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AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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CG, 5th Infantry Division (Mech)
CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
1. (U) REFERENCES.

a. OPORD 13-67 (Operation DALLAS (U) dated 16 May 1967 to implement instructions received in 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (OPORD 13-67 (Operation DALLAS) (U) dated 16 May 1967).

b. Maps, Vietnam, 1:50,000 Series 7070L, Sheets 6130 IV, 6311 I, II, III.

2. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION. The name of the operation was DALLAS and was a search and destroy operation conducted in the western portion of WAR ZONE D.

3. (U) DATES OF OPERATION. 170700 May to 260900 May 1967 (Squadron participation).

4. (U) LOCATION. The area of operations for the squadron's phase of the operation was conducted in the western portion of WAR ZONE D. The area was generally northeast of TAN Uyen, in an area bounded by Route 16 to the west, the Dong Nai River to the south and east, and the Song Be River in the north and west.

5. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS. The 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division was the controlling headquarters for the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The reporting officer for this report is Lieutenant Colonel Martin D. Howell, Commanding Officer, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Subordinate commanders during the operation were as follows:

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron
Troop A
Troop B
Troop C
Company D
Howitzer Battery
1st Platoon, Air Cavalry Troop
1st Platoon, 919th Engineer Company

6. (C) GENERAL.

a. The below indicated organisation was the squadron's basic configuration for the operation. Daily modifications were made to permit flexibility, but generally each unit had access to all elements of their assigned task organization as outlined:

Squadron Control:

Howitzer Battery
Aviation Section
1st Platoon, Air Cavalry Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
1st Platoon, 919th Engineer Company

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Team A:
Troop A (-)
Tank Section, Company D

Team B:
Troop B
3rd Platoon, Company D

Team D:
Company D (-)
2nd Platoon, Troop A

b. Artillery: Direct support was provided by howitzer battery with reinforcing fires being provided by artillery supporting the 1st Brigade.

c. Army Aviation:

(1) First Platoon, Air Cavalry Troop flew in direct support of the squadron. Light and heavy fire teams were used continuously on a daily basis. The squadron aviation section provided daily command and control coverage over the area of operations.

(a) Deployment:
1. Command and control
2. Aerial fire support
3. Column cover
4. Reconnaissance
5. Day and dusk patrols of larger areas
6. Mortar watch
7. Suppressive fire runs (Aerial Thunder Runs)

(b) Statistics on support rendered:
1. Sorties flown = 176 (1 combat missions)
2. Hours flown = 260

(c) Results:
Aviation elements were credited with two VC KIA (killed in action), six structures, two sampans destroyed and twenty-seven structures, one point captured. Ammunition expenditures were 209,000 = 7.55c rounds, 272 = 2.72c rounds, 1700 = Kala\vam\nand 150 clips grenades.

Air Force: During Operation DALLAS, nineteen TAC Air sorties were flown. Nine strikes were preplanned, nine were immediate requested for forces in contact, and one fire ship was called during a mortar attack.

(c) INTELLIGENCE:

Information available to the squadron prior to initiation of Operation DALLAS had primarily been gathered through agent reports from various sources. Because the area had not been penetrated by allied forces for some time...
eight months, it was difficult to determine how much of the information was reliable. In addition, the squadron was not really sure how much tactical movement would be restricted by the terrain, mines, roadblocks, and impending monsoon rains. From experience and limited aerial reconnaissance, the consensus of the ground commanders was favorable. No major changes in methods of tactical employment were contemplated. Attention was initially directed to a known major route, east to west, generally through the center of the brigade area of operations; and possible detection and engagement of the VC-273rd Main Force Regiment, which was suspected because of the recent attacks on the PTEK HQ and PHUOC VINH bases. Possible reinforcement by the 271, 272 VC Regiments and the 101st NVA Regiment, meant that the squadron must increase preparedness in the two areas:

(1) Ability to reinforce the infantry battalions in the event of major engagement. This was accomplished by continuous aerial reconnaissance of access routes into the infantry's position and careful selection of daily areas of operations to facilitate immediate reaction.

(2) Protection against possible, large scale mortar attacks. The squadron reviewed and strengthened counter-mortar procedures and, in retrospect this was particularly rewarding.

Lastly, the enemy installation target lists provided by brigade intelligence were extremely valuable and accurate. On 22 May the squadron encountered significant enemy resistance at exact target list coordinates that had been received through brigade intelligence channels.

8. (c) MISSION. The 1st Squadron attacks north into sector, seizes and secures two artillery support bases. Conducts combat reconnaissance in assigned AO's; destroys VC/NVA forces and installations in sector.

