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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO San Francisco 96257

1. (U) REFERENCES.
   a. 9th Infantry Division OPORD 50-67, (Operation AKRON), 30 May 1967.
   b. 11th Armored Cav Regiment OPORD 10-67 (Operation AKRON), 1 June 1967.
   c. Map Series L70L4, Vietnam, Sheets 6330 L-II, 6330 L-IV

2. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION. 9th Infantry Division Operation AKRON, Jungle Clearing, Search and Destroy.


4. (U) LOCATION. The area of operations was confined primarily to the HAT DICH SECRET ZONE in PHUOT TUT Province west of Interprovincial Route 2.

5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL HEADQUARTERS.
   a. Operation AKRON was controlled by Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division with 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, and 11th Armored Cav Regiment (-) the participating headquarters. The reporting officer for this report is Colonel Roy V. Parley, Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.
   b. Subordinate commanders during the operation were as follows:
      1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry - LTC Martin D. Howell
      3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry - LTC Arthur F. Cochran
      Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry - CPT Marvin L. Doeck
      Air Cavalry Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry - MAJ Francis B. Martin
      37th Medical Company - CPT Dennis J. Blais
      919th Engineer Company - CPT Donald J. Crocker
      409th Radio Research Detachment - LIT Frank Zachar
      51st Military Intelligence Detachment - MAJ Cornelius Grey
      17th Public Information Detachment - CPT Owen W. ditchfield
      Battery B, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery - CPT Ralph P. Swofford III
      35th Ranger Battalion (III Corps - ARVN) - CPT Jared L. Bates, Advisor
      32nd Ranger Battalion (16th Inf Div - ARVN) - CPT Alexander P. Shine, Advisor

6. (C) GENERAL. Operation AKRON, controlled by Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division was initiated to seek out and destroy Viet Cong/NVA forces in the HAT DICH SECRET ZONE, and to conduct jungle clearing operations along the FIRESTONE, BRIDSTONE, and BLACKSTONE TRAILS.

   a. Task Organisation. Control of the operation was exercised by the Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division, with the 11th Armored Cav Regiment (-) attached. The regimental command post remained at the LONG Giao Base Camp vicinity TPH1665. The initial task organisation is indicated below:

      Regimental Control:

GROUP 1
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Air Cavalry Troop
37th Medical Company
97th Engineer Company
409th Intelligence Detachment
31st Radio Research Detachment (-)
1st Military Intelligence Detachment
1st Squadron
2nd Squadron:
3rd Platoon, 1st Engineer Company
1 AVL 15th Engineer Battalion

b. Artillery.

(1) Size of Forces:

Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
Battery B, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery - 105mm (Y)

(2) Missions fired by supporting artillery were contact missions, harassment and interdiction (H&I), reconnaissance by fire and navigational.

(3) Concept of the Operation: The howitzer batteries organizes to the regiment were used in direct support of their parent squadrons and in general support of maneuver elements participating in Operation ARKON. Howitzer Battery, 1st and 3rd Squadrons, initially supported operations from base camp positions. As forces maneuvered out of artillery range, Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron deployed and remained with the squadron command post. Battery B, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery became OCON to the regiment in direct support of the 52nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN); the battery deployed to GM NZ vicinity YS692 in order to support operations in Area LION.

(4) The timeliness and effectiveness of artillery support was highly instrumental in inflicting maximum losses upon enemy forces and installations.

(5) During the period 8-27 June 1967, the following number of rounds were fired in support of ground operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron</td>
<td>3659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery B, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Rounds Expended</td>
<td>6279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Engineer. Engineer support was provided the regiment by the 919th Engineer Company (Armored). One platoon was attached to the 3rd Squadron throughout the operation while the 2nd Platoon supported the 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) on the 16th and 17th of June for the purpose of VC base camp destruction. In support of the 3rd Squadron, fifteen mines were detected and either removed or destroyed; three expedient ford crossing sites were constructed and one expedient type timber bridge, Class 55, was constructed to replace an AVLB on the Firestone Trail.

During the early morning attack of 19 June, the 3rd Platoon suffered two KIA and twelve WIA out of the twenty-six men involved. This was due to their occupation of that portion of the perimeter bearing the brunt of the ground attack. All platoon vehicles received light or moderate damage with one vehicle alone taking sixty-three rounds of small arms and one 90mm round. Due to casualties and equipment damage, the 2nd Platoon relieved the 3rd Platoon on the 20th of June and continued support throughout the remainder of the operation. In support of the 35th ARVN Ranger Battalion.
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a demolition team from the 2nd Platoon was airlifted in on the 16th and 17th of June by OH-23Ds.s. Thorough search was the destruction of one extensive VC base camp consisting
of over 175 bunkers with overhead cover and a connecting trench network. While involved with this mission, thirty-eight mortar rounds, three claymore mines and miscellaneous small arms ammunition were found and destroyed.

d. Chemical. No chemical munitions or riot control agents were employed during the operation.

e. Army Aviation.

(1) General: The Regimental Air Cavalry Troop and Regimental Headquarters Aviation Section supported the operation with thirteen OH-23's; twelve UH-1D's; and nineteen UH-1C's. The OH-23's were flown a total of 552 hours, consumed 9,384 gallons of 115/145 fuel and transported 1,022 passengers. The UH-1C armed helicopters flew 633 hours, consumed 37,950 gallons of JP-4 fuel; fired 285,200 rounds 7.62mm, 966 rounds 2.75" and 1,073 rounds 10mm. Two structures were destroyed. The UH-1D helicopters were flown 421 hours, consumed 25,620 gallons of JP-4 fuel, transported 856 passengers, and carried 6.8 tons of cargo (1.5 tons a day).

(2) Employment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF SORTIES</th>
<th>Command &amp; Control</th>
<th>Reconnaissance</th>
<th>Aerial Support &amp; Reaction Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-23</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>152</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Lift</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cargo Lift</td>
<td>Casualty Evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total of 2,055 sorties flown in support of the operation.

(3) Techniques:

Proven concepts were employed during this operation with no significant changes.

(4) Maintenance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On Hand</th>
<th>Available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-23</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1C</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Low availability of OH-23's is due to a continuous loss of generators, and excessive time for arrival of replacement parts.

f. Air Force. Preliminary coordination was made with the 9th Infantry Division TACP's. Since only two OH-1 aircraft are available to the regiment, considerable scheduling difficulties were encountered; however the 9th Infantry Division did supplement the TAC resources of the regiment. In most instances the Blackhorse FAC were able to meet all of their commitments without requiring outside assistance. The TACP remained with the regimental TAC at LONG GIAO. No communication difficulties between the 3rd Squadron and the TACP were experienced; however much more efficient and responsive FAC service could have been provided if the 3rd Squadron would have operated within the FM radio capability of the OH-1 aircraft. Under the present setup, if the 3rd Squadron desires FAC assistance they must switch to the FAC frequency. No problem exists in this vein, however if the FAC desires to contact the
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3rd Squadron and inform them of any targets or pending dangers he is not able to do so because of frequency limitations on FAC radios. The near proximity of this operation to LONG GIAO did not require continuous airborne FAC coverage during daylight hours. Full FAC coverage was provided by a combination of strip alert at LONG GIAO and airborne FAC aircraft.

