days
   - Class III
     - JP4: 90,000
     - AVGAS: 50,000
     - MOGAS: 60,000
     - DIESEL: 60,000

3. Items in short supply: Swing blades, 8' pickets, generator repair parts, poncho liners, air mattresses, ponchos, helmet camouflage covers, AM-PRO 25, boots size 9R, sharpening files, and water cans.

c. EVACUATION:

1. Casualties:
   a. From hostile action - 90
   b. Disease - 6084
   c. Injury - 460

2. Prisoners of War: 0

3. Refugees: None

d. TRANSPORTATION:

1. Highway: 1250 tons of cargo were moved to Lai Khe, 362.5 tons of cargo were moved to Quan Loi over Highway 13.

2. Air: 400.6 tons were airlifted to Lai Khe, 2007.2 tons were airlifted to Quan Loi.

e. SERVICE:

1. Maintenance: The Direct Support Ordnance unit has been able to keep abreast of maintenance problems in the vehicle category. Generator maintenance is deemed critical due to lack of repair parts.

2. Construction: Approximately 70% of the approved base plan has been completed.

3. Miscellaneous: NA

6. (C) PART VI CHRONOLOGY:

13 August 1967  Operation PORTLAND Commenced
21 August 1967  Operation PORTLAND Terminated
20 August 1967  Road Clearing Operation Commenced
10 September 1967  Road Clearing Operation Terminated
30 September 1967  Operation SHERANDOAH II Commenced
29 October 1967  Operation SHERANDOAH II Terminated

CONFIDENTIAL
7. (C) PART VII. DISCUSSION and RECOMMENDATIONS:

Actions during this period indicate that the following point should be continuously emphasized:

(a) Continuing requirement for dispersion between vehicles and personnel on road clearing operations.

(b) Necessity for contingency planning on S&D operations due to terrain conditions.

(c) Necessity for active ambush operations at night to prevent remining of roads previously cleared during road clearing operations.

(d) Necessity for the continual preplanning for the combined use of air and arty support.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ALBERT G. MAROSCHER
Major, Infantry
Adjutant
AVDB-RAT

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
APO US Forces 96345


2. (C) In compliance with referenced regulation, the following report for the period ending 31 October 1967 is submitted:

Item: MIXING ORDNANCE ON HASSISSING AND INTERDICTION FIRES

Discussion: A target is selected for a TOT based upon the best possible intelligence coupled with a visual reconnaissance conducted prior to darkness. Based upon the nature of the terrain and the target, the type of fuses to be fired are selected. Fuse VT or PD is used with high explosive (HE) ammunition and fuse time or PD with white phosphorus (WP). The HE and WP are fired together to produce a killing and psychological effect. The white phosphorus with fuse time over a clear area or fuse PD in the trees is very impressive and the effect can be seen for miles. The effect of the mixed ordnance is both devastating and demonstrative.

Observation: Mixing ordnance and firing a time on target with all available artillery as a part of the harassing and interdiction program has a portentous effect upon the enemy.

Item: CONDENSATION INSIDE THE PANORAMIC TELESCOPE

Discussion: The high relative humidity, heat, and frequent rains normally experienced in the low-lands of Vietnam have caused condensation inside the panoramic telescope. This fogs the lens and renders this fire control instrument completely inoperable. When the supporting ordnance unit cleaned the telescope they placed a small container of dessicant inside the instrument prior to sealing. This action has virtually eliminated the problem.

Observation: To eliminate condensation in the panoramic telescope, have the supporting ordnance unit clean the instrument, place a small container of dessicant inside and reseal.
ITEM 1: GENERATOR MAINTENANCE

Discussion: Operational commitments often require firing battery elements and headquarters elements to operate from different locations. Generator maintenance becomes extremely difficult for the generator mechanic. The generator mechanic is unable to visit units in the field on a regular basis. Due to limited maintenance it is difficult to keep the generators in a satisfactory operating condition. Increase in the number of major repairs which could have been avoided by systematic inspections, detection and correction of minor failures is an area of paramount concern.

Observation: Selected battalion and battery personnel should be provided with an instructional block of training given by the supporting technical service on the particular generators in use within their unit.

ITEM 2: ADEQUATE LEVELS OF AERIAL DELIVERY EQUIPMENT IN FIELD POSITIONS.

Discussion: Problems are encountered in the air movement of a battery from a field position when sufficient empty A-22 bags are not immediately available in the battery.

Observation: An artillery battery must always be in a posture to make a subsequent move. If this movement is by air, major considerations are the length of advance notice and the number of A-22 bags immediately available for the rebagging of ammunition. It requires five men 15-20 minutes to pack one A-22 bag with 80 rounds of 105mm ammunition. With an ammunition level of at least 2,000 rounds of HE and 300 rounds of illumination, approximately 30 empty bags are required. This number should be maintained in each battery's field position at all times. A minimum of 200 A-22 bags are required for a battalion to support adequately three firing batteries in the field, conduct resupply, and maintain the batteries' capability to conduct a rapid, short notice displacement by CH-47.

ITEM 3: FIRE COORDINATION LINE

Discussion: Several problems have arisen in coordinating tactical air strikes and artillery fires. Fire Coordination Lines (FCL) for air strikes were established by each battalion within their respective battalion areas of operation without regard for adjacent units or the use of artillery in the immediate area of the air strike. This problem was resolved by having FCL's established at brigade level. This is done by the Brigade S3 in coordination with the BS artillery battalion S3, the artillery LNO, and the ALO.
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (U)

Observation: The Fire Coordination Line must be established at brigade level with the concurrence of all personnel concerned. This allows for continuous artillery fire support during tactical air strikes. Both lateral and vertical separation distances must be taken into consideration.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

RONALD A. PISTONE
Major, Artillery
Adjutant
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (I)

TO: Commanding General
   1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVIB-2
AFO 96345

1. (a) Introduction

   a. Immediately prior to this reporting period the 1st Infantry Division Support Command provided division-wide combat service support to all divisional units and other units attached during operations. Support Command provided logistical support for permanent facilities at DL An, Phu Loi, Lai Khe, Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi. Operation LAM SON 67 continued through the period, being supported from permanent facilities at DL An, Phu Loi and Lai Khe. Operations MANHATTAN 23 Apr - 11 May; DALLAS 17 - 25 May; BUXSF& 11 - 26 June were conducted by the Division and supported by Support Command.

   b. Component units and Commanders:

      (1) Support Command: Col. George E. Newman (1 August - 10 September) and Col. Buckner W. Creed III (10 September - present).

      (2) 1st Supply and Transport Battalion: LTC Robert E. Ingers.

      (3) 1st Medical Battalion: LTC Patrick D. Tisdale.

      (4) 701st Maintenance Battalion: LTC Lloyd J. Faul.

      (5) 1st Administration Company: Capt. Charles W. Coffee.

      (6) HHC & Band Support Command: Capt. Lyle E. Tan Rye (1 August - 26 October) and Capt. Bedolf Roberts (26 October - present).

      (7) The headquarters of all units are located at DL An Base Camp.

2. (c) Tactical Operations:

   a. Support Command's primary area of interest in tactical operations was the DL An Base Camp and immediate surrounding area. This headquarters was responsible for the scheduling, coordinating and control of patrolling, roadrunner and reconnaissance activities in the Support Command TAOR/AD. During the reporting period the following is a summary of small unit operations conducted:

      (1) Recon patrols - 37

      (2) Ambush patrols - 112

      (3) Roadrunner operations - 12

      (4) Listening posts - 16
Fire support for the above operations was provided by HHC & Band Mortar Platoon.

3. (c) Intelligences:

b. Viet Cong in or around the Support Command AO which could participate in a mortar or ground attack against DL An Base Camp are the Di An Platoon, C3 LF Co (Lai Thieu Dist) and the 3d VC LF Infantry Bn (Di An Dist). The latter two units possess 60mm and 81/60mm mortar capabilities.

c. Current identification, strength, combat effectiveness and location of above mentioned units are as shown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Di An Platoon</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Combat effective</td>
<td>XLY40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 LF Co (Lai Thieu)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Combat effective</td>
<td>XTR8803, XTW209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d VC LF Inf Bn (Di An)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Combat effective</td>
<td>Dispersed in area north of Di An Base Camp.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. VC activities during the reporting period were primarily restricted to acts of assassination, terrorism and harassment by individuals and small groups. Support casualties were negative for the reporting period. There was no evidence of VC use of air, artillery or armor in or around the Support Command AO. The VC continued to use command detonated claymore mines and various types of booby traps.

d. The VC will probably continue to snipe against DL An Base Camp and vehicles/patrols outside the base camp. A decrease in assassinations and terrorist activities is expected due to the elections being over. It is doubtful that the VC will conduct any attacks in the Support Command area, but will continue to operate as individuals, and in squad size groups.

4. (d) Personnel:

a. Strengths:

1) US troops:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED STRENGTH</th>
<th>ASIGNED STRENGTH AS OF 1 AUGUST 67</th>
<th>ASIGNED STRENGTH AS OF 31 OCTOBER 67</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC &amp; Band</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Med</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st MI</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>701st Maint</td>
<td></td>
<td>719</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Maint</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Replacements:

1) 701st Maint Bn: This unit in the last ninety days has been the recipient of personnel. The picture has been very one-sided in that the battalion lost approximately one-hundred more people than it gained. Aware of this situation, positive steps have been taken in attempts to halt the decline and assure that required MOS's keep coming into the unit. On 28 October 1967 a list of critical MOS's was submitted to 1st Inf Div SUPON. It was the complete status of maintenance personnel. By direct liaison with division some replacements have reported to their battalion in MOS's that are vitally needed. The battalion has been drawn down to TOE strength and will require an increased effort in personnel management to correct MOS imbalances and shortages of critical MOS's as these can severely hamper the mission. In the way of officer
replacements, the battalion is up to strength in most areas. With almost complete turnover of officers in the last quarter the battalion has managed to affect a smooth transition to a highly efficient team. A shortage still exists for one warrant officer, MOS 4444.

(2) 1st Medical Bn: All shortages have been requisitioned through the Division Personnel Management Branch. Replacements are usually school trained but in some cases lack in practical experience. There has been a shortage of motor and mess personal, and this condition continues to exist.

(3) 1st MT Bn: All shortages have been requisitioned through the Division Personnel Management Branch. All replacements are MOS qualified and replacements have been received in a timely manner.

(4) 1st Admin Co: The unit continues to enjoy an adequate replacement flow, however, a small percentage of clerical technicians must be obtained by reclassifying incoming personnel possessing other MOS’s.

d. Disciplined: There were no unusual disciplinary problems or problems concerning law and order during the reporting period.

d. Prisoners of War: There were no prisoners of war taken for this period.

e. Burials and Graves Registration: Graves Registration Branch processed a total of 131 bodies for the reporting period.

f. Civil Assistance:

(1) 70lst Maintenance Battalion paid several goodwill visits to the Lai Thieu Deaf-Mute School. A contact team was sent to the school to repair their generator which provides all the electrical power for the school. During this period they were given salmon oil, wheat, rolled oats, powdered milk, corn meal, rice, clothes and some monetary donations. The battalion also visited the Dong Tao Village to see if their school could be helped. The battalion is presently looking into the requirements for a water well and latrines for the school. Nothing has been physically started as of this date.

(2) 1st Medical Battalion has performed Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAP) for local nationals for Lam Son Operations. Weekly units of the battalion conduct regularly scheduled MEDCAP’s in the villages surrounding the respective base camps. In addition Company D operates the Phuoc Vinh Dispensary for RVN Nationals. This unit provides one (1) medical officer and three (3) medical airmen, six (6) days per week to work along with an RVN Staff in a training program. During the reporting period a total of 3040 patients were treated. The unit also provided dental care for 300 RVN Nationals during the period. Members of this unit organized a program called the “Phuoc Vinh Mission.” Through the local Vietnamese school system, the Phuoc Vinh Dispensary and the dental clinic distributed approximately 500 pounds of clothing, toys, brushes, toothpaste, soap, and school supplies to the children of Phuoc Vinh. The unit also maintains a playground on the local school area.

(3) 1st SAT Battalion: During the quarter some 2,400 pounds of bulk foodstuffs were distributed to the orphanage at Thu Duc. Following is a breakdown of these bulk foodstuffs:

- 7 cases of salmon oil (approx 175 lbs)
- 9 bags of powdered milk (approx 900 lbs)
- 9 bags of bulgar wheat (approx 225 lbs)
- 9 bags of corn meal (approx 900 lbs)
- 13 cartons of rolled oats (approx 260 lbs)

TOTALS: Approx 2,400 lbs

CONFIDENTIAL

3
Beginning 11 October 1967, weekly visits, for the purpose of strengthening the Division's "people to people" program, were made to Tan Dong Hiep village's two hamlets of Tan Dong Hiep I and II. The villagers have proven basically friendly and courteous, but indifferent to the presence of US personnel. Entry into the hamlets was conducted with a security element consisting of four armed personnel and an armored vehicle. Tours of the two hamlets were conducted on foot.

(4) 1st Admin Co: Twice monthly visits were conducted to the Go Vap II Catholic Orphanage. Food stuffs, candy, clothing, toys, and other civic action gifts were donated. Additionally the unit was assigned the hamlet of Binh Duong for civic action liaison. Several visits have been made to the hamlet and excellent rapport established to date. Over 500 lbs of food stuffs, toys, grain, clothing and school supplies have been donated to the acting hamlet chief. Tentative arrangements also have been made for a one-day MEDEVAC visit.

(5) 55, Support Command: Through coordination with the Lai Thieu and Di An District Military Advisors, this office and its subordinate units receive and distribute commodities to various villages and hamlets within its sector. Additional assistance is given in the form of furniture construction, building renovation, road repairs and other civilian projects which benefit the local community and enhance Vietnamese/American relations. This program is instituted on a self help basis providing for the local Nationals to perform portions of the labor under American guidance.

6. Morale and Personnel Services:

(1) 1st Maint Bn: The unit's morale is being maintained in a high state. The men are interested in their work and approximately 75 extensions of service tours have been processed for personnel of this unit. The continued effort placed on extensions and reinstatements by this battalion has resulted in our being first in the division in both categories. During the reporting period 72 awards and decorations were processed.

(2) 1st Medical Bn: The esprit de corps continues to be extremely high within this command. The men are encouraged to make maximum use of B&R, both in-country and out of country, leave and pass privileges, and other special services activities which are available at the respective base camps. All deserving personnel have been recommended for appropriate awards on a timely basis.

(3) 1st S&T Bn: Morale of the Battalion continued at a high level due, in part, to excellent living conditions, off-duty entertainment facilities and maximum utilization of B&R allocations. In addition, a total of seven shows, consisting of country and western, rock and roll, variety, song and dance and candy acts were booked by the battalion and performed exclusively for battalion personnel.

(4) 1st Admin Co: Esprit de corps within the unit is excellent, having reached a peak when the unit area was elevated to its current state of cleanliness and beautification. Other contributing factors are the high standards required at the daily guardmount, improved mess standards, and an absolute minimum of "ED" from various duty rosters. Passive factors contributing to the individual's morale is the pass/leave/B&R policy; awards and decorations; promotions to deserving personnel; unit and subactivity social functions; and rigid unit health/sanitation standards. Unit esprit de corps has reached an all-time high also due in part to the unit receiving numerous laudatory comments during the recent unit COM from numerous visiting VIP's, from the CG of Support Command, and the outgoing and incoming Division Adjutant General. The special staff activities continued to provide their mission oriented personnel services in a praiseworthy manner.

h. Personnel Management:
CONFIDENTIAL

(1) In some cases personnel have not received assignment instructions until late prior to DEPLO. This causes an undue hardship for those affected in that they may not have enough time to ship their hold baggage or move their dependents. This puts strain on the man and is a frequent occurrence.

(2) Profiled individuals reassigned from line units should be reclassified into their MOS without delay to accurately reflect the strength of combat-ready individuals. Maximum use can be made of profiled individuals in combat related positions relating to base defense.

1. Civilian Employees: In addition to daily average of 80 temporary hire in the units at the end of the reporting period, Support Command has permanent hire personnel in categories as indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clerk typists</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse aid</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive servicemn</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouseman</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchen help</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janitor</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrician</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1,60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock control clerk</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanics</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seamstress</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Miscellaneous: M/A

5. (C) Logistics

a. Logistical Situation: During the reporting period Support Command provided Division-wide combat service support to all Divisional units and other units attached during operations. Only one major logistical support operation, for which statistical data has been compiled as of this date, was conducted during the reporting period, this being Operation PORTLAND 12-21 August. The location of subordinate battalions and methods of support are outlined below.

OPERATION PORTLAND

(1) General: The basic concept for logistical support of Operation PORTLAND featured supply point distribution of high tonnage items from established forward distribution points at Lai Khe and Quan Loi. Unit distribution of Class V was affected from Lai Khe and Quan Loi by rotary wing aircraft to Fire Support Patrol Base (FSPB) Caisson I at An Lo, FSPB II at Dateman's, FSPB III north of Cau Ma Phud and FSPB Caisson III (South) at Bau Long. The impetus of supply was from the rear and focused on the maintenance of adequate stocks at forward distribution points to meet peak unit demands without delay or adverse effect on tactical operations. Resupply of the forward distribution point at Lai Khe was predominately by Land IOC; resupply of Quan Loi was by Air IOC exclusively. Through continuous liaison with the tactical units by Support Command personnel, and by the full use of the Logistics Coordination Center (LOCOC), logistical problems were identified early or anticipated before they reached a magnitude that hampered tactical operations. Through the LOCOC machinery, corrective action and anticipatory planning was initiated in a timely manner to insure logistical support of all operations.

