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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 96345

9 November 1967

AFTER ACTION REPORT - OPERATION PAUL BUNYAN

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation PAUL BUNYAN was a jungle clearing operation. Reference: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, series L 7014, sheets 6331 I, 6330 IV, and 6331 II and III.


3. (C) GENERAL: Operation PAUL BUNYAN was a 1st Infantry Division controlled operation. The operation was conducted in two phases. The first phase was conducted in the ONG DONG Jungle located about eight kilometers north of DI AN base camp. The second phase was conducted along Route 13 north of PHU CUONG. The general area of operation is shown at Annex C.

   a. The reporting officer for this report is Major General John H. Hay, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division.

   b. Task Organization: Control of the operation was exercised by the 2d Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division. Command Post was located at DI AN from 19 July 1967 to 11 September 1967 for both phase I and II of Operation PAUL BUNYAN. Commanders are shown at Annex A.

   Phases I

   Phase I

   2-2 Inf (Mech) Bn
   1/5-2 Arty (-)
   B/3-34 Armor
   B/1st Engr Bn
   A/168 Engr Bn

   Phase II

   2-2 Inf (Mech) Bn
   1-4 Cav (-)
   A/5-2 Arty
   A/168 Engr Bn

4. (C) INTELLIGENCE: See Annex B.

5. (C) MISSION:

   a. Phase I: Conduct land clearing operations and reduction of enemy base camp facilities in the ONG DONG Jungle commencing 19 July 1967 and effect necessary measures to insure security in the area of operation.

   b. Phase II: Conduct land clearing operations and reduction of enemy base camp facilities along Highway 13 north of PHU CUONG commencing 19 August 1967 and effect necessary measures to insure security in the area of operation.

6. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The 1st Infantry Division initiates Operation PAUL BUNYAN on 191000H July 1967. A/168 Engr Bn moves by convoy from DI AN to Base Camp 1 (XT 919210) and prepares to conduct jungle clearing operations in the ONG DONG area. The 2-2 Inf (Mech) moves to Base Camp 1 from PHU CUONG to provide security for jungle clearing operations and Base Camp 1.

7. (C) EXECUTION: a. 20 July: Phase I of PAUL BUNYAN.

   TASK ORGANIZATION

   2-2 Inf (Mech)
   1/5-2 Arty (-)
   B/3-34 Armor
   B/1st Engr Bn
   A/168 Engr Bn
After a 31-minute artillery preparation, A/168 Engr and B/1st Engr initiated jungle clearing operations approximately 1000 meters south of Base Camp 1 with 2-2 Inf (Moch) and B/2-34 Armored conducting security operations via (XT 915206). Twenty-two Rome Plows and eight bulldozers began clearing operations and cleared a total of 300 acres of medium jungle on the first day.

b. 21 July - 23 July: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued without incident. Total acres of jungle cleared:

- 21 July: 260
- 22 July: 310
- 23 July: 420

c. 24 July: No change in task organization. A/168 Engr and B/1st Engr continued jungle clearing with 2-2 Inf (Moch) and B/2-34 Armor providing security. Two personnel were wounded when an RPG activated a booby trap. A total of 420 acres of medium jungle was cleared for the day.

d. 25 July: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued and a total of 380 acres of medium jungle was cleared for the day. 2-2 Inf (Moch) and B/2-34 Armor conducted security operations without incident.

e. 26 July: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued and a total of 345 acres of medium jungle was cleared for the day. 2-2 Inf (Moch) and B/2-34 Armor conducted security operations with 1 KHA and 8 WHA for 2-2 Inf (Moch). (Two of the WHA became KHA).

f. 27 July: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued and a total of 393 acres of medium jungle was cleared for the day. 2-2 Inf (Moch) and B/2-34 Armor conducted security operations without incident.

g. 28 July: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued and a total of 40 acres of medium jungle was cleared. At 0930H B/2-34 Armor departed Base Camp 1 (XT 913213) to escort bulldozers and plows to Base Camp 2 (XT 930270). One Rome Plow activated a pressure mine resulting in 2 WHA with moderate damage to the plow. Minor damage resulted when a tank of B/2-34 Armor hit a mine.

h. 29 July: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued without serious incident. A total of 400 acres of light jungle was cleared.

i. 30 July: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued. One APC had two roadwheels and one track blown off by a mine. A total of 485 acres of light jungle was cleared.

j. 31 July: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued with a total of 450 acres of light jungle being cleared. One tank was damaged and the driver wounded when a 155mm dud was activated.

k. 1 August - 3 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued without serious incident. Total acres cleared:

- 1 August: 380
- 2 August: 240
- 3 August: 420

l. 4 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued without incident. C/1-7 Arty moved to Base Camp 2 and closed at 1225H. A total of 435 acres of light jungle was cleared.

m. 5 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued after a mortar and artillery preparation via (XT 905261). A total of 330 acres of light jungle was cleared. No enemy contact was made throughout the day.
a. 6 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued without serious incident. A total of 20 acres of light jungle was cleared for the day. Primary effort was expended on movement to Base Camp 3. Two artillery rounds hit within Base Camp 3; no casualties resulted.

b. 7 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued after an artillery preparation vic (XT 898238). A total of 70 acres of light jungle was cleared. The primary effort of units was directed toward preparing defensive positions.

c. 8 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued after an artillery and mortar preparation vic (XT 898238). A total of 350 acres of light jungle was cleared. Booby traps resulted in 1 US WHA; no damage was sustained by tracks.

d. 9 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued after an artillery and mortar preparation vic (XT 908276). One APC had two roadwheels blown off by a mine resulting in 1 WHA. A total of 450 acres of light jungle was cleared and 1.4 tons of polished rice captured.

