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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (H) (14 Mar 68) FOR OT RD-674290

22 March 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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Major General, USA
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1st Logistical Command
IST LOGISTICAL COMMAND

OPERATIONAL REPORT
LESSONS LEARNED

1 AUGUST - 31 OCTOBER
1967

FOR OT RD 674290
AVCA CG

11 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
APO 96375

Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20315

The Operational Report of this headquarters for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 is forwarded in accordance with Army Regulation 1-19 and USARV Regulation 870-2.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

SIDNEY V. BINGHAM, JR.
COLONEL, VGS
Chief of Staff

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SECTION I: SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

A. (U) COMMAND SECTION. During the past 3 months, the 1st Logistical Command bid farewell to General Lollis as he left to command Army Tank Automotive Command and welcomed Major General Thomas K. Scott, Jr. as the new commanding general. The headquarters was visited by Department of the Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson, Vice Chief of Staff General Ralph E. Haines, Jr., and Deputy Commanding General U.S. Vietnam General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. Intensive interest in better management has been the singular highlight of the period to ensure that the fighting troops have the materials and tools to do their job when they are needed and the 1st Logistical Command is operating efficiently in providing those supplies. Better management will promote more efficient use of personnel resources to the betterment of the command. (Complete list of visitors is included in this report as Inclosure 8.)

B. (U) SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR MATERIAL READINESS, Annex A. The Material Readiness Expediter (MRE) program continued to be of great benefit to the command. MREs provide a direct link between logistical agencies and supported units through scheduled visits to unearth problems and expedite solutions. This is accomplished by personal accelerations of standard supply and maintenance procedures in areas of need. Improved managerial techniques as well as continued personal contact with unit personnel have resulted in the maintaining of an average processing time of 10 days which is the established objective of this office. The reporting units continue to closely scrutinize and analyze previously reported items before submitting the succeeding report.

C. (C) ACofS, PERSONNEL, ANNEX B, C, D. The most significant activities conducted were the implementation of the Long Binh Post People to People program which involves 223,000 Vietnamese residing in 82 hamlets in the Long Binh post area, the shipment of 2,445,906 lbs. (1,023 short tons) of commodities through the Civic Action Distribution Point and the continued efforts by all subordinate units in the conduct of military civic action and community relations programs.

D. (U) ADJUTANT GENERAL. For Adjutant General activities, refer to annex E.

E. (U) CHAPLAIN, Annex F. As of 31 October 1967, 1st Logistical Command had total authorizations for 77 chaplains. 63 of these spaces are filled with 49 Protestant and 14 Catholic chaplains. 71 of the 77 authorizations for chaplain are filled. Chapel attendance percent of strength experienced a small decrease. This reduction was created by personnel turbulence. The number of services each chaplain...
conducted per week exceeded the US Army Vietnam (USARV) goal in each month except September. A newly established monthly Chaplain Civic Action Report indicated that 1,453,584 VN were donated through chapel offerings to civic action projects during August, September, and October. The flow of supplies to chaplain customers in the field has improved.

F. (C) SPECIAL SERVICES, Annex G. Final field tests confirmed the superior qualities of the German manufactured barbed tape and concertina wire. Boston Whaler boats have been operational in the support command areas with some difficulties encountered in one of the areas. No action has been realized as yet on the movement of the ARVN ammunition discharge site at Nha Be. The third US Coast Guard Explosive Loading Team is awaiting approval for employment in the Qui Nhon area. Implementation of provisions of LC 125-2 has been initiated and a team visited Qui Nhon Support Command to make evaluations and assist the command as needed to control and safeguard US supplies and military property. A test force of direct hire civilian guards is pending approval. Improvement in physical security measures at ammunition supply facilities is continuing and has permitted substantial reduction in security guard forces at these facilities.

G. (U) SPECIAL SERVICES, Annex H. Progress continues in all areas of the 1st Logistical Command Special Services program. Increased command emphasis has reduced the number of "no-shows" for R&R flights. A Table of Allowances has been published for sports equipment. 186,000 troops were entertained by professional and military touring shows. This command was assigned the mission of supporting the 1967 Bob Hope Christmas Show. Three new service clubs were opened. A change of supply procedures makes it easier for Property Book Officers to obtain supplies and equipment. Twelve photo shops and seven multiple type craft facilities have been opened. Four new libraries and twenty field collections were opened. "Army Times" is to be mailed directly to units from Tokyo.

H. (U) ACoS, SP&O, SECURITY DIVISION, Annex I. Hostile forces conducted four major attacks which affected this command: two against POL depots, one convoy ambush, and one against a motor pool. On 21 August 1967, 1st Logistical Command Regulation 604-5 was published to delineate responsibilities and prescribe procedures for the personnel security clearance program. Several messages were sent to the subordinate units of the command concerning security of personnel and installations during the period of the Vietnamese elections, 3 September and 22 October 1967. Additional administrative orders were published to enhance the security awareness of members of the command.
I. (C) ACofS, S&O, PLANS DIVISION, Annex J. During August, representatives from this command attended the CINCPAC Capabilities Conference at Camp Smith, Hawaii. The purpose of this conference was to develop forces for deployment to RVN through FY 68. A Defense Against Rocket and Mortar Attack (DARMA) Survey was conducted to determine all active and passive defensive measures that have been taken and others that could be taken to implement DARMA.

Representatives of this command attended United States Army, Vietnam (USARV Ad Hoc Study Group) Base Development Program meetings and made field trips in August, September, and October 1967. The purpose of these meetings and field trips was to review base development requirements in the light of austerity and to make recommendations for adjustments of base plans. During September, representatives of this command attended a USARV (G-4) meeting to review the overall mission of the US 7th Air Force/United States Army, Vietnam (7th AF/USARV) Joint Logistics Survey Team.

J. (C) ACofS, S&O, OPERATIONS DIVISION, Annex K. There were several unrelated events which highlighted command activities. Two brigade-size organizations arrived in the Republic of Vietnam. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment deployed to Vietnam from Thailand over the period 18-23 September, arriving by sea at Newport. This unit was received, serviced, and transported to its base camp by elements of the 1st Logistical Command, in conjunction with the 9th Infantry Division. The 198th Light Infantry Brigade (Separate), deployed from Fort Hood, Texas, arriving in the Republic of Vietnam by sea at Da Nang 22-26 October. This unit was moved immediately from Da Nang to Chu Lai by LST and received at Chu Lai by the 1st Marine Division. The movement was supported by the 80th General Support Group, an element of the 1st Logistical Command at Chu Lai. The planned use of river patrol boats (FBI) by Army units has given rise to the need for training 1st Logistical Command personnel in the operation and maintenance of these vessels. Aerial resupply operations were conducted to deliver 3,447 short tons of supplies by airdrop to tactical units, including units of the US Marine Corps. Nineteen major tactical operations were supported by the 1st Logistical Command during the reporting period, thirteen of which were still in progress at the close of the period. Numerous incidents occurred which indicated a general lack of knowledge of the proper means to state special requirements for airlift required issuance of clarifying instructions. Night convoys were used for the first time with considerable success. Expanded use of night convoys is being planned. Several incidents involving convoys brought to light the need for additional attention to the security aspects of convoy operations and considerable effort has been expended toward improving this shortcoming. The requirement for Forward Support Areas (FSA) should continue to decrease as organic
divisional support assets increase, and as the road net is improved.
A strike, by Vietnamese employees of government and commercial
firms providing important services to US forces has emphasized the
importance of having alternate means to provide these services,
should strikes jeopardize support.

K. (U) ACofS, COMPTROLLER, Annex L. Numerous visits of
CONUS-based activities were conducted to include an audit of
requisitioning and stock control procedures and a review of Commodity
Programs of USAID, both by USAGO. Additional audits of Unit Military
Strength Reports and the control of receipts and distribution of
material in VDN were accomplished by USAAA. The Saigon Area Office
of USAAA has planned an audit of Government Furnished Property to
be completed during the next quarter. Financial unit activities
included the transfer of the 51st Financial Detachment from Long
Binh to Pleiku, which will be followed by a planned move of the 10th
Finance Section from Tan Son Nhat to Phu Loi. Approval was granted
for the use of the 9th Finance Section as the funding office for the
Navy at Cat Lo, with commencement of service not later than 31 Dec 67.
The 7th Finance Section underwent a successful AGI. Finance officers
throughout the Command were advised to effect cash payment to vendors
of fruits and vegetables, due to non-availability of banking facilities.
This further predicated, in part, the approval granted to the 9th
Finance Detachment to maintain $50,000 cash on hand for the Class B
Agent at Can Tho. A recent Vietnamese decree now requires that merchant
seamen have only Vietnamese currency in their possession upon departure
from their vessels. A piaster rate change became effective 1 Oct
67 which stipulated that all disbursements would be made at the 118
rate. Special training courses included a two day maintenance
seminar of the UNIVAC 1005 Computer System, a receipt and disburse-
ment of 40 quotas for an ADP orientation course at Long Binh, and
the submission of a request to USARV for 44 quotas for ADP courses
to be conducted at Japan, Okinawa and Hawaii. Within the headquar-
ters, a new Monthly Command Review and Analysis publication was
distributed, and the Organization and Functions Manual is being
revised. An AIF Budget Review for CY 67 was made and the CY 68
AIF budget was developed. Concerning the ISSA Reimbursement
Program, the Commanding General was briefed on the findings of the
management of the program, a listing of active ISSAs was published
and submitted to subordinate commands, and a DA Task Group, from
the Office of the Comptroller of the Army (COA), conducted an
investigation of the program. Feeder data is being received for
analysis and inclusion in the FY 68 Command Budget Execution
Review to be submitted in November 67.
L. (U) ENGINEER, Annex M. Troop Operations Division. The Laundry and Bath Section was transferred to this division from the Director of Services. A monthly report of Operations (RCS AVCA EN-10) was established to provide performance data on all engineer R&U detachments in order that this office may assure utilization consistent with 1st Logistical Command objectives. Interservice Support Agreements for R&U support are being negotiated by USAHV for Navy support of Army units in I Corps Tactical Zone and for Army support of Navy in II, III, IV Corps Tactical Zones. Complete analysis of Navy base data as well as a detailed listing of Army facilities to be supported was provided to USAHV. Twenty-two M532 (Sidal) laundry trailers arrived during the reporting period. A total of 106 trailers are now in RVN. Field laundry production hit a new high of 11.1 million pounds. Two ISSAs were negotiated for laundry service, one for the US Navy in II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones, and one for USAF personnel confined in the Long Binh Stockade. Three laundry contracts expired and four were left, having an estimated dollar value of $1.2 million. Change 1 to LC Leg 210-10 was published, relieving the support commands of the responsibility to inspect contract facilities and maintain source lists. Over 234,000 showers were provided during the period, and a study instituted to reduce personnel by eliminating some bath teams.

2. Facilities and Engineering Division: The two 97.5-ton amphibious tree crushers have been utilized in a test and evaluation program clearing the foliage on Long Binh Post. The crushers have cleared approximately 1800 acres at an average rate of 2.1 acres per hour of machine operation. On 1 November 1967, the tree crushers and the Tree Crusher personnel were to be transferred to the Engineer Command to be utilized for tactical clearing requirements. The 1st Logistical Command's original allocation of 257 housetrailers has been reduced to 164 housetrailers as a result of a change in utilization policy and a reduction in the total number of housetrailers allocated to US Army Vietnam. The 1st Logistical Command personnel at Long Binh will be housed in trailers allocated to Long Binh Post. As of 25 October 1967, the overall project for the new Logistical Command Headquarters is 83 percent complete. The Beneficial Occupancy Date for the last building is 4 November 1967, with final completion of the entire complex in February 1968. The first container ship, under the Sea-Land Service, Inc, contract to provide container van service to Vietnam, is scheduled to arrive at Cam Ranh Bay 5 November 1967. The marshalling facilities at each port will be completed 1 November 1967. Due to excessive wear of the command fir deck on the 1st Logistical Command De Long Piers, it was decided to nail a 3-inch hardwood wear deck to the fir deck. Installation of this wear deck, which will be completed during 1967, will reduce maintenance costs considerably. Repair of the damaged
trestle leading to the De Long Pier at Qui Nhon was completed in October 1967. Requirements for railroad spurs at logistical facilities have been reanalyzed by the support commands and have been forwarded to USARV for incorporation in the RVN railroad construction program. An Ad Hoc Committee has been established by US Army, Vietnam (USARV) Headquarters to study base development at US Army installations throughout South Vietnam. The purpose of this Committee is to make recommendations as to the minimum essential additional construction necessary at each base to limit the monetary expenditure on future construction.

3. Contract Operations Division: Comprehensive technical inspections of R&U Contractor activities at Can Tho, Soc Trang, Vung Long, Vung Tau, Di An, Mekong, Phuoc Vinh, Phu Loi, Bearcat (Long Thanh), and Xuan Loc (Blackhorse) were accomplished. A survey was made of R&U support requirements at Navy activities in II, III, and IV CTZ in order to define contractor manning requirements. A new directive was initiated changing the format, frequency and scope of Contractor Performance ratings made by Assistant Contracting Officer's representatives in the field. An evaluation of the contractors management was conducted by three members of the Performance Analysis Section. The first Unit Expenditure Report was received from the contractor 22 Sep 67. An inspection of R&U activities in Vietnam was made by a team from the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army. The contractor's first submission of the Technical Data Report was received 14 Aug 67. Twenty-three items of essential contractor equipment were received from depot stock, and additional equipment valued at $144,788 was obtained from RMK excess stocks. Incremental shipments, comprising 26 line items of equipment, procured by purchase have been received. The evaluation of contractor leases or rentals of equipment, trash and garbage collection and refuse disposal sub-contracts have resulted in a reduction of disbursements amounting to $364,811 per month. The estimate of equipment required for FY 69 was completed. The estimate was made by activity, and the distribution shown within the activity. A cannibalization program was established for the 100 KW Taiyo generators.

4. Installation Management Division: The rate of phasing down the USARV was greatly reduced due to increases in the contractor construction requirements. The US Army received the largest share of the assets released. The publication of the 1st Logistical Command regulation which prescribes the detailed procedures for acquisition, allocation, transfer and accountability of the released assets has assisted in the supply accountability and control of these assets. Development began on a procedure to be implemented on a command-wide basis for the expeditious processing of work order
documents to the Central Real Estate Office for work accomplished by the Government on leased properties where the responsibility for maintenance rests with the owner. Heretofore, the lack of such a procedure caused excessive delays with possible monetary loss because funds, so spent by the Government, must be recouped from the property owners involved by timely deduction from rental payments due. Difficulties have arisen during the reporting period due to the lack of a uniform policy concerning conversion from dollars to piasters for rental payments. Many leases contain a clause linking the payment in piasters to a stated amount of dollars. This clause has formerly been interpreted in favor of the property owners with regard to past increases in the rate of exchange. A recent ruling of the Controller General interpreted the clause to be in favor of the US Government. This coupled with a recent increase in the rate of exchange is expected to cause extensive ill will on the part of property owners. A standard payment clause is under development which will be inserted in all new leases.

K. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL, Annex N. The office of the Inspector General extended assistance to 569 members of the command. Approximately 40 percent of the requests for assistance received concerned promotion, assignment instructions, port calls, and transfers. Of the 82 complaints processed, 12 were justified. There were 59 Annual General Inspections conducted, of which 57 of the units inspected received a rating of satisfactory. Supply, maintenance, training and security continued to be major areas of interest.

N. (U) INFORMATION OFFICE, Annex O. The period 1 August through 31 October 1967 showed information activities within the command at a level similar to the preceding report period. 7th Public Information Detachment personnel are now merged with the Information Office. The command again led all major Army units in Vietnam with 10,853 hometown news releases and 933 hometown photo releases. A total of 538 hometown radio tapes were released including Thanksgiving and Christmas messages. News stories totaled 172 and 212 photo captions accompanied the news releases. Emphasis has been placed on improving quality, along with selective distribution to the more than 50 different news media. A total of 200 press queries were received from news representatives, of which more than half resulted in person-to-person contact with the newsman. Five mimeograph newspapers are being published either weekly or bi-weekly by subordinate information offices. Ground work was established for a 12 page tabloid, 1st Log newspaper. Updating an informational brochure in magazine form is also in progress. The command information presented 5 topics for the report period. Command information guidance continues to give specific textual and factual material,
yet allow unit commanders freedom to substitute their own topics. Distribution of command information material was stressed at subordinate level for correctness and efficiency. The principle of personal escort of newsmen to command activities has been followed. Special projects accounted for: monthly updates of the Pictorial Progress Lill Report of Facilities Development; escort for the Army Material Command photo team; color slide presentations for both higher headquarters, the command group, and newly arrived personnel. A library of color slides depicting 1st Logistics Command activities has been established.

O. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, Annex P. This command has paid $60,544 in personal property claims and Judge Advocates have handled 2,430 legal assistance cases. Court-martial rates within the command remain at or below the Armywide level. The command has tried 7 General Court-Martial cases, 215 Special Court-Martial cases and 132 Summary Court-Martial cases. Disciplinary action under Article 15, UCMJ has been given in 2,567 instances.

P. (U) COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE, Annex Q. The third and final portion of the US Army Electronics Command (USADCOM) project to install AN-VVF radios in Army "Marinecrat" was completed 25 August 1967. The three phases of the project installed over 300 radios, enhancing control of vessels being operated throughout South Vietnam. In preparation for the proposed move of this headquarters to Long Binh, extensive planning was accomplished by this office to ensure adequate telephone and teletype communications at the new site.

Q. (U) DIRECTORATE OF ACQUISITION, Annex R. Purchasing requests and Commitment (P&C) received during the report period, 1 August thru 31 October 1967, totaled 721 at a value of $35.3 million. Total P&Cs processed during FY 68 amounts to 1,457 valued at $275 million. As of 31 October 1967, excluding Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA), 129 contracts valued at $427 million were under the administration of the United States Procurement Agency Vietnam (USAPAV). During the report period 24 monthly and 4 quarterly reports were prepared and forwarded to the appropriate agencies. Command efforts were successful in reducing 1st Quarter FY 68 procurement to $4.4 million as compared to $10.7 million in the 1st Quarter of FY 67. An Advance Procurement Plan was developed to increase contracting lead time and develop competition thereby reducing costs to the government. A repair and utilities (R&U) contract awarded to Pacific Architects & Engineers, Inc. (PAE) is expected to reach $121.4 million, making it the largest contract in the history of USAPAV. Four projects to improve PAE management have been initiated. A significant cost reduction is expected in PAE overtime work and cessation of procurement actions. Subsistence Division Field Representatives have been located at Qui Nhon and Can Tho to improve
local fresh fruits and vegetables procurement. Coordination is being effected between USAPAV and agricultural advisors of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Civil Organization for Revolutionary Development (COORD) to improve agricultural markets in Vietnam. Requests for Proposal were made more attractive in appearance to draw attention. Simplified commodity descriptions of fresh fruits and vegetable items have been prepared and staffed with the Veterinarian, 1st Logistical Command, Subsistence Branch, and USAID agricultural personnel, and were distributed to all Vietnamese vendors, inspectors, and supply point personnel. Utilization of "vegetable fat" in milk ingredients has increased milk and ice cream production: demand has also increased 20% each month, and price has reduced by 33%. New prospective sources and the combining of the Army, Air Force, Navy, PAES, USAID source lists has greatly expanded the USAPAV Source List of Vendors. A total of 98% Request for Proposal or Quotation were mailed or passed out to prospective offerors. The Pricing Division became operable and has completed 8 cost and pricing actions, one Independent Government Cost Estimate, and approximately six other informal pricing actions. Present officer strength is slightly above authorized in order to fill key civilian professional positions. Property Administration Division performed twenty eight inspections of a contractor's supply records. The contractor was advised of the results of these inspections and was required to correct deficiencies in his system.

R. (C) DIRECTORATE OF UNITS, annex S. The Surveillance Branch, with the assistance of personnel from USAMC Ammunition School (Surveillance), conducted training for ammunition personnel in surveillance and inspection techniques. In addition, continued investigations of packing material deficiencies of 81mm mortar ammunition is being conducted. There has been no significant change in the ammunition maintenance posture. Criticality of storage space still dictates that items requiring extensive maintenance be evacuated and that renovation units devote maximum effort to care and preservation of unit turn-ins and depot stocks to maintain existing supplies in a ready for issue condition.

2. USAV continues its Explosive Ordinance Decontamination training to troops in the theater in an effort to minimize casualties and incidents with explosive ordnance items. Supply Branch is still concerned about the number and frequency of Inventory Adjustment reports and corrections to posting. Efficient management of stocks will only be made possible when accurate reports from the support commands preclude emergency shifting of stocks. Retrograde of slow moving items is a managerial objective to reduce deterioration of unneeded types of ammunition and to reduce line item control. Class V support is now afforded throughout Vietnam, from the IVZ to the delta, as support has been

S. (U) DIRECTORATE OF MAINTENANCE, Annex T. A capabilities versus requirements study of 1st Logistical Command maintenance units under Program 5 was completed 16 August 1967. Certain 1st Logistical Command maintenance units arrived in Vietnam and were deployed in areas to balance capabilities versus requirements. The General Support Overhaul Program was revised in October 1967. Plans were initiated to establish an M16 A1 rifle retrofit/repair program which involves changing the present barrel for a new chrome-chambered barrel. Arrangements were made in October 1967 to obtain 200 polyurethane foam kits for installation in fuel tanks of M113 armored personnel carriers to reduce fuel fires and explosions. Multifuel engine failures, caused by overheating, hydrostatic lock and engine vibration, continued to be a problem. Collapsible fuel drum and tank repair continued at a high rate. Difficulty was experienced in the procurement of rockcrusher engines and engine repair parts. The Closed Loop Program is now in effect for the cyclic overhaul of standardized generators. A shortage of 10 ton crawler cranes, in engineer units, has developed due to excessive age of cranes, making them uneconomically repairable, with no replacement cranes forecast until the 3d quarter of Fiscal Year 68. A total of 34 National Cash Register model 500 Mechanized Stock Control Systems have been installed in selected direct support units and general support units, with direct support missions, in the Republic of Vietnam. On 31 August 1967, requests for Modification to Tables of Organization and Equipment were submitted recommending that the 218th and 633rd Collection, Classification and Salvage Companies (CC&S) be increased to full strength TOE authorization of 226 personnel each. Civilian technical assistance personnel were requested from Army Material Command and sent to 1st Logistical Command to survey CC&S operations. They will assist in establishing and implementing the latest approved procedures for collecting, segregating, preserving, packing and processing unserviceable material for evacuation to COMUS for rebuild. Problems in maintenance support of countermortar radars have been experienced due to increased requirements and lack of replacement radars. Psychological warfare operations has introduced nonstandard equipment into military system causing difficulty in repair parts support.

T. (C) DIRECTORATE OF ESTIMATES, Annex U. Enemy action against petroleum facilities increased during this reporting period. Pipelines will be bar or tack welded to discourage sabotage and pilferage. The difficulties caused by the mud at Pleiku, prohibiting truck discharge, were overcome by the installation of pipelines from the main highway to the tank farm. The barges at Due who will continue to be used during the monsoon if they can be secured in a new location. One TC
Medium Truck Platoon (30L) has been sent to Qui Nhon on TDY to support increased requirements in that area. Due to the monsoon, tanker transfers for Qui Nhon are being conducted at Vung No Bay. The feasibility of supplying JP-4 by defueling U-133 aircraft is being studied. Construction of petroleum pipelines, storage tanks, and tanker discharge facilities continues. The army spectrometric oil analysis laboratory has been moved from Okinawa to Cam Ranh Bay. The liquid petroleum gas facility at Nha Be has been completed and filled.

U. (U) DIRECTORATE OF RETROGRADE AND DISPOSAL, Annex V. The Directorate of Retrograde and Disposal was organized 2 October 1967, to provide staff supervision of the command retrograde program. The directorate assumed the property disposal functions, formerly a part of Services Directorate. During August, September and October 7776.7 short tons of material were removed from property disposal yards. 700 copies of invitations for bids were mailed to perspective bidders throughout the world. It is estimated that 60,000 short tons of scrap will be generated in country during the coming year.

V. (C) DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL SUPPLY, Annex W. The 1st Logistical Command Integrated Supply Data System Plan is being developed. A program for the interchange of data systems information has been established by means of Standard Data Systems Notices and periodic interchange conferences. A 1st Logistical Command Data Systems Training Program is being developed, to include training of local nationals. An alternate site ADP plan was developed to assure continuity of ADP operations. The Standard Supply System Vietnam is being prepared by modification of the USAF Standard Supply System for implementation in Vietnam. Representatives of the 1st Logistical Command attended five Closed Loop Support Conferences held in CONUS and Hawaii during the reporting period. The M6A1/M14 rifle exchange program has been a high priority within the command and will increase in activity in the months to come. A study is being conducted by 1st Logistical Command to determine the degree, and causes, of losses and delays in processing requisitions. Stock record support will be provided with assistance from 2d Logistical Command to DSU/GSUs supported by the Cam Ranh Bay Depot. The construction and use of skid base crates will provide the triple wall corrugated fiber board container protection from weather and handling. Limited use of railroad Reefer cars is being planned. Foremost Dairies has begun producing a more acceptable milk product at a lower unit cost. A large volume of recouping of class I nonperishables has been accomplished. New stockage levels for class I have been proposed which will reduce inventories and result in more efficient management of a better subsistence program.
X. (U) DIRECTORATE OF TRANSPORTATION, Annex X. The tonnage handled through all the 1st Logistical Command Ports decreased as compared to the previous reporting period and it is expected that future tonnages will continue to decrease. The mission for discharging rice ships was turned over from the US Army to the government of Vietnam. Qui Nhon reached a high in handling cargo in August and broke its own record in September. Berth K12 in Saigon became available on 17 October for limited operations after being non-operational for 3½ months. Newport experienced severe personnel shortages in October but has been brought back up to an operational posture. The completion of a barge quay at Qui Nhon raised the port's throughput capability. POL discharge facilities were completed at Long Binh and Vung Ro increasing the POL discharge capability by 90,000 barrels per day. Sea-land gantry cranes at Da Nang Bay were completed 14 days ahead of schedule and the Containerization Program will get under way with the arrival of the first container ship on 5 November. 245,000 S/T per month were moved during the period; 60% of this tonnage was moved by military trucks and 40% by contractor. The feasibility of using rail continues to be studied and 20 US Army owned rail cars were designated for transfer from Da Nang to Qui Nhon. A total of 17,694 troops arrived in Vietnam via sea and air.

X. (U) DIRECTORATE OF SERVICES, A study made during September 1967 showed the feasibility of abolishing the Directorate of Services and creating a new Directorate of Retrograde and Disposal. After approval by the commanding general, an effective date of 15 October 1967 was established so that sufficient time would be available for the three support commands to study the impact of the change on their organizations. At a conference held 3 October 1967, each command determined that the reorganization was practical and would cause no adverse impact. Subsequently, the Directorate of Services functions were reassigned. Staff supervision for graves registration, mortuary, and personal effects depot were assigned to G-5, Personnel, laundry and baths to the Engineers, food service and bakery to Subsistence Branch, Directorate of General Supply, and property disposal to the new Directorate of Retrograde and Disposal. The transfer of these functions was completed prior to 15 October 1967.
SECTION II, PART I: OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

A. (U) ACofS, PERSONNEL

GRAVES REGISTRATION

1. ITEM: Additional and more suitable refrigerated storage for human remains was required for use in isolated areas.

DISCUSSION: Refrigerated storage for human remains is required to perform graves registration missions satisfactorily. The usual type of storage used at forward graves registration points in support of tactical units, is the five drawer mortuary refrigerator. This was found to be unsuitable because it was not readily portable, requiring disassembly and reassembly when moved. Further, it is quite easily damaged and difficult to repair. Its storage capacity of only five remains makes it an undesirable piece of equipment. To better satisfy requirements, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, modified CONEX containers by lining with styrofoam insulation and sheet metal, constructing nine sliding shelves on racks, and installing a 5000 BTU electronically operated cooling unit. Approximately 12 such units are now being used in I CTZ and Northern II CTZ, and have been found highly satisfactory.

OBSERVATION: The CONEX modified for storage of human remains has been found desirable for its portability, simplicity, and capacity, making it particularly suitable for use at forward graves registration collecting points.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. ITEM: Some units are inclined to treat civic action as a charitable activity, gearing their programs toward donations to orphanages and other institutions, commodity distribution, and unilateral construction projects.

DISCUSSION: Experience has shown that unilateral "give away" programs destroy initiative and prevent the development of the proprietary interest and pride in accomplishment that is necessary if the people are to maintain the project after the US unit departs.

OBSERVATION: Wherever feasible units should insist on maximum Vietnamese participation. "Self-Help" projects give the people a stake in the result and also serve to develop a spirit of cooperation among them.
2. **ITEM:** Units tend to concentrate their civic action effort in a few pet institutions or a relatively small area while surrounding areas and other similar institutions receive no support at all.

