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<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 13 AUG 1966. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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SECURITY
MARKING

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO SF 96347

AVBD-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966

THRU: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development

TO: Washington, DC 20310

13 Aug 66

Significant Unit Activities: The Brigade was involved in combat operations during the entire reporting period. Training was conducted concurrently with combat operations during periods when units were resetting and preparing for new phases of operations. The Brigade conducted three administrative moves during the reporting period, and elements of the Brigade were involved in these moves for a total of twenty-two days.

A. Combat Operations: A summary of the concept and execution of each of the Brigade's operations is given below.

1. Operation AUSTIN VI
   b. Mission: Conduct search and destroy operations near the Cambodian Border and astride the II and III Corps boundary in QUANG DAO and PHUOC LONG Provinces to locate and destroy enemy forces and facilities prior to the beginning of the southwest monsoons.
   c. Location: QUANG DAO and PHUOC LONG Provinces.
   d. Forces Involved:
      (1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division minus 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry.
      (2) Other: 265th RF Company, elements of 31st Ranger Battalion (RNW), elements of 55th Infantry Regiment (RNW), CIDG units and RF Scout Company.
   e. Concept and Execution: See Inclosure 1, Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN.

2. Operation COOPER: (Suspended) The Brigade moved to Củ Chi 250 to conduct Operation COOPER commencing 20 May 1966. The operation was suspended and the Brigade assumed the mission as I FFORCEN reserve. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry moved to Pleiku to back up US Forces engaged west and southwest of Pleiku.

3. Operation HAMPTON:
SUJ ECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966

b. Mission: Conduct search and destroy operations in the vicinity of DA' TO, TO, VUNG RO, and TAN CH. and assist in the withdrawal of the VC/NOVREG Regional Force outpost.

c. Location: KONTUM Province.

d. Forces Involved:

(1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division minus 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, and 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

(2) Other: 1/42d Infantry Regiment (ARVN), 21st Ranger Battalion (ARVN), nine CIDG Companies, and one RF Company.

e. Concept and Execution: See Inclosure 2, Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HATTHOUXU.

1. Operation BEAUGUARD (EAGLE BATT):


b. Mission: Conduct surveillance of the LAOTI AN/CHAODIA orders, block and ambush VC/NoVREG infiltration routes, and fix and destroy enemy in zone.

c. Location: KONTUM Province.

d. Forces Involved:

(1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division minus 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

(2) Other: CIDG Companies from DA' TO, MANG BUK and DAK PEK.


5. Operation JOHN F. O'GROVE (Phase I):


b. Mission: Seize and hold the vital terrain and installations in the VUNG RO Pass (to include LST sites, railroad tunnel, and bridges) along Highway 1 north from VUNG RO Bay to the 2d Korean Marine Brigade area of operation and provide protection for Engineer work parties in the bay area along the line of communications in the area of operation.

c. Location: PHU YEN Province.

d. Forces Involved:

(1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

(2) Other: 24 Korean Marine Brigade, 47th Infantry Regiment (ARVN).

e. Concept and Execution: On 23 July, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into the southern

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portion of the area of operation and seized and defended the critical
terrain, LST sites, railroad tunnel, and Highway 1. Also on 23 July, the
1st Battalion (Airborne), 17th Infantry passed through the 2d ROX Brigade
and conducted a ground assault and seized objectives in the northern
portion of the area of operation. Both battalions continued to defend
the critical terrain and conducted saturation patrolling until 30 July
when they were relieved by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.
The detailed Combat Operations After Action Report for Operation JOHN
PAUL JONES will be submitted with the next Quarterly Operational Report.

6. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was detached
from the Brigade on operations in the TUY HOA area during most of the
reporting period. At the beginning of the reporting period through
19 June 1966 the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry continued on
Operation FINCH under the operational control of I Field Force
Vietnam. Between 19 June and 1 July 1966, the 2d Battalion (Airborne),
327th Infantry came under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry
Division during Operation NATHAN HUGHES. From 2 July through 11 July 1966,
2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was under the operational control
of the 1st Cavalry Division on Operation HEY CI Y. On 25 July 1966 the
2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry returned to the operation
control of the Brigade and began preparation for Operation JOHN PAUL JONES.

B. Training: Most of the time covered by this reporting period was
spent in the conduct of tactical operations. However, during periods of
refitting and preparation for new phases of operations, units concentrated
training efforts in those areas which could be improved on as noted during
previous operations. In addition to the emphasis placed on small unit
tactics, the following training was organized at Brigade level:

1. All now incoming personnel, officers and enlisted men, were
processed through a replacement detachment at PHAN RANG, the Brigade Rear
area and Base Camp. Here they received 6 days of rigorous training in
small unit tactics, weapons indoctrination, survival, land navigation,
patrolling and physical conditioning. In addition to combat conditioning
individuals and instructing them in "lessons learned" for the individual
soldier and small unit, the training served to accustom personnel to the
hot, humid climate of Vietnam.

2. In each area of operation, ranges were quickly established in
the Brigade forward base to accommodate firing of small arms, machine
guns, grenade launchers and mortars. The ranges were scheduled for use
by the units of the Brigade to allow for the maximum use of the ranges
during periods when units were refitting and preparing for new operations.

3. Helicopter rappelling training was established to increase
the proficiency of personnel in the techniques of rappelling into dense
jungle terrain which does not have accessible landing zones. This training
was particularly concentrated toward training Brigade and Battalion
reconnaissance elements and Engineer Landing Zone clearing teams.

4. Driver training was conducted for all units to train drivers
in aircraft loading techniques for vehicles. The training was aimed at
making drivers more proficient in driving vehicles on and off aircraft,
in order to provide for smoother loading operations during air movements.

5. Flamethrower teams from each Infantry Battalion received
proficiency training in the use of the portable flamethrower. The object
of the training was to train personnel who could be placed in an "on call"
status to be prepared to provide flamethrower support to the front
line units as required. As the need for flamethrowers becomes apparent,
the teams can be flown in by helicopter with charged flamethrowers to

CONCLUSION

Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966
(RCS: CSF05-65)
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6. In June 1966, the Brigade received forty Winchester, Model 70 rifles to support a particular requirement. A program was established to train selected personnel of the Brigade in the use of the weapon and sniper techniques.

7. Training was also conducted for radio telephone operators in radio-telephone security and procedures and the use of the GCI.

8. Infantry personnel received training from the Artillery in artillery adjustment procedures and techniques. The purpose of the training was to refresh and train officers and noncommissioned officers.

9. By coordination between the Brigade and Special Forces Advisors, a mobile training team was established by the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery to train CIDO units. Training was provided in survey, fire direction, service of the weapon, ammunition handling and observer procedures.

10. A squad leaders combat reaction course has been established in the PH1N RAIN Base Camp area. The course is one week in duration and has been established to instruct small unit leaders in the latest combat techniques.

C. Tactical and Administrative Moves:

1. Numerous tactical and administrative moves were made during the reporting period. Tactical moves were made by both motor vehicle and helicopter. The majority of the administrative movement was made by C-130 aircraft. Listed below is a brief description of each of the administrative moves conducted:

   a. Between 19 and 27 May, the Brigade deployed from PH1N CO to CHEO by 203 sorties of C-130 Aircraft.

   b. Between 29 May and 3 June 1966, the Brigade (-) deployed from CHEO to DAK TO. A total of 201 sorties were utilized. On 2 June, the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry deployed from PLEIKH to DAK TO by CV-2 aircraft and vehicular convoy.

   c. Between 15 July and 21 July, the Brigade deployed by C-130 aircraft from DAK TO to TUY HMA. A total of 182 sorties were utilized.

2. The major problems encountered on the administrative moves were as follows:

   a. The Army was not given sufficient information regarding Air Force capabilities to support air movement operations.

   b. Communications difficulties were encountered by the inability of the Army and Air Force personnel to communicate between the departure and arrival air fields.

   c. There were insufficient spare parts and repair facilities available at the departure and arrival airfields to enable minor aircraft repairs.

   d. The USAF mission commanders varied daily during particular movements and they were not at all times familiar with the aircraft capabilities.

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(RCS: CSF-1.65)

E. Intelligence:

1. Following is a list of losses inflicted on the enemy during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
<th>LC-300</th>
<th>MAC-THE-CUS</th>
<th>BEAUMQAD</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA (IC)</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA (Est)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA (Est)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA (Est)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA (Est)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA (Est)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA (Est)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA (Est)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WEAPONS

| Individual | 32 | 88 | 9 | 129 |
| Crew Served | 6 | 24 | 0 | 30 |

2. Intelligence Problem Areas:

a. Monitoring of radio and telephone lines uncovered a number of communications violations. Command emphasis has been given to potential problem areas.

b. Ground fog and cloud cover had a detrimental effect on the accomplishment of many of the visual reconnaissance, road haze and photo missions. Increased patrolling has to be conducted during this period to obtain the necessary intelligence information.

c. In areas where the local population was exclusively Montagnard, interpreters were found to be lacking in proficiency of the numerous dialects. Support from the ARVN and National Police helped overcome this difficulty.

d. The S-2 Air has been provided an additional radio to enable direct communications with all visual reconnaissance aircraft. This will facilitate immediate initiation of response to intelligence requirements as they arise.

F. Personnel:

1. Unit Strength:

a. The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of the period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorised</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Present for Duty</th>
<th>Not Present for Duty</th>
<th>Base Camp</th>
<th>Tuy Hoa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>5,502</td>
<td>4,510</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>1,165</td>
<td>3,095</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The assigned strength is 122 percent of the authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 101 percent of the authorized strength.

c. Of the not present for duty strength, 240 were hospitalized personnel.
d. The assigned strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the not present for duty figures for the following reasons:

(1) A large number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to offshore hospitals, C-19US, and even discharged from the US Army without notification to the losing unit.

(2) The present strength accountability system requires assigning personnel (EDSCA) to units prior to their physically joining the unit rather than administratively carrying them in the pipeline.

(3) EDCSA personnel have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit.

2. Casualties:

a. Casualties for the period (1 May - 31 July 1966) were as follows:

- KIA: 157
- WIA: 790
- MIA: 0

b. Total casualties to date are as follows:

- KIA: 268
- WIA: 1,412
- MIA: 2

3. Personnel Programs: The following programs were initiated during the reporting period.

a. Officer Warrior of the Week: This program was instituted in order to provide recognition to a lieutenant of one of the combat arms for outstanding leadership on the battlefield. The "Warrior of the Week" spends a twenty-four hour period in the Brigade Command Post as a personal guest of the Commanding General. He dines in the General's mess, is billeted in a tent complete with bed, sheets and mattress, and accompanies the Commanding General on trips made during the twenty-four hour period. A daily bulletin notice is published recognizing the "Warrior of the Week" and his unit. Also, a letter is written to the individual's next of kin notifying them of his selection. A similar program has been initiated for an Enlisted Warrior of the Week.

b. Utilization of in-country R&R facilities: During Operation HAWTHORNE, seven personnel a day were given the opportunity to utilize the facilities of the HAVO compound in PLEI Ku. Twenty-five men per day were flown to KO Trường for an eight hour visit. Currently, fourteen men a day are using the facilities offered by the USS Saint Paul, a Navy cruiser which provides naval gunfire support for the Brigade.

c. Strong command emphasis was placed on the Brigade Savings Bond program. An immediate goal of 90 percent was reached and an ultimate goal of 100 percent participation is expected.

d. A long range athletic program for the PHAN RANG Base Area has been developed. This includes planning for baseball diamonds, football fields, volley ball courts, miniature golf courses, hand ball courts, basketball courts, and horseshoe pits. A new Special Services beach is already in operation.
Personnel Planning: The following items were planned during the period:

a. A table of distribution has been organized for the Base Camp at PHAI RANG which will insure a much more effective utilization and efficient operation of current and proposed facilities. The reorganization will allow an addition of approximately 250 men to the foxhole strength of the Brigade.

b. A Brigade cooks school has been established to relieve the critical shortage of cooks in the Brigade. Classes are conducted in the base camp area for a period of three weeks and each class has an attendance of twenty personnel.

c. Coordination was made with USARV to explore the possibility of spreading a planned rotation of 1,200 personnel in December from 15 November to 30 December. It was further requested that replacements and DFOS personnel be flown directly to PHAI RANG or CAM RANCH BAY for the CONUS.

5. Problem Areas: Administrative problem areas encountered during the reporting period included the following:

a. Receipt of orders on personnel evacuated through medical channels are seldom received promptly and many times are not received at all. Close coordination has been made with USARV and the evacuation hospitals. Purging of morning reports for intransit personnel and coordination with the 90th Replacement Battalion has been initiated to drop from the rolls assigned to personnel who were subsequently assigned elsewhere or never arrived.

b. A rotational hump existed of approximately forty-five percent of Brigade personnel during the months of June and July. USAV was apprised of the problem and the rotation was programmed from 15 May through 31 July.

c. Shortages of critical MOS's in the areas of cooks, mechanics, medical specialists, x-raying, legal clerks, and surgeons exists. A report was submitted to USAV on 14 June 1966 listing critical MOS shortages, and liaison visits have been made to the USARV G-1 and AG.

d. The supply of Bronze Star, ARCO and Air Medal certificates has been depleted. This shortage is theater wide.

6. Morale: Morale remained "Excellent" throughout the period.

7. Logistics:

1. Material and Services:

a. Supply:

(1) Class I: During the period an adequate supply of "B" rations was received and "A" ration meats were issued in sufficient quantity to supplement most "B" ration meals. However, fresh fruits, vegetables and bread were extremely limited. The following are the Brigade consumption rates of Class I supplies for the entire reporting period:

- May: 138.7 N/T
- June: 196.0 N/T
- July: 160.0 N/T
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(RCS: CSFD.0-65)

(2) Class II and IV: The Brigade Support Battalion (Rear) at PHAN RANG provided the primary source of clothing and TOE equipment on a call-forward basis utilizing direct support CV-2 aircraft and on a mission basis C-130 aircraft. FSA was the primary source of barrier materials and dry cell batteries. The following are consumption rates of Class II & IV items for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>35.2 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>96.5 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>30.0 S/T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Class III: POL was transported into the operational area by C-130 and CV-2 aircraft and by surface transportation. Storage and distribution of POL was affected by utilizing 1,200 gallon tankers, 500 gallon collapsible cans and 10,000 gallon ground storage bladders. The following are the POL consumption rates for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>156.5 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>269.5 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>261.8 S/T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Class V: The Brigade maintained its basic load of ammunition throughout the reporting period.

(a) The following items remained in short supply during the reporting period; hand-held flares, white star clusters, green star clusters, white star parachute flares.

(b) Brigade ammunition consumption rates for the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>34.2 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>226.3 S/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>190.0 S/T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Maintenance: The Brigade initiated daily "equipment stables" and continued its normal maintenance program. Repair parts shortages existed for generators, vehicles and field ranges, however, the Brigade was capable of performing its mission. The following are the number of jobs received and completed by the Maintenance Company, Support Battalion during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>1,358</td>
<td>1,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Transportation:

(1) Supplies and equipment were transported to the forward area by C-130 and CV-2 aircraft. During Operations HUY HANG and MAWANG some supplies were transported by land line of communication from PHAN RANG.

(2) Vehicular transport remains the primary means of transport from USASC, CAN RANG BAY to the Base Camp at PHAN RANG. Vehicle transport in the forward areas has been extremely limited due to road conditions and enemy activity. However, 595 short haul, 2½ ton truck requirements were fulfilled during the reporting period.
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RCS: CSFOR-65

(3) Air transport was used extensively by the Brigade for movement to operational areas and for transport of personnel, supplies and equipment to and from the forward areas. Some problems were encountered during the airlift operations could have been prevented had joint Army-Air Force planning conferences been held. During the period 518 sorties were flown in support of the Brigade. In addition to USAF support the following data represents sorties flown and personnel and equipment transported by direct support CV-2 aircrafts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Lb S/T of Cargo</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>5,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1,026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Throughout the reporting period both UH-1D and OH-47 helicopters proved extremely effective for aerial resupply operations. Two UH-1D helicopters were placed in direct support of each Infantry Battalion for tactical and logistical operations. OH-47 helicopters were used primarily to resupply artillery units. The total tonnage by type of supply lifted during the reporting period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>CI I</th>
<th>CI V</th>
<th>Water and Misc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>62.15</td>
<td>4.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>67.70</td>
<td>302.84</td>
<td>41.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>10.45</td>
<td>66.38</td>
<td>5.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Water: Two 600 GPH water purification units provided water to the Brigade initially. A 1,500 GPH water purification unit was added during the quarter providing continuous, trouble-free water supply for the Brigade.

e. Laundry: Initially laundry was a problem because a laundry unit was not taken to the PHAT CO area during Operation ANZU VI. It was believed that the laundry at PHAN RANG could provide adequate service to the fighting units. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory due to length of processing, lost items, and bad weather which prevented aircraft flights to and from the objective area.

f. Bath: Bath service was provided to the Brigade by the 118th Quartermaster Company.

2. Medical:

a. The sanitation of mess halls, latrines and unit areas required command emphasis to achieve minimum acceptable standards during the first two months of the reporting period. However, health and hygiene remained excellent considering the operational environment. A marked improvement was noted during July.

b. During Operation HAWTHORNE, the Brigade experienced serious difficulty in extracting wounded personnel from mountainous and densely covered terrain. The two medical evacuation helicopters available to the Brigade proved unsatisfactory since they were not equipped with a hoist capability. Two Air Force CH-43 and Marine CH-46 helicopters were requested to assist in extracting wounded personnel from the battlefield. These helicopters provided invaluable service to the Brigade during Operation HAWTHORNE.

c. The following statistical data on significant diseases were compiled during the reporting period:

CON/FIDENTIAL
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(RCS: CSFR-65)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrub Typhus</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastroenteritis</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hepatitis</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-P Problems</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amebiasis</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shigellosis</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot Problems</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal Disease</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUO</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respiratory Infection</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H. Civil Affairs:

1. The Brigade Civil Affairs/Civic Action Program for the reporting period was conducted in the following major areas:

   a. Health and sanitation: Sick calls were held in six provinces by the MEDCAP Medics attached to this Brigade. A total of 16,000 persons were treated.

   b. Public Works: In May the Engineers repaired 18 kilometers of road, two bridges, three culverts, four school houses and improved grounds for future buildings. In June, a total of 24 kilometers of road and one bridge was repaired along with the repair of one culvert. In July, 24 kilometers of road were repaired, two bridges built, one bridge repaired and one culvert repaired. The Market Place in TAN CAIH was leveled and the grounds leading to the TAN CAIH Hospital were filled in.

   c. Transportation: Continuous transportation was provided for laborers in each area that laborers were hired. Transportation was provided for refugees who had left their villages to go to resettlement stations.

   d. Laborers: The Brigade hired a total of 24,000 laborers during the period. The largest portion of the laborers were hired in PHAN RANG. An average of 857 laborers were hired per day. Wages per workday varied between 80 VN$ in PHAN RANG, 50 VN$ in DAK TO and 90 VN$ in TUY HOA.

   e. Agriculture: The Brigade Engineer and the Civil Affairs Team coordinated and managed the construction of a reservoir at DAK HOI.

   f. Education: During the period, an officer from the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry taught English in the TUY HOI High School for a period of 48 hours.

   g. Claims: Twenty-three claims were processed against the US for losses due to military operations and three claims were processed for non-combat accidents. A total of 12,000 VN$ were paid to Vietnamese Nationals.
Refugee Extraction:

(1) A total of 532 refugees were extracted from operational areas and returned to GVN control. Emergency medical care and temporary relief assistance were given to many of the refugees. Transportation, to expedite the return of these people to GVN control, was furnished by the Support Battalion and the attached aviation units which flew thirty-seven sorties.

(2) During the reporting period two CA teams, Team 9 and Team 15, of the 41st Civil Affairs Company were attached to the Brigade. Team 9 was placed at the rear area base camp at PHU 2013. Team 15 was deployed with the Brigade forward elements. The attachment of these two teams has greatly enhanced the Civil Affairs/Civic Action capabilities of the Brigade.

i. Chemical: During Operation HAWTHORNE two offensive chemical strikes were conducted. One strike was conducted using the UH-1D to drop M7A3 CS filled grenades on dug-in troops on a ridge line. These grenades were dropped from an altitude of 100 feet; however, there was extreme difficulty in marking the target area due to heavy overcast and rain. The second drop consisted of the delivery of M7A3 CS filled grenades and M158 Canister Cluster CS munitions systems. The drop was held at an altitude of 500 feet because of heavy overcast. The target was a possible supply base, and the strike was exploited by a B-52 raid about one hour following the drop.

j. Psychological Warfare: The Brigade considers the Psychological Warfare effort to be an extremely important adjunct to ground tactical operations. We have had up to two teams attached to the Brigade for operations although generally there is only one. Leaflets are delivered primarily by a U-10 aircraft and a C-47 aircraft, both of which are assigned to the 5th Air Command Squadron which is based at PLEIKU. At times organic aircraft have been utilized to drop leaflets or broadcast Psychological Warfare tapes. During the reporting period, the Brigade participated in Operations AUSTIN VI, HAWTHORNE and BEAUREGARD and is currently participating in Operation JOHN PAUL JONES. During Operation AUSTIN VI, 755,000 leaflets were dropped and 20 hours of broadcast time was utilized. During Operation HAWTHORNE 6,600,000 leaflets were dropped and 28 hours of broadcast time was utilized. On Operation BEAUREGARD 13,592,000 leaflets were dropped and 37 hours of broadcast time was utilized. Operation JOHN PAUL JONES was a week old at the close of the reporting period and at that time 2,162,000 leaflets had been dropped and 10 hours of broadcast time utilized. The majority of the broadcasts were made from aircraft, however, ground mobile speaker teams have been utilized by front line Infantry Battalions.
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Section 2 (C) Commanders Observations and Recommendations

Part I Observations (Lessons Learned):

A. General. In a counterinsurgency environment it is essential to win the loyalty and allegiance of the people. In a country with such great political instability as exists in Vietnam, our presence, conduct and methods of tactical operations must not become a political issue. Otherwise, the government could fall. Our actions must be above reproach so that the communists and Viet Cong have no cause to exploit unfavorable actions through propaganda. Since we command no other forces but our own, it is also essential that we win the respect and admiration of the military and paramilitary forces in Vietnam. Unlike in other wars, the importance of the individual soldier as an ambassador at large is much greater than ever before, and in guerrilla warfare the cutting edge is the squad and the individual soldier. To this end we have published a brochure (See Inclosure 5), Tips for Diplomats and Warriors. This brochure lists lessons learned and tips for small unit leaders and individuals in Vietnam.

B. Operations:

1. Item: Assignment of a command and control helicopter in direct support of the Infantry Battalion.

   Discussion: The use of a command and control helicopter in the direct support of the Infantry Battalion can provide flexibility to the commander. This helicopter can be used to assist units in pinpointing their location, in guiding units to their objective, and in relaying communications. A helicopter in this role can further be utilized for medical evacuation and resupply missions.