9. (c) EXECUTION.

a. Maneuver:

(1) The 1st Squadron was placed under control of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division on 16 May 1967, and moved into a forward assembly area at NHU LOC on the same date. The squadron's howitzer battery was emplaced initially at FSB A, vicinity TM5261.

The brigade area of operation was divided into six subordinate AO's, WACO, HOUSTON, LONGVIEW, AUSTIN, KIEN, and DRAGON. (See Annex A.) Initially, the squadron was to operate in AO's WACO, AUSTIN, and KIEN, which placed the squadron generally in the center of the brigade AO, and positioned as a mobile reaction force for the infantry battalions, should they encounter substantial contact. However, the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was inserted into AO KIEN, rather than AO HOUSTON and lost KIEN. Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron, 11th armored Cavalry was reemplaced first at FSB B and later at FSB D. This move necessitated a limited engineer work on the road between the two fire support bases and the squadron assumed security responsibility for ordnance convoys along the route.

During Operation DALLAS, the 1st Ariane received two agent reports which located elements of the 273rd VC Main Force Regiment in the brigade AO. The 1st Squadron reacted in both instances, locating elements of the 2nd Battalion, 273rd VC Regiment on 21 and 22 May 1967.

(2) There were no squadron operations conducted in conjunction with ARVN forces during Operation DALLAS.

(3) The squadron completed the following, troop and battalion size missions during Operation DALLAS;

(a) Battalion combat attack (tropes): 1

(b) Troop size security missions: 24

(c) Troop size security mission: 2

(d) Troop size security mission: 3

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(a) Troop size area reconnaissance missions: 1
(b) Troop size convoy escort(s): 1
(c) Troop size engineer work party security: 1
(d) Troop size route security missions (OPCON Inf): 2
(e) Troop size reaction missions: 1
(f) Platoon size search and destroy operations: 7
(g) Platoon (composite) engineer work party security missions: 3
(h) Platoon size night route clearance missions (Thunder Run): 1

TOTAL: 51

Squadron elements made contact on eight out of the fifty-one missions mentioned above. Six of these contacts were light and two were moderate contacts, each lasting approximately three hours.

10. (c) SIGNIFICANT ACTION:

17 May 1967

The squadron crossed the line of departure at 1706Z May with Troop B leading, followed by Troop C, Troop 0 and then 90. The first objective, FSB B, was entered at 0755 and completely secured by Troop B and Troop D at 0800. Troop A had secured a landing zone for the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, along the route of advance, at 0710Z.

At 0729 hours, a Chinook and the squadron's LPI received ground fire vicinity X293KJ. Two platoons from Troop B, reinforced with tanks attached north to locate and destroy these enemy forces. At 1012 hours, while closing in the objective area, Team B's lead element spotted two VC running from north to south vicinity X293KJ. The troop set up a small base of fire and began to assault the woodline directly to their right flank. Almost immediately, one of the tanks hit a mine as the maneuver element crossed a road parallel to their axis of advance. Three more VC were sighted at X293KJ, moving east to west. Following this incident, an immediate air strike was placed on the objective area and artillery was utilized to attempt to seal enemy withdrawal routes to the north-east. During the remainder of the morning and afternoon, Troop B conducted operations in the general area. A small base camp was found at X293KJ, with fresh tracks leading in from the south. 300 pounds of polished rice and sixty pounds of salt were uncovered and destroyed, later, at 1330 hours, vicinity X293KJ, elements found an antitank mine (estimated to be 10 lbs) and evacuated it through intelligence channels. No further contact was established.

Troop D had attacked through FSB B to the east to seize FSB D. At 1312 hours, the troop detonated an antitank mine vicinity X293KJ. The vehicle sustained minor damage and there was one 12.7 MM. At 1418 hours, Troop C found a VC body, with documents, at X293KJ. A series of documents were found elements of 2nd Battalion, 273rd VC Regiment. At 1355 hours, Troop C was attacked vicinity X293KJ. There were no casualties and the VC suffered moderate damage. While sweeping the area, Troop C found and detonated a second mine at X293KJ.

The squadron's howitzer battery began displacement from FSB C to FSB D at 1551Z and closed in Position B at 1618 hours.

Troop A closed in FSB D at 1456 and conducted search and destroy operations to the north for the remainder of the afternoon.

18 May 1967

Troops A and C operated in Areas A and D within AO MAOC. Troop B conducted operations in Area C.
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Two platoon size clearing operations north and south of FSB B. Team D conducted reconnaissance of a fort site, vicinity X797347, which was to be used on the nineteenth during movement to secure a landing zone for the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry.