**DISCUSSION:** This frequently results in excessive support which tends to create "haves" and "have nots" and, in some instances, has encouraged corruption among administrators. There are cases where orphanages have received such excessive support that parents and foster parents have placed children in orphanages rather than care for them at home.

**OBSERVATION:** Units should attempt to distribute their civic action effort throughout their area of responsibility. Civic action programs must be carefully controlled to avoid the concentration of excessive support in any one area or institution.

3. **ITEM:** In some instances units undertake large projects which reach only a relatively limited group of the local population such as schools for the blind.

**DISCUSSION:** The objective of civic action is to contribute to general economic and social development. Projects should provide for maximum Vietnamese participation and be designed to benefit the largest number of people.

**OBSERVATION:** A limited number of such projects may be proper but they should not comprise the major portion of a unit's civic action effort.

4. **ITEM:** Units occasionally circumvent GVN agencies and officials in conducting civic action because they feel they can accomplish a project more efficiently and more rapidly if they do it themselves.

**DISCUSSION:** This is in direct contradiction to one of the principal objectives of military civic action, which is to enhance the image of the GVN and serve only to interpose the image of the US between the people and their government.

**OBSERVATION:** Members of US units must constantly seek to bring indigenous officials onto the scene and make it obvious that the US unit is assisting the GVN and acting only in its behalf. Although unilateral efforts may be necessary in combat areas where GVN authority is not present, it is improper where GVN authority is present.
4. **ITEM**: Units occasionally establish projects involving long range or continuing assistance which could not be supported or sustained at the same level by the GVN upon US departure.

**DISCUSSION**: In such instances when US departure would leave a vacuum, the GVN image would be tarnished and the institution or program itself would be jeopardized.

**OBSERVATION**: Sound civic action programs should generally have short completion times. This not only avoids the problems discussed here, but ensures that results of civic action efforts are immediately visible to the people.

5. **ITEM**: Units occasionally establish projects which they think the people need rather than coordinating with GVN officials and MACV advisors to find out what the real needs are.

**DISCUSSION**: Many projects have fallen into disrepair after completion or after the US unit departs because they were not what the people needed or wanted and they had no interest in maintaining them. By the same token there have occasionally been "show projects" designed not to meet the needs of the people but to show visiting dignitaries the wonders of a unit's civic action programs.

**OBSERVATION**: If projects are not geared to the real needs of the people they will show little interest in supporting or maintaining them and frequently treat them with disdain. They are quick to recognize "show projects" and they resent what they properly consider to be exploitation.

6. **ITEM**: Units frequently publicize their civic action efforts with too much emphasis on the US effort, i.e. pictures showing US personnel handing out commodities, signs in English commemorating the US unit which supported the project, etc.

**DISCUSSION**: One of the principle objectives of the civic action effort is to enhance the image of the GVN.

**OBSERVATION**: US efforts should be shown in a supporting role, such as providing material, technical assistance, etc. Any signs erected should be in Vietnamese.

**ITEM**: Units frequently fail to coordinate all projects with GVN officials and MACV advisors.
DISCUSSION: The crux of successful military civic action is coordination. Proposed projects must be closely coordinated with province and district level officials and their MACV advisor counterparts to determine actual needs, to avoid duplication and excessive support, to rechannel misdirected idealism, and to receive maximum benefits from skills, labor, supplies, equipment and funds involved.

OBSERVATION: Civil affairs officers should serve as the focal point for this coordination, insuring that all civic action conducted by their units, to include all medical civic action and other civic activities undertaken by unit chaplains, are properly coordinated through, and approved by, the appropriate GVN official and MACV advisor.
B. (U) CHAPLAIN

1. Item: Requisitions for non-expendable ecclesiastical supply items not being filled in a reasonable length of time.

   Discussion: Close monitoring of the flow of supplies to chaplain users in the field revealed that requisitions were not being filled in an acceptable time frame. It was determined that the Depot Chaplains could assist in alleviating the problem by closely monitoring the chaplain supply operation at depot level.

   Observation: A Letter of Instruction (LOI) was published in coordination with the Director of General Supply. This LOI provided the Depot Chaplains with the necessary guidelines and authority to monitor the receipt, storage and issue of chaplain supplies in their depots.

2. Item: Lack of information on the civic action activities of Chaplains in the 1st Logistical Command.

   Discussion: Civic action is a major functional area of a chaplain's work in Vietnam. No formal records of the chaplains' efforts in this activity were maintained at this headquarters.

   Observation: To provide the command with a more complete picture of chaplain activities and to evaluate the work of subordinate chaplains, a monthly report on chaplain civic action activities was initiated.

3. Item: An understanding of Vietnamese religion and culture by the American soldier can assist in the internal defense effort in the Republic of Vietnam.

   Discussion: The US Navy has initiated a Personal Response Program in the training of Combined Action Teams in the III Marine Amphibious Force area in which they instruct their personnel in the religions and culture of Vietnam. The purpose of this instruction is to assist the serviceman to understand the Vietnamese people and the reasons for their behavior patterns and way of life. This knowledge places the soldier in a position where he can control and direct his own behavior toward the ultimate objective of winning the cooperation of the people. The 1st Logistical Command Staff Chaplain's Office has drawn up two lessons plans: One on Vietnamese culture and the other on Vietnamese religions. Two pilot classes have been conducted and were well received. The reaction of the men was one of intense interest.
Observation: This educational program appears to be a project that should be further explored. The success of the pilot classes indicates that it is a subject about which the soldiers are interested and concerned. The overall benefit that the Army in Vietnam can derive from such a program is great. The American soldier should be familiar with the people whom he is assisting.
1. (C) **Item:** Security boats, Boston Whalers.

**Discussion:** Based on prepared plans, the Boston Whaler boats were distributed to the Support Commands at Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon. Upon initial receipt and processing in-country, it was obvious that improper packing and crating procedures were used at the shipper's location causing numerous craft to be damaged, i.e., holes in hulls, and numerous component and spare parts packages missing. Steering wheels had the highest damage rate of the equipment. Factory representatives in-country were notified of the discrepancies relative to packing and crating procedures. To counter the other problems, aggressive action was taken to coordinate with the Navy for training of personnel in fiberglass repair procedures; locate spare parts within the supply system; and fabricate replacement steering wheels from salvaged vehicle steering wheels available in the command. After a short period of operation, boats in the Saigon Port complex were removed from security patrol duties for maintenance difficulties. An apparent lack of supervision and the improper use of POL products caused motor breakdown and subsequent deadline of boats. A retraining program was instituted which should eliminate these problems. It is expected that boats should be back to full operation in the near future.

**Observation:** The boat program is experiencing "growing pains". As the project continues, and by the time the larger, more sophisticated patrol boat is received, (the Patrol Boat, River, PBR) minor operational and administrative problems will have been reduced to a realistically insignificant number.

2. (C) **Item:** Safeguarding Supplies and Property.

**Discussion:** LC Reg 525-2, subject, Control and Safeguard of US Supplies and Military Property, published in May, was revised in September. Initial response to the regulation was less than desired and it was obvious that implementation by the various support command staffs was not in accordance with the intent of the regulation's procedures. Upon solicitation of recommended changes and clarifications deemed appropriate, the regulation was revised and republished. An evaluation team was formed and is conducting staff visits to assist the commanders in the implementation of the revised regulation.

**Observation:** It is anticipated that, with full implementation of the regulation, reports of losses should increase due to better reporting procedures and conversely, as the controls are
implemented and improved, the amount of military property and supply losses from receipt in port to first consignee should decrease.
D. (C) AGofS, SECURITY, PLANS AND OPERATIONS

Item: Night Convoy

Discussion: Civilian congestion during daylight hours and enemy route interdiction has led to the study and employment of night convoys.

Observation: Night convoys may be conducted with little more hazard than day convoys over some routes, provided sufficient emphasis is given to prior planning for all phases.
1. Item: Interservice Support Agreements.

Discussion: In the R&U field, Interservice Support Agreements are the most economical method of providing support where one service has the capability and/or mission to support the other.

Observation: Action was taken by this headquarters to provide USARV with all necessary data to establish agreements for the Navy to support the Army in I CTZ and for the Army to support the Navy in II, III, and IV CTZ.


Discussion: A USARV G-4 Committee is studying base development countrywide and making recommendations to limit further construction at each US Army base. The Committee is visiting one installation at a time and finalizing its recommendations on each base prior to considering the next base. This method leads to the possibility of some arbitrary decisions. By dictating to the commander responsible for base development exactly which facilities can be constructed and which cannot, USARV is actually doing the job of the base development officer at each base. There is a workable base development system in existence, but the USARV Ad Hoc Committee is preventing this system from functioning by, in essence, performing the planning function for each base. A more efficient approach, that would produce longer lasting results, would be to establish new construction criteria and standards that would limit the construction at each base. These criteria and standards should be published and each of the base development officers would use these criteria to produce a new base development plan for submittal to USARV. By attacking the criteria rather than each base separately, the established procedures for base development will continue to be effective while, at the same time, the amount of future construction can be limited to that established in the new criteria.

Observation: The USARV Ad Hoc Committee could more efficiently reduce planned future construction in South Vietnam by publishing new construction criteria and standards which would limit the type and amount of facilities at each base.

3. Item: Programming Construction Requirements.

Discussion: Requirements for the FY 67S/69 program were submitted in list form to USARV in April. In May USARV published a Facilities Review Board listing which consolidated all requirements submitted in April. By this consolidation, most of the requirements lost their identity. Information
provided at the various Facility Review Board meetings was that construction directives would be issued from the listing. However, due to the loss of project identity, and because the program was developed at USARV on a consolidated countrywide basis by category code, construction directives are not being issued until the projects are identified. On 22 October USARV directed all subordinate commands to submit their requirements for the FY 70 program, not later than 30 November. To date USARV has not provided subordinate commands with a list of approved projects for the FY 69 prior programs.

Observation: Approval of construction requirements is not provided to the user until a construction directive is issued and a firm construction program has not been developed. Therefore, the user does not know when the required facilities will be constructed. This lack of a construction plan has an impact on this command's ability to plan for future activities. Further, the lack of this information prevents adequate determination of future program requirements.

4. Item: Unit Expenditure Report

Discussion: The July Unit Expenditure Report was not received until 22 September 1967. Because of poorly instituted data collecting and reporting systems, the contractor had much difficulty in obtaining the base unit quantities necessary for this report. In areas where the base unit quantities are missing, analysis of trends and comparison of costs with other areas in the world cannot be made. It is anticipated that by December the Unit Expenditure Report will be timely and accurate.

Observation: Due to the cost plus fixed fee contract, the contractor has very little initiative to obtain data for use as a management tool in evaluating performance. It is imperative that the contractor establish timely and reliable data collecting and reporting systems for the base unit quantities.

5. Item: Review of Contractors Sub-Contracting Procedures

Discussion: In the absence of equipment required to perform the repair and utilities mission, the contractor has been allowed to rent or lease mission-essential equipment. The contractor was also allowed to enter into subcontractual arrangements for the collection and disposal of trash and garbage. A review and evaluation of the requirements disclosed that the rationale used to compute the numbers of equipments and the data on which the rationale was based did not support the requirements. Additionally, instances were revealed where Purchase Requests for rent or lease were submitted as a matter of routine when Government furnished equipment was on hand to satisfy the requirement.
Observation: Review and evaluate of contractor lease or rental requests are vital to insure that the valid requirements justification support the expenditures.

6. **Item:** Condition of Equipment.

**Discussion:** The pressure of operational requirements in many cases encourages military units to accept equipment of marginal value in hope of obtaining some use out of it. This equipment creates unnecessary work for the user and support elements.

**Observation:** Both the support element and the units allocated equipment should inspect it carefully to determine the condition and the unit ability to operate and maintain it.

7. **Item:** Audit Trail.

**Discussion:** Shipments of assets from out of country sources go directly to the users bypassing the supply controls and breaking the audit trail.

**Observation:** Units receiving allocated assets directly from the contractor should expedite sending the receipt documents (vouchers) to 1st Logistical Command.

8. **Item:** Repairs and Utilities expenditures on leased property that is owner maintained.

**Discussion:** Such expenditures, when incurred by the Government, must be recouped from the property owner. This is best accomplished by timely deductions from rental payments due. Lack of published procedures, however, has caused excessive delays in processing costed work order documents to the Central Real Estate Office. This could cause monetary loss if this information reaches the Central Real Estate Office after the lease has been terminated.

**Observation:** Procedures are under development that will expedite the flow of information on such expenditures to the Central Real Estate Office.

9. **Item:** A large number of leases do not contain clear provisions for the payment of rents in local currency.

**Discussion:** A clause had been inserted in a large number of leases which presumably intended to base the rental payment in piasters upon a fixed dollar amount thus protecting the property owner from fluctuations
in the rate of exchange. The clause, however, was not clearly worded and doubt arose concerning the propriety of payment on this basis. A recent decision by the Comptroller General interprets the clause as having been intended to protect the US Government rather than the property owner. Therefore, excess payments made in the past must be recouped and future payments will be in a reduced piaster amount. This, coupled with a recent increase in the rate of exchange, is expected to cause definite ill will on the part of a large number of property owners.

Observation: A standard payment clause is being developed to be used in future leases that will leave no doubt concerning the US Government's obligations concerning payment in local currency.
F. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

1. **Item**: Legal Assistance

**Discussion**: Formerly, personnel needing legal assistance were required to proceed to their command's Judge Advocate Office, regardless of the individual's location or the location of his particular unit. This problem was most acute during the transitional stage of units moving to Long Binh from the Saigon area.

**Observation**: Any authorized individual should proceed to the nearest Legal Assistance Office, irrespective of his assignment or his unit's location.

2. **Item**: Preventive Law

**Discussion**: An active preventive law program, while a command responsibility, can be enhanced by distribution of publications, instruction at Command Information classes and the awareness of the availability and capabilities of the Legal Assistance Office. Such a program will assist individuals in either avoiding, or nipping in their initial stages those legal difficulties which contribute to low morale and inefficiency and which frequently result in disciplinary or adverse administrative actions.

**Observation**: Information on the legal assistance program should be disseminated by periodic blocks of instruction by representatives of the Judge Advocate Office. In addition, the publication and distribution of a Legal Affairs Handbook, emphasizing problems peculiar to the Republic of Vietnam, will go far towards the achievement of the goals of the Preventive Law Program.
1. **Item:** Contractor Implementation of USARV Local National Personnel and Pay Practices.

**Discussion:** P&F and other contractors have not established personnel management practices consistent with USARV policy. The worst discrepancies concern failure to implement uniform wage schedules, granting of unauthorized step increases and promotions, and proselyting of employees.

**Observation:** Contracts were not written in such a manner as to require full compliance of the contractor with USARV personnel and pay practices and contract administration did not correct this discrepancy until the beginning of Fiscal Year 1968.

2. **Item:** Current use of the Pricing Division is increasing.

**Discussion:** For the first few weeks of its operation, the Pricing Division was barely used. As the Contracting Officers became aware of its capabilities the section began to increase its workload. Contracting Officers now know what information the Pricing Division needs so that they can perform their mission. Also, the inclusion of the Pricing Division in negotiations is now being accomplished.

**Observation:** Application of the Pricing Section procedures and a realization of the Pricing Division's mission will make this element more effective.

3. **Item:** Training of Local Vietnamese Pricing Personnel.

**Discussion:** Because the contract price analyst performs a specialized task, training of personnel is difficult under existing circumstances. Under ideal conditions, the training period would ordinarily take one to two years. A Local National with the proper educational background could be trained to accomplish pricing actions.

**Observation:** At least one Local National should be hired as a trainee. His background should include accounting experience or education.
4. Item: It was found that source applications received were taking anywhere from 2 weeks to 3 months to process and inform the firm that they had been placed on the Agency Source List.

Discussion: The long time in processing applications was due to inadequate staffing and also a cumbersome system which required typing a category list for the file and typing a card for each category. The typing of a category list was eliminated by replacing it with a mimeographed form listing the majority of categories and these are checked off as applicable. Second, the "card for each category" was eliminated and an IBM listing by category was used for selecting bidders. In addition, a form was prepared on which to annotate Requests for Proposal, contract, and performance information for each firm on the list in lieu of listing it on the category card.

Observation: Improved processing of source list applications has resulted in prompt service for the applicant of no more than one to three days as compared with 2 weeks to 3 months previously.


Discussion: The Supplies Division has accumulated a total of seventeen authorized price lists for BUSH contracts administered by the US Air Force. These price lists cover delivery of 100 percent US made goods and contain sufficient information for USAPAV to issue Delivery Orders. Under the program US Policy Exemptions are not required. The contracts offer delivered cost advantages that qualify for reporting under the DOD Cost Reduction Program.

Observation: Supply activities have not in all cases coded their stock records to reflect BUSH contracts as the "source" for goods identified in the Authorized Price Lists. A concentrated effort is being made by USAPAV to furnish the necessary data to the 11th Inventory Control Center and the 506th Field Depot to code records accordingly.

6. Item: Milk and Ice Cream Delivery Tickets.

Discussion: Dairy product customers had complained they were unable to get sizes or flavors as ordered. This was caused by negligence on the part of driver or improper loading of orders at the producing plant. A simple delivery
A ticket was produced that would insure the producer knew each customer's exact order and further protect the customer from delivery of products other than that ordered.

Observation: A requesting document should be provided for each customer's use and remain valid until delivery.


Discussion: Wooden crates or boxes used for packing fresh fruits and vegetables were originally being made of pine; then, due to shortage of pine, it was decided to change to rubber wood which was plentiful. These later turned out to be unsatisfactory due to cost and breakage. Plans are being developed for a waterproof cardboard container to be produced both in Saigon and Dalat. Adequate raw materials are available and a guaranteed price is being determined.

Observation: Raw material availability and a guaranteed price range should be surveyed prior to requiring a particular pack for vendors.

8. Item: Site Selection for Milk Plant.

Discussion: When the milk plant site was selected for Qui Nhon, plans for drainage were not considered or included in the construction plans. Due to this oversight, or lack of coordination with neighboring units or activities, the runoff from other areas has been channeled toward the milk plant location prior to the completion of its site, hardstand, litches, etc. This has necessitated approximately $50,000 of additional construction work not originally programmed.

Observations: Site selection of any unit and its accompanying drainage, roadways, and utilities should always be coordinated with the Area Development Plan. No construction should begin without this coordination and approval.

9. Item: Department of the Army Civilian personnel positions are difficult to fill and are frequently filled with inexperienced personnel.

Discussion: The system for establishing civilian personnel positions and recruitment of personnel does not maintain pace with a logistical build up such as was experienced.
Vietnam. As an example, the US Army Procurement Agency Vietnam has experienced a low percentage of fill on civilian personnel vacancies. Delays in recruitment have caused shortages in professional personnel positions reducing operating efficiency. Also a large percentage of personnel who are selected for USAPAV positions have been found to lack experience. Grades need to be at least one grade above that normally found in organizations in the Continental United States in order to make positions in a War Zone challenging and to provide an incentive to high caliber personnel. In highly specialized fields, direct contact between requiring organizations and Department of the Army should be authorized.

Observation: The highest priority should be given by DA to selection and expediting placement of highly qualified civilians in professional positions in a War Zone.
SECTION II - PART 1

H. (C) DIRECTORATE OF AMMUNITION

1. Item: Munitions Safety. Unit turn-ins of unused ammunition and non-explosive residue.

Discussion: Continued receipts of turn-ins from combat units which are loaded on vehicles in an unsafe or incompatible manner results in an unnecessary hazard. Both unit and support personnel, their equipment, and supplies are jeopardized by this practice. Numerous items returned to supporting installations were too hazardous to move and should have been destroyed in place.

Observation: Combat units are understandably limited in time and personnel to handle Class V but steps should be taken to minimize unnecessarily hazardous conditions. Letters sent to DCG, USARV; CG, IPPV; and CG, IIPFV, have resulted in additional command emphasis on munitions safety and a reduction in incidents.
2. **Item**: Supply Slippage. Estimating time of arrival of ships

**Discussion**: Stockage objective realization is limited by continued slippage of munition ships destined for Vietnam. An average of 11.5 days slippage on ship arrivals has resulted in shipments arriving during the month of planned consumption rather than at the time requested. This has necessitated diverting other ships and in-theater shifting of stocks to various depots. In several cases, emergency shipment by air was necessary.

**Observation**: The order and ship time of 90 days has not proved adequate for Vietnam munitions shipments. It has been necessary to add 12 days in an effort to meet theater requirements. Unsatisfactory mechanical condition of ships arriving to transport munitions and of union strikes in CONUS have been the principle causes of delays. When these conditions are rectified, the 90 day order and ship time should prove adequate.
3. **Item**: Ammunition unit capabilities in Vietnam

**Discussion**: Experience has shown that ammunition supply units are not capable of performing at stated TO&E lift capabilities. Several factors contribute to this situation. A combination of heat and moisture causes a more rapid deterioration rate for all ammunition items and packing materials. This increases the maintenance workload with a corresponding reduction of lift capability. In addition, heavy rains cause marked deterioration of ammunition storage facilities and increase the requirement for rewarehousing. Consequently, considerable effort, during fair weather, is required to repair roads and berms. Additionally, the high deadline rate of material handling equipment and vehicles adversely affects unit lift capabilities. The susceptibility of ammunition installations to sabotage and guerrilla activity has caused the diversion of personnel from mission activities to security details.

**Observation**: Lift capabilities stated in TOE are too general in nature. When unusual environmental conditions exist, mission capabilities require adjustment to compensate loss of efficiency. Methodology used in derivation of lift capability for TOE 9-17 E or G units by man hour and MHE was requested from Department of the Army 17 Sep 67. This information would assist in determining team or detachment size when supporting forward support areas (FSA) utilized in Vietnam. The information is required also to determine depot and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) requirements for units, and degradation which should be applied in the event the units are fragmented.
4. Item: Vehicle Design. Unsatisfactory transport for palletized ammunition

Discussion: Present design of 2½ and 5 ton trucks and semi-trailers, stake, 12 ton, 4 wheel, M127A1, used in hauling ammunition, prevents full utilization of material handling equipment (MHE). The sideboards for the semi-trailer must be removed to load palletized Class V. When the load is secured with steel banding, the sideboards cannot be replaced. In addition, when the sideboards are not capable of being utilized, the canvas cover with which the trailer is equipped cannot be used because of the fire hazard and lack of ventilation for the ammunition. The box type design of the 2½ and 5 ton cargo truck bed prevents side loading pallets with forklifts. Forklifts are unable to place heavy ammunition loaded pallets far enough forward in these vehicles when loading from the rear.

Observation: Ammunition unit lift capability is significantly reduced when MHE cannot be efficiently utilized. Experience in Vietnam indicates the need for sideboards on all military cargo vehicles that swing down for MHE loading operations. The beds of these vehicles should be designed in such a manner that the load can be secured with steel banding and still allow the sideboards to swing back up into an upright position. Attempts have been made to construct false bottoms in vehicles that do not permit removal of sideboards. This has not proved satisfactory because a high center of gravity, created by this modification, is unacceptable for travel over the rough roads and terrain of Vietnam.
5. **Item**: 182d Stock Control Detachment - Manual vs Mechanized Stock Control

**Discussion**: The 9-500D BC Detachment for ammunition stock control has no provision for converting from manual to mechanized stock control. Upon arriving in a combat theater, the manual system of stock control has been the only practical means of ammunition stock control. At some period of time, these detachments should be capable of rapid conversion to mechanized equipment. For detachments of this type to adequately provide complete support and conversion to automation accounting of Class V in Vietnam, the following personnel and equipment would be needed:

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<tr>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
<th>MOS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Machine Records Officer</td>
<td>2401</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>LT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machine Supervisor</td>
<td>74D</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>E7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machine Operator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machine Repairman</td>
<td>34C</td>
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<td>Asst Machine Operator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Key Punch Operator</td>
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<td>Key Punch Helper</td>
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<td>Machine Operator Helper</td>
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<td>026</td>
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<td>088</td>
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<td>407</td>
<td>IBM Accounting Machine</td>
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<td>519</td>
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</table>
This detachment could be an augmentation team to be brought into a theater when sophistication of the supply system is practical.

Observation: The conversion from a manual system of stock control to an automated system to link 1st Log Comd and USARPAC is presently in progress. This conversion has caused several problems, so facilitate the conversion, it is necessary to train individuals, with little or no formal schooling or experience, in automated equipment. It has been necessary to secure the services of the automated sections of the 44th Medical Brigade and the 222d Personnel Services Section (PSS). The approximate manhours expended per week by the 182d Stock Control Detachment is 400 hours. This does not take into account the manhours which personnel of the 222d PSS have devoted to the change over. It has been difficult to secure adequate machine time. Some time has been obtained from the 222d PSS and the 27th Data Processing unit for ammunition reports. The delay experienced in submitting reports has proved unsatisfactory. Implementation of the complete automated system is dependent on obtaining adequate equipment.
I. (U) DIRECTORATE OF MAINTENANCE

1. Item: Repair cement for collapsible fuel drums.

Discussion: Shipment of repair cement for repair of collapsible fuel drums previously arrived at Cam Ranh Bay. Cement for use at Qui Nhon had to be transported onward and this repeatedly resulted in two days delay in transit to Qui Nhon. During this two day period the cement was exposed to the heat and sun and approximately 50 percent had congealed upon arrival in Qui Nhon. Therefore, only half the cement arriving in Qui Nhon could be used for repairs. Shipments of the repair cement for Qui Nhon are now flown directly from the United States to Phu Cat, thereby allowing the highly sensitive cement to be placed in refrigeration approximately two days earlier than had previously been possible.

Observation: The change in shipping procedure of repair cement to Phu Cat, and the use of a new container guaranteed to protect the cement from the effects of heat, is expected to increase the percentage of usable cement and thereby reduce the overall costs of supplies required for repairs to collapsible fuel drums.

2. Item: General Support Overhaul Program.

Discussion: The General Support Overhaul Program, developed in January 1967, proved to be unrealistic because of the excessive number of items and unrealistic quantities programmed for overhaul. Based on a review of theater stockage objectives and performance data for the first quarter of Fiscal Year 68, a revised program was developed in October 1967.

Observation: A realistic General Support Overhaul Program must be based on known overhaul capabilities and requirements. This information must be determined by collection of data reflecting actual workload and accomplishments in general support maintenance units in Vietnam.


Discussion: Reticulated poly-urethane foam installed in fuel cells/tanks of vehicles has been tested to determine its effectiveness in reducing fuel fires and explosions. Arrangements have been made to install 200 foam kits in low mileage M13 armored personnel carriers to further determine its effectiveness in combat vehicles.

Observation: Preliminary tests have shown that poly-urethane foam installed in vehicle fuel cells/tanks is effective
in reducing fuel fires and explosions due to incendiaries and penetrations from hostile fire. Results of actual effectiveness in other combat vehicles will be determined upon conclusion of current tests.


Discussion: Experience in Vietnam has established that certain serious multifuel engine failures cannot all be attributed to quality defects of the engine. Independent studies made by United States Army Tank-Automotive Command and Continental Aviation and Engineering Corporation have established that these failures are associated with overheating of the engine, hydrostatic lock and engine vibration. Engine overheating is attributed to insufficient radiator capacity. However, the limited space in the engine compartment will not permit installation of a radiator of the proper size to provide the required cooling capacity. Some reports of generator bolt failures followed by loose fan belts due to vibration, also accounts for overheating because of fan inefficiency in drawing air to cool the water in the radiator and in providing direct air cooling to the engine. In addition, the water pump does not properly circulate sufficient liquid to cool the engine when this occurs. A high rate of injection line failures prompted a study which determined that line vibration was the cause. Hydrostatic locks, in many cases, have been traced to improper use of, or leaking flam heaters.

Observation: In order to correct the deficiencies causing multifuel engine failures, a "fix and do" team, made up of Continental Motors and Army Tank-Automotive Command technicians, has been operating in the command. To reduce overheating of the engine, the fuel flow is being reduced and a high idle is being reset to a governed speed of 2850 revolutions per minute (RPM), plus or minus 50 RPM. Original power is maintained at engine speeds below the torque peak while the heat load in the combustion area is reduced. A locking device is installed in the fuel flow adjustment to preclude tampering with the high idler adjustment screw. The flam heater system is being disconnected to prevent its use and avoid any hydrostatic lock due to a leaking system. The failure of the fuel injector tubes because of vibration is being corrected by addition of clamps and brackets to hold the tubes in place. The generator is being shimmed to the bracket to avoid loosening and to maintain proper tension on fan belts.

5. Item: 75 Ton Per Hour Eagle Rockcrushers.
Discussion: There are 37 primary (jaw) and 36 secondary (roll) rock crushers operating in Vietnam. Problems have been encountered in procuring replacement engines for these rock crushers.

