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1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade (SEP) (LT) for quarterly period 1 Nov 1966 - 31 Jan 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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LESSONS LEARNED

1 NOV 1966 - 31 JAN 1967

(RCS CSFOR - 65)

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199th Infantry Brigade (Sop) (Light)
Operational Report-Lessons Learned
1 Nov 1966 - 31 Jan 1967

15 February 1967

I Significant Organisation and Unit Activities

1. Introduction:

The 199th Infantry Brigade (Sop) (Light), "REDCAP/ESUS", was activated at Fort Benning Georgia on 1 June 1966. Its mission, to activate, equip and train so as to achieve a RECON 1 by 15 October 1966.

For implementation of the training program, the Brigade was divided into three increments. (Inc 2) Basic Unit Training was conducted at Fort Benning, Georgia. Advanced Unit Training (Inc 3) was conducted at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. The A.U.T. phase concluded on 6 October 1966.

8 October 1966 marked the beginning of preparation for Overseas Movement. This period extended through 19 November, the date the first main body departed Ft. Benning for deployment to SVN. The second main body departed Ft. Benning, for further deployment, on 21 November. The Brigade, minus the Third Battalion, Seventh Infantry, closed Viet Nam on 12 December 1966. The Third Battalion, Seventh Infantry, closed Viet Nam on 24 December 1966.

After a brief period of "in-country" training, the Brigade began combat operations on 16 December 1966, when the Second Battalion, Third Infantry was committed in Operation UNIONTOWN (INTLOR). The Fourth Battalion, Twelfth Infantry followed on 17 December 1966 with Operation 173rd TAOR, the first air-mobile "in-country" operation for the Brigade. It is interesting to note, at this point, that the Brigade's heavy equipment did not start to arrive until 21 December 1966, and it all didn't close at Brigade until after 5 January 1967. Units were short heavy equipment but still able to carry out their missions. On 26 December 1966 the Third Battalion, Seventh Infantry relieved the Second Battalion, Third Infantry from the UNIONTOWN MISSION.

The early missions were characterized by search and destroy and ambush operations. On 12 January 1967 the Brigade initiated Operation FAIRFAX. Operation FAIRFAX, a Revolutionary Development and Pacification mission in Gia Dinh Province, covers three districts: Quan Than Dao, Quan Binh Danh, and Quan Binh Chanh. Joined side by side, these three districts ring the Southern approaches into Saigon. It is essential for the security of this capital city, that they remain under the control of the GVN. The Brigade's position not only serves to block this enemy avenue of approach into Saigon's back door, but it also gives the Brigade the opportunity to assist the Vietnamese people through the (RD) Program.

Working with counterpart ARVN combat forces and in coordination with the loc-1 district chiefs, the Battalions of the Brigade have conducted many operations in support of the Pacification effort. They have conducted frequent air-mobile assaults, both conventional and Eagle flights. Saturation patrols and stay behind patrols, as well as cordon and search operations have also been employed very effectively. A thorough study of the program, and its goals, allowed the Brigade to achieve early success as establishing and maintaining the proper rapport in its working relationships with local Vietnamese Government officials. Mutual cooperation has been a key factor in the success gained thus far, in operation FAIRFAX. Operation FAIRFAX was still in progress at the close of this reporting period. The after action report of this operation will be enclosed in the first ORIL after its conclusion.

The Brigade Civic Action Program up to 12 January 1967 was represented by MEDCAP assistance to a few villages. When the Brigade took on the RD mission, the CA program was enlarged to provide more material benefits to the inhabitants of Gia-Dinh Province, the Brigade's area of operation (AD).
**2. Organization:**

The 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Light) consists of three Infantry Battalions, an Artillery Battalion, a Troop of Cavalry, an Engineer Company and a Brigade Headquarters Company. In addition, there are seven detachments, attached to the Brigade Headquarters Company. These detachments represent the following branches, or agencies, of the service: Chemical, Military Intelligence, Signal, Army Security, Military Police, Public Information and Military History. The attached Signal Platoon had not arrived "in-country," at the close of this reporting period.

Each Infantry Battalion has only forty-six wheeled vehicles; no tracked vehicles. A battalion consists of three rifle companies and a combat support company. The rifle companies contain three rifle platoons and an 81mm mortar platoon. The combat support company a reconnaissance platoon, 106mm rifle platoon and an 81mm mortar platoon. M60E2 number 77-102T, OD USCWC 2/67, adds a fourth rifle company to each of the infantry battalions. This fourth company is not expected to join until March 1967, at the earliest.

The artillery battalion has as its main armament the (M101 1-1) 105mm (towed) howitzer. It is organized into three firing batteries, of six tubes each, and a headquarters and service battery.

The support Battalion has a headquarters detachment, an administration company, a maintenance company and a medical company. At full strength, the battalion has the capacity for Brigade level logistical support, to include storage of all classes of supply. It provides direct support maintenance, and can also furnish Brigade medical service, including evacuation, establishment and operations of clearing stations and medical supply. The battalion has a limited capacity to carry Brigade reserve supplies.

Able to sustain itself in combat, the 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Light), is as its motto states: Light-Swift-Conceited.

Brigade organization is shown at Inclosure 1.

**3. Intelligence:**

a. Throughout the reporting period, the Viet Cong avoided direct contact whenever possible. One of the notable encounters occurred on 17 January at 2250 in the vic of XS44966 in the District of Thu Duc, when a friendly force ambushed an estimated 8-10 man VC squad. Four of the VC were killed in this action. The second incident occurred on 29 January at 1846 in the vic of XS68806, NHA BE, an estimated force of 20 VC fired approximately 6 rounds of 60mm mortar into the position of the 52nd Co (ARVN) who were in support of the Second Battalion, Third Infantry. In the VC fled the area in four sampans, they were ambushed by elements of Co B 3/3. Results were four sampans sunk, 2 VC KIA (BG) and 3 VC KIA (Cao Ba). A peculiar incident occurred on 27 January at 2030 in the vic of XS55942 (Thu Duc). An element of Co B 4/12 Infantry reported hearing a loudspeaker broadcasting, inbroken English, "GI come out and fight, you are a yellow belly."

b. Using small arms, mortar fire command detonated mines and booby traps, the Viet Cong perpetrated 56 incidents. There weren't any large scale or serious incidents. This tends to indicate that although the VC are located in the area covered by Brigade operations, they are not willing to risk any involvement that is not to their immediate advantage.

c. VC Losses for the quarter include:

| VC Losses for the quarter include: |  
|---------------------------------|---|
| 72 KIA (body count)            |  
| 52 KIA (probable)              |  
| 55 VC                           |  
| 16 Small Arms                  |  
| 85 Grenades                     |  
| 1192 pounds of TPT              |  
| 5 Typewriters                   |  
| 3 Sewing Machines               |  
| 16 Outboard motors              |  

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4. Combat Operations:

a. General. The Brigade base is situated at a staging area in Long Binh, VN. All Brigade operations, except DUCK, have been launched from this base. It is anticipated that the Brigade will eventually move into a permanent base camp; but at the close of this reporting period a site has not been selected. The Brigade does not have a tactical area of responsibility (TAO). Operations conducted during this reporting period varied in size from squad ambushes thru battalion search and destroy missions, and finally to Brigade level Revolutionary Operations.

b. December. The last element of the Brigade closed Long Binh, VN on 24 December 1966. The first combat mission was initiated on 16 December with the Second Battalion, Third Infantry jumping off on Operation UNIFORM (INITIATOR) (Incl 14). This was a combination security and search and destroy operation involving the security of the Long Binh/Conjunction Complex. It was timely and worthwhile for the battalion in that it was not a "heavy contact" operation. Subsequently, the Third Infantry gained much experience "cheaply". 17 December found the Fourth Battalion, Twelfth Infantry conducting the Brigade's first "in-country" air mobile assault. Further defined as S & D operations in sector of 173rd Abn Div TACR (Incl 15), this was the first combat mission for this unit since its arrival in country on 11 December 1966. Primary a security mission, the AO provided unlimited opportunity for search and destroy operations. It allowed for the establishment of ambushes and the development of associated techniques. One tactical fire mission and one CS mission were requested during the operation.

Reported were 2 VC KIA (PROB) and one VC base camp destroyed.

(2) Operation - S & D operations in Sector of 173rd Abn Div TACR, a battalion operation, continued through 23 December 1966. Conducting an air mobile assault into their AO the Fourth Battalion, Twelfth Infantry established company bases and conducted search and destroy operations within designated Co AO's. Although established ambushes produced negative results, procedures were refined and techniques were perfected. Starlight Scopes were used for night observations with M-16 rifles; however, no enemy were seen. Five VC huts and numerous anti-helicopter devices were found and destroyed.
(3) Operation DUC, involving perimeter security of Beacrest AB and search and destroy operations in the Beacrest TA&R, found TP 4/12th Infantry conducting an airmobile movement in the Beacrest staging area from multiple PZ's in its sector of the 173rd Abn Bde TP QN. Three companies of the 4/12th Infantry were kept on C & D operations in Beacrest AO while one company remained at the battalion command post, as the Brigade ready reserve force (RRF). The perimeter was divided among the units of CON to TP 4/12th Inf. (Incl 16)

(4) Operation WIGGINS, 2/3rd Infantry, scheduled to begin on 27 Dec 66, was delayed one day because aircraft were withheld for higher priority operations. WIGGINS was a battalion operation with organic companies conducting search and destroy operations within assigned AO's. Though no tactical artillery missions were fired during the duration of WIGGINS, II & I fires were employed on a regular basis. The effectiveness of the TAC Air LZ preparation, was very limited because the ordnance was concentrated in only one corner of the LZ. The AO was not a base for any known VC units, rather, it was a known infiltration route from the North. These routes were the primary points for interdiction. Much evidence of frequent use of the trails and base camps was found.

(5) During December, organic artillery fired 68 rounds (1.25 tons) during a total of 7 missions in support of operations. Prior to 30 December 1966, artillery support was provided by C/3 19 - B/319, 173rd Abn Bde; A 7/9 and B 1/95. Two CAS strikes were flown in support of the Brigade during the month of December:

20 Dec 66 VN13054 (Caves & Bunkers)
ACFT - 4 F-4C
ORD - 16 MK117 (750 pound HE) bombs
20 MTR Strafe

26 Dec 66 VN2206 (LH - reoccupation)
ACFT - 3 F-100
ORD - 4 MK117 (750 pound HE) bombs
4 MK81 (250 pound HE) bombs
4 PODS 2.75" rockets

BD: not available (Smoke and Foliage)

o. January. During the month of January 1967 the 199th Infantry Brigade conducted counterinsurgency combat operations in the UNIONOWN, NGOC TRACH, THU DUC, BINH CHANH areas of operations and the BINH S.T S BELL ZO of the Republic of Vietnam. Participation in Operation F.ERFAX introduced the Brigade to Revolutionary Development activities in the THU DUC, BINH CHANH Districts of CIA BINH Province and found the Infantry Battalions of the Brigade working in cooperation and coordination with their counterparts WUVF battalions. These activities restricted Viet Cong operations, resupply activities and movement throughout all AO's.

(1) In the NGOC TRACH, Operation KELLEY HILL, (Incl 10), (Incl 19), commenced on 2 January with the airmobile insertion of the 2/5 Inf, 4/12 Inf, 5/2/40 Arty, C/2/40 Arty and selected Bde Headquarters Forward Command Post personnel into the AO. 3/17 Cav and the remaining Bde/Brig elements moved overland to the AO on the same day. On 5 January Bde Hq, 4/12 Inf and C/2/40 Arty were extracted by air from the AO and returned to the Brigade base at DOC BINH where the 4/12 Inf and C/2/40 Arty prepared for air movement to PHUOC VINH. On 8 January the 2/5 Inf, A/2/40 Arty and B/17 Cav were extracted from the NGOC TRACH AO bringing Operation KELLY HILL to a close. VC contact during the operation was sporadic with the largest force encountered being an estimated squad. The enemy relied on sniping attacks, mines and booby traps, and light probes of the perimeter at night to harass US elements. One VC KIA (BC) was accounted for in the operation against one US KIA.

(2) On 7 January the 4/12 Inf and C/2/40 Arty was airlifted from Bien Hoa air base by twenty C-130 aircraft to NGOC VINH to secure the base camp of the 1st Bde, 1st Infantry Division. Upon closing PHUOC VINH the unit came under the C.G.OM of the 1st Infantry Division. On 11 January the
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...
and logistical support in other words: OJT. Howev realzing the desirability to improve their proficiency in tactical operations, portions of the support battalion and the brigade headquarters communications personnel received squad and platoon tactical training which was presented by the rifle battalions. In the Brigade Headquarters Company, the M platoon and the rifle platoons participated with the rifle battalions through the end of the platoon training period and then picked up their speciality training programs. The brigade communications platoon, under the direction of the brigade signal officer received its initial training from the Infantry School as there was insufficient communications equipment available to the Brigade at that time with which to conduct training. The Engineer company, Artillery Battalion and the Cavalry troop conducted standard unit training modified to prepare them for operations in a counter-insurgency environment.

In order to off setively support both Basic Unit Training and Advance Unit Training an aggressor force was developed during a two week guerrilla training program, and presented by representatives from the JFK Special Warfare Center. The Cav Troop, BBC rifle platoon and the Reconnaissance Platoons from the three rifle battalions participated. Once trained, these units were employed as aggressors against other units in the Brigade during company and battalion training. At the request of the Commanding General, USAG, the 2/506th ABN Inf Battalion aggressed against the brigade during the brigade FTX October 1966.

For implementation of the training program the brigade was divided into three increments. (Note unit listings and dates at Incl 2) The first increment, consisted of the 2/3 and 2 Troop 17 Cav and began training on 27 June 1966. The second increment 4/12, 2/40, S t Bn, Engr Company, and 8EC began training on 5 July 1966. The third increment, 5/7 began training on 11 July 1966.

The training areas used by the Brigade for Basic Unit Training are depicted at Incl 3. Note the Brigade C Location on Kelley Hall. The general concept was to achieve uniformity of training by having each increment conduct training in the same area, with a division of responsibility between units for problem preparation. The 1st week of training was conducted in area "B" and "P", and 2d week in "G" and the 3d week in "O". Then the "round-robin" was repeated engulfing additional areas as the level of training-required. Some adjustments of this procedure were necessary due to scheduling problems, but the concept remained sufficiently intact to facilitate planning and problem preparation.

The first week of Advance Unit Training consisted of a Battalion FTX, conducted in area "O". Designed primarily as a vehicle to shake down the battalion, it exercised battalion tactical S0'N'S and presented an opportunity for refining command and control procedures. Battalion commanders were chief controllers for their own exercises and no evaluation reports were submitted to Brigade. ASL, working in coordination with the commanders, offered a means to the commander for checking his signal security, and otherwise to improve his communication procedures. After completing FTX 1 units moved to Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

The "Advance" Party moved to Camp Shelby Mississippi on 22 August 1966 while the three training increments departed for Shelby on 25 Aug, 31 Aug - 1 Sep, and 15 Sep. Troops traveled by commercial bus while TOE equipment was carried on organic transportation in convoy. Although it was only an eight hour trip by bus, the truck convoys had to remain overnight at the Naval Air Station outside Meridian, Mississippi. After the Advance Unit Training was completed the Brigade returned to Port Henry, (7-13 Oct.)

