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SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation PIKESVILLE, Hqs, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), 1st Special Forces, Period 6 June - 3 July 1967 (U)

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HEADQUARTERS,
5TH SF GA (ABN), 1ST SF
APO 96240

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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Pikesville 6 Jun - 3 Jul 67

1. (C) SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF OPERATION: Reconnaissance Company with Company Headquarters; eight Roadrunner teams composed of four Vietnamese Nationals (VNN) each; five reconnaissance teams composed of two USASF and four VNN each; Command companies composed of 6 USASF and 333 VNN.

2. (C) MISSION: To capture PWs and/or documents in AO BEAR.

3. (C) TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: Operation Pikesville was conducted from a Forward Operations Base (FOB) located at Quan Loi, RVN (XT 807899) within the perimeter of Task Force Dixie North 1st Infantry Division during the period 6 June - 3 July 1967. Project SIGMA advance party began movement by C-130 from Bien Hoa Airbase to FOB 050300 June 67 and completed movement 051130 June 67. FOB activated 051800 June 67. The main body was moved by C-130 transport from Bien Hoa Airbase with the first element arriving 061000 June 67 and the last element closing at 061320 June 67. Command element arrived at FOB by helicopter at 061330 June 67 and FOB was fully operational as of 061355 June 67. The operation terminated 022400 July 67 and the Detachment Command element was returned to Base Camp by helicopter 030700 July 67. The main body began movement by C-130 transport from FOB to Bien Hoa Airbase 030740 July 67. Project Sigma elements closed at Base Camp 031500 July 67.

4. (C) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Operation Pikesville began with the issuance of a written OPORD from Co, II FFV to Co, Det B-56 on 011500 June 67. Det S-2 visited II FFV and CINCV and obtained current intelligence on the assigned area of operations (AO). Det Co, S1, S3 and Co, 2nd Commando Company departed 021330 June 67 for aerial reconnaissance of AO, selection of FOB site and necessary coordination at that location. Co, B-56 visited Co A, 5th SF GA at 021600 June 67. On 03 June unit airlift requirements were submitted by S3 to II FFV and a unit movement order was published. OPORD for Operation Pikesville issued 040800 June 67. Helicopter support provided by 334th Armed Helicopter Co. composed of five transport and two armed helicopters. Two C-130 radio relay aircraft were provided by the 7th Reconnaissance Airplane Company. Artillery support by the 23rd Artillery Group consisted of; Liaison party (1 Off & 3 EM) to Sigma Ioc.; two FO Teams (1 Off & 2 EH each); 1 AO (1 Off); A 6/27th Quan Loi and B 6/27th Quan Loi and B 6/27th Quan Loi and B 6/27th Quan Loi and B 6/27th Quan Loi. On 6 June aerial reconnaissance of the entire AO was conducted, reconnaissance zones were designated and three Roadrunner teams began preparation for infiltration on 7 June 1967.

a. RECONNAISSANCE TEAM OPERATIONS:

(1) Recon Msn #1: Team received mission order 070900 June 67, conducted aerial recon of RZ 071530 and presented a mission briefback 072000 June 67. Team was scheduled for infiltration into RZ LE CLERO via XT 615002 at 08000 June, however, mission was cancelled due to 5th ARVN Div scheduled ARCLIMHT missions in that area.
(2) Recon Man #2: Team received mission order 080900 June, conducted aerial recon of RZ 081500 and presented mission briefback 081930 June 67. Team attempted infiltration into RZ PATTON vic XT h54838 on 091040 June. As infiltration ship approached LZ, Recon Team Leader observed three VC dressed in khaki and armed with US carbines to the southwest, two more were observed by a second team member. One VC was shot by the team leader and the helicopter lifted off. Mission was aborted due to enemy activity on LZ.

(3) Recon Man #3: Team received mission order 090800 June, conducted aerial recon of RZ 091100 and presented mission briefback 091930 June 67. Team infiltrated RZ BRADLEY vic XT h35318 at 101117 June without incident. After infiltration, the team moved 60 meters west of the LZ when they began to receive AW fire from their right flank, heard brush cracking to their front and three rounds fired from the south. Team leader called for extraction and began moving the team back to the LZ. As they approached the LZ, a team member observed one VC 25 meters to the north wearing a khaki shirt and grey hat armed with an AK-47. After shooting the VC in the right side, three more VC appeared at the same location. Team leader moved onto the LZ and flashed his panel while team took VC under fire. As the team was being infiltrated, one team member lost his weapon after falling from the helicopter as it was lifting off. Recon mission #3 was exfiltrated at 101138 June 67.

(4) Recon Man #4: Team received mission order 092000 June, conducted aerial recon of RZ 101140 and presented mission briefback 101930 June 67. Team infiltrated RZ HALSEY vic XT h49708 at 111302 June without incident. Team moved north of the LZ into the edge of bamboo clumps, formed a defensive perimeter and stopped to listen. After approx three minutes, team heard cracking of bamboo to the north and observed one VC wearing a green shirt and carrying an AK-47 slung over his shoulder. The VC stopped and spoke to someone in a bunker about 20 meters from the team. VC then unslung his weapon and advanced at port arms. At the same time a second VC was spotted advancing on the team from the north-northeast. Team members killed both VC, moved back to the north edge of the LZ, and requested extraction after hearing shouting to the north and northeast. Team was extracted under fire resulting in two USAF team members WIA (one serious), and one WIA recovery man WIA. Team estimated a VC squad (+) on three sides of their position.

(5) Recon Man #5: Cancelled due to inclement weather.

(6) Recon Man #6: Team received mission briefing 121000 June, conducted aerial recon of RZ 121200 June and presented a mission briefback 122000 June 67. Team infiltrated RZ HALSEY vic XT h62695 at 131810 and linked up with TF ASKINE for the purpose of conducting a stay behind mission to capture a NW or documents. Planned break-away from the task force during movement did not take place due to enemy activity. Team performed flank recon and rear guard security during remainder of TF mission and was exfiltrated vic XT h69702 at 171430 June 67 with the Task Force.

(7) Recon Man #7: Team received mission briefing 121000 June, conducted aerial recon of RZ 121500 June and presented mission briefback 122030 June 67. Team infiltrated RZ ALLEN vic XT 373736 at 171550 June in conjunction

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with a resupply mission conducted for 2nd Reaction Company. Team remained with Company until 200610 June when it broke away via XT 376695 to begin its stay behind mission. Team moved to vic XT 379711 and established a recon point to observe an NW trail for the purpose of capturing a PW. Team observed this trail for two days with negative enemy sightings. Team was exfiltrated via XT 377709 at 221120 June 67 without incident.