(2) Forward Command Post: The Support Command Forward Command Post, in conjunction with the Logistics Operation Coordination Center (LOCOC) displaced simultaneously with Division Headquarters (Forward) to Lai Khe, and became operational at 071500H August 1967. The LOCOC functioned as a coordination center for all support rendered during the operation. This was accomplished by receiving, evaluating, consolidating, and transmitting to the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion in Lai Khe and its forward support elements at Lai Khe and Quan Loi, requests for Class
CONFIDENTIAL

I, II, and III support. In a similar manner requests for Class V were transmitted to the 3d Ordnance Battalion, 29th General Support Group in Long Binh. Maintenance requirements were transmitted to the 701st Maint BN at Di An and its forward support elements at Lai Khe and Quan Loi. Aggressive follow up action was initiated and continually exercised throughout the operation to insure that all valid demands were satisfied in the shortest possible time. The LOGC in addition, was the focal point for consolidation of data relative to consumption rates, receipts and draw in of supplies and equipment. This information was translated into meaningful planning data to insure the uninterrupted and timely flow of optimum amounts of all classes of supplies and equipment to the ultimate consumer.

On 14 August the Division Transportation Officer established a Forward command post at Division Headquarters (Fed) which was integrated into the structure of the LOGC. Requests for fixed wing lifts were accepted by the DTO, coordinated with the LOGC, and forwarded to the Airlift Control Center, 8th Aerial Squadron, Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base in Saigon for appropriate action. Continual monitoring and coordination between all concerned was then effected to insure successful mission completion. The DTO rear element, under the command and control of the Forward command post, coordinated the formation of required vehicular convoys, as well as assisting in the loading of all cargo airlifted from Di An Airfield in support of Operation PORTLAND.

(3) Method of Direct Support and Re Supply:

(a) 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

1. The activities of the 1st S&T Bn were controlled by the Battalion Commander through his staff and subordinate commanders. The Battalion GP was located in Di An. Operation of the Forward Supply Section at Lai Khe and Quan Loi was controlled in a normal routine manner. The Office of the Division Supply Officer was the focal point for the coordination of the logistical support rendered by the Supply and Transport Battalion. Here data on consumption receipts and amounts on hand in the forward areas was gathered and considered with the logistical situation, to insure the uninterrupted flow of adequate supplies to the forward areas. In addition, an assistant 34 was located with the LOGO at the Division Forward Command Post for liaison with the Support Command Staff and GL.

2. The battalion concept of supply and service support for Operation PORTLAND involved utilization of established forward supply sections at Lai Khe and Quan Loi Base Camps to provide direct support to operating elements. All units participating in the operation were supported with Class I, Class III and Class II and IV from those locations. Adequate stocks were maintained at Lai Khe by Land LOGC from 1st Log Command activities located in the Saigon-Long Binh logistical complex and the Battalion main supply facility at Di An. AF aircraft were utilized on a non-scheduled basis to supply both barrier material and fast moving II & IV items to Quan Loi. Normal frag of AF aircraft provided Class I and Class III to Quan Loi.

3. The Battalion maintained the capability to provide emergency refueling in isolated field locations and to expand existing Class III facilities on short notice to support airlift and air mobile assault operations for the duration of the operation.

4. Support Locations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>SUPPORT</th>
<th>DATES OES</th>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lai Khe</td>
<td>I,II,III,</td>
<td>PERMANENT</td>
<td>1 OFF 16 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GRE REG,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SALVAGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quan Loi</td>
<td>I,II,III,</td>
<td>PERMANENT</td>
<td>1 OFF 17 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GRE REG,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SALVAGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. A combination of area and unit support was used during this operation. Class III/IV supplies were normally supplied on a unit basis, Class I and III and GR REG service were normally provided on an area basis. Salvage collection was available on an area basis, utilizing internal transportation assets.
Due to the proximity of operations to 701st Maintenance Battalion direct support unit locations, primary support was accomplished from these established locations.

Small assistance teams operated in the following areas:

1. The contact team which normally operates at Quan Loi was increased in strength by 5 EM to support the increased density of equipment operating in the area.

2. A contact team of 1 NCO and 5 EM was dispatched to Chon Thanh for the duration of the exercise.

3. A recovery and evacuation team with a tank recovery vehicle was centrally located at Lai Khe, to perform field evacuation in support of Task Force Dragoon. This proved to be extremely valuable.

4. A total of 9 contact teams were dispatched from Lai Khe to various field locations on an "On Call" basis. Resupply was affected from established battalion locations at Quan Loi and Lai Khe.

5. Medical support was provided to the division from the following locations: "B" Company from its base camp at Lai Khe with one clearing section, consisting of two officers and 27 EM; at Quan Loi; "C" Company located at Quan Loi; and "D" Company located at Phuoc Vinh. All medical companies had "00 TSMMS" ready to move "on order". Medical resupply to the division was provided from "B" Company at Lai Khe, "D" company at Phuoc Vinh, and Division Medical Supply at Di An. Resupply was by air. The infantry units were resupplied directly from the medical companies at Lai Khe, Phuoc Vinh, and Division Medical Supply at Di An.

Division Transportation Office was organized into two basic elements, one forward and one rear. The forward element was primarily concerned with central control of all DIV activities with the emphasis being placed on tactical and logistical fixed wing airlift operations. At the forward location, requests for fixed wing lift were accepted, processed, coordinated and forwarded through channels to the Air Force for appropriate action. Constant monitoring was required of all airlifts to insure timely and successful mission completion. The DIV rear element concentrated primarily on highway operations. The rear party organized convoys and coordinated with the various units concerned; the Provost Marshall, and the Ready Reaction Force (RRF) elements. Rear DIV personnel were further on hand to assist in dispatching each convoy. The Di An Army Airfield was also operated by rear DIV personnel who manifested and supervised the loading of all fixed cargo flown out of Di An. The amount of cargo originating from Di An by air in support of Operation PORTLAND, however, was only a small part of the normal daily operation.

Division Ammunition Office was provided through forward distribution points (FDP) at Lai Khe and Quan Loi. The Lai Khe FDP was resupplied by periodic Log Command convoys from Long Binh. Quan Loi FDP was resupplied by air force air from Bien Hoa. EOD service was provided by a team from the 1st Ord Det (MTO) at Quan Loi.

Ammunition supply service to the division was controlled by the DAO whose base of operations was in the 1000 at Danger Forward in Lai Khe. The DAO was assisted in the 1000 by two enlisted men.
Three BN from the 9th section and six BN from the 40th ORD company operated the FEP at Quan Loi. Five BN from the 40th ORD company operated the FEP at Lai Khe. Stockage of the FEP's was coordinated by the 306th LOGO and the 306th LOGO at Long Binh.

2. The method of resupply for the units engaged in Operation PORTLAND was split between Lai Khe and Air LOG as follows:

- Lai Khe FEP:
  - Air LOG = 0
  - Land LOG = 100%

- Quan Loi FEP:
  - Air LOG = 100%
  - Land LOG = 0

(4) General Support and Resupply Sources:

(a) 1st Supply and Transport Battalion: The battalion used its normal resupply sources throughout the operation. Requirements of supported units were routed to the Division Supply Office at Di An. For those items not available, and for anticipated requirements, a request was placed on the 306th Field Depot in Saigon.

(b) 701st Maintenance Battalion: Repair parts were obtained from the 306th Field Depot in Saigon.

(c) 3rd Medical Battalion: The advance platoon of the 32d Medical Depot provided medical resupply to the division from its location at Long Binh. Patient care was provided by the 21st and 93d Evac Hospitals located at Long Binh. Aeromedical evacuation was provided by the Air Ambulance Company (Prov) at Long Binh, by locating one standby "Dust Off" at both Quan Loi and Lai Khe.

(d) Division Ammunition Office: The Long Binh Ammunition Depot, operated by the 3d Ordnance Battalion, provided ammunition by unit distribution to the Lai Khe FEP.

(5) Unit Resupply Concepts:

(a) 1st Supply and Transport Battalion: Supply point distribution was provided throughout the operation. Unit trains were located vicinity Lai Khe and Quan Loi. Units received supplies at the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion Forward Supply Sections at these two locations. An exception to this method of resupply was the delivery of ice cream to field locations.

(b) 701st Maintenance Battalion: Highly responsive supply of repair parts was affected by helicopter movement to field locations.

(c) 3rd Medical Battalion: Medical resupply to infantry units of the division was by supply point distribution. Units desiring medical supplies brought their requests to the medical companies providing area support. Supplies were issued immediately.

(d) Division Ammunition Office: Unit distribution from Long Binh was provided in all cases.

(e) Services: Service rendered as part of this was:

- Maintenance:
  - Direct support workload 701st Maintenance Battalion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job orders received</th>
<th>Job orders completed</th>
<th>Average ASL on hand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>291</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
### Average ASL Demand Satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demand</th>
<th>Lai Khe</th>
<th>Phuoc Vinh</th>
<th>Quan Loi</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total demands</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total issues</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total transactions</td>
<td>2078</td>
<td>2078</td>
<td>2078</td>
<td>2078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Locations Supporting Operations

#### Medical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patients Treated</th>
<th>Lai Khe</th>
<th>Phuoc Vinh</th>
<th>Quan Loi</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRHA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHRA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBI &amp; NIS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA - NBI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GING</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole Blood (unit)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Supply (lbs)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,900</td>
<td>7,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Laundry and Bath

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATIONS</th>
<th>Quan Loi</th>
<th>Lai Khe</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Shower heads</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Washers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Graves Registrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATIONS</th>
<th>Quan Loi</th>
<th>Lai Khe</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remains Processed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Salvage Collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATIONS</th>
<th>Quan Loi</th>
<th>Lai Khe</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turn-In Documents Processed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Following is a recapitulation of explosive ordnance disposal support provided by the 42d EOD Detachment during the operation:

- Number of incidents > 10
- HE items destroyed:
  - LB - 32
  - VC - 18
- Small arms destroyed:
  - 3 - 500
b. Supply

(1) Supported Strength: 28,435 for the period.

(2) Supply levels:

(a) Class I - Adequate

(b) Class II & IV: The following is a list of critical items in short supply:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1670-735-3790</td>
<td>Sling, Cargo, Aerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3940-675-5601</td>
<td>Sling, Endless, Nylon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3940-892-3755</td>
<td>Sling, Cargo, Net, 12 x 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5110-813-1266</td>
<td>Machete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6260-161-4296</td>
<td>Candle, Illuminating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6840-823-7969</td>
<td>Insecticide, 12 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7105-267-0286</td>
<td>Cot, Folding Steel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7105-267-0286</td>
<td>Cot, Folding Steel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7105-267-0297</td>
<td>Cot, Folding Canvas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7210-359-4896</td>
<td>Rod, Insect Bar Steel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7310-269-6153</td>
<td>Can, Water, 5 gal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8340-269-6154</td>
<td>Tent, Hexagonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8340-513-7787</td>
<td>Tent, GF Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8340-753-6570</td>
<td>Tent, GF Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8470-624-6634</td>
<td>Armor Vests XL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8470-624-6635</td>
<td>Armor Vests L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8470-624-6636</td>
<td>Armor Vests M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8470-624-6637</td>
<td>Armor Vests S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8470-823-7370</td>
<td>Armor Vests S w/collar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8470-823-7371</td>
<td>Armor Vests M w/collar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8470-823-7372</td>
<td>Armor Vests L w/collar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8470-823-7373</td>
<td>Armor Vests XL w/collar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5180-408-1579</td>
<td>Tool Kit MK-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8010-842-3583</td>
<td>Liner, Poncho, camouflage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7630-259-4319</td>
<td>Typewriter, portable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7310-292-5793</td>
<td>Safe, Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8430-928-6840/8430-889-3590</td>
<td>Boot, jungle 9R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8430-928-6850/8430-889-3500</td>
<td>Boot, jungle 11R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8405-082-3565</td>
<td>Coat, tropical SS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6005-082-5356</td>
<td>Trouser, men's 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6165-257-4526</td>
<td>Cover, canteen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4110-198-2572</td>
<td>Chest, jcs, 200.3b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6840-753-4563</td>
<td>Insect Repellent, 2 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6650-670-2491</td>
<td>Binocular, 6x30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5350-260-2920</td>
<td>Steel Wool, grade 0W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5350-262-4403</td>
<td>Steel Wool, grade 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5350-262-4404</td>
<td>Steel Wool, grade 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5350-262-4405</td>
<td>Steel Wool, grade 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7920-292-7274</td>
<td>Brush, scrub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8490-276-7569</td>
<td>Napkin, paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8440-277-5361</td>
<td>Napkin, paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5110-293-2336</td>
<td>Axe, single bit &amp; lb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5110-293-2339</td>
<td>Axe, single bit 2 lb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7920-292-4364</td>
<td>Broom, waist 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7920-292-4375</td>
<td>Broom, upright</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7920-292-4375</td>
<td>Tools for general mechanics tool set</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following critically short items bear special attention.

Hand tools of all types have been in short supply. Of the 1300 line items of hand tools on the SL, more than 50% have been at nearly continual zero balance during the period. These items are badly needed to support maintenance problems which are complicated...
by the adverse weather and terrain.

2. Common sizes of boots and clothing. These items are worn out rapidly in the conditions under which the Division has been operating. They are essential for the health and comfort of the individual soldier.

3. Armor vests. These are essential for protection of gun crews, personnel on convoy operations, and for personnel on other tactical operations.

4. Five (5) gallon water cans. These are essential for tactical operations, especially in the hot-dry season which will start soon. However, there are none in country.

5. Insect repellent and insecticides. These items are essential to aid in prevention of insect-borne disease and thereby conserve the fighting capacity of the troops. The two (2) excellent bottles of insect repellent is preferable to the six (6) oz aerosol can, since it is more easily carried by the soldier in the field.

6. PRC-25 radios have not been available in adequate quantities. This basic infantry radio is essential to operations in jungle terrain.

7. Batteries. Bi-386, Bi-505, and Bi-999 batteries have been in consistent short supply. This is critical since those are required for portable infantry radios.

(c) Class III: Adequate

(d) Class V: No Supply levels within the division.

(e) Medical Supply: Division Medical Supply is located at the division main base camp at D1 in. All units of the 1st Medical Battalion are supplied from this location by air or by road. Each of the three medical companies in turn gives direct medical support to one of the brigades. The addition of a Medical Equipment Repairman, MOS 15030 makes periodic visits to the forward companies to inspect and/or repair medical equipment. That equipment which requires repairs beyond his capabilities is evacuated to the rear.

1. The Division Medical Supply supported 25,000 - 30,000 men (combat troops) during the reporting period and numerous prisoners of war. A total of 42,047 pounds of medical supplies were shipped and issued to supported units during this period.

2. Supply Levels: The DMSD maintains a forty-five day level of supply which includes approximately 2,000 line items of Class II and IV medical supplies. Each company within the 1st Medical Battalion is required to maintain a fifteen day level of supply. During the previously mentioned operations, independent brigades came under operational control of the 1st Infantry Division, and 1st Medical Battalion issued medical supplies to these units. Critical items during this period included; Procaine penicillin, 1,500,000 units; tetracycline HCL Tablets; Radiographic paper (Polaroid); Litter covers; Litters, folding aluminum pole. These were in short supply and were obtained only by submitting Q3 priority requisitions whenever the situation dictated.

3. Local Procurement: The only medical items procured locally were the various types of Anti-Venoms for use in snakebite cases. These were obtained from the Pasteur Institute in Saigon, but dealing were always through the 32nd Medical Depot and never directly through the Institute. The quantity has proved to be satisfactory.

Miscellaneous: The Division Medical Supply shipped 37,000 pounds of medical supplies in support of the Medical
CIVIL ACTION PROGRAM

All supplies are requisitioned from the 32nd Medical Depot and no distinction is made between regular medical supplies and MEDCAP Supplies.

C. Evacuation

1. Casualties: Normal evacuation of routine patients and casualties from the Di An Clearing Station was accomplished by organic ambulances. All emergency evacuation was accomplished by aeromedical aircraft provided by "Dust Off" Operations Control in Long Binh. "Dust Off" ships are located as follows:

- Loc He - 2
- Quan Loi - 1
- Phuoc Vinh - 1

Routine evacuation from forward units was accomplished by aeromedical aircraft as they are available or by other types of military aircraft (i.e., "slicks") as needed.