e. 10 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued after mortar preparations were fired. A total of 300 acres of medium jungle was cleared without incident.

f. 11 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued after artillery and mortar preparations were fired. A total of 360 acres of medium jungle was cleared without incident.

g. 12 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued after artillery and mortar preparations were fired. A total of 200 acres of jungle was cleared which completed the ONG DOH Jungle area. A total of 7,726 acres of jungle was cleared during Phase I of Operation PAUL BUNYAN.

h. 13 August: Task Force PAUL BUNYAN I terminated with 2-2 Inf (Moch) and Company B/2-34 Armor moving to PHU LOI and the Rome Plows and bulldozers to DI AN. Elements of 2-2 Inf (Moch) and 168th Engr Bn were airlifted by CH-47 to PHU LOI and DI AN commencing at 0730H and closing at 1127H. Fifteen sorties were required to complete the movement. The 2-2 Inf (Moch) Bn (-) commenced movement to PHU LOI by convoy at 1100H and closed at 1445H. The Rome Plows and bulldozers were moved on lowboys to DI AN and closed at 1535H. The period 13 - 15 August was used for maintenance by all units concerned.

i. 16 August: Phase II of PAUL BUNYAN:

**TASK ORGANIZATION**

2-2 Inf (Moch) Bn
168th Engr Bn
1-2 Arty
1-4 Cav (-)

Task Force PAUL BUNYAN II commenced movement from PHU LOI at 0702H by road and closed on its base camp vic (XT 795203) at 0855H. The movement was conducted without incident. Land clearing operations were initiated on arrival. A total of 150 acres of light jungle was cleared for the day.

j. 17 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued and Rome Plows cleared 350 acres of light to medium jungle. No men were wounded when a plow detonated a booby trapped grenade. In addition, mortar, rocket, and small arms fire was received, resulting in 1 WHA.

k. 18 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued after artillery and mortar preparations were fired. A claymore mine mounted in a tree caused 1 WHA and damaged the radiator of one Rome Plow. A total of 350 acres of light to medium jungle was cleared.
y. 19 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued after artillery and mortar preparations were fired. A total of 335 acres of light to medium jungle was cleared. Twenty rounds of 82mm mortar fire were received, resulting in 2 WHA.

z. 20 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued after an artillery preparation was fired. Rome Flows cleared 290 acres of light to medium jungle. Five rounds of 82mm mortars hit base camp via (XT 795206) causing 3 WHA.

aa. 21 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued after a mortar preparation was fired. Rome Flows cleared 300 acres of light to medium jungle. Small arms fire was received in base camp causing 2 WHA.

bb. 22 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued after a mortar preparation was fired. Rome Flows cleared 330 acres of medium jungle. One man was wounded when a Rome Flow hit a booby trapped grenade.

c. 23 - 24 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued after a mortar preparation was fired each day. Rome Flows cleared 290 acres of medium jungle on 23 August and 240 acres on 24 August with no significant enemy activity.

dd. 25 August: No change in task organization. Relocation of task force BUNYAN to a base camp via (XT 766273) was initiated at 0715H with all elements closing on area at 1225H. Rome Flows cleared 100 acres of medium jungle without significant enemy contact.

eee. 26 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued with a total of 125 acres cleared, and 80 acres piled. Priority of work was placed on construction of defensive positions. Three WHA and 1 RHA were sustained when an APC hit a booby trapped 155mm dud. The vehicle was a combat loss.

ff. 27 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued with a total of 340 acres of jungle cleared. There was no significant enemy activity.

gg. 28 August: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued with a total of 320 acres of jungle cleared. One VC was captured as a result of a brief VC contact; no US casualties were sustained.

hh. 29 August - 2 September: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued with no significant enemy activity during this period. Total acres of jungle cleared:

- 29 August: 290
- 30 August: 210
- 31 August: 340
- 1 September: 450
- 2 September: 325

ii. 3 September: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued with a total of 330 acres of light to medium jungle cleared. One APC was a combat loss after being hit by an RPG round. There were 4 US WHA.

jj. 4 September: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued with a total of 220 acres of light to medium jungle cleared. One WHA was sustained from a booby trapped grenade and one tank received a cracked roadwheel and idler from an AT mine.

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X. 5 September - 8 September: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued with no significant enemy activity during this period. Total acres of jungle cleared:

- 5 September: 220
- 6 September: 315
- 7 September: 285
- 8 September: 120

XI. 9 September: No change in task organization. Clearing operations continued with a total of 250 acres of light to medium jungle cleared. One Rome Flow was hit by an RPG round causing 2 WIA.

XII. 10 September: No change in task organization. Phase II of Operation PAUL BUNYAN was terminated with a total of 6940 acres of jungle cleared.

XIII. 11 September: No change in task organization. 2-2 Inf (Mech) moved by road from Base Camp V to Lai Khe and 166th Engr BN (-) moved by road from Base Camp V to DI AN. Total jungle cleared during Operation PAUL BUNYAN I and II was 14,566 acres.