Camp Shelby provided a wealth of training areas. Note the cordonment area at Incl 5.

The first battalion FTX (FTX 2) at Shelby required the establishment of a battalion base with all around security, conduct of saturation patrolling, a meeting engagement and the concentration of forces and firepower to defeat the enemy. The FTX culminated in a live fire phase.
The second iteration FTX (FTX 3) at Shelby consisted of a route security mission, a search and destroy mission, and the employment of a quick reaction force. Brigade Headquarters participated as the coordinating headquarters in conjunction with both of these FTXs.

Battalion FTXs were conducted by a USAIC Evaluation Group working from the Office of the Director of O & T, USAIC. Each consisted of a series of operations in a counter-insurgency/counter-guerrilla environment. The Brigade FTX was also conducted by the USAIC Group and it encompassed a major portion of the reservation.

The Brigade received a significant assist from the Infantry School, instruction wise. Each Thursday, for eight weeks, one of the instructional departments presented a two hour evening class to all officers and on Tuesday night to NCOs filling 5-7 and above positions. In addition hundreds of officers and NCOs attended resident instruction for the first several months. In other instances school departments presented training to specific groups on such subjects as demolitions, 106 RL, 81 mortar, Communications and Pathfinder techniques. On 30 July a training program was developed, in coordination with the Airborne Department, to qualify two men per combat Company/Battery in Pathfinder Techniques. The primary purpose of this one week course being to develop the capability of assisting one, or a few, helicopter(s) in landing for resupply or evacuation missions. Fifty "Red-cathers" were trained under this program.

Additional training support was to provide to one degree or another. For example - the 10th Aviation Group presented a two hour Air Mobile orientation to all company sized units. Subsequently, they provided troop lifts within their capability and consistent with their primary mission of Transition Training in preparation of Aviation units for deployment. Commencing 1st September, and carrying through the Brigade FTX, they supported the Brigade with 2-147 Company and a Chinook Company, at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. During this period, there were 1350 HH-47 sorties and over 200 CH-47 sorties involving troop and resupply missions. Support was also provided from off-post agencies. A four hour block on Air Ground Operations was presented to select Brigade personnel, on 29 July 66, by the JAG from Keesler AFB. Live air strikes of ordnance were provided during company training and during battalion FTXs/ATTs at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

Shortages of personnel, minimized the value of training conducted by the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, as it was filled at only 46 percent authorized enlisted strength on 6 Aug 66. Although it got a late start, the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, reaped the accelerated training program outlined in COKHC cir 350-33, rapidly reaching a RBDCOF I. This program consisted of six weeks of training, one week for evaluation and one week for participation in a major FTX. This closes the book on stateside training. With elements deploying by sea and air, the Brigade was completely closed in Vietnam on 24 December 1966.

Since arrival in the country the 2/3 Infantry, 4/12 Infantry and D/17 Cavalry have conducted training in the use of inflatable and assault boats and river crossing operations. The 5/7 Infantry confirmed the zero of all 1-16s at the THU EDC ranges. Co C, 7th Support Bn (Medical Company) continued formal training along with mission performance.

The Redstonech Combat Training Center was established for newly assigned replacements to present an intensified refresher course in weapons, demolitions, mines and booby traps, tactics to include patrols, and ambushes, map reading, airborne operations, intelligence and lessons learned to newly assigned personnel. Fifty four hours of classroom and practical work are presented to the students prior to graduation. One hundred and seventy six (176) replacements have gone through the center during the month of January.

Selected individuals from the 3/7 Infantry participated in three days of training with 1st Infantry Division on one of its operations.

D/17 Cavalry held training on the use of the starlight night vision devices. Selected members of the Bde attended an orientation on the use and maintenance of the X-148 weapons system. 2/40 Artillery continued concurrent gunnery and FDC procedures to insure accurate and timely response to fire missions. The Chemical Section and 5/3d Chemical 1st presented classes on the
Mighty Kite to maneuver battalions. Brigade had one graduate from the NACV Records School.

6. Psychological Operations and Civic Action:

a. Psychological Operations:

(1) The first operation in which psychological operations were employed by the 199th Infantry Brigade was Operation code nanodi "CBUET HHJ". During the 4 day period that the Brigade was involved in this area 225,000 199th Infantry "Good Guy" leaflets and 100,000 199th Infantry Intelligence "96G" leaflets were air disseminated. Due to the quick curtailment of the operation the results of these activities were never fully determined and are assumed to be negligible.

(2) Since the Brigade has been committed to Operation "PAANFX", the 199th Infantry Brigade and supporting units have disseminated over one million leaflets. Emphasis being placed on the "Chieu Hoi" program, Intelligence and Support of the Government of Vietnam themes.

(3) Result so far is one "Chieu Hoi" rallier from the TIN DOU District. However, it is felt that this is only the beginning of much greater results.

(4) Currently there is no electronic or printing equipment organic to the brigade for PsyOp purposes. Efforts are being made to procure this equipment. The Brigade receives general support in the air dissemination of leaflets and broadcasts from the 296th PsyOp company in Minh Hoa. They also reproduce any special leaflets requested by the Brigade.

(5) Future operations will emphasize the three themes previously mentioned with the target audience primarily Viet Cong military personnel or their dependents. Short range support of tactical operations will be administered by the Brigade's PsyOp section while long range operations will be left to ARVN and NACV Advisory personnel.

b. Civic Action:

(1) On 15 December 1966 a Civil Affairs Platoon (2 Off, 2 EM) from 2d Civil Affairs Company was attached to Brigade to advise, assist, and support S-5 in Civil Affairs Activities.

(2) During the period 15-20 December 1966 contact was made with S-5, 173rd Airborne Brigade, and guidance furnished on S-5 activities concerning various agencies to be contracted which support civic action in country.

During this period, contact was made and accounts established with Catholic Relief Service, CABB, and MACV Civic Action Fund. Contact was also made with USAID and USPAC.

(3) During this reporting period a total of 2,857 patients were treated under the HEDCAP II Program.

(b) Civic Action efforts during this period have included the following:

(a) Establishment of Civic Action Coordinating Committees within each of the three Districts: Quan nan Do, Quan Nha Bo, and Quan Sinh Chunh.

(b) Construction of 125 meters of roadway; repair 3,610 meters of road.

(c) Repair of two bridges.

(d) Erection of fifty motors of fence and repair of an additional thirty-five motors of fence.

(e) Repair of two school buildings.

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(f) Construction twenty foot bridges.
(g) Distribution of 850 pounds of food stocks.
(h) Completion of three minor drainage projects.
(i) Completion of 50% of a trash clearance project in one city of 17,000.

7. Aviation:

The Aviation Section 199th Inf Bde has (8) organic, OH-23G aircraft. The section arrived at the port of Vung Tau, aboard the USNS CORE (AO), on 29 Dec 66. The first three aircraft joined the Brigade on the night of 30 Dec 1966. The remainder of the aircraft (minus one down for maintenance) were ferried into the Brigade area on 31 Dec. The section became operational on 2 Jan 1967.

During this reporting period the section flew 1974 sorties, accounting 450 hours, over 795 missions. 1248 passengers were transported.

8. Logistics:

a. General During the period 14 Dec 66 through 31 Jan 67, the 199th Infantry Brigade conducted tactical operations in assigned AOs. Logistical support was provided to Battalion and Company size units from Base Camp and Saigon Support Command (506th Field Depot and Saigon Station Break Down). All tactical operations were adequately supported logistically despite difficulties in obtaining required movement transportation. With the exception of vehicle transportation, no major logistical problems were encountered.

b. Supply and combat service activities (Incl 9).

c. There has been no permanent construction to date.

9. Personnel Administration:

a. Personnel:

(1) Strength:

(a) There was an overall improvement in the Brigade strength during this period. Assigned strength as of 31 January was 101% of the authorized strength. This is an increase of 4% during the month of January. The present for duty strength was 99% of authorized strength. As of 31 January, the Brigade had sustained 5810, 37/37, 1 non-battle dead, 2 non-battle injured and 1 non-battle missing, for a total of 5810 casualties. Losses due to rotation, ETO and other administrative causes were insignificant due to the relatively short time the Brigade has been in Vietnam. Brigade gains during the quarter totaled 263. A serious replacement short fall was developing in the Infantry MOS field. The following critical positions are vacant and have no programmed replacements:

1 Brigade SI - Major - 2110
2 Aircraft Maintenance Officer - Lt - 66423
1 Electronics Repair Foch - AO - 286 AO

(b) Brigade strength as of 31 January 1967 is:

OFF 100 20 3774 3594
ASDM 289 16 3712 3977
TDY 246 17 3604 3927

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(c) Casualties: (by month)

1. November: None

2. December:

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4. Statistical analysis of battle casualties attached at Enclosure II.

(2) Civilian Personnel:

(a) An initial 170 permanent hire positions were approved by the Manpower Control Div, USAFR, on 31 Dec 66. However, a reapportionment of all available spaces not in progress stopped permanent hire effective 7 Jan 67. The Brigade employs no permanent hire personnel at present.

(b) On 1 Dec 66 the Brigade temporary hire program was authorized VHS $120,000 for the period 1 Dec 1966 to 31 Dec 1966. The Brigade hired a daily average of 100 local nationals during that period. On 1 Jan 1967 the Brigade was authorized VHS $102,000. For the period 1 Jan 1966 to 31 Jan 1967 the Brigade hired a daily average of 13 local personnel.

b. Discipline, Law and Order:

(1) The discipline in this quarter has been generally good. There has been 117 instances of punishment under Article 15, UCMJ. As in the past, this quarter encompasses the period of FON leaves and the time aboard ship, the amount of punishment under Article 15 is expected to decrease significantly as the Brigade situation stabilizes. No stragglers were apprehended and only two serious incidents were recorded for the quarter.

(2) Courts-Martial rate during this reporting period has remained moderate. There has been a total of two (2) Summary Courts-Martial, sixteen (16) Special Courts-Martial, and one (1) case referred to Superior Headquarters, USAFR, for disposition by General Courts-Martial.

(3) There was no appointed Brigade IG during this period. All requests for IG assistance were referred to the III Field Force V. Thus, 31 January 1967, Brigade personnel had registered no complaints and made three requests for assistance.

c. Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(1) The status of morale within the Brigade is excellent. The men realize the task at hand and take pride in the Brigade's ever-increasing list of accomplishments.

(2) Finance: Participation in the Soldiers' Deposit Program has remained at a relatively low level, largely due to the fact that most members of the Brigade are sending the bulk of their pay to CONUS. Funds remaining in country have dropped to 7% of the latest payroll. The
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Overall savings program participation in the Brigade is at 83.6%.

(3) Chaplains: During the period 1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67 the Chaplains conducted 238 religious services with a combined attendance of 7198 personnel. On 14 Jan 67 the 199th Infantry Brigade was visited by Chaplain (Col) Walton G. Sugg, Jr. Headquarters U.S. Army Vietnam.

(4) Special Services: The allocations for "in-country" R&R were set at (3) every (3) days beginning 5 Jan 67. On 25 Jan 67 these allocations were increased to (2) every day. As of 31 Jan 67, (51) individuals have taken advantage of "in-country" R&R and (2) have been sent on R&R outside of Vietnam.

(5) Red Cross: Case load figures are not available for the period that the Brigade was at Fort Benning, as it was serviced by the Field Director, Fort Benning, Ga. From 28 Nov 66 through 31 Jan 67, 147 cases were serviced with $847.00 being given as loans or grants.

Though the final brigade element didn't close Vietnam until 2/ Dec 66, the Red Cross gave a Christmas "ditty bag" to every man on Christmas Day. These "gifts from home" were greatly appreciated.

(6) Awards and Decorations: 1653 Officers and men, were awarded the Combat Infantry Badge; 79, the Combat Medical Badge. Also presented, one (1) Bronze Star (merit); three (3) Air Medals and forty-two (42) unit awards.

(7) Burials And Graves Registration: There is no organic capability within the Brigade. The graves registration platoon of the 493d Field Services Company, which is attached to the 266th Supply and Services Battalion, Long Binh provides this service. During this period the GR Platoon received, processed and evacuated five (5) remains of Brigade personnel.

10. Chemical Operations: There was no significant employment of chemical agents or devices during this reporting period.
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II Commanders Observations and Recommendations

1. Observations (Lessons Learned):

PERSONNEL

Personnel Section 4G

Item: Organization of personnel section to support overseas deployment.

Discussion: The Brigade deployed to VH in five groups. An advance planning Group, advance Party/Hear Detachment and three (3) Main bodies. There was a requirement to provide administrative support to all groups, except the Planning Group. The Personnel Section contained two officers and thirty-eight enlisted men. In order to provide continuous, and immediate support to the individual, it was necessary to have his records jacket accompany him. To service the records, the section was broken down into groups. The advance Party element consisted of the 4G and six enlisted men. Each Main Body Group was provided a team.

Observation: This breakout of the Personnel Section provided 4G support of an immediate nature whenever and wherever required.

INTELLIGENCE

VC Hidden Weapons

Item: Search for missing VC weapons.

Discussion: A recent experience involving the trailing of two wounded VC disclosed a novel technique employed by the VC to preclude capture or discovery of their weapons. In the process of following a blood trail which led to a stream, friendly units discovered 2 VC weapons had been cast into the stream in an attempt to preclude their capture. Apparently, the wounded VC found the weapons to be cumbersome to their escape or evacuation and threw them into the stream. The alertness and experience of an ARVN Ranger unit working with US forces led to the discovery of the weapons discarded into the stream.

Observation: Whenever an encounter with the VC occurs in the vicinity of a fordable river or stream, and VC casualties have been inflicted, search the water for discarded weapons.

VC Identification

Item: Identification of VC Suspects.

Discussion: Examination of the personal effects of VC KIA disclosed a common oddity. The presence of 1 piaster notes appeared to bear significance. It was also noted that the 1 piaster note is uncommon on the Vietnamese economy. Upon querying local GVN officials, it was learned that the VC use the 1 piaster note as a symbol of identification amongst themselves.

Observation: Therefore, interrogate thoroughly, any suspect found to possess a GVN 1 piaster note. It may be the only critical clue to his/her true VC identity.

OPERATIONS

Interdiction of LOCs

Item: VC lines of communication.

Discussion: As a general rule, the VC will utilize the most convenient means of travel between two points. In an area of operations interwoven with rivers and streams, the predominant mode of VC travel is conducted via the waterways by sampans. Along rivers and streams affected by the changes in ocean tides, the bulk of VC waterway traffic occurs at the evening high tide generally between dusk and midnight. This permits the VC to utilize small streams that are un navigable at low tides. Further-
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Loco, travel on ming high tide is much as non-motorized sampans. On the larger streams and rivers, the use of motorized sampans has given the VC the flexibility of movement during either high or low tide. Therefore, reinforced squad and platoon sized ambushes have been extensively used, during hours of darkness, along known or suspected VC lines of communications. In a one month period the Brigade with counter-part ARVN Bns established a total of 947 ambushes of which 70 made contact.