   Observation: When available from supporting airmobile units, a utility helicopter should be assigned in direct support of the Infantry Battalion.

2. Item: Daylight movement in dense terrain.

   Discussion: It is essential, when moving during daylight hours in dense terrain, to deploy on mutually supporting axes in order to preclude enemy ambush and provide a force which can be made available to encircle the enemy once contact is made. Trails can be utilized for the main element, with patrols out to the front and flanks. The rate of movement of the main body must be slower to permit flank units to keep up. Maintaining flank security in thick jungle during hours of darkness in almost impossible. Therefore, consideration should be given to establishing a perimeter and ambushing trails at night.

   Observation: When moving in dense terrain, forces should be deployed on mutually supporting axes.


   Discussion: Machine guns should be placed well forward in moving columns so that a heavy base of fire can be immediately established with a minimum of manuever. In many cases the M-60 rifle should be issued in lieu of the M-79 grenade launcher and the M-72 LAW. This should be done where the terrain is so thick it limits the fields of fire to such an extent that it renders the M-79 and M-72 ineffective. Also, in extremely dense terrain, approximately fifty percent tracer ammunition can enhance the effectiveness of the rifleman by permitting him to observe his fire.

   Observation: In extremely dense jungle terrain, consideration should be given to employing machine guns well forward in moving columns.
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use of approximately fifty percent tracer ammunition, and to replacing the M-79
and M-72 with the H-65 rifle.

4. Item: Utilization of helicopter units in support of the
battalion.

Discussion: When helicopter companies are placed in direct
support of an Infantry Battalion, greater responsiveness and effectiveness
can be realized by continuously employing the same helicopter units
with a particular battalion. This permits the helicopter and Infantry units to become
more familiar with each other's personnel and methods of operation.

Observation: Every effort should be made to have the same
helicopter unit consistently support the same Infantry unit.

5. Item: Attachment of Engineer landing zone clearing teams.

Discussion: In many cases, when operating in dense terrain,
natural landing zones are not available. The assignment of small engineer
teams to the Infantry Battalions, for use in cutting or improving landing zones,
will permit the use of helicopters for resupply and medical evacuation which
might otherwise not be possible.

Observation: When operating in dense terrain, small Engineer
landing zone clearing teams should be attached to each Infantry Battalion.


Discussion: When B-52 strikes are to be conducted, they must
be scheduled to permit immediate exploitation of the target area following the
strike. This enables our forces to catch the enemy off guard when he is still
dazed by the strike and unprepared to fight. The enemy will be more likely to
withdraw and be caught off guard. Therefore, consideration should be given to scheduling the
B-52 strikes during daylight hours.

Observation: B-52 strikes should be scheduled to permit
exploitation of the target area by friendly forces immediately following the
strike.

7. Item: Engagement of newly infiltrated NVA units.

Discussion: Newly infiltrated NVA units engaged at the border
are extremely vulnerable to attack. They have just finished a long journey
that left them physically and psychologically unprepared for combat. They are
inexperienced and not knowing the terrain are forced to use existing road and
trail networks. This makes them easily detected and subject to ambush.

Observation: NVA units should be engaged by friendly forces
as soon as possible after they have infiltrated into RVN.

8. Item: New Lightweight Howitzer M-102 continues to present problem
in the maintenance areas. The following defects have been noted during the
past operations: Broken sight mount, broken bearing on variable recoil can
roller, broken bearing bracket, binding elevation mechanism, cracked base
plates and broken platform stakes. Emergency EIR's have been submitted on
these items.

Observation: The defects noted on the M-102 howitzer need
to be corrected as rapidly as possible.

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Discussion: The conventional M-79 round was found to have limited value in extremely thick bamboo jungles, since the round could not penetrate the undisturbed canes, and for the M-79 grenade launcher, however, proved to be highly effective in penetrating the bamboo. The shot pattern at 100 yards provides an extremely high number of first-round hits. The use of this round together with the 60mm mortar was effective in discouraging "hugging" techniques by the enemy.

Observation: The XM76NP cannister round is effective for use in dense jungle terrain and its issue to units in Vietnam should be expedited.

10. Item: Continuous tactical air and artillery support.

Discussion: The continuous and simultaneous employment of artillery and tactical air support of the same target area has been a problem. A possible solution to this problem is to place a UHF (MVB-25) radio in the artillery FSO and to have an artillery FO accompany the FSO or train the FSO in FO procedures. The FO would be equipped with an AN/VRC-25 radio. This would provide continuous communications between the artillery FSO, AM, FAC's and fighter pilots and thus permit direct coordination.

Observation: Continuous communications between the artillery and Air Force is necessary to effect continuous and simultaneous artillery and Tactical Air support of the same target area.

11. Item: Use of cratering charges.

Discussion: Cratering charges are more effective than TNT or C-4 for the destruction of tunnels, fortifications and caches. Although cratering charges are awkward and not easily transportable by footmobile elements, the charge is very stable and can easily be delivered to the area by employing free-fall techniques from a hovering helicopter.

Observation: Cratering charges are more effective than TNT or C-4 for the destruction of tunnels, fortifications and caches.

12. Item: Flamethrowers.

Discussion: Flamethrowers have been found to be too cumbersome to be carried by elements maneuvering by foot in dense jungle terrain. The 18 flamethrowers authorized the three battalions of the Brigade have been turned into the Brigade Base Camp, and have been issued to the Support Battalion (Forward) for use on call by the battalions. This pooling of infrequently used assets conserves material, reduces maintenance and reduces unit impedimenta. Flamethrowers should be flown into the objective area as required. Support Battalion, with the assistance of the 20th Chemical Detachment, has been given the responsibility for maintaining three portable flamethrowers in a ready, charged state to be issued to the using unit on short notice.

Observation: Flamethrower teams with charged flamethrowers should be on call to be flown by helicopter into forward areas requiring their use.

13. Item: Inadequacy of current helicopter winch systems.

Discussion: Many missions require the use of helicopters with a winch capability. The hoist on the UH-1D medevac needs to be modified...
to increase its reliability. The hoist of the CH-47 is adequate but to slow for personnel evacuation. The hoist of the Marine Corps CH-46 is adequate. However, we believe the AF HH-43 is the best means available. Air Force and Marine helicopters can be used if available but only on a mission basis. Consideration should be given to providing the Brigade two HH-43 helicopters until the UH-ID has been modified to provide for reliable extraction.

Observation: Helicopter winch systems for the CH-47 and UH-ID should be improved to provide a more reliable and faster hoist capability.


Discussion: Airlifting of artillery units by CH-47 helicopters can be expedited through the use of "piggy-back" sling loads. This technique reduces the time and number of sorties required.

Observation: "Piggy-back" loading should be used when displacing artillery units by CH-47 helicopters.

15. Item: Reporting of mine field locations.

Discussion: During the month of July 1966, elements of the Brigade encountered three mined and unreported mine fields which had apparently been placed by friendly forces. A total of seven lives were lost in these mine fields and more than six platoon days of effort were required to identify and mark the limits of the fields or to destroy the mines.

Observation: It is imperative that all mine fields known to any element of friendly forces be reported through proper channels.

C. Intelligence:

1. Item: Use of IPW teams and interpreters at battalion level.

Discussion: The use of IPW teams at battalion level to interrogate POW's can provide valuable information which would otherwise not have been available for some time. Also, the use of interpreters down to company level can be useful in obtaining information from POW's and the local populace.

Observation: When available, IPW personnel and interpreters should be provided down to the battalion level.

2. Item: Reliability of sources of intelligence information.

Discussion: Operations during this period reconfirmed the fact that the best intelligence information is received from friendly units on the ground. The information gained from ralliers, agents, local civilians and visual reconnaissance has been found to be extremely sketchy and unreliable.

Observation: Friendly units on the ground provide the most reliable intelligence sources.

3. Item: Lack of adequate communications by Viet Cong.

Discussion: The apparent lack of adequate Viet Cong communications has enabled the Brigade to engage many small elements without the Viet Cong being able to alert other enemy forces in the area. Engagements with these small groups of NVA soldiers enabled capturing prisoners and documents from which valuable information was obtained. From these documents it was often possible to rapidly determine the enemy's strength and disposition.
Observation: The Viet Cong lack of communications often permits engagement of one enemy element without permitting other Viet Cong forces in the area to be alerted.

4. Item: North Vietnamese map coverage.

Discussion: Frequently captives can read their own maps but are unfamiliar with ours and unable to read them. Better information can be obtained from captives if the IPW teams and the front line battalions have North Vietnamese maps of the operational area.

Observation: North Vietnamese map coverage of the operational area should be provided to IPW teams and front line battalions.

5. Item: Necessity for capturing prisoners of war.

Discussion: During Operation HUTUOE, prisoners were not captured until late in the operation. Individual soldiers must be impressed with the importance of capturing prisoners. They are often inclined to be too quick on the trigger.

Observation: Individual soldiers must be impressed with the importance of capturing POWs.

6. Item: Immediate deployment of IPW teams to points of Viet Cong capture.

Discussion: The immediate deployment of IPW teams to the place where Viet Cong have been captured, enhances the timeliness of the information gained and negates the possibility of false or misleading information being obtained by untrained interrogators.

Observation: When possible, IPW teams should be sent to the location where the POWs have been captured.

7. Item: Conversion of the truck mounted 1,500 GPH Erdalator water purification set to an airmobile item.

Discussion: Co A, 326th Engr Bn arrived in Vietnam with two 600 GPH trailer mounted Erdalator water purification sets. These items had been well used before arrival in country and began to have maintenance troubles immediately. A single 600 GPH set must be run almost continuously in order to supply the 1st Brigade with water. This continuous operation compounded the maintenance problems, USARV reco,ni-ored the unsatisfactory performance of the 600 GPH sets and issued two new 1,500 GPH sets to replace them. The truck mounted 1,500 GPH sets are too high to fit in any aircraft other than the C-124. This negated the usefulness of these items to the 1st Brigade in Vietnam.

Observation: A visual inspection of the 1,500 GPH set revealed that the van containing the purification equipment is attached to the frame of the truck with ten bolts, five on each of the main frame members. The only other connection to the truck body was a gas line from the fuel tank to the place holder within the van. Because the heater is not needed in Vietnam, this line was permanently disconnected. By loosening the bolts, the van can be lifted by two forklifts onto pallets and into J-130 aircraft. The 27 ton truck with the van dismounted and the 3/4 ton trailer containing the 10 KW generator make one C-130 load. The van body takes one-half of another load. Upon arrival, the van can again be placed onto the truck. This disassembly, loading, and reassembly has been accomplished twice without mishap or undue effort. The 1,500 GPH Erdalator water purification set has provided the 1st Brigade water almost without interruption since it has been in the forward area.
is great enough so that the equipment operates less than half of the time and adequate time is available for preventative maintenance.

8. Item: Maintenance of contact with the enemy.

Discussion: The LRRP is an intelligence collection agency and by virtue of the nature of its operations is often subjected to enemy contact. Since the enemy contact is of such a positive intelligence nature, it has been found necessary to have an immediate action force available in conjunction with all LRRP operations. The force need only be of sufficient size to maintain contact with the enemy until an adequate size force is employed. This force, of platoon or company size would be deployed in proximity to the LRRP so it can move to engage when the LRRP observes an enemy force.

Observation: Reconnaissance elements should often be backed up by immediate action forces which can maintain contact with the enemy until a larger force can be deployed in the area.

D. Logistics:

1. Item: Use of native supply bearers.

Discussion: In extremely dense terrain, carrying of excess ammunition and equipment, can extremely hinder the maneuverability and effectiveness of the individual soldier. Natives can be employed and utilized in carrying food and supplies from landing zones to clandestine base areas. Small units can be resupplied from these locations.

Observation: When possible, native supply bearers should be utilized in dense jungle terrain so our troops can travel lightly and be in better physical condition to fight when the enemy is encountered.

2. Discussion: Most CIDG personnel are armed with either the caliber .45 M1911A1 caliber or caliber .30 Carbine, and provisions must be made for having such ammunition immediately available for resupply. CIDG personnel also prefer to be given fish and rice, their normal diet, rather than C-rations.

Observation: The resupply of ammunition and food for CIDG units should be handled through Special Forces Advisors and not by direct resupply by the Brigade.

3. Item: Necessity for a joint Army - Air Force planning conference prior to major deployment by aircraft.

Discussion: During past operations, there has been a lack of information provided to the Army regarding the capabilities of the Air Force to support air movement operations. Additional difficulties were encountered by the inability of either the Army or Air Force to communicate directly between the departure and arrival airfields. The assignment of a senior mission commander to remain with the deploying unit to coordinate the movement would further enhance the operation.

Observation: A joint planning conference should be held between the Army and Air Force prior to the unit deploying by air.

E. Psychological Warfare:

1. Item: Location of Psychological Warfare unit.

Discussion: Psychological Warfare aircraft should be attached to and operate from the Brigade. Stationing these aircraft at air strips.
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other than the Brigade's reduces the flexibility and responsiveness of the Psy War effort.

Observation: Pay War aircraft should operate from the Brigade location.

2. Item: Assignment of Pay War personnel to the Brigade.

Discussion: To conduct an effective Pay War program in the Brigade, it is imperative that a school trained officer, preferably a captain, be assigned to the S-3 Section as the Brigade Psychological Warfare Officer.

Observation: A school trained Pay War officer should be assigned to the Brigade.

Part II Recommendations:

A. That Pay War aircraft be attached and remain in the Brigade area during operations.

Action Taken: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division letter dated 21 June 1966, Subject: Psychological Warfare, to I FFORCIV, requested this attachment.

B. That the Brigade be provided with one school trained Psychological Warfare Officer and a small Pay War detachment capable of printing, packaging and delivering leaflets.

Action Taken: Request was forwarded to I FFORCIV by 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division WM (S), 6-406A dated 23 June 1966, Subjects: Psychological Operations Posture.

C. That a senior USAF mission commander be assigned for airlifts and that a joint Army - Air Force planning conference be held prior to any air movement.

Action Taken: A letter is being prepared on this subject for submission through channels.

D. That a fourth maneuver battalion be provided to the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

Action Taken: TIX (S), this Hqs, 8-C611, Subject: Fourth Maneuver Battalion Separate Brigade, to I FFORCIV submitted the recommendation that action be taken to that end as soon as practicable and gave advantages to such a concept.

E. That Department of Army approval be given to the MTOS for the 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division. Approval has been received to date only by USAF and USAMPH.

Action Taken: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division letter, Subject: Recommended Augmentation to 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, to Commanding General, USAF, dated 11 November 1965.

F. That the employment of native supply bearers on combat operations be approved.

Action Taken: Recommendation forwarded by TIX, this Hqs, Subject: Formation of TSC to USAF, dated 19 May 1965, and letter, this Hqs, Subject: Formation of Vietnamese Service Corps, to I FFORCIV, dated 26 June 1966.
AVBD-C

(RCS: OSFOR-65):

0. That the 1,500 GPH truck mounted eductor, FSH-610-649-8386, be
   redesigned to be air transportable by C-130 aircraft.

   Action Taken: A letter recommending this action is being prepared
   for forwarding through USAXV to the Army Materiel Command.

   WILLIAM PEARSON
   Brigadier General, USA
   Commanding

Inclosures
1 - Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN
2 - Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORNE
3 - Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BEMBEARD (EAGLE BAIT)
4 - Operations Overlays
5 - Tips for Diplomats and Warriors

Distribution:
2 - CO, T. E. FORBES, APO 96040, ATTN: AVF-FG-TDC
1 - Asst CofS For Force Development, D5, Washington DC 20310 (thru channels)
1 - ELMER HAVAR, APO 96558, ATTN: GPO-7H
3 - CO, USAIV, APO 96307, ATTN: AVO-DH

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Inclousure 4 (Operations Overlays) to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966

The Tabs to this inclousure provide overlays for each of the Brigades operational areas during the reporting period as follows:

- Operation AUSTIN VI - See Tab A
- Operation FANTHORPE - See Tab B
- Operation HUNGERFORD - See Tab C
- Operation JOHN PAUL JONES - See Tab D
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Tab 0 to Enclosure 4 (Operation BEUREGARD) to Operations Overlays

BEUREGARD

Scale: 1:350,000

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Tab. D to Enclosure 4 (Operation JOHN PHIL JONES) to Operations Overlays

John Phil Jones
Phase I

Scale: 1:250,000

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN (RCS: MACV J3-32)

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO US Forces 96240

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J3L3
APO US Forces 96243

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation AUSTIN.

2. (U) Date of Operation: 12 April to 18 May 1966.

3. (U) Location: LAM DONG, BINH THUAN, BINH TUY, QUANG DUC, and PHUOC LONG Provinces.


5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Willard Pearson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

6. (C) Task Organization:

a. Shown below is the task organization of the Brigade during Operation AUSTIN 2 (PHAN THIET Area). This organization remained relatively unchanged throughout the entire operation, with the exception of GVN Military and para-military forces who were attached and/or under operational coordination of the 1st Bde during various phases of the operation. The GVN units are listed in paragraph b below.

   **TF 2/502**
   - 2/502 Inf
   - C2/320 Arty
   - 3d Plt (-) A/326 Engr
   - Tm 3d RRU

   **TF 1/327**
   - 1/327 Inf
   - A2/320 Arty
   - 1st Plt (-), A/326 Engr
   - Tm 3d RRU

b. During AUSTIN 2 the 442d RF Company and 23d Recon Company, 23d Infantry Division (ARVN) provided security by mutual agreement with CG, 1st
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN (RCS: MACV J3-32)

Bde for the PHN THIET airfield complex by conducting S&D operations in adjacent areas. PF units from the local NY training center assisted in providing airfield security. Coordination with the 15th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) provided security for A/326 Engr to repair, clear, and open National Route 1 from PHN THIET to SONG MAO during phase II. CIDG units from LUONG SON CIDG camp accompanied each Bde Inf BN on operations during phase II. Local PF units were used as blocking forces and additional combat power. During AUSTIN 6 the 285th RF Company was attached to the lst Bde. Early coordination was established with MACV Adv Tm 32 (QUI Nhon - QUANG Duc Province) and MACV Adv Tm 91 (LC5-5-31) (SONG BE - PHUOC LONG Province). Montagnard scouts, porters and guides, a III Corps Ranger Company from the 31st Ranger BN, CIDG units, and elements of the 15th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) were attached and/or worked in conjunction with lst Bde during all phases. Initial NHON CO Airfield security was provided by an RF scout company and upon their departure, by a CIDG company with subsequent relief during phases II and III by a battalion from the 15th Infantry Regiment (ARVN).


d. On 11 May 1966 TF2/503Inf was attached to the Brigade. This TF consisted of 2d Battalion (Abn), 503 Inf. 3 Battery, 2d Battalion (Abn) 319th Artillery. A Co, 82d Aviation Battalion from Bien Hoa was in direct support of TF 2/503.

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. 2/320th Artillery (Abn): Employed in a direct support role.

b. 31/30th Artillery: Provided general support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

c. 10th Aviation Battalion: Provided helicopters for 10 company size or larger assaults throughout the operation. In addition, the unit flew daily resupply missions and provided armed helicopter support.

d. A Company, 82d Aviation Battalion: Provided direct support helicopter lift for TF 2/503 Inf.

e. 7th Fleet, US Navy: The USS Canberra and USS Higbee provided naval gunfire support during Operation AUSTIN 2.

f. 7th Air Division, MAG-3: Employed 82 tactical air missions for 215 sorties. Results of the above missions include 61 VC KIA, 61 structures destroyed, 36 structures damaged, 1 secondary explosion, 1 bunker destroyed, 3 bunkers damaged, 3 caves destroyed, 3 wells destroyed. In all cases, tactical air support was immediately responsive to requests.

g. Strategic Air Command, USAF: Flew 1 He-52 mission for 3 sorties in support of Operation AUSTIN 6.

h. 508th Medical Detachment (Airmobile): Provided continuous and efficient medical evacuation for the Brigade throughout the operation.

8. (U) Intelligence: Enclosure 2, Intelligence.

9. (U) Mission: Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam directed that the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division initially conduct search and destroy operations astride the II and III Corps boundary in the PHN THIET area and subsequently in the NHON CO area, to locate and destroy enemy forces and facilities.
10. (C) Concept of Operation: Operation AUSTIN consisted of two operations, AUSTIN 2 and AUSTIN 6.

a. Operation AUSTIN 2: This operation was conducted in two phases. See Inclosure 3 (Operations Overlay, Operation AUSTIN E).

(1) Phase I (12 April to 18 April 1966): This phase consisted of the initial search and destroy operations by 2/502 Inf and 1/327 Inf, astride the II and III Corps boundary northwest of PHAN THIET.

(2) Phase II (18 April - 25 April 1966): This phase consisted of Hunter Killer operations northeast of PHAN THIET by 2/502 Inf and 1/327 Inf and in conjunction with the 15th Inf Regt (ARVN), opening National Route 1 from PHAN THIET to SON HQ.

b. Operation AUSTIN 6: This operation was conducted in three phases. See Inclosure 4 (Operations Overlay, Operation AUSTIN 6).

(1) Phase I: (1 May - 10 May 1966). This phase consisted of initial search and destroy operations by 2/502 Inf in the vicinity of the BU PRANG RF outpost to spoil a suspected NVA attack in that area. This phase also involved the commitment of 1/327 Inf southeast of the BU PRANG RF outpost astride two main infiltration routes from Cambodia. All operations were conducted in conjunction with the 15th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) conducting a search and destroy operation to the southwest of SON HQ.

(2) Phase II: (6 May - 11 May 1966). This phase consisted of search and destroy operations in the vicinity of BU GLA RF Airfield by 2/502 Inf, 1/327 Inf and 2/503 Inf. While 2/502 Inf entered the BU GLA RF area on 6 May, 1/327 Inf remained in the vicinity southeast of BU PRANG, subsequently joining the BU GLA RF campaign on 10 May 1966.

(3) Phase III: (11 May - 18 May). This phase consisted of the exploitation of a B-52 strike northwest of BU GLA RF by the 2/502 Inf and 2/503 Inf, 1/327 Inf and 3d Bn, 15th Regt, conducting Search and Destroy operation in their respective areas southeast of BU GLA RF, and in the final phases affected a link-up.

11. (C) Execution:

a. AUSTIN 2:

(1) The Brigade (-) began deployment by air and sea from the TUY HOA area into the PHAN THIET area on 8 April 1966. The last elements closed PHAN THIET on 16 April 1966. A total of 237 C-130 sorties were flown and 3 barges used.