8. (G) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Engineer: See Annex E.

b. 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry: See Annex F.

c. US Air Force Tactical Air Support: Tactical Air support for Operation PAUL BUNYAN was satisfactory. Total sorties flown and total tonnage of ordnance expended are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PAUL BUNYAN I</th>
<th>PAUL BUNYAN II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SORTIES FLOPN</td>
<td>ORDINANCE EXPENDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SORTIES</td>
<td>TONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jul</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jul</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Jul</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 Jul</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Jul</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Aug</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total for Operation PAUL BUNYAN I and II

- 9. (G) RESULTS:

a. Operation PAUL BUNYAN I

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RESULTS:

(1) US KHA: 3; US WHA: 14
(2) VC Personnel Losses: KIA (DC): 0; IW: 0
(3) VC Equipment Losses:
   (a) Weapons: none.
   (b) Ammunition:
      1 50 rds small arms ammo
      2 5 2.75mm rockets
   (c) Explosive materials:
      1 2 claymores
      2 13 grenades
      3 65 artillery rounds (duds)
      4 8 81mm mortar rounds
      1 500 lb bombs
      15 CBU's
      2 75mm RR duds
      1/2 lb explosives
      1 AP mine
      2 2 cases of dynamite
   (d) Miscellaneous:
      1 22 bunkers
      1 5 11 fighting positions
      2 7 military structures
      2 VC gas masks
      5 plastic containers
      150 meters of trenches
      16 VC ponchos
      1 packet of misc documents
      2 pots
      2 2-55 gal drums of CS
      1 5 gal can of water
      1 canteen cup
      5 small base camps
      1 hole (2' x 4')
      1 claymore detonating wire
      3 tunnels
      1 table
      1 bamboo cot
      1 1.4 tons of polished rice
      1 canteen
      2 2 watches
      1 diary
      23 1 roll of 35mm film
      27 1 small amount of medical supplies
      24 5 batteries

(4) Ares cleared: 7,726

b. Operation PA "TAINAN II

RESULTS:

(1) US KHA: 1; US WHA: 36
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(2) VC Personnel Losses: KIA (EC): 3; KI: 1

(3) VC Equipment Losses:

(a) Weapons:
1. 2 Soviet small arms
2. 1 RPG-7

(b) Ammunition: 1 RPG-7 round

(c) Explosive Materials:
1. 87 grenades
2. 2 claymores
3. 3 CBU's
4. 2 browning bettys
5. 2 AT mines
6. 2 250 lb bombs
7. 5 500 lb bombs
8. 7 artillery rounds (duds)
9. 1 79 round

(d) Miscellaneous:
1. 71 bunkers
2. 6 military structures
3. 3 walls
4. 4 VC gas masks
5. 4 small amounts of documents
6. 6 tunnels
7. 3 foxholes
8. 275 lbs of rice
9. 1 flashlight
10. 6 punji pits
11. 1 wallet
12. 1 pair H0 CHI MINH sandals
13. 15 fighting positions
14. 4 fish traps

(4) Acres cleared: 6940

10. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: (Omitted)

11. (C) COMMANDERS' EVALUATION:

a. Jungle clearing of areas close to populated areas in the 1st Division TAOR has denied sanctuaries and interdicted infiltration routes of VC/NVA main force units, forcing these units to limit operations to less populated areas.

b. Jungle clearing operations are beneficial to the Vietnamese people in many ways. Wood made available as a result of clearing operations is usually promptly cut and collected by the local populace for use in their homes and for construction. The vast majority of the jungle areas were previously VC controlled and were heavily mined and booby-trapped. This denied the populace any use of the area. Cleared areas now can be used as farm land and eventually greater agricultural production will result.

c. Jungle clearing operations have deprived the enemy of bases of operation and storage areas. As a result the enemy has been forced to break up tactical entities and to operate in smaller groups.

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As a result of the jungle clearing operation along Highway 13, convoy movement can now be conducted on a daily basis between DI An and LAI KH6 with limited risk to personnel, vehicles and equipment.

Clearing along routes of communication has caused a noticeable increase in their use by the civilian populace and has allowed more goods to be transported to and from market.

12. (G) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusions: Operation PAUL BUNYAN was one of the longest and most successful jungle clearing operations conducted by the 1st Infantry Division. The division achieved all of its goals for the operation. The experience gained will provide a basis of operation for future jungle and road clearing operations.

b. Lessons Learned:

1) Clearing of jungle cut to 150 meters from the road has greatly facilitated convoy movement by increasing observation to the flanks and denying the enemy concealment for ambushes or positions for command detonation of mines.

2) Reconnaissance by tank fire using canister is effective in penetrating and clearing booby trapped jungle areas.

3) Clearing operations should be conducted in jungle areas of approximately 3000 or more acres. This eliminates the need for frequent displacement of the NDF and reduces the distance engineer plow teams must move to cutting areas.

4) Once jungle has been cleared, it should be defoliated and burned to prevent rapid growth of underbrush.

5) Land clearing teams require augmentation for command and control, communications, maintenance, mess and supply.

6) Cutting operations must be closely controlled for maximum efficiency and close coordination at all echelons must be maintained. To insure peak operational efficiency, additional operators are necessary to replace those lost through enemy action, B&R, and administrative actions. Additional personnel must be provided to control supply of equipment, clothing, laundry, etc.

7) Wheeled vehicles are inadequate for support of jungle clearing operations. Clearing operations normally take place over rough terrain littered with cut trees. Command vehicles, maintenance vehicles, and air compressors must have a cross country capability to properly control and support those operations.

8) Armored personnel carriers should be authorized the Land Clearing Task Force for command and control; one for the Task Force Commander, and one for each of the cutting team loaders.

9) Loading and unloading Ross Flows at field locations requires special techniques and detailed planning. During PAUL BUNYAN loading times varied from 15 to 105 minutes and unloading took from 30 to 60 minutes. Loading and unloading time depend primarily on the condition of the site and access/exit points. Loading sites should be selected after a thorough reconnaissance. Old laterite pits are particularly well suited as loading sites.

10) Approximately five percent of the convoy lowbed trucks become disabled during a move. Additional lowbeds should be taken to replace disabled ones. Transfer can be affected by backing one lowbed up to the other.
(11) Excessive tracked vehicle traffic causes rapid deterioration of base camp soil conditions. A race track around the inner perimeter with defined exits and rigid traffic control is necessary to prevent this deterioration.