Observations: When it is difficult to fix enemy forces because they operate over widely dispersed areas in small groups, extensive use of nighttime ambushes greatly hamper the enemy's operations and resupply, and are successful in inflicting casualties on his forces with relatively small losses among our personnel.

Ambushes

Item: River and Canal Ambushes.

Discussion: Many expedient devices may be constructed to increase the effectiveness of ambushes along rivers and canals. A claymore mine, placed in a tree and directed downward on a slant, increases the lethality of an ambush directed against personnel in sampans. The claymore may also be placed on a floatation device, camouflaged as a piece of river residue and held in the mainstream by wires. A thorough knowledge of the effects of tides is also necessary to ensure that the ambush position is located where rising water will not force the position to move and disclose its location. Recovery of enemy weapons and equipment is very difficult in deep water and some thought should be given to the use of nets or magnets to assist in recovery.

Observation: Ambushes established along river or canal banks require knowledge of tides and provides the small unit loader with many opportunities to increase the lethality of weapons employed in the kill zone. Detail planning pays off.

Riverine Operations

Item: Procedures for Operations in Delta Areas

Discussion: It is absolutely essential that units being introduced to a riverine environment receive extensive practical training on river crossing operations to include expedient methods of crossing men and equipment. Further, non-swimmers must be identified and paired with a strong swimmer through all phases of water operations. Operations must be planned to allow personnel a "drying out" period after being in water for extended periods of time. Close coordination with medical personnel is required and each man should be inspected after operations to prevent needless loss because of immersion foot and infection. Silicone grease spread on the feet and legs helps prevent tissue breakdown.

Observation: Intensive boat and expedient river crossing training is required prior to committing a unit into a riverine environment. Once committed, close personal inspection is required to prevent casualties occurring from immersion foot and other related injuries. Plans must include a "drying out" period for each committed unit. As a general rule, personnel should not remain in water for over 48 hours.

Army Air

Item: Flying the OH-23G faster to preclude effective enemy ground fire.

Discussion: No hits were registered on 199th organic OH-23G aircraft during the reporting period. It is believed that the reason may partially be in the fact that these aircraft are flown at a cruising speed of 75K instead of the normal 60K. This additional speed makes it difficult for the enemy to get a proper lead on the aircraft.

Observation: By tracking the rotor blades of OH-23G aircraft at 75K instead of 60K, as recommended by the aircraft handbook, the aircraft not only flies smoother at high speed, but enables flight up to the maximum
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DiscusSion: Squad sized ambush patrols at night normally have little in the way of directing aircraft into a PZ. Should it become necessary to guide in a medevac or resupply helicopter several simple devices may be used. The first items is a hand held flare to guide the aircraft to the general area. A minimum of three flashlights should be carried with each patrol to properly mark the PZ. Also, although it does not fit in with current tactical doctrine, cigarettes or cigarette lighters may be used in the absence of flashlights and fires may be built. The pilot will coordinate recognition signals with the unit on the ground to insure that he is landing in the proper PZ. Patrol members must be prepared to give the pilot proper directional headings for the safest and most secure decent. Scout the area for obstructions that may endanger the aircraft and keep the pilot away from these locations. Talk to the pilot on the radio. Try to land the helicopter in the long axis of the PZ and over the lowest barriers. Wind above 10K should also be taken into consideration. Try to avoid bringing the aircraft in over areas where previous enemy contact has been made.

Observation: Patrol members must be prepared to use all means available to safely guide medivac helicopter’s into their location.

LOGISTICS

Maintenance

Item: Special tools, tool sets authorized by Technical Manuals.

Discussion: Many special tools and tool sets are authorized a unit based on the Technical Manual pertaining to the particular equipment to be supported. Since the unit was activated and not all end items were on hand prior to deployment, several special tools and tool sets could not be ordered until arrival in-country and have not yet been received.

Observation: The lack of authorized special tools and tool sets has caused delay in the repair time of many items or required the evacuation to back-up units or equipment which could be repaired and returned at direct support level. This was particularly noticeable in the electronics, armament and aircraft sections. Tools and tool sets on POM requisition were not received and were reordered since a rival in-country. Efforts to fabricate and substitute have been only partially successful. Special emphasis should be placed on obtaining all authorized special tools and tool sets prior to deployment.

Maintenance

Item: Common hardware, shop stock items required during maintenance in shop.

Discussion: The nature of maintenance activities requires that common hardware such as nuts, bolts, screws and other frequently used items such as gasket material, safety wire, insulating tape, etc. be available in the shop when needed. These requirements are difficult to forecast but can cause delay in the repair of equipment.

Observation: With the exception of the items which were brought by this unit, the items required in shop maintenance such as those given above are hard to obtain. A kit could be improvised or developed by commodity group, which would have these necessary items contained in it and issued to a unit prior to departure from CONUS or shipped to them in-country.

Maintenance

Item: Effects of climate on optics.

Discussion: The high heat and humidity cause optical instruments to deteriorate and become unserviceable. The repair of these items is made difficult by the lack of adequate tools and a relatively dust free work area.
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Observation: Items of critical nature such as artillery or mortar sight units have become unserviceable after only a short period due to climate. Each company or battery should have at least one replacement sight on hand.

Maintenance

Item: Establishment of repair parts supply accounts.

Discussion: During the period from activation to deployment, only one account was authorized to requisition supplies. This resulted in confusion and delays in processing requests.

Observation: Whenever a unit has a multiple supply mission such as repair parts and Class II & IV supply it is essential that separate supply accounts be established as early as possible.

Maintenance

Item: Repair parts in short supply.

Discussion: Several items are in short supply and are difficult to obtain. Long LDP has been experienced, however, these items are not constant but the list will vary from time to time.

Observation: The most difficult to obtain parts experienced during the period were:

- 2530-737-3716 Shaft, axle, 3/4 ton left
- 2550-737-3717 Shaft, axle, 3/4 ton right
- 2520-267-9987 Shaft, ⅔ ton H3542
- 2930-632-4048 Water pump, 3/4 ton (no repair kit)
- 6140-405-2553 Battery
- 6140-405-2554 Battery
- 6810-249-9354 Battery acid

This is only a partial listing but points out the necessity for units to deploy with a minimum zero balance and a 75 day ASL. While some shortages were anticipated, the shortage of such common items was not expected. New units should put special emphasis on obtaining direct exchange type items prior to deployment.

2. Recommendations: (NONE)

CHARLES W. NYDER JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
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AVFDC-II (15 Feb 67) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967, 199th Infantry Brigade (1a)(Sep)

To: HQ II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 20 MAR 67

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army,
Washington, D.C. 21310

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by the 199th
Infantry Brigade (Sep)(1a) for the quarter ending 31 January 1967 is
forwarded herewith.

2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs
with the comments, recommendations and actions taken as stated in
the basic report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

[Name]

CPT, ADC

Act AG

Regarded UNCLASSIFIED

When Separated From

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Inclosure 3

48964 Army-Ft. Benning, Ga. 17 Nov 66
Inclosure 6, Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 199th Inf Bde (Sep) (LA) 
31 Jan 67.

ROSTER OF Key Personnel

COMMANDING GENERAL ........................................ EGT CHARLES W. RIDER JR.
DEPUTY-COMMANDING OFFICER .................................. COL GEORGE D. REMKOFF
COMMANDING OFFICER, 2ND BN, 3RD INFANTRY ........ LTC LOUIE W. GOM
COMMANDING OFFICER, 3RD BN, 7TH INFANTRY ........ LTC WILLIAM F. HARTMAN
COMMANDING OFFICER, 4TH BN, 12TH INFANTRY .......... LTC JAMES G. BOATNER
COMMANDING OFFICER, 2ND BN, 40TH ARTILLERY .... LTC HARRY W. BROOKS
COMMANDING OFFICER, 7TH SUPPORT BN .................... LTC ROY O. STEVENS
COMMANDING OFFICER, TROOP D, 17TH CAV .......... CPT MICHAEL C. SMALL
COMMANDING OFFICER, 87TH ENGR COMPANY ............ CPT JACK R. TATE
COMMANDING OFFICER, HHC, 199TH INF BDE ........ CPT ALFRED SMITH
COMMANDING OFFICER, HHC, 2ND BN, 3RD INFANTRY ... CPT ROBERT WAGNER
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO A, 2ND BN, 3RD INFANTRY ... CPT LEWIS JOHNSON
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO B, 2ND BN, 3RD INFANTRY ... CPT TEDDY W. TURNER
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO C, 2ND BN, 3RD INFANTRY ... CPT JOE E. WILLIAMS
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO E, 2ND BN, 3RD INFANTRY ... CPT HOMER F. BACHMAN
COMMANDING OFFICER, HHC, 3RD BN, 7TH INFANTRY ... CPT WILLIAM E. McCLELLAND
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO A, 3RD BN, 7TH INFANTRY ... CPT JOHNNY T. BURGWELL, JR.
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO B, 3RD BN, 7TH INFANTRY ... CPT ROGER A. DIER
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO C, 3RD BN, 7TH INFANTRY ... CPT PHILIP H. WOOD
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO E, 3RD BN, 7TH INFANTRY ... CPT MARSHALL R. GRAY JR.
COMMANDING OFFICER, HHC, 4TH BN, 12TH INFANTRY ... CPT LLOYD V. OLIVER
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO A, 4TH BN, 12TH INFANTRY ... CPT JOHN H. MACK
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO B, 4TH BN, 12TH INFANTRY ... CPT GEORGE J. JURKOVICH
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO C, 4TH BN, 12TH INFANTRY ... CPT THOMAS H. SELLERS
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO E, 4TH BN, 12TH INFANTRY ... CPT RAYMOND N. SAKAI
COMMANDING OFFICER, HQ & HQ DET, 7TH SUP BN ... MAJOR JACK A. LEE
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO A, 7TH SUPPORT BN ... CPT DAVID L. SCHMITZLER
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO B, 7TH SUPPORT BN ... CPT RICHARD L. BARR
COMMANDING OFFICER, CO C, 7TH SUPPORT BN ... MAJ ROLAND J. SYLVESTER
COMMANDING OFFICER, HHC, 2ND BN, 40TH ARTY ... CPT CLAUDE R. DENTON
COMMANDING OFFICER, HTR A, 2ND BN, 40TH ARTY ... CPT JAMES ALLING
COMMANDING OFFICER, HTR B, 2ND BN, 40TH ARTY ... CPT ANIL E. WILLIS
COMMANDING OFFICER, HTR C, 2ND BN, 40TH ARTY ... CPT ALLEN A. NIX
Inclosure 8, Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 199th Inf Bde (Sep) (Lt)
31 January 1967.

BRIGADE UNIT SWITCHBOARD DESIGNATORS

199TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP) (LT) ................ REDCATCHER
2D BN, 3D INFANTRY ................................. RASCAL
3D BN, 7TH INFANTRY ................................. RANSOM
4TH BN, 12TH INFANTRY ............................. REBEL
2D BN, 40TH ARTILLERY .............................. RED DOG
7TH SUPPORT BATTALION ............................. RECKLESS
D TROOP, 17TH CAV ................................. RECALL
37TH ENGINEER BATTALION ......................... REBATE
298TH SIGNAL PLATOON (NOT JOINED AS OF 31 JANUARY 1967) ........................ RAVEN

REDCATCHER TRUNKS

IX FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM ........................ HURRICANE
LONG BINH POST .................................. LONG BINH
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Inclusion 9, Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 199th Inf Bde (Sep) (It)

1. Supply: The average strength supported during the period varied slightly under 5,000 troops. The supply levels for the Brigade on 31 January 1967 were as follows:

   a. Class I

      | Type Ration                        | Days of Supply |
      |------------------------------------|----------------|
      |                                    | Objective      |
      | (1) MEF                            | 5              |
      | (a) Forward battalions and          | 5              |
      |   separate companies               |                |
      | (b) Base Camp                      | 3              |
      | (c) Brigade reserve                | 3              |
      | (2) B Rations (Main)               |                |
      | (3) 4 Rations (only a 2, 2, 1 cycle) |

   b. Class III

      | Type Fuel/Commodity                        | Days of Supply |
      |                                            | Objective      |
      |                                            | 0/1            |
      | (1) JP-4                                   | 5              |
      | (2) Avgas                                   | 5              |
      | (3) JP-9                                   | 5              |
      | (4) JP-9 (only)                             | 5              |
      | (5) JP-4 (only)                             | 5              |

   c. Package Items and Oils

      | (1) At base camp                          | 30             |

   d. Receiving Products:

      The 6th Quartermaster Battalion delivers Avgas and Diesel to this unit in 5,000 gallon tank trucks. JP-4 is picked up at Bien Hoa Air Base in a tank and pump unit. Most packaged products are picked up at the 6th at the time of requisitions. Several requisitions have taken 45 days for completion.

   e. Storage:

      The original warehouse was not sufficient. In base camp two (2) 10,000 gallon tanks provide a fire (5) day storage capability for Diesel and Avgas. The other five tanks are being reserved for JP-4. Presently JP-4 is being stored in a tank and pump unit placed on the ground. In the field 500 gallon collapsible drums are used for ground storage.

   f. Issue:

      In the base camp Avgas and Diesel are gravity flowed into vehicles from elevated 600 gallon tanks. JP-4 and Avgas are pumped into aircraft from pump units. In the field either Avgas or Diesel is gravity dispersed into a vehicle from a 2½ ton truck. The other is pumped. JP-4 is dispersed from a tank and pump unit on the ground.
Operational Report on Lessons Learned (Cont')
31 January 1967
Equipment / Deployment in Field

The infantry battalions have no "in house" petroleum capability. The following equipment is sent forward with them: two (24 ton trailers), one tank and pump unit for JP-4, four (500 gallon collapsable drums) for Diesel and Mogas, a pump unit for Diesel, a 50 GPM pump for either Mogas or Diesel.

Equipment:

Six additional tank and pump units were needed to support the Brigade. The combining of 10,000 gallon tanks, tank and pump units and 500 gallon collapsible drums requires numerous couplings and reducers. The section has had problems finding some and many more are still needed. An additional mission of water resupply has required seven 600 gallon aluminum tanks and three 50 GPM pumps.

(6) Problem Areas:

If all three battalions are deployed separately, the section will not have sufficient equipment to support them. Nine (9) trucks and thirteen (13) pumps would be needed; the section has four (4) trucks and twelve (12) pumps.

c. Class V

(1) Storage:

Ammunition is stored in its original containers on pallets. In base camp, 10 days of supply is the sought objective. However, there is not sufficient space to meet minimum safety requirements, even in a tactical situation. Additional space is also required for parking of vehicles and establishment of a storage area for defective ammunition, expended ammunition and packing materials.

(2) Issue:

Using units pick up their ammunition from the Class V ASP and transport it themselves to their locations. Forward supply points have been established on two occasions; however, very little ammunition has been issued from these temporary forward locations.