(2) Phase 1c: On 11 - 12 April 1966, small recon elements from 2/502 Inf and the Brigade Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol were covertly introduced at dusk by helicopters into Area BULL RUN. The mission of these elements was to develop hard intelligence of the area and secure landing zones in preparation for the main (-) assault the following day. On 13 April 1966, TF 2/503 Inf conducted a helicopter assault on multiple LZ's in Area BULL RUN. The scheme of maneuver involved one company blocking across the valley in the eastern portion of Area BULL RUN with one company sweeping southeast along the stream and river bed areas. The third company conducted a sweep from the western portion of Area BULL RUN, east along the valley and into the blocking force. Following a link-up of all forces on 16 April 1966, TF 2/502 Inf re-oriented to the southwest and conducted a two day sweep operation generally parallel to the II and III Corps boundary. Following the completion of this sweep on 18 April 1966, TF 2/502 Inf was extracted by helicopter back to PHAN THIET Airfield. Concurrent with operations in Area BULL RUN, 1/327 Inf initiated...
operations in Area SUMTHI. Recon elements were introduced into the area at dusk on 16 April 1966 accompanied by platoon size units which acted as immediate reaction forces. Small recon teams continued to be introduced into Area SUMTHI until, by 16 April 1966, the total force comprised was approximately one reinforced rifle company. The BN (-) remained at PHAN THIT Airfield as Brigade BN. 1/327 INF reserve. Vigorous saturation patrolling continued throughout Area SUMTHI until 18 April 1966 when all forces were extracted by helicopter back to PHAN THIT Airfield. During this period a Vietnamese RF Company, 23d Recon Co, and selected FF units provided security for the PHAN THIT Airfield complex.

(3). Phase III: Based on intelligence that a VC base area was located in the mountainous area northeast of PHAN THIT, plans were formulated to commit forces in that area. On 18 April 1966, 2/320 Artillery (-) moved by C-130 aircraft into the LUONG SON CIDG camp to BLT/320 and moved by C-130 aircraft into PHAN THIT Airfield to conduct a logistical resupply into the LUONG SON CIDG camp. At dusk on 18 April 1966, recon elements from 2/502 INF and 1/327 INF were introduced into Areas RUMTHI and LEOWANG by helicopter. Concurrent with these recon elements, assaults by the 23d Vietnamese-Junk Fleet conducted a joint amphibious assault along the coastlines. On 20 April 1966, 2/502 INF and 1/327 INF conducted helicopter assaults on multiple LZ's in red-cliner and LEOWANG respectively. Elements from the LUONG SON CIDG camp accompanied both battalions acting as guides and interpreters. Concurrently the battalions of the 13th INF BCT (2/425) initiated operations along parallel intercoastal routes. Four RF companies from 2/502 INF moved to and occupied blocking positions in Area ODO. Additional RF companies were heliborne into the operational area to conduct sweeps with 2/502 INF and 1/327 INF to the south, southeast, northwest respectively. On 22 May 1966 2/502 INF provided liaison personnel as training cadre and battalion commanders with RF companies sweeping to the south and east; 1/327 INF swept south while the RF units swept to the northwest from the same LZ, thus installing new confidence in the local SVN forces while dispelling exaggerated intelligence myths concerning the presence of large VC forces in the area. Following search and destroy operations to the south, 2/502 INF and 1/327 INF were extracted by helicopter to PHAN THIT Airfield. All units closed by 25 April 1966 terminating Operation JUSTIN 2.

b. JUSTIN 6:

(1) The Brigade began deployment from the PHAN THIT area to the NUNG CO area by C-130 aircraft on 25 April 1966. A total of 172 sorties were flown. All units had closed NUNG CO by 2 May 1966.

(2) Phase I: On 30 April 1966, recon elements of 2/502 INF and 1/327 INF were introduced into Areas JACKSON and SHERMAN. On 1 May 1966, 2/502 INF conducted a helicopter assault into Area JACKSON to plug a suspected VC main attack on the PHAN THIT RF outposts. 2/502 INF conducted search and destroy operations in areas JACSON until 6 May 1966 with negative contact. 1/327 INF was committed on 1 May 1966 by helicopter into Area SHARON astride south. 1/327 INF conducted search and destroy operations in Area SHERMAN until 8 May 1966 with negative contact. Security of the PHAN THIT Airfield was coordinated with and provided by a Maritime scout company and, upon their relief, by a local CIDG company. All operations were conducted in coordination with the 13th Infantry Regiment (APA) search and destroy operation to the southwest of NUNG CO.

(3) Phase II: Acting on reliable intelligence reports that a VC buildup was taking place in the PHAN THIT area, 2/502 INF was committed on 6 May 1966 by helicopter in the vicinity of 24 ODA RF area and initiated search and destroy operations in that area. Although the intelligence situation developed it was decided to commit 1/327 INF into the area to

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reinforce 2/502 Inf. Three days were required to complete the heliborne move-
ment due to inclement weather. 1/327 Inf completed movement on 10 May 1966
and initiated search and destroy operations southeast of BU GIA MAP. On 8 May
1966, in order to release A2/17 Cav and one rifle company for commitment to
reinforce 2/502 Inf and 1/327 Inf, one battalion from the 15th Regt (ARVN)
was provided for security of the NHON CO Airfield and Brigade CP complex.
During the early morning hours of 11 May 1966 2/502 Inf began receiving
sniper fire while conducting search and destroy operations west of BU GIA MAP.
This contact developed into a battle with two company NVA force. Elements of
2/502 Inf and A2/17 Cav surrounded this force, directed artillery and Tac Air
into the area and was able to decimate an entire NVA Battalion, as confirmed
by body count and later POW interrogation. Two batteries of 2/320 Artillery
lired 2,000 rounds in support of 2/502 Inf during the engagement. On 11 May
1966, TF 2/503 was attached to the Brigade and moved by C-130 aircraft to
SONG BE Airfield. Deploying by helicopter to LZ’s north of SONG BE, TF
2/503 initiated search and destroy operations to the north and linked up
with 2/502 Inf on 13 May 1966 west of BU GIA MAP.

Phase III: At 140000 May 1966, a B-52 strike was con-
ducted northwest of BU GIA MAP in Area SAND. 2/502 Inf and 2/503 Inf con-
ducted search and destroy operations in this area to exploit the strike.
Relatively light contact was experienced by both forces throughout the ex-
ploitation. On 17 May 1966, 2/503 Inf was extracted by helicopter to SONG BE
and subsequently moved by C-130 aircraft to BIRN HOK. 2/502 Inf moved by
helicopter to BU GIA MAP Airfield and was extracted by CV-2 aircraft to
NHON CO on 17 May 1966. Concurrent with the B-52 exploitation, 1/327 Inf con-
tinues search and destroy operations southwest of BU GIA MAP, seizing a VC
Provincial Hq., Hospital and POW camp. One company from the 31st Ranger
Battalion (III Corps) provided security for three 155mm howitzers from B1/30 Arty,
supporting elements of the 15th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) in operations in
Area TORCH southwest of BU GIA MAP. On 15 May 1966 a link-up was effected
with elements of the 3d Bn, 15th Inf Regt (ARVN), sweeping north from
National Route 1a. Following the link-up, 1/327 Inf was extracted by
helicopter to NHON CO Airfield on 18 May 1966.

Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, succeeded in its
mission to find, fix, and destroy Viet Cong forces and facilities in the
PHAN THIET and NHON CO areas.
b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during Operation
AUSTIN 2.

(1) Personnel losses:
   16 VC KIA (BC)
   5 VC KIA (ARVN)
   5 VC KIA (EST)
   16 VC KIA (EST) (USAF)
   25 WGS
   3 VC (Incl 2 WIS)

(2) Weapons captured:

Nomenclature Quantity
(a) United States Manufactured
 Shotgun, 12 gauge 1
 Rifle, US, M1903, Cal 30.06 1
 Carbine, US M1, Cal .30 1
 SMG, M3, Cal .45 1
 SMG, Thompson Cal .45 1
(b) German Manufactured
 Rifle, Mauser 98, Cal 7.92 1
(c) French Manufactured
 Rifle, MAS 1936, Cal 7.5mm 1

(3) Food
 Rice destroyed 13½ tons
 Rice evacuated 2 tons
 Potatoes destroyed 2 tons

(4) Camps or Buildings destroyed (unless noted)
 Structures 61
 Structures damaged 36
 Administrative camp (100 persons) 1
 Bunkers 1
 Bunkers damaged 3
 Caves 3
 Wells 3

(5) Body to weapons ratio: 2.7 to 1.

The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during Operation AUSTIN 61:

(1) Personnel losses:
  101 VC KIA (BG)
  103 VC KIA (EST)
  45 KIA (EST) (USAF)
  7 VCD
  6 VCC (Includes 3 WIA)

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN (RG: MACV J3-32)

5 June 1966

(2) Weapons captured:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) United States Manufactured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbine US M-1, cal .30</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) German Manufactured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle Mauser 98, cal 7.92mm</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) French Manufactured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMG, M1949 9mm</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Chinese Communist Manufactured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMG type 56 (Soviet ARD)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT rocket launcher type 56 (Soviet RPG-2)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953 copy of Soviet 7.62mm rifle M1918/30 (sniper rifle)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbine type 56 (Soviet SKS) 7.62mm</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbine type 52 (Soviet M1944) 7.62mm</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault rifle, type 56 (Soviet .30-47) 7.62mm</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Unknown manufactured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown (Destroyed)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Ammunition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81mm mortar</td>
<td>124 rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm mortar</td>
<td>141 rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57mm RR</td>
<td>101 rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm for RPG-2</td>
<td>300 rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.45 cal</td>
<td>2,000 rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 cal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Body to weapons ratio: 2.3 to 1.

13. (c) Administrative Matters:


b. Logistics: Inclosure 5 (Logistics).
11. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. In the PHAN THIET area, water resupply was most difficult. There were no streams and few LZs existed for resupply by helicopter. Resupply of water in 5 gallon cans was accomplished, but extraction of empty cans was difficult and time consuming. Collapsible canvas water bags which, when empty could be folded and carried, proved to be the best solution.

b. By cutting trails in the jungle until an established trail was intersected, elements were able to avoid established VC early warning outposts.

c. Ground elements must be positioned in mutually supporting positions due to loss of helicopter support to move reserves during periods of inclement weather.

d. Native bearers can be effectively utilized to resupply units in clandestine bases. The bearers' and supplies can be moved to an LZ some distance from the clandestine base by helicopters; guides from the unit then can escort the native bearers to the clandestine base and back.

e. Due to the thick jungle terrain encountered in the NHON CO area, several new employment techniques for weapons were developed.

(1) Because of the difficulty in maneuvering, machine guns were placed well forward in columns so that a heavy base of fire would immediately be available when contact was made.

(2) The M-79 and the M-72 (LAW) proved relatively ineffective in the thick jungle. The terrain precluded good fields of fire. As a result fewer M-72's were used and additional M-16 rifles substituted.

(3) Following the initial successes gained by experiments with tracer ammo the Infantry Battalions utilized tracer ammo in a 50 - 50 ratio. This technique proved extremely effective, particularly in the dense jungle, firing at a fleeing, elusive enemy.

f. Moving through dense terrain in daylight on mutually supporting axes is essential to preclude enemy ambush and to provide an immediately available encircling force once contact with the enemy is made. Trails must be utilized for movement of the main body, with recon patrols well out to the front. Flanking units must be kept out at least 500 - 600 meters, with plans for flanking or encircling any enemy force engaged. The rate of the main body must be slowed to permit the flank units to stay parallel to or leading the main body. Night movement through thick jungle maintaining flank security proved almost impossible. Therefore, the trails were ambushed at night and a perimeter was established.

f. Effective utilization of artillery fire contributed significantly to the very favorable kill ratio obtained. Several techniques used in the employment of artillery were as follows:

(1) Artillery was employed as soon as contact was made in the jungle. Fire was initially placed well to the rear of the enemy's position and adjusted onto the position. This prevented the enemy from breaking contact and held him down in position while we deployed forces around his flanks and rear.

(2) The NVA made maximum use of wire for communications when set up in ambush or defensive positions. A rapid and heavy volume of artillery fire disrupted their communications.
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(3) Artillery fire was "rolled" in front of the pursuing force in 100 meter increments in order to disrupt enemy delaying actions.

(4) Smoke rounds were used extensively to pinpoint locations in the dense jungle.

g. The use of IPW teams at BN level to interrogate POW's provided valuable information that otherwise would not have been available for some time. Also, the use of interpreters at company level proved to be of great help in obtaining information, both from POW's and local population.

h. Assignment of a C&C helicopter in direct support of each Infantry Battalion proved quite effective. The battalions used this helicopter for liaison, communication relay with subordinate units, assisting units to pinpoint their locations, guiding units to terrain objectives, and locating potential LZ's.

i. During this operation, as in many past operations, maximum use was made of ARVN forces as security for the artillery batteries. This released US forces from the security mission and added to our combat capability.

j. When conditions permitted, an airmobile company was placed in direct support of each infantry battalion, and the same company habitually supported a specific battalion. This arrangement was mutually advantageous. It resulted in increased responsiveness, and enhanced the effectiveness of aviation support.

k. Operating across Corps Boundaries with the Base and Hqs in one Corps area and the tactical operation in another seemed to enhance the security of the operation and decreased the likelihood of premature compromise.

l. Use of recon elements to secure LZ's for the assaulting battalions increased our element of surprise.

m. All weather close air support provided by the use of "Sky Spot", has definite value. 18 "Sky Spot" sorties were flown during Operation AUSTIN 6. All were preplanned missions. Evaluation of these missions indicated relatively good coverage and accuracy. The largest circular error was approximately 300 meters from the prescribed target with some ordnance within 10 meters. The accuracy of "Sky Spot" is primarily dependent on accurate 8 digit target coordinates. With the difficulties of identifying exact positions from the ground in dense jungle, airmal or artillery confirmation of coordinates must be made before requesting "Sky Spot".

n. The technique of publishing and distributing a cover plan to the actual operation proved highly effective and seemed to increase the element of surprise. In connection with this cover plan, artillery fires were used to prepare fake LZ's, with helicopters conducting feint assaults in the areas mentioned in the cover plan. In addition, increased aerial reconnaissance was conducted in these areas.

o. One significant aspect of Operation AUSTIN was the active integration of all available forces to include RF/PF, GIDG and ARVN units. This greatly increased our combat power and helped to instill a greater degree of confidence in the GVN forces. At the close of AUSTIN 2 the US Sector Advisor to VINH THUAN Province noted, "The people really got a boost by the presence of the Brigade in the province. Statistics given to me by the Province Chief show forty-one ralliers, true VC, returned to GVN ranks; and three hundred and sixty-one men, women, and children formerly under the VC yoke have returned to government control. To me this is significant and quite meaningful."
15. (C) Commander's Analysis:

a. Suitable techniques must be developed to permit simultaneous employment of close air support and artillery. When the artillery cease fire is given there is usually a lull while the FAC identifies and marks the target. This lull has been used by the enemy to police his dead, wounded and equipment from the battlefield. Likewise, there is usually a lull following an air strike before artillery can again be brought to bear.

b. Employment of the starlight device is limited in dense underbrush. The thick underbrush prevents long range observation.

c. The wear out period of jungle boots and fatigues in jungle terrain was more rapid than anticipated or previously experienced.

d. All enemy base camps and other installations were found near the intersection of trails and streams. Search of water sheds should be among the top priorities when seeking enemy installations.

e. All enemy movement was along well defined trails. Ambushing the trails, particularly at night, resulted in several VC KIA, prisoners, weapons, and documents captured.

f. Enemy ambush positions were generally located along high ground adjacent to trails.

g. Enemy automatic weapons positions generally covered the long axis of approach, e.g. the trails.

h. Enemy forces were vulnerable to encirclement and made little or no use of flank security when engaged.

i. The support of the 265th Psy Ops Company was inadequate. Although special personalized leaflets were prepared, (See inclosures 10 - 13 for examples), delivery time was too slow on all except one. Also, the 5th Air Commando Squadron provided inadequate aircraft support for Psy War operations. Psy War aircraft were grounded in NHA TRANG and elsewhere due to weather while planes were flying in the operational area.

j. A B-52 strike was conducted at 0100H May 1966 along the Cambodian border. Because of the dense jungle, units could not deploy until daylight. Several more hours were required to traverse the 3 KM Buffer Zone. When units reached the strike area they found numerous footprints in a bomb crater indicating that the NVA had time to evacuate before pursuit could be initiated. B-52 strikes must be scheduled to permit immediate exploitation, preferably at first light.

k. The new Lightweight Howitzer continues to present problems. The following are defects that occurred during the operation:

- Broken sight mount.
- Broken bearing on variable recoil cam roller.
- Broken terrain tire bearing bracket.
- Fogged sights.
- Turned sight rotor tails.
- Binding elevation mechanism.
- Cracked base plates.
- Broken platform stakes.

l. During clearing operations in bamboo forests, chain saws are of little value. Vines become easily entangled in the saws and the bamboo
splinters cause many lacerations among the workers.

m. Package petroleum products should be issued in quarts. 55 gal drums are too large to allow for efficient distribution to units.

n. The hoist for aero-medical evacuation is invaluable in jungle areas; however, the present hoist needs modification to increase its reliability.

o. Newly infiltrated NVA units engaged at the border were extremely vulnerable to attacks for the following reasons:

1. They had just finished a long and harrowing journey that left them physically and psychologically unprepared for combat.
2. They were inexperienced in combat.
3. Not knowing the terrain, they were forced to use existing road and trail networks, especially when guides were not available and thus could be easily detected by LRRP type patrols and later ambushed.
4. Many units infiltrate without their heavy weapons or all of their individual weapons.

16. (c) Recommendations:

a. That commando marking kits (balloons with CO2 capsules) or hand held smoke flares be issued to units to assist in marking location in jungle terrain with thick canopy.

b. That the psychological warfare capability be increased by increasing the size and capability of the supporting detachment. The following are considered essential:

1. More and better broadcasting capability.
2. Increased photo reproduction capability.

c. That sufficient Psy War aircraft be attached or remain in the Brigade area during an operation.

d. Present methods of destroying large quantities of captured rice continue to be inadequate and time consuming. A quick and efficient means of destroying large quantities of rice is needed.

e. Many times individuals were forced to sleep on leech infested terrain. Consideration should be given to issuing a lightweight jungle hammock.

f. During the monsoon season when resupply may be delayed due to inclement weather, Infantry Battalions are forced to carry additional ammunition. In this connection, a lightweight plastic, disposable magazine for the M-16 is needed to reduce the weight carried by the individual soldier.

g. That the hoist for aero-medical evacuation be modified to increase its reliability.
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h. That the direct support Aviation Battalion be issued the portable navigational beacon. This will greatly increase their capability during adverse weather conditions and at night.

i. That two U-6 aircraft be assigned to the Brigade to handle minor resupply and administrative missions so that the Brigade's O-1 aircraft can be used solely for operational reconnaissance and surveillance.

[Signature]
WILLARD PEASE
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

Incluons:
1 - Personnel and Administration
2 - Intelligence w/2 Incls
3 - Operations Overlay, Operation AUSTIN
4 - Operations Overlay, Operation AUSTIN
5 - Logistics w/2 Incls
6 - Communications
7 - Civil Affairs
8 - Psychological Warfare
9 - Artillery w/2 Incls
10 - 12 Examples of personalized leaflets

Distribution:
1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington D.C. 20310
1 - CG, USARPAC (ATTN: GPOP-MH)
1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MAC J3-32)
1 - CG MACV (ATTN: MAC J2)
1 - CG MACV (ATTN: MACJ)
2 - CG USARV
1 - CG USARV (ATTN: AUC Historical Division)
2 - CG I FORCES
2 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
1 - CG
1 - DCO
1 - XO
1 - SI
1 - SS
10 - SI
1 - SI
1 - SS
1 - TO
1 - SIG
1 - MSE
Inclosure 1 (Personnel and Administration) to After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

1. (C) Unit Strengths:

a. The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation AUSTIN were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Authorized Augmented</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Joined - Not Assigned</th>
<th>Present for Duty</th>
<th>Not Present for Duty</th>
<th>Airhead</th>
<th>Base Camp (Phan Rang)</th>
<th>Tuy Hoa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5062</td>
<td></td>
<td>183</td>
<td>5143</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>2162</td>
<td>1402</td>
<td>1279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The assigned strength was 124% of the augmented authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 107% of the augmented authorized strength.

c. Of the not present for duty strength, 362 were hospitalized personnel. Because of casualties, ETS losses, and the number of personnel remaining in a hospitalized status, rifle company present for duty strengths were reduced during the operation.

d. The Brigade now has 21 ARVN NCO interpreters and 3 LNO's assigned.

2. (C) Casualties:

   a. Casualties for Operation AUSTIN 2 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. Casualties for Operation AUSTIN 6 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (U) Programs:

   a. The Brigade continued to operate a Forward Personnel Services Center of AD, Postal, and Finance representatives and scheduled periodic visits to units of JAG and Red Cross representatives. With one battalion at Tuy Hoa, an increasing number of replacements at Phan Rang, and the Brigade (-) at Phan Thiet, it became necessary to temporarily augment administrative personnel in order to meet all necessary personnel services requirements.

   b. The newly arrived Red Cross Recreation Unit formulated its program of services to the Brigade and established a temporary office at the Base Camp. The unit initiated visits to troopers at Tuy Hoa and Phan Thiet. Response was excellent. A recreation center is also being constructed at the Base Camp.

   c. To take advantage of the excellent beach facilities at Phan Thiet, the Brigade established a swimming beach co-located with the shower point. One Special Service entertainment group provided a variety show performance at the Phan Thiet airstrip.

   d. In order to expedite award of the Purple Heart to members of the Brigade who are wounded in action but not evacuated, the Brigade requested authority to award the Purple Heart.

4. (U) Morale: Morale during the operation remained "excellent".
Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

1. (c) OPERATION AUSTIN 2:

a. Weather: The weather in the PHAN THIET area was under the influence of the transition from the NE to SW monsoon seasons. There was relatively little rainfall and drought conditions generally prevailed in the coastal plain. Cloud cover and severe winds occurred infrequently. In general, the weather had no effect on friendly operations, except that the shortage of water adversely affected both VC and friendly movements.

b. Terrain:

(1) The terrain in the area of operations was characterized by extensive rice paddies in the LA NGA River valley, and mountainous terrain to the east of PHAN THIET. Cross country movement was restricted to trails and stream beds in the mountains and jungle.

(2) The mountain area northeast of PHAN THIET provided cover and concealment and limited fields of fire. In the area to the east, the heavy jungle provided good concealment and fair cover, while observation and fields of fire were severely limited. Terrain generally favored small unit guerrilla tactics.

(3) The principal avenues of approach were Route 1 to the North and South and the unnumbered route NW to HONG MIN. Secondary avenues of approach were along branches of the KAO ET River from the SW and the LA NGA River from the West and North.

c. Enemy Situation: Initially Viet Cong units were believed to be located as follows:

(1) The 186 Main Force battalion reported by a raider North and West of PHAN THIET in the DANG GLA VC base area.