FAC and tactical fighter/bomber sorties flown in support of the 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during Operation AKRON were as follows:

(1) Total O-1 Sorties - 90
   (a) Forward Air Control - 28 (72:35 hours)
   (b) Convoy Escort - 42 (100:55 hours)
   (c) Visual Reconnaissance - 18 (28:40 hours)
   (d) Maintenance - 2 (0:55 hours)

(2) Fighter/Bomber Support
   (a) Total strike aircraft missions - 43
   (b) Total strike aircraft sorties - 100
   (c) Immediate missions - 7 (10 sorties)
   (d) Preplanned missions - 36 (90 sorties)

(3) Size and Composition of Forces:
   (a) Immediate Missions - by flight:
      2 AH-1W 12MK - 81
      1 AC-47 21,000 7.62mm / 45 Flares
      1 AC-47 / 50 Flares
      1 AC-47 20,000 7.62mm / 30 Flares
      1 AC-47 / 20 Flares
      2 F-5 12MK - 82
      2 F-100 6MK - 82 / 1200 20mm
   (b) Preplanned missions - by flight:
      2 F-100 8 MK-82 / 1600 20mm
      3 F-100 6 MK-82 / 6 750 NAP
      3 F-100 8 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 1600 20mm
      2 F-100 4 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 1600 20mm
      *2 F-100 4 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 1500 20mm
      2 F-100 4 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP
      3 F-4C 12 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 2400 20mm
      3 F-4C 12 MK-62 / 4 750 NAP / 3600 20mm
      *2 F-100 Ordnance Expended: UNKNOWN
      *1 B-37 3 MK-65
      2 F-100 4 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 400 20mm
      2 F-100 8 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 2 LBU-3
      3 F-100 12 MK-82
      2 F-100 4 MK-82 / 2 750 NAP / 2 LBU-3
      3 F-100 5 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 2 LBU-3 / 2400 20mm
      3 F-100 8 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP
      2 F-100 6 MK-116 / 2 750 NAP
      3 F-100 6 MK-117 / 6 750 NAP
      4 F-4C 12 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 4 LBU-3 / 4400 20mm
      3 F-100 8 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 1600 20mm

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(a) Employment and Results: All but four missions flown in support of the 3rd Squadron were executed by Blackhorse FAC. Increasing inclement weather necessitated the use of low level delivered ordnance; e.g., MK-82 high frag, napalm, and 20mm. Although the MK-82 bomb (500#) is not as effective as the M-117 (750#) bomb, the tactical aircraft were able to deliver much more ordnance on targets in weather which would have been prohibitive to the larger type ordnance. The bomb damage assessment (BDA) indicates that more reliable intelligence is still badly needed.

(a) Recap of ordnance delivered,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MK-65</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>BOMBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-117</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>BOMBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-82</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>20mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-81</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>BOMBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLU-3 or BLU-27</td>
<td>750# NAP</td>
<td>BOMBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAU-3 RX PODS</td>
<td>19 RX/POD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flares</td>
<td>149</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20mm Rounds</td>
<td>25,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm Rounds</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Bomb damage assessment (post strike mission report).

KBA - Confirmed - 17 / possible - 22
Bunkers or foxholes destroyed, damaged or uncovered - 6
Trenches destroyed, damaged or uncovered - 190
Secondary fires - 10
Trails uncovered - 400 meters

g. Civic Action / Psychological Warfare.

(1) Civic Action: During Operation ALEXON, the 3rd Squadron conducted MEDCAPS at CAM MY (TS 662915) and AP HOUNG SA (TS 682810). A total of 134 patients were treated. In addition, using commodities provided by the regiment, the 3rd Squadron donated 1,200 lbs of rice, 952 lbs of powdered milk, 72 gallons of cooking oil, 700 lbs of corn meal, 1200 lbs of rolled wheat, 900 lbs of bulgur wheat and 50 lbs of assorted candy to needy people in the CAM MY area. With voluntary contributions from members of the 3rd Squadron, a television set was purchased and donated to the people of CAM MY. A television antenna was also provided and erected by the 3rd Squadron.
(2) PSYOPS activities: PSYOPS support to the operation consisted of a total of twelve loudspeaker - leaflet missions during which 1,388,000 leaflets were dropped. Eight types of leaflets were dropped. A total of twelve special tapes were used during 8 hours and 10 minutes of speaker time. The basic themes of the tapes included curfew instructions, rally instructions, warnings to the VC that they would be defeated, exploitation of VC homesickness, and the publicising of the 969 Reward for Information Program.

(3) Observations: The good will generated by the active CA/PSYOP program during Operation AKRON was clearly demonstrated by a farewell banquet held by the people of CAM MY for the commander and staff of the 3rd Squadron shortly after the conclusion of AKRON. The squadron S-3, who directed much of the CA/PSYOP operations in the operational area, received special recognition by the people.

7. (c) INTELLIGENCE.

a. Anticipated enemy situation:

(1) At present, no major VC Main Force units are known to be occupying the area of operations. Elements of the 84th Rear Service Group and local units can be expected to be encountered throughout the area of operations and to oppose our movement with sniping, mines, and limited defensive action, especially in the area of stores and caches. Main force units could reoccupy the area without warning prior to our movement into the area of operations. All likely avenues of approach for armored vehicles, to include main roads, are expected to be mined. 5th VC Division can be expected to counter-sweep, either by striking forward bases in the area of operations, or by attacking friendly installations or convoys outside the area of operations.

(b) Order of Battle:

(a) Composition and disposition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th Div HQ</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Y56004</td>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>A-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Div PEO CP</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Y56392</td>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>A-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/274th Regt (-)</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>Y56479</td>
<td>3 Jun</td>
<td>A-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/275th</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Y5704</td>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>F-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275th Regt (1?)</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>Unloc vce Y56293</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/274th (1?)</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>Unloc</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prob w/5th Div HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th Rear Svc Cp</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>Y54784</td>
<td>6 Apr</td>
<td>C-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D445 LF Bn (-)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Y54660</td>
<td>28 May</td>
<td>F-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3/0445</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Unloc vce Y52677</td>
<td></td>
<td>F-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C200 LF Co</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Y52890</td>
<td>22 May</td>
<td>F-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C20 LF Co</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unloc vce Y54004</td>
<td></td>
<td>CHU DUC Dist Co</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Strength:

1. Committed Forces: Within the area of operations, elements of Group 84, the C20 LF Company, the C200 LF Company, and C3/0445 must be considered immediately available for employment. It is also possible that an NVA replacement unit of up to battalion size could be encountered on its way through the area to reinforce the 5th VC Division.