(3) Problem Areas:

The Class V section completely lacks any ammunition handling capability. Because all equipment must be borrowed, its availability is extremely unreliable, and little planning can be done. Personnel consist of 2 stock records clerks and a radio operator/light truck driver. These personnel must be used to actually handle ammunition, which results in inaccurate records and consequent unavailability of ammunition, delays in issue and difficulty in keeping check on suspended lots. An augmentation detail of 4 men has been authorized temporarily to help in this regard.

d. Class II and IV

(1) Receiving Procedures:

Supplies are received either from 266th SPS Battalion in Long Binh, or by unit pick up (by exception only) at the 506th Field Depot in Saigon. Several problem areas are inherent in such a pick up procedure. It is felt that all requisitions should be submitted directly to the 506th Field Depot and that all supplies should be picked up at that installation, thus eliminating the middle men.

(2) Storage Procedures:

Standard storage practices are used. However, the volume of
Opportional Report on Lessons Learned (Cont'd)  
31 January 1967.

Maps requisitioned necessitates the creation of a storage facility and fabrication of storage bins. Clothing and boot storage also require added storage space. Storage objectives had to be developed both for maps storage and clothing items. Back up storage for expendables is in concern; with a self service facility in tentage.

(3) Issuance Procedures:

A dual out card is made up for each item of issue when passing action is required. When the item is received from depot the card is attached to the dual out release thereby insuring that the proper requisitioner receives the supplies. Expendables are issued on "Paper" to build proper demand experience and as a control device.

(4) Field Deployments:

It is noted that additional radios are required in the field for rapid communications. A forward logistical element is in constant communications with a rear logistical element (BRDC). Experience indicates that only small amounts of stand-by stockage of all classes of supply are needed in the forward "BRDC".

(5) Class II & IV - Clothing:

It has been our experience that the normal tariff sizes of clothing do not provide the proper sizes for the infantry men in this Brigade. Many more small sizes are required than the normal tariff allows. Consideration should be given to ascertaining if other infantry units have had the same experience.

(6) Publications and Blank Forms:

Current in-country procedures require all supply publications and blank forms to come from Japan. Fortunately this unit brought sufficient quantities to last until supply line is established. Any new unit coming in-country should bring enough of each to last at least four months.

(7) Materials Handling Equipment:

Upon arrival, this unit did not have its authorized (2) 6,000 lb. rough terrain fork lifts. This caused considerable problems in material handling. Another problem area is in operating, training, and maintenance support required for proper handling of HHS fork lifts.

(8) WAGTAC:

The WAGTAC package arrived without ice chest, 10 kw Generators and refrigerators. All these items are in short supply in-country and many of our problems in the mess halls and in the company areas hinge about these three items.

(9) Transportation:

As in many other areas this section suffers from lack of adequate transportation. An augmentation unit, or added vehicles and drivers, should be assigned. Recommend 20 2½ ton trucks and 5 S & P's.

(10) Labor:

When this unit arrived it had many, many problems associated with labor and other Class IV items. We arrived during a rainy period and it was most difficult to "get out" of the mud because of the shortage of lumber.
Operational Report on Losses Learned (Cont'd)
31 January 1967.

(11) The following items are in short supply and are required in the Brigade:

(a) Replacement radios for combat losses. (New Family)
(b) Tentage & Polos (GP medium-life of canvas estimated at 6-9 months)
(c) Undergar & Socks
(d) Quick Release Straps
(e) Armor (Aircraft)
(f) Generators (5, 10, 60 and 100 KW)
(g) Watches, Non-Maintainable
(h) Office Furniture (Desks, chairs, file cabinets etc.)
(i) Aviators gloves and sunglasses
(j) Petrolous handling equipment, i.e., mini ports, light and heavy weight pumps, and 10,000 gal tanks.
(k) Folding chairs
(l) Camouflage covers for steel helmets
(m) Pump for water purification unit 1500 gal.
(n) 4 ea Scoop Loaders
(o) 600 gal water purification sets
(p) 2 ea refrigerator vans for Class I
(q) 20 additional 21/2 ton trucks & 10 stake & platform trailers w/prime movers.
(r) Nylon ropes
(s) 70 cu. ft. refrigerators
(t) Blank forms and publications
(u) 4 ea 1650 cu. ft. refrigerators for Class I, receipt, issue and storage.
(v) Ice chest (75 can)
(w) Moss ball equipment i.e., tables, chairs, steam table, etc.
(x) All items of TA 50-901 (i.e., helmets, liners, pistol bolts, air mattresses, ponchos, etc.)

o. Repair Parts:

Parts which were on POM requisitions were considered as invalid and all unit PLL and Support ASL items at zero balance were reordered, if required, starting 11 January.

(1) Following is a summary of requisitions handled by Co "B", 7th Support Battalion Repair Parts Section during the period 11-31 January 1967
(Only data available):

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Operational Report on Lessons Learned (Cont'd)
31 January 1967

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(a) Requests received

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPD</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>982</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPD</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOT Request</td>
<td>2915</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Requests for 331 items 1495
(c) Requests non-ASL (fringob) 1420
(d) Issues made 767
(e) Requests passed 1601
(f) Requests rejected 24

(2) Reason for rejection of requests

(a) 20 were items issued by Brigado Supply
(b) 2 were duplicate requests
(c) 2 were for direct exchange items

(3) Procedures were established for the processing of "REDBALL EXPRESS" requests. Procedures are in 199th Inf 3rd Reg 700-13.

2. Combat Service Support Activities

a. Medical Evacuation. The following number of personnel were treated during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>DISE. SE</th>
<th>NON-BATTLE INJ</th>
<th>INJ RECEIVED</th>
<th>DEATH ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admissions</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>direct Disposition</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to duty Disposition</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by transfer Death</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Transportation:

(1) During the period from 14 December through 31 January 1967, the Brigade has moved its battalions approximately 17 times. Each battalion size movement requires the minimum of 40 2 1/2 ton trucks. Each infantry battalion has (9) 2 1/2 tons trucks TO&E. Considering the fact that there is no transportation section, as such, in the support battalion, it becomes necessary to request transportation from local supporting transportation units. It has been found that because of the many commitments imposed on supporting transportation units they have generally only been able to provide the Brigade with 10 augmentation trucks per day for movement. This necessitates the driving of trucks from our organic artillery and Support Battalions. The 2 1/2 ton trucks organic to the Support and artillery Battalions are TO&E vehicles, therefore when they are used to transport an Infantry Battalion, the drivers and vehicles are pulled from their TO&E missions.

(2) The addition of a Brigade Transportation officer would take a burden off the S-4 of the Support Battalion

(3) Within the past two months extensive use has been made of aerial resupply. Normally it requires three AID Helicopters to resupply the Brigade's three infantry battalions. Headquarters and Headquarters Company has eight HH-53 Light Observation Helicopters organic to the company. As those helicopters are
only designed for observation purposes, the brigade must request helicopter support from local units. To remedy this situation, our aviation section has requested to exchange four (4) H-23's for three (3) HU-1D's giving the brigade a limited resupply capability as well as an observation capability.

c. Maintenance Services

(1) Following is a summary of maintenance production during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JOBS REC</th>
<th>JOBS COMPLETED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Machine</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Section</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The maintenance float authorized by USARW Reg 750-17 was ordered during the period. Procedures were established for the use of such float.

(3) A daily report of equipment status and repair parts levels was established in 199th Inf Bde Reg 750-2. Information obtained is used to brief the Commanding General, and to expedite repair parts required by giving the maintenance officer a guideline for requisitioning.

(4) Procedures were established to obtain information required to be submitted to USARW on selected items of equipment, by publishing 199th Inf Bde Reg 750-4.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS LEAFLETS

PURPOSE: This leaflet serves a dual purpose: it is both a reward "leaflet" and also contains instructions to those VC who desire to "Chieu Hoi" to the GVN. This leaflet may be disseminated by hand or air drops.

CHÚ Ý CÁC BẠN TRONG HÀNG NGŨ VIỆT CÔNG

Chính phủ VNCH sẽ nâng thưởng về giúp đỡ khi bạn bố mẹ.

1. Khi con mất ngoài
2. Khi con mất ngoài cho ông bạn
3. Cho mỗi con có căn bản
4. Sẽ thềm các khoan khe c

Vì những khi GHN hay mang về

Bà được thưởng lương theo loại.

Front - (translation).

To friends in the VC Ranks:
The GVN will give you reward and help when you return:

$26 a day for food
$12 a day for your wife
$12 a day for each of your children and other allowances.

Weapons that you bring in will be rewarded for according to each type of weapon.

CUNG CÁC BẠN TRONG HÀNG NGŨ VIỆT CÔNG

Để là anh hùng của nhân dân để góp phần về phục Chinh Nhũ và Quốc gia.

1. Nên sống đời sau không có nghĩa vụ cho Chinh Nhũ và Quốc gia.
2. Trong khi sống đời sau không có nghĩa vụ cho Chinh Nhũ và Quốc gia.
3. Khi con mất ngoài, hãy tìm kiếm con để đưa về gia đình.
4. Khi con mất ngoài, hãy tìm kiếm con để đưa về gia đình.
5. Khi con mất ngoài, hãy tìm kiếm con để đưa về gia đình.
6. Khi con mất ngoài, hãy tìm kiếm con để đưa về gia đình.

Back - (translation).

To friends in the VC Ranks:

These are the necessary instructions which will help you to return to the just cause:

1. Pick up a National Safe Conduct Pass and keep it with care and wait for an occasion to return.
2. While being patient to wait for a good occasion, you should be loyal to the VC to avoid any doubt.
3. When the chance comes, escape immediately and return home.
4. If you can only escape at night, find a place to hide. Report to the GVN authority in the daytime. Hide your weapons in one place before you rally. After you rally, you can show to the GVN authority where the weapons are hidden to receive the reward.
5. Always keep carefully the safe conduct pass, so that when you can return to the just cause or when you are captured, you have proof to show that you wish to rally to the just cause and see your family.
6. Anytime, day or night, if you have a Safe Conduct Pass, you will be welcomed as a friend.

Inclosure 10
PURPOSE: This is a reward type leaflet designed to induce people to give US Forces information. These leaflets may be disseminated by hand or air drop.

969 TIỂN THƯỞNG 969

Quân Đội Hoa Kỳ có mặt tại Việt Nam để giúp đỡ Chính Phủ cứu các nạn nhân miền Bến tre, vun đắp lòng tin và sự ủng hộ của gia đình và các tổ chức xã hội. Những lá đơn này sẽ giúp đỡ các tổ chức và indใช้ các nguồn lực để giúp đỡ các nạn nhân và gia đình.CHANH

- Cam kết, Những tổ chức xã hội của Việt Nam.
- Hãy liên lạc với binh sĩ Hoa Kỳ gần nhất tại Lữ Đơn 199 BĐ Binh Hoa Kỳ để hỗ trợ cho những người cần hỗ trợ. Lữ Đơn 199 BĐ Binh Hoa Kỳ sẽ hỗ trợ cho những người cần hỗ trợ.
- Quân đội Mỹ sẽ giúp đỡ các tổ chức và ind sử dụng nguồn lực để giúp đỡ các nạn nhân và gia đình. Những lá đơn này sẽ giúp đỡ các tổ chức và ind sử dụng nguồn lực để giúp đỡ các nạn nhân và gia đình.

LƯƠNG 199 BỘ BINH HOA KỲ - TIỂN THƯỞNG: LƯƠNG 199 BỘ BINH HOA KỲ

TR.wrapper: The American soldiers are here in Vietnam to help your country bring peace and security to your country. To accomplish this task, we need your help. To protect you and other innocent people, we will give a reward to anyone who gives us information on:

- VC mines and weapons caches, VC tunnels, VC booby traps and ambushes.
- Contact the nearest American soldier of the 199th Infantry Brigade and give him this leaflet or number 969. He will read the reverse side of this leaflet written in English and have you report your information to the authority concerned. You will be properly rewarded for valuable information.

199th US Infantry Brigade - REIGND - 199th US Infantry Brigade
PURPOSE: This leaflet is commonly referred to as "Good Guy" and informs people the reason for the 199th Inf Bravo being in their area. The most common means of dissemination is by hand.

**TRANSLATION:**
The US 199th Infantry Brigade has arrived in Vietnam. They have mighty weapons that will seek out and destroy the Viet Cong. When not fighting the VC bandits who rob against their own people, the US 199th Infantry Brigade will be helping to build schools, treat the sick and injured and distribute food to the people of Vietnam.

But they can only help you, if you help them. When you see the American soldiers wearing the Flaming Spear on their shoulders, remember, we are your friends.
PURPOSE: Those two leaflets are "scare" leaflets. Their purpose is to bring awareness to the VC of the futility of their cause. Those leaflets are designed to motivate VC into surrendering or "Chieu Hoi". Because these leaflets have as their target the VC, it is most commonly air dropped.

Translation (from back of leaflet).

Translation (from back of leaflet).

Translation (from back of leaflet).
PURPOSE: This leaflet runs in conjunction with the leaflets on page 4 in that a VC, unaware, may use this leaflet to surrender without bodily harm by any allied forces. Instructions to allied forces are written in English, Vietnamese, and Korean. This leaflet is disseminated by air drop.

SAFE-COUD-CT PASS TO BE HONORED BY ALL VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ALLIED FORCES

TRANSLATION: Safe Conduct Pass
Purpose: This leaflet is specifically designed as a "Chieu Hoi" leaflet. By using the comments of a former Viet Cong, our hope is to induce other Viet Cong, especially members of the defector's unit, to return to the GVN with full amnesty. Air drop and hand out are the methods of dissemination. (NOTE: This man was the first "Chieu Hoi" of the 199th. He turned himself in on 24 January 1967 to Co "E", 4/12 Inf Bn, in the Thu Duc Area).

Translation:

My name is Tran Van Tho, oldest son, 25 years old at Ha Dong Ria Province. I was in a production team. I rallied on 25 Jan 67. I call on Dung, Hai, Ta, Hung, Dao, Nam, Thanh and Miss Dai to Dung to come to the national cause. I have been well treated. Return to the national just cause in order to rebuild your family and country.
PURPOSE: This leaflet is directly related to the HEWAP program. At these times our units are in villages and hamlets treating people, this leaflet is passed out by hand to as many people in the village as possible for the purpose of encouraging them to avail themselves of medical benefits being presented by all health agencies in Vietnam.

In villages all over Vietnam, American army doctors or medics make visits to give better health to the people. The medical team can help you cure skin diseases, colds, headaches, and most other complaints. When a medical team comes to your area, they will be glad to help you.
## CONFIDENTIAL

### TYPE CASUALTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KEA</th>
<th>WKA</th>
<th>MKA</th>
<th>NED</th>
<th>NBI</th>
<th>NEM</th>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>87TH ENGR CO</td>
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</table>

### CAUSE OF BATTLE CASUALTIES (DEATHS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>Small-Arms</th>
<th>Mines</th>
<th>Booby-traps</th>
<th>Grenades</th>
<th>Frag Wounds</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2D BN, 3D INF</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>3D BN, 7TH INF</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4TH BN, 12TH INF</td>
<td>6 (3)</td>
<td>9 (2)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D BN, 40TH ARMY</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>REC, 199TH INF EDE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Distinguished 'Out-Of-Country' visitors to the 'Rodcatohor'-Brigade

BG (RETIRED) S.L.A. MARSHALL ........................................ 19 DEC 66

GEN HAROLD K. JOHNSON ............................................. 24 DEC 66
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

THE HONORABLE JOSEPH Y. RESNICK .......................... 30 DEC 66
CONGRESSMAN OF THE 28TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT,
NEW YORK STATE

GEN E.RLE G. WHEELER ..................................... 8 JAN 67
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

GEN (RETIRED) WANG ........................................... 13 JAN 67
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

GEN DWIGHT E. BEACH ...................................... 21 JAN 67
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, US ARMY PACIFIC
During the latter phase of Advance Unit Training, conducted at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, the need for the initiation of preparation for overseas deployment became acute. Overseas movement was coming so close on the heels of this training, that it had really been impossible to devote full attention to the Brigade's field training exercise and that, in fact, some 15 officers were back at Fort Benning working on the movement problem.