(8) Recon Msn #8: Team received mission briefing 191930, conducted aerial recon of RZ 203500 June and presented a mission briefback 201900 June 67. Team infiltrated along with Operation LOC 5/6 (Det A-331) Loc Minh via UX 651040 at 211918 June with the mission of conducting a stay behind patrol. Team began stay behind mission via UX 614038 at 221130 June 67. At vic UX 613037 team found a small cache of clothing, grenades and three books. The grenades were defused and the books were captured. At 221150 team spotted three men near a stream via UX 618032, one of whom was cleaning fish, the other two were armed with M-16's and wearing tiger suits. The team moved back and declared an emergency condition by radio then planned to shoot and capture one of the men observed. However, upon arriving at the stream, the VC were no longer there. Team moved SW to vic UX 615032 where they spotted two VC armed with AK-47 rifles running south. After being directed to an LZ by the FAC, team members heard VC yelling "friend", "friend". Team was extracted by sling without receiving hostile fire via UX 616039 at 221506 June 67.

(9) Recon Team #9: Team received mission order 240900 June, conducted aerial recon of RZ 211500 June and presented a mission briefback 251330 June 67. Team infiltrated via XT 469596 at 251330 June 67. After moving 150 meters team heard talking to their front so they moved SE to bypass VC. Vic XT 468825 the team was spotted by a VC in a guard house who gave the alarm. Team moved north approx 100 meters into a clump of bamboo and requested extraction. During the extraction by sling, the team was blocked on three sides and the helicopters attempting recovery sustained heavy damage from hostile fire, resulting in an A/C making a forced landing in enemy controlled territory. A/C destroyed by aerial gunfire the following day. Remainder of A/C were evacuated to Bien Hoa or repaired at FOB.

b. ROADRUNNER TEAM OPERATIONS:

(1) RR Msn #1: Team infiltrated RZ HALSEY via XT 392713 at 071130 June 67 with the mission of route recon. Vic XT 740395, team observed 4 VC dressed in black with khaki hats, but say no weapons. Vic XT 390737 team observed 4 VC moving south along a trail on bicycles. Each man carried two AK-47's slung and 7 rounds of mortar ammunition. Team was exfiltrated via XT 374717 at 061050 June 67 without incident.

(2) RR Msn #2: This mission was aborted on first attempt due to inclement weather on 7 June 67. Team was infiltrated into RZ MINTY via XT 494917 at 081030 June 67. Team found many well used trails along their route. They were observed by a man via XT 503950 who then ran away. Vic XT 472865, team heard music, singing and female voices from a large group of people having a party. Team was exfiltrated via XT 478873 091200 June 67 without incident.

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(3) RR Msn #3: Team infiltrated RZ PATTON vic XT 285965 at 081528 Jun 67. Team apparently became disoriented on infiltration and began to move North instead of East on a trail as planned. Team spotted several VC in vic XT 284970, armed with AK-47 and MAS 36 weapons. Team was exfiltrated vic XT 285973 at 091406 Jun 67.

(4) RR Msn #4: Team infiltrated RZ SL721 vic XT 336869 at 081540 Jun 67. An unknown number of VC with automatic weapons fired at the team vic XT 336893. Team returned fire, evaded and were extracted by rope ladder vic XT 337379 at 091415 June 67 without incident.

(5) RR Msn #5: Team infiltrated vic XT 542818 at 121640 June 67 with a mission of establishing an ambush to capture a NW. Team observed 40 VC vic XT 514819 at 131030 June moving East armed with AK-47, carbines and M-1 rifles. Vic XT 502820 at 131030 team observed 3 VC on bicycles armed with AK-47's moving East on a road. Team attempted to ambush, but a team member made a noise which alerted the VC, who then ran East and fired a signal shot. Team evaded and was exfiltrated vic XT 543855 without incident.

(6) RR Msn #6: Team infiltrated vic XT 539737 at 121640 June and went into an ambush position vic XT 531744 and XT 532737 at 141830 June without incident.

(7) RR Msn #7: Team infiltrated vic XT 645010 at 151650 June on a mission of trail recon. Vic XT 645012, team received 50-60 rounds of AW fire from estimated VC platoon. At 180800 June vic XT 645913, team received fire from an unknown number of VC. At 191530 June team was in position for exfiltration, however, they were afraid to throw smoke because of VC moving near their position. Team then began movement by foot, truck and bus to reach the SIDGII FOB at Quan Loi, arriving at 190850 June 67.

(8) RR Msn #8: Mission cancelled due to scheduled TAC AIR STRIKES vic of infiltration LZ.

(9) RR Msn #9: Team infiltrated vic XT 519917 at 181216 June and moved to a trail vic XT 519869. At 181600 June, team observed two VC pass each other on the trail. The VC wore khaki pants, black shirts and were unarmed. The team had negative contact or sightings during the next two days and were exfiltrated from the Special Forces Camp at Ton Le Chan at 201800 June 67 without incident.

(10) RR Msn #10: Team infiltrated vic XT 321908 at 191132 June 67. At 201130 June, the team observed a VC carrying party and security element numbering 25-30 men vic XT 377850. The VC were heavily camouflaged with grass and moving in a column format. Only one weapon was observed, a Soviet 7.62 carbine. During a scheduled radio contact with the team, the Sigma interpreter understood the team to say, they were in contact with VC elements. The team was exfiltrated vic XT 377857 at 201757 June and after pick up, it was determined that the team had not been in contact.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Pikesville (CONT'D)

(11) RR Msn #11: Team infiltrated vic XT 495653 at 201210 June 67.
At 201800, via 469639, team observed 12 VC moving west on the road. Team saw 3
AK-47's, 2 M-1 rifles, 4 Soviet carbines and 1 PPS-43 SMG. New houses with
underground bunkers were observed vic XT 446664. Team was extracted by rope
ladder vic XT 471645 at 231531 June 67. Gunships providing cover for the
extraction received SAF fire from east of the LZ. No hits were sustained by the
gunships.

(12) RR Msn #12: Team infiltrated vic XT 417605 at 211237 June 67.
At 211700 June vic XT 407623, team received 15-20 rounds of AK fire from an unknown
number of VC with negative casualties. The team fled south without returning fire,
swam the stream vic XT 401617 then moved west. The VC followed the team to the
stream, but did not cross it. Team heard artillery fire from unit at Soul Da and
moved all night in that direction, arriving at 220800 June 67. Team was later ex-
filtrated by Sigma.