2. Reinforcements: The 5th VC Division, with the 274th and 275th Regiments, can be committed in the eastern portion of the area of operations within 24 hours after commencing movement. It is also possible that the 274th could reoccupy its old bases in the HAT DICH prior to the initiation of Operation AKRON. If the multiplicity of agent reports of NVA regiments and battalions have
any foundation, it is possible that an NVA battalion or regiment could also be committed within 24 hours. However, no NVA regiments are believed to be in the 5th Division area, although a battalion size nucleus for the yet to be formed third regiment may be present. In addition to known 5th Division elements, the DiCo 1F battalion (-) could move into the area of operation in 24 to 48 hours.

2. Personnel: The 5th Division is at about 60% strength overall. This is mainly due to the lack of a third regiment. However, both remaining regiments are understrength. The 277th, the stronger of the two, has about 65% of the TOE strength of 2500. The 278th is considerably lower, probably around 50% TOE strength. The major local force unit in the area of interest, the DiCo 1F battalion of PHOC TOF Province, is well up to strength with approximately 1000 men.

3. Equipment: The Soviet-CHICOM family of weapons is now found throughout the 5th Division. No rockets or heavy mortars have been confirmed, although the 95th AN Group reportedly has two 120mm mortars. A pallier report of one quad-mounted 12.7mm VBO within the division has not yet been confirmed. A minor chemical capability does exist in that un-packed flamethrowers are found in a chemical platoon under division control. One such weapon was captured from 2/275 in March.

4. Tactics: From prior experience during prior into the II I7 DIVISH area, the VC can be expected to use their base camps by the extensive use of mines, sniping and RPG-7s. The main force unit encountered can be expected to rely on prepared positions, using mortars and recoilless rifles, in addition to their normal complement of AT and automatic weapons. The 5th Division can be expected to counter-attack by either mounting diversionary attacks elsewhere or attacking the operational forces directly. Such attacks would normally be targeted against base camps, forward command posts or resupply convoys. A mortar/recoilless rifle attack can be considered the minimum to be expected with the possibility of a ground attack or ambush always present. The terrain along Interprovincial Route 2 and the covered approaches provide ample opportunity for employment of 5th Division forces.

5. Training: As shown by the contacts the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment has had with VC main force units, especially the 21 May ambush, the individual VC is a well trained, competent leader, professional soldier. The recent influx of NVA units and fillers will further increase the already high state of training in the 5th VC Division.

6. Logistics: Resupply of the 5th VC Division units is handled by the 86th Hear Service Group which operates throughout the area of operation as well as to the MV TAC mountain area. Services provided by the group include quarter-master, transportation, ordnance, medical, production and finance. The main east-west supply route crosses Interprovincial Route 2 in the TAI (10750), XI BUNG, Slope 30 area (X:585).

7. Combat efficiency: The 5th Division's efficiency as a division is questionable due to the lack of a third regiment and insufficient personnel in the other two regiments. The 277th in particular has a poor recent record. Although it has still mounted battalion (-) operations such as G.O.M. on 6 May (250/552). In the 10 G.O.M. (255155) of 20 March, the second battalion was reported to have been reduced to less than 100 men, and a result disastrous. If this is true, the combat effectiveness of the 275 Regiment is about that of a full strength battalion. The 278th Regiment, although less than full strength, is still an effective fighting force. It has a fine combat record, even against the 275th. The 278th can be expected to put up strong resistance if engaged. The combat effectiveness of the local force units is generally unknown except for the DiCo 1F which is rated as fully combat effective.

1. Actual enemy situation:

   The intelligence estimate prepared for Operation 10 is wrong to be correct. Well prepared fortifications, small bases and numerous bunkers, trench and foxholes were found during the operation. In the north, contact with the VC were limited to small unit actions. The most significant element occurred in the morning of 19 June at CIL542 when the 3rd Platoon was ambushed by a Tropic...
3rd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company, located vicinity Y6AL7825 sustained an intensive ground attack from an estimated reinforced VC battalion. The VC did not attempt to overrun the perimeter, but fired into it with small arms, machine guns, mortars, 57mm and 75mm recoiless rifles, M-79 grenade launchers and heavy machineguns. Fire was returned with all organic weapons to include mortars and artillery, and LFT's and Air Force Flare ships provided suppressive fires. The VC broke contact with the perimeter at 0200H and as they withdrew to the west they overran a K Troop patrol, vicinity Y6AL7833 resulting in six US KHA from the patrol. Six VC bodies and numerous abandoned weapons were found near the patrol. During the attack, the M Company perimeter received an estimated eight rounds of mortar fire, vicinity Y6AL5850. At first light, a search revealed forty-five VC bodies around the command post. Additional bodies were found east of Interprovincial Route 2 along the withdrawal route of the attacking VC force. A detailed study of the numerous documents found in the battle area indicate that the attack was probably mounted by the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, with at least the 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion and divisional artillery elements supporting. VC losses were fifty-six KIA (BC), two PW (WIA); one M-79 grenade launcher, one SKS carbine, four AK-47 assault rifles, five RPG-2 rocket launchers, one Type 50 SMG, one Type 56 CHICOM carbine, one M1 carbine, two BAR's, two Type 52 carbines, forty-two hand grenades and a large amount of ammunition captured.

v. Sources of information:

Various sources of information were utilized before and during Operation AKRON to collect information of Viet Cong activities. Preliminary estimates were prepared from Viet Cong installation lists, SPAR and other agent reports, Periodic Intelligence Reports (II FORCES V), terrain studies, climatic weather studies and reports received through Vietnamese Intelligence channels. Daily intelligence was obtained from interrogation reports and both ground and aerial surveillance and reconnaissance activities. Reconnaissance operations were supplemented by night vision devices. Captured enemy documents and other material were also helpful in providing information of the VC situation.

8. (C) MISSION.

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) was to conduct reconnaissance and search and destroy operations to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations, and to be prepared to provide security for engineer work forces in sector.

9. (C) CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION.

a. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) conducts operation in two phases, utilizing two armored cavalry squadrons and available ARVN forces.

b. Phase I. 3rd Squadron conducts reconnaissance and search and destroy operations in coordination and cooperation with the 35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) along Interprovincial Route 2 and in AO BOOT and AO SADDLE.

c. Phase II. Secures engineer clearing of Blackstone and Firestone Trails east of N-S grid line 37; continues reconnaissance and search and destroy operations in TACOR.

d. 1st Squadron continues Operation KITTY HAWK with security of the base camp and GIA RAY rock quarry and conducts ROAD RUNNER operations along National Highway 1; prepared to react with troop size reinforcement and prepare to secure engineer work parties along the Blackstone Trail east of N-S grid line 37.

10. (C) EXECUTION.

7 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK, securing the base camp and GIA RAY Rock Quarry, and conducting ROAD RUNNER operations between LONG BUNK, GIA RAY, and the base camp.

3rd Squadron. Initiated Operation AKRON at 0600H with Troop K clearing Interprovincial Route 2 to vicinity Y6AL5800, Troop J and K and Company M attacked to seize objectives 1 (Y83987) and C (Y83986) (See Annex B). Upon seizure of objectives...
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maneuver elements initiated search and destroy operations in AO SADDLE (See annex 3). No contact was made; squadron command post received one round sniper fire vicinity YS38186 resulting in negative casualties.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued to support operations, providing light fire team cover.