(12) Communication between the team leader and cutting dozers is difficult because of noise and limited visibility. Each team should be authorized AN/PRC 25 radios with headsets.

(13) Following are lessons learned in regards to maintenance:

(a) Engine oil pans received punctures caused by logs forced upward through the oil pan drain hole. Prefabricated steel plate with drilled and taped holes should be bolted to the bottom of the belly pan to eliminate this problem.

(b) The hydraulic line on top of the blade lift cylinder was constantly smashed by logs and debris. Guard plates, four to five inches high, were prefabricated from half-inch steel plates set on edge, and welded along the full length of the line.

(c) Screens and braces on the cab of the Rome Plow were inadequate. The cab should be reinforced by welding sections of engineer stakes at 18 to 24 inch intervals and then welding cyclone fence to the engineer stakes.

(14) A maintenance schedule must be established and followed during jungle clearing operations. Two hours of operator maintenance must be performed for every eight hours of dozer operation. A ten day maintenance stand down, exclusive of travel time, should be held for every thirty to forty days of jungle clearing.

(15) When the tactical situation permits, organizational maintenance should be conducted at night. Organizational maintenance performed at night permits availability of the maximum number of Rome Plows for the next day. Quarterly inspections, due every 125 hours, can also be completed at night without reducing the daily cutting force. If night maintenance is not possible, plows will not be available for work the following day. For this reason blackout maintenance tents should be fabricated to allow maintenance after dark.

(16) A maintenance base should be established in a secure area and disabled dozers evacuated to it for performance of third echelon maintenance.

(17) Two weapons should be authorized each driver, an M14 rifle and a .45 caliber pistol. The operator requires a .45 caliber pistol to defend himself while in the cab and the M14 rifle for base camp defense.

(18) Cultivated rubber is best cleared by an anchor chain towed by two dozers. Two to seven rows of trees can be cut depending on size and spacing. The dozers should be far enough ahead of the falling trees to eliminate radiator damage. The chain should be 180 foot long and weigh three to four tons.

(19) Cut areas require further treatment to prevent jungle regrowth. During PAUL BUNYAN II, an area which had been cut six months previously had to be recut because the underbrush had grown back. Defoliation or controlled burning should be used to retard growth of cleared areas.

(20) Dismounted infantry used as a security force cannot keep up with the Rome Plow teams. Rough terrain, heavy underbrush, and the speed of the cutting plow requires mechanized infantry to adequately secure them.
(21) Artillery preparations reduce enemy activity in the area being cleared. Approximately 30 to 45 minutes of artillery should be fired prior to the first cut each day.

(22) Mine sweeping teams should be attached to the Land Clearing Task Force to sweep base camps and access routes because restricted routes of travel provide an ideal situation for placement of mines during the night.

(23) Steel helmets and flak vests must be worn at all times during mine clearing operations to protect the operator against mines and booby traps. Supplementary protection should be fabricated to reduce the hazard of face and arm wounds.

(24) Two fire extinguishers should be carried on every plow as a precaution against fires in the radiator pan which occur when dried brush ignites.

(25) A light observation helicopter should be furnished the Task Force Commander prior to the first cut and after the last cut for control and evaluation of the cutting effort.

(26) Aerial resupply should be planned for when operating in remote areas so that no reduction in the cutting effort will occur due to a shortage of food, fuel or repair parts.

(27) Jungle clearing close to populated areas has denied sanctuaries and interdicted infiltration routes of VC/NVA main force units, thus forcing the VC to limit their operations to less populated areas.

(28) Land clearing reduces the requirements for US operations to secure population centers, permitting this task to be handled by ARVN/RF/FF forces.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GEORGE J. KELLER
1st, AGC
Asst AG

Annexes:

A - List of Commanders
B - Intelligence
C - Operations Summary
D - 2-5 Inf (Motor) Bn After Action Report
E - 166th Engineer Bn After Action Report
F - 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry After Action Report

Withdrawn,
Hqs, DA
SOMERSET: After Action Report - Paul Bunyan

TO: Commanding Officer
79th Engineer Group
ATTN: BGM-3
APO US Forces 90491

1. Name of operation: Paul Bunyan


3. Location:
   a. Phase I: Ong Dong Jungle
   b. Phase II: Area adjacent to Highway 13 from Phu Cuong to Ta I Khe

4. Command Headquarters: 168th Engineer Combat Battalion

5. Task Organization: Task Force Alpha (Annex A)

6. Intelligence:
   a. Phase I: The Ong Dong Jungle is located about 8 KM directly north of Di An Base Camp. The vegetation of the Ong Dong Jungle was 50% dense primary forest (mainly evergreen) and 50% secondary forest (rubber trees). Since 15 May 1967, there had been numerous VC and NVA sightings in the operational area. The units sighted were the Phy Loi Bn, Autumn fighters, C-265 Co, C-63 Co, C-300 Flt, C-118 Flt and the Tan Hoa Khanh guerrillas. This area was being used as a base camp from which operations were launched, and as a supply storage area.

   b. Phase II: Prior to Operation Paul Bunyan IX there were numerous sniper incidents. Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG's) hit convoys along Highway 13 between Phu Cuong and Ben Cat. Unit movements were also reported. These units included the Phu Loi Battalion, C-61; C-62; C-301; C-303 and local force guerrillas.

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7. Mission:

a. Primary: Jungle clearing

b. Secondary:

(1) Destroy tunnel complexes, base camps, and bunkers.

(2) General engineer support.