Observation: To improve availability rates of these critical items, the Continental SD 802 engine is being replaced by the Caterpillar D337TA engine. This Caterpillar engine, also used in 40-ton cranes, has been more readily available and can be installed with only nominal modifications.

6. Item: Generator Standardization Program.

Discussion: Only 6,985 standardized generators have arrived in country out of 17,595 programmed. Of those that have arrived, less than 4 percent are in the critical range of 15-Kilowatt and above. There continues to be approximately 140 makes and models of generators which causes repair parts supply to be less than adequate.

Observation: The Closed Loop Support Program for generators is being implemented in Vietnam. The increase in quantity of standardized generators, especially in the 15-Kilowatt and above category, should greatly improve the generator availability rate in Vietnam.

7. Item: Mechanization of Direct Support Unit Stock Control.

Discussion: Thirty-four National Cash Register (NCR) 500 Mechanized stock Control Systems are operating in Vietnam. Thirteen more systems are scheduled for installation and operation during the second and third quarters of Fiscal Year 1968.

Observation: The emphasis of this program is shifting from installation and initial operation to improving operations and reducing downtime.

8. Item: Shortage of Trained Mechanized Stock Control Supervisors.

Discussion: A critical shortage of trained Mechanized Stock Control Supervisors exists in units equipped with the mechanized system. Past experience indicates that the effectiveness of a mechanized operation is dependent upon the quality of supervision.

Observation: An emergency requisition has been placed for trained supervisors, for each mechanized unit in Vietnam, by United States Army, Vietnam.
9. Item: Authorized Strength of Collection, Classification and Salvage (CC&S) Companies.

Discussion: The 218th and 633d CC&S Companies were originally organized as Type B, TOE organizations. As such, they are authorized 91 military personnel. Experience has proven that Type B organizations are not capable of performing the CC&S missions encountered in Vietnam. Requests for Modification to Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) were submitted recommending that each of these two companies be increased to full TOE strength of 226 military personnel. These MTOEs were returned to 1st Logistical Command on 19 September 1967 by USARV with instructions that they be held in abeyance pending action on a separate proposal to include CC&S companies in new Tables of Distribution and Allowance of field depots.

Observation: Two CC&S companies of this command are organized as Type B units with an authorized strength of 91 military personnel each. This authorization is not adequate to perform the assigned CC&S mission in Vietnam in view of the low indigenous skill levels and limited qualified labor available.

10. Item: Cracked Engine Heads, Tractor, Full-Tracked, 07E

Discussion: Engine heads have been cracking on the full-tracked tractor, 07E, as a result of the engine overheating. This problem is prevalent in the land clearing teams of US Army Engineer Command, Vietnam (Provisional) units. Factors contributing to this problem are low coolant levels in the radiators, air spaces between tubes on the radiator cores being plugged with debris, and obstruction of air flow around the engine from mud packed between the belly pan and the engine block.

Observation: Investigation of the cracked engine heads indicates that there is a lack of trained operators and proper preventive maintenance on the full-tracked tractor 07E.

11. Item: Counter-Mortar Radar AN/MPQ-4A.

Discussion: Because of increased requirements for counter-mortar radars (CMR) to provide greater security of airfields and other vital areas, Department of the Army directed that incoming sets destined to be used in the cyclic overhaul program be used to fill these requirements. This precludes replacement of other sets which need periodic maintenance or minor repair. It further precludes the replacement of most sets which have reached the usable life limits as set in manufacturer's specifications and
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servicing policies. While the criteria for depot rebuild is 4000 running hours, many sets in Vietnam are still operating past 8000 running hours. Because of the shortage of counter-mortar radar sets, the maintenance float sets have decreased from six to three and the three remaining are approaching the point where they are no longer maintainable.

Observation: The shortage of counter-mortar radars has seriously jeopardized maintenance support. Sets arriving in country, to replace sets scheduled for replacement under the cyclic overhaul program have been used to fill additional operational requirements. As a result, only one set has been replaced since May 1967 under the cyclic overhaul program.

12. Item: Repair Parts Support of Psychological Warfare Equipment

Discussion: Because of expanded psychological warfare operations, additional equipment has been issued to divisions and separate brigades. Most of this equipment is nonstandard, commercial design equipment, and has created a problem in repair parts support.

Observation: Greater preparation is necessary, to include plans for adequate repair parts support, to insure a smooth introduction of nonstandard equipment into the military system.


Discussion: The increasing complexity and magnitude of the technical supply mission at the unit level requires able and experienced supervisors, knowledgeable in technical supply procedures. The present shortage of enlisted supervisors, trained in mechanized stock control procedures, further complicates the problem.

Observation: The technical supply warrant officer, MOS 4530, has been deleted from the Army-Force Structure. The restoration of this career supply specialist, and authorization of one such position to each direct support maintenance unit, would materially improve technical supply performance and efficiency at the direct support unit level.
DISCUSSION: An increasing number of fires and serious incidents have occurred as a result of pilferage of fuel at couplings along the Qui Nhon - An Khê pipeline. The pilferage and resulting fires have caused the loss of petroleum products, impaired pumping operations, and have resulted in loss of civilian lives and property.

Observation: Tack or bar welding of couplings in addition to mounding earth over pipelines will discourage pilferage by making it difficult to loosen couplings and by removing the pipeline from general observation. Instructions have been given to the Support Commands concerning this subject.

2. ITEM: Jet Fuel from Aircraft Fuel Tanks

DISCUSSION: C-150 aircraft flying into supply points and forward support areas can carry, in most cases, additional fuel above the quantity required to fly the mission. The additional fuel can be defueled from the aircraft's tanks as a means of resupply of JP-4. This procedure has been tried on two occasions at Quan Loi and Phuc Vinh.

Observation: Defueling of aircraft tanks promises to be an economical method of supplying JP-4 to numerous locations in Vietnam. Procedures and equipment to refine the method are being studied.

3. ITEM: Manufacture and Use of "Camel" Buffers Between Ships in Rough Seas.

DISCUSSION: During the Northeast monsoon it is impossible to effect ship to ship transfers at Qui Nhon. The T-2 tanker used for floating storage must be moved to Vung Ro Bay. Although Vung Ro Bay has a well protected harbor it is still affected by the monsoon. Damage can result to tankers during ship to ship transfers in rough water. "Camels", which are constructed from wood piling or heavy timbers wired or belted together, placed between the ships, prevent the ships from coming together and damaging each other.

Observation: "Camels" are being constructed at Cam Ranh Bay. Prior to the arrival of the Northeast monsoon, actions should be coordinated to effect simultaneous arrival of floating storage and "camels" at Vung Ro Bay.
K. (U) DIRECTORATE OF RETROGRADE AND DISPOSAL

1. Item: Consolidate the retrograde of empty 155mm propellant charge containers inside empty 175mm propellant charge containers.

Discussion: Ammunition Supply points are backing empty 155mm prop charge containers inside empty 175mm prop charge containers in retrograde of reusable ammo containers from Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

Observation: It is expected that this expedient of consolidating empty propellant charge containers will result in significant space and material savings.

2. Item: Use of shaped charge M2A3 of 15 pounds to demilitarize 175mm gun tubes, as well as 6-inch Howitzer tubes and other artillery tubes, in RVN as required.

Discussion: A test explosive demilitarization of gun tubes was conducted on an 8-inch and a 175mm gun tubes on 15 Oct 67. The purpose of the test was to determine if a relatively inexpensive explosive could successfully and satisfactorily demilitarize gun tubes locally in RVN. This would avoid the expense and effort to retrograde these gun tubes which are eventually disposed of as scrap or salvage. A 15-pound M2A3 prepared shaped charge (FSN 1375-028-5235), which contains 12 pounds of pentolite explosive, was placed approximately 4 feet from the breech of the 8-inch tube on the top center line. Using the optimum stand-off distance, the shaped charge was detonated non-electrically. The results were complete penetration of one side of the tube. The diameter of the penetration ranged from 3½ on the outside to 1 3/4" on the inside of the barrel. A similar shot using the 15-pound M2A3 shaped charge with optimum stand-off was placed on the top center line of the 175mm gun tube approximately 12 feet from the breech end. The shaped charge was detonated non-electrically resulting in a complete penetration of one side of the tube. The diameter of the penetration ranged from 3½" on the outside to 2" on the inside of the barrel. This shot also resulted in considerable spall on the inside of the barrel.

Observation: This method of demilitarizing artillery gun tubes by use of shaped charge M2A3, FSN 1375-028-5235, cost $12.90, represents an effective and economic means of
rendering these military items useless other than for scrap. These gun tubes could be turned over directly to property disposal yards for appropriate disposal actions.

3. Item: Ban on in-country sales impedes progress in managing the property disposal program.

Discussion: The current ban on sales of Foreign Excess Personal Property (FEPP) for import into the economy of Vietnam is a serious problem and is the main obstacle to progress of the property disposal program. The American Embassy delay in negotiating in-country sales of FEPP places the disposal program at a decided disadvantage in moving merchandise from overloaded disposal yards. Moreover, the restriction is not realistic because it fails to recognize that many items of salvage and scrap property have no actual scrap value. This disposal program is plagued by poor performance of offshore purchasers in removing property from scrap yards. The main problems center around lack of commercial transport, both land and water, bonded storage areas and the continued harassments of purchasers by local customs officials. On 8 August 1967, a meeting was held at the American Embassy to resolve the in-country sales problem. Those in attendance included representatives of the Embassy, Department of the Army, CINCPAC, MACV, USARV and Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. It was generally agreed that in-country sales should be resumed as soon as possible. On 26 August 1967 the Embassy, in a message to the Department of State, withdrew its previous objection for in-country sales and recommended they be resumed by 30 September 1967. On 4 October 1967, the American Ambassador forwarded a message to the Department of State in which he asked for an early resolution to the problem. Approval for in-country sales by all concerned is expected prior to 31 December 1967.

Observation: All Foreign Excess Personal Property sold must be physically removed from RVN. The numerous restrictive export laws of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, limited docking facilities, nonavailability of commercial transportation and material handling equipment and limited bonded storage areas, restrict buyers from effecting rapid and timely removal of the purchased property within the time frame specified in the sales contract.

4. Item: Lack of a diplomatic agreement by the United States and the Republic of Vietnam on specific conditions
under which the disposal program can operate hampers the sale of Foreign Excess Personal Property.

Discussion: There continues to be a serious problem caused by the failure of the American Embassy in Saigon to resolve the long standing problem of country-to-country agreement outlining conditions under which foreign excess personal property may be disposed of. The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 as amended (40 U.S.C. 511-514) directs that foreign excess disposal programs be developed and conducted with the coordination and approval of the United States Diplomatic Mission in the country concerned. Accordingly, there is definite need for a diplomatic agreement between the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam on conditions which will govern sales of Foreign Excess Personal Property in RVN. Without such an agreement, the property disposal program cannot progress to the point necessary to insure expeditious disposition of excess property.

Observation: Property Disposal Activities continue to be burdened with large inventories of foreign excess personal property. Generations exceed 5,000 short tons per month and continue to increase. A significant impact in reducing the accumulation of tonnage could be made by having a bilateral agreement between the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam outlining conditions under which the program can operate.
1. **Item:** Repair Parts Support for Nonstandard Equipment Received from RMK/BRJ Contracting Combine.

**Discussion:** Although Officer in Charge Construction (OICC), Navy, had previously agreed to turn over the nonstandard repair parts inventory and facility at Cam Ranh Bay to the Army during the month of October, the Department of the Navy disapproved the transfer. The contractor (RMK/BRJ) will continue operations on a reduced scale and the depot facilities will be retained until further notice. Parts on hand at RMK/BRJ and not required will be issued to Army on a "Fill or Kill" basis and no backorders will be established.

**Observation:** In view of the decision by the Navy, the Army must provide repair parts support on a contract basis. Our present contractor (PA&E) for nonstandard repair parts will, of necessity, have to supply all customers, in lieu of just those activities being supported by the engineer R&U contract. This added mission will increase the scope of the PA&E contract.

2. **Item:** Construction and use of Skid Base Crates.

**Discussion:** To adequately protect items of supply and equipment from the weather and to properly utilize available storage space, skid base crates are necessary for use with triple wall corrugated fiber-board containers.

**Observation:** Items shipped and stored in triple wall corrugated fiberboard containers are susceptible to deterioration in storage and handling. Utilizing the skid base crate in conjunction with a polyethylene shroud provides protection for the fiber board container, plus the rigidity necessary for stacking.

3. **Item:** Necessity of Preserving Nonperishable Subsistence Stored in Unprotected Areas.

**Discussion:** An aggressive recouperage program for preservation of nonperishable subsistence, starting when the item is received, is essential.

**Observation:** A well planned continuing recouperage program to rehabilitate deteriorated stocks on hand as well as newly received stocks should be included in all supply activities.
Item: Use of Sea-Land containers for shipment of retrograde cargo.

Discussion: Requests have been made to use Sea-Land containers for the retrograde of cargo such as reusable ammunition components, depot excesses, station returns and other compatible cargo.

Observations: A policy has been established by MACV-TMA whereby Sea-Land containers may be authorized for use in the retrograde of cargo if a rate favorable condition exists and CONEX transporters or Roll On - Roll Off trailers are not available for use.
Section II, PART II: RECOMMENDATIONS

A. (U) ACoS, Personnel:

That when possible, only refrigerated storage for human remains having the qualities of the modified CONEX reefer be used at forward graves registration collecting points.

B. (U) PROVOST MARSHAL:

German manufactured barbed tape concertina wire (FSN 5660-921-5516) and barbed tape (FSN 5660-921-5517) should continue to be stocked for use in HVN.

C. (U) ENGINEER:

1. The Navy be encouraged to complete action necessary to establish an ISSA to provide H&U support to Army Forces in I Corps Tactical Zone.

2. The USARV Ad Hoc Committee on Base Development limit future construction by developing new construction criteria and standards, rather than by the present method of developing future construction programs for each base separately.

3. a. USARV approve individual projects at the time of original submittal and those projects which are disapproved be returned to the originator with reasons for disapproval.

b. USARV publish a construction program of approved projects by FY prior to requesting requirements for a new FY planning action.

4. In future, uniform procedures for rental payments in the local currency should be developed in the initial stages of real estate acquisition.

D. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE:

1. Commanders at all levels and major subordinate commanders reemphasize the necessity of expediting the processing and forwarding of courts-martial charges.

2. An increased number of classes of instruction in the field of military justice and preventive law be incorporated into the training program at all levels of command, and that qualified Judge Advocates be called upon to give this instruction.
E. (U) DIRECTORATE OF PROCUREMENT:

1. Future contracts should be drafted to include labor standards provisions which will guarantee personnel policies, wage scales, classification standards and general employment policies identical to those used by the highest controlling headquarters.

2. Department of the Army should consider changing civilian personnel recruitment procedures and establishment of higher grade structures, in order to provide the highest caliber of professional personnel, as expeditiously as practicable to RVN.

F. (C) DIRECTORATE OF AMMUNITION:

1. Continued emphasis be placed on ammunition safety both in combat and support training schools in CONUS and throughout the combat zone.

2. CONUS port authorities schedule munition ships destined into Vietnam early enough to detect unsatisfactory conditions and correct them in order to meet combat munition requirements.

3. Combat Developments Command (CDC) investigate and publish guidance on degradation of unit capability when all personnel and/or equipment are not on hand and when unit is fragmented below platoon level as current operations dictate.

4. Combat Developments Command determine the requirements and implementation of an automated stock control detachment for control of Class V stocks.

5. Action be expedited on the recommendation of 1st Logistical Command to provide 2½ ton and 5 ton truck units with drop side vehicles to permit maximum utilization of material handling equipment when supplies are palletized.

6. Tactical commanders be made aware of EOD Reports of possible abandonment of ammunition by US units, the hazardous condition prompted by this practice and the potential source of supply this abandonment presents the enemy.

G. (U) DIRECTORATE OF MAINTENANCE:

1. A new vehicle should be designed with an engine compartment spacious enough to accommodate a radiator with the proper capacity to cool the multifuel engine and to allow sufficient space for direct air cooling of the engine.
2. Continued close supervision should be maintained over shipments of standardized generators, and generator engines, to and from Vietnam.

3. Maintenance float, parts rebuild program and engine standardization for 75-Ton-Per-Hour Eagle stockcrushers should continue to receive intensive management.

4. All commanders, having mechanized stock control systems, insure that an adequate number of supply supervisors are cross-trained on the NOR 500 Mechanized Stock Control System. All company grade officers, assigned to direct support units, and all junior staff officers, responsible for supervision of stock control, should also receive this training.

5. Approval should be expedited to increase authorized strength of 218th and 633d Collection, Classification and Salvage Companies to full strength; authorization of 226 military personnel, either through approval of requests for modification to TOE or through approval of new Table of Distribution and Allowances for field depots.

6. Personnel replacements, assigned to Vietnam, as heavy equipment operators, (i.e., full-tracked tractor 07E) be given more instructions on proper operations of the equipment and proper preventive maintenance on the equipment.

7. The cyclic overhaul program for counter-mortar radars be increased to replace worn-out sets and to replenish the maintenance float sets.

8. Greater provisioning for repair parts support of nonstandard items of equipment be made before equipment is introduced into the military system.

9. The technical supply warrant officer (HOS 4530) be restored to the Army Force Structure and that one such position be authorized each direct support maintenance company.

H. (U) DIRECTorate OF PEPtEFOLEUM:

For tack welding and earth covering of pipelines should be considered for inclusion as part of the project for future construction of coupled pipelines in Vietnam, to be accomplished after the pipeline is tested for leaks.
I. **DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL SUPPLY**:  

1. Stock record support currently being tested with the assistance of 2d Logistical Command, in the Cam Ranh Bay DSU/GSUs should be continued and expanded to other support command areas as problems are worked out.

2. Skid base crates should be used in conjunction with a polyethylene shroud to protect fiberboard containers being used as shipping containers.
AVHGC-DST (11 Nov 67)  1st Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO 96375  30 JAN 1968

TO: Commander  & Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GFOP-DT,
APO 96558

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C.  20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters,
1st Logistical Command (BGUA) as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning interservice support agreements, page
      23, paragraph 1; and page 51, paragraph C1: Concur. USARV is processing
      ISSA's for logistical support by the Navy. The mission in I Corps Tactical
      Zone is clearly defined, but take over by the Navy is contingent upon capabili-
      ties.

   b. Reference item concerning preventive law, page 27, paragraph
      2; and page 51, paragraph D2: Concur. Suitable legal articles have been sub-
      mitted to IO, USARV for publication which should improve this situation.

   c. Reference item concerning filling of DAC employee positions,
      page 30, paragraph 9; and page 52, paragraph E2: Nonconcur. Selection of
      an employee to fill a position is done by the employing agency, based upon a
      review of the individual’s career records. The majority of the positions are
      to be filled by registrants in a career field who must possess the minimum
      qualifications established by the Civil Service Commission. Direct contact
      between the organization and DA is not authorized. United States Army
      Materiel Command provides referral lists for positions GS 13 and above.
      USARPAC is responsible for filling positions GS 12 and below. Inflation of
      the grade system as an incentive would negate the basic purpose of the grade
      structure system.

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AVHGC-DST (11 Nov 67)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

d. Reference item concerning vehicle design, page 34, paragraph 4: Concur. A list of drop side cargo trucks was recently completed and it was recommended that such vehicles be adapted specifically for the purpose mentioned.

e. Reference item concerning countermortar radar AN/MPQ-4A, page 40, paragraph 11; and page 53, paragraph 7: This headquarters is attempting to build the maintenance float to its proper level of both major items and major components. 1st Logistical Command has been tasked to provide recommendations on the composition of this float.

f. Reference item concerning repair parts for PSYOPS equipment, page 41, paragraph 12: Concur. This matter was discussed at the monthly MACV PSYOPS Conference, and every effort is being made to improve repair parts stockage and to standardize the equipment.

g. Reference item concerning lack of experienced technical supply supervisors, page 41, paragraph 13; and page 53, paragraph G9. 1st Logistical Command has been instructed to submit a recommendation for establishment of Technical Supply Warrant Officer MOS code in accordance with paragraph 14, AR 611-112. This regulation contains instructions for the addition, modification, and elimination of MOS's. Also, major commanders may indicate special training requirements on regular monthly requisitions. In the case of supply MOS's, a Supply Specialist Refresher Course is conducted at Fort Lee, Virginia; however, at the present time, the input to this course is limited to senior grade enlisted personnel.

h. Reference item concerning ban on in-country sales, page 44, paragraphs 3 and 4: Concur. The United States State Department has granted approval for in-country sales effective 23 November 1967.

i. Reference item concerning individual projects, page 51, paragraph C3a: Concur. The USARV Ad Hoc Committee on Base Development reviews base development by on-site evaluation with a view toward austerity, and approves for construction only that which is considered to be absolutely essential for the combat mission. The committee recommends diversion of facilities where they are not effectively utilized. Criteria for various types
of construction, i.e., billets, maintenance facilities, and covered storage, have been standardized by the committee and are generally in accord with the 1st Logistical Command criteria. The committee recognizes only the Field Standard of Construction with specific exceptions where they apply.

j. Reference item concerning construction program, page 51, paragraph C3b: Concur. The construction programs for all FY’s are being staffed by this headquarters.

k. Reference item concerning LOD Reports, page 52, paragraph F6: Concur. Information on incidents of this nature have been, and will continue to be, provided to appropriate tactical commanders emphasizing the lack of supply discipline, potential enemy use, and related problems stemming from abandonment of ammunition, and recommending appropriate action be taken to preclude a recurrence.

l. Reference item concerning training of supply supervisors, page 53, paragraph 4: Concur. Managerial and supervisory training on the NCR 500 Mechanized Stock Control System is being planned for appropriate units. The training is scheduled to be presented by the ADFSC Team Pacific on or about 1 February 1968 under the supervision of G4, USARV.

m. Reference item concerning welding and covering of pipelines, page 53, paragraph H: Concur. In areas where there are high incident rates of pilferage or damage to pipelines caused by vehicular traffic, the coupled pipeline should be buried a minimum of two feet. In other areas where it is impractical to bury a pipeline, either tack welding of the coupling nuts and bolts, or welding of a bar across the coupling halves will deter pilferage at the pipe unions. If mounding is used to afford protection of the pipeline from small arms fire and pilferage, the earth mound over the pipeline should be 18” to 24” high.
AVHGC-DST (11 Nov 67)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

3. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
HQ, 1st Log Comd
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 from HQ, 1st Log Comd (UIC: WBGUAU) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 11 MAR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference paragraph 2c, 1st Indorsement: In October 1967, a recommendation was made to Headquarters DA that a special recruitment campaign be conducted to obtain qualified personnel for the U. S. Procurement Agency, Vietnam (USAPAV) for both TDY and PCS assignments. This special effort resulted in the selection of 15 individuals against 26 requisitions for USAPAV which were forwarded for recruitment by DA in October.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG
ANNEX A (U) SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR MATERIAL READINESS

1. Currently staffed by 3 officers and 2 enlisted personnel, the office of the Special Assistant for Material Readiness has continued to pursue the following four major areas of activity:
   a. Supervision of the Material Readiness Expediters (MRE) program.
   b. Follow-up action on problems reported in Periodic Logistics Reports (PLR).
   c. Expediting shipments of high priority cargo throughout Vietnam.
   d. Completion of projects assigned by the Commanding General.

2. There are currently 27 MREs located in key areas throughout the command, providing a direct link between support commands and their supported units. The greatest percentage of MRE effort expended during the past quarter has been in the area of expediting the issuance of urgently needed repair parts. A detailed analysis of one month's expediting within the Nhon Support Command revealed total requirements of 3,005 repair parts to remove end items from deadline. A fill of 57% was realized from in-country source through the efforts of MREs.

3. Follow up action on problems reported in the USAV Periodic Logistics Reports is still the major activity of this office. The follow up action and the results achieved on the semi-monthly PLRs from the major tactical units are presented to the Commanding General as appropriate, at the daily briefing. The complete status of each item listed is furnished to the G-4 or S-4 of the reporting unit before the PLR is briefed. The PLRs are submitted on the 5th and 20th of the month. The single remaining problem with PLRs continues to be the abuse of the system by reporting unauthorized or non-combat essential requests. During the first two months of this quarter, the number of items appearing on the report increased as a result of an addition of rifle companies within the units but during the last month the number deceased. This reduction can be attributed to the implementation of an accelerated schedule of staff visits to reporting units. Discussions with staff personnel have emphasized that shortages listed in the PLR should reflect those items not on hand in the reporting units, the absence of which
materially affects the unit's accomplishing its tactical mission. Continued personal contact with personnel has resulted in the reduction and frequency of reported non-essential items. At the same time improved managerial techniques have resulted in the established objective of this office. The processing time for August was 4.5 days, Sep 11.3 and Oct 9.4 days. The positive supply action taken during this period was reduced from 51% to 41%. This reduction was attributed to the increase of reported electronic items which have not been available in Vietnam.
ANNEX B (U)  PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

1. Military Personnel: The military strength of the command was reduced from 61,633 to 51,501. This reduction of 10,132 reflects the transfer of the 44th Medical Brigade and assigned units to Headquarters, US Army, Vietnam (USARV) effective 15 August 1967 and a more austere staffing posture in Combat Service Support Units. At the close of the period the command is staffed at 92% of authorized strength.

2. Department of Army Civilians: The command is authorized 227 Department of Army Civilians, with recruiting authority for an additional 124. Recruiting efforts show satisfactory progress with current employment of 225 personnel. Operational responsibility for all Special Services Activities in the Republic of Vietnam was assigned to the command 27 September 1967. A survey of personnel requirements to staff existing and projected facilities was completed and a request for 309 additional spaces was forwarded to USARV 23 October 1967.

3. Direct Hire Employees: The command received a revised local national manpower authorization voucher 10 October 1967, reducing the command's ceiling from 12,029 to 11,813 direct hire local national spaces. This reduction of 216 spaces was due to the over-staffing of mess halls with kitchen helpers. The requirement to reduce the command's overstrength by 31 October 1967 was extended to 20 December 1967 by HQ, USARV. All subordinate commanders were requested to closely review the LN utilization within their commands to ensure that this limited source of manpower is being utilized to staff mission essential functions. Commanders were also requested to verify the assignment of each LN employee against an authorized position, due to the possibility that a number of LNAs may have resigned or transferred without completing required civilian personnel procedures.

4. Daily Hire Employees: Local National daily hire employees have been utilized during this period at a command average daily rate of 2617 personnel. The average daily rate for 1st quarter FY 68 was approximately 900 personnel higher than anticipated. This was due to an increase of funds made available for this purpose by Department of the Army (DA). This command has been authorized an average daily rate of 2812 personnel for 2d quarter, FY 68. It is anticipated that the average daily rate for 3d quarter FY 68 will be approximately the same.

5. Authorization Documents: The Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) for the US Army Mortuary, Da Nang was approved by DA and the unit was organized effective 25 August 1967. (b) A manpower survey of the US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam was completed 19 August 1967 by USARPAC. The TDA reflecting recommendations of the survey team was completed and forwarded to USARV 2 September 1967. (c) The organizational study of the Depots at Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon was completed and TDA were forwarded to USARPAC 24 September 1967.
(d) A new TDA for Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command was published 30 September 1967 which implements the recommendations of the USARPAC manpower review in July 1967. This TDA will be used until the scheduled USARPAC manpower survey takes place in January 1968. (e) The TDA for the Central Real Estate Office was returned by DA as not favorably considered. This function will be presented to the USARPAC manpower survey team for consideration as an element of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. (f) The proposed TDA for the Red Ball Express Control Office was evaluated by USARV and returned, not favorably considered as a separate activity. The administrative functions have been assigned to the 14th Inventory Control Center and the cargo handling functions assigned to the 4th Transportation Command. (g) Long Binh Post (Provisional) was transferred from USARV to 1st Logistical Command 1 October 1967 and further assigned to US Army Support Command, Saigon. The TDA for Long Binh Post was forwarded to USARV 28 October 1967.
1. The most significant civil affairs activity undertaken was the implementation of the Long Binh Post People to People Program as directed by HQ, USARV on 1 Sep 67. This program involves weekly visits and the implementation of civic action projects within eighty two hamlets in Cong Thanh and Duc Tu Districts of Bien Hoa Province. These hamlets, with a total population of 223,000 people, have been further assigned to subordinate units of United States Army Support Command, Saigon (USASC, Saigon) and units assigned to HQ, USARV located within the Long Binh Post Area. Responsibility for control and coordination of the program has been assigned to CG, USASC, Saigon. All units assigned responsibility for a hamlet are required to submit Hamlet Visitation Reports on a weekly basis.