10 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued search and destroy operations in AO SADDLE to seize Objectives B (YS3785) and D (YS3985). Troop I located one VC KIA (T) vicinity YS42881; captured one M-36 bolt action rifle vicinity YS43881. Troop D located and destroyed a base camp containing 105 bunkers vicinity YS38489. Troop L destroyed a base camp containing twenty bunkers vicinity YS37987 at 1305H. At 1318H the troop destroyed a trench bunker complex 100 meters long with 100 bunkers vicinity YS37789.

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Received direct support at 1000H and moved by foot into AO BOOT at 1145H.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations.

11 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued search and destroy operations in AO SADDLE. Troop K evacuated six tons (100 lb bags) of polished rice and 1,600 pounds of salt vicinity YS38885 at 0830H. Company M captured one detainee vicinity YS437865 with Claymore grenade at 0930H; at 1255H evacuated 2,750 pounds polished rice vicinity YS453865. Destroyed thirty bunkers vicinity YS423865 at 1500H.

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Continued operations in AO BOOT without incident.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations.

12 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued search and destroy operations in AO SADDLE. Troop L engaged and killed one VC vicinity YS36885 at 1600H; at 1600H in ACV received RPG-2 fire resulting in moderate damage, one VC KIA, three US WIA, and one National Policeman WIA. Artillery supported with unknown results. At 1600H vicinity YS42884, received two rifle grenades and operated small arms fire with negative results. Troop K destroyed base camp containing twenty bunkers vicinity YS37485 at 1700H; destroyed thirty-seven bunkers vicinity YS36884. Company M evacuated 1.5 tons polished rice and destroyed forty-five fortifications vicinity YS243050. At 1900H an ACV hit a mine vicinity YS403050 leaving a crater 2x2x6 feet long and resulting in damage to the suspension system; four VC KIA; engaged one VC with unknown results.

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Continued operations in AO BOOT. Located a base camp vicinity YS377885 in 1420H consisting of thirty bunkers, thirty mortars rounds, 2,500 rounds of small arms, fifty rounds MG, 20 1 lb TNT, twenty-two mortar fuses, and twenty non-electric blasting caps.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations.

13 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued operations in AO SADDLE. Troop D destroyed bunkers consisting of twenty bunkers, three kitchen huts; captured a Uzi submachine gun, two CHICOM grenades, and one rifle vicinity YS43884. Troop L destroyed base camp vicinity YS423865.
taining twenty-three military structures.

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Continued search of base camp located 12 June vicinity YS428853. Destroyed additional ninety bunkers and six 82mm mortars.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations. LRP engaged and killed one VC (RO) vicinity YS429963 at 1230H, captured one M99 with seven rounds, one claymore, one US web-belt, one US knife and one US canteen.

14 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK. Troop C secured Engineer Rome Flow parties in zone along the Blackstone Trail.

3rd Squadron. Continued search and destroy operations in AO SADDLE and conducted Eagle Flights. Troop I at 0800H, uncovered a bunker complex containing twelve foot bunkers, one medical hut with syringe, one hand grenade, one canteen, and nine flashlight batteries. vicinity YS428853. The bunkers were destroyed and all equipment and supplies were evacuated. At 0930H, Troop K found one bunker and two tunnels containing cooking pots and clothing vicinity YS438884. Emplacements were destroyed. At 1430H, 2.2 tons of rice (YS488883) was uncovered and evacuated.

3rd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company. Located, vicinity YS458834, one M1A1 mine and destroyed it in place.

15 June

1st Squadron (-). Continued Operation KITTY HAWK. Troop B continued security of Engineer Rome Flow parties along the Blackstone Trail.

3rd Squadron. Continued operations in AO SADDLE. Command post received ten rounds of small arms fire vicinity YS447837 at 0833H; there were no casualties. Troop K destroyed a base camp containing thirty-three bunkers and three CBU vicinity YS456825 at 1235H. A tank with Troop L sustained minor damage from an antitank mine vicinity YS438850 at 0823H; there were no casualties.

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Moved overland from AO BOOM to vicinity YS440835.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations.

16 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK and security of Rome Flow parties along the Blackstone Trail.

3rd Squadron. Continued operations in AO SADDLE and conducted Eagle Flights in area without achieving significant contact. Troop K found and destroyed fifteen bunkers vicinity YS468883. One bunker contained one VC gas mask made from a plastic bag and bloody rags.

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Conducted operations in AO RANGER (See Annex C) without contact.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations.

17 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued operations in AO SADDLE and RANGER without contact. Troop I conducted search and destroy operations in area 38 (See Annex D). At 1235H, the troop destroyed fifteen bunkers, fifteen CBU's and three pounds of clothing vicinity YS430800. Troop K destroyed ten bunkers vicinity YS448826. At 1435H one CBU was found and destroyed vicinity YS448826. Two long range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP) inserted into AO MIKE (See Annex E) at 0900H.

15th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Continued operations in AO RANGER without contact.
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Air Cavalry Troop, Continued support of operations. LRRP were inserted into AO MIKE at 0900H; one patrol engaged seven VC vicinity Y347836 resulting in five VC KIA (BC) at 1745H. Both patrols were extracted without incident.

18 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation "KITTY HAWK.

2nd Squadron. Continued operations conducting search and destroy operations in AO SADDLE and MIKE. Attacked engineer platoon developed stream crossings in area 40. Command post displaced to YSLK8826, closing at 1430H. Troop I searched in area 38 and at 1805H destroyed a GNP bunker rigged with a claymore vicinity YSLK3824. At 1010H destroyed two well fortified bunkers, 300 meters of trench and one machine gun (YSLK8012). Troop L conducted search and destroy activities in area 33. At 0815H, elements of the troop located an abandoned village vicinity YSLK50813 which appeared to have been occupied the previous night. At 0920H, found abandoned village (YSLK52815 with markings indicating the area was booby-trapped and mined. Six foxholes and five L-shaped mortar emplacements were also located in the same area. At 1545H, elements of the troop found a battalion sized assembly area including fresh foxholes, footpaths and VC leaflets.

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Continued operations in AO RANGER.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations.

19 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation "KITTY HAWK.

2nd Squadron. Continued operations conducting search and destroy operations in AO SADDLE and MIKE. At 0115H, elements of the 1st Battalion, 276th VC Regiment launched a mortar, recoilless rifle and ground attack against the command post defended by Troop L. Light fire teams, artillery, and flareships supported with contact broken at 0210H. VC losses were fifty-six VC KIA (BC), two PK, twelve driven munitions, thirteen weapons, five RPG-2 launchers, assorted types of grenades, recoilless rifle rounds and small arms ammunition captured; US losses were nine KIA, thirty-two WIA, one AVLB and six ACV's damaged. The battalion (-) conducted sweep of the area west of Interprovincial Route 2 without contact. (See Annex H for details account of the attack and subsequent actions initiated by the reaction force.)

35th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Was extracted from vicinity YSLK8826 by CH-47, extraction completed 1005H.