At 1235 hours, Team A found three graves vicinity T705736B, which appeared to be a week old. Three bodies, wrapped in plastic and dressed in black, were found in the graves. Again at 1455 hours, Team A found and evacuated 23,000 pounds of polished rice and 1875 pounds of salt. At 1555 hours, Team B evacuated 150 steel reinforcing rods, 7 to 8 feet long, thirty sheets of tin and 30 pounds of salt, vicinity T798313B. At 1557 hours, Troop C evacuated 3000 pounds of rice from coordinates T039399.

The only contact of the day occurred at 1745 hours, vicinity XT917155, when an observation post from Team A received one round of sniper fire. The squadron's LIT observed one VC withdrawing from this area, engaged him and was credited with one VC KIA (POW).

19 May 1967

Team A conducted search and destroy operations in Area A, AO HOUSTON, Troop C conducted search and destroy operations in Area C, AO HOUSTON, and Team B secured a landing zone (vicinity XY642348) and Team B secured FSB B. The 2nd Platoon, Team B was placed OPCON to the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry at 1025 hours.

20 May 1967

Team A conducted search and destroy operations in A/19, AO HOUSTON, Team B secured engineer work parties along the route from FSB B and D, Troop C conducted search and destroy operations in Area C, AO HOUSTON, and Team B conducted search and destroy operations in FSB B. There was negative enemy contact during the day.

Troop A found 6 fresh graves (less than 72 hours old) vicinity T023377 at 1115 hours, and a third grave at T023368 at 1115 hours.

Troop C hit a mine at 1810 hours, vicinity T138398, with no US casualties and minor damage to one LVT.

During the day, 110 pounds of rock salt, two antitank mines, 4 pounds of documents, four barrels of diesel fuel, 500 pounds of polished rice were recovered and one CMUCOM grenade booby trap was blown in place.

21 May 1967

Team B attacked north to locate and destroy major units of the VC (Main Force) 273rd Regiment, suspected to be located vicinity coordinates, X797388.

Team C and Troop C conducted search and destroy operations in Areas A/20, and C/20, AO HOUSTON, respectively. Team D conducted local search and destroy operations in Area D.

Team B, operating in conjunction with the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, secured the entire suspected area and access routes south with negative results. Meanwhile, at 1605 hours, Troop D was engaged by an estimated company of VC believed to be occupying hasty ambush positions. The ambush was initiated with rocket and automatic weapons fire,streamlined 3rd grenades and apparently was tripped early by the Cavalry unit. Extensive heavy anti-aircraft fire was received in the area by gunships, high performance aircraft, and rescue choppers. One F-100 (Super Sabre) crashed during a napalm run, a Huskie rescue shipper was downed by enemy fire, and eventually had to be destroyed that night. Two Army gunships received 12.7mm hits and had to be grounded for repairs. The Air Force pilot was killed (Pierre), it was C 154, 5th FTS, 433rd FTS, USAF, who had been assigned earlier to the squadron as a FAC for approximately 6 months before being reassigned to the 7th AFT at TINS NPA. These Air Force rescue crews were wounded and one Army gunship crew chief was lightly wounded. US ground forces sustained five WIA, none serious. Enemy casualties were unknown. Immediate

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Air strikes and missions poured fires into the area most of the evening, and artillery continued B-47 fires throughout the night.

Teams A and D both hit mines during the day, with negative friendly casualties and only light damage to vehicles in each case.

22 May 1967

Troop A (-) moved from PFB D to secure a LZ for the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry and later, assisted in an attack conducted by Teams B and D. Teams B and D attacked north into a suspected base area found during operations the previous day. Troop C conducted search and destroy operations in Area O/2Q - AO HOUSTON, cleared the route from PFB D to PFB B and assisted Howitzer Battery and the squadron command post to Position B.

Team B made limited contact with enemy forces at 0531 hours and moderate contact was maintained throughout the morning by both Teams B and D. The attack slashed through dense foliage, which had been raised by air strikes and artillery pre-launch strikes earlier in the morning, to overrun a company-sized base camp occupied by an estimated two platoons of Viet Cong. Contact was broken by the VC at 1129 hours as they fled to the northeast. During this contact, two VC were killed (20). US casualties were one KIA and three WIA. The squadron employed one M29 Carbine, one RPG-2 Launcher, one BAR, one M49, and one US 60mm rifle.

At 1341 hours, Team A received an RPG-2 round, narrowly missing the lead truck, vicinity X502351. At 1102 hours, Team A engaged four VC running from south to north across their front, and killed two. GBU runs and artillery were called to block withdrawal routes. Contact was not regained as Team A pushed forward.