(2) The 602 Provincial Battalion and the companies of the 603 Provincial Battalion located North and East of PHAN THIET in the LE HONG PHONG VC base area.

(3) Unconfirmed reports indicated that the 48th VC Regiment was located north of PHAN THIET.

(4) Three separate local force companies, 12 guerrilla platoons and an estimated 1,000 local guerrillas were scattered throughout the area of interest. Aggregate VC strength was estimated at 4,300 personnel.

(5) The DONG GLA Base area, North and West of PHAN THIET was believed to contain the B.300 VC Province Headquarters, a medical facility and two VC PX camps. The area was also believed to be a storage area for rice, salt, and weapons.

The LE HONG PHONG VC base area, North and East of PHAN THIET was believed to contain three VC district headquarters, rice storage and food production areas.

d. Results:

(1) Order of Battle:

(a) As a result of a sweep operation, in the DONG GLA Base area, one unidentified VC platoon was contacted and two popular force prisoners of the VC were liberated. No significant camps or documents were found.
Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation AUSTIN

(b) A sweep directed against LE HONG PHONG resulted
one contact with an unidentified platoon. The capture of one prisoner
from Company 486, 602nd Battalion; and the discovery of a VC Political
headquarters.

c) The myth that the DANG GIA and LE HONG PHONG areas
were major VC base areas was dispelled. There were numerous indications
that they were used by the local VC, but not on the scale that was believed
prior to our entry into the area.

d) VC units and their locations for Operation "AUSTIN
2nd" are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVALUATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46th Regiment</td>
<td>AN 7940</td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>Unconfirmed</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186th Infantry</td>
<td>ZT 1394</td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602 Battalion</td>
<td>BN 100300</td>
<td>4 Apr</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>486 Co</td>
<td>BN 100300</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>487 Co</td>
<td>BN 100300</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>100</td>
</tr>
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<td>603 Battalion</td>
<td>BN 010480</td>
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<tr>
<td>490 Co</td>
<td>BN 100300</td>
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<td>440 Co</td>
<td>BN 220350</td>
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<tr>
<td>450 Co</td>
<td>AN 955165</td>
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<td>ZT 180340</td>
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<td>460 Company</td>
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<td>490 Company</td>
<td>BN 520480</td>
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<tr>
<td>430 Platoon</td>
<td>AN 825150</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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Guerrilla Units:

HAI CUONG Vill Plat ZT 254046 " Unconfirmed 14
HONG CHIEN " " BN 100210 " " 36
HONG TIEN " " BN 073185 " " 24
HAI THI MP " " ZT 250180 " " 17
HAI KIEM " " ZT 270030 " " 27
HAI CHIEN " " AN 830390 " " 36
HONG LIEM " " BN 050350 " " 16
HONG SUN " " BN 016930 " " 26
THUYAN XU " " AN 950170 " " 20
THUYAN HOA " " AN 940200 " " 20
HONG HAI " " AN 950150 " " 24
Part time guerrillas, scattered 1,000

(2) VC personnel and equipment losses: See paragraph
12b of this After Action Report.

e. Significant VC Engagements and Losses:

(1) 121445 Apr at ZT 234359 12 VC were engaged by Recon
2/502 resulting in the release of two PF that were prisoners of the
VC. PF stated that contact permitted 56 other prisoners to escape.

(2) 121555 Apr at ZT 090286 approx 25 VC engaged LRRP Team
#1 resulting in 5 VC KIA (BO) before team was extracted.

(3) 211000 Apr at BN 020318 a VC was captured by 3/2/502.
VC stated he was a member of the 486th Company.

(4) 211000 Apr the 2/502 found what appeared to be a VC
Admin area, possibly an induction center, based on the number of applications
to join the National Front for the Liberation of SVN found.

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Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation AUSTIN

f. Lessons Learned: Our operations again proved that the best intelligence is that gained by units on the ground. The Dang GIA and LE HONG PHONG Base areas (especially the latter) had been built up into major base areas on information gathered from agents, ralliers, local civilians and visual reconnaissance. This information proved to be extremely sketchy and unreliable when checked against the actual ground.
Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

2. (C) Operation AUSTIN 6:

a. Terrain: The area of operations consisted of mountainous terrain rising to heights of 900 meters. About 75 percent of the terrain was covered with jungle, which included a canopy as high as 100 feet and thick underbrush. The plateau area around Bu Prong was relatively open. Observation and fields of fire were fair to excellent and cover and concealment ranged from poor to good. Extremely heavy growths of bamboo were encountered around Bu Gia Map where observation and fields of fire were poor, and cover and concealment varied from good to excellent. Primary avenues of approach were Route 14 from the North and South, the unnumbered East-West road along the Cambodian border, and the Song Be River from the West. The terrain favored enemy infiltration operations by providing concealment from aerial observation, and restricted our operations because of the lack of landing zones, especially in the Bu Gia Map area.

b. Weather: May was the beginning of the Southwest monsoon and there was an increase in cloudiness and precipitation. High winds occurred infrequently, but rain and low cloud conditions usually began each afternoon at 1500 hours and lasted until 1000 hours the following morning. The weather severely limited our aerial activity and restricted visibility during morning hours when ground fog was prevalent. These weather conditions favored the enemy by concealing his activity and movement from our aerial observation.

c. Prior to Operation AUSTIN 6, little was known about enemy activity in northern Phouc Long and western Quang Duc Provinces. The following information was available at the beginning of the operation:

1) Major VC infiltration routes crossed the II/III Corps boundary and the Cambodian border in this area.

2) A VC captain captured near Song Be in April stated that the 602-608 NVA infiltration groups were near Bu Gia Map.

3) A VC provincial headquarters (B6) was believed to be located near the II/III Corps boundary southwest of Bu Gia Map.

d. During the operation, the intelligence situation developed rapidly. Because this development was so unique in its scope and time-line, detailed description of development is included in SI (Development of Intelligence in the Bu Gia Map Area) to Inclosure 2 (Intelligence).

e. Results:

1) Order of Battle: As a result of Operation AUSTIN 6, the following major units were identified by POW's, documents and ID cards:

a) 141st NVA Regiment alias 14th Regiment alias 304th Infiltration group.

This regiment was identified in Pleiku province in April 1966 and was reported by POW's to be moving to War Zone D. POW's and maps taken in the Bu Gia Map area further indicated that the 141st was moving to War Zone D.

b) The 3rd Battalion, 141st NVA Regiment fought a delaying action against the advance elements of the 2/502 Inf and A/2/17 Cav on 10 and 11 May in the vicinity of YU 2634. This action rendered the 3rd Battalion ineffective as a fighting force. Total results of this engagement were: 69 VC KIA (D), 74 VC KIA (est), three LMG's and nine individual weapons captured.
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Inlosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

3 It is believed that the 141st Regiment withdrew northwest into Cambodia on or about 11 May.

4 The 141st Regiment is believed to consist of three infantry battalions (numbered 1, 2, and 3) and specialized supporting companies. The 3rd Battalion, 141st Regiment is composed of three rifle companies (numbered 11, 12, and 13) and a heavy weapons company. Weapons of the battalion include four 60mm mortars per company and light machineguns. The heavy weapons company has three 82mm mortars and heavy machineguns. The regimental commander is Lt Col Tong and the 3rd Battalion Commander is Captain Thuan.

(b) 250A NVA Regiment alias Bac Son (North Mountain) Regiment.

1 This regiment is believed to be composed of Battalions numbered 603 through 605 and specialized companies designated C-13 through C-19.

2 A prisoner taken from the 608th Battalion indicated that four of the separate companies of the Bac Son Regiment are in this battalion: C-13 (Infantry), C-14 (Engineer), C-15 (Signal), and C-16 (Mortar and Heavy Machinegun). He stated that the battalion had moved north into Cambodia.

3 This regiment is believed to have infiltrated by battalion toward Binh Ninh (Vu Gia Phu) from the Bu Gia Map area on 18-30 April.

(c) Infiltration Group 609:

1 Identification cards of the 609A and 609D battalion size infiltration groups were recovered from several VC KIA's. These cards indicated the presence of an NVA Regiment using 609 as its infiltration number.

2 Prisoners consistently reported the presence of three regiments (16th, 141st, and 250A) in the area. Compositions of the 141st and 250A regiments as determined above do not include elements of the 609th infiltration group. The 609th infiltration group may also be known as the 16th Regiment.

(d) VC 36 (Phuoc Long Province) Headquarters:

1 1/327 Inf overran the VC Province Headquarters via YU 4424 on 16 May.

2 Captured documents included intelligence estimates, personnel and weapons rosters for the five district companies, after action reports, reports on the US buildup, captured ARVN documents, and large amounts of VC propaganda.

(e) List is a list of VC units and their locations during Operation AUSTIN 6.

(2) VC personnel and equipment losses: See para 12c, this After Action Report.

f. Intelligence Analysis, Lessons Learned:

(1) Analysis:
Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

(a) The Bu Gia Map area was a major VC supply base and rest station as indicated by the capture of 80 tons rice and large amounts of mortar and NR ammunition.

(b) The presence of three NVA Regiments indicates the possibility of a VC division size unit operating in this area. Two of the regiments (141st and Bac Son) were reported to be infiltrating towards War Zone D.

(c) As indicated by POW’s, units infiltrating into South Vietnam have low morale because of homesickness and hardships endured during infiltration. POW’s indicate that they are receiving about five months basic training before starting infiltration, and some newly drafted NVA soldiers are only fifteen years old.

(d) The malaria rate of infiltration groups is as high as 90 percent with an average five percent death rate. Desertion is high in infiltration units. One POW reported that twenty percent of his company had deserted during infiltration.

(e) POW’s reported that heavy weapons are issued upon arrival in South Vietnam.

(f) VC B6 (Phouo Long) Province infrastructure was significantly damaged with the capture of the Province Headquarters complex and the many records of the headquarters.

(2) Lessons Learned:

(a) The apparent lack of adequate VC communications enabled us to engage many small enemy elements without alerting other enemy forces in the area. Engagements with these small groups of NVA soldiers enabled us to take prisoners and capture documents, from which we were able to rapidly determine the enemy’s strength and disposition.

(b) Extremely accurate information provided by a VC rigger combined with Red Haze, Special Agent Reports, and our knowledge of the infiltration routes, were the intelligence factors which enabled us to locate and overrun a major VC base.

(c) In areas such as Bu Gia Map, where friendly forces have not challenged the VC for a long period, the VC tend to become as nonchalant about security as we do in our safe areas. It was this false sense of security, and our clandestine entry into the area that made the surprise of our attack so complete.

2 Inclosures:

1 - Development of Intelligence in the Bu Gia Map Area

2 - VC Units and Locations, Operation AUSTIN 6
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Incl 1 - (Development of Intelligence in the Bu Gia Map Area) to Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

1. 4 May - 01-B on a VR mission received fire off the south end of Bu Gia Map Airfield.

2. 041240 May - Bde aerial observer received fire at YU 358365.

3. 061600 May 3/2/502 captured an ammunition cache at YU 344372 consisting of 100 rds 57mm HR, 68 rds 60mm Illum, 24 rds 60mm HE, 63 rds 81mm Illum, 8 rds 81mm HE, approx 300 rds .45 cal, and approx 2000 rds .223 cal (M16). Two fresh signs (ballpoint ink on cardboard) indicated the ammunition had switched from control of enemy province headquarters to Military Region VI headquarters, and that the 840th NF Battalion had illegally drawn two rds of 57mm HR ammunition. One sign stated that units must coordinate with Military Region VI Hqs before drawing additional ammunition from the cache.

4. 061635 May 0/2/502 captured 1 NVA soldier with pack at YU 356365.

a. The prisoner stated no was a rifleman in the 608th NVA infiltration BN, which is in the Ba Son (North Mountain) Regiment. His unit rested near Bu Gia Map one month (via YU 313339), and departed to move north across the Cambodian border on 3 May.

b. He stated the 608th Battalion has 300 men organized into four companies. The battalion has two 81mm mortars with twenty rds of ammunition each, two heavy machineguns with 400 rds per gun, AK-47's with 100 rds each, and SKS's with 50 rds each. The general health condition of the unit is poor. The 608th has never supplied replacements to other units.

Subject's knowledge of elements of the 608th BN:

(1) BN Hqs:

- BN CO: Tuyen
- BN XO: Duong
- Plat Off: Nhan

(2) 13th Company:

- CO: 1/Lt Cau
- XO: 1/Lt Khi
- 1st Plat Ldr: 2/Lt Mac
- 2nd: " M/Sgt Quang
- 3rd: " CWO Nguyen Thu Dong

Subject was a member of this company. There are three platoons with three squads of nine men. There is no weapons squad. Each squad has four or five AK-47's or AK-50's. Company strength is about 60 of 100 authorized. The unit has never been in battle. Three men have deserted, three died of malaria and 34 were left behind because of malaria.

(3) 14th Company (Combat Engineers):

- CO: Capt Cau
- XO: Dat

Mission is to prepare roads and act as infantry. They also purify water for medical purposes. They have shovels, picks, and knives, and are armed with AK-47's, AK-50's, and SKS's. Each platoon has a light MG. There are 30 men in each platoon. Four or five men of this unit have died of malaria.

2-A-1
15th Company (Combat Communications): There are three platoons in the company. Company equipment includes three telephones and two HT-1 radios. Ten personnel carry approximately one RL-159 (equivalent) of wire (two IMs per man). Weapons of the company are AK-47's, SKS's and two K-44 Russian 7.62mm Mosin-Nagant carbines.

16th Company (Heavy Weapons):

- The company has three 30 man platoons, two 82mm mortars with 10 rds of ammunition each, and two 12.7cm heavy machineguns.

Subject heard other personnel mention that the 603rd infiltration Battalion moved south.

On 5 May he observed 60 rice porters moving along the road at YU 313339, headed towards Bu Gia Map.

Subject was carrying a notebook with hospital records, supply records, and rice receipts. He stated he did not own the notebook but that he had picked it up as he left the company camp to use as cigarette paper. (He did not change his explanation throughout interrogation).

- The hospital records indicate an important enemy hospital is near Bu Gia Map. They listed 200 sick personnel from the 603rd, 604th, 605th, and 608th NVA infiltration battalions who were treated by the hospital during April 1966.

- The supply records indicate that there is a supply base near Bu Gia Map which is subordinate to Military Region VI Hqs.

- The rice receipts indicated that units which drew rice at Bu Gia Map during the month of April were the 603rd, 604th, 605th, and 608th NVA infiltration battalions, the 840th NVA battalion, and the C13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 companies (suspected separate NVA companies).

5. 061930 May B/2/502 discovered an abandoned VC camp with seven huts capable of housing 300 personnel at YU 349345.

6. 070645 May B/2/502 engaged 5 VC at YU 353367. Results: 2 VC KIA (BC), 1 VCC, 1 MAT 49 captured.

- The VCC was an ammunition bearer in the C-7 mortar company (NVA). The company has 110 men. Five men died of malaria during infiltration. The unit has not been issued its full complement of weapons. It has no mortars, and there are only 20 AK-47's and ten French MAT 49 submachineguns. The remainder of the personnel carry grenades.

- The prisoner left his company on 7 May with four other personnel with instructions to pick up ammunition at the airfield. After capture he led elements of B/2/502 to a camp at YU 381358 consisting of eight huts which appeared to have been evacuated two days previously. He stated his company had been resting at the camp for two months to recoup from the long trip and many cases of malaria.

- The subject said everyone in his unit has malaria to some degree, (he was suffering from malaria when captured). About 15% were serious cases and cannot walk. The company has never been engaged, morale is very low, and the men are sick and afraid of fighting.

- The company was supplied rice, sauce, and salt by B-1. They went to B-1 to draw supplies.
Incl 1 - (Development of Intelligence in the Bu Gia Map Area) to Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation ASTHIN

7. 070950 May 1/2/502 discovered three tons of rice buried at YU 361559.

8. 071020 May B/2/502 discovered a VC camp with four huts which appeared to have been abandoned three or four weeks at YU 351348.

9. 071450 May A/2/502 engaged fifteen VC at YU 316357. VC withdrew SE.

10. 071456 May B/2/502 engaged one sniper at YU 375353. Results: one VC KIA (BO), captured one unidentified bolt action weapon.

11. 080725 May A/2/502 engaged four VC at YU 307356. Results: one VC KIA (BO), two packs and one AK-47 captured.

a. A set of North Vietnamese 1:100,000 maps classified SECHET covering the coastal area from the Delta north to Nha Trang and of War Zone D (vic Ben Cat) were found with the body.

b. The dead man carried an ID card indicating he was a member of the 304A NVA battalion.

c. Two VC and one returned in the PLEIKU-KNOTUM area in the month of April indicated the 304th Infiltration Group is the 141st Regt of the 312th NVA Division. The infiltration group includes four battalion size groups: 304 A, B, C, and D. Those personnel stated that the infiltration group was infiltrating south to War Zone D. The 304A infiltration group is the 2nd Bn, 141st Regt and has 500 men. The CO is Capt Gia Thanh Vinh.

12. 080901 May A/2/502 engaged at YU 338376.

13. 080930 May A/2/502 engaged a sniper at YU 335353. Results: one VC KIA (BO), one unidentified bolt action weapon captured.

14. 081500 May A/2/502 discovered a hut with two tons of oats at YU 318339.

15. 081950 May Reconnaissance Platoon 2/502 surrounded a small VC force at YU 338339. Results: two VC KIA (BO), captured one AK-47.

16. 090715 May A/2/502 found one RPG-2 rocket launcher at YU 299386.

17. 091950 May Reconnaissance Platoon 2/502 engaged a sniper at YU 299386. Results: two VC KIA (BO), captured one unidentified bolt action weapon, one RPG-2 rocket launcher, and twelve packs containing 24 rockets and documents.

a. The two dead men carried ID cards of the 304D infiltration Bn.

b. Documents were weapons rosters, passwords and countersigns, and personnel rosters from B-3 platoon, U/I company, 304D battalion. The platoon has a strength of 25 men of which seven are AWOL. The platoon is armed with eight AK-47's, and six SKS carbines. Squads in the platoon are numbered A7, 8, and 9.

18. 090715 May A/2/502 found one RPG-2 rocket launcher at YU 299386.

19. 090720 May A/2/502 engaged one VC at YU 299386. Results: one VC KIA (BO). The dead man carried an ID card of the 304D battalion.

20. 091140 May B/2/502 engaged two VC at YU 384306. Results: two VC KIA (BO), and one SKS carbine captured.
21. 091520 May A/2/502 engaged one VC at YU 298340. Results: one VC KIA (10), captured one AK-47.

22. 9 May an informer at Quang Duc Sector Hqs reported a 100 ton rice storage area via 385858. Aerial photography shows tents just across the Cambodian border in the same area at YU 385995 (3), YU 379592 (3), and YU 380566 (2).

23. 9 May received report from Phouc Long sector Hqs that a raider from VC-Military C110 stated as follows:
   a. VC Provincial committee base via YU 455262.
   b. Army medical base via YU 455525, and a military base via YU 440236.
   c. 300 barrels of rice stored via YU 455270.
   d. A large rice cache was moved from Bu Gia Map to via YU 350290.
   e. Milk, fish juice, sugar, local cigarettes, salt, and 5200 liters of rice is stored at YU 285655. There are also five houses (6M X 4M) at this location.
   f. The cadre of the VC military committee have announced that they will attempt to have an operation in Phouc Long Province very soon.

24. 091525 May sector agent reports a POW camp with one US prisoner between YU 222273 and YU 228281.

25. 100715 May A/2/502 engaged one VC at YU 277348. Results: one VC KIA (30), captured one ChiCom carbine.

26. 100930 May A/2/502 engaged one VC moving east on a trail at YU 274348. Results: one VC KIA (30), captured one AK-47.

27. 101015 May A/2/502 engaged five VC at YU 274348. Results: one VC KIA (30), one VCC, captured two AK-47's.
   a. VCC was a master sergeant in the 2nd Squad, 1st Pit, 2nd Co, 3rd Bn, 141st Regt. He was manning a guard post in front of his company when captured.
   b. The prisoner stated that four companies were dug-in in an ambush position with indirect fire support forty minutes walk west of the point of capture, and that three more companies were located one and one-half hours walk west on the same trail.
   c. He located his Bn CP at a clearing between YU 233353 and YU 222361, and the 141st Regt CP via YU 1858. It is the general policy that each Bn is separated by a one hour march, and the regimental CP is a four hour march to the rear.
   d. Once a week members of his company received supplies from a supply point one half a day's march away.
   e. The prisoner stated there are three companies in each Bn, and three Bns in the 141st Regt. There are 120 men in his company. The unit is now short 20 men because of malaria and desertion. Each company is armed with one 82mm mortar, three 60mm mortars. The mortars were issued in the Bu Gia Map area. Each squad has a light MG, AK-47's and SKS's. The company has an adequate food supply, is sometimes short of ammunition, and always short of clothing.
f. Unit morale is low. All men are draftees and are homesick.

28. 101258 May 3/2/502 observed four VC at YU 315308. The VC dropped packs and fled northwest on a trail.

29. 101325 May Reconnaissance platoon 2/502 discovered a battalion size enemy base camp at YU 270334. It had been occupied within the past day.

30. 101445 May Reconnaissance platoon 2/502 engaged company to battalion size unit at YU 278345. Results 18 VC KIA (BO). The bodies were stripped by the enemy.

31. 101445 May A/2/502 engaged VC briefly at YU 319332. Results, three VC KIA (BO), captured one US gun.

32. 101610 May B/2/502 engaged VC sniper at YU 319322. Results: one VC KIA (BO), captured one US gun.

33. 101610 May C/2/502 captured one VC with n OG-2 rocket launcher at YU 279348.

a. The prisoner was a member of CL Co (stated it was known as 104 during infiltration). He did not seem to know his Bn and Regt designations (mentioned 2nd Bn, 3rd Bn, 3rd Regt, 111st Regt and CL Regt during interrogation). He believed his Bn CP was located via YU 275335.

b. He says that there are only 30 men in his company - during infiltration 20 men deserted and 20 died of malaria. Unit morale is low because men are homesick.

c. His company had set an ambush via YU 310339. His unit became scattered when everyone ran at the sound of gunfire. He was captured wandering by himself.

d. Subject was 35 years old, and was drafted into the army five months ago.

34. 101825 May A/1/327 found a company size bivouac at YU 370310.

35. 102015 May A/1/327 discovered ammunition cache at YU 349377. The cache contained 49 rds 60mm and 53 rds 81mm mortar ammunition.

36. 102035 May 0/2/502 engaged VC at YU 377317.

37. 111045 May A/2/502 was fired upon by two snipers at YU 261348.