2nd Squadron. 5th Cavalry (-). Became OPCON to the regiment at 0854H and assisted in sweep operations south of the Courtenay Rubber Plantation. At 1440H, Troop L engaged unknown number of VC vicinity YS12884, artillery, light fire teams, and air strikes supported with unknown results. There were two PK, one AVLB damaged. At 1520H Troop C found eight bodies (VC KIA (BC) in fresh graves. Bodies and graves less than 12 hours old, killed by small arms and fragments vicinity YS178846.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations and 3rd Squadron engagement with elements of 276th VC Regiment.

20 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation "KITTY HAWK.

2nd Squadron. Continued operations in AO SADDLE conducting saturation patrols in area 40 without contact.

3rd Squadron. 5th Cavalry (-). Continued search and destroy operations south of the Courtenay Plantation without contact. At 1514H, elements of the squadron uncovered a large camp 100x200 meters with bunkers. Air strikes were employed against the camp producing five secondary brush fires. Returned to 9th Infantry Division control at 1700H.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations, conducting surveillance of the area of operations and provided light fire team support for the squadron.
21 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued operations in AO SADDLE. At 1034H, 3rd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company received three rounds sniper fire vicinity YS459905; the area was searched with negative results.

52nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Became direct support to the regiment at 0724H and moved south from the base camp to AO LION (See Annex F).

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations.

22 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron (-). Continued operations in AO SADDLE. Troop I conducted cordon and search of LANG LOM vicinity YS455835 without incident, Troop J provided direct support for the 52nd Ranger Battalion in AO LION. Troop K provided security to the 919th Engineer Company moving parties along the Firestone Trail.

52nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Conducted search and destroy operations in AO LION with Troop K providing direct support. Battery B, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery provided supporting fires from vicinity CAM MY.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations and provided three Eagle Flights to 3rd Squadron. At 1900H found 1 lb of documents and 5 lbs of medical supplies; destroyed structure vicinity YS458990.

23 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron (-). Continued operations in AO SADDLE. Troop I conducted cordon and search and MEDCAP vicinity XA BONG (Y5467858); treated eighty patients. Troop K continued direct support of 52nd Ranger Battalion. Troop L continued security of engineer work parties. Company M destroyed 300 meters of trench and seventy-five reinforced bunkers vicinity YS368838 at 1130H.

52nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Continued operations in AO LION without contact.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations; provided three Eagle Flights to 3rd Squadron.

24 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron (-). Continued operations in AO SADDLE; conducted MEDCAP at CAM MY treating 120 patients. Troop K continued direct support to 52nd Ranger Battalion. Troop L continued security of engineer work parties along Firestone Trail. Company M located base camp consisting of 1200 meters of trenches and seventy-five reinforced bunkers vicinity YS488990 at 1000H. 3rd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company conducted mine sweeping operations along Interprovincial Route 2; located and destroyed nine mines vicinity YS458996.

52nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Continued operations in AO LION with Troop K. At 0913H, 3400 pounds of cement and seven gallons of cooking oil at YS515335 were found and evacuated.

25 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK.

3rd Squadron. Continued search and destroy, cordon and search, MEDCAP, mine sweeping and saturation patrolling in AO SADDLE. Troop I conducted search and destroy operations in Areas 19, 24, and 13 (See Annex C). At 1130H, fourteen detainees were evacuated to 900TH district headquarters from the area of YS5457839 and YS4559097. Troop J secured pickup zone (PD) for extraction of 52nd Ranger Battalion and conducted
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Worden and search of AP HUONG SA (YSL83812). Apprehended three male detainees who were evacuated to DUong THAN and conducted a MEDIC treating fifty patients. Troop L continued security of base work parties along the Firestone Trail. Company N completed destruction of base camp found on 21 June. At 0740H the troop found and destroyed a US hand grenade rigged for immediate detonation when the pin was removed vicinity YS42587.

2nd Platoon, 2/10th Engineering Company. Swept Interprovincial Route 2 for mines south from YS455896. At 1630H, two antitank mines were located (YS442667) and destroyed. One was an RPO-2 rigged as a mine.

52nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Was extracted by CH-47 from PZ vicinity YS525840; extraction completed at 1120H.

Air Cavalry Troop. Continued support of operations.

27 June

1st Squadron. Continued Operation KITTY HAWK. At 1917H, the squadron (-) moved to reinforce the 18th Infantry Division (ARVN) in contact with the 3rd Battalion, 75th VC Regiment vicinity AP PHU CAI (YT3231).

3rd Squadron. Continued operations in AO SADDLE. Commenced extraction from operational area. Troop L was relieved of security for engineer work parties along the Firestone Trail at 0700H by elements of the 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry (Mech). All elements closed the base camp at 1653H.

II. (C) RESULTS.

a. Enemy Losses:

(1) Personnel:

65 VC KIA (RC), 3 NV, 1 NOI CHANH, 51 Detainees.

(2) Fortifications and buildings:

44 military structures and 661 fortifications destroyed.

(3) Material (captured and destroyed):

20 small arms weapons, 12,335 small arms rounds, 20 lbs TNT captured, 124 artillery rounds, 13 mines, and 56 grenades destroyed.

(4) Foodstuffs:

14.3 tons rice, 0.8 tons salt, and 7 gallons cooking oil.

(5) Miscellaneous:

5 lbs documents, 5 lbs medical supplies, 2 bicycles, 1.7 tons of cement.

b. Friendly Losses:

(1) Personnel:

10 KIA, 52 WIA.

(2) Material:

1 AVLB, 1 M60A3, 7 ACAV's damaged.

c. Followup action by friendly ground forces continues to be hampered by the difficulty of cross country movement. When a target area is reasonably accessible immediate reaction is initiated; however the percentage still remains relatively low.
12. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.

a. Logistics.

(1) Resupply.

(a) Method of Operation.

During Operation AKRON, the regiment was under the operational control of the 9th Infantry Division and received logistical support from the Blackhorse Base Camp (LONG GIAO) supply facilities. The 3rd Squadron with attached units was the principal recipient of the support. The 551st Light Maintenance Company and the 506th Supply and Service Company which are located in the base camp and the 3rd Ordnance Battalion, Class V point at LONG BINH, provided the support for the operation through the base camp facilities. Resupply to the forward areas was accomplished by the use of CH-47 and UH-1D helicopters while wheeled vehicles moved the items from the depots to the base camp.

The squadron trains remained at LONG GIAO; wheeled vehicles were dispatched to pick-up Class I - IV supplies and repair parts from the 506th Supply and Service Company and the 551st Light Maintenance Company respectively for transportation to the squadron trains area. At this point they were prepared for aerial movement (sling loaded) to the forward area on CH-47 helicopters. Class V supplies were moved overland from LONG BINH to LONG GIAO by organic 5 ton trucks and trucks from the 709th Transportation Battalion.