(13) RR Msn 13: Team infiltrated vic XT 398905 at 231726 June 67.
Team found a well hidden base camp vic XT 359911 guarded by 6 VC armed with AK-47
and carbines. VC did not fire, but ran south away from the camp. The camp was
new and had 20 huts which would hold 12 people each. One building 15' x 45'
contained USM1 rice. Team had no further contact or significant sightings and
was exfiltrated vic XT 348919 at 261645 June 67 without incident.

(14) RR Msn 14: Team infiltrated vic XT 630910 at 241737 June 67.
Team found many new bunkers vic XT 618926. One bunker had 500 rds linked 30 cal
MG ammo, M-79 grenades, M-26 grenades and Chicom stick grenades of which the team
extracted 100 rds of ammo and all grenades except the Chicom type. At 250915, team
observed 100-125 VC moving past the bunker area. VC wore khaki uniforms, camouflaged
coolie hats and carried heavy rucksacks. The first 10 VC were armed with AK-47
and RPD-46 MGs. At 261130 team was spotted by 5-6 VC vic XT 635945. The team
was able to evade, but had to move by dead reckoning because both teams compasses were
not operating correctly after becoming wet during a stream crossing. Team boarded
a bus from Loc Ninh traveling highway 17 and returned to Sigma FOB 271800 June 67.

(15) RR Msn 15: Team infiltrated vic XT 507759 at 271650 June.
Team set up an ambush on a trail near the infiltration LZ. Shortly afterward two
VC on bicycles came down the trail. The team stopped the VC and told them to drop
their weapons, however, the VC opened fire wounding one team member in the chest.
The team returned fire, killing one VC and wounding the other who escaped. Team
captured one AK-47 and searched the body with negative results. The team began
receiving SAF and SA fire and during the withdrawal they became separated into two
groups. Upon rejoining vic XT 504752 at 271725 it was learned that the two team
members had left the wounded man after he lost consciousness and they could no
longer carry him. At 280730 team again received SAF fire and during evasion, one
man became separated from the team. Team again received fire vic XT 492763. Team
(-) was extracted by sling vic XT 399728 at 291000 June. Team member who became
separated was exfiltrated vic XT 495747 at 291154. Wounded team member is missing
in action.

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AFTER ACTION RE Operation Pikesville (CONT'D)

(16) RR Men 16: Team infiltrated vic XT 465798 at 281514 June. Team was ambushed by a VC force of unknown size at 010610 July. The team leader was T1 and two other team members ran. The remaining member ran and hid in the brush after his weapon was shot from his hands. This man was exfiltrated vic XT 410696 at 01420 July. The other three men are KIA.

(17) RR Men #17: Team infiltrated vic XT 465798 at 281514 June. Team found a comin line vic XT 479794 from which they cut out a 10 meter section. At 281630 and all during the night the team heard shots from the direction of where the comin wire was cut. From an OP established vic XT 468703, team observed 6 VC moving northeast on highway 244. 4 AK-47's and one US cai were observed. Team was exfiltrated vic XT 468703 at 011605 July. One gunship and one slick supporting exfiltration were hit by SA fire resulting in one crew member WIA.

(18) RR Men #18: Team infiltrated vic XT 415738 at 290950 June 67. At 291200 June vic XT 397738 team fired on 12 VC moving south on trail killing 4 VC who were armed with AK-47's and a NVA type 50 SMG. The team became separated at this time after two members moved to the trail and recovered one AK-47 and the type 50 SMG. Team was fired on again trying to cross the Rach Sanh Dai River. Team swam river, but lost the captured weapons, their clothing, compasses and packs. Team (-) walked into camp at Soui Da and was exfiltrated at 101410 July. Remaining separated team members were located and exfiltrated vic XT 375661 at 011812 July.

c. REACTION COMPANY OPERATIONS:

(1) 2nd Reaction Company: Company was composed of five USASF; three USA artillery team and 111 VNN personnel. Unit mission was to recon in force along road 216 from Bo Tu (XT 380857) north to vic of Katum (XT 333898) then south along route TL 4 to vic XT 297830. Primary mission was to locate possible caches, determine unit identification and capture PW's or documents. Company infiltrated RZ SLIM on LZ WHITE vic XT 373825 at 281229 June 67. Company moved south off LZ and made contact with approx 12 VC vic XT 383610 resulting in one KIA or WIA who was carried off. VC attacked a squad ambush in position vic XT 365852 at 291231 June resulting in one VNN slightly WIA. Ten rounds of 60mm mortars were fired and the VC advanced to within 15 meters of company. A combination of artillery, gunships and airstrikes caused contact to be broken at 291450 June. Results were 3 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC KIA (BC). Unit estimated 35 to 40 more VC either KIA or WIA. Made contact with approx 1 platoon of VC in bunkers vic of XT 385866. Company located a base camp area that had been evacuated just prior to arrival of unit. Camp had trenches, bunkers and a mess hall. One building contained 12 AK-47 rifles and numerous mines and ammunition which was all either destroyed or buried. Company moved to the Special Forces Camp at Prek Klok (Det A-322) and returned by C-123 transport to FOB at 011315 July 67.

(2) 1st Reaction Company: Company was composed of five USASF; three USA artillery FO team and 160 VNN personnel. Unit mission was to conduct a recon in force of RZ HODGES, HALSEY and ALLEN and to assist in the insertion of recon team mission #6. Company infiltrated on LZ RED vic XT L75585 at 131304 June 67.
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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Likesville (CONT)

without incident. Vic XT 46795 at 131450 June flank security wounded one VC who fled. At 131642 vic XT 460590, unit received harassing fire from 3 VC who broke contact and fled north. Unit received sniper fire from vic XT 453364 at 141847 June resulting in negative casualties. Harassing fire received from vic XT 453364 at 141642 with negative casualties. Helicopters resupplying the company at 141642 June sustained two hits from small arms fire from the vic of XT 466694. Gunships placed fire into area with unknown results. Company secured LZ vic XT 462695 for the infiltration of recon mission #6. Team infiltrated at 141847 June without incident. At 150939 June forward element of Company received sniper fire from vic XT 468706 which resulted in 1 friendly WIA (DOW) and 2 VC KIA (BC). At 151100 June vic XT 477707, point element came under fire from an unknown size force in concrete bunkers. Results of this encounter were 1 USASF WIA, 1 VNN WIA, 1 VNN MI (IA), 3 VC KIA (BC), 5 VC KIA (Prob). At 160715 an airstrike was placed on the bunker area. Unit established a defensive perimeter vic XT 467702 at 161030 June and at 161205 contact with an unknown number of VC was made on the north and south side of the perimeter resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and negative friendly casualties. At 161205 June an airstrike was placed north and south of perimeter resulting in destruction of bunkers and foxholes and 20 VC KIA (Prob). Company remained in defensive perimeter and at 170515 June received 2 mortars rounds of mortar fire, size unknown from the southwest resulting in friendly casualties of 5 VNN WIA. Unit was exfiltrated from LZ BROWN vic XT 469703 at 171231 June without incident. Recon mission #6 was unable to accomplish its stay behind mission due to enemy activity and was exfiltrated with the company.