2. POW: N/A

3. Refugees: N/A

d. Transportation:

1. Highway

(a) Supplies transported

1. Class I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tons Shipped To</th>
<th>Dev</th>
<th>Bi An</th>
<th>3433.0</th>
<th>Dagger</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>Duty</th>
<th>527.8</th>
<th>Drumfire</th>
<th>132.4</th>
<th>Quan Loi</th>
<th>160.0</th>
<th>Chl Linh</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2. Class II & IV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tons Shipped To</th>
<th>Dev</th>
<th>Bi An</th>
<th>66.9</th>
<th>Dagger</th>
<th>65.5</th>
<th>Duty</th>
<th>74.2</th>
<th>Drumfire</th>
<th>61.1</th>
<th>Quan Loi</th>
<th>92.5</th>
<th>Chl Linh</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2. Class III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gallons shipped</th>
<th>Dev</th>
<th>Quan Loi</th>
<th>Duty</th>
<th>Drumfire</th>
<th>Rec'd</th>
<th>Rec'd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP44</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>1,175,660</td>
<td>1,497,500</td>
<td>857,300</td>
<td>536,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP45</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80,500</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>100,950</td>
<td>303,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP51</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>163,000</td>
<td>165,000</td>
<td>540,616</td>
<td>596,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP54</td>
<td>29,600</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>480.00</td>
<td>585,000</td>
<td>810,770</td>
<td>869,024</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Package FOLs: 66,142/319, 112,470/318, 134,122/319, 0, 74,579/55, 735/318

CONFIDENTIAL
(b) The following is a list of conveyances, consisting of ten or more battalion vehicles, in which A Company participated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th># OF VEHICLES</th>
<th>DISTRIBUTION</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
<th>SUPPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Aug 67</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Lei Khe</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Aug 67</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Lei Khe</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Aug 67</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Ha No Lai</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Aug 67</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Ha No Lai</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Sep 67</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Ha No Lai</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Sep 67</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Lei Khe</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Sep 67</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Lei Khe</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sep 67</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Lei Khe</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Sep 67</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Sep 67</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Sep 67</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Sep 67</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Lei Khe</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Sep 67</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Lei Khe</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Oct 67</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Lei Khe</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Oct 67</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Lei Khe</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Oct 67</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Lei Khe</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Oct 67</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Lei Khe</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Oct 67</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Lei Khe</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Oct 67</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Lei Khe</td>
<td>B Co</td>
<td>Fwd Sup Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The following is a list of extended dispatches of cargo vehicles during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPEDITED DATE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF VEHICLES</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug - 22 Sep</td>
<td>1 (Tanker)</td>
<td>B Co Fwd Sup Sec Ha No Lai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug - 16 Sep</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>B Co Fwd Sup Sec Lai Khe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Aug - 15 Aug</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>B Co Fwd Sup Sec Ha No Lai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Aug - 23 Aug</td>
<td>1 (Tanker)</td>
<td>B Co Fwd Sup Sec Ha No Lai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Aug - 31 Aug</td>
<td>1 (Tanker)</td>
<td>B Co Fwd Sup Sec Lai Khe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Sep - Present</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>B Co Fwd Sup Sec Lai Khe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Oct - Present</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>B Co Fwd Sup Sec Lai Khe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Oct - 23 Oct</td>
<td>1 (Tanker)</td>
<td>B Co Fwd Sup Sec Lai Khe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Oct - 30 Oct</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>B Co Fwd Sup Sec Lai Khe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Oct - Present</td>
<td>1 (Tanker)</td>
<td>B Co Fwd Sup Sec Lai Khe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) The following is a list of recurring (static) dispatches during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># OF VEHICLES</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 (2-2)</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Thu Dan</td>
<td>Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (2-2)</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 (Bus)</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ice (dry)</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bread</td>
<td>Long Khan</td>
<td>Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (2-2)</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Thu Dan</td>
<td>Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Trash</td>
<td>Class II &amp; IV</td>
<td>Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>(Go to &amp; from airstrip)</td>
<td>Class II &amp; IV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Railway: 387.4 tons Class I and 558.5 tons Class II & IV received at II this quarter.

(3) Water: N/A.

(a) Air

1. Class I

Tons shipped to:

68 14
DI in
Devil 2559.0
Dagger 0
Duty 49.9
Drumfire 0
Quan Loi 1169.8
Chi Linh .2

2. Class II & IV
Tons Shipped To:
DI in 0
Devil 1227.4
Dagger 0
Duty 66.1
Drumfire 0
Quan Loi 803.2
Chi Linh 11.2

3. Class III
Gallons shipped air:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Devil</th>
<th>Quan Loi</th>
<th>Duty</th>
<th>Drumfire</th>
<th>Rec'd</th>
<th>Rec'd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J14</td>
<td>611.020</td>
<td>442.358</td>
<td>10.140</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N2</td>
<td>70,350</td>
<td>42,500</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2</td>
<td>285,536</td>
<td>142,200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF2</td>
<td>321,516</td>
<td>99,259</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Package POC2.4</td>
<td>215,618LB</td>
<td>5,250LB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total POC converted to Tons: 4,579.2

(2) Areas particular to SAT Rm:
(a) Two major resupply convoys to CL and one to PY were conducted.
(b) Rail shipment from the 506th Field Depot was discontinued during the month of September. It was limited to 126 tons in October. On 24 Oct, US Army Vietnam, directed the 1st Logistical Command's Saigon Support Command to resume shipments.
(c) During the past quarter, Battalion trucks carried 45% of the truck tonnage from the various depots to DI in. This percentage represents 485 2½ ton truck loads and 379 12 ton stake and platform trailer loads. In view of the doctrine calling for the import of resupply from the rear to the front, this additional burden of utilizing Battalion vehicles to carry supplies from depot to DI in, a function not envisioned by the TCE, seriously affects the units capability of performing its TOE transport missions.

(3) Areas particular to 1st NCC Rm:
(a) Highway: All medical supplies were transported from the 32nd Medical Depot in Saigon over Highway 1 or 1A. The DDG has four (4) 2½ ton Cargo Vehicles for this purpose. Trips were made to the Depot at least four times each week without difficulty or incident.
(b) Railwy: N/A
(c) Water: N/A
(d) Air: Medical personnel, equipment, medical supplies, medical resupplies, and personnel reinforcements were moved by air. Tactical aircraft were used to make initial displacements. Medical resupply and reinforcements of medical personnel and equipment were moved by "Dust Off" aeromedical helicopters and tactical aircraft.

(e) Pipe line: N/A

(f) Areas particular to 701st Maint BN

(e) Highway - Whenever the road to resupply points is open, major assemblies and heavy items of supply are moved forward. No major problems have been encountered. No personnel are moved by this means.

(b) Air - Movement of supplies and personnel by air to forward locations is the method of transportation most often used. At times the availability of aircraft is erratic, and any planning on a schedule is difficult. Also, when aircraft are available notification of their expected arrival at the unit is often tardy. This problem is being alleviated by coordinating more directly with staff personnel concerned.

(c) Service:

(1) Maintenance

(a) A team of instructors from the 701st Maintenance Battalion and the 1st Engineer Battalion visited each base camp and gave basic instruction on chin saws to users. The instruction consisted basically of:

1. Safety precautions
2. Operator daily maintenance checks
3. FLL and requisitioning procedures
4. Adjustment of chin tension and sharpening
5. Demonstration of proper techniques in use of chin saw

(b) An intensive effort to retrofit all M-16's within the 1st Infantry Division was undertaken. Several approaches have been taken to insure that 100% were replaced. The 701st Maintenance Battalion sent teams to each unit to inspect for the new buffer and replace if necessary. It was found that this was necessary because only enough buffers were issued to satisfy requirements. This approach replaced about 80% of the buffer to obtain a new one. It is felt that this was the only way to ensure 100% completion with the limited quantity that was on hand to work with.

(c) The 1st Infantry Division has experienced serious difficulty with short rounds from the 60mm mortar. Complete Ti's of Divisional mortars to date indicates that the cause does not lie with the mortar. Further investigation of the ammunition is being conducted.

CONFIDENTIAL
During a recent road opening operation, nine mine detectors were used extensively. Supported units flooded the 701st Maintenance Battalion with two-thirds of the Division mine detectors over a two-week period. Repair parts were not immediately available and had to be obtained from any available source that could be located.

During a road opening an N88 was struck by a mine which resulted in a combat loss. Recovery was affected by loading the N88 on a "Dragon Wagon". However, the rear ramps rubbed the tires because of the length and excessive weight of the N88. Wedges were made of 3/4" plate steel and inserted underneath the rear ramps. The recovery mission proceeded without further problems.

Many parts of non-supply are required from the C&G Company. In order to obtain these and establish a continuous flow of parts, we have permanently stationed a man at the C&G Company.

The supply parts for fuel and electric (F&E) items of repair are critical. When these repair kits are not available, additional cost to the government results by obtaining the next higher assembly.

A contact team is established at Phu Loi to provide maintenance service to supported units. This has definitely proved valuable in reducing equipment non-available time. Additional contact teams are formed on an "as-required" basis to go to the location of the non-operational equipment and repair it. Air lifting these teams reduces the time factor even more.

Use of transportation units vehicles and trailers has greatly reduced the time required to push unservicable out of the division area. This unit must still send organic vehicles daily, to Tan Son Nhut Air Base to pick up Red Ball requisitioned parts. TU Support in this area is desirable, but still unavailable.

Recovery of heavy divisional track equipment presents unusual problems in this counter-insurgency war. Recovery teams must be augmented by security forces as they go forward on a mission. Use of mine detectors is a must in clearing pathways to the equipment that has stayed in the field overnight. Recovery of a heavy tracked recovery vehicle (M88) on a tank transporter was accomplished first by the 701st Maintenance Battalion.

Replacement of an engine in an M2 "Duster", in a remote field location, was another first for the 701st. To do this, an "A" frame was constructed at the base camp, slung loaded, and moved by CH-47 to the field location along with repair parts, tools, TA's and repairmen. When the CID of the contact team determined that the transmission also needed replacement, a radio message resulted in air lifting the needed repair parts to the field. After completion of this unusual job, the "A" frame and hoist were used on two other "Dusters" to pull the pack (engine-transmission); troubleshoot an electrical problem and to replace an engine.

After approximately eight (8) months experience with the NCR 500, Mechanical Stock Record Accounting System, the following conclusions can be made:

1. The system works well but lacks the flexibility to apply specialized stock management in a straightforward manner.

2. A high speed printer and a collator are definitely required to handle the large volume of data in an efficient manner. Uses include cyclic printing of ASL lines, preparation of cyclic reconciliations and printouts of management data.

During the period, the greatest percentage of supplies were delivered by air to D Company in Phuoc Vinh. The balance was delivered by the only convoy permitted - three trips for resupply and four trips for backhaul of unservicable and salvage material. The convoy
was adequate for resupply of the company. Movement of supplies by air was improved in latter part of the period. The company, being isolated to ground transportation, has to move most items by air. Major assemblies are moved by convoy when the road to Phouc Vinh is open. Vehicles and personnel are adequate for convoy movement. Movement to the contact at Quan Loi is usually by air. Transportation is usually provided by helicopter, with fixed wing aircraft being used as needed for major assemblies. Evacuation from Quan Loi is accomplished by air also.

The major problem presented by the isolation of the unit and the contact team is to get an urgently needed part quickly. This has been met by special flights and using any available aircraft for transportation.

(a) One maintenance assistance program carried out during the period was very successful. The company L09 howitzer float was hand receipted to the 1/7th Battery Battalion and was Chinooked to a battery field location. The Chinook would then haul back a howitzer and it would be brought into the company armament shop. There, the howitzer would be completely T.I.'d by instrument repairman and the armament repair technician. All repairs were performed, and if parts were required which did not deadline the howitzer, the parts were placed on requisition and the howitzer was released to the 1/7th. This procedure was followed until every howitzer in A and B Batteries had been inspected and repaired. C Battery was excluded due to their distance from DL en. Follow ups were made on each howitzer when the requisitioned parts were received, which were mainly sight mounts and instruments. This program will be repeated during the coming quarter.

(c) Project Counter II - This team from CONUS had a two-fold mission. One portion of the team visited three Divisional base camps and instructed organizational PHL clerks and supervisors in the proper techniques of administering unit PHL's. The other portion of the team concerned itself primarily with the .50's. .50's were checked to insure that all PHL items were included, also, a 5% inventory check was made. The PHL instruction was well received by the Joe Divisional personnel. The .50 portion is currently underway and cannot be evaluated at this time.

(p) M109, 155mm SP Technical Representatives: Two M109 tech representatives visited the 1st Inf for about 2-1/2 weeks. During this period they conducted organizational training for arms clerks and maintenance personnel while living with the M109 batteries in the field. During the last three days of their visit, they instructed field maintenance personnel of the 701st Maintenance Battalion in trouble shooting procedures of the armament, engine and track.

(q) Company E, 701st Maintenance Battalion continued to operate an aircraft Tech-supply section in an effort to support aviation operators of the 1st Infantry Division. This section is located at Phu Loi base camp for the purpose of expeditiously supporting the greatest density of aircraft. The section maintains an 85% of approximately 2,799 separate line items and provides all of the functions necess-ary for the storage, issue, receipt, transporting and issuance of all aircraft repair parts.

1. 112 aircraft of the OH-13, OV-2 and OH-1 types are supported by this section.

Presently, the section operates an 85% with a stockage objective of 45 days with exceptionally good reaction time on requisitions. Consequently, there are no serious shortages nor critical items at this time.

(r) For the past six months, Lear-Siegler, Inc., a civilian contract facility has provided two aircraft structural repair specialist and one electrical specialist to augment these capabilities under the TCR. The services of these three personnel were terminated near the end of this reporting quarter. Because of the types and quality of work performed by these individuals the capability of this unit...
has suffered, forcing aircraft to be work ordered to our support maintenance facility. Additionally during this quarter, this unit has been reduced in maintenance personnel from 244 assigned down to 192 on hand. This reduces the capability of this unit for aircraft maintenance approximately 20-25 per cent, a minimum of 220 personnel are required to adequately support the flying hour utilization rate of this division. Furthermore, the loss of these maintenance personnel reduced the probability of being able to maintain a "quick change assembly" program for major components within the allied shop.

(2) Constructions: DL An South is being developed to support a present and programmed strength of 5900 personnel. At present, the base camp is approaching the NLVC intermediate category, which is the designated standard of construction. Of course the new Air Cavalry squadron which is due to arrive will not have its area built to the same standard for some time. The 147th Engineer Company (1E) has moved into the 106th Engineer Battalion area and its cantonment area will have to be built also.

(3) Miscellaneous:

(a) The medical equipment repairman spent over 214 man hours repairing approximately 21 pieces of medical equipment. He visited each of the medical companies as scheduled and performed organizational maintenance on equipment there, including that brought in from the infantry battalion aid stations. Direct support maintenance was provided by the Medical Maintenance Section of the 32d Medical Depot.

(b) The Division Medical Supply Section of the 1st Medical Battalion is responsible for the ordering of spectacles for the division personnel. During the reporting period the 320 processed over 1330 prescriptions for eyeglasses. The length of time required to obtain eyeglasses through the optical section, 32nd Medical Depot has increased approximately two-thirds. This increase is due to the apparent shortage of qualified optical technicians. Routine requests now require 30 days or longer to be delivered.

5. (c) Chronology: During the reporting period, Support Command provided logistical support for permanent facilities at DL An, Phu Loi, Lai Khe, Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi. Operation LAM SON 67 continued through the period, being supported from permanent facilities at DL An, Phu Loi, and Lai Khe. Operations PORTLAND 15 August - 21 August and MULTIFIELD II 23 September - 27 September were conducted by the Division and supported by Support Command. Operation LAM SON 67 continues at the end of the reporting period. The Support Command was designated by Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division as the sponsor for the 3d Air Cavalry Squadron, 17th Regiment. This sponsorship involved extensive monitoring of construction, movement and equipment of the unit plus planning for the unit as a tenant at DL An Base.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

WALTER J. GREENWOOD
Major, Infantry

Adjutant

3 Items:
1. Problem Discussion and Recommended Solutions
2. Lessons Learned
3. Diagram of Main Supply Routes

DISTRIBUTION:
Special

CONFIDENTIAL
1. (C) Item: Problem encountered with sling loading.

Discussion: An incident occurred when an unserviceable 155MM howitzer tube was dropped from a helicopter sling load. The direct cause was the gun tube working loose and the box breaking apart. Since the net sling was not large enough to encompass the tube and wooden container, the tube was dropped.

Recommendation:
(a) Internally load when possible
(b) Commanding officer or XO should inspect slings and containers and all loads for proper rigging

2. (C) Item: Improvement of supported units PLL's

Discussion: Infantry Battalions have consolidated PLL records and most of their repair parts at battalion level. 701st Maint. Bn. devised a procedure whereby certain fast moving weapons, chemical and kitchen equipment repair parts could remain with Infantry Companies and be replenished with very simple requisitioning procedures. The effectiveness of this procedure has not been evaluated but it is designed to simplify and improve PLL management in infantry battalions and to assist their companies while in the field.

Recommendation: That PLL's be fluid and suit the situation

3. (C) Item: Normal replenishment priorities do not satisfy the system.