23 May 1967

In accordance with terms of the cease fire, the squadron did not conduct offensive operations on this date. Troop C secured a LZ for the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry and Team B conducted resupply convoy runs from PFB B to PFB G.

At 23014.1 hours, twenty-three rounds of 60 mm mortar fire fell to the southeast of the squadron night defensive position at FBI B. Perimeter elements reported that enemy fire positions appeared to be located to the north of the lane, in the range of 800 - 1000 meters. The squadron employed all counter-mortar procedures; there were no US casualties.

24 May 1967

Team B and Troop D attacked to the north to locate and destroy major forces of the 273rd Regiment suspected to be in the general vicinity of X792377. Intelligence information had been received at 0200 hours from the 1st Brigade. At 0256 hours, Team A saw two enemy vehicles X792377, took them under fire, killing one, capturing a CHINON Type 35 Carbine.

At 0717.9 hours, Troop C uncovered 250 (100 lb.) bags of polished rice vicinity X792351. All bags were evacuated and the remainder, which had been hit by artillery, was destroyed. In the same area, 35 minutes later, Troop C uncovered a small tank killer team, killing one VC, capturing one M29, and one RPG-2 launch.

At 1040 hours, Troop C uncovered a small tank killer team, killing one VC, capturing one M29, and one RPG-2 launch.

At 1059.5 hours, Team C engaged two VC in a small tank killer team, killing one VC, capturing one M29, and one RPG-2 launch.

The attack on the evening of 25 May at 2051 hours, PFB B was hit with a second mortar attack. Seventy-three 60mm mortar rounds and eighteen 81mm rounds fell within the perimeter during the 1 - 5 minute attack. The squadron immediately initiated counter-mortar procedures which included artillery counter-mortar fires, perimeter direct fire, weapons firing, howitzer gunnery, "Aircraft" (AV), "Aircraft" (AV) fire, and an AV Combat Proof mission. It was established that three 60mm and two 81mm rounds were descending on a target gun azimuth of 2290 - 1900 m. The combat team was called and instructed to direct an immediate artillery and AV "Aircraft" (AV) fire on the suspected target area with unknown results. US casualties were eight VC, none seriously. No equipment was damaged.

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During the period 25 - 26 May 1967, the squadron's second phase of operations (see Annex B) commenced; no enemy contact was made. Numerous small base camps were found and destroyed but no enemy materials of significance were uncovered.

11. (c) RESULTS:

a. Personal Losses:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Device</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>VC</th>
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<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19 and 3 (Pows).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WGI</td>
<td>--</td>
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b. Equipment Losses:

(1) US Losses: None

(2) VC Losses:

(a) Weapons:

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RPO-2 Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIOM Carbine Type 56</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-47 Assault Rifle</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle</td>
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</tr>
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<td>BAR</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauser</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spare Barrel</td>
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(b) Ammunition:

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<tr>
<td>CHIOM grenades</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cal .30 rounds</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rifle grenades</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPO-2 rounds</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm mortar rounds</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-47 (magneto)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm artillery shells</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Claymore CHIOM</td>
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(c) Foundry Items:

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Raw steel</td>
<td>235 tons</td>
<td>50 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolt stock</td>
<td>250 tons</td>
<td>--</td>
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(d) Miscellaneous:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Captured</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Documents</td>
<td>10 lbs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>86 lbs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½ ton truck</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian type diesel fuel</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1 ton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel reinforcing rods</td>
<td>1 roll (100 ft)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper cable</td>
<td>30 sheets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin</td>
<td>2 - 55 gal drums</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS gas</td>
<td>5 lbs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC-Wi radio parts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. (C) Logistics:

a. Class I: The squadron continued to use a 1-4 and 2-10 ration meal/day cycle during the operation.

b. Class II & IV: At the end of Operation DALLAS, the squadron was still short eight AGAVs.

c. Class III: The squadron used 11,050 gallons of MGGAS and 9,300 gallons of diesel during Operation DALLAS. All Class III products were delivered by air.

d. (Class V: The squadron expended the following amounts of ammunition during Operation DALLAS:

- 7.62mm: 550,000 rounds
- 50 Cal: 125,000 rounds
- 60mm: 4,900 rounds
- 90mm HE: 30 rounds
- 90mm (Canister): 318 rounds
- Hand Grenades: 1,200

c. Transportation: During Operation DALLAS, the squadron used 150 CH-17 sorties and eighty-eight UN-1D sorties to move approximately 1,250,000 lbs of resupply material.

13. (C) Commanders' Analysis:

a. Selective extensions of AOs to exploit intelligence findings at squadron level.