(3) 1st Reaction Company: Company was composed of five USASF, three USA artillery FO team and 145 VNN personnel. Unit mission was recon in force of RZ MONTY. Company infiltrated on LZ YELLOW vic XT 467874 at 231520 June without incident. At 231835 June 5 VC were observed vic XT 518998 moving north and were taken under fire with unknown results. A few minutes later rear security element shot and killed 1 VC and captured 1 AK-47 rifle. Company ambush patrol observed 20 to 25 VC building a base camp vic XT 56083 at 241800 June. An airstrike on the base camp area was requested and executed at 250915. Airstrike hit west of target area with negative results. Unit received heavy automatic weapons fire from vic XT 261215 at 261127 June. VC force estimated at one platoon. Gunships suppressed fire and VC moved north. Results were 2 WIA, 1 KIA friendly. Company moved to Special Forces camp at Ton Le Chon and was exfiltrated 271252 June by helicopter without incident.

(4) 2nd Reaction Company: Company was composed of three USASF, three USA artillery FO personnel and 368 VNN. Unit mission was recon in force of RZ ALLEN and assisting in insertion of recon mission #8 as a stay behind patrol. Company and recon mission staged at Minh Thanh (XT 612671) and infiltrated on LZ GREEN vic XT 377373 at 171655 June 67. At 180535 June vic XT 367733 company made contact with an estimated platoon of VC. 6 VC were armed with AK-47's and carbines. Artillery and mortar fire were placed on the VC who withdrew south. Results of contact were 5 VC WIA (prob), 2 VNN friendly WIA. Recon mission #7 detached from Company at 200630 June and moved into an ambush position vic XT 376695. At 201655 June the Company encountered an estimated 2 platoon size VC force vic XT 506697. Several rounds of mortar fire were received shortly after contact with negative friendly casualties. Sigma FAC directed an airstrike vic XT 402699 resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC), 3 bicycles destroyed and 1 VNN friendly WIA.
AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Pikesville (CONT)

At 210930 June company elements ambushed 2 VC on bicycles moving north-south on trail vic XT 114691. VC fled north leaving one Chicom carbine and both bicycles. Company made contact with an unknown size VC force vic XT L12678 at 211200 June 67. Gunships and artillery fire were placed on area with unknown results. Friendly losses were 3 VNN WIA and 1 US KIA (attached FO party). At 211522 June the company received mortar fire on their position vic XT L10673 resulting in 3 VNN WIA and 1 VNN KIA (body could not be recovered). Counter artillery fire and an airstrike were placed on suspected enemy positions vic XT L12671 resulting in 75 bunkers and fighting holes uncovered and 25 bunkers destroyed. At 211915 June vic XT L12671 Sigma gunships killed 1 VC (IC). Company was exfiltrated from RZ HALSEY vic XT L15685 at 231332 June 67 without incident.

5. (C) ENEMY INFORMATION: Many battalion and a multi-battalion size base camps were located in the AO. Throughout the AO it is possible to move 100-300 meters in any direction and find new bunkers and/or foxholes. Strong points are located throughout the AO utilizing squad to platoon size security elements. These strong points can be reinforced by reaction forces in a time span of 30 minutes to one hour if the VC choose to defend. The L2's in the AO including one helicopter size L2's are fortified with bunkers facing the long axis of the L2. All VC combat troops encountered were armed with AK-47 or some type of IMG. VC captured or killed carried a complete basic load of ammo and grenades. Weapons and ammo were in good condition, many were new. No guerrillas were encountered in the AO, all contacts were with main force type units. All caches located were in structures and in good condition. Wooden platforms had been built approx 12 to 18 inches above ground level to allow air circulation for both food and equipment. All caches were located near VC base camps or had a security element guarding it.

b. The VC are apparently using the AO as a Army staging area for training and re-equipping of VC forces and as a logistical base to support other tactical zones within RVN.

6. (C) RESULTS OF ENCOUNTER WITH THE ENEMY:

a. Friendly losses:
   (1) KIA: 1 USA; 2 VNN
   (2) WIA: 6 USASF; 6 USA; 20 VNN
   (3) MIA: 3 VNN
   (4) Equipment: Aircraft - helicopters: 14 damaged and 1 destroyed; OEL: 1 damaged.

b. Enemy losses:
   (1) KIA - 27 (BC), 2 (pos)
   (2) KBA - 74 (BC), 25 (pos)
   (3) KB - Art - unknown
   (4) VCC - none
   (5) Equipment:
      (a) Weapons and ammo: 5 AK-47; 1 SKS; 1 Chicom B-40 RL w/4 projectiles and 2 Chin Claymores.
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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Pikesville (CONTD)

(b) Clothing and Equipment:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>ITEM</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
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<td>32 tubes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toothbrush, new</td>
<td>50 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hat, jungle, green</td>
<td>1 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco, package</td>
<td>20 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needle, package</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloth, gray, new</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycles parts, new, package</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garlic, 10 lb bag</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pepper, 30 lb bag</td>
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<tr>
<td>Playing cards (US type), new</td>
<td>5 decks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Milk, condensed (US type)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tire, bicycle, new</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar, 10 lb bag</td>
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<td>Peanuts, 3 lb bag, new</td>
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<td>Net, Mosquito</td>
<td>1 ea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blanket</td>
<td>2 ea</td>
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<td>Pistol belt, canteen w/cover</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hairpins, package</td>
<td>1 ea</td>
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<td>Ground sheets</td>
<td>5 ea</td>
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<td>Razors, safety, new</td>
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<td>Weapon, .45</td>
<td>4 ea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weapon, AK-47</td>
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<td>SKS Carbine</td>
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<tr>
<td>10mm Rocket Launcher (Chicom)</td>
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(c) Miscellaneous:

1. Total installations located: 21

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bn size complete</td>
<td>XT442703</td>
<td>1st Co</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bn size complete</td>
<td>XT469827</td>
<td>Rom 9</td>
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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Pikesville (CONT)

En size complete: XT370855 2nd Co
Base area w. 70 bldg: XT359911 FR 13
and rice cach.: Co base camp XT37692 FAC
Co base camp XT32697 FAC
Co base camp XT352747 FAC
Strong points XT526838 Rcn 2
XT65817 Rcn 3
XT49708 Rcn 4
XT383851 Gunships
XT68704 1st Co
XT56867 1st Co
XT369825 2nd Co
XT34858 2nd Co
XT68703 Gunships
XT502790 Pearl Diver
XT591038 A-331
XT586052 A-331
XT58745 A-331