Discussion: With the inception of Red Ball Express (RBE), the 701st Maintenance Battalion eliminated the priority 02 and 05 requisitions. Except for RBE, supported units could only submit priority 12 or 17 requisitions. Presently supported unit PLL's are about 30% "O" balance and AEL's are 33% "O" balance, while zero balances are high the division equipment has been kept operational through a system of parts expediting. This requires an exorbitant number of personnel to locate parts for deadline equipment. Approximately 7 officers and enlisted men of the battalion material section must spend most of their time expediting parts; one warrant officer and two enlisted men are required full time as material release expediters at the supply depots. In addition, countless manhours are spent at company level, expediting parts, searching for parts and transporting expedited parts.

Recommendation: Priority 05 requisitions should be used to replenish critical items that can deadline combat essential equipment. The supply system must be improved to a point where the system will furnish most parts without a special expediting staff.

4. (C) Item: Chain saws have experienced a high mortality rate.

Discussion: Wash out rate of chain saws has been 100% for the past six months. About one third of these were for broken handles and another one third for frozen engines or engines with loss of power.

Recommendations: To alleviate the handle breaking, cages have been built by using units to hold chain saws when they are being transported. Also, an additional steel brace has been welded to the handles to give reinforcement. The only way to alleviate the engine overload is to purchase a heavy duty saw that can hold up during jungle clearing operations.

5. (C) Item: There is a need for a TD organization to take over "house keeping" activities in a fixed base type situation.
Recommendation: There is a large population of transient and
detachment size units using the mess facilities of one forward support com-
pany because these units do not have capabilities of self support as a com-
pány does.

Recommendation: That open messes of field ration messes be
established in populated base camps.

6. (C) Item: Area Development Needs.

Discussion: The improvement of the HQ Company "A" Company a clearing Sta-
tion at DL an has progressed slowly during the past year. However, construc-
tion has commenced on the concrete floor throughout the building and approx-
imately one half of the job is completed.

Recommendation: That emphasis be placed on obtaining a cement
mixer for P&BE so that the concrete floor can be completed.

7. (C) Item: Aeromedical Evaluation of Medical Clearing Stations.

Discussion: In the past, stand by aeromedical helicopters were
not utilized at all of the forward clearing stations. It was felt that this
situation reduced the effective utilization of the medical unit in casualty
care.

Recommendation: It was recommended that aeromedical Helicopters
be placed in BS of the 1st Infantry Division. On 27 October 1967 a
platoon of the 45th lied Co (air ambulance) was placed in BS of the Division
with 67 at Quan Loi, Phuoc Vinh, and Lai Rie.

8. (6) Item: Urgency Requests:

Discussion: The Supply and Transport Battalion received many
emergency type requests for rapid use and common type items which should
have been normal resupply actions. This is the result of inadequate planning
and preparation by Battalion S4's and Property Book Officers. When the Sup-
ply and Transport Battalion is compelled to operate at the supply room level
instead of the wholesale supply level, the entire supply system is diverted
from its normal functioning.

Recommendation: That emphasis be placed on obtaining a cement
mixer for P&BE so that the concrete floor can be completed.

Recommendation: That more efficient planning by
Battalion S4's be stressed, so that rapid use supply items are on hand in
sufficient quantities to sustain operations. This is not to imply that
telephone requests for bonafide emergencies will not be quickly responded
to; however, these requests should be reserved for actual emergencies.

9. (C) Item: The lack of adequate radio and telephone communiciation
greatly hampered the operation of the LOG section.

Discussion: When the LOG section became operational in the
LOGO Forward, radio and telephone communications were marginal. The antenna
for the 106 was relocated and raised, and the vehicle mounted 106 radio at
the East Ramp. Bin Nha was relocated. Radio communications has been generally
improved since these activities were taken. One direct telephone line to
the DI an system was installed in the LOGO which greatly improved the ser-
vices. This line is shared with 67. Difficulty in obtaining fast telephone
service through the Dang Forward manual switchboard was encountered.

Recommendation: Recommend that direct telephone communcation
be installed between the LOGO and the major area switchboards serving the
logistical centers, ie., DL an and Long Binh.

10. (C) Discussion of Changes:

a. During the period 1 August 1967 through 31 October 1967
the Battalion developed a system for keeping the forward supply sections
adequately supplied with expendable II & IV items to include certain
batteries and weapons' cleaning materials. A minimum stocking level was
established for each item at each forward supply section. Forms were
prepared showing each item, PSh, minimum stockage, quantity
on hand, quantity received and quantity issued. This form was distributed to each FSS and facilitates the calling in of a daily report by each section. Working directly from this form, the ADSO can determine what items are needed by the forward supply section, prepare an Item List, and ship the required item.

b. A plan for preparing and maintaining clothing packs for emergency issues to the division has been implemented. Four (4) each 100 men packs and two (2) each 500 men packs are now maintained by the TA Depot. The sizes of the clothing included in the packs are determined by the tariff developed from data of past usage by the 1st Infantry Division.

c. Upon notification that the 1st Infantry Division would sponsor the 316th Air Cav Squadron a plan was developed and implemented to support this unit upon arrival. One hundred and twenty-six (126) requisitions were prepared and submitted to the 506th Field Depot. Follow-up action is still being carried out in order to supply this unit. Many items were supplied this unit from 1st SAF In stocks. All tents, items required for comfortable sleeping and the items needed immediately upon arrival of the main body of this Unit have been issued.

d. Before completion of the above project the 1st Infantry Division was notified that it would sponsor a Division size unit upon its arrival in country. A plan has been formulated for supply of this Division. All requirements of the various Commodity Managers were consolidated and over 1100 requisitions were prepared and delivered to the 506th Field Depot.

e. When the 2nd Battalion 28 Infantry suffered heavy casualties and loss of equipment during October the Division Supply Office immediately responded by releasing and delivering all items the unit had on requisition. Several other items which would be needed were force-issued to this unit and delivered as soon as possible.

f. A Lieutenant and a Warrant Officer from the office of the ADSO have been assigned duty in Saigon to expedite the materiel released from the 506th Depot to the 1st Infantry Division. The actions of these officers have been directed by telephone each day. Transportation has been arranged for all critically needed supplies after these Officers have coordinated the release and pick up.

g. Over the period of time that the 1st Infantry Division has been in Vietnam, large quantities of excess materiel built up in tactical units. To eliminate the encumbering effect of these excess supplies, a turn-in program was undertaken in which items that were excess in one unit were transferred to units that were short. The office of the ADSO assisted in the turn in of equipment from units and redistributed assets within the Division. This resulted in a savings to the Government by making assets available that otherwise would have been requisitioned from the supply system.

Recommendations:

R. Doctrine concerning transportation of supplies as stated in FM 10-50 (Supply and Transport Battalion, Division Support Command), FM 54-2 (The Division Support Command) and other field manuals is that the issuance of supply is from the rear, meaning the supporting unit ships to the supported unit. Approximately 45.8% of tonnage received by vehicle transport from Saigon or Long Binh is moved by 1st SAF In trucks, 1st Logistic Command, as the supporting element, should transport supplies to 1st SAF, too great a quantity of 1st SAF In transportation assets is dissipated in going to the supporting depot to obtain supplies. This comment was included in Nov 66 - Jan 67, Feb 67 - Apr 67, and in the May-July 67 report.
b. The practice of attaching non-divisional units to the Division for provision of rations and POL products imposes a drain on Ist S&T Bn personnel assets. The Ist S&T Bn is presently supporting approximately 2 times the number of personnel and amount of equipment the Division was designed to support. It is recommended that when additional units are assigned to the Division for support, additional logistical personnel should be assigned to augment logistics capabilities. Request was forwarded to CG, USA RV on 17 Oct 67 requesting augmentation of 46 personnel.

c. Too many Ist S&T Bn personnel are dissipated in performance of necessary but non-Tog functions. This includes operation of one crew platoon, operation of argue control points at 3 air strips, and the requirement to provide liaison personnel to the Saigon depot area to hand carry requisitions, coordinate shipment of cargo and generally expedite shipment of previously requisitioned supplies. It is recommended that logistical command personnel be provided to perform these depot type functions.

d. The shortage of trained supply clerks continues to be critical. The quantity of school trained supply clerks received is insufficient to fill TOE positions authorized for the MOS. A large number of the supply clerks received have not had sufficient supply training to enable them to operate without extensive supervision and instruction. The number of TOE supply MOS's does not allow for this instruction. It is recommended that the quantity and quality of supply clerks produced by MOS producing schools be increased, and that such schools provide more drill and practice in basic stock record keeping procedures.

e. During the evacuation of 56 remains from Lai Khe during October, additional personnel and equipment were moved into the area. Flexibility, it was learned, is as applicable to the smooth functioning of graves registration activities as it is to any other situation, and is essential to cope with a rapidly changing situation. Remains were evacuated directly to Ton Son Nhut Mortuary, saving processing time which is essential in the tropical climate of VN. Simultaneously, graves registration personnel can be moved from Di to Ton Son Nhut to complete processing.

f. During the period there were 30 new officers assigned to the Battalion of the 37 officers assigned at the end of the reporting period. This is an unacceptable turn-over rate for a three month period. The assignment of such a large proportion of new officers to key positions in such a short period of time seriously affects the efficiency and mission performance of the Battalion. It is recommended that immediate action be taken to dissipate this "hump" so that it is not perpetuated next year at the same time.

g. The draw-down of 69 personnel during the period is inconsistent with the added missions assigned over and above those specified in the TOE. The Battalion is feeding almost twice the authorized strength of the Division, and refueling non-divisional helicopters at four or five times its TOE capacity, as well as handling a quantity of Class II & IV materials never envisioned in the TOE. As an example, the Battalion pumped 2,464,748 gallons of POL products in October while operating from five base camps. The Battalion's TOE authorized strength must be augmented in order to accomplish these additional missions imposed on the Battalion.

h. It has proven necessary that a Sergeant First Class (E7) be assigned at each forward supply point instead of the authorized E-5. The skill and maturity of an E-7 is required for the job to be accomplished in an acceptable manner. This requirement for an upgrading of this position has been submitted in this organization's latest MTOE dated 16 October 1967.
CONFIDENTIAL

LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons Learned OPERATION PORTLAND:

a. Reliable radio communications between Bien Hoa and the LOC is imperative when supplying ammunition on an Air LOC.

b. Prompt, high quality telephone service between the LOC and the logistical activities is required to insure timely supply and to minimize problem areas.

c. It is necessary to review and revise our present loading plans, (Med Bn). Additional emphasis will be placed on the prepackaging of medical and other Class II & IV supplies which will accompany a unit on its initial move. It is felt that Hq & Co A and Co C 1st Medical Battalion have learned much in the preparation of supplies for loading onto aircraft.
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Activities and Lessons Learned (U)

1. (U) Reporting period: 1 August 1967 to 31 October 1967.

2. (U) Listed below are the activities of the Division Chemical Section during the reporting period 1 August 1967 to 31 October 1967.

   a. 1 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section Mianpack Personnel Detector (MPD) team conducted a search of two areas, east and southwest of QUAN LOI. Fourteen (14) hot spots were identified and reported to 02 Air and the 3d Brigade.

   b. 2 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team, accompanied by two trainees from the 2d Infantry Division, conducted a search northeast of QUAN LOI. Six (6) hot spots were identified and reported to 02 Air and the 3d Brigade.

   c. 3 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team, accompanied by two trainees from the 2d Infantry Division, conducted a search northeast of PHUOC VINH. Forty-six (46) hot spots were recorded and reported to 02 Air and the 1st Brigade. The trainees from the 2d Infantry Division departed for their home station in Korea after the MPD mission.

   d. 4 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search northeast of PHUOC VINH. Fifty-four (54) hot spots were recorded and reported to 02 Air and the 1st Brigade.

   e. 5 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search northeast of QUAN LOI. Fifteen (15) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade.

   f. 6 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search of two areas north and northeast of QUAN LOI. Thirty-two (32) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. A CS drop team dropped thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on...

Confidential

80

Downgraded at 3 Year Intervals
Declassified After 12 Years
DOD Dir 5200.10
AVD-OM  
31 October 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Activities and Lessons Learned (U)

two target areas: TT10751 to TT115503 and TT12517 to TT10506. A low ceiling prevented a bomb damage assessment.

g. 7 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section HPD team conducted a search northeast of QUAN LOI. Nine (9) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade.

h. 8 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section HPD team conducted a search west of QUAN LOI. Twenty-two (22) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. A courtesy chemical equipment inspection was conducted for the 1st MP Company at DI AN.

i. 9 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section HPD team conducted a search south of QUAN LOI. Thirty-six (36) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade.

j. 10 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section HPD team conducted a search of two areas southwest of QUAN LOI. Thirty-seven (37) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade for the planning of fire. A test using the HPD in a OVI-C (Mohawk) aircraft was conducted at PHU LOI. (See Lessons Learned, this report.)

k. 11 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section HPD team conducted a search of two areas northwest of LAI KHE. Forty (40) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade.

l. 12 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section HPD team conducted a search of an area west of LAI KHE. Forty-four (44) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade.

m. 13 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section HPD team conducted a search of two areas, northeast of LAI KHE, and east of QUAN LOI. Seventeen (17) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. A second test was conducted on the use of the HPD in a OVI-C (Mohawk) aircraft. (See Lessons Learned, this report.) A CS drop team dropped thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic TT108503.

n. 14 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section HPD team conducted a search of two areas, west of LAI KHE, and northeast of QUAN LOI. Thirty-six (36) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. A test was conducted on the E-158 CS
munition and three new bursting systems for the CS drums. (See Lessons Learned, this report.) The Division Chemical Section Forward Command Group moved to LAI KHE.

o. 15 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search of two areas, northwest of LAI KHE, and northeast of QUAN LOI. Forty-eight (48) hot spots were recorded and reported to G2 Air. A CS drop team dropped thirty (30) drums of CS-1 vic XT869607 to XT875608. SFC Paul Stephens reported for duty with the Division Chemical Section.

p. 16 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search northwest of LAI KHE. Twenty-five (25) hot spots were recorded and reported to G2 Air and the 3d Brigade. A test mission was conducted with the MPD, over an area where 1st Division troops were known to be working. (See Lessons Learned, this report).

q. 17 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search northwest of LAI KHE. Nineteen (19) hot spots were recorded and reported to the G2 Air and the 3rd Brigade. A test mission with the MPD over an area occupied by U.S. troops was conducted. (See Lessons Learned, this report.) A CS drop team dropped thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on two target areas: YT120673 to YT122667 and YT114665 to YT122668.

r. 18 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search of two areas, one north of PHUOC VINH, and northeast of QUAN LOI. Nineteen (19) hot spots were recorded and reported to the G2 Air and the 1st and 3rd Brigades.

s. 19 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search of two areas, southeast of QUAN LOI, and northwest of LAI KHE. A total of forty-five (45) hot spots were recorded and reported to the G2 Air and the 3rd Brigade. A CS drop team dropped thirty (30) drums of CS-1 in the vicinity of XT944966 to XT943962.

t. 20 August 1967 - A CS drop team dropped thirty (30) drums of CS-1 in the vicinity of XT992141.

u. 21 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search of an area southeast of PHUOC VINH. A total of one hundred and four (104) hot spots were recorded and reported to the G2 Air and the 1st Brigade.

v. 22 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section CS drop team dropped forty (40) boxes of CS-1 vic XT946866 to XT944866.
SUBJECT: Op. rational Report on Activities and Lessons Learned (U)

w. 23 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search of two areas northeast and northwest of PHUOC VINH. Seventeen (17) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 1st Brigade.

x. 21 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search of two areas north and northeast of QUAN LOI. Twenty-nine (29) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade.

y. 25 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section CS drop team placed forty (40) boxes of CS-1 on a target vic XX9286L3. The Division Chemical Officer delivered six (6) cases of M1 thickener and four (4) CS-1 munitions to the DONG XOAI Special Forces Camp.

z. 27 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search of two areas north and northeast of PHUOC VINH. Thirty (30) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 1st Brigade. LTC Bass from the MACV Chemical Section reported into the Division Chemical Section for a liaison visit.

aa. 28 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search east of LAI KHE. Six (6) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 1st Brigade. A thirty (30) day test on the MPD sensors was started with this mission. During this period, artillery would not be fired into the target areas. (See Lessons Learned, this report.) LTC Bass from the MACV Chemical Section concluded his visit and departed for MACV headquarters. The Assistant Division Chemical Officer, CPT Gardner, departed the 1st Infantry Division, rotating to the States.

bb. 29 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search of two areas, south and north of PHUOC VINH. Thirty-four (34) hot spots were reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. CPT Jackson reported for duty as the Assistant Division Chemical Officer.

c. 30 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search north of PHUOC VINH. Fifteen (15) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 1st Brigade. A defoliation team from the Division Chemical Section sprayed the perimeter of the DONG XOAI Special Forces Camp.

d. 31 August 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search of two areas, northeast of QUAN LOI, and east of
AVDB-CH
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Activities and Lessons Learned (U)

FHUOC VINH. A total of fifty-six (56) hot spots were recorded and reported to the G2 Air and the 1st and 3d Brigades. Seven (7) cases of CS grenades (M7A2) were delivered to the 184th AVN Company. The USARV Chemical Officer notified the section that 140 XM-166 Miniature CS Grenades had arrived for the 1st Infantry Division.