2. The 1st Logistical Command Civic Action Distribution Point processed and shipped 2,445,906 pounds (1,223 short tons) of commodities to all four corps areas. This figure represents a sharp reduction from the previous quarter and was due primarily to delayed in-country arrival of commodities for Fiscal Year 1968. Commodities shipped consisted primarily of food (for the Popular Force Food Supplement Program), clothing and medicines.

3. Units of 1st Logistical Command continued to conduct extensive civic action and community relations activities. For principal areas of activity and commodity statistics of products distributed through Civic Action/Community Relations efforts see Inclosure 9.

4. Excellent progress has been made within the command in the conduct of military civic action. Occasionally, however, units have encountered pitfalls which have markedly reduced the effectiveness of their civic action programs. The more common and recurring failings include:

a. Treating civic action as a charitable activity, i.e., donations to orphanages and other institutions, unilateral construction projects, etc. Experience has shown that unilateral "give away" programs destroy initiative and prevent the development of the proprietary interest and pride in accomplishment that is necessary if the people are to maintain the project after US units depart. Wherever feasible, units should insist on maximum Vietnamese participation. "Self-help" projects give the people a stake in the result and also serve to develop a spirit of cooperation among them which is one of the principal objectives of civic action. A limited amount of charitable activity is proper, where a need exists which clearly cannot be fulfilled in any other manner. When conducted, such charitable activities are really in the area of community relations and not civic action.
b. The concentration of civic action effort in a few pet institutions or a relatively small area while surrounding areas and other similar institutions receive no support at all. This frequently results in excessive support which tends to create "haves" and "have nots" and, in some instances, has encouraged corruption among administrators. There are cases where orphanages have received such excessive support that parents and foster parents have placed children in orphanages rather than care for them at home.

c. Undertaking large projects which reach a relatively limited group of the local population such as schools for the blind. The object of civic action is to contribute to general economic and social development. Projects should provide for maximum Vietnamese participation and be designed to benefit the largest number of people. Again, a limited number of such projects may be proper but they should not comprise the major portion of a unit's civic action effort.

d. Circumventing Vietnamese agencies and officials because units feel they can accomplish a project more efficiently and more rapidly if they do it themselves. This is in direct contradiction to one of the principal objectives of military civic action, which is to enhance the image of the Government of South Vietnam (GVN), and serves only to interrosee the image of the U.S. between the people and the GVN. Members of U.S. units must constantly seek to bring indigenous officials onto the scene and make it obvious that the U.S. unit is assisting the GVN and acting only in its behalf. Although unilateral efforts may be necessary in combat areas where GVN authority is not present, it is improper where GVN authority is present.

e. Establishing projects involving long range or continuing assistance which could not be supported or sustained at the same level by the GVN upon US departure. In cases, when US departure would leave a vacuum, the GVN image would be tarnished and, the institution or program itself might be jeopardized. Sound civic action projects should generally have short completion times. This not only avoids the problems discussed here, but ensures that results of civic action efforts are immediately visible to the people.

f. Establishing projects which they think the people need rather than coordinating with GVN officials and MACV advisors to find out what the real needs are. Some projects have fallen into disrepair after completion or after the US unit departs because it was not what the people needed or wanted. By the same token there have occasionally been "show projects" designed not to meet the needs of the people but to show visiting dignitaries the wonders of a unit's civic action program. The Vietnamese are quick to recognize this and they react accordingly.
g. Publicizing civic action projects with too much emphasis on the US effort, i.e., pictures showing US personnel handing out commodities, signs in English commemorating the US unit which supported the project, etc. Since one of the principal objectives of the civic action effort is to enhance the image of the GVN, US efforts should be shown in a supporting role, such as providing material, technical assistance, etc. Any signs erected should be in Vietnamese.

h. Failure to coordinate all projects with GVN officials and MACV advisors. The crux of successful military civic action is coordination. Proposed projects must be closely coordinated with province and district level officials and their MACV advisor counterparts to determine actual needs, to avoid duplication and excessive support, to rechannel misguided idealism, and to receive maximum benefits from skills, labor, supplies, equipment and funds involved. Civil affairs officers should serve as the focal point for this coordination, insuring that all civic action conducted by their units, to include all medical civic action and other civic activities undertaken by unit chaplains, are properly coordinated through, and approved by, the appropriate GVN official and MACV advisor.

5. Military civic action has three principal objectives:

a. The foremost is to develop popular support for the GVN. Without the support of the people, no government can hope to survive the level of insurgency which presently faces the GVN. The people must be persuaded toward allegiance to their government while that government and its allies appear to be causing great damage and death all around them.

b. A second objective is to improve the living conditions of the people and thus remove one of the underlying causes of insurgency.

c. The third objective is to develop a spirit or cooperation among the people. They are clan and kinship oriented and very distrustful of those outside their own family group. If they are to help themselves, they must learn to work together.

6. When the pitfalls outlined in paragraph d above are avoided these objectives are well met. As indicated earlier, progress in the conduct of military civic action has generally been excellent, but the pitfalls exist and units continue to fall into them. Correction is a matter of education, experience and command emphasis. Two new publications should serve to eliminate some of the problems in this area. A revised 1st Logistical Command Regulation 515-1, now in draft form, will when approved, provide more definitive guidance in the areas
outlined above. A monthly Civil Affairs Bulletin published for the first time in October will serve to provide the most current information and guidance to the field on a monthly basis. The problem areas continue to be a major item of interest and are directly addressed on staff visits to all subordinate units.
ANNEX E (U) ADJUTANT GENERAL

1. (U) Technical inspections of three Army Postal Units were conducted to determine whether their operations were being conducted in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and directives. Results of these inspections reveal that these units are performing their mission in an efficient and economical manner. Data concerning these inspections are at Inclosure 1.

2. (U) On 24 September 1967, representatives from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Security Plans and Operations reviewed all TOP SECRET documents on file in the AG Classified Repository for possible destruction. As a result of this review, 76 TOP SECRET documents were destroyed.

3. (U) The over-use of the SCM copiers in the AG Administrative Services Division, has resulted in an excessive amount of maintenance time. These machines were not designed for high volume copying. In an attempt to reduce the amount of copying on these machines, quick copy reproduction is being accomplished on Thermofax machines. In addition, a request for Xerox Model 914 copying equipment has been submitted to USARV.

4. (U) An aggressive reenlistment program is being conducted to retain quality soldiers of the command and in the US Army. A full time Reenlistment Officer has been appointed and staff visits are being made to field units to insure a highly successful command reenlistment program. Reenlistment statistics are attached at Inclosure 2.

5. (U) The personnel rotating to CONUS have continued to exceed personnel replacements, thus causing a considerable reduction in assigned strength. Personnel replacement and rotation statistics are attached at Inclosure 3.

6. (C) The assigned strength of 1st Logistical Command has decreased considerably during this period and is at 92% of authorization as of 31 October 1967. Current and projected personnel shortages within the command have dictated that certain MOSs be identified which are essential to mission accomplishment. A list of critical MOSs was furnished Headquarter, US Army Vietnam requesting that these specialties be maintained at 100% of the authorized strength at all times. To insure proper assignment of replacement personnel and maximum utilization of available personnel resources, Personnel Inventory Reports are now being prepared and submitted by each major subordinate command on a bi-monthly basis. This provides current strength data from which a more equitable distribution of personnel replacements can be made.

ANNEX E

CONFIDENTIAL
7. (U) Command strength report for the period 1 August thru 31 October 1967 is at Inclosure 4.

8. (U) Directors and Special Staff Section Chiefs of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command are being furnished information on officer personnel in their respective directorate or section. This data includes the TDA authorization, name, grade, MOS and DEROS of the incumbent and requisition number, name and ETA of known programmed replacements. This procedure was established to provide a better understanding of the officer requisitioning system by all concerned and to keep the Directors and Special Staff Chiefs informed on the status of their assigned officers and programmed replacements.

9. (U) The command enlisted promotion statistics are attached as Inclosure 5.

10. (U) Command casualty statistics are at Inclosure 6.

11. (U) Awards and decorations statistics are at Inclosure 7.
ANNEX F (U) CHAPLAIN

1. Personnel:
   a. As of 31 October 1967, 1st Logistical Command had 77 authorized chaplain spaces. This figure includes 74 TOE/TD spaces and three VOOG spaces. There are 63 chaplains present for duty of which 49 are Protestant and 14 are Catholic. Jewish coverage for the command is provided by Jewish chaplains assigned to other commands. The Staff Chaplain makes continuous visits throughout the command to insure that efficient and complete religious coverage is provided. 21 TOE/TD and 4 VOOG chaplain spaces were lost to the command with the shifting of the 44th Medical Brigade to USARV control.
   b. As of 31 October 1967, 1st Logistical Command had authorizations for 77 chaplain assistants. This figure includes 74 TOE/TD spaces and 3 VOOG spaces. 71 of these are filled. Due to a shortage of chaplain assistant replacements through normal AG channels, some chaplains were provided clerical personnel for on-the-job training (CJT). In most instances, this action proved to be highly successful.

2. Religious Coverage:
   a. Chapel Attendance Percent of Strength: The decrease in attendance percentage from last quarter (22.6%) can be attributed to three factors: First, the command lost 22 chaplains when the 44th Medical Brigade was placed under USARV control. The chaplains of the Medical Brigade worked in a stable situation which insured them of a constant attendance figure. Second, 18 chaplains rotated and were replaced in August and September. A new chaplain normally requires a month to adjust to his new assignment and to establish a set schedule of worship services. Third, two Catholic chaplains were on special leave from the Qui Nhon area. Their absence demanded a consolidation of several religious services.

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<tr>
<td>USASC, Saigon</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
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<td>USASC, Can Ranh Bay</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>USASC, Qui Nhon</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recap</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
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ANNEX F
b. Average Number of Services Weekly per Chaplain: The Department of the Army goal is two services per chaplain per week. The US Army Vietnam goal is four services per chaplain per week. During a period of increased chaplain rotation, slight variations in these figures are common. It is contemplated that the number of services that our chaplains conduct each week will continue to increase as the Christmas season approaches. This increase is already evident in the October figures.

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<td>Recap</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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3. Training:

a. Chaplains:

(1) Supervisory Chaplains' Training Conference. The Staff Chaplain conducted a Support Command Chaplains' Training Conference, 22-24 August. This conference proved highly successful. It provided an opportunity for the supervisory chaplains of the command to coordinate matters of interest and to discuss common problems.

(2) Monthly Chaplains' Training Conference: Each Support Command Staff Chaplain conducts a Monthly Training Conference for all chaplains under his supervision. A representative from the Office of the Staff Chaplain, 1st Logistical Command, habitually attends these conferences.

(3) Hospital Chaplains' Workshop. A Hospital Chaplains' Workshop was conducted at Vung Tau, 18-21 September. Although 44th Medical Brigade was no longer under 1st Logistical Command at the time of the workshop, plans which had been made earlier were followed through to completion. All of the staffing and support of the workshop went through or was directed by this headquarters. Vung Tau Sub-Area Command provided the logistical support.

(4) Liaison visit of Staff Chaplain, 1st Log Comd, to 2d Log Comd, 7-12 August 1967, and of 2d Log Comd Chaplain to 1st Log Comd, 2-8 October 1967. The Staff Chaplain continued the policy of
exchanging liaison visits with 2d Logistical Command. These visits assist to coordinate matters of common interest in the area of chaplain supply.

b. Chaplain Assistants: A Quarterly Training Conference for chaplain assistants has been initiated. The conferences are conducted by personnel from the Office of the Staff Chaplain. The instruction is provided at each Support Command.

4. Civic Action: A monthly Chaplain Civic Action Report has been initiated by the Staff Chaplain to determine the money donated through chapel offerings to civic action projects. A consolidation of the donations reveals that 336,972 $VN was given in August, 402,617 $VN in September, and in October the amount donated to projects of this nature was 713,993 $VN.

5. Chaplain Supply:

a. Requisitioning Objectives. After 1 July 1967, the Authorized Stockage List for non-expendable ecclesiastical supply items was increased from 7 to 44 items. At that time a Requisitioning Objective for each item was established. However, since no experience factors were available upon which to base the Requisitioning Objectives, it was known that certain adjustments would be necessary. A survey of ecclesiastical items currently in-country, and close observation of demand, assisted the Staff Chaplain in adjusting the Requisitioning Objectives to be more in line with anticipated requirements.

b. Depot Chaplains in monitoring supplies. As the Staff Chaplain monitored the flow of supplies to chaplain customers, it became evident that the Depot Chaplain could assist the supply system by monitoring the receipt, storage, and issue of chaplain supplies at Depot level. A Letter of Instruction was prepared for the Director of General Supply and published to provide the Depot Chaplain with guidelines and authority to accomplish this task.
1. (C) German Manufactured Barbed Tape and Concertina.

   a. The evaluation of the German Manufactured barbed tape and concertina wire previously reported upon was completed. Final field tests reiterated information contained in previous reports, and concluded that this type barrier is superior to standard tactical wire.

   b. Completed test reports and recommendations were sent to interested agencies, i.e., Army Concept Team Vietnam, Military Police Agency CDC, Fort Gordon and PM USARV.

2. (C) Port Security.

   a. To implement the port and inland waterway security mission of this command, a program of obtaining patrol boats was initiated in FY 67. Based on prepared plans, the Boston Whaler boats received in the command were distributed to the Support Commands at Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon. Prior to putting the boats into operation, a three day training program for boat crews was conducted, by the Coast Guard Port Security and Inland Waterways Detail, at each of these areas. The program of instruction covered all aspects of safe boat handling operations.

   b. Overall, the operation of the security boats has been beneficial to the command. Some difficulties, in maintenance resulting in the temporary discontinuation of boat operations in the Saigon area have been experienced. These problems, however, have been identified and appropriate action necessary to resume operations has been taken.

   c. The Boston Whaler boat was considered as a substitute item pending receipt of the Patrol Boat River, (PBR), and plans for the PBR boat unit and operations are proceeding satisfactorily. Directives have been initiated to organize a Transportation Patrol Boat Company, determination has been made on the distribution of the craft, and training and maintenance arrangements in conjunction with the Navy are under way.

   d. The arrival of the PBRs is anticipated in January 1968, as previously reported, but a possibility exists that the craft may arrive in country as early as December 1967. No serious problems have arisen with this project thus far.

3. (C) Ammunition Discharge Site Movement.
a. Action to encourage relocation of ARVN ammunition discharge and loading activities from Nha Be continues.

b. Information has been received that ARVN is considering the proposal to relocate to a new site, thereby reducing the hazards of collocation of ammunition and POL operations at Nha Be.

4. (C) US Coast Guard Explosive Loading Teams.

a. Presently, there are two Coast Guard Explosive Loading Teams in country.

b. The assignment of a third Explosive Loading Team has been requested. The need of an Explosive Loading Team at Qui Nhon was dramatically emphasized 23 Oct 67 when three 75OLB bombs accidentally slipped off their pallet while being loaded aboard a lighterage vessel. The bombs exploded killing two enlisted men, wounded several others and sank the lighterage vessel. This accident probably could have been avoided had a Coast Guard Explosive Loading Team been available to supervise this off loading operation. The assignment of a Coast Guard Explosive Loading Team for Qui Nhon was requested in March 1967. Indication of approval for the team has been received and its arrival is anticipated in January 1968. This highlights the fact that it sometimes takes a tragic accident to stimulate action on obvious requirements.

5. (C) Control and Safeguard of US Supplies and Military Property.

a. LC Reg 525-2; Subject, Control and Safeguard of US Supplies and Military Property; published in May, was revised in September based on recommendations from the field. To promote compliance with, and understanding of, the details of this regulation, a team of officers has been formed at this headquarters consisting of representatives from the offices of the Comptroller, Director of Transportation, Director of Supply, and Provost Marshal. One function of this team is to visit the major subordinate commands to evaluate progress and assist the commanders in implementation of the provisions of this regulation.

b. The first visit took place during the period 26-28 October and appropriate reports are being prepared for evaluation.

c. It is anticipated that with full implementation of this regulation, reports of losses should increase due to better reporting procedures and conversely, as the controls are implemented and improved upon, the amount of actual loss should decrease.
6. (C) Security Guards.

   a. In view of the continued reduction of personnel resources, the feasibility of using civilian guards of some category is still being actively pursued. Previous proposals, which suggested the use of NUNS and/or third country nationals, have not been favorably considered.

   b. A request for the hiring of approximately 300 direct hire local nationals in the Saigon Support Command area as a pilot test force is pending approval at the present time.

7. (C) Physical Security.

   a. Emphasis on physical security of ammunition supply facilities has continued through means of staff visits, inspections and command directives. Through these visits, current data is maintained on the progress of completion of physical security improvements at each of the facilities.

   b. Though some difficulties have been encountered in obtaining glare projection lighting and chain link fencing as initially programmed, other security improvements to include additional barriers of tactical wire, burning of pads, guard tower construction and command and control innovations are all being combined to provide maximum security in depth. Substantial reductions in security force requirements can be attributed directly to the completion of these projects. A noted example is the Long Binh ASD, where security forces of over 1000 personnel, employed immediately after the 4 February disaster, has been reduced to approximately 334 as of the end of October. Although not of the same magnitude, substantial reductions are being made in other facilities of this command.

8. (C) Discipline, Law and Order.

   Department of Army Regulations have changed the categories of offender reports. This action negates any comparisons on like types of offenses and/or offenders for this period. Subsequent reports will reflect trends and rates for the command. The number of traffic offenders declined for this quarterly period.
except one include facilities for photography. Twelve unit photo labs are operational and another eight are projected by December.

b. Central Post Funds for establishing the Crafts Revolving Fund Supplies Account have been activated and range from $1,000 grants for photo facilities, to $20,000 grants at Long Binh and $30,000 at Vung Tau.

c. The Crafts Branch has six approved appropriated fund spaces. One is occupied by the Staff Director and one by Assistant Area Director who arrived in country in September. Four GS-11 spaces are approved: two NAF-11 Area Directors are awaiting transfer to GS-11 positions, leaving two open for worldwide recruitment.

d. Projected for operation by the end of 2d Quarter FY 68 are additional 19 facilities - MTC Photo Labs and 10 MTC facilities.

8. Library Branch:

a. Two professional librarians were added to the staff during this period.

b. Four libraries were opened during this period: (1) Dau Tieng; (2) An Khe; (3) Bearcat; (4) Nha Trang Sub-Area Command.

c. Twenty field collections of paperback and clothbound books were established.

d. Total library bookstock for all libraries in RVN is now 110,000 volumes.

e. Funds were transferred to the Adjutant General's Office, Department of the Army, for procurement of 800 paperbound books kits to supplement 9,200 monthly kits already on requisition.

f. Purchase orders in the amount of $424,700 were committed from NAF during the 1st Quarter.

g. With the increase of "Army Times" to 26,500 copies per week, the manual addressing and mailing from the Library Service Center in Saigon became too unwieldy. Arrangements have been made to mail these copies directly from Tokyo and to keep up the mailing list through use of IBM equipment.
1. (U) a. The most significant event in the area of security was the Vietnamese National elections, 3 September 1967, and its effect on enemy activity. The election was preceded by a significant increase in enemy initiated incidents which reached a peak 31 August 1967 and 1 September 1967. The incidents primarily involved assassinations and mass kidnappings of Vietnamese civilians and mortaring of villages, hamlets, and district towns, resulting in many civilians being murdered, wounded or captured. These actions were coordinated with numerous road interdictions and attacks on Republic of Vietnam (RVN) military units in a campaign to discredit the RVN government and disrupt the election. The majority of incidents involving US military personnel occurred in the Cholon section of Saigon and resulted in the terrorist slaying of one member of this command and the death of two other US personnel.

b. Prior to the election, CONFIDENTIAL message AVCA GO-S 07-093 was dispatched to the command, outlining the anticipated trends in enemy initiated activity and directing that subordinate commands take additional security measures as deemed appropriate. On 28 August 1967, CONFIDENTIAL message AVCA GO-S 08-182 forwarded additional guidance on the pre-election activity and directed that a posture of maximum alertness and security be maintained from 28 August to 5 September 1967 with a strict 24 hour curfew from 3100H August to 0400H September 1967. On 1 September 1967, the period of maximum alertness for the command was extended to 10 September 1967 by CONFIDENTIAL message AVCA GO-S 09-012.

c. During the election period only one major incident, involving elements of this command, was reported. This incident occurred at 021900H September 1967, when an estimated company-sized enemy force ambushed a convoy of the 8th Transportation Group, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, on Highway #19, approximately 10 kilometers West of An Khe in the II Corps Tactical Zone. During the ambush, which lasted five minutes, the enemy employed all arms, automatic weapons, mines, and mortars, to inflict heavy damage to the convoy.

2. (C) While the overall tempo of hostile activity decreased in the operational area during the period, there was a continuation of attacks against POL storage areas; a trend that was first noted during the last reporting period.

a. At 022700H August 1967, an unknown number of enemy launched an attack against friendly forces and installations at N°.1 Be,
Republic of Vietnam (RVN), using automatic weapons, mortars, and recoilless rifle fire. During a 35 minute attack, 46 personnel were wounded including 31 US. Incoming mortar rounds ignited a fire in the drum storage area at the Shell Tank Farm resulting in the destruction of approximately one thousand 55 gallon drums of Mog's and damage to several thousand others.

b. At approximately 231000H September 1967, several personnel working in the POL storage and Supply Point (SSP) at the 88th Supply and Services Battalion, Pleiku, RVN, heard a sound similar to that of an M-79 Grenade Launcher being fired. The sound came from an area outside the northern perimeter of the SSP and was accompanied by several rounds of tracer fire observed passing over the SSP. Seconds later, a muffled explosion occurred and a fire was observed within the SSP. Before the fire was extinguished, 109,000 gallons of Mog's, 109,000 gallons of Diesel Fuel, twenty-three 10,000 gallon bladders, two 350 gallon per minute (gpm) pumps, two 350 gpm filter separators, and miscellaneous hoses and fittings valued at $95,000 were destroyed.

c. At 080000H October 1967, the Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) compound and in Khe Sub-Area Command Transportation Motor Pool (TMP) at Camp Radcliffe in Khe, RVN, received 10-15 rounds of small arms fire, followed by a ground attack by approximately 15 enemy. The enemy, wearing black shorts and dark camouflage, penetrated the perimeter through two holes in the fence and placed approximately 40 charges of C4 and TNT throughout the area. During the 15 minute attack two were killed (1 US and VN civilian) and two were wounded (1 US and 1 VN civilian). There were sixteen vehicles destroyed and sixteen damaged. Buildings valued at $17,300 were destroyed and additional damage to buildings was estimated to be $2,300. Supplies valued at over $60,000 were also destroyed. Guards on duty at the compound returned small arms fire, killing three enemy.

3. (U) On 21 August 1967, 1st Logistical Command Regulation 604-5 was published to provide guidance concerning the personnel security clearance program. The ACoS, Security, Plans, and Operations is assigned staff responsibility for the command personnel security program. Authority to validate TOP SECRET clearances and to grant interim TOP SECRET and interim SECRET clearances is retained by this headquarters. The authority to validate SECRET clearances, grant CONFIDENTIAL clearances, and grant Cryptographic access is authorized to this headquarters and subdelegated to the major subordinate commands. The use of WCB Form 458-R (DoD Form 873 Removal Record) is required to insure that a record is maintained in the Personnel Records Jacket (201 File) of an individual when the certificate of clearance is removed for validation.
4. (U) Reassignment of the 44th Medical Brigade on 10 August 1967 to Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) reduced the number of personnel security clearance actions by approximately 20 per cent. Receipt of USARV Regulation 604-5 and publication of 1st Logistical Command Regulation 604-5 during August resulted in more complete written guidance concerning proper completion of personnel security clearance actions. As a result, the percentage of requests for security clearance returned to subordinates for correction was greatly reduced. The following statistics reflect the size of the personnel security program in this command:

a. Clearances Validated: 209
   - (1) TOP SECRET: 164
   - (2) SECRET: 45

b. Requests for National Agency Check: 174

c. Requests for Background Investigation: 11

d. Requests for United States Army Investigative Records Repository Check: 1,002

e. Clearances Granted: 104
   - (1) Interim TOP SECRET: 8
   - (2) Interim SECRET: 81
   - (3) CONFIDENTIAL: 15

At the end of the period, 686 clearance actions were pending.

5. (U) Activities of the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment (CI):


b. Sabotage Threat Surveys of the following 1st Logistical Command installations were completed:
   - (1) Vung Tau Sub-rea Command,
   - (2) United States Army Terminal, Vung Tau/Delta.
c. The Detachment conducted 64 announced Counterintelligence Inspections and 48 unannounced inspections.

d. Twenty-five Personnel Security Investigations were completed, comprised of 163 Agent Reports and 182 leads.

e. "Operation INDUCE" which was inaugurated during July 1967 was expanded to cover all installations in 1st Logistical Command. The objective of the program is to obtain intelligence information from local nationals employed by this command. Participation in the program by local nationals has been below expectations and a new leaflet has been developed to increase participation in the program.

f. At the close of the reporting period the strength of the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment (CI) was 72 authorized, 79 assigned. Headquarters was located in Saigon with field offices in: Saigon, Vung Tau, Long Binh, Nha Trang, Nui Phu, Pleiku, Cam Ranh Bay, and Tuy Hoa.

6. (U) Weather: a. During August and September, the weather continued to be fair over the Central and Northeast Coast of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), with minimal adverse effect on logistical operations. Throughout other areas in RVN the full effects of the Southwest Monsoon were being felt. In the Central Highlands, monsoon rains turned roads, storage areas, and grounds, at all facilities, into a vast sea of mud, which severely restricted all logistical operations. Additionally, use of air transportation was hampered by the continuing poor visibilities and low ceilings during the morning hours. In the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), the pace of friendly operations slowed because of the monsoon conditions, and heavy rains caused periods of local flooding and road washouts.

b. The transition to the Northeast Monsoon in October caused a sudden deterioration in the weather over the Central and Northeast coastal regions with increased cloudiness, increasing seas, and heavy rains which caused widespread flooding and interdiction of roads. These conditions and increasing seas adversely affected logistical operations, particularly in Southern and Central I CTZ. Increasing seas also resulted in periodic interruption of port operations. Elsewhere in RVN, the transition from the Southwest Monsoon brought an overall improvement in weather conditions. However, several severe thunderstorms caused temporary inundation of roads and flooding of facilities.
1. (C) CINCPAC CAPABILITIES CONFERENCE. From 21 to 31 August 1967, representatives from this command attended a conference at CINCPAC headquarters to evaluate deployment of units to RVN in FY 68. At the conference, representatives from the various services presented their requirements for additional units in RVN to support the additional combat units approved for deployment. The two main combat forces to deploy are the 11th Light Infantry Brigade and the remaining two brigades of the 101st Airborne Division. The list of additional units for the 1st Logistical Command was prepared and staffed by this headquarters prior to the conference. Each support unit requested had to be justified in detail prior to being placed in the program. All additional units proposed by 1st Logistical Command representatives were approved and placed in the program.

2. (C) DEFENSE AGAINST ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACK (DARMA). During August, this headquarters conducted a Defense Against Rocket and Mortar Attack (DARMA) Survey to evaluate defensive measures now in effect, plan additional defensive measures for subsequent implementation and identify personnel and equipment required for the planned defensive measures. The survey was conducted in five phases:

   a. Phase I - Neutralization or destruction of rocket and mortar weapons and crews prior to employment.

   b. Phase II - Neutralization or destruction of rocket and mortar weapons and crews after emplacement but prior to firing.

   c. Phase III - Neutralization or destruction of rocket and mortar rounds in flight.

   d. Phase IV - Neutralization or destruction of rocket and mortar systems and crew after firing but prior to displacement, using signature of firing.

   e. Phase V - Neutralization or destruction of rocket and mortar systems and crews during or after displacement following firing, using location derived from signature of firing or signature of movement.