To partly solve the difficulty, two groups were established. One defined as a Movement Planning Group, was charged with initiating the necessary planning to get movement actions underway. A second, which was given the title of FOR-POM Coordination Group was charged with the preparation of an individual for overseas shipment, determining the capacity of various Post/Brigade facilities to process the individual and procurement on a recurring basis from subordinate units, of the number of individuals who still require further FOR qualification. These two groups had accomplished considerable preliminary work in the two areas by the time load elements of the Brigade had returned to Fort Benning.

A schedule was developed providing for: POM leave; Packing-Crating- Loading FOR qualification and necessary Brigade Administration. The schedule was broken into five groups: Movement Team; Advance Planning Group; Carotaker Group; Advance Party/Rear Detachment and Main Body.

Plans were pointed to an overall completion date of 20 November 1966, the Brigade's Personnel Readiness Date.

The fifteen day POM leaves began with the Movement Team, on 8 October 1966. At the end of each leave period, was programmed as the return to duty date. This allowed a determination of the exact date when all personnel would be present for duty; this date was 19 November 1966.

Having returned to Fort Benning, from Camp Shelby, 26 September, the POM Coordination group was in full swing. With the FOR program formed up the group was in the process of designating troop movements; listing specific personnel on each movement.

The troop movement groups consisted of: Two main body, troop movements; Two, two-hundred and fifty man, voyage staff personnel; An advance planning group; An advance party of two-hundred and eighty men and a breakdown of those personnel accompanying equipment - Major shipment personnel, to accompany other or auxiliary equipment - Rod T&T, to accompany aboard troop ship - Organic aircraft (8 OH-23), one pilot and mechanics.

Schedules had been arranged for: Dental checks; Health records checks; Training records checks; ID tags, cards and processing and necessary arrangements made for Central Post Clearance.

Although FOR qualification is the Command responsibility of the individual units, guidance was given by, and coordination effected through, the FOR-POM Coordination Group. In this manner Brigade kept abreast of the situation. As time went on, it became evident that a tight reign was required in order to complete this phase of the operation.

Several problems developed during FOR processing. The first was in the area of weapons qualification. The Brigade received M-16 rifles towards the end of October. Though it was known this issue was forthcoming, Post would not allow the Brigade to schedule any ranges until the weapons were in hand. Therefore, the late delivery of the M-16s found the ranges scheduled to Post units. This made scheduling a matter of coordination with other units, as well as with the Post; complicating a program that had an early deadline — NLT 19 November 1966. The qualification was further complicated by the number of personnel who were required to participate. The majority of those not required to qualify had to fire for familiarisation. This, all at a time when approximately 30% of all Brigade personnel were on POM leave.
An associated problem was in the area of transportation to support the
exercise. It was necessary to request support from other agencies as most
organic vehicles were being processed for shipment

Relaxation of Post's range scheduling policy or an earlier weapons delivery
would have alleviated many problems, as the limiting factor - time, could
be changed.

Another problem area was in Dental processing. Disposition of dental
records made it difficult to screen them to determine the brigade's status. Due
to the physical disposition of brigade units, elements at Koller Hill and at Sand
Hill, the Brigade was serviced by two dental clinics. Brigade dental records
were split between two servicing clinics. To further complicate matters, when
individuals were transferred from one unit to another, during organizational
development, dental records were not always moved accordingly. When a man
reached the unit in which he would serve, his records would remain in his old
unit's file. Some men joined the Brigade from other units and didn't even bring
their records. After due time this problem was solved. Units were required
to send two copies of their unit rosters to their servicing clinic. Records
were checked against those rosters and misplaced records, searched out and placed
in the proper unit file. The clinic was then able to produce rosters, by unit,
of those personnel requiring FOR checks. The requirement was solved, but time
was lost.

If dental records had been retained by the individual, or at a central
point, until troop dispositions were firm, this probably would not have become a
problem area.

The big problem faced by the Movement Planning Group was a lack of material
handling equipment (MHE) and a lack of firm knowledge on train arrival times
and train configuration.

This problem was created when the train loading date was moved up one week;
from 5 November 1966 to 27 October 1966.

All completion dates were, accordingly, moved up one week. This caught
whole teams of men on their FM leaves, creating a requirement to draft new teams
from available personnel. The movement training schools, scheduled to be conduc-
ted by Post, had to be rescheduled for an earlier date.

MHE programmed to arrive on 5 November 1966, didn't start to arrive until
7 November 1966, when one fork-lift was delivered. Of five lifts requested, only
four were delivered; and the fourth, not until 11 November 1966. The loading task
was made even more difficult, as hard-stand type lifts were issued in lieu of the
rough-terrain type, requested.

Earlier procurement of trains, necessitated by the revision in the loading
schedule, posed a real problem. To fulfill the mission, trains were literally
thrown together. It was all but impossible to produce a firm train schedule at
this short notice. Brigade found its equipment being loaded, piecemeal fashion
on miscellaneous trains of varied configuration. Not being able to arrive at
a firm schedule, it was not possible when a train would arrive, where it
would be positioned or what its configuration would be. As it turned out some
trains would arrive with no two cars of the same dimensions. This required a
new loading plan, for each car producing unrealistic train loading times.

In order to load out, units were required to be prepared to move all or
parts, of their equipment to any one of several loading sites, on a moment's notice.
As no load time could be programmed to allow a unit to be in position to load
when a train arrived, a degree of inofficiency was built into all loading pro-
cedures.

Those problems might have been avoided by allowing the original train
loading date, 5 November 1966, to stand or by readjusting train and MHE avail-
ability dates to meet the new load date of 27 October 1966. The mission would
have been better served, had the MHE been of the proper type.

In addition to the special problems involved with FOR-POM processing, there
remained the over pressing ones, inherent to daily operations, as the Brigade was
still in the process of receiving personnel and equipment.
The Brigade found itself with some 221 more enlisted personnel assigned than was authorized. However, 18% of those were non-deployable due to ETS, medical or other reasons. Many of them were non-commissioned officers. In contrast to this average there were 121 non-commissioned officers or critical specialists positions vacant, or occupied by privates. 18 November 1966 found the Brigade a little understrength with the most notable shortages in the grade of E-7; the Brigade had 61 of 108 (56%) of authorized E-7s.

During this period the Brigade found itself receiving all of the attention that it wished it had received in July. Coming down to the wire, the order of the day, in addition to the obvious maintenance, packing, loading and leave, was assistance visits, inspections and reports. Nonetheless, the long-standing equipment shortages were being gradually reduced with each passing day.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

TO: Commanding General
199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt)
ATTN: S3
APO 96279

1. (c) Name/type of operation: Uniontown/search and destroy.


3. (c) Location: Bien Hoa, Long Binh (TY0712).

4. (c) Command Headquarters: Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt).

5. (c) Reporting Officers: Battalion Commander, 3d Bn 7th Inf-LTC William F. Hartman.

6. (c) Task Organisation:

   A/3-7
   Arty PO Party
   B/3-7
   Arty PO Party
   B/3-7
   Arty PO Party

   Battalion Control
   B/3-7
   Recon Plat
   B/3-7
   RV Mort
   AT Plat
   1st Plat, 87th Eng
   1/2/4/17 Cav
   E/2-40 Arty (DS)

7. (c) Supporting Forces:

   a. Artillery, B/2-40 (DS). No tactical missions were fired in support of this operation. H and I fires were planned and fired each night with unknown results.

   b. USAF: 7th USAF. No CAS missions were flown in support of this operation. FAC's were used occasionally for VR. This unit did not have occasion to utilise illumination from supporting units.

   c. Army Aviation: A CH-47 was used to transport an element to a remote site and also to extract this unit. Resupply missions, command and control, and reconnaissance missions were flown daily. Helicopter support was adequate.

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6. (c) Intelligence.

a. The primary force in this area of operation was local force Viet Cong in small groups (4-5 men). They were reportedly engaged in covert actions of sabotage and theft of ammunition. The above information was supplied in part by the 2d Bn 3d Infantry who was operating in the area prior to our assumption of the South Uniontown mission.

b. During the operation, a total of four contacts with Viet Cong were made by units of the battalion. Of these contacts, an estimated strength 15-20 was the largest encountered. There were no VC captured nor any verified as killed during the operation. There were no hard installations discovered which had not been previously reported by other units.

c. Terrain. The general area of operations offers good cover and concealment. The area lent itself to the VC operations mentioned in a above. The area was heavily vegetated near the numerous intermittent streams and was marked by a large network of well used foot paths.

d. Weather. Good visibility and high ceilings were prevalent throughout the operation.

9. (c) Missions: (Incl 1 & 2)

a. Move by truck to AO's commencing 26/0900H Dec 66.

b. Conduct Search and Destroy operations in assigned AO's with primary emphasis on security of the ammunition storage area and provide security for civilian construction equipment in area of operations.

c. Provide security detachment for 53d Sig Bn relay site.

d. Assume attachment of D/17 Cav (-) to include mission of securing sand dredge.

e. Maintain a minimum of 1 company in 173d TACR (North Uniontown).

f. Maintain a minimum of 2 companies in South Uniontown.

g. Rotate companies throughout AO's and ENB for maintenance.

10. (c) Execution:

a. Warning order to conduct operations in Uniontown was received on 25 Dec and was issued to subordinate units 2100 hrs on the same day as HQ 3-7 Inf OPORD 9-66 dated 25/1700H Dec 66.

b. Motor movement to Uniontown AO's commenced 26/0900H. Last element closed 26/1040H and Bn assumed responsibility for Uniontown mission. Co A, B, C and E established company bases and commenced search and destroy operations in assigned AO's by patrolling during daylight hours and establishing ambush sites during darkness. All of the activities were closely coordinated with 5d Ordnance Bn and Long Binh Post Headquarters.
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o. On 26 Dec B Co established first contact at YTC9088 at 1515 hrs by firing at 1 VC. He fled to the Northeast. The 5 rds fired at the enemy flushed 2 more VCs who ran to the Southeast. A thorough search of the area was conducted with negative results. The Battalion established 9 squad size ambushes on the night of 26 December.

d. On 27 Dec, the battalion conducted patrolling and established 11 ambush sites. Co A received sniper fire at 2230 hrs which resulted in the B Co's first casualties, SGT Spriggs and CPL Mizzell.

e. On 23 Dec, companies conducted patrolling and SAD operations. B Co established contact with 15-20 VC at 2025 hrs, while enroute to an ambush site. The Platoon SGT maneuvered his element and fought his way back to friendly positions. VC casualties were unknown, however the VC were heard screaming in the area. 1 US casualty (PC Johnson) resulted from an enemy grenade.

f. From 29 Dec to 31 Dec, units conducted patrolling and established ambush sites without contact.

g. On 1 Jan, companies continued SAD operations in assigned AO's except C Company which was rotated to BMB for maintenance.

h. On 3 Jan, C Co commenced operations in 173d TAOR (North Uniontown). B Co & B Co mortar platoons in South Uniontown received SA fire at 0400 hrs which resulted in 3 US WIA.

i. On 4 Jan, B Co was extracted to BMB for maint.

j. On 6 Jan, A Co was extracted to BMB for maint.

k. On 7 Jan, AT Plt conducted airmobile move to radio relay site of 55d Signal Bn, to provide security.

l. Aggressive patrolling and ambushes were conducted daily throughout the remainder of the mission with no positive contact. Companies were rotated throughout the AO's and BMB for rest and maintenance.

m. All companies extracted over land from AO's to BMB commencing 261355H. Extraction completed 261445 Hrs.

11. (c) Administration:

a. Because of the closeness of the area of operation to the Battalion Base area no significant problems were experienced in supporting the Battalion's operation.

b. The following administrative activities were conducted during this period with results as indicated:

[5] Morale....................Excellent. In-country R&R quotas were established and filled.

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(6) Religion.............Good. Chaplain led to vary schedule but all services were held each week.

(7) Military Justice........Good. Special courts were held during the period when they did not conflict with operational commitments.

c. Recommendations: It is recommended that officers be placed on the payroll with their respective companies thus eliminating a separate pay roll for officers which will eliminate the requirement of an additional Class A agent in order to pay officers.

12. (c) Logistics.

a. Generally, the logistical support of the Uniontown mission was accomplished with little difficulty; however the following observations are made.

(1) The late arrival of resupply helicopters at times prevented initiation of planned early morning operations.

(2) The non-availability of helicopters at various times for retrieving residue delayed tactical movements.

b. Initially the Battalion experienced difficulty in obtaining the following supply and items of ammunition:

1) Sandbags
2) 40mm HE ammunition
3) LAW
4) Claymore mines
5) Fragmentation Grenades
6) Smoke Grenades
7) Hand Held Flares

c. The Battalion began tactical operations prior to the arrival of its organic equipment which caused several transportation problems for Command and Control and resupply. Efforts were made to attach cargo trucks and utility vehicles to the Battalion but these attachments met only the very bare minimum of transportation requirements.

d. The Battalion hand receipted kitchen equipment from other units in order to feed the battalion during this operation.

e. Recommendations:

It is recommended that each Battalion involved in an operation be allocated daily one helicopter for resupply and Command and Control.

13. Commanders Analysis.

This operation commenced one day after the Battalion closed in country providing an excellent shakedown and training period for all elements.
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For the first time individuals were issued ammunition without excessive control and safety measures being applied. Through continued carrying, handling and firing of these munitions, individuals to include leaders at all echelons became less apprehensive about probable accidents and individuals acquired confidence in themselves and their units.

Extended periods of operations within the same limited assigned areas without contact with the enemy causes units to relax and become less alert. To overcome this trend, companies were rotated to other areas within the Battalion operational area as often as feasible.

Because of firing restrictions the mortar platoons and the anti-tank platoon contributed little to the overall operation. The mortar platoons of the rifle companies normally utilized one mortar and the other squads were utilized for other missions. E Company (CS) was reorganized into a reduced strength rifle company consisting of two rifle platoons and a mortar platoon of two squads; however the company still maintains a capability to employ two 106 RR if the need arises.

It is felt that the Battalion contributed to the security of the Long Binh complex and at the same time benefited immeasurably from the training received in a relatively quiet combat area.