1. 1 September 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search southeast of FHUOC VINH. There were no significant readings. The Division received 175 XM-166 Miniature CS Grenades. They were distributed by the Division Chemical Officer to the Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon (LRRP) and the Aerial Reconnaissance Platoon (ARP).

2. 2 September 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search of two areas north of QUAN LOI. Twenty-nine (29) hot spots were recorded and reported to the G2 Air and the 3d Brigade. A courtesy chemical equipment inspection was conducted for HHC, 1st Bn 26th Inf at DI AN.

3. 3 September 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search of two areas north of QUAN LOI. Twenty-nine (29) hot spots were recorded and reported to the G2 Air and the 3d Brigade. The CS drop team made two drops, consisting of forty (40) boxes of CS-1 wash on XT928925 and XU913061. A courtesy chemical equipment inspection was conducted for the 1st Bn 2d Inf at PHUOC VINH.

4. 4 September 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search of an area east of QUAN LOI. Forty-four (44) hot spots were recorded and reported to the G2 Air and the 3d Brigade. A CS drop team conducted two drops of thirty (30) drums each on the following targets: XT971902 and XT944813.

5. 5 September 1967 - The Assistant Division Chemical Officer and the CO of the 242d Chemical Detachment made liaison visits at PHU CUONG and BIEN HOA concerning defoliation requests and their status.

6. 6 September 1967 - The CO of the 242d Chemical Detachment made a liaison visit at PHU LOI and BIEN HOA concerning defoliation requests.

7. 7 September 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MPD team conducted a search of two areas, west of FHUOC VINH, and northeast of QUAN LOI. Seventeen (17) hot spots were recorded and reported to the
AVLB-CM
31 October 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Activities and Lessons Learned (U)

02 Air and the 1st and 3d Brigades. A courtesy chemical equipment inspection was conducted for the 2d BN, 16th Inf at PHUOC VINH. Twenty-four (24) XM-166 Miniature CS Grenades were delivered to the Airborne Rifle Platoon (ARP) for test and evaluation. A CS drop team placed forty (40) boxes of CS-1 on a target vic XT996857.

11. 8 September 1967 - A Division Chemical Section MFD team conducted a search of one area northwest of LAI KHE. Thirty-four (34) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 1st and 3d Brigades. A CS drop team placed forty (40) boxes of CS-1 on a target vic XT995853.

nn. 9 September 1967 - An MFD team conducted a search of one area north of LAI KHE. Thirty-six (36) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. A CS drop team placed forty (40) boxes of CS-1 on a target vic XT932861.

nn. 11 September 1967 - An MFD team conducted a search of two areas, northwest of LAI KHE, and southeast of QUAN LOI. Twenty-nine (29) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. A test was conducted on the defoliation apparatus for the CH-47 aircraft. (See Lessons Learned, this report.) A CS drop team placed forty (40) boxes of CS-1 on a target vic XT991363.

pp. 12 September 1967 - An MFD team conducted a search of an area west of LAI KHE. Nineteen (19) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. A courtesy chemical equipment inspection was conducted for the 1/4 Cavalry at PHU LOI. The CS of the 212d Chemical Detachment made a liaison visit to III Corps Advisory Group and II FFV to coordinate defoliation requests. A CS drop team placed forty (40) boxes of CS-1 on a target vic XT882630.

qq. 13 September 1967 - An MFD team conducted a search of an area northeast of QUAN LOI. Eleven (11) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. A CS drop team placed forty (40) boxes of CS-1 on a target vic XT992111.

qq. 14 September 1967 - An MFD team conducted a search of an area northeast of QUAN LOI. Sixteen (16) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. A second test was conducted on the defoliation apparatus for the CH-47 aircraft. (See Lessons Learned, this report.) Two CS drop teams placed a total of eight (88) boxes of CS-1 on two targets, XT992111 and XT991127.
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Activities and Lessons Learned

XX. 15 September 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas, east and southeast of QUAN LOI. Fourteen (14) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 1st and 3d Brigades. The CH-47 defoliation apparatus was used to spray the western perimeter of the DI AN Base Camp. A CS drop team placed forty (40) boxes of CS-1 on a target vic 1X928966.

XX. 16 September 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas, northwest of PHOOC VINH, and east of QUAN LOI. Fifty-two (52) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 1st and 3d Brigades. Eleven (11) cases of experimental 40 mm CS XM651/XM651KL rounds were picked up from LONG BINH for test and evaluation.

tt. 17 September 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of an area east of QUAN LOI. Twenty-nine (29) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. A liaison and maintenance visit was made to the 79th Maintenance BN concerning the E53 M199A1 Personnel Detector. Several 40 mm CS XM651 XM651KL rounds were delivered to the 1/16 INF for test and evaluation.

uu. 18 September 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas, southwest and east of QUAN LOI. A total of thirty-seven (37) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. A CS drop team placed forty (40) boxes of CS-1 on a target vic 1X952177.

vv. 19 September 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of an area northeast of QUAN LOI. A total of five (5) hot spots were recorded and reported to 02 Air. A courtesy chemical equipment inspection was conducted for the 1st Engineer Battalion at DI AN. A CS drop team placed forty (40) boxes of CS-1 on a target vic 1X957850. A visual reconnaissance was made by the Division Gmlo of the Rome-Plowed areas for possible defoliation.

ww. 20 September 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of an area east of QUAN LOI. Eleven (11) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 1st and 3d Brigades. A liaison visit was made with BT3 Hoa Province concerning defoliation requests in that province. A CS drop team placed forty (40) drums of CS-1 on a target vic 1X927634.

xx. 21 September 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas northwest of LUH VINH. Thirty-one (31) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. The Operations
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Activities and Lessons Learned (U)

Sergeant made arrangements for classes on the M-63 MPD with the support personnel of the 79th Maintenance Battalion. Three NCOs from the Division Chemical Section will attend these classes. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XT866603.

yy. 22 September 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas, northwest and northeast of LAI KHE. Fifteen (15) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XT957063.

ss. 23 September 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas northwest of LAI KHE. Thirteen (13) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade.

aaa. 24 September 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas, north and northwest of LAI KHE. During the mission, eight VC were observed and engaged, resulting in six VC KIA (3C). Documents and one (1) Cache grenade were captured and evacuated. Twenty-five (25) hot spots were recorded and reported to 02 Air.

bbb. 25 September 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas, one was east of QUAN LOI, and the other northeast of LAI KHE. Seven (7) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 1st and 3d Brigades. Fourteen (14) barrels of defoliant were shipped to PHUOC VINH via a C7A aircraft. A CS drop team placed 30 drums of CS-1 on a target vic XT963813. Today's MPD mission completed the thirty day test period. A memorandum for record was prepared and submitted to the 02. (See Lessons Learned, this report.)

ccc. 26 September 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas, west of LAI KHE, and west of PHUOC VINH. Sixteen (16) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. The Division Chemical Officer along with LTC Longo (III Corps), LTC Bass, and SGT Nixon (III Corps) conducted a VR of the Rome-Plowed areas, requiring defoliation. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XT977362.

ddd. 27 September 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas, one was east of QUAN LOI, and the other northeast of LAI KHE. Seven (7) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. The Division Chemical Officer along with LTC Longo (III Corps), LTC Bass, and SGT Nixon (III Corps) conducted a VR of the Rome-Plowed areas, requiring defoliation. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XT977362.

eee. 28 September 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas, northeast of LAI KHE, and north of PHUOC VINH. Sixteen (16)
AVDB-CM

31 October 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Activities and Lessons Learned (U)

hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 1st and 3d
Brigades. LTC Longo (TFFORDEV) participated in a conference with the
Chief of Staff and Division Chemical Officer at LAI KHE concerning
defoliation. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a
target vic XT865602.

fff. 29 September 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of
two areas with negative results. A test was conducted on the M10
destructor assembly for CS drums. (See Lessons Learned, this report.)
A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XT883621.

ggg. 30 September 1967 - A CS drop team placed thirty (30)
drums of CS-1 on a target vic XT998887.

hhh. 2 October 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of areas
north of PHUOC VINH. Twelve (12) hot spots were recorded and reported
to the 02 Air and the 1st Brigade. A CS drop team placed sixty (60)
drums of CS-1 on a target vic XT992112.

iii. 3 October 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two
areas north of PHUOC VINH. Sixty-five (65) hot spots were recorded
and reported to the 02 Air and the 1st Brigade. A CS drop team placed
thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XT985825.

jjj. 4 October 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two
areas north and northwest of LAI KHE. Thirty-six (36) hot spots were
recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade.

kkk. 5 October 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two
areas northwest of LAI KHE and north of PHUOC VINH. Nineteen (19)
hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade.
A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic
XT982869.

lll. 6 October 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two
areas northwest and east of LAI KHE. Twenty-nine (29) hot spots were
recorded and reported to the 3d Brigade. A test was conducted
on the M-2 igniter and fuse assembly used on the CS drums. (See
Lessons Learned, this report.)

mmm. 7 October 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search east
of QUAN LOI. Sixteen (16) hot spots were recorded and reported to the
02 Air and the 3d Brigade. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of
CS-1 on a target vic XT944030.

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Activities and Lessons Learned (U)

mm. 8 October 1967 - An MFD team conducted a search of two areas north of LAI KHE and northeast of QUAN LOI. Twenty-three (23) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XU986077.

ooo. 9 October 1967 - An MFD team conducted a search of two areas northwest of LAI KHE. Seventy-six (76) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade.

ppp. 10 October 1967 - A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic YU02136.

qqq. 11 October 1967 - An MFD team conducted a search of three areas, northwest, north, and northeast of LAI KHE. Two (2) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XU917136.

rrr. 12 October 1967 - An MFD team conducted a search of two areas northeast of LAI KHE and east of QUAN LOI. Ten (10) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. The Division Chemical Officer attended a defoliation conference held by III Corps at PHU LIOI. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XT951880.

sss. 13 October 1967 - An MFD team conducted a search of two areas north and northwest of PHUOC VINH. Fifty-nine (59) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 1st and 3d Brigades. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XU909122.

ttt. 14 October 1967 - An MFD team conducted a search of two areas northeast of QUAN LOI. Thirty-two (32) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 1st and 3d Brigades. LTC Longo attended a conference at LAI KHE with the Division Chemical Officer and the Chief of Staff. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XT983908.

15 October 1967 - A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XU921217.

16 October 1967 - An MFD team conducted a search east of QUAN LOI. Twenty-eight (28) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 1st Brigade. LTC Longo, the II Field Forces Chemical Officer, conducted a visual reconnaissance of the 1st Infantry Division Chemical Officer.
Division TAOI with the Division Chemical Officer. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XU911134.

WWW. 17 October 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas northeast of LAI KHE and northeast of QUAN LOI. A total of thirty-four (34) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 1st and 3d Brigades.

XXX. 18 October 1967 - A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XU940127.

YYY. 19 October 1967 - A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XU951313b.

ZZZ. 20 October 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of three areas northwest and north of LAI KHE and south of PHUOC VINH. A total of twenty (20) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 1st and 3d Brigades. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XU971111L. LTC Stoner departed the 1st Infantry Division for a new position at MACV.

AAA. 21 October 1967 - A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XU956031L. LTC Longo reported into the 1st Infantry Division as the Division Chemical Officer.

BBB. 22 October 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas northwest of LAI KHE and northeast of QUAN LOI. A total of twenty (20) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XU928028. LTC Longo moved to the Division Chemical Section forward location at LAI KHE.

CCC. 23 October 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas northeast of LAI KHE and southeast of PHUOC VINH. A total of twenty-four (24) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 2d and 3d Brigades. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XT996628.

DDD. 24 October 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas northeast of QUAN LOI. A total of seventeen (17) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 02 Air and the 3d Brigade. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XT962852.
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Activities and Lessons Learned (U)

25 October 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas northeast of LAI KHE. A total of thirteen (13) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 1st Air and 3d Brigade. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XU986147.

26 October 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas northeast and east of LAI KHE. Twenty-six (26) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 2d Air and the 1st and 3d Brigades. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XU982145.

27 October 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas northwest and east of LAI KHE. Eleven (11) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 2d Air and the 1st and 3d Brigades. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XU982145.

The Division Chemical Officer made a visual reconnaissance of the recently plowed areas.

28 October 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas northeast of SONG BE and east of QUANG LOI. Eighteen (18) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 2d Air and the 1st and 3d Brigades. A CS drop team placed thirty (30) drums of CS-1 on a target vic XU986147.

29 October 1967 - The Division Chemical Officer, Assistant Chemical Officer, and the Operations Sergeant departed DI AN for a chemical conference at USARV headquarters.

30 October 1967 - An MPD team conducted a search of two areas west of LOI: HINH. Seventy-six (76) hot spots were recorded and reported to the 2d Air and the 3d Brigade. The Division Chemical Officer returned to LAI KHE and the Assistant Chemical Officer and Operations Sergeant returned to DI AN after the chemical conference at "SARV.

During the reporting period, LTC John K. Stoner, Jr., served as the Division Chemical Officer until 20 October 1967. LTC Dominic F. Longo assumed the duties as Division Chemical Officer on 20 October 1967.

A summary of the activities during this reporting period shows:

a. 123 Bloodhound missions flown
b. 61 Tons of CS-1 dropped on enemy targets.
Subject: Operational Report on Activities and Lessons Learned (U)

4. (c) Listed below are the activities of the 212d Chemical Detachment (CBNCO) during the reporting period 1 Aug 67 to 31 Oct 67.

a. The detachment processed 1st Infantry Division defoliation requests and monitored the status of defoliation programs of the 1st Infantry Division and those of III Corps which lie within the 1st Infantry Division area of interest.

b. The detachment provided personnel as crew members for the CS drum drops conducted by the 1st Infantry Division Chemical Section.

c. The detachment provided personnel as HPD operators on the personnel detection missions flown by the Division Chemical Section.

d. The detachment provided personnel as crew members on defoliation missions conducted around the perimeters of various base camps in the 1st Infantry Division’s Tactical Area of Interest.

5. (c) Listed below are the activities of the 26th Chemical Platoon (DS). The platoon was commanded by LT John W. Pittman until 30 September 1967. LT Richard D. Haley assumed command of the platoon on 30 September 1967.

a. The platoon had maintained contact teams at the 1st and 3d Brigades of the 1st Infantry Division during the entire reporting period. They provided the Brigades with chemical maintenance, assistance in CS operations, ground based defoliation, and provided instruction and training on flame operations to include the portable flame thrower and flame field expedients.

b. The platoon provided personnel as crew members for CS drops. They also continued to store and modify CS drums and boxes with fusing and burster systems for CS drops.

c. The platoon provided personnel as inspectors for the CMNI team.

d. The platoon continued its mission as the Ready Reaction Force for the DI At Base Camp. Search and destroy operations, road running, convoy escort, and Rome Plow security missions were conducted throughout the reporting period.

e. The platoon provided personnel to construct and operate a special defoliation apparatus for use on a CH-47 helicopter. (See Lessons Learned, this report.)
AVB-9M
31 October 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Activities and Lessons Learned (U)

6. (C) Lessons Learned.

ITEM: CS Persistency.

DISCUSSION: A test was undertaken in January 1967 to determine the persistency of CS-1 in the various seasons encountered in RVN. At the beginning of both the dry season (January thru April) and the wet season (May thru August) two 55 gallon drums of CS-1 were detonated using Composition C-1. In each case, one of the drums was suspended approximately ten (10) meters off the ground in thick jungle and the other drum was detonated on the surface in thick underbrush. A system of evaluating the persistency of the CS for unprotected personnel, was established as follows:

+++ - heavy contamination (cannot walk through the area)
++ - moderate contamination (cannot camp or work in the area)
+ - light contamination (can camp or work in the area with slight irritation)

OBSERVATION: See Inclosure 1.

ITEM: Application of Herbicide Using Helicopters.

DISCUSSION: There is an increasing interest in area defoliation using Division resources. This interest has been fostered by the extensive jungle clearing operations being carried on by the 1st Infantry Division and other elements of II FFV. Several months after an area has been cleared, scrub growth begins to reclaim the area. If not checked, this growth will eventually undo the work accomplished by the Home Plows. A program of repetitive defoliation in these areas is believed to be a partial solution to this problem.

To this end, a helicopter spray system has been constructed using the following materials:

a. 500 gal collapsible fuel cell.
b. 50 gpm field fuel dispensing system.
c. Spray boom constructed of 2" pipe.
d. Two quick acting valves.

(See Inclosure II - Sketch of helicopter spray system.)
OPERATIONAL REPORT ON ACTIVITIES AND LESSONS LEARNED (U)

31 October 1967

SUBJ-CT: Operational Report on Activities and Lessons Learned (U)

OBSERVATION: Design and test of the system identified two critical points. First, the spray boom must extend a minimum of seven (7) feet beyond the end of the lowered tail ramp of the CH-47 to preclude blowback into the aircraft. Second, quick-acting valves are required as close to the spray boom as possible to minimize drainage when the system is shut down.

The former problem is easily solved. The latter problem requires the installation of lever activated valves using a pulley system to permit control from inside the aircraft.