(1) Problem: On 21 and 22 May 1967, the squadron was engaged in the most significant contact of Operation DALLAS. Initial contact was established at 1700 hours on the 21st. An exploitive attack was launched on the 22nd. The squadron and continuous contact was maintained throughout the morning. Field intelligence revealed that the attacking force had engaged an established enemy force element from the 2nd Battalion, 573rd Main Force Regiment. Documents subsequently indicated possible presence of support elements from COM 77th Infantry Regiment north. This was subsequently found when the 22nd. 77th Infantry Division was sent to the strong possibility that a major installation existed further to the north east, vicinity padre squares, R535, R715, or D-104. The squadron would Nov
required an estimated one or two day extension to thoroughly search this area and could have conducted the operation with organic combat and combat support elements. However, the squadron was committed to the ONE DING secret area, to the west, and could not continue in this area of interest.

(2) Discussion and Recommendations: The squadron's experience during ten months in-country, has shown that battlefield intelligence reports provide the most useful information for armored cavalry exploitation. Scheduling of cavalry employment must provide sufficient flexibility to permit timely and thorough reaction to these battlefield intelligence reports. Our combined arms team composition, rapid reaction capability, and self-sustaining characteristics, facilitate such employment.

b. Use of stay behind patrols and enemy target lists. Discussion: The squadron's experience has shown that the VO repeatedly use old base camps and consistently returned to sites of contact. During the initial stages of an operation, the enemy installation target list is extremely important, to establish contact and verify known installations. Stay behind patrols and HRP's are extremely valuable to reestablish contact, trace infiltration and exfiltration routes, and possibly capture POW's.

c. Counter-Mortar Fire Procedures: Discussion: The squadron has developed a counter-mortar fire plan, integrating all organic and combat support fire, which was successfully employed during Operation DAILAS on two occasions. Procedures include: Artillery counter-mortar fires, direct fire from perimeter forces (7.62 MD, 30 Cal MG, 90mm HE delay and M-79), light and heavy fire team gun runs, non-stop mortar watch-firing, AP Flare/minigun ships, combat proof missions, and immediate airstrikes. These procedures require detailed planning and exercise. Other tactical considerations are: Enforcement of overhead cover policies for all, requirements for LP's/OP's and AP's to obtain cover from perimeter direct fire weapons, alert teams to provide information on crater analysis, light discipline and establishment of fire-control and media parties.

d. Artillery Support:

(1) Problem Areas:

(a) Serious maintenance problems were encountered with the M-109 Howitzers during the reporting period. The lack of replacement parts presented the most serious problems and a partial list of the most critical of these parts are listed below:

1. Seals for hydraulic systems.
2. Bore evacuator plugs (150 rd life).
3. Firing locks.
4. Detent plungers (1500 rd life).

(b) Some problem arises on one occasion in obtaining permission to have one battery, firing (6A) for squadron troops in contact, revert to (G3) role during the duration of the contact.

(2) Discussion and Recommendations:

(a) The maintenance problems of the M-109 Howitzers can be alleviated by a greater input of replacement parts and increasing use of computer-aided control boxes with a corresponding increase in a sense of urgency by the troops. In addition, responsibility of administrative, it is recommended that one tube be administratively declaired for 12 hours out of every 72 hour period, for complete maintenance.

b. The squadron recommends that batteries firing in (6A) of maneuver battalions/squadrons, revert to (6G) of the battalion/squadron establishing significant contact for the duration of the encounter. These batteries would revert to (G3) roles or (63) of other maneuver battalions, should the need arise, by more extensive use of artillery communications networks.
(c) During Operation DALLAS, VT flares were used extensively to cover roads and trails during hours of darkness. These fires supplemented clearing teams and thunder runs, with considerable success in keeping lines of communication open.

(d) During Operation DALLAS, we found that initial reservations on the use of 155mm delayed-fuse rounds to open up fortifications and installations were incorrect. We initially expected to encounter a higher def ratio than would be acceptable. In fact the ratio is about the same as that with fuse QUICK.
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ANNEX B - AREAS OF OPERATION (Phase II),

Operation DALLAS

- Areas worked by the 1st Squadron

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ANNEX B 12
**REPORT TITLE**

Combat After Action Report - Operation DALLAS, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (U)

**EXPERIENCES OF UNIT ENGAGED IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, 17-26 MAY 1967**

CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

**REPORT DATE**

Undated

**TOTAL NO. OF PAGES**

13

**PROJECT NO.**

N/A

**ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER**

67X179

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT**

N/A

**SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY**

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**ABSTRACT**

N/A