8. Concept of operation:

a. Phase I: Convoy from Di An to a night defensive position in the southern Cng Dong. Clear jungle in southern, central, and northern Cng Dong in three successive operations. By 12 Aug 1967, be prepared to return by convoy to Di An.

b. Phase II: Convoy to night defensive position north of Phu Cuong. Two teams operating from this base to clear jungle north along Route 13. One team operating from maintenance base at Phu Loi, clear jungle north of Phu Loi. By 25 Aug 1967, be prepared to move to night defensive position south of Don Cat. Locate maintenance base at Lai Xai. Clear jungle along Route 13 south of Don Cat.

9. Execution:

a. Deployment:

(1) Phase I:

(a) Base Camp I (XT 919210) by convoy on 19 July 1967.

(b) Base Camp II (XT 947256) by convoy on 26 July 1967.

(c) Base Camp III (XT 911252) by convoy on 6 Aug 1967.

(d) Di An by convoy on 12 Aug 1967.

(2) Phase II:

(a) Base Camp IV (XT 796210) by convoy on 16 Aug 1967.

(b) Base Camp V (XT 764270) by convoy on 25 Aug 1967.

b. Clearing operation:
EBA-CO

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Phan Duyan

(1) Phase I: Operating from Base Camp I the task force cleared 2,790 acres in nine cutting days. After moving to Base Camp II, 3,160 acres were cut from 29 July to 6 August 1967. Finally the northern Ong Dong, consisting of 1,760 acres of jungle, was cleared.

(2) Phase II: Initially, the operation was conducted along Route 13 north of Phu Cuong. During this time, 2,520 acres were cleared. The task force then moved to Base Camp V and cleared 4,680 acres of jungle on either side of Route 13 south of Don Cat.

c. Extraction: Task Force Alpha returned to Di An by road march on 11 Sep 1967.

10. Results:
   a. Enemy personnel losses: none
   b. Friendly personnel losses: none
   c. Enemy equipment captured: none
   d. Friendly equipment losses: two (2) D7E bulldozers
   e. Acres cleared: 14,910 acres

11. Administration and logistics.
   a. Rations: During Phase I, rations were hauled by truck from Phu Loi. During Phase II, rations were trucked from Lai Kho. Class A rations were served for breakfast and supper. C-rations constituted the noon meal.
   b. Arms and ammunition: The basic load of ammunition was taken by each platoon. This was sufficient for the entire operation.
   c. Uniforms and equipment: All uniforms and personal equipment were ordered through the unit supply on a personal need basis.

12. Commander's Analysis and Lessons Learned:
   a. Organization:
      (1) Observation: The 27th. Lap Clearing Team requires augmentation for command and control, communications, maintenance, mess, and supply.
(2) Discussion: Cutting operations must be closely controlled for maximum efficiency. Close coordination at all echelons must be maintained. Consequently a control headquarters was taken from a line company. To meet the additional communications requirements of this headquarters, a communications section was added. Similarly, augmentation was required to keep all plows properly maintained. To insure peak operational efficiency, additional operators were necessary to replace those lost through enemy action, R&R, and administrative actions. Finally, personnel had to be provided to control supply of personal equipment, clothing, laundry, etc. Because of these shortcomings the 27th Land Clearing Team was integrated into Task Force Alpha.

(3) Recommendations: The Land Clearing Team should be integrated into a land clearing task force to provide the additional support required on extended operations. The 27th Land Clearing Team has now been organized into the Land Clearing Task Force shown in Annex B. Ultimately, the formation of the self-sufficient Land Clearing Task Force shown in Annex C is recommended.

b. Equipment:

(1) Observation: Wheeled vehicles are inadequate for support of jungle clearing operations.

(2) Discussion: Jungle clearing operations normally take place over rough terrain littered with cut trees. Command vehicles, maintenance vehicles, and air compressors must have cross country mobility under all conditions to properly control and support plow operations.

(3) Recommendation: All support vehicles should be tracked. Four Armored Personnel Carriers should be authorized the Land Clearing Task Force for command and control - one for the Task Force Commander, and one for each of the cutting team loaders. Air compressors and maintenance equipment should be mounted on tracked carriers. The M584 utilized by the artillery would make an ideal tracked contact truck and air compressor mount.

c. Convoy procedures:

(1) Loading and unloading:

(a) Observation: Loading and unloading Rome plows at field locations requires special techniques and detailed planning.
(b) Discussion: During Paul Bunyan loading times varied from 15 to 105 minutes. Unloading took from 30-60 minutes. Loading or unloading time depends primarily on the condition of the site and the access and egress at the site. Loading sites must be subjected to thorough reconnaissance. Old laterite pits are particularly well suited as loading sites. Loading ramps greatly facilitate initial offloading, but dozers with bull blades can construct unloading platforms faster than ramps can be shifted. Loading sites can be prepared in advance and require no loading ramps.

(c) Recommendation: Convoy to new sites with bull blades loading the convoy. The lowbeds carrying the bull blades should be equipped with loading ramps. When the bull blades have been off loaded, they can immediately build off loading ramps for the remainder of the convoy.

(2) Lowbed Support:

(a) Observation: Five percent of the convoy lowbeds become disabled during a move.

(b) Discussion: If a lowbed breaks down during a convoy, a replacement carrier must be available. During each Paul Bunyan convoy, one or two lowbeds became disabled. Additional lowbeds were taken to replace disabled ones. Transfer was effected by backing one lowbed up to the other.

(c) Recommendation: A trail party of 3 lowbeds and a wrecker accompany every Land Clearing Task Force convoy.

d. Base camps:

(1) Roadways:

(a) Observation: Excessive tracked vehicle traffic causes rapid deterioration of base camp road conditions.