Herbicide operations clearance remains a problem. Use of a helicopter spray system is not a GVN/MACV recognized system. On the other hand, certain areas, such as VC garden plots, are not extensive enough to warrant C-123 application, but at the same time, cannot be defoliated by ground-based means. Accordingly, a positive program of action is required by US Forces in Vietnam to obtain approval for use of discreet helicopter spray systems for attack of VC food producing locales. Current intelligence indicates that continued pressure in the crop producing areas will have a significant effect on VC operations in the II FW area of interest.

ITEM: Use of the Manpack Personnel Detector, Airborne Mode

DISCUSSION: The lack of technical publications which provide detailed guidance covering employment of the Manpack Personnel Detector in the airborne mode leaves many questions unanswered concerning interpretation of sensings and limitations of the equipment. Accordingly, the 1st Infantry Division Chemical Section undertook a series of test programs in an effort to develop technical guidelines for this unique device. Consistent use of the detector as an intelligence gathering system raised the following type questions.

a. What is the decay rate of human effluents?

b. What is the decay rate for artillery and bomb crater effluents?

c. How much downwind travel of airborne effluents occurs in the jungle? In open terrain?

d. What is the significance of an isolated sensing versus a cluster of sensings versus a string of sensings?

Two test programs were conducted by the Division Chemical Section. First, a series of missions were flown in an area before,
Operational Report on Activities and Lessons Learned (U) during, and after the insertion of a US battalion into a night defensive position. Second, a thirty (30) day test was conducted in which repetitive missions were flown in general areas known to be active secret zones for NVA regiments. Artillery fires against detector sensings in these areas were restricted during this test program.

**OBSERVATION:** The lessons learned from these tests are:

a. Sensings from human activity can be obtained for 18-24 hours after the activity takes place.

b. Sensings from artillery and bomb craters can be obtained for a period in excess of 12 hours.

c. The personnel detector should be employed as an area search weapon rather than a point target locator.

d. The value of placing artillery fires on a broadly defined area target must be weighed against the intelligence value of repetitive detector flights in that same area.

e. Clusters of sensings indicate active base camps, work areas, or stop over points.

f. Movement patterns can be discerned by repetitive detector missions in a general area.

g. The significance of isolated sensings is undetermined at this time.

Further study is required and tests should be conducted in controlled rather than field conditions to refine these determinations.

**ITEM:** CS Drum Burster

**DISCUSSION:** The fusing burster system used prior to August 1967 as discussed in the Lessons Learned dated 31 July 1967 proved to be 90% effective. Further testing was conducted to improve the fusing burster system effectiveness. For a period during the testing phase, CS-1 was received in wooden boxes requiring a separate fusing burster system.

**OBSERVATION:** The wooden boxes contained five (5) plastic containers of CS-1 (5 pounds of CS-1 per container). A ten to fifteen foot length of det cord was wrapped around the plastic containers and
and the loose ends were extended through a hole cut in the top of the wooden box. Two fuses, each consisting of a 1/2 inch length of time fuse, with one end connected to a number 6 blasting cap and the other end to an M2 igniter were attached to the loose ends of the det cord. This double fusing system with the det cord proved to be over 93% effective.

Several tests using the M10 Destructor were conducted with the 55 gallon drums of CS-1. The following system was found to be most effective.

a. M10 Destructor - The destructor was secured to the cardboard separator in the center of the drum.

b. Det Cord - A three foot length of det cord was attached to the destructor and the other loose end was extended through a small hole cut in the top of the drum.

c. Fuses - Two fuses each consisting of a 1/2 inch length of time fuse, a blasting cap, and an M2 Igniter were attached to the loose end of the det cord.

This double fusing system so far has proven to be 98% effective in over thirty (30) CS drum drops, consisting of thirty (30) drums each.

ITEM: Use of the MPD in the OVI-C (Mohawk) Aircraft.

DISCUSSION: The Manpack Personnel Detector (MPD) in the airborne mode had been used successfully in the NH-1D helicopter. In August 1967, a test was conducted to determine the feasibility of using the MPD in the OVI-C (Mohawk) aircraft. Two tests were conducted under the following conditions:

a. Aircraft speed 130 - 200 knots

b. Altitude 50 ft or tree top

c. Probe mounting Next to the right front air scoop

OBSERVATION: The MPD functioned properly throughout the tests. Readings were obtained under the above conditions when flying over villages and large groups of people. Due to a lack of space in the aircraft, the machine had to be held in the operator's lap. Further
AVDB-CN
31 October 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Activities and Lessons Learned (U)

Testing must be conducted with the MPD in the OVI-C (Mohawk) aircraft to determine its capabilities and limitations prior to its actual use in Vietnam.

2 Incl
as

D. F. LONGO
LTC, Calc
Division Chemical Officer
GENERAL COMPARISON OF DRY AND WET SEASON CS TESTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRY SEASON DEGREE OF PERSISTENCY</th>
<th>WET SEASON DEGREE OF PERSISTENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Days after initial contamination</td>
<td>Air burst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DEFOLIATION APPARATUS FOR CH 47

Spray Boom 1/8" Dia
Holes Spaced 2 to 2½" Apart 12½ Ft.

2½" Pipe

15½ Ft.

50 GPM Motor

11½ Ft. Fuel Hose, 2½" Dia.

22½ Ft. Fuel Hose, 2½" Dia.

500 Gal. Fuel Pod

INCLUSION II
Section 1. Significant Activities

a. The 1st Aviation Battalion furnished general aviation support to the 1st Infantry Division throughout the period cited. In essence, this general support can be further defined as: a. Planning, coordinating, and executing air mobile assaults with organic and nondivisional aviation assets; b. Furnishing organic aircraft to units within the division requesting aviation support (i.e., resupply and command and control (C2) aircraft) on a daily basis; and c. Providing direct fire in the form of gunships from the organic armed helicopter platoon.

b. Battalion command structure at the end of the reporting period:

- LTC Eugene N. Jones Commanding
- Lt Alfred L. Kresse CO, HHD
- Maj Donald D. Wilkes CO, Co A
- Maj Harold L. Anderson CO, Co B
- Maj Larry E. Lowe S-3

c. Narrative of tactical operations and problems encountered.

(i) Operations during the reporting period included extensive maneuvering in AO Strikes, and the Lamson TAOR. Highway 13 was opened from Lai Khe to Quan Loi, Operation Bluefield II, and Operation Shemnadoah II was mounted during October and continues through the end of the reporting period.

(a) AO Strike operations were conducted to familiarize the new commanders and staff officers with the divisions method of operation in HVN. This was necessitated by a large officer turnover during August - September. The 1st Aviation Battalion provided airlift of troops and resupply as well as direct fire support from organic gunships. Boost lifts were short range and provided valuable experience to commanders, staff and aviators.

(b) Operations in AO Lamson were characterised by search and seal operations utilizing aircraft and general aviation resupply.

(c) The periodic opening of Highway 13 from Lai Khe to Quan Loi again demonstrated the significant value of aviation in the HVN. Gunships were utilized to provide enroute convoy coverage while the Military Police directing the convoy.
were in turn directed by the Provost Marshal and Assistant Provost Marshal in CH-13s. Convoy Security was directed by the brigade commanders in their respective sectors from GOC US-1Ds while the whole convoy was overwatched by the GOC and AND's, also in US-19 OHC aircraft.

(d) Operation Shenandoah II, initiated as a road opening operation west of Lai Khe which spread to significant contact with first the 271st VC Regiment and later with elements of both the 7th NVA and 9th VC Divisions, again demonstrated the value of aviation and also pointed out several problems of operating in jungle LZs and forward supply areas.

1. LZ size - Units frequently establish an LZ within their NDF for resupply purposes. All too frequently the LZs are cut for the convenience and ease of construction, not necessarily to the requirements of safe aircraft operation. Recommend that commanders insure that all brush, stumps and small trees are removed from LZ areas to preclude aircraft damage.

2. LZ location - Units cutting an LZ in heavy jungle should be aware of prevailing wind direction as well as height of barriers before beginning cutting. As a general guideline LZs should be cut with the long axis as much as possible in the direction of the prevailing wind with the lowest barriers in the direction of take off.

3. Debris in the LZ - As a result of building LZs with NDF's a great amount of loose equipment, debris, etc is lying around which is constantly being sucked into the rotor wash of helicopters and occasionally into the rotor blades. This is an especially hazardous problem as well as inconvenient to the troops. Recommend that ground commanders insure that their personnel secure all loose equipment during helicopter resupply operations.

(e) The 1st Aviation Battalion provided General Support to the Division throughout the reporting period. Special missions flown were Loxen searchlight and Bloodhound missions. Direct fire support was provided by the armed platoon of the airborne company.

Statistical data for the quarter:

1. Rotary wing hours flown 11,256
2. Rotary wing sorties 25,269
3. Fixed wing hours flown 902
4. Fixed wing sorties 2,132
5. Passengers moved 35,512
6. Cargo moved 2,061

Section 2, Commanders Observations and Recommendations, Part I, Observations - (Lessons learned)

Personnel

Item: Lack of support personnel for the ASTA Platoon.

Discussion: There are insufficient maintenance personnel and repairmen within the General Support Aviation Company and the direct Support Maintenance Company to support the OV-1s of the ASTA Platoon. This is largely a product of making-do with what is available and failure to establish a true personnel demand, however the TOQ is not adequate as to types and number repairmen authorized.
a. The AG has been furnished with a list of necessary personnel.

b. Direct coordination is being affected with support maintenance to determine actual needs.

Observation: Particular attention should be paid to establishing a true personnel demand at the earliest possible time after unit establishment.

Lack of Instructor Pilots.

Discussion: The lst Infantry Division aviation units are constantly short of qualified instructor pilots. This is a particular problem in the units equipped with OH-133 since new aviators are not qualified in the OH-133 and must receive a minimum of 5 hours of dual instruction.

Observations: None should insure that sufficient IPs are available to conduct unit training and each IP should train a replacement if qualified pilots are available.

Operations: None

Training and Organization: None

Intelligence:

Item: Xenon Searchlight

Discussion: The helicopter-mounted Xenon searchlight was employed as an intelligence gathering, barragem and interdiction device during the reporting period.

Observation: The searchlight is not satisfactory due to the low altitude at which it must be employed (700'). Also, there is no established maintenance or parts backup. The light must be installed on a semi-permanent basis thereby limiting the use of the aircraft. The mission will continue to be flown as long as maintenance permits.

Lack: Bloodhound

Discussion: The packpack personnel detector is being successfully employed by the lst Aviation Battalion. The aircraft must be flown at low level.

Observation: Care should be taken not to establish a pattern in areas covered as the aircraft is very susceptible to tree-mounted explosive devices and ground fire.

Logistics:

Item: Ballistic Flight Helmets

Discussion: Sufficient quantities of large SAR helmets have not been received to enable issues to all personnel. The construction of the helmet causes great discomfort if worn for extended periods. The discomfort seems to be caused by insufficient width or too heavy springs in the earphones.

Other: None

Part II: Recommendations

Extraord:

Item: ASTA Personnel Shortages.
AVDB-AV
SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Joint Task Force (HMS 02/SEP-65)

Recommendation: An ACTA Platoon TOE be established to provide the platoon with an internal aircraft support capability. This capability must provide for aircraft as well as aircraft repairs.

Pro: Lack of Instructor Pilots.

Recommendation: Instructor Pilots be identified with an NGS or prefix and assigned equitably throughout RW.

Operations
See Section 1, paragraph 4.

Training and Organization - (None)

Intelligence

Item: Special Missions

Recommendation: The Xeros and Bloodhound missions should be centralized within the G-2 intelligence gathering resources to provide for better coordination and to give the 1st Aviation Battalion a greater general support capability.

Logistics - (None)

Other - (None)

[Signature]

Commanding
AVDB-CE-3

20 October 1967

SUBJECT: Quarterly Operational Lessons Learned Report

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
APO 96345

1. Introduction: The following is a summary of lessons learned, methods used, and new concepts developed by the 1st Engineer Battalion during the period 1 Aug - 20 Oct 67.

2. Road Repair: During Operation Shenandoah II, continuous heavy rains and traffic caused numerous breakdowns of the thin laterite base of route 240. While timber trestle superstructures would have solved the problem as they had on past occasions, there were just too many bad spots in this case to make this an economical means of repair. It was found that several layers of corduroy from the trees along the road produced the fastest and most economical means of repair.

Observation: This technique of using a corduroy repair of soft spots is both speedy and economical. Of course, trees must be available in the immediate area in order to make this method feasible.

3. Road Repair: During Operation Shenandoah II, a number of 3'x4'xL' checkerboard cuts in the road made Route 240 impassable to vehicular traffic. Because of the wet weather, and the length of haul from a source of available laterite, it was felt that simply filling the holes with laterite would not be a reasonable solution. Instead, it was decided to fill the holes with timber that had been cut along the road, and then cap this timber with laterite. This produced a fast and reasonable solution that gave a stable, passable road bed in a very short period of time.

Observation: This method of repairing holes will certainly not give a long lasting road bed, but it will, however, quickly produce a usable road bed that will last at least two years with light traffic. Timber, of course, must be available nearby.

Incl 10

104
4. Jungle Clearing: In jungle clearing during the wet season, there are areas that cannot be cleared by Rome plows due to soft ground. When these areas are adjacent to roads, it is necessary to clear by demolition and chain saws. Where the vegetation is a dense thicket type of growth, standard means of demolitions have proven to be generally ineffective. The Bangalore torpedo, however, has been found to be quite effective in clearing this type of brush.

Observation: In areas inaccessible to Rome plows, and where the vegetation is generally of small diameter, Bangalore torpedoes have been found to be the most effective and speedy means of clearing this brush.

5. Jungle Clearing: During recent heavy jungle clearing operations, the control of Rome plows turned out to be one of the most critical problem areas. The only way that control could be maintained was to place an assistant operator equipped with a radio in the cab of each dozer. This allowed communications to be maintained at all times with the team leader. Additionally, when starting new cuts into virgin jungle, placing the supervisor in an aircraft with a radio is necessary to effectively control the size and shape of the cut.

Observation: In order to quickly and efficiently control heavy jungle clearing by Rome plows, a radio and radio operator should be placed with each plow. In addition, an aircraft can be extremely helpful in controlling the overall clearing operation.

6. Helicopter Recovery: A helicopter crashed into the Dong Hai River with all personnel aboard, and recovery efforts were started in order to recover the bodies. Navy deep-water diving gear was tried, but was unsuccessful due to the swift current of the river. In order to locate and recover the chopper, it was necessary for E Company to assemble a five float reinforced raft, and mount a 20 ton, rough terrain crane. The raft was pushed to the recovery area by bridge boats, while two other bridge boats dragged a one inch steel cable between them in order to locate the downed helicopter. After several days the chopper was located and an attempt was made to lift it by CH-54. This proved unsuccessful due to excessive vibrations set up by the downwash of the CH-54 rotors. The helicopter was finally lifted out by the 20 ton crane. This was done by stages where the helicopter would be lifted ten feet, tied off, lifted another ten feet, etc, until the craft was above water and could be swung into a waiting barge.

Observation: The floating crane has proved to be an effective river recovery vehicle as long as there are adequate numbers of bridge boats available to maneuver and assist the crane.

7. Bridge Building: In order to reinforce a 190 foot, double single Bailey bridge on Route 21 to carry divisional loads, it was necessary to change it to double double and to install an intermediate bent. The double double reinforcing was routine, but the bent installation was a new chapter for the Battalion.
A double bent, pile pier was constructed by removing portions of the decking, and then driving the crane onto the bridge in order to drive the piles. Once the pier was installed, the bridge was jacked up one inch above normal, and the caps placed. The bridge was then lowered onto the pier.

Observation: The installation of a pile pier under an existing bridge is an efficient and effective method of reinforcing if the driving rig and the piles are available. The pile spacing will be slightly more than is recommended, but with additional cross bracing should present no problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

STANLEY H. KANGA
1LT, CE
Adjutant
SUBJECT: Operation Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGP-2A (RI)) for the period 1 August 1967 - 31 October 1967

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
APO 96345

i. (C) Part I. Introduction

a. During this reporting period the 121st Signal Battalion provided communications support for Operation Portland which commenced on 12 August 1967 and terminated on 31 August 1967.

The Forward Area Signal Center Platoons, supporting the brigades, remained deployed with the brigade forward and rear elements for the duration of the operation. Radio relay systems were established to interconnect the brigade forward elements into the Division Communications System.

During this period a signal center was established at the Division Support Command by the Support Command Operations Platoon of Company C and for the 2nd Forward Area Signal Center Platoon of Company B.