38. 111050 May A/2/502 engaged reinforced VC platoon at YU 261349. The engagement continued through the afternoon. Enemy force increased during the battle to an estimated two companies. The enemy was dug in and communications wire had been laid in the position. The enemy force was enveloped by A/2/17 Cav from its rear. Airstrikes and 1500 rds of artillery were called upon the enemy trapped between our forces. At 1600 the enemy broke contact and withdrew northwest (probably along a trail via YU 255245, YU 240355, YU 210370, YU 185390). Results: 51 VC KIA (BO), 59 VC KIA (est), 15 VC KIA (est), captured three MG and nine individual weapons.

39. 111100 May 1/327 discovered three tons of rice at YU 353367.

40. 111340 May A/1/327 discovered two VC bodies in black pajamas and pieces of two destroyed weapons at YU 347405. This was an apparent result of our HAV fires.

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41. 111540 May 1/327 engaged five VC at YU 355365. Two VC fell and were engaged into a woodline.

42. 111540 May 1/327 discovered a Montagnard village (50 personnel) and 75 tons of rice at YU 360350. The rice will be evacuated and the Montagnards have also requested evacuation.

43. 11 May captured documents indicate the enemy has drawn large quantities of foodstuffs via Phouc Tinh.

44. 121300 May Reconnaisance Platoon 1/327 discovered three tons & rice in three houses at YU 372366.

45. 121300 May 1/327 discovered two company or larger bivouacs, one on each side of the river vicinity YU 379588. Six hundred pounds of rice were found in one bivouac.

46. 121300 May 4/2/502 engaged eight VC from a range of 20 meters at YU 250354. Our unit was surprised, because the enemy personnel wore US type uniforms with fatigue-type caps. After the engagement one pistol belt and pack covered with blood was captured (one VC KIA (est)).

47. 121430 May aerial observer reported bunkers and trench network at YU 243353.

48. 122000 May Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol was unable to infiltrate by helicopter at YU 173352 because of heavy AW fire.

51. 12 May 2/502 reported 1 VC KIA (est) from air or artillery at YU 243326.

52. 122255 May 2/503 discovered 1000 pounds of rice at YU 280285.

53. 12 May 1/327 discovered a VC base camp at YU 238355. The camp includes 15 huts and a 40-50 man hospital. Although no medical supplies or documents were recovered, it was apparent that surgery had been performed in the hospital. The camp had been abandoned in the past two days.

55. 131100 May 1/327 reported seven Montagnards came to their CP at Bu Gia Map airfield. The Montagnards stated they had been held prisoner last night but had escaped. They stated there are many VC four hours march away, but could not give a direction.

57. 131620 May Brigade Aerial Observer received ground fire (AW & SB) at YU 212406.

59. 132115 May RIO radio relay at YU 184506 received grenade and SA probe.

59. 15 May Visual Reconnaissance Reports:

- YU 567598 Stock pen with two water buffalo.
- YU 360592 1 house - 3 people ran.
- YU 385596 1 house - 1 man.
- YU 345568 Camouflaged house.
- YU 274574 People tending fish traps.
- YU 12406 Two 9' rafts, four 15' rafts, one 12' boat, received ground fire (SA and AW).
- YU 233594 Five people on trail, ran into woods.
- YU 212592 Seven people in clearing, ran.

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57. 141005 May A/2/17 Cav discovered 3 VC KIA at YU 3613.59. Bodies were three or four days old.

58. 141030 May LRRP Team 1 discovered three tons of rice at YU 090999.

59. 141230 May A/2/502 engaged 15 VC at YU 1943. Results: 4 VC KIA (BC), captured 2 AK-47's.

b. Following documents were captured:

(1) Communist party ID and passport for Trinh Ban Do, PFO, 24th Co, 306th Division.

(2) Rice receipts: one from 609th unit (Regt?) and one from 16th Regt and 141st Regt.

(3) Receipt from unidentified unit for one pair Russian binoculars, one compass and 22 map sheets.

(4) Personnel and weapons rosters for squad 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Platoon size unit: 2 is composed of A5, 6, 7, and 8. Return address of B2 is 3156A, C2, H20.

(5) Song books for Liberation Army.

60. 141300 May A/2/502 captured 1 VC WIA at YU 237354.

b. Captive was a PFC, 13th Co, 3rd Bn, 141st Regt.

c. The 3rd Bn has four companies: 11th, 12th, 13th, and an Artillery Company armed with three 82mm mortars, and three heavy machine-guns. The battalion has no ammunition for the mortars.

d. Captive stated the 14th Regt is the code designation for the 1st Battalion. He located the 2nd Bn, 141st Regt at Bu Dinh (YU 0030) and the 1st Bn and 141st Regt Hq at YU 2546. His regiment was supposed to proceed to Ong Cu 28/5.

e. The captive's Co told him there were two other regiments in the area: the 16th Bn at YU 2341, and the Bac Son (North Mountain) Bn, unlocated.

f. Captive stated his company left NVA with 124 men, but only 40 men were in an ambush position during an engagement with the 2/502 on 10 May. (50% of the company has malaria). The prisoner was wounded in this engagement and states that his company and the 11th Company were severely mauled. The engagement with the 2/502 on 11 May rendered the 12th Company ineffective.

61. 141315 May 2/502 reported many footprints across a B-52 crater via YU 195360.

62. 141445 May A/2/502 reported hearing what seemed to be troops digging in vic YU 1943. Artillery was fired -- negative results.

63. 141715 May A/1/327 discovered a trail lined on both sides with newly emplaced punji stakes at YU 453286.

64. 141750 May Reconnaissance platoon 1/327 discovered a VC camp at YU 448318. It appeared to have been deserted for some time.
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1. Development of Intelligence in the Bu Gia Map Area to Inclosure
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65. 141810 May A/2/502 discovered a large base camp with 60-70
huts at YU 192376.

66. 141830 May C/2/502 discovered a VC base camp at YU 223360.

67. 151030 May C/1/327 engaged 5-6 VC at YU 420257, discovered
slightly prepared position, carbine magazine, weapon stock, documents,
black clothing, trails leading SE and communications wire leading to a
camp at YU 421254. Many trails lead SE from the area.

68. 151220 May C/1/327 engaged 5-6 VC at YU 426254.

69. 151330 May B/1/327 discovered extensive, recently used trail
complex at YU 445250.

70. 151448 May C/2/503 discovered VC waystation at YU 255294. Freshly
prepared food was on tables, and documents dated 31 April were found. The
main route from the way station is on an azimuth of 225°.

71. 151530 May B/1/327 engaged 12-VC at YU 444253. Results: 1 VC
KIA (2C), captured one Mauser 98. Discovered several buildings and tables
in the area.

72. 151530 May 1/327 discovered large complex of trails and buildings
via YU 431245.

73. 151453 May Aerial Observer discovered bridge at YU 163338.

74. 151525 May A/1/327 engaged three VC with AM vicinity YU 468274.
Det 1 VC WIA. Three VC appeared to be wearing jungle fatigues. Documents
captured at the location included letter to the CO of K58 POW camp:
"Special attention will be given one US POW and 2 VN POWs". The letter
was dated 11 May and further warned the camp CO to be ready to move in
five minutes (included some information of our operations in the area.)

75. 160155 May 1/327 CP at YU 366310 received two rds SA fire.

76. 160725 May A/1/327 captured one VC WIA with Mosin-Nagant 44
rifle at YU 480258.

a. Captive was a warrant officer, the Plt Ldr of the G-317
security section, assigned responsibility for security of VC province
HQs (36). The platoon had ten other men armed with .45 cal pistols.

b. He said the 141st Regt was on the Cambodian border and two
other U/S VC/NVA regiments and five local force companies are in Phouc
Long Province. One company was assigned to each district, and one each
to K-58 and K-6 District HQs. K-58 is via YU 480258 where subject was
captured, and K-6 is 8-10 Km to the east.

c. Captive stated an American prisoner was kept at K-59 POW
camp until 15 May. The prisoners' name was McLean (or something similar).
He wore camouflaged fatigues and a green beret. He was captured in the
battle of Bu Dang, in 1964. He has no wounds and is in good health.
The US prisoner has been taken to K-59 District.

77. 161045 May B/1/327 observed 13 VC moving NE via YU 450258.

78. 161230 May 2/503 found a voltage meter, made in the People's
Republic of China, on trail at YU 204359.

79. 161500 May 2/27 discovered a hospital with medical supplies
and one civilian radio at YU 440239.

Confidential

-5-
80. 161523 May B/1/327 discovered an abandoned village at YU 455235.

81. 161930 May D/1/327 found a VC area via YU 440244.

a. The unit found one messhall (50 man capacity), one dispensary (6 beds), one permanent barracks, several small huts, several bunkers under construction(apparently for future GP), 15 chickens, 15 rds 7.62mm, 30 rds cal .30, 4 stick grenades, one 57mm lid xi, packages of poyer and small quantity of pills and morphinolate.

b. Documents indicate this was a VC Provine Hqs, with related installations.

c. Documents also indicate that an American, Captin Clayton Holland, A/D Team 94, has been in the area. The MGY Team (USAF) at Song Be stated that Capt Holland had been killed and a Sp/4 Ho Clain had been captured.

82. 16 May Visual Reconnaissance: eight personnel with weapons ran at YU 265334.

83. 170840 May 10th Avn Bn reported UN aircraft received one hit at YU 241038.

84. 170905 May B/1/327 found document, 100 rds 7.62mm and MG ammunition drum at YU 440241.

85. 170915 May D/1/327 found a portable typewriter with a half written message at YU 440242.

86. 170910 May CV-2 received three hits at YU 9442.

87. 171000 May 7/1/327 found a portable typewriter with a half written message at YU 440242.

88. 17 May Visual Reconnaissance: YU 484395 - 3 huts with possible trenches.

89. Special Agent Reports during the operation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 apr</td>
<td>YU 425258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 apr</td>
<td>YU 435257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>YU 580575</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>YU 424290</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>YU 306428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>YU 421279</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>YU 410412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May</td>
<td>YU 465356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 May</td>
<td>YU 439384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>YU 400326</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>YU 560047</td>
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<td>80. Hq Base Reports during the operation:</td>
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<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>MISSIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>031200 May</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td></td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>051900 May</td>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>122130 May</td>
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Incl 2 - (VC Units and Locations to Operation AUSTIN 6) to Inclosure 2 (Intelligence to Combat Operations After Action Report Operation AUSTIN)

1. Units identified by all sources during Operation AUSTIN 6.
   a. Units identified or mentioned by xW's and ralliers.

   14th alias 1/1st alias 304 Regt
   16th Regt
   Bac Son Regt
   608th. Bn Bac Son Regt
   Companies 13, 14, 15, 16, 608 Bn Bac Son Regt
   C-7 mortar Company (Separate)
   3rd Bn 11th Regt
   C-11 Co 3rd Bn 11th Regt
   C-12 Co " " "
   C-13 Co " " "
   C-310 Phuoc Long Military HQ
   C-317 Phuoc Long Province HQ Security Plat
   K-6, K-59, K-99 Phuoc Long District Co's
   270, 272, 315, 316, 317
   A-207 Phuoc Long Dist HQ

   b. Units identified by ID cards:

   609 A 16th Regt?
   609 D 16th Regt?
   304 A 14th aka 141st Regt
   304 D 14th aka 141st Regt

   c. Units identified by documents:

   609 Bn
   609 Bn
   Bac Son aka 250 A
   608 Bn
   C-13
c-14
   C-15 Bac Son Separate Companies
   C-17
   C-18

   609 Unit (16th Regt?)
   14th Unit aka 141st Regt aka 304
   D-2 Plat Believed to be subordinate to Phuoc Long Province
   X-58 1st HQ Phuoc Long
   0270 Co
   0271 Co Dist Companies Phuoc Long Province
   0277 Co

   840 MP Bn - Quan Dao H 260 unidentified unit.

2. Final Enemy Disposition

<table>
<thead>
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<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVALUATION</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>11 May</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>250A - Bac Son</td>
<td>YU 0919</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>10 Apr</td>
<td>Conf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>609 - 16th Regt</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>11 May</td>
<td>Unconf Poss</td>
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<tr>
<td>608 Bn 250A Regt</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>Unconf Prob</td>
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<tr>
<td>840 Bn aka 120</td>
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<td>400</td>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>Conf</td>
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<tr>
<td>186 Bn</td>
<td>Kien Duc Dist</td>
<td>320</td>
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2-3-1

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- 54 -
<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVALUATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>145 (RV) Bn</td>
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<td>130</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Conf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Bn</td>
<td>Kien Luu Dist</td>
<td>350</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-24 Co</td>
<td>YU 8272</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>27 May</td>
<td>Conf</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-70 Co</td>
<td>Duc Lap Dist</td>
<td>60</td>
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</tr>
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<td>C-75 Co</td>
<td>Kien Luu Dist</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>C-280</td>
<td>Kien Luu Dist</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Unconf Prob</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-7</td>
<td>YU 318358</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5 May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

TOTAL STRENGTH: 5,500
Inclosure 5 (Logistics) to After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

1. (c) ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT:

a. Support Battalion:

(1) Headquarters Detachment: This section provided the command and control of Support Battalion (Forward). It was organized into command, operations, communications, and movements control sections.

(2) Supply Detachment: This section was responsible for the receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided a Tigger section and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team.

(3) Maintenance Detachment: This section provided a repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineer, automotive, signal and quartermaster equipment. It was organized into a shop office, and a recovery and contact team.

(b) Medical Company: A clearing station was established with a twenty-bed capacity, a surgical section, a holding section, emergency treatment section, a dental section, and a graves registration section.

b. Supporting Forces:

(1) Forward Support Detachment, NHA TRANG Support Command: Commanded by Capt Donnelly. This unit provided the command and control of the supporting logistics area, and coordinated activities of the supporting units. This headquarters was extremely cooperative and responsive throughout the operation.

(2) 10th Aviation Battalion: Two Airmobile companies supported tactical and logistical operations.

(3) 135th Aviation Battalion: Provided CV-2 aircraft to transport supplies, repair parts, and personnel to and from the forward area. Aircraft sorties allocated were not sufficient to support the logistics plan on all occasions.

(4) CH-47 helicopter support was provided by 167th Aviation Company (Airmobile Medium) and 1st Cav Div (Airmobile).

(5) 168th Aviation Company: Provided medical air evacuation throughout the operation.

2. MATERIAL AND SERVICES:

a. Supply: Forward Support Detachment, NHA TRANG Support Command and Support Battalion were collocated. This provided an efficient operation and reduced handling of supplies.

(1) Class I: "B" and "C" ration meals were consumed during the operation. Supples to the "B" ration, consisting of fresh meat and bread, were issued periodically and in lesser quantities than desired. Fresh fruit and vegetables were in short supply. A five-day stock level of "C" rations was maintained by the NHA TRANG Forward Support Detachment and Support Battalion supply point. There were 213 short tons of "B" rations issued. Only a small portion of the required condiments were received. Sundry items arrived late and in inadequate quantity.

(2) Class II & IV: A support Battalion (Rear), PHNE TRANG provided Class II & IV items. 54 short tons were issued. A large quantity of barrack material was issued. Boots and clothing were received in sufficient quantities to meet the Brigade requirements.
Inclosure 5 (Logistics) to After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

(3) Class III: The NIA TRADG Forward Support Detachment provided all types of Class III items in sufficient quantities. 155 short tons of FOL were issued during the operation, to include 21,962 gallons of NO#5, 6,255 gallons DIESEL, and 19,315 gallons AVGas.

(b) Class V: The Brigade entered the operation with its basic load. The Forward Support Detachment, NIA TRADG Support Command, maintained a three day stock level until during Operation AUSTIN 6, when weather conditions delayed resupply of Class V to the point where only 2600 rounds of artillery ammunition were available. This necessitated calling for a tactical emergency resupply of artillery ammunition. In view of this, the stockage objective was increased to four days. During Operation AUSTIN 6 the ammo depots at CM RHM by shipped Rockot, LAN, 660N, Lot No. 15-18-1 to the HGN 00 area. This lot had, previous to shipment, been suspended from issue except for emergency combat use. No other lot was made available. An insufficient amount of yellow smoke grenades and signal illuminating ground star clusters and parachutes were not available for issue. Support Battalion authenticated transportation orders and the Forward Support Detachment, NIA TRADG Support Command received, stored, and issued all ammunition.

(5) Water: Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion operated a water point at HGN 00 and PHN H高铁 using one 600 GPH Centrifugal.

b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion maintenance detachment received 41 automotive, 121 signal, 66 armament, 10 instrument, 25 quartermaster, and 20 engineer job orders. All but 4 automotive, 16 signal, 2 armament, and 6 engineer jobs were completed. The shortage of spare parts for generators still exists. 9 BEA were submitted on the Starlight Scope.

(1) Ground Transportation: The 2 1/2 Ton Trucks of Support Battalion were used on 161 missions.

(2) Air Transportation:

(a) Fixed Wing: C-2 aircraft supporting the Brigade flew 512 sorties for a total of 5,075 Pax and 534 short tons of cargo.

(b) Rotary Wing: (Helicopter resupply)

1. Both UH-ID and CH-77 helicopters were used to supply committed forces. The use of the UH-ID reduced the time required for resupply from that required by the CH-77 and released UH-ID's for support of tactical operations.

2. Use of slings and nets was a particularly effective method of resupply, reducing aircraft ground time for loading and off loading.

(c) Army aircraft lifted a total of 370 short tons of supplies in the forward area. Attached at bases one and two the daily coastal resupply tonnage by class of supply during Operations AUSTIN 2 and 6.

c. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration was provided by 166th Quartermaster Company.

(2) Bath: 166th Quartermaster Company provided a bath unit in the PHN H高铁 and HGN 00 area.

(3) Laundry: A laundry unit was not taken into the HGN 00 area for two reasons: First, the Brigade was travelling light and secondly it was believed that the laundry at PHN RANG could supply adequate service. Unfortunately this proved to be unsatisfactory. Laundry took too long to process, pieces were missing when received and bad weather prohibited timely flights from PHN RANG to the objective area.
Inclosure 5 (logistics) to After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

3. (c) MEDICAL:

a. The sanitation of mess halls, latrines and unit areas was good. Health and hygiene were at a high level. Two medevac helicopters were available; one was equipped with a winch, which proved invaluable in extracting wounded from the jungle. Due to operating great distances from clearing facilities one medevac ship was stationed in the area of operations, the other medevac ship remained at the clearing company.

b. Patients Treated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUSTIN 2</th>
<th>AUSTIN 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) WIA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) KIA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Non-Battle Injury</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Disease</td>
<td>235 (7 Malaria)</td>
<td>357 (17 Malaria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Returned to duty</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Evacuated to hospital</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Remain in holding</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Total patients treated</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. The hospitalized personnel are categorized by wounds as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUSTIN 2</th>
<th>AUSTIN 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Head</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Chest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Abdomen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Upper extremities</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Lower extremities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. (d) SUMMARY:

a. Supply operations were simplified by collocating the Forward Support Detachment, NHA TRANG Support Command and Brigade Support Battalion. Common supply points were used for Class I and Class V. The Forward Support Detachment did not provide Class II and IV supply; Class III was issued in bulk to Support Battalion.

b. The Brigade made extensive use of the CH-47 helicopter for resupply. It provided a substantial increase in carrying capacity and therefore a reduction in time required for aerial resupply.

c. Water supply in the PHÄNH THIET area presented a major problem. Of the two 600 GPH generators assigned to the Brigade, one was turned in for maintenance and the other one operated at a maximum capacity of 250 GPH. The Brigade also used a water treatment plant at the PHÄNH THIET Airfield, but had to transport rain water 7 KM through the city and was delayed at times by political demonstrations.
Inelostwe 5 (Logistics) to After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

5. (a) CONCLUSIONS:

a. Collecting the organic supply detachment (Support Battalion) and the back-up support unit (Mail Spt Det, IHA Training Spt Cmd) is an efficient method of providing support to the Brigade when operating separately and away from established support areas. The workload is shared by both units and excess handling is eliminated.

b. Supply of forward units is greatly facilitated by having an adequate number of helicopters in direct support; in this case two Chinook companies (UH-1D) and three CH-47s.

c. Slings and nets provide the best and most rapid means of aerial resupply.

d. Laundry service should be provided in the vicinity of the Brigade trains. Shipment of laundry by air caused considerable problems in handling, and control of laundry and increased airlift requirements.

2 Incl
1 - Air Re-supply Data - Operation AUSTIN 2
2 - Air Re-supply Data - Operation AUSTIN 5
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Inclosure 1 (Air Resupply Data - Operation JUSTIN II) to Inclosure 5 (Logistics) to After Action Report Operation JUSTIN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CLASS I</th>
<th></th>
<th>CLASS V</th>
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<th>MISCELLANEOUS &amp; WATER</th>
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<td>7,500</td>
<td>3.75</td>
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<td>8.21</td>
<td>124,490</td>
<td>6.15</td>
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<td>4.21</td>
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Inclosure 1
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<th>MISC &amp; WATER POUNDS</th>
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<tr>
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<td>7,300</td>
<td>3.65</td>
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<td>25.00</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.25</td>
<td>10,500</td>
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<td>5.58</td>
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<td>9,220</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.45</td>
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<td>232,700</td>
<td>117.925</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inclusion 2
Inclosure 6 (Communications) to After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

1. (C) Background

The Ist Brigade MHC Communication Platoon and the 1st FASOP, B Company 501st Signal Battalion, had the mission of providing internal communications in support of Brigade tactical operations. These two platoons installed, maintained and operated the communications facilities in the Brigade Command Post. These included the Brigade Communications and Message Center, FN and AM net control stations, and Brigade switchboard wire system. They also installed and maintained voice circuits to subordinate organizations.

2. (C) Operations, (AUSTIN 2)

a. VHF Section - Equipment operated by 1st Signal Battalion gave the Brigade access to Typhoon and Strike Rear, while our own MID-68 gave the 2/320 Artillery a common user circuit to Strike Switch and a hot line to the FSCC.

b. Communications Center Section - Operated on line TT with Typhoon and provided motor and air messenger service to all units.

c. Switchboard and Wire Section - The Brigade Switchboard consisted of one 6B-86 Switchboard, providing a total of 60 common user circuits. An average of over 700 calls were made per 24 hour period. Twenty-five miles of wire WD-1/TT were laid for Operation AUSTIN 2.

d. FM Radio Section - The primary mode of communications with subordinate units was FM radio. Most of the traffic was passed over the Brigade Operations Intelligence Net. The Brigade Command Net was rarely used. An automatic retransmission station for the Operations Intelligence Net and a manual relay station for the Administration Logistics Net were located on Hill 672 and 1302.

e. AM Radio Section - RATT communications were installed between 2/327 Infantry Battalion, Brigade Command Post and Phan Tang Base Camp. This net was used primarily for classified service messages. A radio team from the 54th Signal Battalion was provided in direct support with an AM/ GM-45 (AM) and KMC-2 (SSB). The AM radio gave the Brigade entrance into Command Net B, a secure direct RATT Net controlled by IFFV. The KMC-2 provided a phone patch into the Typhoon Switchboard, allowing an alternate means into the long line trunks.

f. Maintenance Section - The maintenance section provided 2nd echelon maintenance support for signal items and generators. The major maintenance problem during this operation was teletype equipment. Generators were fairly stable. Generally the time delay experienced on items evacuated for repair and returned through Phan Tang Base Camp has increased. The Rod Ball Express System has improved 100 per cent.