(b) Discussion: Repeated use of interior lanes of travel within base camp areas resulted in isolated elements separated by mounds of mud ten to twenty feet wide and four feet deep. Resupply and maintenance are more difficult under these conditions.

(c) Recommendation: A race track around the perimeter with defined exits and rigid traffic control will maintain trafficability within the defensive perimeter.
EBA-60
SUDJECT: After Action Report - Paul Jones

o. Communications:

(1) Observation: Communication between team leader and cutting dozers is difficult because of noise and limited visibility.

(2) Discussion: Radio communication between the team leader and the lead, middle, and trail vehicles is essential to proper control of the cutting effort. Headsets are necessary to hear above the noise of the dozer.

(3) Recommendation: Each team should be authorized four PRO25's with head sets.

f. Maintenance:

(1) Problem areas:

(a) Observation: Proper maintenance is absolutely essential to continued plow operation.

(b) Discussion: Major maintenance down-time is shown in Annex D by item, frequency and total hours expended. Problem areas and action taken are shown below.

1-1 Engine oil pan: Punctures were caused by logs forced upward through the oil pan drain hole.

Action: Prefabricated steel plate with drilled and tapped holes were bolted to the bottom of the belly pan.

2-2 Hydraulic line, steel tube: The hydraulic line on top of the blade lift cylinder was being smashed by logs and debris.

Action: A guard plate, four to five inches high, was prefabricated from half-inch steel plate, set on edge and welded along the full length of the line.

3-3 Cab: Screen and braces on cab were inadequate.

Action: Cab was reinforced by welding sections of engineer stakes at 16 to 24 inch intervals. Cyclone fence was spot welded to the engineer stake.

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SUBJECT: Action Report - Paul Dunyan

4-4 Radiator grill: Grill was of inadequate strength.

Action: A grill plate was fabricated from half-inch sheet metal with spaced air slots cut out.

5-5 Bolly pans: Bonding was occurring to the point of forcing the bolly pan into the bottom of the oil pan drain plug.

Action: Bolly pan was reinforced with ½ inch steel plate.

6-6 Cable: Cable under 3/4 inch diameter or cable with rope core was inadequate for winching dozers from craters or through untrafficable terrain.

Action: One inch steel core cable was used for winches.

(2) Organization:

(a) Observation: A maintenance schedule must be formulated and followed during a jungle clearing operation.

(b) Discussion: During Paul Dunyan, two hours of operator maintenance were performed for every eight hours operation. In addition, a three-day maintenance stand down was held at the termination of Phase I and an eight-day stand down at the end of Phase II.

(c) Recommendation: Two hours of operator maintenance should be performed for every eight hours of dozer operation. A ten day maintenance stand down exclusive of travel time should be held for every thirty to forty days of jungle clearing.

(3) Night maintenance:

(a) Observation: When the tactical situation permits, organizational maintenance should be conducted at night.

(b) Discussion: When organizational maintenance was performed at night, a maximum number of Rome plows was available for work the next day. Quarterly inspections, due every 125 hours, could also be completed without reducing the daily cutting force. The majority of deadline deficiencies were discovered during the evening operator maintenance period. If no night maintenance were possible, these plows would not be available for work the following day.

(c) Recommendation: Night maintenance should be performed whenever possible. Blackout maintenance tents should be fabricated to allow maintenance after dark.
EHA-CO
SUBJECT: After Action Report - Paul Bunyan

(4) Establishment of a secure maintenance base:

(a) Observation: If possible, a maintenance base should be established in a secure area and disabled dozers evacuated to it for repair.

(b) Discussion: During Phase II of Paul Bunyan, a maintenance base was established at Phu Loi during the southern operation and at Lai Khe while cutting the northern sector. Disabled or damaged dozers were evacuated for repair or turn in. Permanent maintenance facilities at these bases were far superior to field maintenance conditions. More efficient maintenance was possible.

(c) Recommendation: When practicable, a maintenance base should be established in a secure area for performance of third echelon maintenance.

f. Armament:

(1) Observation: M-14 rifles are not effective for use in the cab of a Rome plow.

(2) Discussion: M-14 rifles are too cumbersome to be effectively used by an operator in a Rome plow cab. The limited cab space restricts movement and hampers effective counterfire. In addition, brush and trees tend to catch on a rifle, often pulling it from the cab.

(3) Recommendation: The operator needs a .45 caliber pistol to defend himself while in the cab and his normally assigned weapon for base camp defense. Two weapons should be authorized each driver, an M-14 rifle and a .45 caliber pistol.

g. Cutting technique:

(1) Observation: Cultivated rubber is best cleared by an anchor chain

(2) Discussion. Rubber trees vary from four to forty inches in diameter. Rubber trees are very tough and brittle. Cutting rubber with Rome plow blades resulted in a high damage rate to radiators because of falling limbs. An anchor chain, towed by two dozers with a trail dozer for extra push on heavy trees proved effective in cultivated rubber. Two to seven rows of trees can be cut depending on size, age, and spacing. The dozers are far enough ahead of the falling trees to eliminate radiator damage. The chain is 180 feet long and weighs three to four tons. The chain is ineffective in dense rubber.
SUBJECT: After Action Report - Paul Bunyan

(3) Recommendation: Each team be authorized one anchor chain to be used for clearing cultivated rubber.

h. Further defoliation of jungle:

(1) Observation: Cut areas require further treatment to prevent jungle regrowth.

(2) Discussion: During Paul Bunyan II, an area which had been cut six months previously had to be re-cut because the underbrush had grown back. This was easy to cut but required operation time which could have been used to cut virgin jungle.

(3) Recommendation: Defoliation or controlled burning should be used to retard regrowth of cleared areas.

i. Security:

(1) Type unit:

(a) Observation: Only mechanized infantry can adequately secure the Rome plow teams.