2. Installations and items damaged and destroyed:

<table>
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<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
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<tr>
<td>XT67702</td>
<td>10 bunkers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>XT49708</td>
<td>2 bunkers</td>
<td>9 bunkers</td>
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<tr>
<td>XT42671</td>
<td>25 bunkers</td>
<td>75 bunkers and fighting holes</td>
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<tr>
<td>XT34855</td>
<td>20 land mines, 2 cases</td>
<td>7.62 ammo, 7 AK-47, 2 claymores</td>
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</table>

7. (C) SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES:

a. Propaganda analysis: None
b. Hamlets encountered: None
c. Changes in tactics: N/A
d. Suspected infiltration routes: There is a vast road and trail system throughout the AO and all trails and roads encountered in the AO had signs of traffic. The majority of trails and roads run north and south. Particularly heavy ox cart traffic was noted on Rts 4 and trails north of Katum XT332899 and SE of Katum on Rts 24L6 to the bridge XT 337894. Rts 24L6, 24L4, 213 and the NS trail below Bo Tec XT 380857 contained evidence of heavy bicycles and foot traffic. The VC are using these road and trail systems both day and night to move personnel and supplies.

8. (C) WAS MISSION ACCOMPLISHED: Yes.

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9. *(c)* **PROBLEM AREAS:** Some problem areas manifested themselves during the conduct of the operation. These were as follows:

a. Adverse weather conditions during the period of the operation seriously hampered the maximum utilization of attached air support. From the beginning of the Sigma operation, it was observed that severe weather conditions would be a major deterrent in the efficient accomplishment of the mission. This proved to be true. Flying conditions during the entire operation averaged four hours per day. This type weather condition can be expected during the southwest monsoon period over most of III CTZ, however, it progressively improves the further south one moves in the zone.

b. Existing organic communications facilities proved to be inadequate to satisfy the demands of rapid and timely transmission of information obtained by Sigma.

c. The number of attached helicopters proved to be insufficient to support the many operations which were being conducted simultaneously. Many planned missions had to be cancelled due to lack of sufficient aircraft to support the missions.

d. There was a slow feedback of intelligence developed from information gathered by the detachment.

e. No trained interrogation personnel are assigned or attached to the detachment. It was felt that valuable combat information and OB was lost through interpretation/translation and the absence of trained interrogators, using correct interrogation techniques.

f. Heavily defoliated, sparsely vegetated and heavily bombed areas are not conducive to Sigma type operations. The covert nature of Sigma operations necessitate the presence of sufficient vegetation to provide cover and concealment for the committed recon elements.

g. A critical shortage of US personnel, especially in the MOS 05E, 91B and 11F exist in the detachment. This shortage of personnel seriously limits the number and frequency of recon teams committed in an AO.

10. *(c)* **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

a. During future Sigma operations, higher headquarters provide "HOT LINE" communications from Sigma TTO to their TTO. This would satisfy the requirement of instant communications placed on Sigma by higher headquarters and which is so vital to the transmission of timely information which then could be used to exploit the situation.

b. A minimum of 10 UH-1D and 5 UH-1C helicopters should be on hand at the FOB to support plans that call for the employment of 5 UH-1D and 2 UH-1C helicopters. This is necessary due to required maintenance of the aircraft, replacement of aircraft damaged in combat and the time delay of bringing replacement
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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Pikesville (COMD)

aircraft from Bien Hoa. Additionally, sufficient aircrew would be available to
permit rotation of pilots during the operation to insure that proficiency is not
impaired due to fatigue. During the operation a total of 7 UH-1D aircraft
commanders accumulated 656 hours total flying time in 142 flying days, for an
average of 4 hours 35 minutes per aircraft commander per flying day. Three of
these aircraft commanders had 25 consecutive flying days. Of these 656 hours,
nearly all was combat assault, a large portion of which was actually under in-
tense enemy fire in which many hits were taken by the aircraft, resulting in a
total of 15 aircraft becoming unserviceable due to combat damage. Additionally,
several air crew members were WIA.

c. That agencies processing information gathered by Sigma complete the
processing and disseminate the intelligence formulated as soon as possible to
permit rapid exploitation of the tactical situation.

d. That higher headquarters attach one IPW team to Sigma during the
period of combat operations.

e. That a maximum effort be made to bring Sigma up to authorized
strength, particularly in MOS 91B, 05B and 11F.

II. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. That the VC are using war zone as a fortified army area. They have
established within the area, numerous large and small size base areas, logistical
support sites, training areas, R&R areas and hospital facilities. More of these
type facilities are in the process of being constructed and improvement made to
existing facilities.

b. That the VC are using the facilities mentioned in paragraph 1 above,
to support the staging of troops for commitment in other areas of RVN.

c. That the VC are using War Zone "C" as a secure and relatively in-
volate infiltration area for the introduction of troops and supplies from Cambodia.

C. T. HENLEY
LTC, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
SPECIAL
1 ea - CO, Co A, 5th SFCA, 1st SF
1 ea - CO, 5th SFCA, 1st SF
1 ea - CO, 23rd Arty Grp
1 ea - Co, II FFV
1 ea - MiCV J-211
1 ea - Files

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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Pikesville (CONT)
334th Armed Helicopter Company (-)

1. (C) PROBLEM AREAS:

a. Reaction time for reaching critical areas.
   
b. Availability of aircraft.
   
c. Pilot Fatigue.
   
d. AO coverage and number of operations per number of aircraft.
   
e. Gunship reaction.

2. (C) DISCUSSION:

a. For a suitable reaction time, in an operational area of this size
   the aircraft should be centrally located. In some instances the reconnaissance
   teams were located 46,000 meters from the FOB.

b. Many operations were planned where a minimum of 5 UH-1D aircraft
   were required. Due to maintenance limitations of this location and combat damage
   combined with the time limitation of bringing up replacement aircraft from Bien
   Hoa, many of these missions could not be accomplished.

   c. A total of seven UH-1D aircraft commanders accumulated 656 hours
      total flying time in 142 days, for an average of 4 hours and 35 minutes per
      aircraft commander per flying day. Three of these aircraft commanders had 25
      consecutive flying days. Of these 656 hours, nearly all were combat assault,
      a large portion were actually under fire in which many hits were taken in the air-
      craft and several air crewmen were injured.

   d. In at least one instance the aircraft were on a separate operation
      and had to go to another airfield to refuel after being called for an emergency
      extraction. In this extraction 7 aircraft were damaged, one of which was destroyed,
      and 3 air crewmen were injured. Had the aircraft been immediately available the
      enemy situation possibly would not have developed into such organic fire power to be
      placed on the aircraft.

   e. The UH-1C could not take off with fuel from the FOB thereby
      causing a minimum of 15 minutes delay when scrambled.

3. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. In future planning the area of operation be smaller or the FOB
   be centrally located within the AO.

b. A minimum of 7 UH-1D helicopters and 4 UH-1C helicopters be on hand
   at the FOB when plans are being made for 5 UH-1D and 2 UH-1C helicopters. The
   reserve helicopters should never be used while the others are in use.
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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Pikesville (CONT'D)

334th Armed Helicopter Company (-)

c. The number of pilots should be increased or the missions decreased so that crew members do not average more than 3 hours per day to insure that his proficiency is at a safe level.

d. When an American team is on the ground, a minimum of 3 UH-1D and 2 UH-1C helicopters should be on immediate stand by for extraction.

e. The FOB be located adjacent to a runway or an area with sufficient running room to allow the UH-1C to be armed and fueled at all times.

SUPPORT STATISTICS 334th Armed Helicopter Company

DURATION: 27 days (6 June - 2 July)

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<th>BREAKDOWN</th>
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<tr>
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<td>A/C AVIATORS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>253+30 9.75 2 4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>578+45 21.4 5 10</td>
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<td>TOTAL (27 days)</td>
<td>832+15 30.8 100% 100%</td>
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RESULTS:

- KBA: 15
- WRA: 11
- STRUCTURES (DEST OR DAM): 13
- CARGO TONS: 19
- MED EVAC: 23
- FAX: 1,895

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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Pikesville (CONT'D)

334th Armed Helicopter Company (-)

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6th Battalion, 27th Artillery

1. The 23d Artillery Group provided artillery support to Detachment B-56 (Sigma) 5th Special Forces (Abn) during "Operation Pikesville", during the period 6 June through 1 July 1967.

2. The Commanding Officer, 23d Artillery Group having knowledge of Operation Pikesville being conducted in an area within range of the artillery weapons of the group devised the concept of support which proved highly successful. An artillery liaison team, two forward observer parties, an aerial observer, and two radio relay stations were placed in support of the Sigma operation.

   a. The liaison team being located at the tactical operations center was an immediate source of information and advice for the Sigma Commander. The team also provided the forward observer with information on what artillery units were within range and the radio frequencies on which to contact them. The liaison team received and passed on to Group the location of base camp areas, troop concentrations, infiltration routes and Viet Cong supply and storage areas discovered by the recon elements. These discoveries then became targets for destruction, harassment, and for interdiction. Another responsibility of the liaison section was to clear target areas for H and I fires.

   b. The forward observer party attached to each company during company operations provided the ground commander immediate artillery support when required. The FO also strengthened the defensive posture by adjusting in defensive concentrations around the night positions. The effect of these defensive fires was evident when companies were attacked and defensive concentrations were called in the contact was immediately broken.

   c. A concept of using an air observer in conjunction with a ground observer was developed during this operation. This concept proved invaluable in that it allowed more rapid and accurate adjustment of the artillery. The air observer was able to see the round explode, thus eliminating adjusting by guess, which would have been required by the ground observer due to thick jungle growth. Also, the ground observer could identify the exact location of friendly troops with much less risk. Another responsibility of the aerial observer was to adjust the preparatory fires on the landing zone. Through coordination with the forward air controller, areas to be covered were divided between the air strike and the artillery which made for more complete coverage, and a safer landing zone. The results of this were no friendly casualties, and a minimum of hostile fire on any of the four company landings. The air observer flew twenty six missions for a total of seventy seven and three quarters in thirteen days.

   d. The establishment of radio relay stations in the east and west of the AO insured continuous communications with the ground observer, and further enhanced rapid reaction to fire. Prior to the establishment of the relay stations, calls for fire were relayed through two to three stations.

3. Lessons learned during this operation were:

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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Pikesville (CONT'D)

6th Battalion, 27th Artillery

a. That liaison personnel located at the TOC provided invaluable assistance to the ground commander in planning his operations, and made it possible for more rapid reaction by the artillery support during operations.

b. That the ground observer is necessary in that it provides the ground commander an immediate source of artillery support through experienced persons having full knowledge of the capabilities of the artillery.

4. Recommendation for future operations are:

a. That artillery liaison personnel be included during the planning stages. This would give the ground commander necessary information as to location, availability and caliber of weapons which could support his operations. Also, this would provide the artillery commander with information as to the amount of support required, and allows him to determine the necessity of relocating his units to provide more effective support.

b. That liaison teams be organized prior to the beginning of an operation and that these personnel work throughout the operation in order to provide continuity.

5. The support provided by the 23d Group was as follows:

a. Personnel:

(1) Liaison team consisting of one officer (Captain).

(2) An officer (lieutenant) aerial observer.

(3) Two artillery forward observer teams, each consisting of one officer (lieutenant) and two enlisted men.

(4) Two ground relay stations, one at Tong Le Chau (XT 622310) and the other at Prek Klok (XT 275785) consisting of three personnel each.

b. Equipment:

(1) Five (5) AN/VRC 46 radios with power supply.

(2) Six (6) telephones TA 312 PT.

(3) Two (2) PRC 25 radios.

(4) Other equipment organic to a forward observer party.

(5) The radio teletype equipment from "A" Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery was also used to transmit messages from Quan Loi to 23d Artillery Group at Phu Loi.
AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Pikesville (CONT'D)

6th Battalion, 27th Artillery

6. Artillery Fire Support:

(1) "A" Battery, 6th Battalion 27th Artillery (8" How-175mm Gun)

(2) "B" and "C" Batteries 2d Battalion 32d Artillery (8" How - 175mm Gun)

(3) "B" and "C" Batteries 1st Battalion 27th Artillery (155mm How)

7. Ammunition Expenditure:

(1) 155mm How - 364 rounds

(2) 8" How - 556 rounds

(3) 175mm Gun - 385 rounds.

CHARLES M. HOOD, JR.
CPT, Artillery
Artillery Liaison Officer

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1 - CO, 6th Bn 27th Arty
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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Pikesville (CONT'D)

AIR LIAISON OFFICER REPORT

On operation Pikesville the tactical air control party flew 74 OIF sorties and directed 36 fighter sorties in support of ground operations. On this operation Sigma initiated a Pearl Diver concept which is in essence a scaled down Eagle Flight in which 15-25 troops are at ground alert with helicopters standing by. The FAC and gunships will perform a VR at high and/or low altitude to find VC moving on a road or trail near a LZ. On sighting VC they are hit by an airstrike or the gunships as deemed necessary. Then the troops are landed to gather the equipment, information and NW's while the FAC and gunships provide combat air patrol. Care must be used in this operation to prevent committing a small number of troops against an unsuspected hidden enemy force nearby. Continuous visual surveillance is necessary to prevent the VC from removing his casualties with weapons and information.