(b) Consumption data (transported by CH-47).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Class III (gal)</th>
<th>Class V (lbs)</th>
<th>Class I (C Rations)</th>
<th>Water (gal)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HRT</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2860</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>308 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trp I</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7400</td>
<td>34600</td>
<td>282 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trp K</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9790</td>
<td>34250</td>
<td>463 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trp L</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9180</td>
<td>49300</td>
<td>390 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co N</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12890</td>
<td>25525</td>
<td>365 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Btry</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1353</td>
<td>206500</td>
<td>26 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mort Btry</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>141000</td>
<td>98 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-7-9 Arty</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals 43605 gallons 334925 lbs 1932 cases 36800 gallons (217.41 tons)

(2) Maintenance: Operation AKRON continued to show the value of logistical support by air. As in other operations repair parts were airlifted to field locations. Major assemblies were also moved the same way accompanied by maintenance contact teams. Major assemblies replaced during the operation included two N46A3 engines, three M8A3 transmissions, five M30A3 final drives and three M13 final drives. A total of six M6A3 tanks were deadlined for major components and all but two were repaired within 36 hours in the field. The remaining two were evacuated to the 551st Light Maintenance Company at the base camp for 3rd echelon repairs. Eleven armored personal carriers (M113) were deadlined during the operation; two of them were evacuated to the 551st Light Maintenance Company for repair.

(3) Treatment and evacuation of casualties: Casualties incurred during Operation AKRON were light with the vast majority of them occurring on 19 June as the result of the VC attack on the 3rd Squadron Command Post. Backup medical support for the squadron was provided by the 24th and 93rd Evacuation Hospitals in LONG BINH and the 7th Surgical Hospital and 37th Medical Company in the base camp.

b. Communications: Operation AKRON was unique to the regiment, in that the regimental headquarters remained in the base camp and thus was able to take advantage of all base camp communications facilities.

(1) Preliminary Plans: Very little preplanning was necessary as the regiment had already received VHF and communications center support from the 9th Signal Battalion, 9th Infantry Division. In addition, communications had been previously established in the 9th Division FM and AN radio nets.

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(2) Communications to higher headquarters:

(a) FM - Prior to the beginning of Operation AKRON the regiment was already operating in the 9th Infantry Division CG Command Net and the Intelligence Net, with no difficulties encountered.

(b) AM - The regiment entered the Division Operations/Intelligence AM RATT Net prior to Operation AKRON, therefore traffic was already being passed before the operation commenced.

(3) Communications from the base camp: Since the regimental command post did not displace from the base camp, normal base camp facilities were fully utilized. Continuous radio contact was maintained with the operating squadron, plus attached units, throughout the operation.

(4) Radio nets and telephone-teletype circuits utilized:

(a) Radio Nets:

1. FM - Normal regimental FM nets were employed as well as entry into the 9th Infantry Division net (see Appendix 1 to Annex I).

2. AM-AM RATT - contact was maintained in the 9th Division Operations/Intelligence Net (see Appendix 2 to Annex I).

(b) Telephone Circuits:

1. Common User - Normal base camp common user circuits were maintained and utilized. In addition, common user circuits were established to the Reliable Main switchboard (see Appendix 3 to Annex I).

2. Sole User - Sole user telephone circuits were established between the regimental TOC and the 9th Division TOC, 0-3 Air/3-3 Air, and an Artillery Coordination circuit. In addition, a sole user circuit from the regimental TOC to the 1st Australian Task Force TOC was re-established (see Appendix 3 to Annex I).

(c) Teletypewriter Circuits: The normal base camp teletypewriter circuit was utilized for everyday administrative and logistic traffic. A separate tactical teletypewriter circuit was established between the regimental command post and the 9th Division, providing a quick reaction, secure, page copy capability.

d. Administration:

(1) General. The administrative plan utilized during Operation AKRON was essentially the same as when search and destroy operations are conducted by the squadrons in the regiment's TAOR. Since regimental headquarters remained in base camp no necessity existed for administrative personnel to move to a field location. No administrative difficulties developed during the operation.

(2) Casualties:

US Losses:

Killed by Hostile Action 10
Wounded by Hostile Action 52
Missing by Hostile Action 0
Non Battle Dead 0
Non Battle Injured 0

(3) Personnel Services:

(a) Religious. Such services were conducted with a total attendance of 89% for personnel of all faiths.

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b) Special Services. No special services activities were conducted in the field.

c) Post Exchange. Post exchange facilities were not available to units involved in the operation. Existing base camp facilities were available and utilized when the situation permitted.

15. (C) COMMANDER’S ANALYSIS.

Operation AKRON, as did Operations JUNCTION CITY I and MANHATTAN, proved to be a successful operation not only from the standpoint of casualties inflicted on the enemy, but also the number of base areas denied him. For the first time, the enemy chose to engage armored cavalry forces of the 3rd Squadron in a night attack; otherwise, the enemy fought limited engagements. The attack upon the 3rd Squadron Command Post on the morning of 19 June was successfully defended by Troop K and 3rd Platoon, 95th Engineer Company with few casualties; five of the nine KHA were sustained as the Viet Cong withdrew and overran a ten man ambush patrol. Casualties along the perimeter were minimal due to the armor protection, despite massive fires from enemy mortars, recoilless rifles, RPG-2’s, and heavy machine guns.

The base area denial effort was accomplished with minimal delay; the extensive use of engineer support to develop landing zones and lines of communication through the jungle made the enemy aware that his bases safe havens were in jeopardy. For future operations, however, it is quite apparent that the VC will seed the trails with mines. These mines will not stop armored cavalry forces, but will require tedious mine sweeping operations, thus enabling the enemy to escape through hidden jungle trails. In order to complete base area denial, jungle clearing operations must be intensified to compartmentalize the jungle into pockets of four to six kilometers square. When enemy battalions are being pursued, they are forced into an area that is clearly defined; attempts to flee across jungle fire trails can be easily observed and interdicted by close air and gunship support.

15. (C) LESSONS LEARNED:

(a) Item: Mutually supporting artillery.

Discussion: The enemy has repeatedly directed massive ground attacks against command posts and fire support patrol bases.

Observation: Fire support patrol bases should be within mutual supporting range of 105mm or 155mm artillery.

(b) Item: Protective cover at night defensive positions.

Discussion: During mortar or ground attacks, a large number of casualties are sustained due to failure to utilize existing protective cover.

Observation: Armor vehicle protection should be utilized while sleeping. At a minimum, sleeping areas should have berms level with individual sleeping; overhead protection is desired.

(c) Item: Ambush patrol and listening post briefing.

Discussion: During the attack on 19 June, ambush patrols were cut-off by the enemy and pinned down by enemy and friendly fire.

Observation: Patrols and listening posts should be briefed prior to their departure on alternate positions, routes of withdrawal, and actions to be taken if the parent unit comes under attack.

(d) Item: Employment of Seismic Anti-Intrusion Devices.

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During the attack on 19 June the anti-intrusion devices did not provide early warning of the impending attack. The national pick-up transducers were employed at a range of 100 meters from the perimeter, however, the enemy attack was initiated from a range of 150 meters.