(b) Discussion: Dismounted infantry, when used as a security force, cannot keep up with the Rome plow teams. Rough terrain, heavy underbrush, and the speed of the cutting plow require mechanized infantry to adequately secure them.

(c) Recommendation: Only mechanized infantry be used to secure Rome plow teams.

(2) Artillery preparation:

(a) Observation: Adequate artillery preparation reduces enemy activity in the area being cleared.

(b) Discussion: Approximately 30 to 45 minutes of artillery preparation was fired prior to the first cut.

(c) Recommendation: The area to be cut should be sufficiently prepared by artillery fire to induce enemy activity.

(3) Sweeping access routes:
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EDA-CO

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Paul Bunyan

(a) Observation: Access routes to the area to be cut should be swept for mines prior to moving plows.

(b) Discussion: Because of trafficability limitations during the operation, access routes to cutting areas were well defined. On several occasions, these routes were mined during the night.

(c) Recommendation: Mine sweeping teams should be attached to the Land Clearing Task Force to sweep base camps and access routes.

j. Operator safety:

(1) Protection:

(a) Observation: Protection must be provided the operator against mines and booby traps.

(b) Discussion: Eighty percent of the casualties sustained during Paul Bunyan were caused by shrapnel from mines or booby traps. Wounds on the face and arms were the most common. Various protective measures were tried to include armored protection for legs and groin and sandbagging dozers. These restricted movement and visibility. At present modified armored helicopter seats and swinging doors on dozer cabs are being tried.

(c) Recommendation: Steel helmets and flak vests must be worn at all times. Supplementary protection be fabricated to reduce wounds to face and arms.

(2) Fires:

(a) Observation: Fires in radiator pans occur frequently.

(b) Discussion: Brush collecting in radiator pans ignites spontaneously if sufficiently dried. During dry weather, this presents a hazard to plow operators.

(c) Recommendation: Two fire extinguishers be carried on every plow.

(3) Insects:

(a) Observation: Insects are a hazard to plow operators.
EES-00

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Paul Duyan

(b) Discussion: There were several cases of severe insect bites during Paul Duyan. One man had to be evacuated because of bee stings. Operations were sometimes interrupted when a plow dislodged an ant nest from a tree.

(c) Recommendation: Each operator should carry several insect bombs.

k. Air support:

(1) Control:

(a) Observation: Aerial control is necessary for the initial cut and final evaluation.

(b) Discussion: The initial cut defines the area to be cleared. The operator must be guided from the air for this cut. Smoke thrown from a low flying helicopter is an effective marker for turning points. A helicopter is also essential for making an accurate evaluation of acreage cut and effecting reconnaissance of uncut jungle.

(c) Recommendation: A light observation helicopter be furnished the Task Force Commander prior to the first cut and after the last cut for control and evaluation of the cutting effort.

(2) Resupply:

(a) Observation: In remote location, aerial resupply is necessary and feasible.

(b) Discussion: While at Base Camp III, the Land Clearing Task Force was supplied entirely by air. Food, fuel, and repair parts were delivered by air with no reduction in the cutting effort.

(c) Recommendation: Aerial supply be utilized when operating in remote areas.

John R. Manning
LTC, CE
Commanding
ANNEX A

Organization

2/2 Infantry Battalion (Mechanized)

Company B, 2/34 Armored Battalion

Task Force Alpha
Appendix 2 to Annex A

27th Land Clearing Team

HQ

1 OFF
1 WCO
1 EM

Clearing Team

1 NCO
13 EM

Maint Section

1 NCO
18 EM

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ANNEX B

Land Clearing Task Force

COMMAND SECTION

1-Cpt-1331
1-Lt-1331
1-E7-62E40
1-E6-76Y40
1-E4-71H20
2-E5-91B20
Total: 7

MAINTENANCE SECTION

1-WC-621A
1-E6-62B40
3-E5-62E20
1-E5-64C20
10-E4-62B20
2-E4-63B20
1-E4-63B20
1-E4-76"20
2-E3-62A10
2-E3-63A10
2-E4-63E20
Total: 26

COMMUNICATION SECTION

1-E5-31G40
2-E4-05B20
1-E4-31B20
Total: 4

LAND CLEARING SECTION

1-Lt-1331
3-E6-62E40
40-E5-62E20
20-E4-62E20
Total: 64

AGGREGATE STRENGTH: 3 OFF - 1 WO - 97 EM
## 168th Engineer Battalion Land Clearing Task Force

### 1. T. T. Headquarters:

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<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>ICS</th>
<th>Str.</th>
<th>Grade</th>
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<td>Engr Equip Tech</td>
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<td>Male Steward</td>
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**Total**: 69

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ANNEX C (Continued)

NOTE: To HQ Co, 166th Engr En ndd:

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ACCS Str: 3 OFF, 1 WO, 109 EM
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<td>Transmission</td>
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<td>Turbocharger</td>
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<td>Hydraulic lines</td>
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<td>Radiator and grill</td>
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<td>O rings</td>
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<td>Steering, brakes</td>
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PAUL BUCKLEY I
19 Jul 67 - 2 Aug 67