Many base camps and occupied positions were discovered and plotted. These were not struck with preplanned air strikes because the one assigned OIF aircraft had to remain on alert to support troops on the ground. Two arclights were requested thru Army channels on large occupied fortified locations, but neither had been executed by the end of Operation Pikesville. All requests for airstrikes were either LZ preps, troops in contact, VC in the open, or occupied positions confirmed by ground or air observers.

The MX 109 radio jeep had a power failure 3 days before the end of the operation and we were not able to make repairs. In this instance reports were submitted and airstrikes requested thru Hussey Control. The assigned OIF was delivered to Di An for use of the 2nd Bde, 1st Inf Div on 2 July 67 until Sigma is assigned another operation.

NORMAN E. GIBBONS
CPT
USAF
FAC

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OPERATION PIKESVILLE (CONTD)

1. Detachment A-331, Loc Ninh conducted operations in AO Bear assigned to Project Sigma. The following is a narrative of actions during the period 22 June to 1 July 1967.

   a. Operation Loc 5/6: At 221430 June a force of 1 USASF and 160 CIDG made contact with 5 VC armed with 2 K-50 via XU 591029. Results were 1 VC KIA (BC). At 221630 element made contact with an estimated VC company via XU 591038. Unit moved into a defensive position for the night. Extensive artillery and air strikes contained the VC during the night. A C-47 armed gunship supporting the unit received .50 cal tracer fire from via XU 592047 June 67. Two Mike Force companies infiltrated by helicopter via XU 591535 with a mission of reinforcement and continued the operation. At 221056 June, Mike Force element made contact with 2 VC squads with 86. During pursuit of the VC force, Mike Force element began to receive heavy AW fire from via XU 586205. A reinforced VC company forced the unit to withdraw northwest and contact was broken with gunships and air strikes. The combined unit of Mike Force and Det A-331 withdrew to Loc Ninh, closing at 240015 June 67.

   b. Operation Loc 6/6: An airlight strike was conducted via XU 587045 at 280500 June 67. 1 USASF and 2 CIDG companies were committed with a mission of BDA. Contact was made with 2 VC companies at 281044 June. Two Mike Force companies infiltrated via XU 596072 at 281555 to reinforce CIDG unit. Both units returned to Loc Ninh at 281745 June 67.

   c. Total Losses: Opn Loc 5/6, 6/6, Mike Force

   (1) Friendly:

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   (2) Enemy Losses:

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AFTER ACTION REPORT: OPERATION PIKESVILLE (U)

OPORD 10-67 (OPERATION PIKESVILLE (U))
References: Maps, RVN and Cambodia, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6231 I, 6232 II, 6331 IV, 6232 III, 6332 IV; Series L7016, 6232 I.

1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy forces: Annex A (intelligence)
   b. Friendly forces:
      (1) 11 FFV.
      (2) 1st Inf Div.
      (3) 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div (OPCON 25th Inf Div).
      (4) 7th USAF
      (5) 5th SF (Abn), 1st SF
      (6) A Bty, 6/27 Arty.
      (7) B Bty, 2/32 Arty
   c. Attachments and detachments:
      (1) 1st & 4th Platoons, 334th Armed Helicopter Company.
      (2) 184th Aviation Company (-)
      (3) ALO/FAC Party remains attached.
      (4) detachments: None

2. MISSION
   Project SIGMA (Det B-56) conducts reconnaissance operations within AO BEAR to locate enemy units, caches, infiltration routes and to capture POW's. Based on intelligence developed by Roadrunner Teams, Reconnaissance Teams will then be infiltrated to further develop intelligence. 1st, 2d and 3d Reaction Companies will stand by to assist in extraction of Roadrunner/Reconnaissance Teams, to exploit on order information obtained by Roadrunner/Reconnaissance Teams and to conduct other operations on order.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of operation.
      (1) Maneuver: Project SIGMA Roadrunner Teams will infiltrate assigned Reconnaissance Zones (RZ's) within AO BEAR (Annex B, Op Overlay) commencing 6 June 67 to locate enemy units, caches, infiltration routes, and attempts to capture POW's. Based on intelligence developed by Roadrunner Teams, Reconnaissance Teams will then be infiltrated to further develop intelligence. 1st, 2d and 3d Reaction Companies will stand by to assist in extraction of Roadrunner/Reconnaissance Teams, to exploit on order information obtained by Roadrunner/Reconnaissance Teams and to conduct other operations on order.
      (2) Fire Support: 7th USAF and attached fire team provides close air support. Artillery support will be available for portions of the AO. Artillery fires to be coordinated through and provided by DS and GSR units supporting 1st Inf Div.
   b. General Plan: Operation Pikesville will be conducted in AO BEAR in three phases from 5 Jun to 5 Jul 67.
      (1) Phase I commences 5 Jun 67 with the quartering party and the 2d Reaction Company moving to and establishing a Forward Operations Base (FOB) at Quan Loi (XT807899). The command element, 1st and 3d Reaction Companies and Recon Company will close the FOB NLT 071200 Jun 67. The command air reconnaissance will be conducted NLT 071200 Jun 67. Teams to be initially infiltrated will be issued OPORD and air recon will be conducted prior to 071200 Jun 67.
      (2) Phase II consists of infiltration/exfiltration of SIGMA Roadrunner/Reconnaissance Teams from 6 Jun through 1 Jul 67.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Pikesville (CONT)

(3) Phase III consists of closing out FOB and returning to Base Camp NLT 5 Jul 67.