3. (C) Operations, (AUSTIN 6)

a. VHF Section - An NCO-73 from 5th Signal Battalion provided the Brigade with communications to Typhoon and Strike Rear. An HLC-68 was set up at the MACV Compound at Ghia Nhia giving us a hot line and common user circuit with MACV and a common user circuit to the Aviation Company in that area.

b. Communications Center Section - Operated on line TT with Typhoon and provided motor and air messenger service to all units.

c. Switchboard and Wire Section - The Brigade Switchboard consisted of one 6B-86 and two 21207 providing a total of 60 common user circuits with an average of 500 calls made per 24 hour period. The wire section laid 30 miles of WD-1 Wire, tying in the Infantry, Artillery and Support Battalions, along with separate Companies, to the Strike Switchboard.

CONTINENTAL
Inclosure 6 (Communications) to After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

c. FN Radio Section - The primary means of communication with subordinate units was FN radio. Most of the traffic was passed over the Brigade Operations Intelligence Net. The Brigade Commander's Net was used as an Operations Intelligence Net during the later part of AUSTIN 6. 4/325 Engineer, 2/503rd Infantry, 173rd Airborne Brigade, MACV Advisors and 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division, TICO operated in this net. An automatic retransmission station for the Operations Intelligence Net and a manual relay station for the Administration Logistics and subsequently the Brigade Command Net was located first at Bu Prang Outpost, and then on Song Be Mountain.

d. AN Radio Section - HARR communications were installed between 2/327 Infantry Battalion, Brigade Command Post and Phan Rang Base Camp. This net was used primarily for classified service messages. A radio team on the 5th Signal Battalion was provided in direct support with an AN/ G.C-26 (AM) and KM-2 (SSB). The AN radio gave the Brigade entrance into Command Net A, a secure directed HARR Net controlled by I FFV. The AN/GHC-26 was later replaced with an AN/GHC-46 because of equipment failure. The KM-2 provided a phone patch into the Typhoon Switchboard, allowing an alternate means into the long line trunks.

e. Maintenance Section - The maintenance section provided 2nd echelon maintenance support for signal items and generators. The major maintenance problem during this operation was teletype equipment. Generally the time delay experienced on items evacuated for repair and returned through Phan Rang Base Camp has increased. The Red Ball Express System has improved 100 per cent.

4. Lessons Learned:

a. The PE-75/AF Generator requires oil changes every 20 hours. Fifty weight oil should be used at all times.

b. AN Radios providing HARR (GHC-46 or 26 and VSC-1) should be in much closer proximity to the Brigade Communication Center than was the case in this operation. In any case this distance should not exceed 100 meters.

c. Personnel, particularly supervisors, should be billeted with or adjacent to their equipment for reasons of control.

d. Teletype equipment outages can be attributed to the age factor of the teletypes and constant operation for the past year.

e. Switchboard SB-86 is proving to be an unreliable switchboard. A new SB-86 was installed upon arrival at Nhon Co. After ten days of operation the new switchboard had started to malfunction.

f. Inclement weather (severe rains and lightning) seemed to have an adverse effect initially on the retransmission station. The utmost care must be exercised to protect components and to keep them as dry as possible.
Civic Action:

1. Health and Sanitation:
   a. Sick calls and medical treatment were conducted in the hamlets surrounding Nhon Co. A total of 560 patients were treated by Brigade medical personnel.
   b. Tooth brushes were distributed in two villages and classes conducted on their use.

2. Construction: Land clearing and road building in the Nhon Co area not only benefited the organization of the Brigade Headquarters but was designed to assist in the preparation for the establishment of a relocation village for refugees. Preparation was made for the rehabilitation of the school house used by Brigade Headquarters.

3. Commerce and Industry: Sixty-six porters were hired to transport materials for the operational battalions. Local business establishments were encouraged resulting in the addition of seven new buildings housing various businesses. These were planned to provide trade for the resettlement villages upon the Brigade's departure.

4. Community Relations:
   a. Close contact was maintained with Province, District, and village officials in order to maintain price control to preclude problem areas. Distribution of soap, clothes, food and milk was made to some of the poorer hamlets in the area.
   b. On 2 May 1966 the village of Bu Tong was moved to Gia Nghia. Movement included 31 personnel, 1 hospital complete, 30 tons of rice and household goods.

5. Other Areas of Operation: Civil Affairs Teams #9 and #15, 1st Civil Affairs Company, continued operations in the Phan Rang and Tuy Hoa areas respectively.
1. (C) Psychological Objectives: Psychological warfare activities were oriented and directed mainly to enemy units in each operational area, although selected leaflets and broadcasts were designed to inform the indigenous population (CP AUSTIN 6) of the Brigade's objectives.

2. (C) Psychological Warfare:
   a. AUSTIN 2:
      (1) Leaflets. A total of 293,000 leaflets of the type shown were dropped on the dates indicated below:

      | Date    | Method     | Number  | Type              |
      |---------|------------|---------|-------------------|
      | 19 April| USAF U10   | 10,000  | Safe Conduct Passes |
      | 20 April| USAF U10   | 10,000  | Chieu Hoi         |
      | 21 April| USAF-U10   | 10,000  | Safe Conduct Passes |
      |         |            |         | Eagle Strike      |
      |         |            |         | Chieu Hoi         |
      | 22 April| USAF U10   | 19,000  | Safe Conduct Passes |
      |         |            | 25,000  | Chieu Hoi         |
      |         |            | 20,000  | Eagle Strike      |
      |         |            | 20,000  | Demoralization    |
      | 23 April| USAF U10   | 20,000  | Chieu Hoi         |
      | 24 April| USAF U10   | 20,000  | Chieu Hoi         |

      (2) Loudspeaker. A total of 17 hours of loudspeaker appeals were flown by USAF U10 Pay War aircraft on 22 April and 24 April, using ground units as control stations to insure that the broadcasts were being flown at the proper altitude for maximum audibility.

      (3) Summary. Loudspeaker and leaflet appeals were general in nature with no specific appeal to any particular enemy unit or ethnic group.

3. (C) AUSTIN 6:
   a. Leaflets. A total of 885,000 leaflets of the type indicated were dropped on the dates shown:

      | Date    | Method     | Number  | Type              |
      |---------|------------|---------|-------------------|
      | 30 April| USAF U10   | 40,000  | Chieu Hoi         |
      |         |            | 20,000  | Safe Conduct Passes |
      | 1 May   | USAF U10   | 40,000  | Chieu Hoi         |
      | 2 May   | USAF U10   | 20,000  | Safe Conduct Passes |
      |         |            | 20,000  | Chieu Hoi         |
      | 3 May   | USAF U10   | 20,000  | Safe Conduct Passes |
      |         |            | 20,000  | Chieu Hoi         |
      | 5 May   | USAF U10   | 40,000  | Chieu Hoi         |
      |         |            | 20,000  | Safe Conduct Passes |
      | 7 May   | USAF U10   | 20,000  | Chieu Hoi         |
      |         |            | 20,000  | Safe Conduct Passes |
### Inclosure 8 (Psychological Warfare) to After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div

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<th>Details</th>
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<td>Eagle Strike</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chieu Hoi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May</td>
<td>USAF U1O</td>
<td>Direct Appeal (608th Bn)</td>
<td>(CF Incl 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 May</td>
<td>USAF U1O</td>
<td>Safe Conduct Passes</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Direct Appeal (608th Bn)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 May</td>
<td>USAF U1O</td>
<td>Eagle Strike</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Demoralization</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>USAF U1O</td>
<td>Direct Appeal (608th Bn)</td>
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<td>15 May</td>
<td>USAF U1O</td>
<td>Direct Appeal (11lst Regt) (CF Incl 13)</td>
<td>25,000 Direct Appeal (3/11lst) (CF Incl 11)</td>
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<td>USAF U1O</td>
<td>Direct Appeal (3/11lst)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eagle Strike</td>
<td>20,000</td>
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</table>

(2) Loudspeaker. A total of 5 hours and 45 minutes of loudspeaker appeals were flown by USAF U1O Pay War aircraft on 30 April, 3 May, 10 May, 11 May, 12 May and 16 May. The theme of all appeals was Chieu Hoi. On 10 May an on-the-spot appeal was taped with a captured NVA soldier and flown the same day.

(3) Summary: Four personalized leaflets and one personalized taped broadcast were directed against enemy units and other indigenous personnel in the operational area. As the 1st Brigade did not remain in the area for an extended period of time, the true effectiveness and ultimate impact of the appeals was not known as of the closing date of Operation AUSTIN.

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- (4)
Inclosure 2 (Artillery) to After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

1. (C) BACKGROUND: The 2d Howitzer Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery provided direct support to the 1st Brigade throughout Operation AUSTIN. B Battery, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155mm Howitzers) was under operational control of the Brigade.

2. (C) OPERATIONS:

a. The Batteries of 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery occupied a total of 19 positions in support of the Brigade during the operation. Movement was by road, UH-1D helicopters, CV-2 aircraft, C-123 aircraft, C-130 aircraft, and OH-47 helicopters.

b. Missions fired and ammunition expended - Operation AUSTIN 2:
   (1) Total number of missions fired: 726.
   (2) Total number of rounds expended: 4,083.
   (3) Total number of registrations conducted: 67.
   (4) Total number of H&I targets fired: 649.
   (5) Total number of rounds expended on H&I: 3,600.
   (6) Surveillance: 4 - snipers or A/W silenced, 1 - well destroyed.

c. Missions fired and ammunition expended - Operation AUSTIN 6:
   (1) Total number of missions fired: 1,126.
   (2) Total number of rounds expended: 7,754.
   (3) Total number of registrations conducted: 20.
   (4) Total number of H&I targets fired: 896.
   (5) Total number of rounds expended on H&I: 1,348.
   Surveillance: 20 VC KIA (SC)
   2 VC KIA (EST)
   2 snipers and A/W silenced.

2. Inclosures:
1 - Positions Occupied by Artillery in Operation AUSTIN 2.
2 - Positions Occupied by Artillery in Operation AUSTIN 6.
### Inclosure 1 (Positions Occupied by Artillery in Operation AUSTIN 2) to Inclosure 9 (Artillery) to After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

**Operation AUSTIN 2**

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<td>C</td>
<td>YU797250</td>
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<td>YU806252</td>
<td>29 Apr 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>YU795250</td>
<td>30 Apr 66</td>
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<td>3 Section B/30</td>
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<td>30 Apr 66</td>
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<td>A</td>
<td>YU6806277</td>
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<td>C</td>
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<td>18 May 66</td>
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</table>

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9-B-1

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69
Họ và họ của bà Đặng Thị Hằng, Ông Định, Ông Đặng Văn Sơn và ông Lê Đăng Thạo.

Bà Đặng Thị Hằng, bà Đặng Thị Hằng, bà Nguyễn Thị Minh và ông Nguyễn Văn Ông.

Ông Nguyễn Văn Ông, bà Nguyễn Thị Minh, bà Đặng Thị Hằng và ông Đặng Văn Sơn.

Ông Đặng Văn Sơn, bà Nguyễn Thị Minh, ông Nguyễn Văn Ông và bà Đặng Thị Hằng.
Tôi xin lỗi vì không thể cung cấp dịch văn bản của trang này.
My comrades in the 608th:

Comrads Tuyen, Duong, and Phan

I was sick and abandoned by my unit. I was left without food or adequate clothing; I was left to die.

The Americans found me and gave me food, shelter, clothing, and medicine to cure me of my sickness. They have treated me well in all respects.

I urge all of you, my comrades, to cease this useless fight that can only lead to a discrepancy. Do not shoot your loved ones, nor in an unmarked grave. Before it is too late, rally to the allied forces.

Come to the main highway with your hands off and your weapon over your right shoulder, as I do. Wave your shirt over your head. Come to the nearest allied forces.

You will be given food, shelter, clothing, and medicine.

Rally now.

/signed/

Vi Van Phu

3rd Platoon, 13th Co., 608th Battalion

Used with Operation Austin VI

Job No. 56-8-21S6N
HỘI ANH EM BINH SĨ THƯỞNG THÔNG ĐOÀN 141

Anh em có thể tránh khỏi số phận đến tôi khi tiếp
phản sự bảo vệ chính phủ và Nam Bộ
không để vào lưỡi lưỡi dùng mình khi còn ở đây.

[Signature]
VI SAO?

Vi sao người Thành, miền Trung, miền Bắc
sau cuộc Việt Lại Dään và chiến trong rừng răng tia
vàng dù. Anh có thể sống đến đến bên gia
dịnh, Bên dòng ruộng nơi yểm lừng dũng can
bằng tài rảnh chắc, chắc anh tại miền Bắc ...
Thay vi được sống để giúp đỡ thống hùng, anh đã
cợt thê thảm, không mơ mà, báo nhiều đâm ya tỏ
tiên cha anh.
Trước khi các bạn cùng chịu chung số phận này,
hãy sao nghĩ và quay trở về với chính phủ và lực
luong đồng minh. Người, cả ở, sống ở bên vai
phi, mỗi trục văng đất. Hãy đến nơi lực lượng
đồng minh, đồng gìn giữ, giao thông khó khăn và
vậy làm hiểu.

các bạn sẽ được sản sóc và giúp đỡ chủ đạo trong
mọi phương diện.

thân

56-10-245N
Soldiers of the 183rd Regiment

You can avoid this fate. Cross the lines to the protection of the GVN. Rally to the allied forces before it is too late...

Vi Sao?

Why did this young man from North Viet-Nam come to die here in the jungles of Quang Duc province? His place should have been at his home, on his farm, where his labor is needed to help feed his compatriots in the north. Instead his unidentified body lays in an unmarked grave many kilometers from the graves of his ancestors. His soul will never rest...

Before you suffer this fate, rally to the nearest allied forces.

To rally, take off your shirt and have your weapon over your right shoulder muzzle down. Approach the nearest Allied Force waving your shirt over your head. You will be well taken care of in every way.

Rally Now!

56-10-2h36

1163

56-6-245N (M)
This man you see in the picture is a soldier from the 101st Airborne Division (Screaming Eagle). These men of the screaming Eagle have the mission of freeing all good people from Viet Cong control. These soldiers will fight to guarantee safety for all the Villagers. Come to them, and they will take your family to an area where they can work together for themselves.

Your family will not have to worry about being forced to work for the Viet Cong. Each family will receive material to build their own house, land and seed for crops, chickens and cows. Let the Eagle protect you! And your family will have happiness.

PICTURE: SOLDIER OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE, WITH MONDAYWARD CHILDREN

LEAFLET: 13-5-66 56-6-243(M) (OPERATION AUSTIN 6)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIG. 310TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96347

AVBD-A 12 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAMTHORNE (RCS: MACV J5-32)

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO US Forces 96240

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO US Forces 96243

1. Letter this headquarters, subject as above, dated 22 July 1965, is changed as follows:
   Remove pages one and two of enclosure 1 and replace with attached pages one and two.

2. After the above action has been completed this letter will be filed in front of basic publication.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM E. GROVES
2d Lt, AGO
Asst AG

1 Incl: 

Distribution:
1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army
   Washington DC 20310
1 - CG, USAREC (ATTN: GROF-WH)
1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MAC J3-32)
1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MAC J3-32)
1 - CG, USARV (ATTN: MAC J3-32)
1 - CG, USAFR (ATTN: AVG Historical Division)
1 - CG, TFGORCE
1 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
1 - CG
1 - DCO
1 - XO
1 - S1
1 - S2
10 - SS
1 - S4
1 - S5
1 - S1g
1 - P55

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(2) The present strength accountability system requires assigning personnel (EDCSA) to units prior to their physically joining the unit rather than administratively carrying them in the "in-line".

(3) EDCSA personnel have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit.

2. (C) Casualties:

a. Casualties for Operation HAMPTONITE were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1/327</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>1/326</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/317</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt Bn</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total casualties to date are as follows:

| KIA | 230 |
| WIA | 1206 |
| MIA | 2   |

3. (C) Personnel Management:

a. A total of 291 replacements were received in the Brigade during this period. Breakout of such personnel to the maneuver battalions were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>1/327</th>
<th>2/302</th>
<th>2/320</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>108</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 personnel with critical MOS were assigned as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plat Ldrs</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plat Sgts</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Ops Asst</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medics</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medics</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Emergency requisitions for continuing critical MOS shortage were submitted for E-7 platoon sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, and legal clerks.
1. (0) Unit Strengths:
      (1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation HAWTHORNE were as follows:

      | Authorized | Assigned | Joined/not Assigned | Present for Duty | Not Present for Duty | Air Head Strength | Base Camp | Total ECA |
      |------------|----------|---------------------|-----------------|---------------------|------------------|-----------|-----------|
      | 4400       | 5760     | 116                 | 5252            | 472                 | 2398             | 1793      | 1061      |

   (2) The assigned strength was 130% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 119% of the authorized strength.

   (3) Of the not present for duty strength, 339 were hospitalized personnel.

b. Conclusion of Operation HAWTHORNE.
   (1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation HAWTHORNE were as follows:

      | Authorized | Assigned | Joined/not Assigned | Present for Duty | Not Present for Duty | Air Head Strength | Base Camp | Total ECA |
      |------------|----------|---------------------|-----------------|---------------------|------------------|-----------|-----------|
      | 4400       | 5769     | 115                 | 4703            | 931                 | 2631             | 1527      | 755       |

   (2) The assigned was 128% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 102% of the authorized strength.

   (3) Of the not present for duty strength, 231 were hospitalized personnel.

c. The "assigned" strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the "not present for duty" because:

   (1) A large number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to off-shore hospitals, EUUS, and/or even discharged from the US Navy without notification to the host unit.

   (2) A similar problem exists for aviation personnel.
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96547

AVBD-A 12 August 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAUTHORIZE (NOS: MACV J5-32)

THRU: Commanding General
1 Field Force Vietnam
APO US Forces 96240

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J543
APO US Forces 96240

1. Letter this headquarters, subject as above, dated 22 July 1963, is changed as follows:

   Remove pages one and two of enclosure 1 and replace with attached pages one and two.

2. After the above action has been completed this letter will be filed in front of basic publication.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM E. GROVES
2d Lt, AGC

1 Incl:

Distribution:
1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army
   Washington DC 20310
1 - GG, USARPAC (ATTN: GRP-MH)
1 - GG, MACV (ATTN: MAC J543)
1 - GG, MACV (ATTN: MAC J2)
2 - GG, USARV
1 - GG, USARV (ATTN: AGO Historical Division)
2 - GG, TFORDEN
2 - GG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
1 - CG
1 - CG
1 - XO
1 - S1
1 - S2
1 - S3
1 - S4
1 - S5
1 - XO
1 - SIG
1 - ESS

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80
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Inclosure 1 (contd)

(2) The present strength accountability system requires assigning personnel (EDCSA) to units prior to their physically joining the unit rather than administratively carrying them in the "pipeline".

(3) EDCSA personnel have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit.

2. (C) Casualties:

a. Casualties for Operation HA-'TIVURNE were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/302</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/325</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 2/17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt Bn</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total casualties to date were as follows:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>1206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (C) Personnel Management:

a. A total of 291 replacements were received in the Brigade during this period. Breakout of such personnel to the maneuver battalions were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/302</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 personnel with critical MOS were assigned as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plat 'Ldr</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plat Sgtc</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Ops Asst</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medics</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Emergency requisitions for continuing critical MOS shortages were submitted for E-7 platoon sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, and legal clerks.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclusion 1 (Personal and Administration) to After Action Reports, Operation H-HOTFOG.

1. (0) Unit Strengths:

a. Beginning of Operation Unit Comm:

(1) The brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation H-HOTFOG were as follows:

- Authorized: 4650
- Assigned: 5010
- Joined not Assigned: 116
- Present for Duty: 5252
- Not Present for Duty: 472
- Base Camp: 2398
- Tuy Hoa: 1793

b. Conclusion of Operation H-HOTFOG:

(1) The brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation H-HOTFOG were as follows:

- Authorized: 4490
- Assigned: 5769
- Joined not Assigned: 115
- Present for Duty: 4703
- Not Present for Duty: 931
- Base Camp: 2431
- Tuy Hoa: 1577

(2) The assigned strength was 128% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 105% of the authorized strength.

b. Conclusion of Operation H-HOTFOG:

(1) The brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation H-HOTFOG were as follows:

- Authorized: 4490
- Assigned: 5769
- Joined not Assigned: 115
- Present for Duty: 4703
- Not Present for Duty: 931
- Base Camp: 2431
- Tuy Hoa: 1577

(2) The assigned was 128% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 105% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 339 were hospitalized personnel.

b. Conclusion of Operation H-HOTFOG:

(1) The brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation H-HOTFOG were as follows:

- Authorized: 4490
- Assigned: 5769
- Joined not Assigned: 115
- Present for Duty: 4703
- Not Present for Duty: 931
- Base Camp: 2431
- Tuy Hoa: 1577

(2) The assigned was 128% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 105% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 339 were hospitalized personnel.

(4) The "assigned" strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the "not present for duty" because:

- A large number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to off-shore hospitals, OOHU, and/or even discharged from the US without notification to the losing unit.

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST ENGLISH LANGUAGE AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96247

13 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORNE (MACV J3-52)

THRU:

Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO US Forces 96240

TO:

Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J345
APO US Forces 96243

1. Letter this headquarters, subject as above, dated 22 July 1966, is changed as follows:

Remove pages one and two of enclosure 1 and replace with attached pages one and two.

2. After the above action has been completed this letter will be filed in front of basic publication.

FOR THE CONSIDER:

William E. Crooks

WILLIAM E. CROOKS
21 Lt, AGC
Asst AG

Distribution:

1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army
   Washington DC 20310
   1 - CG, USARPAC (ATTN: GORP-MI)
   1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MAC J345)
   1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MAC J2)
   2 - CG, USARV
   1 - CG, US ARMY Historical Division
   2 - CG, IFORDEV
   2 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
   1 - CG
   1 - DOG
   1 - XO
   1 - SI
   1 - SJ
   10 - SS
   1 - S4
   1 - SS
   1 - IO
   1 - Sig
   1 - USE

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(2) The present strong accountability system requires assigning personnel (EDCSA) to units prior to their physically joining the unit rather than administratively carrying them in the "pipeline".