19 Jul 67 1000 hours Paul Bunya I initiated.
20 Jul 67 300 acres of medium jungle cleared.
21 Jul 67 260 acres of medium jungle cleared.
22 Jul 67 310 acres of medium jungle cleared.
23 Jul 67 420 acres of medium jungle cleared.
24 Jul 67 420 acres of medium jungle cleared.
25 Jul 67 380 acres of medium jungle cleared.
26 Jul 67 345 acres of medium jungle cleared.
27 Jul 67 295 acres of medium jungle cleared. Unit prepares to move to new CP.
28 Jul 67 40 acres of medium jungle cleared. Unit prepares defensive position. One (1) dozer hit mine. No casualties, no damage.
29 Jul 67 400 acres of light jungle cleared. One (1) dozer hit antitank mine, no casualties, no damage.
30 Jul 67 485 acres of light jungle cleared. One (1) dozer hit mine. No casualties, no damage.
31 Jul 67 450 acres of light jungle cleared.
1 Aug 67 380 acres of light jungle cleared.
2 Aug 67 240 acres of light jungle cleared. One (1) dozer hit antitank mine. No casualties, no damage.
3 Aug 67 420 acres of light jungle cleared.
4 Aug 67 435 acres of light jungle cleared.
5 Aug 67 330 acres of light jungle cleared.
6 Aug 67 20 acres of light jungle cleared. Primary effort expended on moving to base camp #3. Two (2) artillery rounds hit base camp. No casualties.
Paul Bunyan I (cont...)

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7 Aug 67  70 acres of medium jungle cleared. Primary effort spent on preparing defensive positions.
8 Aug 67  350 acres of light jungle cleared.
9 Aug 67  450 acres of light jungle cleared.
10 Aug 67 300 acres of medium jungle cleared.
11 Aug 67 360 acres of medium jungle cleared.
12 Aug 67 200 acres of medium jungle cleared. Clearing now 100% complete for Paul Bunyan I.

Acres Cleared: 7726

US WIA: 6
US KIA: 0
VC KIA: 0
VC Captured: 0
Plows hit by mines: 4
Plows hit by booby trapped grenades: 0
16 Aug 67  
Oper.  Co.  B,  1/27  initiated 0900 hours.  150 acres of light jungle cleared.

17 Aug 67  
335 acres of light to medium jungle cleared. Two dozers hit grenades. Two EM slightly wounded. 2100 hours received rocket, mortar, and small arms fire. No casualties.

18 Aug 67  
350 acres of light to medium jungle cleared.

19 Aug 67  
335 acres of light to medium jungle cleared. 2245 hours received 20 rounds of 82 mm mortar. Two WIA, one (1) slightly and one (1) dusted off.

20 Aug 67  
290 acres of light to medium jungle cleared. 2150 hours, 5 rounds of 82 mm mortar hit NDP#4. Three (3) men slightly and one (1) dusted off.

21 Aug 67  
300 acres of light to medium jungle cleared. Received small arms fire at 1000 hours at NDP#4. Two WIA, one (1) slightly and one (1) dusted off.

22 Aug 67  
330 acres of medium jungle cleared.

23 Aug 67  
290 acres of medium jungle cleared. At 2124 hours received 20 mm mortar rounds and two RPG rounds at CP NDP#4. No casualties.

24 Aug 67  
240 acres of medium jungle cleared.

25 Aug 67  
100 acres of medium jungle cleared. Two (2) Rome plows hit by RPG rounds, one (1) combat loss and one (1) D/L. One dozer hit grenade. Small arms fire received but did not engage. Two (2) WIA. 1300 hours redeployed to NDP#5.

26 Aug 67  
125 acres cleared and 80 acres piled. Continued to work on defensive positions.

27 Aug 67  
340 acres of jungle cleared. One (1) dozer hit three (3) booby trapped grenades. One (1) EM slightly wounded, back to duty.

28 Aug 67  
320 acres of jungle cleared. Found one (1) wounded VC and three (3) suspects, WIA was evacuated.

29 Aug 67  
290 acres of jungle cleared. Paul Bunyan II is 58% complete with 3875 acres cleared.

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Acres of Light to Medium Jungle Cleared</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 Aug 67</td>
<td>210 acres</td>
<td>210 acres of light to medium jungle cleared. One Rome plow hit grenade, no casualties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug 67</td>
<td>340 acres</td>
<td>340 acres of light to medium jungle cleared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Sep 67</td>
<td>450 acres</td>
<td>450 acres of light to medium jungle cleared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sep 67</td>
<td>325 acres</td>
<td>325 acres of light to medium jungle cleared. Personnel placed on 100% alert.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Sep 67</td>
<td>330 acres</td>
<td>330 acres of light to medium jungle cleared. One Rome plow hit by booby trapped grenade, damage to radiator resulted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Sep 67</td>
<td>220 acres</td>
<td>220 acres of light to medium jungle cleared. Two (2) dozers, while pulling anchor chain, hit booby trapped grenade. Two (2) WIA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Sep 67</td>
<td>220 acres</td>
<td>220 acres of light to medium jungle cleared. Two (2) Rome plows hit booby trapped grenade, no casualties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Sep 67</td>
<td>315 acres</td>
<td>315 acres of light to medium jungle cleared. Received (3) grenades and five rounds of rifle fire. Operation overall 92% complete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Sep 67</td>
<td>285 acres</td>
<td>285 acres of light to medium jungle cleared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Sep 67</td>
<td>120 acres</td>
<td>120 acres of light to medium jungle cleared. Operation overall 97% complete.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Sep 67</td>
<td>250 acres</td>
<td>250 acres of light to medium jungle cleared. One Rome plow hit by RPG round, 2 WIA. Operation overall 100% complete.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Acres Cleared: 6940
US WIA: 17
US KIA: 0
VC KIA: 0
VC Captured: 4
Plows hit by mines: 0
Plows hit by booby trapped grenades: 12
Plows hit by RPG rounds: 4

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After Action Report - Operation PAUL BUNYAN: Land Clearing Operations, 1st Inf Div (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 19 Jul - 11 Sep 1967

CG, 1st Infantry Division

9 November 1967

67X098

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310