Upon conclusion of Operation Portland, the 121st Signal Battalion remained at the Division Forward area which was redesignated Division Main. The remainder of Company A and Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment moved to Lai Khe to support Division Main.

b. Component Unit Disposition and Commanding Officers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Platoon</th>
<th>1st Lt</th>
<th>2nd Lt</th>
<th>3rd Lt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>121st Sig Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company A</td>
<td>1st Platoon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B</td>
<td>2nd Platoon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C</td>
<td>3rd Platoon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Francis J. Sheriff</td>
<td>CPT Earl C. Weeks</td>
<td>CPT Harvey J. Reynolds</td>
<td>CPT Peter F. Batrow</td>
<td>1LT William K. Lein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1LT William H. Brown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
CONFIDENTIAL

A071-21
10 November 1967
SUBJECT: Operation Report on Lessons Learned (RCS OSORC-2A (R2)) for the period 1 August 1967 - 21 August 1967 (U)

2. (C) Part II. Narrative of Tactical Operation:

a. During the past quarter elements of the Battalion provided communications support for several brigade operations. The Battalion provided communications support for one divisional operation; Operation Portland, 12 August 1967 to 21 August 1967.

b. The communications for Portland were established through a series of maneuvers which positioned units for the operation. The 3rd Brigade was in a forward position at Quan Loi conducting road clearing operations. The division forward CP was established at Le Khe. Company A moved personnel and equipment to Le Khe, by convoy to establish the communications facilities required to support Division Forward CP.

c. A portion of the 1st Brigade was deployed to Song Be and was supported by a 12 channel radio relay system supplied by the 1st Platoon, Company B. 1st Brigade then deployed to Le Khe. Support was furnished by 1st Platoon B Company which was airlifted to Le Khe from Song Be and Phuoc Vinh.

d. Originally two radio relay systems were installed to Mi An from Le Khe. One was direct and the other was relieved through Nui Be Den.

e. B Company installed an AN/MRC-117 radio relay system from Chon Tanh to Le Khe to support the 1/4 Cavalry.

f. On 21 August 1967, the Division terminated Operation Portland, but Division remained at Le Khe.

3. (U) Part III. Intelligence: None

4. (C) Part IV. Personnel:

a. Strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BEGINNING</th>
<th>END OF PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF WO EM</td>
<td>OFF WO EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>24 4 589</td>
<td>24 4 589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>24 4 643</td>
<td>24 3 591</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

10 November 1967
SUBJECT: Operation Report on Lessons Learned RCS CSGP-28 (RI)
for the Period 1 August 1967 - 31 October 1967.

b. Replacements: Replacements were well qualified in their MOS's and were quick to fit into the Battalion Team. There are 219 scheduled losses in the next 90 days.

c. Discipline: The following judicial and non-judicial punishments have been administered during this reporting period:

(1) Punishments under Article 15, UCMJ
   (a) AWOL: 16
   (b) Insubordinate Conduct towards NCO: 3
   (c) Failure to Obey Regulations: 14
   (d) Dereliction of Duty: 3
   (e) Assaults: 1
   (f) Drunk on Duty: 1
   (g) Disorderly in Public Place: 1

(2) Summary Courts-Martial:
   (a) Disobeying an Officer: 1
   (b) AWOL: 1

(3) Special Courts-Martial:
   (a) AWOL: 3
   (b) Disrespect towards a Superior Officer: 1
   (c) Insubordinate Conduct Towards NCO: 1
   (d) Sleeping on Guard: 2
   (e) Possession of Marihuana: 3
   (f) Striking an Officer: 1

d. Civic Assistance: During the last period much assistance was received from individuals and organizations in the United States in support of the Battalion Civic Action activities. This assistance consisted of money, clothing, medicine, school supplies, tools, candy, and many other needed items.

(1) During the last period the Battalion repaired the motor for the water pump, and supplied approximately 40 gallons of gas, four tons of food, 1500 pounds of clothing, 400 pounds of soap, 40 pounds of tooth paste, 40 tooth brushes, and 3 rolls of barbed wire to repair and replace the fencing around the orphanage. Ten MEDCAP missions were conducted at the orphanage and 60 orphans were brought into the Dispersary for treatment.

(2) Future plans for the orphanage include the installation of an irrigation system for the orchards and the painting of the orphanage. These will be completed when the supplies become available.
SUBJECT: Operation Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CGPO-28 (RI)) for the Period 1 August 1967 - 31 October 1967 (U)

e. Morale and Personnel Services: Morale continues to be high. The NCO/Enlisted Club is finished and being enjoyed by all enlisted personnel of the Battalion. There have been 72 R&R's in and out of country during this period. Major personnel services provided that have been processed during this reporting period:

- Application for extension of overseas tour: 34
- Application for special and ordinary leave: 40
- Application for reassignment: 30
- Application for ID cards: 72
- Assignment, preference statements: 150
- Reclassification action: 60
- Application for curtailment of tour: 1
- Allotment authorization: 190
- R & R and leave request: 210

f. Civilian Employees: This unit presently has 44 Vietnamese Nationals employed on a permanent basis. They are:

- KP's: 15
- Carpenters: 8
- Laborers: 15
- Seamstresses: 3
- Clerks: 2
- Drivers: 1
- Photographers: 0

5. (C) Part V. Logistics:

a. The overall logistics picture has greatly improved over the proceeding quarter due to the increased receipt of supplies through the Division S&T Battalion.

b. Surely:

(1) Supported strength - (average during quarter) 617

(2) Considerable difficulty has been experienced in obtaining 26 pair cable. Efforts through normal channels have been to no avail. Indications are that there is none in country or in the supply chain.

c. Transportation:

(1) The Battalion received outstanding cooperation on all request for air and motor movements from all concerned.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operation Reports on Lessons Learned (RCS C80670.00 (RI))
for the period 1 August 1967 - 31 October 1967 (U)

Service:

1) Maintenance - Overall the equipment in the Battalion has had the lowest percentage of deadline rate in quite sometime. Parts have been coming into the supply channels more readily than before, and allowing equipment to be repaired faster. Support maintenance has improved considerably, greatly benefiting the Battalion in maintaining the equipment at an operational level.

2) Generator repair parts are still hard to come by. PLI items are slow coming in. Batteries, spark plugs, starters and generators are high demand items. The majority of items to keep equipment off of deadline have to be placed on Red Ball requisitions.

Construction: The following buildings have been constructed during the reporting period.

1 ex. Bn Mess Hall
1 ex. Bn Ho.

This unit still has a requirement for troop quarters, recreation facilities, maintenance buildings and photo lab at Tan Khe.

6. Part VI. Chronology:

11 August - Established 50-54 & 50-54B system to support Division Forward at Lai Khe.
13 August - Discontinued 50-B1 system.
16 August - Discontinued 50-76 system.
17 August - Established 54-76 system to support Devil.
23 August - Established 50-AI system to support Lai Son Operation.
28 August - Redesignated 54-76 to 54-A1.
1 September - Discontinued 54-A1 system.
5 September - Established 50-76 system to support Devil at Tan Uyen.
10 September - Discontinued 54-D1 system.
13 September - Established 50-54C to provide more common user trunks from Di An to Danger Forward.
14 September - Discontinued 73-79 system.
19 September - Established 54-77 to support Pepper at Bung Dia.
25 September - Established 54-D1 (NRC-112) to support Pracoon at Bau Long.
29 September - Established 54-76 system to support Devil at Bau Long.

2 October - Discontinued 54-D1 system and established 76-D2 (NRC-112) to connect Devil elements at Bau Long and Chon Tahn.
6 October - Discontinued 76-D2 and established 54-D2 (NRC-112) system to support Division controlled elements at Chon Tahn.
12 October - Determined 50-50L system to Ia Pha to provide direct coordination between Danger Main and Lightning Main.
18 October - Discontinued 71-79 and 73-78.
19 October - Established 73-79 system to Cuan Loi.
21 October - Discontinued 50-71 system.
28 October - Established 55-72 system to support Dapper Rear.
30 October - Discontinued 54-76 system.

7. (C) Part VII, Discussion and Recommendations:
(Lessons Learned):

ITEM: Establishment of signal centers at Support Command and Dagger.

DISCUSSION: A signal center was established at the Division Support Command with two radio relay systems, switchboard, switch panel, and commcenter. A signal center was also established at the 2nd Brigade rear location with two radio relay systems, RWI and receiving facilities.

OBSERVATIONS: The establishment of these signal centers adds needed flexibility to the Big Red Ones' communication system, and decreases vulnerability to enemy mortar attack because of the added dispersion.


DISCUSSION: During this reporting period much interference has been encountered on radio relay systems from aircraft VHF control nets, FM radio, and unidentified atmospheric conditions.

OBSERVATIONS: It is obvious that closer liaison should be maintained between the Army and Air Force concerning assignment of VHF frequencies. Many times aircraft control towers can be clearly heard on radio relay systems of this division. The control towers transmit omni-directional and radio relay is directional so the interference is usually one way only.

The interference from FM radio in usually experienced when the transmission is made in close proximity to the radio relay antenna as when helicopters fly close to antenna towers or when 202 antennas are placed in close proximity to radio relay antennas. This indicates that the present family of FM radios transmit an extremely "dirty" signal with many spurious frequencies for a relatively short distance. This interference has been experienced from helicopters as much as 1000 meters from the antenna.

Another interference phenomenon experienced by this battalion has been distortion of radio relay by aircraft flying in close proximity to the antenna. This is much like the condition called "ghosts" which aircraft cause in television reception.
AVDB-SI

SUBJECT: Operation Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSAGO-2A (RI))
for the period 1 August 1967 - 31 October 1967 (U)

The experience of this battalion indicates that all this
interference is lessened by the use of D band AN/TRC-24 equipments rather
than B or C bands.

ITEM: Erection of AB-216 tower at Lai Khe and disassembly of
tower at Di An.

DISCUSSION: An AB-216 tower was erected at Lai Khe to support a
new command signal center to support Division Main at its new location.
the AB-216 at Di An was disassembled to provide a tower that can be
erected at any forward area the Division may set up a CP.

OBSERVATION: The new tower at Lai Khe is physically removed
from the existing tower at Lai Khe used to support the 3rd Brigade. This
was done to decrease the vulnerability to mortar attack by dispersion of
the Battalion resources.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

EARL C. WEEKS
CPT, SigC
Adjutant
AVDB-MP-D

4 November 1967

SUBJECT: First Military Police Company Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

TC: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
APO San Francisco 96345

1. (C) PART I. INTRODUCTION

a. During the reporting period 1 August 1967 to 31 October 1967, the 1st Military Police Company furnished Military Police support to Di An, Phu Loi, Lai Khe, Hoi An Vinh, and Quan Loi Base Camps and several field locations. The company filled many commitments, some of which have existed in the past and some which came into existence during the reporting period. The company provided Military Police escorts and traffic control for convoys, maintained security for Division Main and Division Forward Tactical Operations Centers, handles and controls all prisoner of war collection points and provides highway, town, and base camp patrols. Coordination with the National Police and ARVN Military Police has enabled resource control checkpoint teams to be organized and placed in field locations for the first time during this reporting period. Also during this period the Mortar and Infantry Platoons were reassigned to the 1st Infantry Division Support Command.

b. The Division Provost Marshal is LTC Wallace K. Witwer and the Deputy Provost Marshal is MAJ Walter J. Nagorski. The Commanding Officer of the company is CPT W. H. McComas Jr. who replaced 1LT John E. Hammar. 1LT Jesse C. Jones remains as the Executive Officer. 1SG Avery H. Jackson is the First Sergeant, and 1SG Theodore Nichols is the Provost Marshal Operations Sergeant. The following is a list of the Platoons involved in the company:

1st Platoon (Hoi An Main)
2nd Platoon (21 An North)
3rd Platoon (Lai Khe)
4th Platoon (21 An South)
Security Platoon (Lai Khe Div HQ)
Provost Marshal (Phu Loi)
Convoy Officer (1LT Perry G. Kellenberger)
1LT Lowie C. Turnar
1LT Ralph J. Komaki
1LT Jerry S. Price
1LT Rhin D. Dean
1LT John R. Hammar
1LT John G. O'Brien

Incl 12

CONFIDENTIAL

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 10 years
POD DUE 1980.10
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: FIRST MILITARY POLICE COMPANY OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED (CON'T)

2. (C) PART II. NARRATIVE OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS

a. First Platoon.

(1) During the reporting period the 1st Platoon continued to support the 1st Brigade.

(2) From 16 September 1967 to 23 September 1967 the 1st Platoon played a major role in the Phouc Vinh resupply convoys. They placed three isolated traffic control points along the march route and furnished four gun jeeps for the convoy security.

(3) During the next two months the platoon will move to Quyn Loi to support the 1st Brigade when it moves to that location.

(4) The 1st Platoon has been supporting the 1st Battalion, 13th Infantry on operations near Song Be.

b. Second Platoon.

(1) During the period 1 August 1967 to 31 October 1967, the 2d Platoon continued to provide direct support to the 2d Brigade mission of "Revolutionary Development" in the Di An area. The unit provided security support in the form of population control, detainee security, command post security, convoy escort, and river boat patrol during cordons and searches of Vietnamese villages.

(2) During the month of October a mobile Resources Control Checkpoint system was put into effect consisting of six teams made up of enlisted personnel and 14 National Policemen. The mission of the Resource Control Checkpoints is to search Vietnamese personnel, vehicles, and personal property at different checkpoints using a blacklist prepared by the 2d Brigade S-2. Personnel that are detained are released to the IPW section to determine their status.

(3) During this period the unit continued normal base camp operations. Increased emphasis was placed on internal security and more effective utilization of the Vietnamese National Police assigned to the unit.

(4) A statistical summary of this quarter's activities include:
- Escort convoy security for 1,470 vehicles; security for 75 detainees; 162 different Resources Control Checkpoints which checked 37,893 Vietnamese personnel, 18,308 vehicles, and detained 147 civilians for lack of identification and AWOL and VC suspects; participation in 15 cordon and search operations; and security for 36 Medical Civic Action Projects.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-MP-D

4 November 1967

SUBJECT: FIRST MILITARY POLICE COMPANY OPERATIONAL REPORT – LESSONS LEARNED (CON'T)

c. Third Platoon.

(1) The 3rd Platoon continued in direct support of the 3rd Brigade. The platoon provided Military Police support to the Brigade and Base Camp in areas of traffic control, criminal investigation, physical security, control of local nationals, custody of detainees, and reaction for emergency situations.

(2) Due to the lessening of manpower throughout the reporting interval the platoon has reverted to the mission of providing base camp support.

(3) The 3rd Platoon supported the Quan Loi and Phouc Vinh resupply convoys with traffic control points and personnel.

d. Fourth Platoon.

(1) During the reporting period the 4th Platoon was relocated from Phu Loi to Di An South.

(2) This platoon is responsible for the Military Police support of Di An South, and the many convoys scheduled daily by Support Command.

(3) The platoon supported the Quan Loi and Phouc Vinh resupply convoys with personnel and equipment.

(4) This platoon is also responsible for control of local nationals and furnishes a ready reaction force for the Base Camp.

e. Fifth Platoon (Security Platoon): The 5th Platoon continues to secure Division Headquarters and Division Forward locations. In addition the platoon gives support on all major convoy operations.

3. (C) PART III. INTELLIGENCE (Negative Report)

4. (C) PART IV. PERSONNEL.

a. Strength.

(1) On 1 August 1967 the 1st MP Company had assigned strength of 6 officers, 2 Warrant Officers, and 275 enlisted personnel. On 31 October 1967 the strength had dropped considerably to 11 officers, 2 Warrant Officers, and 220 enlisted personnel. Authorized strength for the company is 9 officers, 1 Warrant Officer, and 179 enlisted personnel. The company can be expected to be at TOE strength during the month of November.

(2) During the period the company experienced 102 losses in personnel due to rotation and 47 gains for a total decrease in strength of 55 personnel. Officer personnel changed during the reporting period with the de-
parture of LT Billy, LT Willis, and LT Fitchum, and the arrival of CPT Comms, LT Shollenburger, LT O'Brien, LT Dehn, and LT Price.

(3) The company sustained two (2) wounded in action due to hostile action during the period. One subject was returned to duty the same day and one was hospitalized for 48 hours.

(4) First Platoon, Company C, 720th MP Battalion, Long Binh, RVN, continued in support of this company with a platoon at the Phu Loi Base Camp, and the 552d MP Company, II Field Force, Long Binh, RVN, has two platoons in support at Di An North and South.

(5) The ten (10) Vietnamese Military Police (VC) are used in support of the company.

b. Discipline: A total of five (5) Article 15s were given to individuals this past quarter. The 1st MP Company has never had a Article 15 problem. The Article 15s given in this unit would probably have been conducted in other units. There were no summary, special, or general court martials during the period. The company still has one man in the stockade, however, he was a member of the Infantry Platoon which has been transferred.

c. Morale and Personnel Services.

(1) Morale is very high within the unit despite long working hours and little free time.

(2) Twelve Bronze Stars, 61 Army Commendation Medals, and 3 Purple Hearts were awarded to members of the company during the reporting period.

(3) Twenty-four out-of-country R&Rs and 6 in-country R&Rs were granted.

d. Civilian Employees.

(1) Sixteen Vietnamese civilian employees are utilized on a permanent basis by the company. Thirteen work in the Mess Hall and Three work in the Motor Pool. In addition 10 - 15 temporary laborers from the CPF are employed each day. No problems were experienced in this area.

e. Prisoners of War: During the reporting period 162 persons were detained. They were classified as follows: two (2) Draft dodgers; 17 Prisoners of War; 130 innocent civilians; and 13 unclassified.

5. (C) PART V. LOGISTICS.

a. Supply: No major changes or problems. The new supply sergeant arrived during the period.
b. Motor Pool.