3. (C) UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM AD HOC STUDY GROUP FOR BASE DEVELOPMENT. Based upon operational requirements which necessitated relocating certain tactical units and an increasing demand for expansion of existing base camp sites, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) formed an Ad Hoc Study Group to determine if current and programmed base development projects are warranted. Representatives of
this command attended a meeting of this study group 16 August 1967 to review the group's mission and itinerary. The meeting was convened under the chairmanship of the G-4, USARV. Membership of the study group included representatives from Headquarters, USARV for G-1, G-3, Engineer, Surgeon, Aviation and Signal elements, and representatives for 1st Logistical Command and the 34th General Support Group. The study group's mission is to visit each US Army installation to review its base development program in the light of austerity and to make recommendations for adjustments of base plans. The committee's itinerary included surveys of:

a. Tay Ninh-Dau Tieng  
b. Pleiku Installation-4th US Infantry Division Base Camp  
c. Cu Chi  
d. Lai Khe-Phu Loi  
e. Bien Hoa  
f. An Khe  
g. Tuy Hoa-Vung Ro  
h. Nha Trang-Ninh Hoa  
i. Qui Nhon  
j. Bear Cat-Long Than  
k. Dong Tam-Can Tho  
l. Xuan Loc-Long Giao  
m. Cam Ranh Bay  
n. Ban Me Thuot  
o. Vung Tau-Nui Dot

To date the team has completed the reviews of the first five installations. These surveys indicated that several installations had programmed construction excessive to their needs. The committee will complete the review of the remaining installation base development programs on or about 20 March 1968.
4. (C) 7TH UNITED STATES AIR FORCE/UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM (7TH AF/USARV) JOINT LOGISTICS SURVEY TEAM. Subsequent to observing apparent duplication of logistic support activities at installations jointly occupied by the Air Force and Army, the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) directed Headquarters, 7th United States Air Force and United States Army, Vietnam (7th AF/USARV) to form a Joint Logistics Survey Team to survey certain installations. The team's mission is to survey functional activities at installations jointly occupied by the Air Force and Army, identify areas in which there is a duplication of effort, and to determine the feasibility of consolidating the duplicative areas to increase operational efficiency and reduce manpower requirements. Representatives of this command attended a meeting of the 7th AF/USARV Joint Logistics Survey Team 10 and 11 September 1967 to review the team's mission and itinerary. This meeting was convened under joint chairmanship of the 7th AF and USARV. The team's itinerary included surveys of:

a. Phan Rang
b. Tan Son Nhat
c. Cam Ranh Bay
d. Vung Tau
e. Bien Hoa
f. Phu Cat
g. Nha Trang
h. Pleiku

To date, the team has completed surveys of the first seven locales. These surveys indicated that in some cases functional areas were integrated or one service was providing common support; e.g., education center activities, ice production and bakery service. In other cases, however, there were areas in which the two services had duplicative activities; e.g., water point operations, automotive maintenance and laundry activities. The team determined that these, and other areas involving duplicative efforts, could either be integrated or one service could support both services through Interservice Support Agreements (ISSA) with a resultant reduction and saving in manpower. The team will complete surveying the remaining area on or about 9 November 1967.
ANNEX K (C) OPERATIONS DIVISION, SECURITY, PLANS AND OPERATIONS

1. (C) Major Unit Arrivals.

a. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR) deployed from Thailand to Vietnam during the period 18 - 23 September via four landing ships tank (LST) and one attack transport (AF'T). The US 9th Infantry Division was designated as sponsor unit for the RTAVR. On 21 September, the largest contingent arrived at Newport. The 71st Transportation Battalion, 4th Transportation Command, provided terminal service and the 6th Transportation Battalion, 48th Transportation Group, provided 80 trucks to move the Regiment from Newport to Camp Bearcat, base camp for the RTAVR. A ceremony, attended by high ranking Vietnamese officials along with General W. C. Westmoreland, greeted the Thais upon their arrival. The reception and staging proceeded smoothly and no major problems were encountered.

b. The 198th Light Infantry Brigade (Separate) deployed from Fort Hood, Texas, to Vietnam, arriving by ship at DaNang during the period 22 - 26 October. The Brigade immediately transshipped to LSTs and moved to Huu Loa. The 1st Infantry Division, appointed sponsor unit for the 198th Lt Inf Bde (Sep) received and staged the Brigade with assistance from the 80th General Support Group, 1st Logistical Command. No major problems were encountered during this operation.

2. (C) Training. The Army is planning to use river patrol boats (PBR) in maintaining port and inland waterway security in the Republic of Vietnam. The 1st Logistical Command has been tasked to provide operators for these vessels and several meetings have been held with US Navy representatives to outline a suitable program of instruction (FOI) so that the training of the operators might commence. The Island FBR School (US Navy) responded to a query from this Headquarters for a recommended FOI, outlining a proposed course of instruction in a message followed by letter with a complete FOI enclosed. An in-country PBR maintenance course, consisting mostly of on the job training (OJT) has been organized by the Navy and will begin in November.

3. (U) Airdrop resupply. Eleven emergency and operational airdrop resupply missions were executed, delivering 3,417 short tons of all classes of supply. These airdrop missions were supported out of Cam Ranh Bay and DaNang by the 109th Quartermaster Aerial Delivery Company, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay. Two missions, totaling 2271 short tons of all classes of supply, including heavy construction materials, were airdropped in support of US Marine Corps forces deployed in Northern I Zip.
4. (C) Tactical operations.

a. The following major operations were logistically supported by this command during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>INITIATED</th>
<th>TERMINATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOLLING</td>
<td>22 SEP 67</td>
<td>IN PROGRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BYRD</td>
<td>25 AUG 66</td>
<td>IN PROGRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCIS PARK</td>
<td>6 APR 67</td>
<td>12 OCT 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAYLICK</td>
<td>17 JUN 67</td>
<td>12 OCT 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOOD RIVER</td>
<td>2 AUG 67</td>
<td>13 AUG 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WALLOWA</td>
<td>4 OCT 67</td>
<td>IN PROGRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHISPER</td>
<td>11 SEP 67</td>
<td>IN PROGRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHEKARCHAN II</td>
<td>29 SEP 67</td>
<td>IN PROGRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORONADO</td>
<td>1 JUN 67</td>
<td>IN PROGRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENTERPRISE</td>
<td>13 FEB 67</td>
<td>IN PROGRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAIRFAX</td>
<td>1 DEC 67</td>
<td>IN PROGRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPHORIA</td>
<td>21 JUL 67</td>
<td>14 SEP 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COOK</td>
<td>2 SEP 67</td>
<td>10 SEP 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENTON</td>
<td>13 AUG 67</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FERISHING</td>
<td>12 FEB 67</td>
<td>IN PROGRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACARTHUR</td>
<td>12 OCT 67</td>
<td>IN PROGRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARKING SANDS</td>
<td>18 MAY 67</td>
<td>IN PROGRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KYTE KOLE</td>
<td>14 MAY 67</td>
<td>IN PROGRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAMOND HEAD</td>
<td>18 MAY 67</td>
<td>IN PROGRESS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Special Mission Requests: Numerous incidents occurred indicating a lack of knowledge at unit and support commands levels.

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concerning the channels and requirements for special airlift requests. On one occasion a tactical unit selected the airfield of origin for a combat essential mission without prior coordination with this Headquarters. Fortunately, the supplies required could be provided at the base selected and the mission was flown as scheduled. Subsequent coordination with the appropriate field force and with MACV Command Center should preclude recurrence of incidents of this nature. In several cases, subordinate support commands were requesting airlift, on behalf of the supported unit, for the onward movement of supplies from the supply point or depot. Consequently, when a movement priority of Ol failed to move the supplies, the supported unit looked to the 1st Logistical Command's supporting command to request the combat essential airlift. This placed this Headquarters in the position of attempting to justify the tactical unit's requirement for airlift. Instructions were dispatched to the subordinate support commands 14 September 1967, directing that 1st Logistical Command units would not request airlift on behalf of a supported unit. Although this command clearly has the responsibility for movement of supplies (e.g. between supply points or between a supply point and a forward support area), the request for combat essential airlift will be initiated through command channels to this Headquarters for submission to MACV Command Center. Units concerned with requesting airlift have been instructed to review the provisions of MACV Directive 55-4 prior to submitting a request.

c. Night convoys: To avoid the heavy civilian congestion on routes used by large military convoys and to discourage enemy-initiated route interdiction, the command has initiated night logistical convoys. On 14 September 1967, 1st Logistical Command vehicles joined a 9th US Infantry Division convoy from Long Binh to Dong Tam. The convoy closed at Dong Tam at approximately 0200 hours 15 September 1967 without incident. A second night convoy, primarily of 155mm ammunition, was dispatched the following night in response to an urgent requirement of the Mobile Riverine Force (2d Bde, 9th US Inf Div), heavily engaged 25 km west of Dong Tam. At 2330 hours an APC in the lead element broke down and, as the other vehicles passed, the enemy detonated a claymore mine against the disabled APC. This type of incident can be expected even during daylight hours on relatively secure routes. The general evaluation of the initial night convoys has been that, given adequate prior planning, route security, and personal and vehicular armament, night convoys may be conducted with little more hazard than day convoys over the same route. Consequently, this command, in conjunction with the 25th US Infantry Division, will be commencing night convoys to Tay Ninh.

d. Convoy operations: At 1850 hours 2 September 1967, a 1st Logistical Command convoy of 28 vehicles from Pleiku to An Khe was
ambushed approximately 10 kilometers west of Khe. The lead vehicle, a jeep with a mounted machinegun, was immediately destroyed thereby reducing the firepower of the convoy. A 1st Air Cav Division reaction force was on the scene within twenty minutes after initiation of the ambush, but no contact was made. All 28 vehicles were damaged to some extent. 1st Logistical Command casualties were 8 KIAs and 17 WIA. This incident identified various weak points in convoy operations. Analysis of this incident has led to meetings with representatives of support commands to discuss and put additional emphasis on convoy operations, particularly the security aspects. Among the measures being taken are:

1. Armoring of vehicles, with priority to those used on night convoys.
2. Command emphasis on wearing of armored vests and helmets by drivers and assistant drivers.
3. Sandbagging vehicles to provide protection against mines.
4. Inclusion in convoys of additional command and control vehicles.
5. Detailed briefing of convoy personnel.
6. Additional training in ambush procedures.

e. Forward Support Concept: The forward support area (FSA), which consists of a task force logistical organization deployed to a brigade or division trains area, provides services and stockage of combat expendables. It was originally devised to offset the inadequate road net available to support daily resupply to forces deployed away from the base camps. Some units, which deployed to RVN in 1966, were received in country with fewer than authorized organic support assets, thus compounding the problem of inadequate land lines of communication. The FSA was used to provide a storage capability of from 3 to 5 days supply of combat expendables at the brigade or division forward support element. As the road net improves, particularly in the III CTZ, the requirement for FSAs is expected to decrease. Additionally, divisional support assets are becoming more self sufficient. Since some tactical effort must be directed to secure the FSA, the commander must weigh the logistical advantages of the FSA against the combat power that must be diverted to insure its security and protect its stocks. Based on this consideration, FSAs will be less frequently employed.
f. Vietnamese employee strikes: Strikes by Vietnamese employees at Sasco, Philco-Ford, 4th Transportation Command, and a near-strike by the Saigon River Pilots, have emphasized the impact of the local national work force upon the capabilities of the 1st Logistical Command. When the Philco-Ford drivers struck at Saigon Port 21 October 1967, 1st Logistical Command implemented OPNAV 15-67, Work Stoppage Saigon Port. Under this plan, military drivers from USARV, US Army Support Commands Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay replaced the striking civilian drivers to assure continued clearance of the port. The use of military drivers quickly demonstrated to the Vietnamese the ineffectiveness of their illegal strike and they returned to work. The strike emphasized, however, that the potential of civilian workers to strike must be thoroughly considered in any future conversion of military spaces to local national or contract hire civilians.
Annex L (U) ACoS, Comptroller

1. FINANCE SERVICES:

a. COMMERCIAL BILLS: Letters were dispatched to finance officers at Cam Ranh Bay, Pleiku, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang 4 August 67 to implement procedures to effect cash payment to vendors of fruits and vegetables within their respective area of responsibility. Non-availability of banking facilities required the implementation of these procedures.

b. FINANCE FACILITY: Comptroller representatives visited Phu Loi 15 Sep 67 to obtain current status of the construction of the finance facility for the 11th Aviation Battalion and other non-divisional troops. It was determined that the facility should be completed on or before 15 Jan 68. Accordingly, necessary action will be initiated to transfer the 10th Finance Section from Tan Son Nhut to Phu Loi on 15 Jan 68.

c. TRANSFER OF FINANCE DETACHMENT: The 51st Finance Detachment was transferred from Long Binh to Pleiku for reassignment to the 126th Finance Section 17 Sep 67. This transfer was accomplished to balance the finance capability and population served in the Pleiku area.

d. FINANCE SERVICE: Comptroller representatives made a staff visit to Vung Tau 19 Sep 67 to investigate the problem of having the 9th Finance Section act as the funding office for the Navy finance office at Cat Lo. It was mutually agreed that these services would be provided pending the completion of adequate Navy facilities within the next 60 to 90 days.

e. MODIFIED MILITARY PAY VOUCHER SYSTEM (MMPVS): The Commanding General, USARV was advised by letter 23 Sep 67 regarding the implementation of MMPVS within 1st Logistical Command. Inadequate facilities has delayed the project. However, it is anticipated that all finance activities will be completely modified about 31 Dec 67.

f. CASH BALANCE: A request was received from the Commanding Officer, 9th Finance Detachment for authority to keep $150,000 cash on hand at the Class B Agent Office at Can Tho. Request was forwarded to USARV 5 Oct 67 and approval has been received. The Class B office in Can Tho will provide finance services in that area and will pay local vendors for fruits and vegetables purchased for the military.

Annex L
g. PIASTER PURCHASES: A new Vietnamese decree requires that merchant seamen possess only Vietnamese currency upon departure from ships in Vietnam. Effectively, this decree will require that a ship's officer obtain piasters from a military finance office or bank for the purpose of converting seamen's money aboard ship. All Finance offices were alerted to this decree 7 Oct 67. No significant problems are anticipated as a result of this requirement insofar as military finance offices are concerned.

h. PIASTER RATE CHANGE: Comptroller, USARV advised this office that effective 1 October all disbursements would be made at the 118 rate. All 80 to 1 piasters being held are to be frozen pending further instructions. All Finance Sections serving 1st Logistical Command units were contacted 13 Oct 67 and informed of the rate change.

i. US ARMY AUDIT AGENCY (USAAA): Team members held an exit interview with the Commanding General 19 Sep 67, in connection with the control over the receipts and distribution of material in RVN. Concerned personnel of this headquarters and USARV were in attendance. The Commanding General congratulated the USAAA on the content of the report and requested that a spot check be made of their findings in about 3 months.

j. The USAAA held an entrance conference with the Commanding General 3 Oct 67 regarding Unit Military Strength Reporting. This audit is part of a DA World Wide Vertical Audit as requested by Office of the Chief of Staff, DA and Chief of Personnel Operations. The objective is to determine the timeliness and accuracy of unit strength reports at all command levels. The audit will be accomplished by visiting selected companies and verifying reported strength as of 30 Sep 67.

k. The Saigon Area Office, USAAA announced plans 16 Oct 67 to commence an audit of Government furnished property (GFP). The objective of the planned audit will be to determine the effectiveness of controls and procedures exercised by the contractor over the procurement, maintenance and utilization of GFP.

l. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (USGAO): Representatives arrived in country 23 Sep 67 to conduct an audit of requisitioning and stock control procedures in Vietnam. An entrance conference was held with the Commanding General 25 Sep 67. The audit began on 26 Sep 67, at the USAUPCOMs, Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and 14th Inventory Control Center. These audits are expected to be completed about 15 Dec 67.
m. USGAO announced on 4 Oct 67 that a review of Selected Aspects of Commodity Programs of Agency for International Development (USAID) would be made. The review commenced 9 Oct 67 and is expected to be completed about 15 Dec 67. USGAO officials stated the primary emphasis would be USAID activities. However, military activities will be included to the extent that they exercise control, accountability and advisory responsibilities.

n. The 22d Finance Section was completed 7 Sep 67. This inspection involved military and civilian pay, and travel sections. Deficiencies noted were called to the attention of the commanding officer for immediate action.

2. MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES:

a. COMMANDER'S MONTHLY REVIEW: The Commander's Monthly Review for July 67 was distributed within the headquarters and to subordinate commands 15 Aug 67. This publication contains selected command operational statistical data for information, planning, and appropriate action.

b. DATA PROCESSING: A two day maintenance seminar on the UNIVAC 1005 Computer System was held 14 and 15 Aug 67 at Hq, 1st Logistical Command. UNIVAC Customer Engineers conducted the seminar with emphasis on first and second echelon repairs. The system assigned to the 222d Personnel Service Company was used as a training vehicle. The following units participated:

   (1) 14th Inventory Control Center
   (2) 506th Field Depot
   (3) 222d Personnel Service Company
   (4) 12th Data Processing Unit
   (5) 58th Transportation Battalion (Ammo)

c. MANAGEMENT STUDIES: Feeder data received from 1st Logistical Command Headquarters Staff and Directorates, USASUPCOMs Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon established a total of 15 Management Studies (In-House and Contract) for FY68, FY69 and FY70. A listing of these studies was furnished USARV Comptroller 13 Sep 67.
d. ORGANIZATION & FUNCTIONS MANUAL: Instructions were issued to hq, staff and directorates 26 Sep 67, regarding the review and submission of changes to the Command Organization and Functions Manual. It is planned that a total revision will be made because of numerous organization and mission changes.

e. FY68 REQUIREMENTS FOR ARMY EXECUTIVE AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING (ADP) ORIENTATION COURSES: Requirements for these ADP orientation courses to be conducted at Japan, Okinawa and Hawaii were coordinated with headquarters staff and directorates and USASUPCOMs Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon. A total of 44 quotas was requested from USARV Comptroller 3 Oct 67.

f. PACIFIC ARCHITECTS & ENGINEERS, INC. (PA&E): Twenty copies of PA&E, 4th Qtr FY67, Review and Analysis Publication were received 6 Oct 67. A review was made of the data pertaining to FY67 accomplishments and resources expended. This publication will serve as a management tool during FY68 for determining and developing workload, manpower and related fund requirements. Copies were distributed to staff sections and directorates and USASUPCOMs Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon for guidance.

g. STAFF DIRECTORY: Hq, 1st Logistical Command Staff Directory as of 1 Oct 67, distributed to staff elements; USASUPCOMs Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon 10 Oct 67. Copies were furnished Hq, US Army, Vietnam; US Army Hq, Area Command, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and US Agency for International Development. Special distribution was made to overseas and CONUS installations.

h. COMMAND REVIEW & ANALYSIS: The initial Monthly Command Review and Analysis Publication was distributed to the command staff and Support Commands 19 Oct 67. This document reflects statistical data pertaining to workload and resource utilization for the months of July, August and September. In addition, projections and estimates were shown for subsequent months. These data will provide information relative to accomplishments versus plans, and will be the basis for command decisions to increase operational efficiency and reduce costs.

i. EXECUTIVE ADP ORIENTATION COURSES: Hq, 1st Logistical Command released 40 quotas 20 Oct 67, for the senior level Army Executive ADP Orientation Courses to be held at Long Binh on 23-25 and 26-28 Oct 67. Quotas for these two courses were allocated as follows:

(1) Hq, 1st Logistical Command - 16
(2) USASUPCOM, Saigon - 10
3. BUDGET AND FISCAL OPERATIONS:

a. The Assistance In Kind (AIK) Budget Review was prepared and submitted to MACV Comptroller 11 August 1967. Requested adjusted Annual Funding Program for Calendar Year 1967 is 164,590,000 SVN.

b. AIK BUDGET: Calendar Year 1968 Assistance In Kind budget was completed and furnished MACV Comptroller 18 September 1967. Requested Annual Funding Program is 164,591,000 SVN.

c. This office presented a briefing to the Commanding General 1 September covering the findings of the Army Audit Agency's review of the Management of the Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA) Reimbursement Program. Findings in other areas were presented by appropriate directorates and staff sections of this headquarters. The presentations were coordinated by this office.

d. This office published a listing of active ISSAs as of 30 September to subordinate commands. The listing depicts ISSA number, customer type and category of support authorized, and the estimated monthly value of the support. This office also published a related listing of ISSA customers which indicates the type of support authorized and whether the support is reimbursable or non-reimbursable. These listings were published in an effort to insure that operating personnel are informed about the ISSA Reimbursement Program.

e. DA TASK GROUP: Mr. Craig of the Office of the Comptroller of the Army (COA), and other COA representatives, visited this headquarters 8 October 1967. The purpose of the visit was to investigate the financial management system in Vietnam with primary interest on the Interservice Support Agreement Reimbursement Program. Command and operational briefings were given by appropriate directorates and staff sections of this headquarters. The reimbursement briefing was presented by this office.

f. This office received instructions during October to submit FY68 Command Budget Execution Review (BER) in November. Planning had already begun and instructions were issued to directorates and staff sections of this headquarters to submit feeder data on which the BER will be based. The data received to date indicates that the revised Annual Funding Program (AFP) to be requested in the BER will be substantially lower than the AFP requested in the Command Operating Budget which was submitted in February 1967.
ANNEX M (U) ENGINEER

1. Troop Operations Division

   a. Organization: A new function was transferred to this division from the former Director of Services Office, the Laundry and Bath Section. Two officers and one non-commissioned officer staff this section. The Laundry and Bath Section provides staff supervision of all field laundry and bath operations within the command's area of responsibility, inspects operations to assure adherence to established procedures and work standards, and provides technical advice and assistance to the support commands and the 44th Medical Brigade for laundries under their operational control. This section is the action office for all purchase requests and commitment (PR&C) documents pertaining to contract laundry service, establishes issue priorities for incoming standard A laundry equipment, and coordinates redistribution of standard B equipment to US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMF) units.

   b. Monthly Reports of Operations: A Monthly Report of Operations (RCS AVCA EN-10) was established for all engineer R&U detachments (TOE 5-500 C units). These reports provide information, which is used to evaluate the performance of all detachments, to assure utilization consistent with lst Logistical Command objectives. Reports contain personnel and equipment status, equipment utilization, and narrative of operations, to include work accomplished on all types of facilities. The detachment work load is categorized as minor construction, alteration, maintenance, repair and operations. Fire fighting detachments report on inspections and operations. Water purification detachments report location of plants, production, and units supported. These reports are used as a basis for planning R&U troop support in future operations, as source documents for reports to higher headquarters, and as basis for possible deactivation of units where optimization of capabilities allows such actions.

   c. Job Order Requests for Minor Construction: This Division processed 57 Job Order Requests during the quarter. Project requests above the approval authority of subordinate commands for OMA Minor Construction ($10,000) were thoroughly evaluated by the division to assure technical adequacy, adherence to prescribed standards, and compliance with regulations. Of the projects received, 12 were forwarded to Headquarters, USARV because they exceeded the approval authority of this headquarters ($20,000), required waiver of the authorized standards of construction, or requested approval to expend Assistance in Kind (AIK) funds.

   d. Requests for Air Conditioning: There were 187 separate actions processed during the reporting period. Of these, 54 were forwarded to Headquarters, USARV, for approval. The other actions were either forward-
ing approval requests, or returning the initial request for detailed technical analysis of the air conditioning requirement after it had been evaluated by this office and found to be insufficiently justified, incomplete, or technically inadequate.

e. Engineer Detachments: Two Water Supply Companies and three Engineer Detachments arrived in country during the reporting period. Five power plant operating detachments are scheduled for deactivation. These are the 116th, 132d, 133d, and 187th and the 556th HQ detachments, totaling 55 personnel. Studies are under way to transfer maximum fire fighting capability to contractor forces and retain only those fire fighting detachments necessary for tactical operations, contingency requirements, and protection in areas where security restrictions preclude use of the contractor forces.

f. Policy Letters: Ten policy and precedent letters were written to either disseminate command guidance to assure compliance with applicable regulations by subordinate commands, or to obtain a policy statement from higher headquarters.

g. Staff Visits: A total of 47 staff visits were made to area and sub-area installations by the staff of the Troop Operations Division, R&U activities, engineer detachments, field laundry and bath units were visited for purposes of inspection or to provide technical assistance.

h. Inter Service Support Agreements (ISSA):

(1) The Navy requested that an ISSA be established to provide complete R&U support to Navy forces in II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ). An on site survey of all requirements was conducted and the necessary data forwarded to USARV for establishment of the ISSA.

(2) A similar request for the NAVY to provide the R&U support for the Army in the I CTZ was also forwarded to USARV. This request included detailed base data of the facilities and support required.

i. Laundry and Bath Section:

(1) A total of 22 of the new M532 (Eidal) laundry trailers arrived in Vietnam. Six of these trailers were issued to laundry sections operated by evacuation hospitals; the 93d in Long Binh, 36th in Vung Tau, and the 67th in Qui Nhon. Four trailers were issued to the 229th Supply and Service (S&S) Co. in Vung Tau, three to the 213d Field Service Company at Camp Enari (Pleiku), two to the 118th (S&S) Co in Nha Trang, one to the 573d (S&S) Co in Pleiku, and one to the 506th S&S Co in Long Binh. The remaining two machines are enroute to the 221st S&S Co in Chu Lai. The per cent of
increase in Standard A equipment in the hands of 1st Logistical Command Support units was 17%. The per cent of increase in production of these same units was 44%; from 7.7 million pounds the previous reporting period, to 11.1 million pounds the current reporting period. While all the support commands continue to show production gains, the most notable gains have been in Saigon, which increased its production by 14.3% over the previous reporting period.

(2) Two Interservice Support Agreements (ISSA) were negotiated. Under agreement number 5D-YT8165-4132-8, individual and unit laundry will be provided US Navy activities in the II, III, and IV CTZ. Under agreement number 5D-YT8165-4134-8, laundry service will be provided USAF personnel confined in the USARV stockade at Long Binh.

(3) Three contracts for laundry service were allowed to expire during the period; DAJB1167-A-0019 in Pleiku, DAJB1167-C0085 in Soc Trang, and DAJB1167-C-0090 in Qui Nhon. Four new contracts were let by the Director of Procurement; DAJB1168-D-0037 and DAJB1167-A-0074 with Kukje Kunyon of Saigon, DAJB1168-D-0045 with Cogigo of Thu Duc, and DAJB1167-C-0150 with Ngo Dien Lien of Pleiku. The estimated dollar value of these contracts is $1,265,163.60 for the current fiscal year.

(4) On 9 October 1967, change 1 to LC Reg 210-10, Installations, Contractual Laundry Service, was published. The change deleted subparagraphs 3b (3) and 3b (4) which made the support command Directors of Services responsible for conducting periodic inspections of contract laundry facilities, and maintaining up-to-date data on possible additional sources for contract laundry services. These responsibilities now revert to the Director of Procurement exclusively, in accordance with current procurement directives.

(5) Field bath support remained constant with support units providing over 234,000 showers during the reporting period. A study was instituted 19 September 1967 to examine the feasibility of reducing military spaces by eliminating bath teams. Initial responses are due from the support commands by 6 November 1967.

2. Facilities and Engineering Division

a. Tree Crusher Detachment: In March 1967 this headquarters entered into a contract with the LeTourneau Corporation for the 6-month rental of two 97.5-ton amphibious tree crushers. Prior to the receipt of the crushers, a provisional detachment was organized to operate and maintain the machines. The tree crushers were delivered to Newport 18 July 1967 and were placed in operation at Long Binh Post 31 July 1967. Since that time, the crushers have been utilized in a program established to test and evaluate the performance and capabilities of the machines under controlled conditions. The crushers
have been cleaning jungle in the area surrounding the new Logistical Depot Complex and the Ammunition Supply Depot (ASD) at Long Binh Post. The tree crushers have cleared to date an average of 2.1 acres of foliage per hour of machine operation. A total of approximately 1800 acres have been cleared. The crushers have been able to clear all types of foliage encountered, however, they have experienced considerable deadline time due to mechanical and electrical failures. Modifications to the machines have been made and it is believed that the majority of the problems, which caused the machines to be deadline, have been eliminated. When the present 6 month contract expires, it will be extended for another 6 months with an option to purchase the machines. Effective 1 November 1967 the tree crushers and the Tree Crusher personnel will be transferred to Engineer Command with OPCON to II Field Force Vietnam. It is anticipated that the crushers will then be utilized for tactical clearing requirements.

b. Houstrailers: The 1st Logistical Command's original allocation of 257 houstrailers has been reduced to 164 houstrailers by headquarters, US Army Vietnam (USARV). The reduction was precipitated by two factors:

(1) A change in USARV policy for the allocation of houstrailers which limits the occupants to female personnel, officers of grade O-5 and above, and civilian of grade GS-14 and above.