   (1) Infiltrate Roadrunner/Reconnaissance Teams into assigned RZ's to accomplish assigned mission, commencing 6 Jun 67.
   (2) Be prepared to act as guides for Reaction Companies or other forces when committed.

b. 1st Reaction Company, Det B-56.
   (1) Be prepared to assist in the extraction of committed Roadrunner/Reconnaissance Teams.
   (2) Be prepared to deploy to exploit information developed by the Roadrunner/Reconnaissance Teams.
   (3) Be prepared to act as guides for other forces when committed.
   (4) Be prepared to conduct reconnaissance in force missions within AO on order.

c. 2d Reaction Company, Det B-56.
   (1) Establish FOB at Quan Loi (XT807899) on 5 Jun 67.
   (2) Be prepared to assist in the extraction of committed Roadrunner/Reconnaissance Teams.
   (3) Be prepared to deploy to exploit information developed by the Roadrunner/Reconnaissance Teams.
   (4) Be prepared to act as guides for other forces when committed.
   (5) Be prepared to conduct reconnaissance in force missions within AO on order.

d. 3d Reaction Company, Det B-56.
   (1) Be prepared to assist in the extraction of committed Roadrunner/Reconnaissance Teams.
   (2) Be prepared to deploy to exploit information developed by the Roadrunner/Reconnaissance Teams.
   (3) Be prepared to act as guides for other forces when committed.
   (4) Be prepared to conduct reconnaissance in force missions within AO on order.

e. Supporting artillery: Provide artillery support to committed Roadrunner/Reconnaissance Teams and/or Reaction Companies.

f. 1st & 4th Platoons, 334th Armed Helicopter Company.
   (1) Provide one command and control aircraft, four slicks and three gunships for reconnaissance, infiltration/exfiltration of committed forces.
   (2) Conduct other operations on order.

h. 181st Aviation Company (-).
   (1) Provide two OIE Radio Relay aircraft for continuous daylight air relay while forces are committed.
   (2) Provide fixes and navigational assistance on call for committed forces.

i. Forward Air Control Party.
   (1) Provide fixes and navigational assistance on call for committed forces.
   (2) Assist in infiltration and exfiltration/extraction of committed forces.
   (3) Conduct T/C air strikes and VR's on order.
   (4) Conduct other operations on order.

k. Coordinating instructions.
   (1) RZ's will be assigned by CO, Det B-56.
   (2) Priorities of reconnaissance: RZ's DOG, CAT and TIGER.
   (3) Deploying forces to give briefbacks NLT 3 hrs prior to infiltration.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Pikesville (CONFID)

(1) Ten slicks and four gunships will be provided by II FFV on a
SIGMA SCRAMBLE with a two hour reaction time. (12th Avn Grp).
(5) Teams/Units will be debriefed at FOB immediately after exfiltration/
extraction.
(6) Section leaders of 334th Armed Helicopter Co and 184th Avn Co
report to CO, Det B-56 NL 021000 Jun 67 for briefing.
(7) Teams extracted by sling will be landed for recovery at locations
designated by CO, Det B-56.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
   a. Administration.
      (1) Mail will be delivered and picked up daily depending on availability
      of aircraft.
      (2) Subsistence advance will be given by S1 to two major units on a weekly
      basis.
      (3) USASF personnel will receive monthly pay at end of month at FOB.
      (4) All personnel departing/arriving at FOB will sign-in and out with
      Det SGM.
   (5) All personnel departing/arriving at Base Camp will sign-in and out
      with the S1.
   b. Logistics.
      (1) Supply;
      (a) Class I. Hot meals will be available at FOB effective 070600 Jun 67,
      (b) Class II. Basic issue accomplished at Base Camp; limited TA
      and TO&E available at FOB.
      (c) Class III. Type A and B available at FOB through supporting
      unit (TF DIXIE NORTH, 1st Inf Div).
      (d) Class IV. Available at FOB.
      (e) Class V. All personnel to carry basic load; re-supply available
      at FOB with back-up from Base Camp.
      (2) Maintenance: Mechanics available at FOB.
      (3) Medical evacuation and hospitalization. Unit SOP.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   a. Signal;
      (2) SOI to be issued at FOB.
   b. Command.
      (1) On infiltrations, exfiltrations/extractions CO, Det B-56 airborne in
      C&C aircraft.
      (2) CO, Det B-56, available on call in C&C aircraft.
      (3) At all other times CO, Det B-56, will be located at the FOB at
      Quan Loi (X2807899).

Acknowledgments:

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Annexes: A - Intelligence
   B - Op Overlay- Withdrawn, Hqs, DA
   C - Signal (Omitted)
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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Pikosville (CONT'D)

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Det B-56, 3rd SPG (Abn)
1st SF
Camp Ho Ngoc Tao, RVN
Oil200H Jun 67

ANNEX A (Intelligence) to OPORD 10-67 (OPERATION PIKESVILLE) (U)

Reference: Maps, SVN, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6231 I, IV; 6232 II, III; 6331 IV; 6332 III; Series L7016, Sheets 6232 I, IV.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION
   a. Area of interest: The geographic area of interest is bounded by the following coordinates: XU7413, XT6686, XT5554, XT4554, XT5580, XT2797, XT3599, XT3995, XT2921, XT1293, XT5890, XU5500, XU5807, XU3711, XU6013.
      The area of interest encompasses approximately 1,500 square kilometers. The south and western sector of the AO (Tay Ninh Province) is principally of the flat delta terrain and will be subject to inundation during the period of this operation. The north and eastern portion of the AO (Binh Long Province) has gently rolling terrain with elevations generally between 50 and 200 meters with few exceptions. Throughout our AO, extensive broad leaf evergreen forest exist forming continuous single and double canopy jungle, with an exception in the western sector where dense growths of bamboo exist. The AO is sparsely populated and all people within should be considered hostile. The primary roads, running north to south are: Route 13 east of the AO; Route 4 west of the AO; Route 244 center of the AO.
      Roads running east to west are: Route 7 north in the AO; Route 246 center of AO and Interprovincial Route 13 south in the AO. Overall, the AO contains numerous trails and small roads leading off the primary routes.
   b. Order of battle. Based on reports compiled by II Field Force, Vietnam, the probable VC/NVA units normally operating within the AO are:

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2. EEI AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
   a. EEI:
      (1) Where are the VC/NVA headquarters and bases areas within the AO?
      (2) What routes are utilized by the VC/NVA in the AO for troop and supply movement?
      (3) What VC/NVA main force units are operating in the AO?
      (4) Where are the arm and ammunition storage areas? Do they contain 120mm mortars and/or 100mm rockets?
   b. Other intelligence requirements:
      (1) Are there any major political elements located in the AO? Where are their headquarters and base areas?
      (2) What is the attitude of the local inhabitants towards the VC/NVA?
      (3) Does the local populace appear to be supporting the VC/NVA with food, intelligence, personnel and money?
      (4) What means do the VC/NVA employ in moving personnel and supplies?

3. CREDITS AND REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION
   None

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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Operation Pikesville (CONT'D)

4. MISCELLANEOUS
   a. Prisoners of War, documents and material will be evacuated as soon as possible to FOB.
   b. Maps will be issued at FOB by S2.
   c. Personnel entering the AO or flying over same will wear ID tags only. Wallets, etc, will be turned into the S1 for safe keeping.
   d. Time permitting, all camps and VC/NVA will be searched for documents and other evidence to unit identification.

Acknowledge.

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