WILLIAM F. HARTMAN
LTC Inf
Commanding

2 Incl

as
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HEADQUARTERS
4TH BATTALION 12TH INFANTRY
199TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP)(LIGHT)
APO San Francisco, Calif 96279

AJILL-DOT

17 January 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

TO: Commanding General
199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt)
APO 96279

1. Name and Type of Operation

OPERATION DUCK/Perimeter security of Bearcat EMB and search and destroy operations in Bearcat TAOR.

2. Dates of Operation

230730R Dec 66 - 311700H Dec 66.

3. Location

Bearcat TAOR (Camp Martin Cox)

4. Control or Command Headquarters

Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt)

5. Reporting Officers

Bn CO LTC James G. Boatsnor
Co A CO CPT John H. Mack
Co B CO CPT George J. Jurkowich
Co C CO CPT Thomas H. Sellers
Co E CO CPT Raymond N. Sasaki
HHC CO CPT Lloyd W. Neinke

6. Task Organization

a. Control Hqs: Hqs, 4-12 Inf
b. Attachments: (1) Engr Plat, 87th Engr Co
   (2) IPW Team, HHC, 199th Inf Brde
   (3) Bde HHC Rifle Plat (29 Dec - 31 Dec)

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HQs, 4-12 Inf, 199th Inf Bde (Sbp)(Lt)
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

1. Detachment: None

2. OPCOM (For perimeter security only):
- 2-60 Inf, 9th Inf Div
- Co A, 3-60 Inf, 9th Inf Div
- Co B, 3-60 Inf, 9th Inf Div
- Co C, 36th Signal Bn
- Bn A Btry, 7-9 Arty
- 15 Engr Bn

7. Supporting Forces

a. Btry A, 7-9 Arty and Btry B, 7-9 Arty fired a total of 189 81 and 81 rounds during the operation. Lack of clearance limited arty support.

b. Troop D, 17th Cav escorted daily resupply convoys between Long Binh and Bearcat.

8. Intelligence

a. Prior to Operation: Agent reports indicated that occasional small unit activity of an harassing nature could be expected. No large units were known to be operating in the TAOR.

b. During Operation: Only light contact was made during the operation. Co B found and destroyed a small VC base camp (IT 174053) and pursued, but lost contact with 3 VC who fled. Co C found and destroyed an empty underground storage area at IT 139041. Co C suffered 3 WIA from a boobytrap at IT 143034. Co A, 3-60 Inf, 9th Inf Div received 5 or 6 40mm or 60mm rounds at IT 148996.

c. Terrain and Weather: Terrain was generally flat with very thick, heavy vegetation around the Bearcat Perimeter. About 400 meters from the perimeter, the vegetation thinned out and tall timber was abundant. The Eastern portion of the TAOR afforded the best avenue of approach. Weather was generally clear and hot, with infrequent afternoon showers.

9. Mission

The mission of TF 4-12 Inf was to supervise the perimeter security force for the Bearcat staging area, conduct S & D operations in Bearcat AO, and provide one company on call as the Brigade RRP.

10. Concept of Operation

a. S & D Operations: TF 4-12 Inf conducted an air mobile movement to the Bearcat Staging Area from multiple LZ's in its sector of the 173rd Abn Bde TAOR. Two rifle companies plus Co E (-) were kept on S & D operations in Bearcat AO, while one company remained at the BN CP as the Brigade RRP.
Companies were rotated, having 4 days in the field and 1 day at the Bn CP for maintenance and rest.

b. Perimeter Security - The perimeter was divided among the units OPCOM to TF 4-12 Inf. Rules of engagement, SOP’s, and reporting procedures were disseminated to the units.

11. Execution

a. Day 1 (23 Dec 66)

The Bn was alerted to move to Bearcat from its operation in the 173rd Abn Bde TACR at 221130H Dec 66. OPCORD 4-66 was issued at 221545H Dec 66 and an air mobile operation began at 2300H Dec. The movement was completed by 1130H and by 1500H, Co’s A & B had moved by foot to their assigned AO’s and were conducting S & D operations. Co C assumed the mission of Brigade RRF. Six rein sqd night ambushes made negative contact.

b. Day 2 (24 Dec 66)

The Recon Plat and Co’s A and B conducted S & D operations with negative results. Six rein sqd night ambushes made negative contact.

c. Day 3 (25 Dec 66)

Co C replaced Co A at 1400H. Co C and Co B conducted S & D operations and each established 3 night ambushes with negative results.

d. Day 4 (26 Dec 66)

Co E (-) moved by foot to its assigned AO and together with Co’s B & C conducted S & D operations. Co B located a small VC base camp at IT 174053 and pursued 3 VC’s who fled south. Contact was broken. Co C found and destroyed an empty underground storage area at IT 139041. Eight rein sqd night ambushes made negative contact.

e. Day 5 (27 Dec 66)

Co A replaced Co B which had been operating for 10 days. Co’s A, C, & E (-) conducted S & D operations with negative results. Co C suffered 3 WIA from a booby trap at IT 143034. Twelve rein sqd night ambushes made negative contact.

f. Day 6 (28 Dec 66)

Co’s A, C, & E (-) conducted one company, two platoon, and four squad size sweeps with negative results. At 0315H, Co A, 3-60 Inf, 9th Inf Div received 5 or 6 40mm or 60mm rounds at IT 143996. There were negative casualties and search patrols made no contact. Seven rein sqd night ambushes made no contact.
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4th Bn 12th Inf, 199th Inf Bde (Sep)(Lt)
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8. Day 7 (29 Dec 66)

With the Bde HHC rifle platoon, Co B replaced Co C, which returned to the Bn CP as Bde RWF. Two company, three platoon, and two squad size sweeps were conducted with negative results. 17 reinf and night ambushes made negative contact.

b. Day 8 (30 Dec 66)

Co C returned to LONG Binh. Co E (-) returned to the Bn CP as Bde RWF. Co's A & B conducted S & D operations with negative results. 14 reinf night ambushes made negative contact.

9. Day 9 (31 Dec 66)

Co's A & B returned to the Bn CP. All units were trucked to LONG Binh, with the last element closing at 1700H. Responsibility for perimeter security was turned over to the 9th Inf Div at 1900H.

12. Results

a. Personnel

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Enemy</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOC</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Equipment and Material: There were no friendly or enemy losses.

13. Administration Matters

a. Supply: Daily resupply of all classes were effective by motor convoy to Bearcat. KCSS operations were moved to Bearcat. During field operations, classes I & V were provided by helicopters from Bearcat.

b. Medical Services: The Battalion aid station moved to Bearcat base camp. Dustoffs and resupply helicopter were utilized to evacuate patients from the field.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques

a. Starlight scopes were utilized.

b. Chain saws and TFF were utilized to construct LZ's.

15. Commander's Analysis:

a. On one occasion during this operation, it was discovered that because
of inaccuracy in boundaries, a night ambush patrol from this unit and one from the adjacent 11th Cav Regt had been established very close to one another. The 11th Cav Regt had received their TAOR boundary from the 173rd Abn Bn and this unit had received its TAOR boundary from the 199th Inf Bde. Although no incident occurred, this emphasized the necessity for close liaison between adjacent units on the battalion level.

b. During this operation, Co B had to clear a landing zone in their AO in order to effect resupply. Engineer troops with chain saws were used initially. This method proved to be too slow and TNT was later used to fell the trees. While blasting TNT was considerably faster, the project still consumed the major portion of the daylight hours. This experience emphasized the necessity for carrying the maximum load of supplies possible into thickly vegetated areas to reduce or eliminate the requirement for resupply. In addition, natural sources of water in the area of operation should be considered when planning routes of movement so as to reduce the requirement for water resupply.

c. Navigation was very difficult for 

16. Recommendations:

a. That great care be taken by Brigade and Regimental-level headquarters in establishing boundaries for subordinate units. This is particularly critical for boundaries between units under the command of two different Brigades.

b. See Para 15b and c above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. W. Cheatham, Jr
Maj, Infantry
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION: Special

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AVBH-A-00

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

TO: Commanding General
199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Light)
ATTN: S-3
APO San Francisco 96279

1. (C) NAME OR IDENTIFY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATIONS: WIGGINS - Search and Destroy.

2. (C) DATES OF OPERATION: 27 Jan 66 - 31 Jan 66.

3. (C) LOCATION: Binh Hoa, VC Tu.

4. (C) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Light).

5. (C) REPORTING OFFICER:
   a. Headquarters, 2d Bn, 3d Inf - LTO Louis W. Oden
   b. Co A - CPT Edwin Y. Jones Jr
   c. Co B - CPT Teddy Turner
   d. Co C - CPT Joe B. Williams
   e. Bn Platoon - LTO Wayne L. Williams
   f. Mortar Platoon - LTO James P. Thomas

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

   Co A 67-3 Inf
   Engineer Team
   1 Interpreter
   Co B 67-3 Inf
   Co C 67-3 Inf
   Engineer Team
   1 Interpreter
   Bn Control
   RV Mort
   Recon Plt
   Engineer Team
   Engineer Team
   1 IPF Team

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD Directive 5200.12
CONFIDENTIAL

AV69-A-00

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report 20 Jan 67

7. (G) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery. 7/9 Arty and C/319 Arty. A 6 Min preparation was fired on LZ BLOI with negative results. No tactical missions were fired during the entire operation. H & I fires were utilised during the entire operation.

b. TAC AIR - 7th Air Force. LZ Preparation was flown with 3 FJ40 D aircraft utilising 500 and 750 lb bombs. Effectiveness was very limited because ordnance was concentrated in only one corner of LZ.

c. Army Aviation. Initial airborne assault was supported by 173d Assault Helicopter Co, utilising 95 sorties of UH-1D slick and 4 sorties of UH-1D Gun Ships. Total time of operation was 3 hrs 26 min. This was the most effective and timely support received by this unit during any operation. Extraction on 3 Jan was supported by 116th Assault Helicopter Co. Support received was less than satisfactory due to last minute changes made in PZ FORMATIONS and number of aircraft by the 116th Aviation Co. 104 sorties were utilised for extraction requiring approximately 5 hours.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. The AO is predominately utilised by local forces, 95 units of squad, platoon and company size. These elements are armed with a profusion of small arms, automatic weapons, grenades, mines and mortars. These elements may be found anywhere within the AO, but primarily around the rubber plantations and along the waterways.

b. The AO is not a base for any known VC units, rather, it is a known infiltration route from the North. These routes were our primary points for interdiction. Much evidence of frequent use of the trails and base camps was found.

c. No enemy troop units were identified during operation WIGORIB.

d. The terrain is generally characterised by flat land with dense evergreen forests covering 90% of the AO. The Song La Buong River provided the western AO boundary. The trails and foot paths in the area are numerous and well used. To the south is a rubber plantation. Cover and concealment is generally excellent. There are no major obstacles to foot movement, but the area is virtually denied to wheeled vehicles with the exception of one or two trails. Adequate landing zones are scarce.

9. (G) MISSION:

a. Return to Staging area 26 Dec upon relief by 3/7 Inf.

b. Conduct Helicopter assault on 27 Dec and assume responsibility for AO (Excl 1) effective 271200 Dec 66.

c. AO includes SAN LA BUONG River.

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20 Jan 67

1. Be prepared for extraction by air to staging area on 30 Dec.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: This operation was planned in three phases:

a. Phase I: Conduct an airmobile assault to seize and assume LZ BLUE commencing 27/10/66 with Rcn Platoon. (Incl 2)

b. Phase II: Conduct search and destroy operations employing 4/2-3 Inf, C/2-3 Inf and Rfn Platoon in AO's JANE, JUDY and BERTY respectively.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Warning order for Operation WEDGE was received on 24 Dec. A warning order was issued to subordinate units on 24 Dec. Written order for operation was issued 26/30 Dec. Operation was delayed one day because aircraft were withheld for higher priority operation. Airmobile assault was conducted on LZ BLUE utilising 95 sorties of UH-IH helicopter on 28 Dec. First Element departed PZ at 1004 hrs and last element closed LZ at 1350 hrs. TAC air and arty preparation was utilised on the landing zones. Suppressive fire was also used by 1st flight of "slicks." Company C detained 3 suspects via coord 217062 for interrogation, and they were identified as weed cutters. All units occupied areas specified in operations order and established ambush sites during hours of darkness with reinforced rifle squads maintaining one platoon as RRF.

b. On 29 Dec units continued to operate in assigned AOs. Co C detained 2 suspects. Both were identified as weed cutters and released. All units established ambush sites during hours of darkness with negative results. Rcn Platoon located base camp, vic coord 2350/71, with 6 fire sites that appeared to have been used in the past 72 hrs. At 1430 hrs a base camp with 11 dug-in positions was located vic 2370/73. Camp appeared to have been used in the last 2 weeks.

c. On 30 Dec operation continued in all AOs. At 0800 one VC was killed vic TF 236069. All articles found on the VC were evacuated to higher Headquarters.

d. On 31 Dec Bn extracted from AO by UH-IH helicopters. 1st element departed at 0730, last element extracted at 1300 hrs.

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly casualties - None

b. Enemy casualties - 1 VC killed (DC)

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report 20 Jan 67

a. Captured or suspected enemy. No VC captured. Five suspects
detained, but later identified as wood cutters and released.

d. Search of air strike area. A ground search of the area was conducted.

e. Number of personnel lost separately by participating units. None

13. (c) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: The Brigade Administrative Order was
adequate to support the operation.

a. Supply. Resupply for this operation was strictly aerial. Lack
of helicopters was a major drawback to resupply missions. Having the use of
only one chopper during our resupply hours hampered the movement of the com-
panies since they had to wait for the one helicopter to make several trips
between the company locations and the resupply point at the heliport. Comments
on specific areas are as follows:

(1) Our resupply schedule was as follows: The line companies
that were our maneuver element were resupplied as early as possible in the
mornings. This gave them more time for movement during the day and also
prevented the appearance of a helicopter to give away their base camp for
the night. Our Battalion CP and its security elements were resupplied during
the evening after the companies had completely resupplied.

(2) The basic load of ammunition for deployment on this operation
was 400 rounds of 5.56mm per man; 1500 rds of 7.62mm per machinegun; 12 rounds
of HE, 8 rounds Illumination, and 6 rounds WP for each mortar tube; and 40 -50 rounds per M-79 grenade launcher. These loads were augmented by the separate
Co Commanders to suit any special situation, e.g. a radio operator would per-
haps carry only 200 rds 5.56mm while a riflemen would carry as much as 300
rounds of 5.56mm.

(3) We received 8 starlight scopes prior to this operation
and 2 during the operation. Using these in conjunction with our TOE infra-
red device, we were able to improve our night movement and security greatly.

b. Maintenance. Maintenance proved to be no problem on this operation.

c. Treatment, evacuation and hospitalization of casualties:

(1) Treatment. Patients were examined and treated at the Battalion
aid station when possible. Many minor abrasions were caused by bamboo thorns,
two of which became infected even after hydrogen peroxide and merthiolate were
used to treat the wounds.

(2) Hospitalisation. Formal procedures were followed.

d. Transportation. Air transportation was used exclusively.
Communications: Some difficulty was experienced with communications, especially at night. This was due mostly to atmospheric disturbances. The frequency assigned to our unit was assigned to several other units operating in our vicinity. Lack of alternate frequencies hindered our communications somewhat.