(2) A 100 houstrailer reduction in the total number of trailers allocated to USARV. The 1st Logistical Command was granted an exception to the USARV policy for houstrailers that already have been installed and are occupied by field grade officers who would otherwise have to live in less than MACV standard V accommodations. The 1st Logistical Command houstrailer requirements at Long Binh will be fulfilled by houstrailers allocated to Long Binh Post.

c. The 1st Logistical Command Headquarters, Long Binh: As of 25 October 1967, the overall project is 83 percent complete. Building D1, D2, and G4 have been accepted for beneficial occupancy. The beneficial occupancy date for building G4 is 4 November 1967. The air conditioning systems for the four buildings are scheduled to be operational 13 November 1967 and balancing of the system completed 27 November. The final completion of the entire complex, which includes switch over to permanent transformers, is February 1968.

d. Sea-Land Containership Service: Under the terms of the Sea-Land Services, Inc. contract, the Government was obligated to provide marshalling facilities for Sea-Land at the ports of Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Newport. Sea-Land was obligated to provide container van service to the three ports and to modify the pier at Cam Ranh Bay for receiving two Sea-Land furnished gantry cranes for off-loading the container vans from their
C-4 ships. The marshalling facilities at Cam Ranh Bay (20.7 acres), Qui Nhon (5.5 acres) and Newport (6.8 acres) will be completed and operational 1 November 1967. The pier modification and crane erection have been completed. The first Sea-Land ship is scheduled to arrive at Cam Ranh Bay 5 November 1967, at Newport 7 November 1967, and Qui Nhon 9 November 1967.

e. DeLong Pier and Maintenance Repair: There are presently seven 1st Logistical Command DeLong Piers in use in Vietnam; four at Cam Ranh Bay, and one each at Qui Nhon, Vung Ro, and Vung Tau. Since the steel surface on the piers does not provide an acceptable deck, the piers were covered with a 4-inch common fir deck which is studded to the steel pier surface. This fir deck has demonstrated excessive wear due to constant heavy use. In addition, maintenance of this deck required special equipment and replacement is quite expensive. For this reason a decision was made to nail a 3-inch hardwood wear deck to the existing fir deck. This deck can be maintained at a low cost without special equipment. It was not possible to have this work done under the (DeLong) Contract for construction of the piers. Only the pier construction phase was awarded to the DeLong Corporation and the majority of the hardwood wear decking has been installed by separate contract. A pier trestle at Qui Nhon, which had previously been damaged, has been repaired by the DeLong Corporation. It is estimated that hardwood wear decking will be installed on all 1st Logistical Command DeLong Piers by the end of 1967.

f. RVN Railroad Construction:

(1) US Forces and other Free World Military Assistance Forces have a need for railroad facilities, especially in the vicinity of large logistical facilities. The requirements for construction, as presented in the last ORLL, have been reanalyzed by each of the support commands to determine current requirements. The current requirements for railroad trackage is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>RR Track</td>
<td>0.25 MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Cat ASP</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>0.25 MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST Beach</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>0.25 MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeLong Pier</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>9.0 MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Tai Valley</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>4.5 MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Valley</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>7.5 MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cha Reng</td>
<td>do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam. Ranh Bay</td>
<td>RR Track</td>
<td>28.5 MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuy Hoa</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>28.88 MI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Phan Rang  
Nha Trang  
Saigon  
Than My An  
Long Binh  
Di An  
Cat Lai  
Phu Loi  
Cu Chi  
Long Giao  
Vung Tau  
Lai Khe  
Tay Ninh  

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>4.0 MI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>RR Track</td>
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<tr>
<td>Than My An</td>
<td>0.2 MI</td>
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<td>Long Binh</td>
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<td>Di An</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cu Chi</td>
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<td>Long Giao</td>
<td>8.7 MI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>50.0 MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lai Khe</td>
<td>4.7 MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
<td>34.0 MI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) These requirements were forwarded to MAJ, USA RV with a request that design work start on the trackage at the Qui Nhon LST Beach, Qui Nhon DeLong Pier, Cam Ranh Bay, Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang, Newport, Than My An, and Long Binh. It was requested that the design of the remaining facilities be deferred.

(3) The architect engineer firm of Adrian Wilson and Associates has been awarded a contract to prepare the bid package for the design of these facilities.

g. Base Development: US Army, Vietnam (USARV) G-4 has established an Ad Hoc Committee to study base development at US Army installations throughout South Vietnam. The purpose of this Committee is to assure austerity in the construction program by reviewing present facility assets. Recommendations are to be made to establish minimum essential construction needed at each base to adequately accomplish this mission. Members of this Committee include representatives of each major staff section in USARV, two representatives from 1st Logistical Command (one from Security, Plans and Operations, and one from the Office of the Engineer), one representative from the 1st Aviation Brigade, and one representative from the 34th General Support Group.

h. The Ad Hoc Committee has established a schedule whereby it will
visit one installation each week. It will remain at each installation for
two or three days inspecting the utilization of present facility assets, and
discussing the needs of the installation with knowledgable personnel. The
Committee will then submit a written report and give an oral briefing of
findings at each base to the USARV Deputy Commanding General and Chief of
Staff. The written report includes a letter to the command responsible for
base development, at the particular base, containing an enclosure which
outlines, item by item, the additional construction authorized at the base.
Any necessary construction beyond that which is authorized in the letter would
have to be requested with full justification and acted upon at USARV on a
case by case basis.

3. Contract Operations Division Activities

a. Technical Inspection Section

(1) Technical Inspection Trips: Since the last reporting period, the Technical Inspection Section conducted comprehensive inspections of the following R&U Contractor Activities: Can Tho, Soc Trang, Vinh Long, Vung Tau, Di An, Lai Khe, Phuoc Vinh, Phu Loi, Bearcat (Long Thanh), and Xuan Loc (Blackhorse). Inspections covered the full scope of R&U services performed. Deficiencies were brought to the attention of the contracting officer, the contractor, and support commanders for necessary corrective action.

(2) Survey of Navy Activities requiring R&U Support in II, III, and IV CTZ: Technical Inspection Section surveyed Navy sites in II, III, and IV CTZ to determine R&U support and contractor manning requirements. Survey was a necessary preliminary to submitting draft test of ISSA to CG, USARV, who will formalize the scope of R&U services to be provided. In accordance with policy direction from MACV, partial support is currently being provided. The assumption of full responsibility for R&U support, to subject Navy activities, is contingent upon the Navy assuming responsibility to support Army elements in I CTZ.

(3) Contractor Performance Ratings: A new directive to support commands will change the format and required frequency of Contractor Performance Ratings initiated by Assistant Contracting Officer's Representative at contractor field activities. The new report will be keyed directly to the quality of performance in functional areas covered by Contract No. DAAB 1168-C-0088. Another feature of the new report is the provision for required follow-up by support command Engineers. The new report will permit more effective surveillance of the performance of the R&U contractor in the field.

b. Performance Analysis Section

(1) Evaluation of PA&E Management: An evaluation of the contractor's management was conducted by the Performance Analysis Section
during this period. The study was concerned primarily with the evaluation of the Contractor's Central Management Office and Area Office functions, the accuracy of the data collection systems and the Contractor's programs to reduce costs. The findings of this survey were furnished as a guide to the USARJ Management Team which is currently conducting an evaluation of the contractor's operations at the request of USAPAV.

(2) **Unit Expenditure Report**: The first Unit Expenditure Report (July Report) was received from the R&U contractor 22 Sep 67. This report was to depict the base unit quantity, expenditures, and unit expenditures for each of the cost activities used in Post Engineering. However, the combat conditions and wide dispersion of installations in Vietnam, coupled with the rapid growth of facilities, has made the accurate recording of base data a difficult task. Much more manpower is required for the recording of real property in Vietnam than in more stable areas. Great emphasis is now being placed on property recording all completed facilities in the 1st Logistical area of responsibility.

(3) **Inspection of R&U Activities by OCE**: During the period 27 Sep to 10 Oct 67 an inspection of R&U activities in Vietnam was made by a team from Office Chief of Engineers (OCE). The team was headed by LTC Brugge, assistant chief of the R&U Branch, OCE. The team spent seven days at selected installations throughout Vietnam.

(4) **Technical Data Report**: The contractor's first submission of the Technical Data Report was received 14 Aug 67. Due to inaccurate base data and mathematical errors it was returned to the Contractor for corrections. The corrected copy was resubmitted 21 Aug 67. The mathematical errors were corrected and costs were redistributed properly; however, the base data remained inaccurate. This resulted in the report being of little value for purposes of unit cost analysis. The reasons for the inaccurate data were poor reporting procedures and a lack of coordination between the Central Management Office and subordinate installations. Steps have been taken to correct these deficiencies in future reports.

c. **Plans and Operations Section**

(1) **Modification of FY 68 R&U Contract**: During the reporting period three modifications of the FY 68 R&U Contract were processed.

(a) A reduction in the number of activities was accomplished by consolidating the Tan Son Nhut Leased Facilities and Tan Son Nhut. The consolidation had been in progress for some time and resulted in a significant reduction of manpower requirements.

(b) Quan Loi and Tour D'Argent were added to the R&U Contract.
An estimate of the contractor workforce and equipment was coordinated and approved after joint meetings with the contractor, customers and 1st Logistical Command representatives. The workforce authorized was based on the work to be done on site.

(2) Water Production: During the reporting period, 9 wells were completed by the US Army Well Drilling Detachments. The number fell quite short of the estimated 30 wells which were to be completed during this period. Operational difficulties seem to be due to rotation of trained personnel to CONUS.

(3) Construction of Water Treatment, Storage, and Distribution Facilities: Nineteen facilities for the treatment, storage and distribution of water, for which US Army Engineer Command has responsibility, were completed during this period. The R&U contractor also completed facilities at deep wells. Engineer troops completed 3 water plants processing surface or shallow well water, and the R&U contractor established treatment facilities at 4 sites utilizing surface or shallow well water sources.

(4) Water Purification: Based on recommendations by the 20th Preventive Medicine Unit, the USARV Surgeon has approved in-line chlorination as sufficient treatment to render water from 16 wells potable. In most instances, correction of minor construction deficiencies were required prior to operating the well as a potable water source. The deficiencies were referred to the construction agency for appropriate corrective action.

(5) Water Production at Contractor Operated Plants: Potable water production at contractor operated water plants increased from 10.2 million gallons per day (MGD) to 11.1 MGD, and the number of plants operated from 119 to 131. A planned increase to 160 plants by the end of FY 68 is anticipated.

(6) Replacement of Tactical Erdalator: Six water purification units were replaced with base mounted and truck mounted units operated by the contractor. The ultimate goal is for the contractor to assume responsibility for the production of both potable and non-potable water at all US Army Vietnam fixed installations in the II and III CTZ. Arrival in country of the 82d and 111th Water Supply Companies has permitted contractor phase out of water plant operation in the I and IV CTZ.

(7) Water Resources Survey-Mekong Delta: The comprehensive water resources study in the Delta area, initiated in March, is continuing. An evaluation is being made by the contractor to determine the adequacy of water supply systems serving MACV personnel in this zone.

(8) Refuse Collection: Refuse collection trucks ordered from

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CONUS earlier in the year have arrived in country. Seventeen subcontractors, previously conducting refuse collection operations, have been phased out. The R&U contractor has expressed the need for additional refuse trucks. The Contract Operations Division conducted a study of the refuse truck utilization and refuse operations. The results of this study revealed low equipment utilization and, according to the contractor, this was due to unfamiliarity of the operators with the new equipment.

(9) Government Furnished Major Items of Equipment for the R&U Contractor: The contractor is receiving major items of equipment as follows:

(a) Depot: A total of 33 line items were received from depot stock.

(b) RMK Demobilization: Equipment obtained for the R&U contractor amounted to $144,788 increasing the total assets from this source to $1,134,708 in value. Included are power tools and materials handling equipment.

(c) Procurement by purchase: The awards for procurement of equipment, authorized by Purchase and Commitment Request Document No 116-EN-00218-67 ($7.8 million), were completed 30 June 1967. Twenty-six line items of equipment arrived in country during the 1st quarter FY 68. Incremental shipments, of the remaining equipment included in the purchase, are expected in the November 1967 - January 1968 period.

(10) Reduction of Contract Leases and Rentals: The contractor was required to justify in detail all equipment and vehicle rentals and service sub-contracts. These justifications, together with the purchase requisitions, were forwarded through the Contract Operations Branch for evaluation. As a result, a significant reduction in monthly disbursements has been accomplished, as shown below:

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<th></th>
<th>VN$</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trash and Garbage</td>
<td>15,795,790</td>
<td>1 Jul 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collection and Disposal</td>
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<td>30 Oct 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Reductions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vehicle &amp; Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Reductions</td>
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<td>Total Dollar Reduction</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total Dollar Reduction</td>
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<td>30 Oct 67</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>154,691</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(d) Total reduction converted to dollars: $364,811 per month

(11) Estimate of FY 69 Equipment Requirements: The estimate of equipment requirements for FY 69 was completed and forwarded to the support command Engineers for comments. The estimate is based on the number of installations and on the number of activities within the installations. This method of presentation provides a more accurate evaluation of the capabilities of each activity section when the manning table and the equipment table are reviewed together.

(12) Cannibalization of Generators: Under the direction of USARPAC, a cannibalization program has been established for the 100 KW Taiyo generators. The generators will be gradually phased out of Vietnam as they become uneconomically repairable.

4. Installation Management Division
   a. Installation Management Office: During the period, the joint venture of Raymond International, Morrison-Knudsen, Brown & Root, and J. A. Jones (RMK-BRJ), being phased down in construction in Vietnam, was reduced from 21,000 to 18,000 personnel. The rate of reduction decreased significantly due to in-country increases in the construction requirements. The contractor assets released during this period were valued as follows: $4,090,412 in structures, $11,550,293 in major equipment and plants, and $621,535 in construction material. The US Army, Vietnam received $7,606,483, the US Navy $3,885,893 and the US Air Force $4,728,864. The cumulative value of the assets awarded to the services since the beginning of the contractor reduction last February is: US Army $17,025,866, Navy $15,737,191, and Air Force $10,713,287. These cumulative assets include about 1380 structures of various sizes from which the Army received 928, the Navy 228, and the Air Force 224. In addition, the assets released included about 1956 major pieces of equipment of which 1001 went to the Army, 502 to the Navy, and 453 to the Air Force. The supply control of these assets after allocation to USARV is the responsibility of the Industrial Management Office of the Installations Management Divisions, Office of the Engineer, 1st Logistical Command. On 8 September, a 1st Logistical Command regulation was published which prescribes the procedures for acquisition, allocation, transfer and accountability for these assets. This regulation, together with staff visits has assisted in maintaining supply accountability and control on the released assets.

   b. Central Real Estate Office

(1) During this period, the Central Real Estate Office began the development of a commandwide procedure for the processing of R&U work orders on leased real estate. It had been determined that in a large number of cases concerning properties for which the owner expected maintenance...
responsibility, that a considerable amount of maintenance and repair work had been performed by the Government although the cost had not been recouped from the owner. A number of factors contributed to the situation, the principal one being the owner's failure to respond when asked to perform maintenance under the terms of the lease. In other instances the owner was not accessible or work was of such urgent nature that time did not allow for owner notification. Under these circumstances, although the work was performed by the Government, in many cases, prompt action was not initiated to obtain redress from the owner. It was found that, barring certain exceptions, no procedures had been developed whereby owner maintained leased properties had been identified beforehand. In addition close liaison between the Repairs and Utilities Office and the Area Real Estate Office was lacking, and no standard operating procedure was in effect which would cause the completed and costed work order to be expedited to the Central Real Estate Office for appropriate deduction from the next rental payment due the owner. Procedures under development, as of the end of the reporting period, are expected to eliminate this problem in the future.

(2) Regulations which govern the leasing of Real Estate in Vietnam do not prescribe a standard method of computing rental payments in local currency. Consequently, some leases specify a straight amount in piasters as the rent to be paid. A large percentage, however, contain a clause presumably intended to tie the amount in piasters to a fixed dollar rate. A typical example follows: "The monthly rental shall be $VN 70,000 the equivalent of $952.00 at the current rate of exchange of 72.765 piasters per US dollar, to be paid in the currency of Vietnam in full, in advance through 19 September 1966. All subsequent payments will be paid in the currency of Vietnam at the legal rate of exchange at the time of payment. The annual rental is $VN 840,000, in no event will the annual rental exceed $1,544.01." Subsequent to the execution of this lease, and many others in the same category, the rate of exchange increased from $VN 72.765 per dollar to $VN 80.0 per dollar. Following the increase in the rate of exchange, rental payments on leases containing this clause were effected by taking the stated dollar amount and multiplying the dollar amount by $VN 80.0, in the meantime on 28 Feb 67, a request had been submitted by the local Finance and Accounting Officer through channels to the Comptroller General for a determination as to whether leases containing this clause were to be paid on the stated dollar amount or the stated piaster amount. On 18 August 1967 the Comptroller General responded with a decision that all such leases were to be paid on the piaster amount in that the wording of the clause was intended to protect the Government rather than the property owner. This decision now necessitates the recovery from future rental payments all excess prior disbursements, and has already caused several disputes with owners who had believed that they were to receive the piaster equivalent to the rent expressed in dollars. On 14 October 1967 the rate of exchange was suddenly raised to $VN 118 per US dollar. The reaction from owners is expected to be highly unfavorable when rental payments are effected at what amounts to the original rate of $VN 72.765
to the dollar, and in view of the recent Comptroller General Decision it appears that there is no legal recourse open to those affected. At the close of the reporting period, the Central Real Estate Office has undertaken the development of a standard piaster versus dollar clause to be incorporated in all future leases.
The period 1 August through 31 October 1967 showed information activities within the command at a level similar to the preceding report period. This was due to the fairly constant level of Command Information personnel in subordinate information offices. This office, however, is presently short one NCO (E-6). Major Wesley Chase assumed command of the 7th Public Information Detachment 4 August 1967.

The 1st Logistical Command continued to lead all United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) units in hometown news releases. A total of 10,853 news releases were sent to the Army Home Town News Center or were released directly to hometown newspapers in the United States. Included within this total were 933 hometown photo releases. Efforts to lower the command's technical "kill" rate at the Home Town News Center continue. Information personnel throughout the command are insuring that additional-duty information specialists at unit level are "educated" in the correct procedures of completing and reviewing DA Form 1526 (Information for Army Home Town News Release). The policy of reviewing hometown releases at the highest practicable level before submission to the Home Town News Center continues with positive results in cutting down the kill rate.

A total of 170 news stories and 242 photo captions were released to more than 50 different news media. (Significant general news photo releases are included at the end of this resume.) Efforts have been made during this time to improve the quality of news and photo releases and, in turn, to insure that finished copy is distributed to news media in a manner appropriate to the needs of editors. Hence, the principle of selective distribution has been combined with a constant effort to improve the quality of all releases. Draft releases are not accepted from subordinate information offices unless the news is usable to the media, and the story or photos give a complete, organized account of the action. Increased emphasis has been placed upon subordinate information offices to seek, write and photograph news in depth throughout their areas of responsibility. Thus, the headquarters information office acts as a final review and edit authority and concentrates on selecting a valid distribution scheme for each release. Personal notes are written to various editors to encourage publication of articles which are pertinent to certain types of media. Realization of publication trends of the news media has placed 1st Logistical Command public information releases in a greater variety of the media.
Eight "In The News" articles continued to bring features of command-wide interest to the individual logistical soldier.

Five mimeograph newspapers are being published either weekly or bi-weekly by subordinate information offices. Groundwork was established for monthly publication in Japan of a command-wide, 12-page, tabloid, 1st Log newspaper similar in format to The Army Reporter and The Observer. Work began to produce an updated informational brochure, in magazine form, concerning the command's activities.

Quarterly command information guidance continued to be disseminated with several subjects prepared for presentation, as it is often difficult for a company-sized unit in the field to research and prepare its own presentations. Sufficient leeway is given the commander allowing him to substitute subjects he feels are of interest to his men. The Command Information section developed a listing of critical criteria by which to judge specific command information presentations.

The 1st Logistical Command information offices are located at major area headquarters. Special projects consume large amounts of productive time. The 7th Public Information Detachment has adapted its efforts to many of these projects. An officer from this unit continues to update the Pictorial Progress Report of Facilities Development.

The detachment has also provided escort service to project officers from such organizations as CBS TV, and the Army Materiel Command's special photo team. The information office has been more directly involved in command briefings. A color slide library of logistical activities has been organized and a large buildup of slide material has been gathered for use with special projects, command briefings, newly-arrived personnel orientations and to update material for other organizations.
Support to the press continued as a major aspect of the information program. A total of 200 press queries were received from news representatives, of which more than half resulted in person-to-person contact with the newsmen. When a call is received from a news media representative, every effort is made to encourage the correspondent to coordinate the matter personally with information personnel. This method has resulted in greater involvement of civilian media with 1st Logistical Command activities. In addition, closer liaison with the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) has been effected in order to interest media representatives in a variety of newsworthy events. Press tours have been arranged in conjunction with JUSPAO, as exemplified by the vast press interest in the Transphibian Tactical Tree Crusher at Long Binh.

Input for and published comments on 1st Logistical Command activities have been greatly expanded in the Army Daily Summary. The Summary is a daily fact sheet published by United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) in narrative, journalistic format which is distributed to newsmen in Saigon and sent to home towns of individuals whose names appear in the Summary. A reporting system for subordinate information offices has been devised to facilitate input for the Summary. As subordinate information offices telephonically report subjects from their areas, the headquarters information office compiles and edits these reports. Hence, the most newsworthy input is chosen and phoned to USARV. Though the Summary leans heavily toward combat units, the command has been the most successful support element in Vietnam concerning timely publication in the Summary. A total of 64 articles were submitted to USARV for inclusion in the Army Daily Summary, of which 26 were published. Figures related a steady increase of publication throughout each month of the report period.

The radio tape hometown program continued to be an asset with 51 hometown interview tapes and 487 holiday messages for the report period. Though essentially a one-man operation (7th PI Det. authorized 2 EM, only 1 assigned), the value of hometown radio tapes cannot be underestimated. Playbacks can be expected in CONUS by affiliates of NBC (Monitor, in particular), ABC, and CBS.

The Command Information section made several liaison visits with USARV-CI and MAOI discussing the entire command information program that is being carried out in Vietnam, especially the production and distribution of fact sheets, troop topics (listed at the end of this resume), and the distribution of The Pacific Stars and Stripes, The Reporter, and The Observer.
ANNEX Q (U) COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

1. The third and final portion of the US Electronics Command (US-ECON) project to install amplitude modulated Very High Frequency (V-HF) Radios in Army Marinecraft in Vietnam was completed 25 August 1967. Under direction of US-ECON, a seven-man team of Department of the Army Civilian technicians arrived in country 12 July 1967 with 107 N/SRC-32 radios and installation kits. Installation was programmed for Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) vessels of the command. Eighty-nine radio sets were distributed for installation in vessels of medium boat transportation companies. The remaining 18 radios and installation kits were retained in depot stocks for use as an in-country float. The three project teams (June-July 66, May-June 67, and July-August 67) installed radios in over 300 marinecraft and command headquarters, greatly enhancing the command and control of vessels being operated throughout South Vietnam.

2. In preparation for the impending move of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command to Long Binh, extensive planning was accomplished by this office to insure a smooth transition and adequate communications, to include telephone service and tele-type message traffic serviced by the Command Communications Center.

   a. On 29 July 1967, the final master telephone figure plans were submitted to the Communications-Electronics Engineering and Installation Agency (CEEIA), 1st Signal Brigade. A contract was drafted by CEEIA listing materials required and other data necessary to install the telephone system in the new facilities. After programming time frames and estimating costs for materials and labor, CEEIA returned the proposed contract to this Headquarters. The Communications Officer initiated a Purchase Request and Commitment (PR&C) to fund the project and submitted it to US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam (USAPAV) who normally lets contracts to a civilian firm. A conference was held at USAPAV 23 August 1967 with representatives of 1st Logistical Command, 1st Signal Brigade, US Army Vietnam (USARV), and USAPAV in attendance. Discussion centered around the possibility of military personnel installing the telephone system instead of letting the contract to a civilian firm. After extensive coordination between USARV, 1st Signal Brigade and 1st Logistical Command, it was decided that this Headquarters would provide one on-site project officer and six enlisted wiremen. The signal brigade would provide one project

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officer, three enlisted wiremen, technical assistance, and necessary materials to complete the installation project. On 11 September 1967 the crew started cable installation in the first of the four major buildings. As the construction contractor finished each building, the telephone installation crew proceeded to install cable and terminal boxes in the completed structure. Estimated time of completion of the telephone installation project is 15 November.

b. The Communications Center discontinued two teletype circuits during the first quarter FY 68: The circuit to US Army Support Command Saigon was discontinued 28 August as a result of that unit's move to Long Binh. On 3 October the teletype circuit to 4th Transportation Command was discontinued. The Transportation Command is now serviced by the new US Army Area Communications Center, Saigon, located at Camp Gaylor Tan Son Nhut. The Area Communications Center will service the units which remain in Saigon/Cholon area. To provide communications center service to the new 1st Logistical Command Headquarters at Long Binh, coordination has been effected between this headquarters, USARV and 1st Signal Brigade. The Signal Brigade will handle the installation. The 101st Radio Research Company has stated that the design meets the necessary security requirements. 1st Signal Brigade is now procuring the necessary material. Equipment in use in the present 1st Logistical Command Headquarters Communications Center will be installed at the new site.
ANNEX R (U) DIRECTORATE OF PROCUREMENT

1. Purchase Request and Commitment Forms (PR&C's) processed during the period 1 August 1967 through 31 October 1967 totaled 721 valued at $35.3 million. A detailed breakdown of these figures reveals that 191 PR&C's were assigned to contracting divisions of the US Army Procurement Agency Vietnam (USAPAV) totaling $32.1 million; 506 PR&C's were forwarded to CONUS totaling $3.1 million, and 24 PR&C's were forwarded to Western Pacific agencies totaling $0.1 million. Total PR&C's processed during Fiscal Year (FY) 1968 amounted to 1,157 valued at $275 million.

2. Contracts under administration by USAPAV as of 31 October 1967 totaled 129 valued at $42.7 million. These figures exclude Blanket Purchase Agreements.

3. Twenty-four monthly and four quarterly reports were prepared and forwarded to Department of the Army, United States Army Vietnam (USARV), Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), and United States Army Japan (USARJ). These reports provide the essential procurement statistics, on a uniform basis, for recurring and special reports compiled by US Army Pacific (USARPAC), Department of the Army and Department of Defense.

4. This Command's effort to reduce offshore procurement and thereby reduce gold flow has met with unqualified success. The Commanding General's memorandum placing stringent requirements on offshore procurement as well as careful scrutiny of requirements by this Agency has reduced 1st Quarter FY 1968 offshore procurement to $0.4 million as compared to $10.7 million in the 1st Quarter FY 1967.

5. The most notable management improvement during this report period has been the development of an Advance Procurement Plan for all contracts in excess of $100,000. The objective of advance procurement planning is to provide a management tool to insure that Contracting Officers have the necessary lead time required to develop competition among prospective bidders, thereby reducing cost to the Government without a decrease in the quality of service.

6. Four better contracts were awarded to Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc. (PA&E) 3C June 1967. These contracts provided for repair and utilities services (R&U) of real property, maintenance of engineer type equipment, and operation of
construction materials and repair parts supply facilities in
the Republic of Vietnam. All letter contracts were made defini-
tive and signed during August and September 1967. The R&M
contract is expected to reach $121.4 million, making it the
largest contract in the history of USARV.

7. On 1 September 1967 an Installation Support Division
was created from what had formerly been Branch B (PA&E) of the
Services Division. The new division is part of the Directorate
of Operations. A Contract Execution Branch and a Contract Man-
agement Branch make up the division. Reorganization resulted
in expansion and three DAC and one Local National (LN) personnel
spaces were added to the previous three Military and three DAC spaces.
The Division has instituted four projects to evaluate and im-
prove the management functions of PA&E. These projects and
progress to date are as follows:

a. Elimination of Non-essential Overtime: The ob-
jective of limiting overtime to 25% of normal time has not yet
been achieved because of shortages of imported personnel. How-
ever, PA&E has taken steps to eliminate all overtime which is
not vital to mission accomplishment.

b. Improvement of Contractor's Procurement System.
A US Army Japan survey of PA&E's procurement made during October
has indicated that the preferred solution would be to get PA&E
out of procurement as quickly as possible. PA&E's procurement
management has failed to provide adequate controls and has not
protected the interests of the US Government.

c. Improvement of Contractor Management Structure
and Systems. A 10-man management survey team from Headquarters,
US Army Japan, spent 3 weeks in October conducting a searching
study of PA&E's contract management and area offices. The
final report of the survey will be available by mid-November.
Recommendations from the report will serve two purposes:
First, immediate implementation of some recommendations will
improve management of current contracts. Second, other recom-
mendations will be used to prepare for future contracting.

d. Evaluation and Improvement of Performance and
Management of Resources. The quality of contractor reports
is being upgraded steadily. A program is being instituted to
improve accountability procedures for Government furnished
plant equipment and supplies. The contractor has been en-
couraged to develop a training program to increase the skills
of Local National employees and thereby replace imported employees.
8. Several cost reduction areas have been identified and monthly cost reports are being studied to determine progress made by PA&E. To date PA&E has made limited progress because little time has elapsed since implementation. The most significant cost reduction items are expected to be the reduction of overtime work and cessation of procurement actions. Two or three more months must pass before any definitive cost reduction trends will be apparent. Other substantial savings may result if reorganization of PA&E management offices causes manning levels to be reduced.