Consideration must be given to terrain, weather and the potential enemy threat in order to properly employ the national pick-up transducers. It should be placed at a sufficient range to pick up movement before an enemy attack begins. It must, therefore, be beyond the point at which the enemy would launch an attack.

(a) Item: Eagle Flight.

Discussion: Eagle Flights consisting of an airmobile squad in two UH-1D aircraft escorted by a light fire team were employed in open areas to apprehend suspicious personnel by moving in rapidly and capturing civilians for immediate interrogation by National Police who accompany the airmobile squad.

Observation: This tactic has proven valuable and has produced a considerable amount of enemy intelligence. If the Eagle Flights are used frequently they can effectively deny the enemy use of open areas in the daylight hours and harass their supply and communications activities.

(f) Item: Tactical airdrops.

Discussion: Prisoners of war and Ho Chanh's have stated that tactical airdrops are relatively ineffective due to the amount of time the FAC normally spends over the target prior to a strike. The VC are usually able to clear a strike area before the first bombs are dropped.

Observation: Airdrop effectiveness can be improved by:

1. Reducing the target identification time by marking the target with artillery when the fighters are ready to start the strike.

2. Employ "Dry Run" airdrops on an extensive basis, by having a FAC go through pre-strike maneuvers to include marking a target, but not bringing in an actual strike. This would confuse the enemy as to when an airdrop would actually take place and also harass him considerably, since he moves whenever a FAC circles an area in preparation for a strike.

ANNEX A and APPENDIX 3 to ANNEX 1 withdrawn. HQ, DA

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SPURD 11-67 (Opn AXON) 3-11 Armrd Cav Regt - Reference maps, VIST-43000
1:50,000; Series I/40K, Sheets 61301, II, III, 61302, II, III, IV.

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OPORD 11-67 (Operation AARON) 3-11 Arm Cav Regt - Reference maps, VIETNAM 1:50,000;
Series L7013, Sheets 6330 I, II, III; 6430 I, II, III, IV.

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ANNEX D

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ANNEX E CONFIDENTIAL
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OPORD 11467 (Operation AHNOM) 3-11 Arm Cav Regt - Reference maps, VIETNAM 1:50,000
Series 7530I, Sheets 65301, II, III; 6630 I, II, III, IV.
On 19 June 1967, the 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, defeated a major Viet Cong force composed of two infantry battalions of the 274th Main Force Regiment, reinforced by heavy weapons elements from the regiment and the 5th Viet Cong Division. The enemy had attacked elements of the squadron near SLOPE 30 Hamlet, located 30 kilometers west of Saigon.

SLOPE 30 Hamlet has long been a bastion of Viet Cong domination in northern PHOUC TUY Province. It sits astride Interprovincial Route 2, the last line of communication available to the Viet Cong between the H.T DICH Secret Zone to the west of the highway and the H.T Tao Secret Zone located to the east. As the focal point of Viet Cong activity in the area, it provides not only a secure haven for enemy forces negotiating the province but also serves as the center for supplying those troops and the local Viet Cong from nearby base camps. The hamlet is bordered by a narrow strip of cultivated fields and rubber and coffee plantations. Beyond this lie the primary forests and jungle.

Prior to the Battle of SLOPE 30, the 3rd Squadron participated in the 9th Infantry Division’s multi-battalion OPERATION ALEXON, initiated 9 June 1967. The objectives of this operation were the destruction of enemy forces and installations in the Viet Cong Secret Zone called the H.T DICH. Concurrently, a major engineering effort was directed toward the establishment of jungle-free east-west and north-south lines of communication to facilitate future reentry and exploration of this long-time Viet Cong sanctuary.

Initially the 3rd Squadron pushed deep into the primary forest from the eastern sector of the area of operation. As the search progressed, the squadron moved south, reaching the vicinity of SLOPE 30 Hamlet on 18 June 1967. In the afternoon on the 18th, the squadron pulled out of the forest and established troop-sized defensive positions in the relatively open area to the north and east of SLOPE 30 Hamlet. By 2000 hours listening posts, ambush patrols, and anti-intrusion devices had been placed outside each perimeter, and defensive concentrations had been fired. The disposition of the squadron at this point is shown in Inclosure 1. For the next five hours the jungle quiet was interrupted only by a suspected enemy movement north of the Team K position at 2200 hours and by the harassing and interdicting fires conducted by the Mortar and Provisional Mortar Batteries.

Suddenly, at 0110 hours on the 19th, the Viet Cong unleashed a violent assault upon the squadron position. Team M with the Provisional Mortar Battery, and Team K with the Command Post, Mortar Battery, and 3/919 Engineer Company were hit simultaneously with mortar fire (Inclosure 2). The fire directed at Team M and the Provisional Mortar Battery was apparently designed to destroy the firing capability of the Mortar Battery and to create a diversion from the main attack. While sustaining this barrage for almost thirty minutes, the personnel never faltered; they began a fire mission which would last for over an hour. Throughout the mission, key personnel remained exposed to call fire commands and to replace striking stakes which were unearthed by the enemy's attack.

The attack on the Team K perimeter was obviously not a diversionsary tactic. In addition to a mortar barrage, the enemy struck with two main force battalions of the 274th Viet Cong Regiment reinforced by heavy weapons elements of the Regiment and 5th Viet Cong Division. The attackers were armed with unusually large numbers of anti-tank and automatic weapons. They used these weapons initially to deliver a devastating fire on the northern sector of the perimeter, followed shortly by successive attacks on the eastern and southern sectors. The latter two attacks were later found to be secondary efforts as the main force was positioned on the northern sector of the perimeter.

In the initial burst of fire, the northeast sector of the perimeter, including the Platoon of the 919th Engineer Company, was hit severely. Men who were blown or shot from their machinegun positions on the armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles (ACAV) staggered to assume their positions. If too severely wounded, they were immediately replaced by volunteers from the inner perimeter. ACAV's that caught fire were saved by officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men from Team K, the command post, and the engineers, who moved from vehicle to vehicle using any available means to extinguish the blaze. These same men repeatedly entered the burning vehicles to vacate personnel, equipment, and ammunition. While rescue and evacuation measures were under way, officers from the inner perimeter directed their ACAV's from this position.
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less critical area to the threatened northern sector. In some cases, ACAV commanders,
upon seeing flank vehicles receive hits, moved their ACAVs to an exposed position
to cover the evacuation of the wounded from the damaged ACAVs and to cover the newly
exposed sectors of the perimeter. Once replacement ACAVs were moved into the breach,
they returned to their original positions.

Recovering quickly from the initial shock of the assault, the defenders countered
with a devastating volume of automatic weapon and 90mm cannon fire which continued for
the next hour and twenty minutes. The return fire was so well directed that the fire
initiative passed into friendly hands at this point, never to be relinquished. Less
than two minutes after the enemy initiated his attack, the Provisional Mortar Battery
fired illumination in support of the Team K perimeter. This was followed by high
explosive and illumination directed to the rubber plantation due east of the perimeter.
Following these initial volleys, the fire was walked through the coffee plantation
and the jungle to the south of the perimeter. At the same time, the Battalion Battery
initiated a counter-mortar fire plan in support of Provisional Mortar Battery. At
0135 hours, a flareship from the USA 7th Tactical Air Force arrived on station to
provide continuous illumination until first light in the morning. This action enabled
the mortars to shift to purely defensive fires.