(3) EDCSA personnel have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit.

2. (6) Casualties:
   a. Casualties for Operation HA'TIFCRINE were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/326</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2/17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt En</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. Total casualties to date are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>1206</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (6) Personnel Management:
   a. A total of 291 replacements were received in the Brigade during this period. Breakout of such personnel to the maneuver battalions were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>108</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 personnel with critical MOS were assigned as follows:

   - Plat' Ldrs: 11
   - Plat' Sgts: 10
   - Doctors: 2
   - Med Ops Asst: 2
   - Medics: 5

   c. Emergency requisitions for continuing critical MOS shortages were submitted for E-7 platoon sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, and legal clerks.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Personal and Administration) to After Action Reports, Operation 「Hamugg」.

1. (6) Unit Strengths:

a. Beginning of Operation «Hamugg».

(1) The brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation 「Hamugg」 were as follows:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>4490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>5420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined not Assigned</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>5722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Penal Strength</td>
<td>2398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp</td>
<td>1793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuy Loa</td>
<td>1061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned strength was 120% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 119% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 399 were hospitalized personnel.

b. Conclusion of Operation 「Hamugg」.

(1) The brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation 「Hamugg」 were as follows:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>4490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>5429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined not Assigned</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>4703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Penal Strength</td>
<td>2431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp</td>
<td>1527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuy Loa</td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned was 120% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 105% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 12% were hospitalized personnel.

c. The "assigned" strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the "not present for duty" because:

(1) A large number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to off-shore hospitals, SGSUS, and/or even discharged from the US without notification to the losing unit.
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96347

AVBD-A 12 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HATHORNE (RCS: MACV J3-32)

T/R/U: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO US Forces 96240

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J345
APO US Forces 96245

1. Letter this headquarters, subject as above, dated 22 July 1966, is changed as follows:

   Remove pages one and two of enclosure 1 and replace with attached pages one and two.

2. After the above action has been completed this letter will be filed in front of basic publication.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM E. GROVES
2d Lt, AG
Asst AG

Distribution:
1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army
   Washington DC 20310
1 - CG, USAFRAC (ATTN: GHRP-MW)
1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MACV J343)
1 - CG, J345 (ATTN: MACV J3)
2 - CG, USAW
1 - CG, USAFR (ATTN: AGO Historical Division)
2 - CG, IFORGEV
2 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
1 - CG
1 - LCO
1 - XO
1 - S1
1 - S2
10 - SS
1 - S4
1 - S5
1 - XO
1 - SLg
1 - MFR

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86
Inclosure 1 (contd)

(2) The present strength accountability system requires assigning personnel (EDOSA) to units prior to their physically joining the unit rather than administratively carrying them in the "pipeline".

(3) EDOSA personnel have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit.

2. (c) Casualties:

a. Casualties for Operation HMAMTRNE were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/326</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 2/17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt. Bn</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total casualties to date are as follows:

- KIA: 230
- WIA: 1206
- MIA: 2

3. (c) Personnel Management:

a. A total of 291 replacements were received in the Brigade during this period. Breakout of such personnel to the maneuver battalions were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>replacements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 personnel with critical MOS were assigned as follows:

- Plat Ldrs: 11
- Plat Sgts: 10
- Doctors: 2
- Med Ops Assts: 2
- Medics: 5

c. Emergency requisitions for continuing critical MOS shortage were submitted for 2-7 platoon sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, and legal clerks.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Personnel and Administration) to After Action Reports, Operation BRIGHT.

1. (a) Unit Strengths:
   a. Beginning of Operation Bright

   (1) The brigade personal strengths at the beginning of Operation BRIGHT were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Joined not Assigned</th>
<th>Present for Duty</th>
<th>Both Present for Duty</th>
<th>Not Present for Duty</th>
<th>Air Head Strength</th>
<th>Base Camp</th>
<th>Tuy Hoa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4490</td>
<td>5740</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1703</td>
<td>4703</td>
<td>1064</td>
<td>2398</td>
<td>1703</td>
<td>1064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (2) The assigned strength was 128% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 119% of the authorized strength.

   (3) Of the not present for duty strength, 339 were hospitalized personnel.

   b. Conclusion of Operation BRIGHT

   (1) The brigade personal strengths at the conclusion of Operation BRIGHT were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Joined not Assigned</th>
<th>Present for Duty</th>
<th>Both Present for Duty</th>
<th>Not Present for Duty</th>
<th>Air Head Strength</th>
<th>Base Camp</th>
<th>Tuy Hoa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4490</td>
<td>5740</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1703</td>
<td>4703</td>
<td>1064</td>
<td>2398</td>
<td>1703</td>
<td>1064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (2) The assigned was 118% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 105% of the authorized strength.

   (3) Of the not present for duty strength, 122 were hospitalized personnel.

   c. The "assigned" strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the "not present for duty" because:

   (1) A large number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to off-shore hospitals, CHUS, and/or even discharged from the US without notification to the losing unit.
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96547

AVBD-4 12 August 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAUThORNE (RCS: MACV J3-52)

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO US Forces 96240

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J543
APO US Forces 96243

1. Letter this headquarters, subject as above, dated 22 July 1966, is changed as follows:

   Remove pages one and two of enclosure 1 and replace with attached pages one and two.

2. After the above action has been completed this letter will be filed in front of basic publication.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
WILLIAM E. GROVES
2d Lt, AGC
Asst AG

1 Incl:
2d Lt, AG

Distribution:
1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army
   Washington DC 20310
1 - CG, USEUCOM (ATTN: GEOR-MH)
1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MAC J543)
1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MAC J2)
2 - CG, USAF
1 - CG, USARV (ATTN: AFO Historical Division)
2 - CG, IFORDEV
2 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
1 - CG
1 - DCO
1 - XO
1 - S1
1 - S2
10 - SS
1 - S4
1 - S5
1 - XO
1 - Sig
1 - FSE

CONFIDENTIAL
Inclusion 1 (contd)

(2) The present strength accountability system requires assigning personnel (3DCSA) to units prior to their physically joining the unit rather than administratively carrying them in the "pipeline".

(3) 3DCSA personnel have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit.

2. (c) Casualties:

a. Casualties for Operation HANTTFORIM were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/326</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 2/17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spn Bn</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>63</strong></td>
<td><strong>241</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total casualties to date are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th></th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th></th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>230</td>
<td></td>
<td>1206</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (d) Personnel Management:

a. A total of 291 replacements were received in the Brigade during this period. Breakout of such personnel to the maneuver battalions were as follows:

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>118</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 personnel with critical HOS were assigned as follows:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plat Ldr</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plat Sgt</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Ops Asst</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medics</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Emergency requisitions for continuing critical HOS shortage were submitted for E-7 platoon sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, and legal clerks.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclusion 1 (Personnel and Administration) to Star Action Reports, Operation BATTLEFIELD.

1. (a) Unit Strengths:
      (1) The brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation NORTHMORE were as follows:

         | Authorized | Assigned | Joined not Assigned | Present for Duty | Not Present for Duty | Air Head Strength | Base Camp | Tuy Hoa |
         | 4490       | 5749     | 116                | 5292            | 472                | 2338            | 1793     | 1061    |

      (2) The assigned strength was 128% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 105% of the authorized strength.
      (3) Of the not present for duty strength, 12% were hospitalized personnel.

   b. Conclusion of Operation NORTHMORE.
      (1) The brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation NORTHMORE were as follows:

         | Authorized | Assigned | Joined not Assigned | Present for Duty | Not Present for Duty | Air Head Strength | Base Camp | Tuy Hoa |
         | 4490       | 5749     | 115                | 5293            | 471                | 2331            | 1527     | 755     |

      (2) The assigned was 128% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 105% of the authorized strength.
      (3) Of the not present for duty strength, 12% were hospitalized personnel.
      c. The "assigned" strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the "not present for duty" because:

         (1) A large number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to off-shore hospitals, OOTUS, and/or even discharged from the US for lack of notification to the losing unit.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96247

AVBD-A 12 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORNE (ACU: MACV 313-32)

THRU: Commanding General
1 Field Force Vietnam
APO US Forces 96240

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J364
APO US Forces 96243

1. Letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 22 July 1966, is changed as follows:

   Remove pages one and two of enclosure 1 and replace with attached pages one and two.

2. After the above action has been completed this letter will be filed in front of basic publication.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM B. GROVES

1 Incl:

as

2d Lt, AGO

Distribution:
1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army
Washington DC 20310
1 - CG, US/RPAO (ATTN: GROV-12)
1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MACV 3363)
1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MAC 32)
1 - CG, USARV
1 - CG, USARV (ATTN: MAC Historical Division)
1 - CG, TFORCE
1 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
1 - CG
1 - DCO
1 - XO
1 - J1
1 - J2
1 - J3
1 - S4
1 - S5
1 - IO
1 - SIG
1 - FSE
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Inclusion 1 (Personnel and Administration) to After Action Reports, Operation HAWTHORNE.

1. (c) Unit Strengths:

   a. Beginning of Operation HAWTHORNE:

      (1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation HAWTHORNE were as follows:

          - Authorized: 4490
          - Assigned: 5840
          - Joined not Assigned: 116
          - Present for Duty: 5252
          - Not Present for Duty: 572
          - Air Ready Strength: 2396
          - Base Camp: 1793
          - Tuy Hoa: 1061

      (2) The assigned strength was 130% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 119% of the authorized strength.

      (3) Of the not present for duty strength, 339 were hospitalized personnel.

   b. Conclusion of Operation HAWTHORNE:

      (1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation HAWTHORNE were as follows:

          - Authorized: 4490
          - Assigned: 5769
          - Joined not Assigned: 115
          - Present for Duty: 4703
          - Not Present for Duty: 931
          - Air Ready Strength: 2331
          - Base Camp: 1527
          - Tuy Hoa: 755

      (2) The assigned was 128% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 109% of the authorized strength.

      (3) Of the not present for duty strength, 121 were hospitalized personnel.

   c. The "assigned" strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the "not present for duty" because:

      (1) A large number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to off-shore hospitals, CCUS, and/or even discharged from the US with out notification to the losing unit.

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBD-A 12 August 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORNE (CS: MACV J3-22)

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO US Forces 96240

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J3-45
APO US Forces 96245

1. Letter this headquarters, subject as above, dated 22 July 1968, is changed as follows:

Remove pages one and two of inclosure 1 and replace with attached pages one and two.

2. After the above action has been completed this letter will be filed in front of basic publication.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM E. GROVES
2d Lt, AGO

Distribution:
1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army
Washington DC 20310
1 - CG, USARV (ATTN: HAG J3-45)
1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: MAC J3-22)
1 - CG, USARV (ATTN: HAG Historical Division)
2 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
1 - CG
2 - DCO
1 - XD
1 - SI
1 - S2
10 - SS
1 - SE
1 - SS
1 - IO
1 - SIG
1 - INR

CONFIDENTIAL
Inclosure 1 (contd)

(2) The present strength accountability system requires assigning personnel (EDCSA) to units prior to their physically joining the unit rather than administratively carrying them in the "pipeline".

(3) EDCSA personnel have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit.

2. (c) Casualties:

a. Casualties for Operation HAMPTON were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/326</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 2/17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt Bn</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total casualties to date were as follows:

- KIA: 230
- WIA: 1206
- NIA: 2

3. (c) Personnel Management:

a. A total of 291 replacements were received in the Brigade during this period. Breakout of such personnel to the maneuver battalions were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 personnel with critical MOS were assigned as follows:

- Plt' Ldrs 11
- Plt Spts 10
- Drctors 2
- Med Ops Assts 2
- Medics 5

c. Emergency requisitions for continuing critical MOS shortages were submitted for E-7 platoon sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, and legal clerks.
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Inclusion 1 (Personal and Administration) to After Action Reports, Operation HAMTHORNE.

1. (c) Unit Strengths:

a. Beginning of Operation HAMTHORNE,

(1) The brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation HAMTHORNE were as follows:

- Authorized: 4490
- Assigned: 5749
- Joined not Assigned: 115
- Present for Duty: 4703
- Not Present for Duty: 472
- Air Land Strength: 2398
- Base Camp: 1793
- Total: 1061

(2) The assigned strength was 120% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 119% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 339 were hospitalized personnel.

b. Conclusion of Operation HAMTHORNE,

(1) The brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation HAMTHORNE were as follows:

- Authorized: 4490
- Assigned: 5749
- Joined not Assigned: 115
- Present for Duty: 4703
- Not Present for Duty: 472
- Air Land Strength: 2398
- Base Camp: 1793
- Total: 1061

(2) The assigned was 128% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 107% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 421 were hospitalized personnel.

c. The "assigned" strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the "not present for duty" because:

(1) A large number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to off-shore hospitals, Cbos, and/or even discharged from the US Army without notification to the losing unit.
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96547

AVBD-A 12 August 1965

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORNE (RCS: J345)

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO US Forces 96240

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J345
APO US Forces 96243

1. Letter this headquarters, subject as above, dated 22 July 1966, is changed as follows:

   Remove pages one and two of enclosure 1 and replace with attached pages one and two.

2. After the above action has been completed this letter will be filed in front of basic publication.

   FOR THE COMMANDER:

   WILLIAM E. GROVES
   2d Lt, AG
   Asst AG

Distribution:
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   Washington DC 20310
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2 - CG, USARV
1 - CG, USARV (ATTN: MAC Historical Division)
2 - CG, JFO/DEV
2 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
1 - CG
1 - DCO
1 - XO
1 - S1
1 - S2
10 - S5
1 - S4
1 - S5
1 - IO
1 - SIG
1 - PSY

CONFIDENTIAL

99
(2) The present strength accountability system requires assigning personnel (EDCSA) to units prior to their physically joining the unit rather than administratively carrying them in the "pipeline".

(3) EDCSA personnel have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit.

2. (C) Casualties:

a. Casualties for Operation HAWTHORNE were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/326</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2/17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt Bn</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total casualties to date are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>230</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>1206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (C) Personnel Management:

a. A total of 29 replacements were received in the Brigade during this period. Breakout of such personnel to the maneuver battalions were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>1/327</th>
<th>2/502</th>
<th>2/320</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>108</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 personnel with critical MOS were assigned as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS Classification</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plat Ldrs</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plat Sgts</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Ops Assts</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medics</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Emergency situations continuing critical MOS shortage were submitted for B-7 platoon sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, and legal clerks.
Inclusum 1 (Personnel and Administration) to After Action Reports, Operation HA'WATHOLS.

1. (c) Unit Strengths

   a. Beginning of Operation HA'WATHOLS

      (1) The brigade's personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation HA'WATHOLS were as follows:

      | Authorized | Assigned | Joined not Assigned | Present for Duty | Not Present for Duty | Air Head Strength | Base Camp | Tuy Noa |
      |------------|----------|--------------------|-----------------|---------------------|------------------|-----------|---------|
      | 4490       | 5040     | 116                | 5252            | 172                 | 2398             | 1725      | 1064    |

      (2) The assigned strength was 120% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 119% of the authorized strength.

      (3) Of the not present for duty strength, 39 were hospitalized personnel.

   b. Conclusion of Operation HA'WATHOLS

      (1) The brigade's personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation HA'WATHOLS were as follows:

      | Authorized | Assigned | Joined not Assigned | Present for Duty | Not Present for Duty | Air Head Strength | Base Camp | Tuy Noa |
      |------------|----------|--------------------|-----------------|---------------------|------------------|-----------|---------|
      | 4490       | 5769     | 115                | 4703            | 931                 | 2313             | 1527      | 755     |

      (2) The assigned was 120% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 108% of the authorized strength.

      (3) Of the not present for duty strength, 621 were hospitalized personnel.

   c. The "assigned" strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the "not present for duty" because:

      (1) A large number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to off-shore hospitals, OCS, and/or even discharged from the US Army without notification to the losing unit.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96247

AVBD-A 12 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HALTHERION (JCS: MACV J-52)

TNRU: Commanding General
1 Field Force Vietnam
APO US Forces 96240

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J545
APO US Forces 96243

1. Letter to this headquarters, subject as above, dated 22 July 1966, is changed as follows:

Remove pages one and two of enclosure 1 and replace with attached pages one and two.

2. After the above action has been completed this letter will be filed in front of basic publication.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM E. GROVES
2d Lt, AG
Act AG

1 Incl:
as

Distribution:
1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, DoD of the Army
Washington DC 20310
1 - CO, USARPAC (ATTN: GROF-MIL)
1 - CO, MACV (ATTN: HAC J545)
1 - CO, MACV (ATTN: MAC J52)
2 - CO, USARV
1 - CO, USARV (ATTN: MAC Historical Division)
2 - CO, IFFICBEV
2 - CO, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
1 - CO
1 - DO0
1 - XO
1 - 51
1 - 52
10 = 53
1 - 54
1 - 55
1 - 56
1 - FSE

CONFIDENTIAL

100
The present strength accountability system requires assigning personnel (EDCSA) to units prior to their physically joining the unit rather than administratively carrying them in the "pipeline".

EDCSA personnel have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit.

2. (c) Casualties:

a. Casualties for Operation HAWTYME were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/325</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 2/17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt En</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total casualties to date are as follows:

- KIA: 230
- WIA: 1206
- MIA: 2

3. (c) Personnel Management:

a. A total of 291 replacements were received in the Brigade during this period. Breakout of such personnel to the maneuver battalions were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 personnel with critical MOS were assigned as follows:

- Plt Ldrs: 11
- Plt Sgts: 10
- Doctors: 2
- Med Ops Assts: 2
- Medics: 5

a. Emergency requisitions for continuing critical MOS shortages were submitted for E-7 platoon sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, and legal clerks.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclusion to After Action Reports, Operation HAMPTON:

1. (c) Unit Strengths:

a. Beginning of Operation Hawthorne,

1. The brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation HAMPTON were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>4490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined not Assigned</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>5252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Head Strength</td>
<td>2398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp</td>
<td>1793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tug Boa</td>
<td>1051</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned strength was 130% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 119% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 339 were hospitalized personnel.

b. Conclusion of Operation HAMPTON,

1. The brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation HAMPTON were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>4490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>5705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined not Assigned</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>4703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Head Strength</td>
<td>2131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp</td>
<td>1527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tug Boa</td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned was 128% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 109% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 421 were hospitalized personnel.

c. The "assigned" strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the "not present for duty" because:

(1) A large number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to off-shore hospitals, COMUS, and/or even discharged from the US Navy without notification to the losing unit.

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBD-A 13 August 1963

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAMTHORNE (ROG: MACV J5-32)

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J5-32
APO US Forces 96243

1. Letter this headquarters, subject as above, dated 22 July 1966, is changed as follows:
   Remove pages one and two of enclosure 1 and replace with attached pages one and two.

2. After the above action has been completed this letter will be filed in front of basic publication.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM B. GROVES
2d Lt., AGO
Asst AG

Distribution:
1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army
   Washington DC 20310
1 - CG, USARV (ATTN: GROF-MHI)
1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: HOG J5-43)
1 - CG, MACV (ATTN: HOG J5-43)
2 - CG, USARV
1 - CG, USAV (ATTN: USA Historical Division)
2 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
1 - CG
1 - DCO
1 - XO
1 - S1
1 - S2
10 - SS
1 - S4
1 - S5
1 - XO
1 - Sig
1 - PEB

CONFIDENTIAL
Inclosure 1 (cont.)

(2) The present strength ac-

uity system requires assigning
personnel (EDCSA) to units prior to their physically joining the unit rather than administratively carrying them in the "pipeline".

(3) EDCSA personnel have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit.

2. (c) Casualties:

a. Casualties for Operation HAWTHORNE were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/227</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/520</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/326</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 2/17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spk En</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total casualties to date are as follows:

KIA 230
WIA 1206
MIA 2

3. (c) Personnel Management:

a. A total of 291 replacements were received in the Brigade during this period. Breakout of such personnel to the maneuver battalions was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/227</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/520</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 personnel with critical MOS were assigned as follows:

- Plat Ldrs 11
- Plat Sgts 10
- Doctors 2
- Med Ops Assts 2
- Medics 5

C. Emergency requisitions for continuing critical MOS shortages were submitted for E-7 platoon sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, and legal clerks.
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Incl. os -r,\-
-1
1. (c) Unit Strengths:

\begin{itemize}
\item[a. Beginning of Operation Hawthorne.]

1) The Brigade personal strengths at the beginning of Operation \textit{Hawthorne} were as follows:

\begin{tabular}{ll}
Authorized & 6459 \\
Assigned & 5040 \\
Joined not Assigned & 116 \\
Present for Duty & 5252 \\
Not Present for Duty & 472 \\
Air Head Strength & 2398 \\
Base Camp & 1772 \\
Tuy Hoa & 1061 \\
\end{tabular}

2) The assigned strength was 130\% of the authorized strength;
the present for duty strength was 119\% of the authorized strength.

3) Of the not present for duty strength, 339 were hospitalized personnel.

\item[b. Conclusion of Operation \textit{Hawthorne}.]

1) The Brigade personal strengths at the conclusion of Operation \textit{Hawthorne} were as follows:

\begin{tabular}{ll}
Authorized & 4499 \\
Assigned & 5783 \\
Joined not Assigned & 115 \\
Present for Duty & 4703 \\
Not Present for Duty & 931 \\
Air Head Strength & 2431 \\
Base Camp & 1527 \\
Tuy Hoa & 755 \\
\end{tabular}

2) The assigned was 128\% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 105\% of the authorized strength.

3) Of the not present for duty strength, 461 were hospitalized personnel.

\item[c. The "assigned" strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the "not present for duty" because:

1) A large number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to off-shore hospitals, OCS-US, and/or even discharged from the US without notification to the losing unit.
\end{itemize}

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO US Forces 96210

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J3/3
APO US Forces 96213

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation BEAUREGARD (EAGLE BAIT).


3. (U) Location: Kon Tum Province.


5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Willard Pearson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

6. (U) Task Organization:
   a. The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation BEAUREGARD (EAGLE BAIT) was as shown below. This organization remained relatively unchanged throughout the operation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TF 1/327</th>
<th>Bde Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327 Inf</td>
<td>HPC (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 2/320 Arty</td>
<td>A 2/17 Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Tm, A 326 Engr</td>
<td>A 326 Engr (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF 2/502</td>
<td>MP Plt (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/101 Avn Sec</td>
<td>1/101 Tm A 2144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502 Inf</td>
<td>20 Chen Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Tm, A 326 Engr</td>
<td>245 Psy O1s Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320 Arty</td>
<td>181 Ht Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B 1/30 Arty (OPCN)</td>
<td>3 RNU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt En (-)</td>
<td>LRRP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. During the operation, three CIDG companies operated with the Brigade through mutual coordination with the Commanding General. Two CIDG companies (DAK TO) with USSF Tm A 2144 worked with TF 1/327 and TF 2/502 respectively. Also, one CIDG company (HMG BUK) with USSF Tm A 213 worked with the Brigade troops. These units and one Regional Forces company served as maneuver elements, protected radio relay sites, protected artillery batteries, protected Brigade base camp and screened flanks of attacking units. Also CIDG elements (DAK FER) with USSF Tm A
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BEAUREGARD (EAGLE BAIT) (RCS: MACV J3-32)

2d2 screened the LAOTIM/RVN border and the PKO River north of the Brigade area of operation. Long range reconnaissance Apache Patrols were also employed to obtain information of enemy locations.

c. TF 2/327 Inf remained detached from the 1st Brigade and was attached to the 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) in IVY HOA on Operations EYTHAN HALE and HEXXY CLAY.