9. The Subsistence Division has located Field Representatives at Qui Nhon and Can Tho. These representatives are expected to improve local fresh fruit and vegetable procurement by attempting to increase the number of eligible vendors, improve procedures for packing and processing, and work with Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), and US Agency for International Development (USAID) officials in expanding new vegetable acreage and items.

10. Efforts are being made to coordinate long-range forecasts for fresh fruits and vegetables throughout Vietnam. This will require the Subsistence Division, USAPAV, to work with the agricultural advisors of USAID and CORDS in surveying the principal growing areas of Vietnam and correlate this information as to best growing periods for each area, normal harvest time frame, items best suited according to area and plan the number of acres for production. It will also provide the basis for timely and economical procurement without seriously affecting the market prices and at the same time provide USAID with sufficient basic information to permit optimization of production in a given area.

11. In an effort to increase competition, through increased fresh fruits and vegetables vendors, the Request for Proposal were "dressed up" to attract attention and copies were displayed at additional locations in Saigon and Dalat. As a result of this increased effort to publicize, forty-two sets of instructions and requirements were passed to interested persons or firms upon their request. Eight applications for approval as vendors have been received.

12. Fresh fruit and vegetable purchases by Saigon and Dalat field offices reflected a wide variance in quality and price, due to the lack of a standard description of the item desired. A thorough study of existing Western Pacific
procurement activity specifications was made and it was determined these were too complicated for use at this early stage of in-country fresh fruits and vegetables development. Simple commodity descriptions were prepared and staffed by the Veterinarian, 1st Logistical Command Subsistence Branch and USDAID agricultural personnel. These were published in English and Vietnamese versions and have been distributed to all vendors, inspectors and supply point personnel.

13. The initiation and utilization of the new milk ingredient "vegetable fat" has created a substantial increase in production due to the high acceptability of the milk and ice cream made with this new ingredient. Requirements based on demand, have increased approximately 20% each month. An interesting sidelight of this is, while production is climbing at a rapid rate, the new price is 33% lower than before.

14. The Agency Source List has been expanded by 292 (from 670 to 962), an increase of 43%. A special effort was made to enlarge the source base by combining with Air Force, Navy, Pacific Architects & Engineers (PA&E), and USAID for International Development (USAID). Of the 292 increased sources, 162 (55%) were due directly to this effort to combine with the other services and PA&E. There are 392 new prospects for the source list, as a result of the combined efforts, which have yet to be heard from. Increase in sources for the various principal categories is as follows: Rock from 175 to 268, 53% increase; sand from 182 to 280, 56% increase; construction from 184 to 218, 35% increase; stovedoring from 71 to 104, 46% increase; laundry from 90 to 133, 48% increase; fresh fruits and vegetables from 87 to 96, 10% increase; potable ice from 47 to 56, 19% increase.

15. A program to provide a continual updating of source applications was initiated 9 October 1967. Firms whose source applications were dated prior to 1 November 1966 were to be sent new applications (approximately 300 total). One hundred sixty of these have been sent and thirteen revised applications received back. In addition, anniversary dates of all other applications were noted to provide a suspense for later mailings.

16. Twenty-four different Requests for Proposal/Quotation (RFP/RFQ's) were solicited. A total of 427 RFP/RFQ's were mailed to prospective offerors and 558 were handed out at the Agency, making a grand total of 985 mailed and given out combined.
17. The Pricing Division became an operable element in September 1967. Since that time, eight complete cost or pricing actions, one Independent Government Cost Estimate, and approximately six other informal pricing actions have been completed.

18. A US Army Pacific Manpower Survey Team performed a manpower utilization survey at the US Army Procurement Agency Vietnam between 7-11 August 1967. The survey team recommended the following changes in manpower authorization:

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<tr>
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<th>Officer</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>DAC</th>
<th>LN</th>
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<tr>
<td>Present Authorization</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed Authorization</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>77</td>
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In order to reduce time in processing and recruiting civilian personnel, this Agency forwarded the management survey report to US Army Vietnam without rebuttal, and the TDA was submitted to US Army Pacific (USARPAC) 11 October 1967. Recruiting actions for Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) spaces were forwarded to USARPAC 14 October 1967.

19. Present officer strength in USARPAC is slightly above authorized. Higher headquarters has permitted an overstrength in officers to help fill vacant DAC spaces until sufficient personnel can be recruited. As of 31 October 1967, there were 12 officers filling civilian positions.

20. Twenty-eight selective examinations of contractor's supply and accountable records were performed by the Property Administration Division on a representative sample basis of the total supply records on hand at each installation, thus allowing a prediction of the condition of the records maintained at the various locations. The contractor has been advised of the results of these inspections and has been required to take corrective action. Follow-up inspections are being made where appropriate.
ANNEX S (C) DIRECTORATE OF AMMUNITION

SECTION I - PART I

1. Surveillance Activities:
   a. Mr. A. J. Wonder and Mr. W. E. James, DAC training instructors (ammo) from the United States Army Munitions Command Ammunition School at Savanna, Illinois provided training in the inspection of conventional ammunition to military personnel during 17 August - 20 September. Such training is not available to military personnel in CONUS schools.
   b. US Army Procurement and Supply Agency (APSA) has been notified of the serious deficiencies found in the new plastic containers for 81mm mortar ammunition. Pinholes and cracks which allow moisture to enter the container resulted in a rash of malfunctions.

2. Maintenance Activities:
   a. Criticality of storage space dictates that ammunition requiring extensive maintenance be evacuated from Vietnam.
   b. Renovation detachments are committed to care and preservation of unit turn-ins and depot stocks which entail minor repairs.

3. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Activities:
   a. Several incidents have been investigated in which units have made unauthorized modifications to ammunition items. Modifications, to those items of ammunition observed, rendered the items unsafe to handle or prevented proper functioning as designed.
   b. USARV has been informed of EOD incident reports which indicate possible abandonment of ammunition by US Army units. Since this practice creates a hazardous condition as well as providing a potential source of ammunition for the enemy, it was recommended that these incidents be brought to the attention of tactical commanders.
   c. Army EOD responded to 3,329 incidents throughout Vietnam. EOD presented 191 Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance courses and trained a total of 20,210 personnel. Exclusive of visits by on site teams, 1,076 liaison visits were made to supported units.

4. Ammunition Supply Activities:
a. Due to a significant increase in 105mm HE ammunition expenditures, an available supply rate (ASR) was imposed by DCG, USARV, in August 1967. It is anticipated that the ASR will be lifted by Jan 68, when it is estimated that production will be capable of meeting demand.

b. An in-country management ceiling or objective on Class V tonnage to be held within a range of 240 - 260 thousand short tons through June 1968 was recommended to and approved by DCG, USARV.

c. Administrative errors, resulting in Inventory Adjustment Reports (IAR) required extraordinary supply action from CONUS by air. Command emphasis at support command level has been requested to eliminate this problem.

d. Estimated time of arrivals (ETAs) of incoming shipments of munitions continue to slip, requiring diversion of ships and cargo. Low supply situations developed at several installations as a result of this slippage.

5. Ammunition Operations:

a. Fifteen ammunition storage pads were designated for US Navy use at Cam Ranh Bay. This was necessary to assist the Navy in planning for covered storage and to simplify inspection and inventory operations.

b. Class V support was extended to include service to US Army and US Navy and Free World Forces in I Corps and IV Corps Tactical Zones with no degradation in support to previous areas. Support is now afforded throughout Vietnam, from the DMZ to the Delta.

c. Approximately 19,000 155mm HE unpalletized projectiles were received by Qui Nhon. Since this resulted in excessive handling and demurrage, this unacceptable situation was reported to the US Army Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency (APSA).

d. Follow up action on disposition instructions for selected slow moving items of Class V continues. Evacuation of those items is a prime factor in maintaining the reduced tonnage levels of the management objective which was established based upon guidance from DCG, USARV.
1. Study of Maintenance Capabilities vs Requirements. On 16 August 1967, the Directorate of Maintenance completed a capabilities versus requirements study of 1st Logistical Command maintenance units under "Program 5". This study was in two parts. The first part of the study determined specific requirements for maintenance support and attendant capabilities to meet those requirements as of 31 July 1967. The second part projected requirements through 30 June 1968 and compared the projected capability to meet those requirements, considering all units scheduled for deployment to Vietnam under Program 5. As a result of this study, certain maintenance units programmed for deployment were recommended for diversion within 1st Logistical Command. Also, additional maintenance units were identified and requested to support the additive requirements of Program 5.

2. Maintenance Units Arrival, Assignments and Realignments.

a. On 20 September 1967, 590th Maintenance Company (Division) (Direct Support) arrived in Vietnam and was assigned to United States Army Support Command, Saigon. The unit was deployed in the vicinity of Bear Cat. Its assigned mission is to provide backup direct support to the 9th US Infantry Division and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment, Vietnam. It will also provide direct support maintenance and repair parts supply support to nondivisional units located in the vicinity of Bear Cat.

b. On 22 September 1967, 588th Maintenance Company (Division) (Direct Support) arrived in Vietnam and was assigned to United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon. The unit was deployed in the vicinity of Chu Lai and assigned the mission of providing backup direct support to the Americal Division and direct support maintenance and repair parts supply support to nondivisional units in the vicinity of Chu Lai.

c. On 22 September 1967, 194th Quartermaster Detachment (Refrigeration Repair) composed of twelve two (2) man teams (total of 24 personnel) arrived in Vietnam and was assigned to United States Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay. The detachment was given the mission of providing refrigeration repair in the Cam Ranh Bay area of operations. A small portion of the detachment was located at Nha Trang to provide refrigeration repair capability in that area.
d. On 22 September 1967, 507th Quartermaster Detachment (Team IE Refrigeration Repair), a two man detachment, arrived in Vietnam and was assigned to United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon. The detachment was deployed to Chu Lai to operate a mobile refrigeration repair facility in that area.

e. On 22 September 1967, 610th Quartermaster Detachment (Team IE, Refrigeration Repair, a detachment of two men, arrived in Vietnam. It was deployed in the vicinity of An Khê to operate a mobile refrigeration repair facility in that area.

f. Effective 9 October 1967, 135th Heavy Equipment Repair Section, 135th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company (General Support) was relieved from attachment to United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon to rejoin its parent unit (the 69th Maintenance Battalion) at Cam Ranh Bay. This action was taken to restore the engineer heavy equipment repair capability in Cam Ranh Bay and provide unit integrity.

g. Effective 9 October 1967, 510th Engineer Company (Direct Support) was relieved from assignment to United States Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay and reassigned to United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon. The unit was deployed to Pleiku, where it joined its 3d Platoon already located there. This action provides the required engineer heavy equipment repair capability in the Pleiku area and restore unit integrity.

3. Review of General Support Program. The General Support Overhaul Program was revised in October 1967 because the original Fiscal Year 63-69 program developed in January 1967 proved to be unrealistic. The number of items previously programmed was excessive and quantities were unrealistic. Only items for which a known overhaul capability and computed requirement exist were included in the revised program. Information on usage was obtained by reviewing theater stockage objectives on selected items. Other data was provided by support commands based on performance during the first quarter of fiscal year 68. No data had been collected previously for determining actual accomplishments in the area of general support maintenance. In October 1967 the support commands were directed to submit a report of accomplishments to include work performed as direct support backup and work performed in the general support overhaul program.

4. Establishment of Retrofit Program for M16A1 Rifle. United States Army Support Commands, Saigon and Qui Nhon have been directed to establish an M16A1 rifle retrofit/repair program which will involve changing the present barrel assembly for a new chrome-chambered one and replacing worn and defective parts. All M16A1 rifles
presently in the hands of combat elements will be exchanged for new rifles already equipped with chrome-chambered barrels. All exchanged M16A1 rifles will be retrofitted with the new chrome-chambered barrel assembly and worn or defective parts will be replaced. Retrofitted M16A1 rifles will be exchanged for M14 rifles presently in the hands of support and logistical forces. Eventually all M14 rifles and unchromed M16A1 rifle barrels will be evacuated to the Continental United States for appropriate disposition. The retrofit/repair program for M16A1 rifles will begin in November 1967 and will be completed in May 1969.

5. Installation of Foam Kits on Vehicle Fuel Tanks. Reticulated poly-urethane foam installed in vehicle fuel cells/tanks has been effective in curbing fuel fires and explosions as the result of incendiary and cell/tank rupture incidents. These type of fires and explosions apparently were caused by sudden enrichment of the air-fuel mixture. In the case of mine or shaped-charge explosions below the fuel level, the foam greatly reduces fuel cell/tank rupture and limits the amount of fuel and fuel mists blown out. The latter characteristic delays fuel ignition and contains the fire if ignition occurs. The United States Army Materiel Command has arranged through the M1I3 Project Officer for the procurement of 200 foam kits for installation in low mileage M113 Armored Personnel Carriers of selected United States Army Vietnam units. A technical representative from the manufacturer (Firestone Company) and a technical from United States Army Tank-Automotive Command will instruct maintenance personnel in country on kit installation procedures. They will also assist in the actual installation of some of the foam kits. Results of actual effectiveness in combat vehicles are not yet known.

6. Multifuel Engine failure Continued. Multifuel engine failures continued at a high rate. Extensive user experience in Vietnam has established that certain serious failures predominant in this engine cannot be entirely attributed to quality defects of the engine. The specific failures of the multifuel engine are: valve seat inserts dropping our, cam and tappet scuffing, connecting rod breakdowns, and injector line deficiencies. Independent studies made by United States Army Tank-Automotive Command and Continental Aviation and Engineering Corporation have established that these failures are associated with overheating of the engine, hydrostatic lock and engine vibration.

7. Status of Repair Program for Collapsible Containers. Collapsible fuel drum and tank repair activities continued at a high rate. Over 3000 fuel drums of 500 gallon capacity were repaired at 1st Logistical Command facilities at Long Binh and
Qui Nhon. Approximately 12,000 of these drums have been repaired since initiation of repair services in June 1966. The recent rubber strike caused a slight decrease in total production figures. However, repair materials on hand were generally sufficient to meet the requirements of the command for the quarterly period. The supply of repair materials on a 30 day recurring basis has continued to improve. Repair materials for Qui Nhon has been flown into Huu Cat instead of Cam Ranh Bay since October 1967. This action reduces the in-country shipment time by approximately two days. Consequently, the tendency for the repair cement to congeal in the hot sun will be offset by elimination of the exposure time. A new shipping container with distinctive markings will be used during November 1967. This container is guaranteed by its manufacturer to prevent congealing of the repair cement. The number of collapsible fuel tanks of 10,000 gallon capacity repaired noticeably increased during the quarter; 109 were repaired during period 1 August - 30 September 1967 alone. The Long Binh repair facility began repairing 10,000 gallon tanks. Over 100 of these tanks were repaired by that facility during this quarter. Procurement action on repair materials has been extended through June 1968.

8. Status of Generator Standardization Program. As of 15 October 1967, a total of 6,985 standardized generators had arrived in country. However, 17,595 generators had been programmed for standardization. Of the 6,985 received, only 284 (less than 4 percent) were in the 15-kilowatt and higher category. The lack of standardized, high-kilowatt rated generators has forced this command to continue maintaining a large number of non-standard generators which have far exceeded their normal life expectancy. In addition, repair parts support, of approximately 140 makes and models of generators has been inadequate and has relied principally on the ‘Red Ball Express’. The Closed Loop Support Program is now in effect for the cyclic overhaul of standardized generators. However, only 1.5-kilowatt generators have been completely standardized. The success of this program hinges on the adequacy of shipments of standardized generators.

9. Shortage of Ten (10) Ton Crawler Cranes. During technical inspections of unserviceable Ten Ton Crawler Cranes located in Engineer Command units, it was determined that many were uneconomically repairable in accordance with Supply Bulletin 5-75, primarily because of age. Many of the Crawler Cranes are between 12 and 16 years old and repair parts are not available in the supply system. Because of the age and unserviceability of these Crawler Cranes, there are currently only 33 on hand versus 100 authorized. United States Army Mobility Equipment Command has advised that the Ten (10)
10. Maintenance Program for Eagle Rock Crushers. The production of crushed rock by Eagle Rock Crushers continues to be a main factor in the success of construction projects in Vietnam. Because of the acute shortage and essentiality of these items, commodity management has been intensive. Difficulty continues to be encountered in the procurement of rock crusher engines and engine repair parts. Since the Continental SD802 engine is difficult to obtain, this headquarters procured the more readily available Caterpillar model D333TA engine as a suitable replacement. The Caterpillar engine is now being successfully operated. Problems of fast wearing roll and jaw assemblies continued to be experienced. A rebuild program has been initiated to eliminate down time due to lack of rolls and jaws. Steps have also been taken to acquire an adequate maintenance float for the 75-ton-per-hour Eagle Rock Crushers. Its arrival in this command is anticipated during November 1967.

11. Status of Program for Installation of MSCS. From 1 August 1967 to 31 October 1967, 13 National Cash Register (NCR) "500" Mechanized Stock Control Systems (MSCS) were installed in country. Additionally 13 systems are scheduled for installation during the second and third quarters of Fiscal Year 1968. Each 1st Logistical Command unit receiving a NCR 500 MSCS was augmented with trained supervisory, operator, and maintenance personnel. These personnel were assigned to the 14th Inventory Control Center (ICC) and attached to their duty units. This method of assignment was unsatisfactory. It caused difficulties in personnel administration because of the individual's records were maintained by the duty units but the 14th-ICC was responsible for requisitioning replacements and obtaining assignments for rotating personnel. This was further complicated by the retention of promotion authority over these personnel by Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. On 16 September 1967, all 1st Logistical Command personnel in this program were reassigned to their duty units. These personnel are assigned as authorized overstrength until MTOE action submitted at Department of the Army direction is approved. As the mechanization of direct support units (DSU) and general support units (GSU) with direct support missions progresses, emphasis by the overall monitoring agency, the DCA/GSU Assistance Team, Pacific, is shifting from system installation to improving system operation and maintenance. To emphasize the importance of this emerging phase of the mechanization program, an overall maintenance, operation, and assistance program was
developed and distributed to all mechanized units. 1st Logistical Command Regulation 750-32, which is the authoritative reference for this project, has been revised to provide additional direction. The most serious problem facing this program is the lack of qualified supervisors at the unit level. Personnel Management, United States Army, Vietnam has placed an emergency requisition for trained supervisors but immediate relief is not anticipated.

12. Request for MTCE of Collection, Classification and Salvage Companies. On 31 August 1967, requests for Modification to Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTCEs) were forwarded to Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam (USARV). It was requested that the 218th and 633d Collection, Classification and Salvage (CC&S) Companies be increased to full strength authorization of 226 personnel each under TOE 29-239F. These two CC&S companies are currently organized as reduced strength companies with an authorized strength of 91 military personnel. The difference of 135 personnel is authorized to be filled with local national personnel. However, experience has shown that the local population base does not contain local nationals with the necessary skill levels and in the quantities necessary to fill these CC&S companies.

The MTCE requests were returned, without action by USARV on 19 September 1967. They are to be held in abeyance pending action on another proposal to include CC&S companies in new Tables of Distribution and Allowance for field depots.

13. Technical Assistance Provided to CC&S Companies. To insure that the three CC&S companies assigned to this command are operating at maximum capacity, civilian technical assistance personnel were requested from the Army Materiel Command (AMC) under the provisions of AR 700-4. AMC immediately sent four CC&S experts to this command for a 60-day period. They will survey current CC&S operations and formulate plans to utilize an additional 25 personnel scheduled to arrive in country 1 November 1967 for a six-month tour. The additional personnel from AMC will be assigned to the three support commands. They will provide assistance in establishing and implementing the latest approved procedures for collecting, segregating, preserving, packaging and processing unserviceable materiel for evacuation to CONUS for rebuild.

Presently all unserviceable APCs (M113 and M113A1) are evacuated from Vietnam to Sagami Army Depot, Japan. There they are classified as reparable or unreparable. A 90-day backlog of reparable assets is retained at Sagami and the remainder of the APCs are transshipped to Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, for rebuild. Since
large quantities of APCs evacuated to Sagarai have been classified as unreparable, sufficient repairable assets are not available for shipment to Anniston Army Depot to sustain the operation of the rebuild facility there. To insure that Anniston has sufficient unserviceable assets on hand to remain operational, AMC has directed that this command evacuate M13 APCs directly to Anniston by air, utilizing Special Aircraft Requirement Document (SARD) aircraft. Between 1 August 1967 and 31 October 1967, 19 M13 APCs have been evacuated to Anniston under this procedure.

15. Maintenance Posture of Countermortar Radar, AN/MPQ-4A.

a. The Countermortar Radar (CMR), AN/MPQ-4A plays an important role in military strategy in Vietnam. This radar will accurately give the coordinates of the origin of incoming mortar rounds. Maintenance is performed by radar repair teams located in Qui Nhon and Saigon Support Commands. In order to achieve the goal of zero deadline, sufficient maintenance float must be available to provide a source of replacement sub-assemblies. These sub-assemblies are used to substitute for a like sub-assembly on a deadlined item and thus return the CMR to operational status as quickly as possible. When the cause of deadline cannot be readily identified, an entire set is replaced. To prevent an "aging of the fleet", these sets have been replaced by a cyclic overhaul program at the rate of two each month.

b. In order to provide greater security of airfields and other critical areas, several months ago Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) requested additional CMRs. As a result, Department of the Army directed that incoming sets on the cyclic overhaul program be used to fill these additional requirements. This action has seriously jeopardized maintenance support, since only one set has been replaced since May 1967. In the meantime, the maintenance float sets have been depleted from six to three and the three remaining are approaching the point where they are no longer maintainable. It is imperative that the cyclic overhaul program be increased to replace worn-out sets and replenish the maintenance float sets. While the criteria for depot rebuild is 4000 running hours, many sets in Vietnam are still operating past 8000 running hours.

16. Maintenance Support Being Rendered to PSYOPS. Psychological warfare operations are now conducted by each division and separate brigade. Each of these units have been issued a "Quick Reaction" press set, which includes a Model 85 press, a plate maker, a polaroid camera and a paper cutter. Additionally, bullhorns and 1000-Watt loudspeakers have been issued. This equipment, for
the most part, consists of commercial "off-the-shelf" items. The introduction of nonstandard items into the military system without proper preparation presents many problems. Adequate prepositioning of repair parts is essential. For the Model 85 press, two kits of repair parts were procured from the manufacturer. One kit was issued with the set and one was placed in the technical supply activity of the general support unit in each support command. Maintenance beyond the capability of the using unit is accomplished on-site to the extent possible. Support of the 1000-Watt loudspeakers has presented no unusual problems. Although a new configuration, it consists of four AN/UIH-5 loudspeakers rated at 250 Watts each.
1. (C) Enemy action against petroleum facilities has shown a marked increase. Military pipelines were damaged a total of six times as a result of enemy explosive charges. There was a total of nine pipeline fires. Some of these were a result of known enemy action, others resulted from line separations caused by persons unknown. The worst incident of the period occurred at Pleiku 23 Sep where enemy action started a fire in the collapsible tank farm. A total of 108,000 gallons of Kogas and 109,000 gallons of Diesel was lost. In addition, 23-10,000 gallon collapsible tanks were destroyed together with related equipment. The Shell facility at Pha Pevs mortared 3 August. A fire started in the packaged product area resulting in the loss of approximately 5,000 55 gallon drums of Diesel fuel and lubricating oils. The aforesaid incidents resulted in only temporary cessation of operations. Repair and replacement of equipment was rapid and operations were resumed in a minimum of time.

2. (U) A number of fires and other incidents have occurred as a result of pilferage at couplings on the Qui Nhon - An Khe pipeline. Instructions have been issued from this Headquarters to tack or bar weld couplings and cover the pipeline with earth at locations where the pipeline runs through heavily populated areas. These actions should discourage pilferage and, at the same time, it will still be possible to effect rapid repair of the line when necessary.

3. (U) Considerable difficulty in discharging tank trucks was experienced at Pleiku due to the arrival of the monsoon and the resulting mud. It became extremely difficult to maneuver and discharge the daily convoy in time for the trucks to return to An Khe. The problem was solved by the installation of four six-inch coupled pipelines from the collapsible tank farm to the main highway, QL 19, a distance of approximately 3/4 mile. Tank trucks can now rapidly discharge their loads and avoid the mud on the road to the tank farm.

4. (C) The barges used for floating bulk petroleum storage at Duo Phe will be moved from their present locations to a small bay south of their present location. This action should result in continued use of the barges during the monsoon.

5. (C) In September one TC Medium Truck Platoon (POL) was sent from Saigon Support Command on TDY to Qui Nhon Support Command. This move was necessary due to the increased Army operations in Southern I CTZ and Northern II CTZ.
6. (U) The Northeast monsoon has made it necessary to cease tanker transfers at Qui Nhon. The T-2 tanker used for floating storage at Qui Nhon has been moved from Qui Nhon to Vung Ro Bay. Two T-1 tankers shuttle from the T-2 to Qui Nhon.

7. (U) "Camels" are being constructed and moved from Cam Ranh Bay for use during ship transfers at Vung Ro Bay. "Camels" are constructed from wood pilings wired or bolted together. They are then tied between ships to prevent the ships damaging each other during transfers in rough water.

8. (U) The barge discharge point at Buu Long on the Dong Hai River became operational during August. All JP-4 for Bien Hoa is supplied by motorized barge from Phu Be. The product is discharged at the barge site and pumped to the air base through two six-inch coupled pipelines.

9. (U) On two occasions, at Quan Loi and Phuc Ving, fuel excess to flight requirements has been defueled from C-130 aircraft as a method of supplying JP-4 to the 1st Infantry Division. Equipment applying this procedure to other locations is being studied. The system appears to be an economical method of supplying JP-4 to several locations in Vietnam.

10. (U) During the first week of October the supply point at Vinh Long was resupplied by Army Y-boat for the first time. Product was discharged through a four-inch hose and a four-inch pipeline to three 1,000 barrel bolted steel tanks.

11. (U) Scheduled inspections of supply point terminals and forward support activities continue to be conducted by officers from the Directorate of Petroleum. Particular emphasis is being placed on proper berming of collapsible tanks. Experience has proven that proper berming and dispersion of collapsible tanks are the best means of preventing the loss of an entire tank farm in the event of a fire or enemy attack.

12. (U) The Army spectrometric oil analysis laboratory has been moved from Okinawa and incorporated in the base laboratory at Cam Ranh Bay. Basically, the oil analysis program is a diagnostic tool for testing the internal condition of aircraft engines, transmissions and other oil-wetted aircraft components. Foreign material, especially metals, present in samples of lubricating oil from aircraft systems is detected and measured by spectral emission and absorption instruments. The wear of various components can be detected and maintenance performed prior to engine or component failure. The movement of the laboratory to Cam Ranh Bay greatly reduces the time required to obtain
sample results. Extensive application of the spectrometric oil analysis program is planned and will undoubtedly result in improved aircraft maintenance.

13. (U) The 130,000 gallon bulk liquid petroleum gas (LPG) facility at Kha Be has been completed and was filled 11 October. The 50,000 gallon facilities at Kha Trang and Qui Pham are at a standstill awaiting parts from GO USA. Bulk service is provided from Kha Bo to the Saigon area and Van Tau by government-furnished, contractor-operated, 2400 gallon LPG tank trucks. The remainder of RVN is supplied LPG in cylinders.

14. (U) Construction of petroleum facilities continued during this period. The 193,000 barrel tank farm at Qui Pham is expected to be completed prior to 31 Dec. The construction of 50,000 barrels of storage has begun at Pleiku. The An Khe - Pleiku pipeline is 67% complete. The Cam Ranh Bay 200,000 barrel tank farm and T-5 jetty are progressing rapidly. An eight-inch pipeline is being installed at Phan Rang and will replace the present six-inch line. The jetty, pipelines, and 86,000 barrel tank farm at Long Binh have been completed. The system will be operational with completion of the Vinnel Corporation pipeline for use in supplying fuel for use in the Long Binh Post electric power generating facility.

15. (U) Bulk fuels consumption by US forces in thousands of barrels in II, III, IV, CT2 RVN is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>496.1</td>
<td>556.1</td>
<td>500.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avgas</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negas</td>
<td>187.9</td>
<td>182.0</td>
<td>175.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>270.0</td>
<td>252.1</td>
<td>320.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>521.6</td>
<td>503.6</td>
<td>509.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avgas</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>81.7</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>104.3</td>
<td>109.9</td>
<td>105.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>277.3</td>
<td>189.1</td>
<td>222.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avgas</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negas</td>
<td>75.2</td>
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<td>89.4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>121.1</td>
<td>126.2</td>
<td>123.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* October data not available at time of publication
1. The command retrograde program has been rapidly increasing in volume over the last three months. Project officer type management had been established in five directorates concerned with excess and reparables and the three directorates having Closed Loop Support Program (CLSP) responsibilities. Even with this increased managerial emphasis, standards of performance were generally unsatisfactory. The quantity of retrograde and disposal material was accumulating faster than it was being processed for out-shipments or for sale. The common problems encountered in retrograde, salvage, and disposal operations were considered of sufficient magnitude to warrant centralized management of the complete package. Accordingly, decision was made to establish a Directorate of Retrograde and Disposal to provide staff supervision of the Command Retrograde Program. The directorate became operational on 2 October 1967. Property disposal functions formerly a part of the Services Directorate, were taken over by the new organization on this same date. The mission of the directorate is to represent the Commanding General on matters pertaining to retrograde and disposal operations and has staff responsibility for plans, programs, and operations concerned with retrograde of materiel and salvage disposal. It also supervises, directs, and establishes procedures to process and control retrograde materiel and dispose of serviceable and salvage materiel.