A short time later, a light fire team from the regiment's Air Cavalry Troop
arrived over the battlefield to provide surveillance of enemy routes of reinforcement
crossing the area. At this time the enemy's main attack was still directed toward the
north. After the location of the ambush patrol in that area was reaffirmed, the
light fire team was directed to engage the enemy firing from the rubber tree line
just north of the perimeter. This was an extremely hazardous assignment since it
called for the team to make its firing pass from west to east, directly into the
trajectory of the mortar rounds falling on the enemy to the east of the perimeter.
This maneuver succeeded in appreciably decreasing the enemy fire. Upon completion of
the firing mission the light fire team jettisoned its rocket pods and voluntarily
landed within the Team K perimeter to evacuate the first group of seriously wounded.

When the light fire team departed, an Air Force "Puff the Magic Dragon" arrived
on station and interdicted possible enemy positions and routes of withdrawal to the
south of the perimeter. As one aircraft expended its ordnance, another relieved it.
This firing was followed by 8 inch howitzer and 175mm gun support from Battery A,
1st Battalion, 93rd Artillery, firing from the 1st Australian Task Force Base Camp
to the south at NUI DAT. This ordnance was directed toward enemy routes of withdrawal
to the south and east.

During the course of the action, the three ambush patrols and two listening
posts were ordered to remain in position since they were caught in an intense cross
fire. When a lull in the firing appeared, the listening posts fought a delaying
action back to the perimeter. Ambush Patrol Two was not affected by the fire and re-
maincd in position to monitor the open flank to the west. Ambush Patrol Three was
plumbed down and could not move. Within a minute a mix of all volunteer forces moved out
cross the perimeter, fought their way to the patrols, and conducted a withdrawal
toward the perimeter, suffering no casualties. Prior to the withdrawal, one patrol num-
ber had been killed and two wounded.

Ambush Patrol One, with one non-commissioned officer and nine enlisted men re-
maincd in position throughout the attack. They had maintained contact with the main
force throughout the battle but enemy movement between their position and the per-
imeter was noted, and they held fast. They were not detected until the Viet Cong
began their withdrawal from the battle area. In the ensuing fight, they were quickly
overrun by a frontal enemy, throwing grenades and firing automatic weapons. Five
patrol members were killed and four wounded. Six Viet Cong bodies were found. When
the Team K commander lost contact with the patrol, he dispatched a volunteer armed
relief force which searched until 0310 hours before the survivors were found and
evacuated.

At 0220 hours the enemy began to retreat. It was initially believed that the
enemy was moving to the northeast, and interdiction fires were directed on routes
of withdrawal in the area. Additionally, Team I was ordered to pursue in that direc-
tion. Subsequently, a captured FN and Viet Cong operation order for the attack indi-
cated that the main effort would withdraw to the east toward Interprovincial Route 2
and ultimately toward the NUI DAT Secret Zone. At this time Team K was ordered to
start a detailed search of the battlefield, while Tours L and M initiated pursuit
to the east. When Tour I uncovered little or no evidence of the enemy activity to
the northwest, they were also committed to the pursuit to the east. Contact was
not regained; however, numerous blood-stained trails were discovered in addition to
eight abandoned bodies. At the site of the battle, 48 Viet Cong dead were found; in
addition, 2 wounded Viet Cong and numerous weapons were collected.

The litter of the battlefield and the enemy's disorganized retreat told the
story of a stunning defeat delivered to a Viet Cong battalion specifically designed
to be an armor-destroying force. The discipline, rapid reaction, and perseverance of
the defenders had succeeded not only in blunting and repelling the attack but in
holding the enemy at a range sufficient for the effective employment of indirect fire
support. The squadron's pursuit of the enemy destroyed its efforts to regroup and to
conduct an organised withdrawal. Subsequent intelligence reports gathered from agents
in the local population, and BUC THANH District indicated that large numbers of Viet
Cong dead and wounded had been carried to the east and that a large number of the
wounded had died in route.

Subsequent to the action of 19 June 1967, forces of the government of South
Vietnam launched pacification in the SLOPE 30 area. The Battle of SLOPE 30 represent
another chapter in the allied struggle to bring former Viet Cong strongholds under
effective government control.
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RESULTS OF THE ACTION

1. US LOSSES:
   a. KIA: 7 - K Trp, 3-11 Arm Cav
          2 - 3rd Platoon, 919th Engr Co
   b. WIA: 1 - HMT, 3-11 Arm Cav
          4 - HMT, 3-11 Arm Cav
          20 - K Trp, 3-11 Arm Cav
          9 - 3rd Platoon, 919th Engr Co
   c. AGI's Damaged: 2 - K Trp, 3-11 Arm Cav
          2 - HMT, 3-11 Arm Cav
          2 - 3rd Platoon, 919th Engr Co

2. Enemy Losses:
   a. KIA (BC) - 56
   b. KIA (Possible) - 150
   c. WIA (BC) - 2
   d. PW - 2
   e. WIA (Possible) - 200
   f. Captured Equipment:
      (1) 5 RPG-2 Launchers
      (2) 1 M79 Launcher
      (3) 4 AK-47 Rifles
      (4) 2 US BAR's
      (5) 1 Chinese Type 56 SNL
      (6) 1 Chinese Type 53 Carbine
      (7) 2 Chinese Type 56 (SKS) Carbines
      (8) 2 US M1 Carbines
      (9) 122 Assorted Grenades
      (10) 9 M79 rounds
      (11) 250 rounds 12.7mm linked
      (12) 1 Chinese night sight for recoilless rifle
      (13) 5 7.62mm RR rounds
      (14) 12 RPG-2 Rockets
      (15) 6 RPG-2 Boosters
      (16) ground mount for 12.7mm AA MG
      (17) 10,000 rounds assorted 5.56 mm
      (18) 250 pounds of assorted individual equipment

2 Enc
1 = Operation Overlay
2 = Sketch of Situation
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Incloure 2, Battle of SLOPE 30.

OLD RUBBER

LEGEND

- Ambush Patrol
- Listening Post
- Anti-Intrusion Device
- Tank
- ACAV
- Recoilless Rifle
- RPG-2
- MG 12.7mm
- 60/82mm Mortar

Incl 2 49
ANNEX H

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Operation AKRON
FM Radio Notes

- 9th Inf Div
- 3rd Sgn Lnd Cav
- 11th Lnd Cav Hqs
- 52nd Ranger Bn

- 9th Division Command Net
- 9th Division Intelligence Net
- 11th Armored Cavalry Command Net
- 11th Armored Cavalry Intelligence Net

Appendix 1 to Annex #1

ANNEX I
Appendix 2 to Annex 9 I
**Combat After Action Report - Operation AKRON, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (U)**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 9-27 June 1967

CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

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**SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

N/A

**SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY**

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**ABSTRACT**

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