(1) A total of 249,950 miles were driven by vehicles of the 1st MP Company during the reporting period.

(2) Twenty (20) ½ ton vehicles were issued to the company and 26 ½ tons were turned in. There were no major accidents during the reporting period.

(3) As of 31 October 1967 this unit had 92 vehicles, all of which were operational.

c. Communications.

(1) PRO 25s have been received and all are committed.

(2) Communications continues to be of major concern and importance in our operations.

d. Construction: A wash rack for the company's vehicles was completed during this period and is operational.

6. (C) PART VI. CHRONOLOGY - This section has been incorporated in Part II.

7. (C) PART VII. LESSONS LEARNED, DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Item: Unit Strength

(1) Discussion: The unit's strength is of major concern as to whether or not this unit can continue to support the Division at five (5) base camps and numerous field locations. It is the intent to bring the unit to TOE strength. However at the same time the unit is expected to fulfill all of its present commitments. The original concept of a Division MP Company was not to run part camp and station activities or resource control checkpoints. The very nature of this war makes it necessary.

(2) Observations: Several alternatives are available for the unit to follow. One; the strength of the unit could be supplemented with other Military Police units. Two; that the unit be authorized to remain overstrength. Three; that our present commitments be revalued to determine if they are just. If the unit is reduced to TOE strength it cannot be expected to fulfill its present commitments.

W. H. MC COMAS JR.
CPT, MPC
Commanding
SUBJECT: Commanders Notes #9 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Normally my commanders notes deal with a single subject. However, there are three areas that concern me at this time. Two of these areas are of an operational nature and the third discusses proper maintenance procedures for the M16A1 Rifle.

   a. Securing of Base Camps. Preparation and execution of defensive measures for our base camps must be thorough and vigorous. Sweeps of areas adjacent to perimeters seldom result in large enemy kills, but the purpose is defensive in nature. It is the thoroughness of our actions, particularly the sweeps, that provides the best defense against Viet Cong attacks of friendly bases. Get patrols out around our bases, day and night, and have rapid reaction forces of sufficient size and adequately equipped and supplied to strike swiftly and violently at points preselected to prevent enemy withdrawal. Such actions tend to keep the Viet Cong off balance and unable to get set for a close in, coordinated infantry/mortar/rocket attack.

   b. Aerial Reconnaissance by Light Fire Team (LFT). The tactic of utilizing armed helicopters to conduct violent and aggressive aerial reconnaissance offers new advantages in detecting and locating the enemy which all commanders should exploit. Armed reconnaissance by LFT provides increased visual aerial coverage and the immediate means to engage observed targets. Additionally, when visual observation apparently indicates there is no enemy present, the delivery of violent fire from helicopters may entice enemy movement or reaction, thus disclosing his location. An effective variation has been the LFT used in conjunction with an aerial observer in a fixed wing observation aircraft with fire support communications.

   c. M16A1 Rifle. During a recent visit of a liaison team from the Army Material Command, it was found that the major problem encountered with the M16A1 rifle is deterioration of the rifle barrel. According to the team, this is attributed to the previous short supply of
AVDB-CG

SUBJECT: Commanders Notes #9 (U)

5 September 1967

cleaning materials and previous lack of emphasis on the need for frequent and thorough cleaning. Continued emphasis will be placed on making cleaning materials easily available to troops. The related problem of copper fouling in rifle bores may be attributed to the frequent use of tracer ammunition. Tracer ammunition characteristically leaves more fouling, causes more rapid deterioration of barrels and necessitates more frequent and thorough cleaning. M16 rifle loads will not exceed 33 1/3 percent tracer ammunition. (One tracer round to each two rounds of ball ammunition.)

2. (U) I desire that the policies discussed above receive the immediate attention of the commanders concerned.

J. H. HAY
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
A
1. Recently this Division has experienced several drowning incidents attributed to the victims' loss of grip while utilizing the safety rope during river crossing.

2. In order to reduce the possibility of similar incidents, and to insure security during the crossing, future river crossing will be conducted employing the following procedures:
   a. When a unit is confronted by a water obstacle, security must be placed out to the flanks and rear prior to crossing the main body.
   b. Sufficient nylon rope should be carried by the element involved and all personnel will be equipped with an aluminum snap link.
   c. The first persons to cross the obstacle must be good swimmers. They carry the nylon rope (safety line) and are overwatched from the near bank. On reaching the far bank, they secure the safety line and then provide frontal and flank security.
   d. The remainder of the main body cross in groups of two or three. They snap the snap link through their suspenders and then to the safety line. Upon completing the crossing, they become part of the security which continues to radiate outward.
   e. The last elements across should be capable swimmers and bring the safety line across with them.
   f. Non-swimmers can be secured to the safety line by snap link and cross in a similar fashion as other personnel. Those with an avid fear of water can be provided with an expedient life preserver fabricated from five to six empty canteens attached to a pistol belt or a poncho filled with foliage and rolled.

This letter will be filed in the unit Command Policy File
g. Water obstacles are likely ambush sites and security on both the friendly and enemy sides is imperative.

3. The above safety procedures will be implemented immediately whenever a water obstacle must be crossed. In addition, these techniques will be practiced whenever possible during the conduct of the quarterly refresher training prescribed for each rifle company by Appendix II of LOI 4-67 (Reorganization of the Infantry Battalion), Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, dated 3 July 1967.

/s/J H Hay
/t/J. H. HAY
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
A

"A TRUE COPY"

WILLIAM E. DANIEL, JR.
Major, Infantry

122
2
1. The prevention of malaria is a command function which begins with the battalion commander and goes down through the chain of command to the individual squad leader. A successful unit program can prevent malaria and prevent the loss of manpower.

2. An investigation of a unit with a high rate of malaria revealed several basic weaknesses in the unit's plan to prevent malaria.

   a. The unit did not have a responsible individual witness the consumption of the anti-malaria pill. It is directed that all units will have a definite policy whereby a roster is maintained and the actual consumption of the pill is witnessed by an officer or senior noncommissioned officer. This is a function of command.

   b. Some individuals did not have sufficient insect repellent, and resupply was not effected even though individuals requested additional insect repellent. It is the responsibility of leaders, at all levels of command, to insure that each individual has sufficient insect repellent prior to departing on an operation. While in the field, as part of the daily inspection of the soldier and his equipment, he will be checked to see that he has a bottle of insect repellent. It is no less important to have insect repellent than to have ammunition, and resupply must be programmed accordingly.

3. When units are operating in areas such as Quan Loi and Tong Le Chon, where a high incidence of malaria is found, personnel will be checked to see that sleeves are rolled down without fail during the hours of dusk, darkness, and at dawn. The prevention of mosquito bites is the first step to preventing malaria.

4. The prevention of malaria is a function of command supervision, and high rates of malaria in a unit are considered to be a dereliction of duty on the part of the commander. Vivax malaria is totally preventable by the weekly use of anti-malaria pills. While the malaria pill
AVDE-CG

SUBJECT: Commander Notes #11

16 September 1967

Consumed by US personnel is less effective against falciparum malaria, it offers some protection and the incidence of falciparum malaria can be reduced by the drug as well as be preventing mosquito bites. Commanders are directed to examine their current procedures for distribution and consumption of anti-malaria pills and other anti-malaria actions. Corrective actions will be initiated as required to prevent malaria in their units.

/s/J H Hay
/t/J. H. HAY
Major General, USA
Commanding

WILLIAM E. DANIEL, JR.
Major, Infantry
1. The status of maintenance in the armored and mechanized units organic and attached to the 1st Infantry Division is a matter of special concern to me. Commanders of these units and commanders under whom they are placed for operational control or attachment must ensure that the peculiarly difficult problems of tracked vehicle maintenance in Vietnam receive their concentrated attention. In essence, I expect all my commanders to demand that maintenance be performed and supervised with the same kind of zeal and enthusiasm as tactical operations.

2. To that end, the following specific policies governing maintenance in units operating tracked vehicles are placed in effect:

   a. Unit and vehicle commanders will ensure that when they are halted or occupying static positions, and security considerations permit, crew maintenance will be performed without delay. Whenever the operational situation permits, supervised organizational maintenance will be performed by platoons. As a guide and consistent with operational requirements, a minimum of 12 hours of supervised maintenance should be accomplished each week.

   b. Scheduled quarterly maintenance on tracked vehicles cannot be deferred in Vietnam without inviting intolerable increases in unit deadline rates. In the 1st Division, planning for the assignment of operational missions and tasks to armored and mechanized units by their commanders, supported unit commanders, and this headquarters will allow, in so far as is operationally feasible, each tracked vehicle platoon a period of five consecutive days each quarter for performance in a base camp location of unit scheduled maintenance.

J. H. Hay
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

This letter will be filed in the unit Command Policy File
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 96345

AVDS-CO 25 September 1967

SUBJECT: Commanders Notes #13

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Recently, several members of this command have been killed or wounded due to accidental discharge of the .45 caliber pistol. Analysis of these incidents reveals that failure to clear the weapon properly, either through carelessness or lack of knowledge, was the common contributing cause.

2. In order to reduce the possibility of future incidents of this type, the following steps will be taken:

a. All personnel armed with .45 caliber pistol will receive a monthly 15-30 minute refresher orientation by a member of the chain of command on the following: (paras 31-39, FK 23-25, Pistols and Revolvers)

   (1) Safety Devices (three)
   (2) Operational tests before firing
   (3) Loading
   (4) Firing
   (5) Unloading
   (6) Malfunctions
   (7) Stoppages
   (8) Immediate action

b. Personnel armed with the .45 caliber pistol will be instructed that the steps prescribed in FK 23-25 for unloading and cleaning the pistol will be repeated twice. These steps are as follows:

This letter will be filed in the Unit Command Policy File

124
AVDB-CG
SUBJECT: Commanders Notes #13

25 September 1967

(1) Come to **raise pistol**
(2) Remove magazine
(3) Pull slide to the rear - slide stop up
(4) Inspect chamber
(5) Allow slide to go forward - slide stop down
(6) Remaining at **raise pistol**, squeeze trigger

c. Any individual who cannot demonstrate a knowledge of the prescribed safety procedures for the .45 caliber pistol when questioned by a member of the chain of command, or who is observed handling the pistol in a careless or dangerous manner will not be permitted to carry this weapon, even if this means his reassignment to a different ToB position.

3. It is my desire that unit commanders, down to the level of squad leader, take a personal interest in the subject of weapons safety and by instruction and example, eliminate the needless and tragic deaths and injuries caused by the improper handling of weapons.

/s/ J H Hay
/et/ J. H. HAY
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
A

"A TRUE COPY"

WILLIAM E. DANIEL, JR.
Major, Infantry

127
AVDB-CO

27 September 1967

SUBJECT: Commanders Notes #14

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. There has been an increasing number of short rounds and malfunctions of 60mm mortar ammunition in this Division which have caused needless casualties to friendly forces. A large percentage of these malfunctions can be eliminated by proper storage and inspection techniques.

2. In the event of a short round or malfunction, the responsible officer will insure that the mortar and remaining ammunition are not used until an investigation is conducted by the 701st Maintenance Battalion. If the ammunition appears to be defective, firing of that lot will be suspended until an investigation is conducted by the Division Ammunition Officer. All short rounds and malfunctions will be reported in accordance with 1st Infantry Division Regulation 700-3, dated 14 June 1967.

3. The following procedures for storage and handling of mortar ammunition will be followed throughout this Division:

   a. Containers will be inspected for cracks prior to breaking the seal.

   b. Ammunition will be stowed on dunnage, 6 inches above ground.

   c. Rounds will be inclined so any moisture in the container will drain from powder increments.

   d. Canvas or ponchos will be utilized to prevent moisture seepage through sandbags and to protect ammunition from the elements.

   e. Seals on containers will be broken as late as possible before firing.

This letter will be filed in the unit Command Policy File
AVDS-CG
SUBJECT: Commanders Notes #14

4. Commanders will emphasize and supervise proper storage procedures
and will insure that the provisions of Division Regulation 700-3 regarding
reporting procedures for short rounds or malfunctions are followed.

J. H. HAY
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

129
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 96345

AVDR-CG.

SUBJECT: Commanders Notes #15

TO: S'K DISTRIBUTION

It has come to my attention that personnel have been taking portable radios to the field. It has been a long standing policy of the division that portable radios would not be taken to the field. The reasons for this are obvious in that personnel that are listening to radios are not alert on their positions, nor can they hear sounds of enemy activity. This is especially true during the hours of darkness when the greatest threat of VC attack occurs. Personnel who are not alert are not only endangering their lives but those of their comrades. Commanders will take appropriate action to insure that portable radios are not taken to the field.

J. H. HAY
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
A - Plus
25 AVDR-TT (M&D)

This letter will be filed in the unit Command Policy File
TO:

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. There is a growing tendency for officers and noncommissioned officers to tolerate a relaxation of normal, well established military standards under the excuse of combat conditions. This is most frequently evidenced by laxness and deficiencies in the following areas:

   a. Personal appearance of the soldier.
   b. Willful neglect of personal equipment.
   c. Willful neglect of weapons.
   d. Failure to control and protect ammunition.
   e. Abuse of government property.
   f. Abandonment of items useful to the enemy.
   g. Substandard field sanitation.

2. In actuality, combat conditions require a greater emphasis on the basics of good soldiering than peacetime garrison conditions as the items above are of great importance to the health and survivability of the soldier. Deterioration of military standards denotes a decline in discipline and no combat unit has ever been a good fighting unit without good discipline. The popular image of the rugged fighter, dirty, unwashed, unshaven and caked with grime is, in reality, indicative of a soldier who has not been supervised and clearly reveals a collapse of leadership and discipline. The same can be said for dirty equipment, personal gear, individual or crew served weapons, fighting positions or vehicles.

This letter will be filed in the unit Command Policy File.
AVDB-CG
SUBJECT: Commanders Notes #16

26 September 1967

3. I desire that the officers and noncommissioned officers of the Big Red One continually work to achieve and maintain the highest standards of soldiering which produce a disciplined fighting man. Accepting less than the highest standards is to jeopardize the lives of the soldiers entrusted to unit leaders from the top to bottom of the command.

J. H. HAY
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
A

132
2
TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. I desire that the following points be implemented by all commanders in the 1st Infantry Division.

   a. Zeroing: Brigade, Division Artillery and Support Command Commanders will insure that the Replacement Training Schools at their respective base camps conduct zeroing exercises during the conduct of their courses. Commanders at all levels are responsible for insuring that each individual within their command has zeroed his assigned weapon and knows what that zero is prior to his introduction into a tactical operation. Additionally, once a week, each individual will confirm his zero. If in the base camp, this can be done on ranges. In the field, improvised targets can be utilized.

   b. Care and Cleaning: Proper care and cleaning is essential if the M-16 rifle is to function properly. Weapons will be cleaned once daily in their entirety. Additional cleanings will be accomplished as the tactical situation permits. These additional cleanings will concentrate on the chamber and the bolt. The lower receiver of the weapon will not be disassembled. All ammunition and magazines will be cleaned daily with the weapon. Each rifleman’s M-16 and magazines will be inspected daily by the squad leader, or platoon leader, or company commander to insure compliance with this policy. All incoming company grade officers and all EM will receive training on this subject as a part of Combat Indoctrination. Battalion commanders will initiate a positive check system to insure adequate cleaning materials are made available on a continuous basis so that daily maintenance can be accomplished.

   c. Familiarization Firing: Commanders will continue the policy of conducting periodic firing in field locations. Additionally, upon returning to base camp or relatively secure areas, the range facilities at these locations will be utilized for familiarization firing. This will instill added confidence in the individual weapon, rotate ammunition loads and improve marksmanship. Emphasis will be placed on fire control and fire distribution.

This letter will be filed in the unit Command Policy File
2. Commanders, at all levels, will insure that the policies specified in the preceding paragraphs receive the maximum command attention and emphasis.

J. H. HAY
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
A
AVDB-CG

SUBJECT: COMMANDERS NOTES #19

TO: See Distribution

1. In my contacts and conversations with soldiers, I very often find that they have not been briefed or given information on current operations and plans. While security must always be an important consideration, it is very important that all personnel be kept informed of their missions and the general plan of accomplishment. Key personnel must be completely familiar with the detailed plans for all operations.

2. It is my desire that commanders from platoons through company level brief their personnel on plans and operations in order that all will be informed. Simple sand tables, maps, and picture maps should be utilized for graphic illustration. As a matter of routine, all units will be assembled and all personnel briefed prior to every operation. Experience has shown that an informed soldier can and will perform his assigned task more effectively.

J. H. HAY
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
A - Plus
25 - AVDB-TT (MHD)

This letter will be filed in the unit Command Policy File
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division (U)**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967**

**CG, 1st Infantry Division**

**3. REPORT TITLE**

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division (U)

**4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967

**5. AUTHOR(s) (First name, middle initial, last name)**

CG, 1st Infantry Division

**6. REPORT DATE**

3 December 1967

**7. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES**

136

**8. NO. OF REPS**

136

**9. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.**

T674246

**10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT**

N/A

**11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

N/A

**12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY**

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**13. ABSTRACT**

136