14. (t) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: No special equipment or techniques were used on this operation.

15. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: This operation was initiated in an area where there was no significant intelligence. Our concept was to cover as much of the area as possible, developing sufficient intelligence on which to base platoon and company S & D operations. Daylight S & D operations, and patrols; and night ambushes were used to try and intercept the enemy during his movement. Other than a few wood cutters, the only activity was 1 enemy Killed (AK). Since numerous areas resembling way stations were found along trails and streams, it appears that the area serves VC mainly as a covered route. Some defoliation missions have "opened up" large areas to aerial observation. More of this would further limit enemy capabilities to move undetected in daylight. The battalion did not remain in the area long enough to give us a good feel as to its overall value to VC. The LZ preparation by Air was unsatisfactory in that each attacking aircraft put his ordnance in almost the exact spot marked by the FAC. This resulted in practically no coverage of the LZ fringe areas. Artillery preparation was likewise "pin pointed." It is possible that aerial observers had not been pre briefed that theirs was more of an area target mission as opposed to a point target one. Armed helicopters did come in 2 minutes prior to LZ time and fired excellent area suppressive fires. The operation provided the battalion with excellent refresher training in air mobile operations, land navigation and night ambushes. Starlite scopes were used for the first time.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS: I have no significant recommendations that are not apparent in the analysis above.
ATSH-A-CO

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

23 January 1967

TO: Commanding General
199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Light)
ATTN: 2-3
APO San Francisco 96279

1. (C) NAME OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION: BATTLE/SEC & Destroy.

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 011400 - 061400 Jan 1967

3. (U) LOCATION: BIEN HOA, MEKONG TRACK (Coord 0963)

4. (C) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Light)

5. (O) REPORTING OFFICERS:
   a. Battalion Commander, 2d Bn, 3d Inf - LTC Louis W Odum
   b. Co A/2-3 Inf - CPT Lewis Johnson
   c. Co B/2-3 Inf - CPT Teddy W Turner
   d. Co C/2-3 Inf - CPT Joe E Williams
   e. Co B/2-3 Inf - CPT Howard P Bachman
   f. Gun Platoon - 2LT Wayne L Williams
   g. AT Platoon - 2LT Frances J Kelble
   h. BN Mortar Platoon - 1LT James P Thomas

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6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Co A</th>
<th>Co C</th>
<th>Bn Control</th>
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<td>Civil Affairs Team</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>MP Squad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery. 1/2/40 (28). No tactical missions were fired in support of this operation. H & I fires were planned and fired each night. One VC (BO) KILL was as a result of Artillery H & I fire.

b. USAF. 7th Air Force. No CAS missions were flown in support of this operation. Immediate request was processed through Army and Air Force nets for illumination. Reaction time was 15 minutes and effectiveness was rated as excellent. Mission was flown by one C47 Aircraft.

c. Army Aviation. 118th Assault Helicopter Company and 148th Helicopter Company. Airmobile assault for this operation was conducted utilizing 65 sorties UH1D helicopters and 10 sorties CH47 helicopters. Support provided by both units was timely and effective. Extraction from area of operation was conducted with 10 sorties UH1D and 17 sorties of CH47. Extraction was conducted with CH47 to extract the BN (-) from the L2 and UH1D helicopter to extract the L2 security. Helicopter support on extraction was outstanding.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Local force Viet Cong are quite active in the Nhon Trach area. Very little of the AO has been pacified. Much of the AO is under VC control both day and night; the exception being the Northeastern sector where the 1st BN 48th Inf (ARVN) has been working and the area to the West along Highway 519 from YS 995657 to XS 990750. The local force units in the area have been known to be supported by hard core units of the GII, DINH and LONG LN Provinces.

b. Numerous supply and infiltration routes are suspected to exist throughout the area.

c. No enemy troop units were identified during Operation BUFFALO.

d. The area of operation is generally level terrain with varying vegetation. There are two rubber plantations within the AO. The rest of the area consists of cleared areas with minor vegetation bounded by bush and dense forest. Observation and fields of fire are generally good.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

25 Jan 67

a. Concealment is fair to good within wooded areas. The villages and hamlets are natural havens for VC snipers. The rubber plantations provide fair concealment in the tall grass that grows within it. The soil is primarily silt and sand and will accommodate wheeled vehicles. Foxholes and fixed defensive positions can be dug. The drainage is good throughout. The entire AO may be traversed by foot, but some parts with extreme difficulty due to dense undergrowth. The Zone of Special Operations (ZSO) which borders the AO provides VC with a haven. The swamp conceals VC movement very effectively.

f. The enemy is very susceptible to the "Open arms" program. Many VC have come over to GVN control in this area recently. Exploitation of this program to the fullest by any unit should have satisfactory results.

9. (C) MISSION: (Inc1 1)

a. Move by truck to REMOTE beginning 011400 Jan 67 with 1/17 Cav (-) as escort.

b. Conduct F & D operations in AO SWIFT.

c. Conduct airmobile assault into multiple LZ's in AO SWIFT beginning 011400 Jan 67.

d. Provide one Co to secure Bde Fwd CP site and act as Bde RRF.

e. On order, conduct F & D ops in AO LIGHT with emphasis on clearing road.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: (Inc1 2)

a. Maneuver. This operation was planned in five phases:

(1) Phase I - 2-3 Inf moves by motor at 011400 Jan 67 to the REMOTE forward staging area to marshall for an airmobile operation.

(2) Phase II - 2-3 Inf conducts airmobile assault to seize and assume LZ's ACE, KING, and QUEEN commencing 020900 Jan 67.

(3) Phase III - 2-3 Inf conducts search and destroy operations employing 3/2-3 Inf in AO SWIFT and C/2-3 Inf in AO GINEL. 4/2-3 Inf launches Bde/NRN and Bde RRF. Bde RRF initially and on order conducts search and destroy operations in AO DILANEZ.

(4) Phase IV - On order, 2-3 Inf conducts search and destroy operations in AO LIGHT with emphasis on ROUTE BLUE.

(5) Phase V - On order, 2-3 Inf extracts from area of operation.

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SÜBJEKT: Geotechnical Operation
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29 Jan 67

(c) EXECUTION:

a. Warning order to conduct operation BUFFALO was received on 30 Dec and was issued to subordinate units on 31 Dec. Written order was issued to subordinate units on 011030 Jan. Verbal air movement schedule was received from Bde at 011300 Jan 67 and written air movement plan was issued subordinate units 011830 Jan 67.

b. Started move to B.E.F.C.T. forward staging area at 011330 Jan 67. Last element closed B.E.F.C.T 011325. Established Bn perimeter and prepared for air mobile assault on LZ's ACE, KING and QUEEN with Co A, Co B and Co C respectively. First element of Co A departed B.E.F.C.T at 0930 utilising UH-1D helicopters and landed LZ ACE at 0935. Co B conducted air mobile assault on LZ KING as recon and BQ Co continued movement into LZ ACE by CH47 helicopters. Assault on LZ QUEEN was made by Co C utilising 9 sorties UH-1D helicopters and 3 sorties CH47. Last element of Bn closed LZ at 1005 hrs. No contact was established during air mobile assault. At 1315 hrs Co C reported finding village of N. BOU deserted except for two women and a small child. Numerous bowls of warm rice were found in the village indicating personnel had departed as US unit moved in. Approximately 25 tunnels were found in the village. Units established 5 platoon sized ambushes during night of 02 Jan with negative contact. Co C provided security for Bn CP, Fire Support Base and Bde Forward CP; and acted as Bn ERF.

c. On 3 Jan Bn conducted Search and Destroy Operation in NVLIN, GISHL and DL/NE with Co B, Co A and Recon platoon respectively. At 1325 hrs Co B moved two platoons into AO LIGHT. Night reinforced squad ambush sites were established during the night of 3 Jan with negative contact. At approximately 092102 Jan 67, Bn perimeter received light probing action from an estimated 10-15 VC. Fire was returned with unknown result. Action lasted approximately 1 hr. 81mm mortars fired 42 rds illumination and 6 rds HE in support of perimeter.

d. On 4 Jan Bn continued Search and Destroy operations in AO MWILI, LIGHT and GISHL. Conducted MEDCAP program in village of XTH QUIX TEALH vic coord 069805. 363 villagers were treated including 33 dental patients. Co B located a VC base camp that would accommodate approximately 300 men. Camp included numerous bunkers with interconnecting trenches. Seven ambush sites were established during the period with negative contact. Bde perimeter received light probing action during the night, with negative results.

e. On 5 Jan a MEDCAP program was conducted in BONG KLI treating 22 patients. Search and Destroy operations in AO's LIGHT, GISHL, and DL/NE. A VC Base camp with tunnel complex covering approximately 1 acre was found vic coord 116878. Eight ambush sites were established during the period, had negative contact.
f. On 6 Jan continued S & D operations in AO LIGHT, DIANNE AND HUN. An area of fresh digging was found via TB 121814 and TB 115795. Eight ambush sites were established with negative results. Received warning order to extract from AO on 8 Jan and plan for operations in WEL BE.

g. On 7 Jan convoy departed BN Base Camp for LONG BINH with all equipment and supplies not needed for present operations. At 0940 4 armed VC were reported via coord 133657. At 1017 one element engaged in fire fight for 16 minutes with an estimated 4 to 5 VC. At 1149 one man was wounded in both feet via coord 134865. A Dust Off was called in and was downed by ground fire via coord 134865. A light fire team was called in to assist in securing the chopper. One gun ship received several rounds of small arms fire during the extraction of the chopper. Liaison was established with lift unit for BN extraction on 8 Jan beginning 0700 hrs.

h. On 8 Jan BN extracted from AO to BELCAT utilizing 17 sorties of CH47 helicopters and 10 sorties of UH1D helicopters. Beginning 0700 hrs and completed at 1103 hrs. BN moved to BMG by truck closing at 1135 hrs.

-12. (C) RESULTS:
   a. Friendly casualties. 1 WIA
   b. Enemy casualties. 1 KIA (2C)
   c. Captured or suspected enemy. NONE
   d. Equipment and Material Losses. One "Dust Off" helicopter was shot down while attempting to extract the wounded men. The helicopter was later recovered.

   e. Search of Air Strike Areas. No air strikes were requested by this unit. A search of fire strike area conducted by other units via coord 151284 and 151283 was not approximate 24 hours after the strike with negative results.

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: The administrative Order from Brigade was adequate to support the operation. The timing of the Admin Order was good, giving us time to plan our logistical operations.

   a. Supply. Supply for this operation was a two step affair. By land convoy the supplies reached BELCAT and from there were flown to units in the field. A 3 day level of supplies was stockpiled in the BN CP area. Helicopter support for resupply missions was excellent.

   (1) Receipt of 200 collapsible water jugs greatly improved the ability of our elements to move more freely since they no longer had to carry empty 5 gal cans from one resupply to the next.

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(2) Due to the late arrival of Zulu equipment from CONUS, we were unable to use our original setup for re-supply. Consequently, all re-supply runs were internal loads. This greatly increased considerably the time aircraft had to be on the ground.

b. Maintenance: During this operation we evacuated 2 M-16's, 1 .50cal machine gun, 1 mortar, 1 mortar night sighting device, and 1 night sight for maintenance and repair.

c. Treatment, evacuation, and hospitalization of casualties:

(1) Treatment. Patients were examined and treated at Bn Aid Station when medical situation permitted. Malaria control pills were given each Monday and sick call was held on a 24 hour basis.

(2) Evacuation. All patients were evacuated by air during this operation. One patient required evacuation through "Dust Off" facilities. Minor casualties were not returned to duty as soon as preferred due to the Bn Aid Station being located at Long Binh.

(3) Hospitalization. All patients were evacuated to the 199th Brigade Clearing Station and the 93d Evacuation Hospital. No evacuation procedural problems were encountered.

d. Transportation. Brigade organic transportation was used for transport to BEUCOT. Transportation for re-supply to BEUCOT was by vehicles organic to Bn. From BEUCOT to the forward area, transportation was furnished by helicopters assigned to our Bde. On 7 Jan 67 a land convoy was escorted to our location by "D" Troop, 17th Cav to extract our extra supplies. The convoy was loaded and left the same day. The next day the Bn was extracted by air.

e. Communications. Communications on this operation were greatly enhanced by use of one of our vehicular radios and the RC 292 jungle antennas. We experienced no great problems with commo or maintenance of commo equipment.

14. (V) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT & TECHNIQUES: No special equipment or techniques were used on this operation.

15. (G) COMMANDER ANALYSIS: Intelligence information on NBDN TRCH indicated that we could expect considerable enemy activity in the area. Although the Battalion fire support base was harassed almost nightly by a few VC, companies encountered nothing during daylight B & D operations and night ambushes except on the day before extraction. On that day Company L encountered about 12 VC in 40 SWIFT. Because it was late afternoon before an early 2d Bn extraction, we could not exploit contact and continue to search the area. Discussions with the District Chief, and his US adviser,
indicated that all villages east of AO's RUN and SWIFT were VC controlled. This is evident in that they "bunk" against the RUNG S&T. We had tentatively planned cordon operations against those villages, but were unable to execute them since our stay was cut short.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That operations be conducted in AO's RUN and SWIFT, and against the VC villages to the east and southeast of them.

b. That, after the above operations FF/RF outposts be re-established in the vicinity of the villages to signify re-control by the governments.

LOUIE W. ODOM
LTC INF
Commanding
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HEADQUARTERS
4TH BATTALION 12TH INFANTRY
199TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP)(Lt)
APO San Francisco, Calif 95279

AIII...DOT

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

TO: Commanding General
199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt)
APO San Francisco 95279

1. Name and Type of Operation
OPERATION KILOILL/ Search and Destroy.

2. Dates of Operation
020800H Jan 67 - 051435H Jan 67.

3. Location
Kaps, Vietnam, 1:25,000, Sheets 6330I & 6330II. Area defined by H 1614,
H 2414, YS 1803, YS 2703 (Son Trach District).

4. Control or Command Headquarters
Hqs, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt)

5. Reporting Officers
Bn CO IRF James G. Bojnow
Co A CO CPT John H. McClelland
Co B CO CPT George J. Jurkowski
Co C CO CPT Thomas H. Sellers
Co E CO CPT Raymond N. Sasaki
HHC CO CPT Lloyd W. Heineke

6. Task Organization
a. Control Headquarters - Hqs, 4-12 Inf
b. Attachments - (1) Engr Plt, 87 Engr Co
(2) IP Team, HHC, 199th Inf 3rd
(3) MP squad, HHC, 199th Inf 3rd

C. Detachments - None.

7. Supporting Forces

Btry C, 2/40 Arty provided DS & fired 205 HAB rounds plus one night illumination mission.