2. Property Disposal: A total of 7,776 short tons of material was removed by purchasers from the seven property disposal yards in Vietnam. Scrap and waste materials consisted of 5,450 short tons, while 2,326 short tons was of the usable property category. Generations during the same period were 24,773 short tons for a tonnage increase of 16,996 short tons for the three month period. Two Invitation for Bids, IFB 92-112-8008 and IFB 92-112-8009, were issued 15 October 1967. Approximately 700 copies were mailed to prospective bidders throughout the world. The bids are scheduled to be opened 30 November 1967. These two sales catalogs offer thirty two line items of diversified scrap. The estimated total tonnage of scrap property listed for sale is 60,000 short tons to be generated at the five up-country scrap yards during the next year.
1. (U) The 1st Logistical Command Integrated Supply Data System Plan is being developed in two segments. A short range plan which covers a period from October 1967 to October 1968 has been developed. This plan pertains to installed or approved second generation Automatic Data Processing Equipment (ADPE) and communications. A long range study is being prepared by the Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) under contract to the Army. This study covers third generation ADPE and advanced communication equipment.

2. (U) A 1st Logistical Command Regulation formulating general policies and standards on Supply Data Systems Control was developed which will be applicable to the headquarters and all elements of the command.

3. (U) A program for the interchange of data systems information between all elements of the command has been developed to promote an effective systems program. A means of disseminating information to all command elements has been developed, by the use of Standard Data System Notices. All elements of the command are furnished systems information of direct and general nature. Information interchange meetings are for information as well as a means of exchanging ideas and discussing problems.

a. The first Data System Interchange Conference was held 16 September 1967. This conference was attended by representatives of HQS, 1st Logistical Command, 14th Inventory Control Center (ICC), 506th Field Depot, USA Depot Cam Ranh Bay, USA Depot Quy Nhon, USARV Comptroller and G-4, USARPAC Field Systems Agency, Computer Sciences Corporation, and International Business Machine Corporation. Presentations were made on the data systems of USARPAC, 1st Logistical Command Supply, and 14th ICC. Other subjects included Standard Supply System Vietnam, Computer Sciences Corporation, and International Business Machine Corporation Support to 1st Logistical Command.

b. The Second Data Systems Interchange Conference was held 30 October 1967. The agenda included 1st Logistical Command's Supply Data Plan, the Standard Supply System Vietnam, 14th ICC conversion to its new system, Computer Sciences Corporation Automated Integrated Logistics Data System Plan, and the 1st Logistical Command Training Program and School.
4. (U) A 1st Logistical Command Data System Training Program is being developed to train the personnel of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, and depot personnel in the management and operation of data systems being installed.

a. Draft of the 1st Logistical Command Training Directive has been prepared to define responsibilities and describe the program.

b. The status of training for system personnel is as follows:

(1) A training package has been developed and completed by 2nd Logistical Command. This training package is a modification of the Standard Supply System for use in Vietnam. The Standard Supply System Vietnam (3SVN) is basically the same as the USARPAC Standard Supply System (3S), with financial accounting, maintenance of a due-in file, and stock location system removed.

(2) The 14th ICC and 506th Field Depot Computer operator personnel received training during the period 1 May to 29 July 1967.

(3) The 506th Field Depot personnel are in the process of receiving training in the Standard Supply System Vietnam. Progress to date includes:

(a) An initial group from the 506th Field Depot was given formal training and OJT at 2nd Logistical Command.

(b) This group has returned from 2nd Logistical Command, with a group of 10 specialists from the 2nd Logistical Command, and is conducting training for the remaining 506th Field Depot personnel.

(4) A 1st Logistical Command Supply Data Systems Training School with facilities at Long Binh is planned. The School will be under the staff supervision of the Director of General Supply and will be operated by the CO, 14th Inventory Control Center.

c. A Vietnamese Intern Training Program in Supply Data Systems is being established to attract, develop and maintain qualified Vietnamese employees in Supply Data Systems.
This program will include the training of Vietnamese as digital computer programmers, digital computer systems analysts, and computer operators.

5. (U) An alternate site plan was developed to provide supply data systems continuity of operations in the event that either the 14th ICC, 506th Field Depot, or both, become inoperative.

6. (U) The Standard Supply System Vietnam (3SW) is being prepared for implementation at the 506th Field Depot. Computer Sciences Corporation under contract to the Army is assisting in this effort.

7. (U) The 1st Logistical Command was represented at the Closed Loop Materials Handling Equipment (MHE) Reprogramming Conference held in St. Louis, Mo., 11-15 September 1967. Emergency authorization of MHE for Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon depots has been approved by DA and were included in the quantities of MHE programmed for Vietnam.

8. (U) The command also took part in the Closed Loop Reprogramming Conference for generators held 23-27 October 1967 in St. Louis.

9. (U) Mission Support Plans were prepared for 26 new line items being planned for distribution in Vietnam. Included were support plans for 16 paving machines, 29 crawler mounted drills, 38 floor mounted air conditioners, and 15 insecticide sprayers.

10. (U) The 1st Logistical Command was represented at a conference regarding the Closed Loop Support Program for Communications-Electronics Equipment held at Electronics Command in Philadelphia, 7-10 August 1967. Purpose of the conference was to review and update the program. Results of the conference are reflected in letter, Electronics Command, AKSEL-MK-NICP-R, Subj: Closed Loop Support Conference (MOT) dated 12 September 1967.

11. (U) Representatives from USARV, 1st Logistical Command, and 1st Signal Brigade attended a meeting held at 14th ICC 24 October 1967 regarding the support plan for Automatic Digital Network Overseas (AUTODIN). It was determined that repair parts could be stocked at one depot with two locations, and expanded if required.

12. (U) The 1st Logistical Command was represented at a Closed Loop Support Conference on weapons, held at Fort Shafter,
Hawaii, 24 through 29 September 1967. Representatives from USARPAC, Army Tank Automotive Command, Weapons Command, Army Material Command, and DA discussed 54 individual items as Closed Loop Support candidates. Thirty-eight of the candidates were adopted as Closed Loop Support items. All items were programmed at the conference and automatic shipments began with the month of October 1967. Implementation instructions have been issued to the 14th ISC and the three support commands. A number of issues have been made already under the program and retrograde action on many items has been initiated. The Project codes assigned are NEA (Self Propelled Artillery), NEB (Towed Artillery), and NEC (Fire Control).

13. (U) The 1st Logistical Command was represented at a Closed Loop Support Conference conducted 28 August to 1 September 1967, in Hawaii, on tactical wheeled vehicles. End items were not put under Closed Loop because no established DA overhaul and rebuild criteria has been established. DA is in the process of developing these criteria. The 2½ ton and 5 ton Multifuel engines were put under the Closed Loop Program. During the month of September 1967 a program of 400 receipts was scheduled and 427 were received during the month. During October 1967, a program of 400 receipts was scheduled, with 465 received. An optional retrograde program was established for the month of October 1967, for M48A3 tanks of 37 each and in November 51 each.


a. The M16A1 Rifle Exchange and Retrofit Program is designed to replace all M14 rifles with M16A1 rifles, an improve the M16 rifle.

b. The following is current status of the M16/M14 rifle exchange:

(1) Total quantity of M16A1 rifles in hands of US Troops: 140,360.

(2) Total quantity of M14 rifles in hands of US Troops: 118,309.

(3) Total quantity of M16A1 rifles in hands of Free World Forces: 29,839.
The M16A1 rifle is a USARV controlled item, and issues are based upon priorities assigned by USARV. The M16A1 rifle program was curtailed from June through September 1967 due to the Colt Industries strike. USARV is scheduled to receive 15,000 M16A1 rifles each month through April 68.

(4) The above quantities of M16A1 rifles have been allocated to USARV.

c. Status of the M16A1 rifle action spring (buffer) retrofit:

(1) The modification of the M16A1 rifle, which requires an action spring to lower the cyclic rate of fire from 700/800 RPM to 600/700 RPM, has resumed. This retrofit was delayed during the Colt Industries strike. Each week in August and September 1967, 15,000 Buffer assemblies were received. Presently, all weapons in Army units have been completed. There have been 25,000 issued to the Marines, 7,500 to the Navy, and 18,000 to the Air Force. There are 25,000 required by the Air Force and 2,700 required by the Navy to complete their retrofit program.

d. Status of the chrome-chambered rifle barrel retrofit:

(1) The recommended allocation and distribution plan envisions issue of new production M16A1 rifles, with chrome-chambered barrels, to the combat maneuver elements as 1st priority in exchange for old M16A1 rifles. The exchanged M16A1 rifles will be retrofitted with chrome-chambered barrels at the rate of approximately 6,000 per month in country at a central location and reissued to support troops in exchange for M14 rifles.

15. (U) Experience has shown that fiber shipping containers are subject to rapid deterioration during shipment and when placed in open storage. As an interim measure, skid base crates were designed to provide the fiber board containers with a shroud of thin gauge polyethylene for protection from the weather and a base for protection during handling, to facilitate stacking and promote more effective use of storage space. The skid base crates are being prefabricated at the United States Army Depot Command, Japan and shipped to the 506th Field Depot, Saigon where they will be assembled and put into use. The 14th ICC has designated an interim Federal Stock number of 3990-J14-1136 for the crates and has requisitioned 5,000 to fill initial demand.

16. (U) Direct Support Units and General Support Units (DSU/ GSU) required Stock Record Support. The 1st Logistical Command has initiated a stock record support plan for the DSU/GSU in the 1st Rein Phu Bay area on a pilot test basis, with the assistance
of 2nd Logistical Command during the initial phase of the test. It is projected that the 14th ICC will provide this support.

Cam Ranh Bay Area DSU/GSU units not having adequate machine capability have manually completed the Authorized Stockage List. The units having National Cash Register model 500s will submit their Data Number I Cards to provide necessary information for processing at the 2nd Logistical Command. Support provided will include title inserts, ASL listings, and prepunched requisitions for each ASL item.

17. (U) A study is being conducted by the General Supply Directorate, 1st Logistical Command, to determine the degree and cause of losses and delays in processing requisitions. The study group is augmented by three representatives from USARPAC. The concept is to trace approximately 3,000 requisitions from the time the requisitions are initiated at unit level until they are rejected, cancelled or filled. At each step in the requisition processing cycle, an analysis will be made to determine effectiveness and problem areas.

18. (U) A review of all items listed in the Theater Construction Materials ASL was conducted in an effort to determine inexpensive items to replace expensive items. The most striking example of cost saving involved 12" bridge spikes. These spikes are extremely expensive, costing $1.30 each. Because of the high cost of these spikes, the 14th ICC coordinated with the Engineer Command to determine the acceptability of using 12" drift bolts, at $.17 each, in lieu of spikes. Based on the coordination, 12" drift bolts were accepted as the new standard item. Necessary supply action has been taken to requisition the bolt instead of the spike. Based on the theater RO of 536,000 each, estimated savings to the government will be in excess of $1 million per year.

19. (U) SUBSISTENCE

a. Railway reefer cars arrived in country for use in transporting class I perishable items. However, the lack of an adequate rail network restricts their use throughout the Republic of Vietnam.

b. The Foremost Dairy plant in Saigon recently inaugurated a new process using vegetable fats instead of anhydrous fat to recombine their whole milk product. The result of this process has yielded a substantial increase in consumption and significant savings in unit cost of the product.
c. A detailed recoupment program was initiated resulting in a savings in product life, reduced inventories by eliminating overaged products and more efficient use of storage space. Most of the supply activities have completely recouped stocks on hand and are now recouping items as they are received in demanded condition.

d. A new stockage level for Class I in country has been proposed and, if approved, is expected to "streamline" Class I management, reduce required on-hand inventories, and yield dollar inventory savings.
SECTION I, PART I

ANNEX X (U) DIRECTIONS ON TRANSPORTATION

1. Ports:

a. During the period 1 August - 31 October 1967, a total of 2,025,422 S/T were handled through the 1st Logistical Command ports. The monthly tonnage was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Tonnage (S/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>725,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>660,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>639,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,025,422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. These decreasing tonnages shown above are due to a decrease in both military and USAID incoming cargo. The CINCPAC Logistics Computer Program Report indicates that these tonnages will continue to decrease in the future.

c. Effective 1 August 1967, the rice handling mission in Saigon Port was turned over from the U.S. Army to the Government of Vietnam. From January to July, the Army was handling an average of 80,000 S/T of USAID cargo per month in Saigon, of which approximately 50,000 S/T was rice, and subsequent to the turnover of the rice mission, USAID tonnages at Saigon dropped to 25,000 S/T per month.

d. In August, Cui Nhon set a record for the port by handling 188,210 S/T of cargo that month. In September, it broke its own record when it handled 190,189 S/T.

e. Berth K-12 in Saigon, which collapsed in July and was under repair and non-operational for approximately 3½ months, came back into operation on 17 October 1967. The lighting system has not yet been totally completed and there is still some reinforcement work to be accomplished. Consequently the berth is limited to daylight operations and approximately 350 S/T per day are being handled at this location.

f. Newport experienced a severe personnel shortage in October due to the 71st Transportation Battalion's reaching its rotational hump at that time. USAID was notified of this problem and maximum emphasis was put on building the 71st Battalion back up to operating strength. Approximately 650 personnel were assigned to the battalion during the second week of October and by the middle of the month, the unit was once again in an operational
posture, and by 19 October was handling 5,503 S/T of cargo per day through the port.

g. During August, a barge way was completed and became operational in Cui Nhơn, thus raising their daily throughput capability from 5400 S/T to 5800 S/T.

h. Two POL barge offloading facilities were completed at Long Binh with a reted discharge capability of 45,000 barrels per day.

i. Two eight inch submarine lines were completed at Vung Ro with a reted POL discharge capability of 45,000 barrels per day.

2. Sea-Land:

On 10 October 1967, the two Sea-Land Container gantry cranes were completed at Cam Ranh Bay, fourteen days ahead of the established schedule. The Sea-Land marshalling areas at the three major ports were progressing as scheduled and will be completed prior to the arrival of the first Sea-Land Container ship on 5 November 1967. Construction of unstuffing docks in selected areas throughout the 1st Logistical Command Area for break bulk activities to facilitate unstuffing of Sea-Land Containers began between 1-16 October 1967. The construction of these areas prior to 1 November 1967 will complete all scheduled projects necessary for offloading, marshalling and transshipping Sea-Land Containers.

3. Highway:

A total of 140,332 short tons of cargo per month were moved by military truck units and 104,625 short tons per month were moved by commercial contract vehicles. Military vehicles transported 25,541 passengers and 6,230,279 gallons of POL per month. Of the cargo transported by military vehicles, 22% was port and beach clearance, 36% was local haul operations, and 42% was line haul operations. Of the cargo transported by commercial contract vehicles, 94% was port and beach clearance and 6% was local haul operations.

4. Rail:

a. A systematic, comprehensive, program of inspection of the 200 US Army railway cars was initiated by personnel of the Rail Branch to validate maintenance billings for work performed by the Vietnam Railway System, and to prevent damage to the cars due to misuse by military consignors and consignees.
b. Complete accounting for spare parts and delineation of resupply and billing procedures necessary to support the use and maintenance of US cars was attained.

c. Complete review of the rail construction programs for all US installations in the II and III CTZ, including more detailed cost-to-benefit studies and more specific facilities requirements, was completed by personnel of the Rail Branch and the 1st Logistical Command Engineer. The proposals have been forwarded to US Army Engineer Command, Vietnam (Provisional), for review and transmittal to the Officer in Charge of Construction, Vietnam, for design and submission to Congress or reprogramming of previously programmed MCA funds.

d. Twenty U.S. rail cars have been designated for transfer from Da Nang to Qui Nhon. Redistribution decision was the result of a lack of open rail in the Da Nang area and a chronic car shortage at Qui Nhon.

5. Troop Movements:

a. Eight troop ships arrived at 1st Logistical Command ports discharging 89 units with a total strength of 14,538 personnel. The following is a passenger break down by port: Da Nang - 5,011, Qui Nhon - 4,484, Cam Ranh Bay - 1,285, and Vung Tau - 3,758.

b. An additional 3,156 troops arrived by air as part of unit advance parties, main bodies, and rear detachments.
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<th>DATE OF INSPECTION</th>
<th>UNIT INSPECTED</th>
<th>RATING RECEIVED</th>
<th>INSPECTING HEADQUARTERS</th>
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<td>1st Logistical Command</td>
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<td>16-17 September 1967</td>
<td>41st Army Postal Unit</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
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<td>5-9 October 1967</td>
<td>575th Army Postal Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1967</td>
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<tr>
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**1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND REPORTING STATISTICS**
1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
PERSONNEL REPLACEMENTS AND ROTATIONS

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>OCTOBER</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REPLACEMENTS</td>
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<td>REPLACEMENTS</td>
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<td>115</td>
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<td>SAIGON</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>1183</td>
<td>689</td>
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<td>CAM RANH BAY</td>
<td>1690</td>
<td>1689</td>
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<td>QUI NHON</td>
<td>1691</td>
<td>1300</td>
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<td>*4TH TRANS CMD</td>
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<td>574</td>
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<td>TOTALS:</td>
<td>3662</td>
<td>4861</td>
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* 4th Trans Cmd included in Saigons' figures for the months of September and October.
### 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
#### QUARTERLY STRENGTH REPORT

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<th></th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
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<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
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<td>16556</td>
<td>14957</td>
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<td>14983</td>
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<td>51501</td>
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* Strength data for 4th Trans Command are included in USASC, Saigon figures for the months of Sep and Oct.
## 1st Logistical Command
### Promotion Allocation and Appointment by Area

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<td>E8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>E4</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL=</strong></td>
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| **USAUSCOM, SGN** | | | |
| E9      | 1    | 0   | 1     | 3     | 3   | 0     | 10    | 9   | 1     |
| E8      | 5    | 5   | 0     | 16    | 11  | 5     | 3     | 3   | 0     |
| E7      | 10   | 10  | 0     | 55    | 50  | 4     | 15    | 15  | 0     |
| E6      | 49   | 49  | 0     | 66    | 66  | 0     | 106   | 106 | 0     |
| E5      | 237  | 237 | 0     | 230   | 230 | 0     | 407   | 407 | 0     |
| E4      | 894  | 894 | 0     | unlimited | 1221 | 0     | 1500  | 1500 | 0     |
| **TOTAL=** | 1196 | 1199 | 1     | 369   | 1981 | 9     | 246   | 2045 | 1     |

| **USAUSCOM, CRB** | | | |
| E9      | 1    | 1   | 0     | 1     | 1   | 0     | 2     | 1   | 1     |
| E8      | 12   | 10  | 2     | 3     | 2   | 1     | 1     | 1   | 0     |
| E7      | 12   | 12  | 0     | 11    | 9   | 2     | 6     | 5   | 0     |
| E6      | 50   | 50  | 0     | 56    | 56  | 6     | 18    | 18  | 0     |
| E5      | 150  | 150 | 0     | 180   | 180 | 0     | 260   | 260 | 0     |
| E4      | 600  | 600 | 0     | unlimited | 1726 | 0     | 350   | 350 | 0     |
| **TOTAL=** | 805  | 805 | 2     | 251   | 1974 | 3     | 666   | 665 | 1     |

| **USAUSCOM, QNH** | | | |
| E9      | 3    | 3   | 0     | 0     | 0   | 0     | 2     | 2   | 0     |
| E8      | 9    | 9   | 0     | 5     | 5   | 0     | 0     | 0   | 0     |
| E7      | 11   | 11  | 0     | 8     | 8   | 0     | 8     | 8   | 0     |
| E6      | 25   | 25  | 0     | 19    | 19  | 0     | 137   | 137 | 0     |
| E5      | 180  | 180 | 0     | 880   | 200 | e     | 350   | 350 | 0     |
| E4      | 550  | 550 | 0     | unlimited | 850 | 0     | 1200  | 1200 | 0     |
| **TOTAL=** | 992  | 772 | 0     | 1072  | 1072 | 0     | 1697  | 1697 | 0     |

**4th Med Bde**

| E9      | 0    | 0   | 0     |
| E8      | 1    | 1   | 0     |
| E7      | 2    | 2   | 0     |
| E6      | 50   | 50  | 0     |
| E5      | 200  | 200 | 0     |
| E4      | 318  | 250 | 68    |
| **TOTAL=** | 571  | 509 | 68    |

**4th Trans Cmd**

<p>| E9      | 0    | 0   | 0     |
| E8      | 0    | 0   | 0     |
| E7      | 0    | 0   | 0     |
| E6      | 5    | 5   | 0     |
| E5      | 49   | 49  | 0     |
| E4      | 169  | 169 | 0     |
| <strong>TOTAL=</strong> | 229  | 229 | 0     |</p>
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<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>DEATHS NON-HOSTILE</th>
<th>INJURIES NON-HOSTILE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>1*</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Includes 1 individual who died as result of injury or illness after reaching medical facilities.
** Includes 1 individual who died as result of wounds caused by hostile action, after reaching medical facilities.

ABBREVIATIONS:
- KHA - Killed as result of hostile action.
- WHA - Wounded as result of hostile action.

Inclosure 6
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<tr>
<th>Medal</th>
<th>HC, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND</th>
<th>USASC, SAIGON</th>
<th>USASC, CAH RANH BAY</th>
<th>USASC, QUI NHON</th>
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<td>Silver Star</td>
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CIVIL AFFAIRS DISTRIBUTIONS

a. CONSTRUCTIONS

b. DISTRIBUTION OF COMMODITIES

(1) Cement 53,210 (pounds)
(2) Clothing 3,366 (pounds)
(3) Food 106,107 (pounds)
(4) Soap 1,405
(5) Lumber (Bd Ft) 188,490 (Bd Ft)
(6) Midwife Kits (Number) 20 ea
(7) Physical Education Kits Number 40 ea
(8) School Kits (Number) 1,349 ea
(9) Tin Sheets (Number) 703 ea
(10) Other (misc. Items)
    Bricks (Number) 26,000 ea
    Tile Press Machine (Number) 1 ea
    Paint (Gallons) 753 Gal
    Tar Paper (Rolls) 355
    Nails 500 (pounds)
    Scrap Metal 2,000 (pounds)
    Pipe 3,000 (pounds)
    Tile (Number) 2,600 ea
    Firewood 2,200 (pounds)

HEALTH/SANITATION

(1) Classes on Personal Hygiene (Attendance) 558
(2) Medical Aides Trained 9
(3) Insecticide-Spray Operation 8
(4) Swamp Areas Drained 1

d. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS IN SUPPORT OF (VN$)

(1) Hospitals 28,841
(2) Orphanages 244,746
(3) Religious 188,342
(4) Schools 41,525
(5) Other
    Refugee Camps 46,210
    Mid-Autumn Festival 9,460

TOTAL: 559,124

EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS

English Classes Held/Attendance 143--2,654

Inclosure
Logistical Critique 10-67 Operation FRANCIS MARION

1. (C) Operation FRANCIS MARION is a reconnaissance and surveil-
   lance operation being conducted in Pleiku Province. This 4th Infantry
   Division operation, began 6 April and continues at this time. This
   logistical critique will cover the period 6 April through 4 July 1967,
   the period during which support was provided by 1st Logistical Command
   Forward Support Areas to the 4th Infantry Division.

2. (U) Tactical contact was light throughout the period of this
   report.

3. (C) Support Operations.
   a. 1st Logistical Command performed its support mission through
      US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon (USASUPCOM, QNH) by the establishment of
      two Forward Support Areas.
   b. The concept of logistical support was supply point distribution
      from 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Areas (FSA) located at Le Thanh
      and Oasis to the 4th Infantry Division. The tactical unit's train elements
      collocated with the FSA's during the operation and supply point distribution
      was easily accomplished. The Pleiku Sub-Area Command provided the FSA's with
      required stocks by land LOC during the operation. Prestocking of the FSA's
      was not required because of stocks on hand at the termination of Operation
      SAM HOUSTON.

   (1) Le Thanh (YA 829251). Personnel and equipment were lo-
      cated at Le Thanh at the beginning of the operation and the FSA was operational
      on 6 April 1967. Class I, III, IIIA and V supplies, laundry and bath services
      and graves registration were provided by the FSA to units of the 4th Infantry
      Division. The FSA personnel, equipment and remaining stocks were withdrawn
      on 23 April 1967.

   (2) Oasis (ZA 125285). Personnel and equipment were located
      at Oasis at the beginning of the operation and the FSA was operational on
      6 April 1967. Class I, III, IIIA and V supplies, laundry and bath services and
      graves registration were provided by the FSA to units of the 4th Infantry
      Division. The FSA personnel were withdrawn on 4 July 1967. The remaining
      stocks were turned over to the 4th Division Forward Support Element (FSE).
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Logistical Critique 10-67 Operation FRANCIS MARION

(3) Logistical Services. Laundry, bath and graves registration service and maintenance support was provided at the FSA's.

(a) Laundry Processed:
   1. Le Thanh - 58,656 lbs
   2. Oasis - 340,799 lbs

(b) Baths:
   1. Le Thanh - 9,600
   2. Oasis - 32,009

(c) Graves Registration
   1. Le Thanh - 4 remains
   2. Oasis - 19 remains

(d) Maintenance - Backup contact teams were provided at the FSA's as required.

(4) The following sized forces comprised the 1st Logistical Commands FSA's.

(a) Le Thanh: 4 Officers - 70 EM

(b) Oasis: 3 Officers - 72 EM

4. (U) Lessons Learned: After three months of FSA support, the 4th Division assumed the direct support mission. At the request of the division, a minimum of equipment was left in place. Unit distribution is provided to the division-operated facility by the 1st Logistical Command. The division's capability to support itself is an indication that the FSA's were not essential to the tactical operation. Requests for FSA's in the future will be analyzed very carefully.

WALLACE D. FARRDUE
Colonel, GS
ACofS, SP&O

Annex A: Logistical Support Data (Oasis)
Annex B: Logistical Support Data (Oasis)
Annex C: Logistical Support Data (Le Thanh)
Subject: Logistical Critique 10-67 Operation FRANCIS MARION

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2 - CO, 43d Med Gp
1 - CO, 55th Medic Gp
2 - Dir of Ammo
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1 - Dir of Sup
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Annex A - Logistical supported data (OASIS)

**Operation FRANCIS MARION**  
**Parent Unit:** 4th Inf Div  
**Period Covered:** 25 Apr to 4 Jul 1967

**Task Organization:**  
1 Bde CP, 3 Inf Bns, 1 Cav Trp, 1 Engr Co, 2 - 105 How Btry's, 1 - 155 How Btry,  
2 - 175/8th Btry's

**Reference:**  
Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000 series L 7014, sheets 6537 I, II, III, IV, 6536 I, II, III, IV, 6535 I,  
IV, 6635 III, 6636 XII, IV.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMODITY</th>
<th>BEST DAY OF SUPPLY</th>
<th>STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>SUPPLY O/H BEGIN PD</th>
<th>SUPPLY O/H END OF PD</th>
<th>TOTAL RESUPPLY</th>
<th>TOTAL CONSUMPTION</th>
<th>AVERAGE DAILY RESUPPLY</th>
<th>AVERAGE DAILY CONSUMPTION</th>
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<tr>
<td>Class I (Rations)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>9,116</td>
<td>17,978</td>
<td>350,698</td>
<td>341,836</td>
<td>4,939</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPA (Gallons)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>533,000</td>
<td>514,500</td>
<td>7,507</td>
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<td>Avgas (Gallons)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>13,000</td>
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<td>183</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mogas (Gallons)</td>
<td>3,200</td>
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<td>9,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>199,500</td>
<td>203,500</td>
<td>2,810</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diesel (Gallons)</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>9,300</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>206,500</td>
<td>208,500</td>
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<td>2,937</td>
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<td>Class V (S/g)</td>
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<td>300</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>3,097</td>
<td>3,050</td>
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<td>Total Tonnage</td>
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<td>680</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>7,655</td>
<td>7,535</td>
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<td>106</td>
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### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command (U)

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations,** Aug - 31 Oct 1967

**CG, 1st Logistical Command**

**REPORT DATE**
11 November 1967

**TOTAL NO. OF PAGES**
152

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