8. Intelligence

a. Intelligence prior to operation: The AO is controlled by local force VC units of platoon and company size. The villages located along H/L 319 from PHU HOI (Ys 0888) to PHUC AN (Ys 1478) are considered to be under strict VC control. The most likely avenues of approach lie to the south and east. The local VC forces of the NHOW TRACH District have been supported in certain operations by units of the 5th VC BN and the 155A VC Regiment.

b. During the operation: Although only four VC were spotted and engaged at coord YS 139795 with negative results, the entire area had a vast network of trenches and trails. These two factors plus the overhead cover afforded by the forest would permit 2-3 VC battalions to move into the area undetected and remain concealed with excellent cover.

c. Terrain: The general area of operations offers excellent cover and concealment. The area is especially suitable for the type of VC operations mentioned in para 8a above. Hill mass at coord YS 130794 is the highest elevation in the southern sector. Observation was generally limited due to the significant amount of dense forest. The best avenue of approach is from the south. The mangrove swamps bounding the AO will conceal movement into the AO.

d. Weather: The weather was suitable for search and destroy operations and saturation patrolling. The weather was usually hot and clear with occasional late afternoon showers.

9. Mission

The mission of TF 4-12 was:

a. Conduct truck movement to DEAR-CAT commencing 020800 Jan.

b. Conduct ajmobil assault into multiple LZs in assigned AO.

c. Conduct search and destroy operations in AO FAST.

d. Prepare to conduct search and destroy operations in AO RUW.
10. Concept of Operation

a. Maneuver:

(1) Phase I - Truck convoy movement to 412th Co. I.
(2) Phase II - Air mobile assault into multiple LZs in AO FAST.
(3) Phase III - Company size sweep operations in AOs C, D, and E.
(4) Phase IV - Platoon size saturation patrolling and ambush operations in AOs C, D, and E.
(5) Phase V - Search and destroy operations in AO A, on order.

b. Fires:

(1) C Btry, 240th Arty supports from positions via coord 169665 initially.
(2) A Btry, 240th Arty supports on 240th Arty air movement to D&F from positions via 09525.
(3) C Btry, 240th Arty continues to support on upon completion of air movement.

11. Execution

a. Day 1 (2 Jan 67)

4-12 Inf received the Brigade OPORD at 010930 Jan 67 and issued its final OPORD, 1-67, at 0800. The 3n (-) trucked to Beavert from 0800 - 0900. An air mobile assault was conducted into LZ ULYS (152792) by Co's A & B, LZ JACK (112986) by Co C, and LZ KIM (142791) by Bn Hqs, Co E, HHC (-). The assault commenced at 1400H and terminated at 1510H. Company sweeps were then conducted with negative contact and nine squad(+) night ambushes made no contact.

b. Day 2 (3 Jan 67)

Eleven platoon sized forces conducted sweep operations throughout the day without contact. Numerous tunnels and trenches were destroyed. Platoons from C Co with IP assistance and National Police searched villages at 172395, 172796, 172995, and 173295. No VC were found, but five usable, unoccupied huts were destroyed. One of the ten night ambushes exchanged fire with four VC at 130795 at 1930H. There were no casualties.

c. Day 3 (4 Jan 67)

Nine platoon sized forces conducted S&D operations with negative results. Nine squad(+/-) night ambushes made no contact. A VC claymore (Chinese make) was command detonated via Recon Platoon (131813) at 1930H. There were no casualties.

Although pursuit was made, contact was broken.
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d. Day 4 (5 Jan 67)

4-12 Inf returned to Long Binh by helicopter and truck. Movement began at 0932H, and the last element closed at 1435H.

12. Results

a. Personnel:

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<th>Enemy</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>VSC</td>
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</tbody>
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b. Equipment and Material: No friendly or enemy losses.

13. Administrative Matters

a. Supply: The 3n S4 section moved from Long Binh to Bao Loc and effected all resupply to forward areas from Bao Loc by helicopter.

b. Medical Services: The Battalion Aid Station was located at the 3n forward CP. Resupply helicopters were used to evacuate patients.

c. Communications: Radio battery life was about one half normal life during the operation. It is believed that humidity plus showers contributed significantly to this.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques

a. Stairnite smoke was utilized, although no enemy were engaged.

b. Chain saws were used to improve LZs.

15. Commanders Analysis

a. On this mission, 3n Hqs back-carried all the equipment necessary for its operation. Complete and successful functioning was effected, thus proving the flexibility and mobility of 3n Hqs.

b. Our recon platoon was camouflaged, but no casualties were sustained. It appears that the main reason this happened was due to the platoon moving into the CP for the night at a time when 2½ hours of daylight remained. Emphasis must be placed on not moving into a position too early, thereby permitting the VC to recon the position.

c. Our TAOR was crisscrossed by many trails and many trenches. The overhead cover afforded by the forest plus the trails and trenches would hide 2-3 VC battalions. This should be kept in mind for any future operations in this area.
16. **Recommendations**

a. Closer coordination should be effected between Brigade and supporting aviation units to prevent aircraft from showing up two hours prior to ETA disseminated to the battalions.

b. The companies need more water carrying capacity. Two two quart containers must be obtained and distributed.

c. A daylight C&C ship (preferably a Huey) must be available at all times to each battalion.

d. See para 15c above.

For Read: Col. Windahl

[Signature]
Col. Windahl, Jr.
2Lt. Infantry
Asst Adjutant

DELEGATION: Special
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4TH BATTLE GROUP 12TH INFANTRY
199th INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP)(Lt)
APO San Francisco, Calif 96279

14 January 1967

To: Commanding General
199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt)
APO 96279

Subject: Combat Operations After-action Report

1. Type of Operation
S & D operations in sector of 173rd abn bde RNVR.

2. Dates of Operation
170730H Dec 66 - 230730H Dec 66.

3. Location
Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series 17014, Sheets 6330 I & 6331 III.
area defined by YT 0418, YT 1018, YT 1118, YT 0314.

4. Control or Command Headquarters
HQs, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Lt).

5. Reporting Officers

En CO  LTC James G. Boatner
Co A CO  CPT John H. Mack
Co B CO  CPT George J. Jurkowski
Co C CO  CPT Thomas H. Jellers
Co E CO  CPT Raymond N. Sasaki
HHC CO  CPT Lloyd A. Heine

6. Task Organization

a. Control Headquarters - HQs, 4-12 Inf.

b. Attachments: Engineer Plt, 87th Eng Co.

c. Detachments: None.

7. Supporting Forces

a. Stry C/319 arty, 173 abn bde was in DS of 4-12 Inf. The Stry fired 174 rounds of H & I fire during operation. Arty support was
restricted due to the many "no fire" zones in the 4-12th Inf TAOR.

b. One platoon from D troop, 17th Cav provided convoy escort to move a small element into the TAOR on 17 Dec and to move out equipment on 23 Dec.

8. Intelligence

a. Prior to Operation: Intelligence indicated that the area was considered one of the most peaceful regions in Vietnam and pro-government. No battalion-size units were known to be located in the area. No recent enemy activities were recorded.

b. During Operation: Six incidents occurred in scattered areas.

c. Terrain and Weather: The terrain was largely flat area with numerous rice paddies, except for a plateau area in the SW sector of the TAOR. This area had a dense overgrown growth varying from 2-3 meters. Few roads existed. Observation and fields of fire were excellent, except in the plateau area where visibility was extremely limited. The main natural avenues of approach were from the north and the east (via YT 050166 and YT 1016). Weather conditions were excellent with occasional heavy burning fog dissipating by 0300hrs.

d. Fortifications: Anti-helicopter devices (cripped structures) were found and destroyed at YT 088156. These had not been recently constructed.

e. CA/Psy Ops: The Bn medical platoon made two trips to the surrounding villages and with 173rd Abn Bde medical personnel ministered to the inhabitants.

9. Mission

The mission of TF 4-12 was to assume responsibility for a sector of 173rd Abn Bde TAOR and to conduct search and destroy operations.

10. Concept of Operation

An initial air mobile assault was conducted into multiple LZ's by each company. The companies then set up separate bases and conducted search and destroy operations. The organic mortars were in vicinity of the BN CP and C/319 arty was in BS from the 173rd Abn Bde base. B Co (-) was retained at the Battalion forward base. The A/M Gun Plt and 2d Plt, Co B were the BN reaction forces. It assisted in BN security and conducted patrolling operations during the day and ambushes at night.

11. Execution

a. Day 1 (17 Dec 66):

This headquarters received the final OPORD from Brigade at
CONFIDENTIAL

Hqs, 4th Bn 12th Inf, 199th Inf Bde (Sep)(Lt)

SUBJ: Combat Operation After-Action Report

161500H Dec 66 and issued OPORD 3-66 at 161930H Dec 66. At 170730H Dec 66, the bn (-) moved to the Bde airstrip. The air assaults commenced at 1212H with the last serial departing at 1315H. By 1320H, the three rifle companies were conducting S & D Operations in their assigned AO's. They closed on their QP locations for the night between 1708H-1730H and each established two (2) reinforced squad ambushes at night. There was no enemy contact on day 1.

b. Day 2 (19 Dec 66):

Three (3) company S & D operations were conducted and six (6) squad (+) ambushes were set out at night with negative contact.

c. Day 3 (19 Dec 66):

The boomer Plt was fired on by two (2) VCs at YF: 078178. The VCs were pursued, but contact was broken. Co B with an engineer team destroyed several ARV mines (096191) and a series of foxholes (078178). Co A destroyed five (5) VC huts and miscellaneous cooking and eating utensils scattered in the 0546 grid square. Co C, with engineer support destroyed anti-helicopter devices at 080166, nine (9) squad (+) ambushes were established that night with negative contact.

d. Day 4 (20 Dec 66):

The companies continued S & D operations. The bn CP, Co A, and Co B each received several sniper rounds during the day, there were no casualties and scout patrols made no contact. Nine (9) night ambushes were established with negative contact.

e. Day 5 (21 Dec 66):

One company and four (4) platoon S & D operations were conducted. Several sniper shots were received (073152, 096179) but no contact was made. Co C turned a possible VC (found at 090179) over to the District Advisor. Co B dismantled two booby traps (085175 & 080185). Ten (10) squad (+) night ambushes made no contact.

f. Day 6 (22 Dec 66):

None of the patrols or sweep operations made contact nor did the eleven (11) squad (+) night ambushes. The bn was alerted at 1130H to be prepared to move to Bourest IAR (Camp Martin Cox) to assume the missions of farm security plus S & D operations. A warning was issued at 1545H to alert the companies.

g. Day 7 (23 Dec 66):

The bn began an airmobile extraction and movement to Bourest at 0730H, with the last serial departing at 1120H and closing Bourest at 1130H.
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Rgs, 4th an 12th Inf, 199th Inf Bde (Sep)(Lt)  
Subject: Combat Operations After-Action Report

12. Results

a. Personnel: Friendly Enemy

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<td>VCC</td>
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b. Equipment and Materials:

There were no friendly or enemy material losses.

13. Administrative Matters

a. Supply: Class I resupply was excellent. Most "A's" were flown to the 3n by helicopter for every evening meal. Class II operations remained at LONG a.DH. Sundry packs were provided to each company. An operational load of ammunition was carried by each man. Additional 81 mm mortar ammunition was brought by helicopter to the forward areas.

b. Maintenance: Preventive maintenance was accomplished daily (par Battalion TACP) on weapons and Some equipment. No vehicles were used on this operation.

c. Medical Services: Medical treatment in the field was excellent. A complete Battalion aid station was set up. Dustoffs were utilized unless a supply helicopter was in the area and could evacuate the patient.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques:

Starlight Scopes were utilized for night observation with H-16 rifles. No enemy were engaged with the scopes.

15. Commander's Analysis

This was the first operational mission for this unit since its arrival in company on 10 Dec 69. Despite the relative absence of contact with VC forces, it provided an excellent opportunity for a "shakedown" of the battalion as a whole and for the officers who had joined the unit since its last training exercise in Oct. No major operational problems were encountered and a multitude of operational techniques were either instituted or refined. The most important of these techniques are covered in the attached Commander's Notes #1.

Some confusion and delay of personnel occurred during the amphibious assault into the 3n AO when the number of troop lift helicopters programmed did not materialize. This shortage was not known until

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F r. 16th In 12th inf, 199th Inf Sop (Lt)

Subject: Combat operations after-action report

the ships were on the ground at the pickup zone.

An aerial reconnaissance by the ground force commander and the airlift unit commander was conducted only minutes before the first troop lift departured the pickup zone. The result was that neither the aircraft commanders nor the ground force company commanders knew exactly where the landing zones were.

A critique was held at the conclusion of this operation. This was very helpful to refine SOP's and share experience. The battalion SOP will be changed to include a past operation critique as a SOP item.

16. Recommendations

a. A coordination and planning meeting should be held for every airborne assault between the ground force commander and the airlift unit commander. This should be conducted the day before the airlift is and should include a joint reconnaissance of the landing zones. This would allow for subsequent detailed briefings for aircraft pilots and ground force company commanders.

b. The ground force Departure Airfield Control Officer must formulate and disseminate plans in advance for realignment of personnel in aircraft chocks in the event that the number of planned troop ships do not arrive at the pickup zone.

c. Brigade should conduct periodic critiques with principle staff and commanders attending to exchange information and refine the Brigade SOP.

Pet Hill O.C.S.

Lt. Col. W. Hill, Jr.
Captain, Infantry
Adjutant
SUBJECT: Commanders Notes #1

1. This is the first in a series of commander's notes concerning combat operations which will be published on as-needed basis to serve as a reference for all unit leaders on the battalion commanders policies.

a. When companies are being resupplied by air they must be in their location for the night by 1500 hours.

b. Companies will habitually keep battalion informed of their activities by reporting when ambushed are in position, when patrols depart or return and the results thereof, when the company begins movement or arrives at a new location, and any other significant activity or occurrence.

c. Reports by all units must be timely, concise and complete. Too many incomplete reports are being received. *Use the box and bullet.

d. It is mandatory that units in a stationary position continually improve those positions as long as they remain there.

e. "Stand To" will be conducted each day 30 minutes prior to 2100. "Stand Down" will be held each day at 30 minutes prior to 0600. All weapons will be checked by squad leaders at Stand To to insure that no rounds are in the chamber.

f. Companies will at all times have a reaction force on hand and thoroughly briefed on the current operation. This force must be prepared to move by any means available to reinforce other elements of the unit.

g. Units of any size must be prepared to work 12's for helicopters and guide them during landings. To the extent practical all units operating independently during daylight hours will carry smoke grenades with them.

h. The requirement for flank security cannot be overemphasized. All leaders will maintain flank security whenever their unit has an exposed flank.

i. Artillery or mortar concentrations or both should be planned as an integral part of every ambush. In most cases these concentrations will not be registered by actual firing, however, the coordinates should be
Commanders Notes #1

Sent through fire request channels, the data computed by the FDC and a
concentration number assigned. These concentrations should be planned at
least 200 yards beyond friendly troops at the ambush sites and "walked in"
to the ambush site at the time the ambush is triggered.

1. The new series of M1 radios must be operated in the "Old
Squelch-Off" position whenever communicating with army aircraft, dust
off ships and F.A. C's.

2. Copies of these and subsequent commanders notes will be distrib-
uted to all small unit leaders down to and including squad leaders. A
file of these notes will be permanently maintained by all company head-
quartes as a reading file for newly assigned platoon/section/squad leaders.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

S/l/Calvin J. Chanthan
ZLT, Infantry
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:"A"

20 Co
20 S-3 File