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. 2/320 Arty: Employed in a direct support role.

b. B 1/30 Arty (OPOCH): Provided general support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

c. 10th Army Aviation Bn: Provided two light airmobile companies plus six UH-1B and four UH-1B aircraft in general support. In addition, two operational UH-47 aircraft were provided from the Ist Cav Div.

d. 129th and 183d Avn Co's: Provided a total of four O-1 aircraft in direct support.

e. 265th Pay Ops Co: Provided two loudspeaker and leaflet teams in general support.

f. 5th Air Commando Squadron: Provided airlift support for Pay War Ops.

g. 299th Engr Bn (Combat): Provided one company in general support.

h. 7th USAF: Flew ten Tactical Air missions totalling twenty-five sorties. Of these missions, nine were preplanned and one was immediate. The immediate strike was requested through the Air Force Direct Air Request Net and the response time from the initiation of the request until time-over-target was twenty minutes. The results of these missions included 5 VC KBA (BO), 21 VC KBA (EST), 3 structures destroyed and 19 structures damaged.

i. 498th Med Det (Airmobile): Provided continuous medical evacuation for the Brigade throughout the operation.

j. MACV and USSF Adv Teams, 26th Special Tactical Zone (ARVN) provided liaison and coordination with ARVN, RF, PF and CIDG forces in the area of operation.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 2, Intelligence.

9. (O) Mission: Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam directed the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct surveillance of the LAOTIM/OCA 30DIAM/RVN borders; block and ambush VC/NVA infiltration routes; and fix and destroy enemy in zone.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: Initially, the concept of the operation was to screen the area east of the PKO River and to employ deception measures to bait the enemy from suspected hiding places into terrain favorable to friendly forces. Following the first seven days of the operation, the concept was to move west and conduct surveillance, blocking and ambush operations between the PKO River and the LAOTIM Border. Later in the operation, the Brigade conducted search and destroy operations to exploit intelligence indications and contacts made with the enemy by reconnaissance forces.
CONFIDENTIAL

AV-320

10 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation EASUREG:

(EAGLE BKT) (RSS: HASS J3-32)

11. (C) Execution: On 24 June, Operation EASUREG: (EAGLE BKT) began with the infiltration of reconnaissance elements and attached CIDG forces to the east of the DMZ. These forces screened all known and suspected enemy infiltration routes. In addition, one rifle company was moved into each of the battalion areas of operation as an immediate action force capable of exploiting any major enemy contact. All possible measures were taken to deceive the enemy as to the presence of friendly forces and to entice him to disclose his presence. Aerial reconnaissance and resupply to the forward elements were severely restricted. Because of little contact, reconnaissance elements and battalion reaction forces moved west of the DMZ on 1 July. (See Inclosure 3B, Operation Schematic, Period 1-7 July). The 1/327 Inf (-) moved by helicopter to conduct surveillance, blocking and ambush operations in the north, while elements of the 2/502 Inf infiltrated on foot to screen infiltration routes in the south. On 5 July, when reliable intelligence sources indicated that two VC companies were moving toward the LAOTI, CIDG forces immediately reacted by placing two rifle companies of the 1/327 Inf, one platoon of A/2/17 Cav, and a battery of 2/320 into blocking positions along the DMZ and DMZ BLOC山谷s. On 7 July, the 2/502 Inf (-) made an airmobile assault on Objective JIM to conduct search and destroy operations in exploitation of a contact made by the Brigade reconnaissance elements with the enemy. (See Inclosure 3D, Operation Schematic, Period 7-11 July). The 2/502 Inf (-) conducted an airmobile assault on Objective PETE to conduct surveillance, blocking and ambush operations in the south, while elements of the 1/327 Inf infiltrated on foot to screen infiltration routes in the south. On 11 July, the 1/327 Inf (-) continued its search and destroy operations to the south. The 2/502 Inf (-) made an airmobile assault on Objective KNIGHT and established a blocking position there. Having made no significant enemy contact, all units returned to the DMZ on 15 July in preparation for deployment to TOU HOA.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission of conducting surveillance of the LAOTI, CIDG and DMZ borders; blocking and ambush VC/NVA infiltration routes; and fixing and destroying the enemy in the zone.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the operation: 18 VC KIA (K), 5 VC KIA (K), 21 VC KIA (K), 17 VC KIA (K), and 6 casualties. In addition, nine individuals and crew served weapons were captured and large quantities of rice and barley were destroyed.

c. Friendly losses during the operation were as follows: 6 KIA, 39 WIA.

33. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel and Administration. See Inclosure 1, Personnel and Administration.

b. Logistics. See Inclosure 2, Logistics.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BEAUREGARD
(EAGLE BAIT), (RCS: NAOV J3-32).

14. (c) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. Deception Techniques: Had additional helicopters been available to the Brigade, deception missions would have been flown to areas in which operations were not being conducted. Such techniques might have been effective in deceiving the enemy.

b. CH-47 "Piggy-back" Loads: The technique of sling loading ammunition under the howitzers in an Artillery displacement saves time and minimizes the time a helicopter requires on the ground. A minimum of four CH-47 helicopters must be provided for displacement of the artillery to insure responsiveness where it appears that major enemy forces will be encountered.

c. Psychological Warfare: The complete saturation of a target is not the answer to a successful psychological warfare campaign. To be most effective, the leaflet program must be introduced into an area where strong tactical pressure has been applied. A four to six week psychological warfare campaign is considered to be the time frame required to produce lucrative results.

15. (c) Commander's Analysis:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) The importance of having interpreters available who are familiar with the local dialect was reconfirmed. CIDG personnel familiar with the local language were effective in obtaining valuable intelligence information from the natives. This information could not be obtained by the intelligence personnel without the interpreters' assistance. The need for qualified interpreters will continue to be an important requirement.

(2) The effects of the then approaching monsoon season were felt during the operation. At times aircraft and helicopter support was inoperative due to inclement weather. However, there were no periods in excess of five hours which precluded the use of helicopters.

(3) The individual soldier must be impressed with the fact that although there are cases of isolated mines, the detonation of a single mine may well indicate a mine field.

(4) In dense jungle terrain, where few natural helicopter landing zones exist, small Engineer clearing teams must habitually be provided to each battalion. These teams can build or improve landing zones for use by helicopters conducting medical evacuation, resupply and troop lifts.

(5) The use of allied and indigenous forces are a valuable asset which will conserve or augment the forces available to a US unit commander. In this operation, Apache reconnaissance forces were invaluable as an extension of our resources.

b. Highlights of Operation:

(1) Throughout the period, CIDG units worked in mutual cooperation with the Brigade. The CIDG personnel enjoyed working with US troops and performed in an enthusiastic manner. The troops of the Brigade gained additional confidence in the local CIDG units. The cooperation and performance of duty of the CIDG and their USSF Advisors in KMT Province was the best and most professional that this Brigade has experienced in the past six months.

(2) Twice during the operation, mine fields were located by our forces. Upon locating a mine field the tactical forces stayed clear of the area, and mine sweeping elements from the Engineers were immediately deployed with a small security force. The mine fields were marked and/or destroyed depending upon the extensiveness of the mine field network.

(3) Although no significant contact was made during the operation, it is believed that the techniques of deception and employment utilized would have been extremely successful if there had been greater numbers of enemy forces in the area.

16. (C) Recommendations:

a. That a minimum of four CH-47 helicopters be provided to the Brigade when supporting Artillery must be moved by air LOC.

b. That the use of Artillery Mobile Training Teams be considered by other US tactical units as a means to improve Artillery techniques of Vietnamese units and to foster a better understanding and relationship between US and Vietnamese forces.

c. That steps be taken by higher headquarters to rigidly enforce the proper reporting and recording of mine fields as prescribed in current doctrine.

d. That organic and supporting logistical agencies continue to collocate in future operations.

e. That provisions be made for medevac helicopters with a more effective hoist capability to support the Brigade during future operations.

WILLARD PEARSON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

Inclosures
1. Personnel and Administration
2. Intelligence
3. Operations Schematics
4. Logistics
5. Communications
6. Civil Affairs
7. Pay War
8. Artillery
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   1 - S1
   1 - S2

   10 - S3

   1 - S4
   1 - S5
   1 - DO

   1 - Sig

   1 - FSE

---

```
1. (C) UNIT STRENGTHS:

a. Beginning of Operation BEAUREGARD.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation BEAUREGARD were as follows:

- Authorized: 4490
- Assigned: 5677
- Joined not Assigned: 93
- Present for Duty: 4500
- Not Present for Duty: 1177
- Air Head Strength: 2324
- Base Camp: 1597
- Tuy Hoa: 579

(2) The assigned strength was 126% of the authorized strength, the present for duty strength was 100% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 42 were hospitalized personnel.

b. Conclusion of Operation BEAUREGARD.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation BEAUREGARD were as follows:

- Authorized: 4490
- Assigned: 5558
- Joined not Assigned: 186
- Present for Duty: 4269
- Not Present for Duty: 1289
- Air Head Strength: 2475
- Base Camp: 1300
- Tuy Hoa: 594

(2) The assigned strength was 124% of the authorized strength, the present for duty strength was 95% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 341 were hospitalized personnel.

2. (C) Casualties:

a. Casualties for Operation BEAUREGARD were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/302</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/329</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC-PRP</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Cav</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. Total Casualties to date are as follows:

KIA 236
WIA 1265
MIA 2

3. (c) Personnel Services:

a. Utilization of in-country rest and recuperation facilities on a 24-hour basis. During this operation, 7 personnel a day were given the opportunity to utilize the facilities of the MCV compound in Pleiku. In addition, 25 men a day were flown to Kontum for an 8-hour visit.

b. AG, Finance, S3A, and American Red Cross Representatives visited the forward area and provided assistance.
Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BEAUREGARD (EAGLE HATI)

1. Terrain:
   a. Terrain was mountainous, covered with dense foliage. The ridges were high with the ravine sides steep. Bamboo and broad leaf tropical plants dominated the lower regions with evergreens showing at higher elevations.

   b. Observation and fields of fire were limited by dense undergrowth and the rugged terrain; however, cover and concealment were enhanced by the same factors. Highway 1 is the principal north south route of approach, while the bridge (ZB 016218) and pass gate (1Z 946282) between Dak To and Dak Sut are keys to the logistics to the area.

   c. Vehicular movement was restricted to the main avenue and a few smaller roads. Generally vehicular overland movement is impossible due to the terrain. Foot movement is slow and difficult.

2. Weather:
   a. The weather was dominated by the southwest monsoon with the cloud conditions and rain being as expected. Visibility was sharply reduced during the early morning, late afternoon and evening hours due to low ceilings and ground fog conditions. Visual air reconnaissance was impossible at times because of obscuring of the ground by fog. Scattered thundershowers were frequent, causing hazardous flying conditions over some areas. These thundershowers generally shifted within an hour or two, increasing visibility and bettering conditions. A particularly violent thundershower would cause small streams to rise sharply for two to three hours within a small area. Best times for visibility were generally between 1000 hours and 1530 hours.

   b. Winds were generally west to east and of negligible to moderate intensity. Heavy winds were not experienced.

   c. The temperature was cool with variations from 73°F - 75°F at night to 83°F - 85°F during the day. Humidity was generally high.

3. At the beginning of Operation BEAUREGARD the following information was available concerning enemy activity.
   a. Trails used for infiltration from Cambodia and Laos crossed the operational area.

   b. Total strength in Kontum was believed to include 3800 NVA personnel, eight to ten local guerrilla companies with a strength of 560 personnel and 2100 militia.

   c. The 630th NVA Division was believed to have been deployed to Kontum area as a reinforcement. The 403rd, 407th and 409th Main Force battalions were also available for reinforcement from Binh Dinh province.

   d. Indications show that the 12.7mm AT. IG was being employed in the area.

   e. Extensive fortifications in the area indicated a war zone type complex that took a great deal of time to prepare (est more than 6 months).

   f. The 4th Bn, 24th NVA Regt was believed to be withdrawing to a rest area in the vicinity of Dak Sut (ZB 9352), along Highway #14. The 5th Battalion was withdrawing to an unknown rest area.

   g. Interrogation reports indicate a mission of the 4th Battalion, 24th NVA Regiment was to attack Dak To and then Tan Canh during monsoon season.
**Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BEAU.EGARD (EAGLE BAIT)**

**h. Interrogation reports place the last resupply to the 4th Battalion at 1 June for ammunition and 31 May for food.**

**4. (c) During the operation, the intelligence situation was developed through:**

**a. Information obtained from VOS produced only data such as the status of Hamlet or Village populace. Names of VQ sympathizers were recorded. VOS did not have knowledge of NVA units or any other Order of Battle information.**

**b. Visual Reconnaissance: VR was flown an average of 9.5 observer hours per day for the past operation and revealed fortifications, heavy trail activity and several radio antennas. VR confirmed several SPARs and checked Red Haze activity within the Bde TAOR. A total of 6 photo missions and 2 Red Haze missions were requested and flown in support of the operation. VR A/C found many AA weapons, and A/C received 2 .50 caliber hits on one occasion.**

**COORDINATES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>RESULTS/ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YB 992195</td>
<td>Circular clearings in bamboo thickets near Bdo Base area. SPAR rytcd VO unit in area. Further ground check revealed diggings in clearing were friendly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 778420</td>
<td>Fast-like object in field, poss radio antennas. Fired 01-0 rockets, results unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 701451 &amp;</td>
<td>A/C found .50 cal AA MG, and drew fire w/tracons. Weapon fired at many A/C in area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 977540</td>
<td>Poss rice storage area, U/G entrance w/boards supporting entrance. Artillery fired, new location, fired again, results unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 6625 to</td>
<td>Well used trail running into jungle, showing signs of recent heavy use. Red Haze revealed heavy use of trail at night.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 952525</td>
<td>20 foxholes w/overhead cover. Rpt to S-2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 135545 to</td>
<td>60-70 anti-helicoptr stakes in rice paddies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 016552</td>
<td>VC trenches and foxholes on ridge line. Artillery adjusted and 75% of fortifications destroyed, Rpt to S-2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 073475</td>
<td>15 new foxholes, camouflaged, with fields of fire cleared in undergrowth. Rpt to S-2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3 820400</td>
<td>Area shows signs of heavy activity, many huts, cultivations and well used trails. Rpt to S-2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 866943</td>
<td>Large number of elephants, appear wild, but may be pack elephants. Rpt to S-2.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** VR listed above does not include all missions, but is merely a listing of more significant sightings.

**c. The Inq Rango Reconnaissance Platoon was utilised extensively for the detection of enemy locations, movements, and/or supporting activities.**

(1) 1 July - The LRRP reported mortar fire vic ZB 083444 and noted heavy recent trail activity moving to the north out of general area ZB 0940.

(2) 3 July - The LRRP discovered a wallet (ZB 065396) lost by a member of the 2/502. The wallet had been lost during a battle with the 4th Bn, 2/502 at a point further east. Conclusion: The 4th Bn, 24th RVN Regt withdrew through ZB 065396 and subsequently north.**
Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BRAUNBERG (EAGLE BAY)

(3) 6 July - The LRRP received small arms and automatic weapons fire from YB 983562, YB 983569, YB 993573, YB 995563 and YB 987560.

(4) 7 July - The LRRP contacted a small VC element at YB 957517.

(5) 10 July - The LRRP sighted 17 VC moving SE at YB 762269.

(6) 11 July - The LRRP contacted an estimated VC platoon at YB 762270.

d. Through coordination with Special Forces, Apache teams were made available as an additional reconnaissance means.

e. Liaison with the 42nd ARVN Regt, CIDG companies in our AO, and 24th STZ Headquarters were complementary intelligence sources.

f. The location of large quantities of rice and barley were utilized as indications of VC activity in the area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>QUANTITY AND TYPE (TONS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YB 920430</td>
<td>2 1/2 (rice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 923404</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 924445</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 927435</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 928418</td>
<td>3 (barley)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 929411</td>
<td>1 (rice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 950560</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 984244</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 960567</td>
<td>3/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YB 955664</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Results:

a. Initial Order of Battle:

(1) Prior to the following is a listing of known units in this area of operations:

- 200th Arty Bn
- 407th MF Bn
- 13th AA Bn
- 24th NVA Regt

(2) POWs, military and suspects: no worthwhile information has been obtained during this period from the interrogation reports.

(3) Total Strength: 4,360 to include VC and NVA personnel.

(4) Initial Enemy Disposition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200th Arty Bn</td>
<td>YB 9563</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>19 Jun</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407th MF Bn</td>
<td>YB 1685</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th AA Bn</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th NVA Regt</td>
<td>Dak To —</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approximate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Order of Battle Summary: During recent operation no new or additional information has been compiled, constituting no change to the present Order of Battle.
6. (C) Intelligence Analysis, Lessons Learned:

a. Analysis:

(1) Because of the losses suffered during Operation HAWTHORNE, the elements of the 24th NVA Regt appeared to be avoiding further contact with US forces.

(2) Local enemy forces continue to operate as a deterring force in those areas where food supplies exist. Although incapable of sustained defensive operations, their presence is sufficient to make CIDO and ARVII surveillance difficult if not impossible.

(3) The terrain in the operational area is of such a nature that both VC and NVA units will continue to have relative freedom of movement as long as their operations are conducted at the individual and small unit level.

(4) Much of the support of the local populace has been lost as indicated by the high refugee rate at the end of Operation BEAUREGARD.

b. Lessons Learned: The LRRP is an intelligence collection agency and by virtue of the nature of its operations is often subjected to enemy contact. Since enemy contact is of such a positive intelligence nature, it has been deemed necessary to have a reaction force available in conjunction with all LRRP operations. The force need only be of sufficient size to maintain contact with an enemy force (e.g. - platoon) until an adequate size force is mustered for employment.

12. (C) Results:

a. The brigade was successful in deploying units in those areas considered to be occupied by the enemy. However, Operation BEAUREGARD was characterized by a distinct lack of significant contact due to the purposeful evasive tactics of those NVA units in the AO.

b. The following is a breakout of the enemy weapons and material losses during Operation BEAUREGARD (EAGLE BAIT):

(1) Weapons Captured:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomenclature</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm Mosin Nagant</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm PPSH, Model 1953</td>
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<td>China</td>
</tr>
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<td>12 gauge Stevens</td>
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<td>US</td>
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<tr>
<td>shotgun</td>
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<tr>
<td>.30 cal carbine, Ma</td>
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<td>US</td>
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(2) Ammunition:

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<tr>
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<td>257</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.62mm (long)</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>.45 caliber</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 gauge shotgun</td>
<td>16</td>
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(3) Food:

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<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>26½ Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>3 Tons</td>
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Incloure 3A (Operation Schematic, Period 21 - 30 June) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BEAUREZ RD (EAGLE BAIT)
Operations After Action Report, Operation BRAHMSHARD (EAGLE RAY)
(5) Water: Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion operated a water point at TAN CANH using a 1500 GPH Erdalator which provided excellent service throughout the operation.

b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion Maintenance Detachment received 37 automotive, 60 signal, 70 ammunition, 20 instrument, 63 quartermaster and 47 engineer job orders.

c. Surface Transportation: 212 - 2 1/2 ton truck transportation requests were filled during the operation.

d. Air Transportation:

(1) Fixed Wing: CV-2 aircraft supporting the Brigade flew 38 sorties for a total of 553 passengers and 26.1 short tons of cargo. 12 - C130 sorties were flown for 72 passengers and 23.75 short tons of cargo.

(2) Rotary Wing: Both CH-47 and UH-1D continued to prove invaluable in aerial resupply operations of committed forces. Two UH-1D's were placed in direct support of each Infantry Battalion and provided extremely efficient tactical and administrative support to the committed units.

(3) Army aircraft lifted a total of 98.52 short tons of supplies into the forward area. Attached at Appendix 1 is the daily aerial resupply tonnage by class of supply during Operation BEAUREGARD (Eagle Bait).

e. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration was provided by 148th Quartermaster Company, and elements of USARSO, QUI NHON.

(2) Bath: 148th Quartermaster Company provided excellent service throughout the operation.

3. MEDICAL:

a. There were no major problems encountered in the areas of field sanitation and personal hygiene. Engineer LZ clearing teams and a single medevac helicopter without winch proved adequate for the relatively small number of casualties generated by the operation.

b. Patients Treated:

(1) WIA 42

(2) Non-Battle Injury 75

(3) Disease 189

Total Treated 306

c. Returned to duty 96

d. Evacuated to hospital 210

e. Remaining in holding 0

f. Hospitalized personnel (Battle Injuries) categorized by wounds are as follows:

(1) Head 3

(2) Chest 2

(3) Upper extremities 4
1. **ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT:**

   **a. Support Battalion:**
   
   (1) **Headquarters Detachment:** Provided command and control for Support Battalion (Forward). The detachment was organized into command, operations, communications and movement control sections.
   
   (2) **Supply Detachment:** Was responsible for receiving, storage and issue of all classes of supply and provided a parachute rigger section.
   
   (3) **Maintenance Detachment:** Provided repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineer and automotive items. The detachment was organized into a shop office and a recovery/contact team.
   
   (4) **Medical Company:** Provided Brigade level medical service. It was organized into a company headquarters section, a surgical section, a holding section, a medical evacuation section, an emergency treatment section, and a dental section.

   **b. Supporting Forces:**
   
   (1) FSA, USASC, QUI NHON (TP Stinson) supported 1st Bde 111th Abn Div. FSA was collocated with Supply Detachment, Support Battalion. It was responsible for receiving and stocking Class I, III and V and for issue of Class III to aviation units.
   
   (2) 10th Aviation Battalion: Provided 2 light air mobile companies, plus 6 UH-1D and 4 UH-1B aircraft to support tactical and logistical operations.
   
   (3) CH-47 helicopter support was provided by 147th Aviation Company (Airmobile) and 1st Cav Div (Airmobile).
   
   (4) 498th Aviation Company: Provided Medical Aerovacuation throughout the operation.

2. **MATERIAL AND SERVICES:**

   **a. Supply:**
   
   (1) **Class I:** A total of 184 short tons of "B" rations and 62 tons of Meals, Combat, Individual, Type "C" were issued during the operation. An adequate supply of "MP" rations was received and "MP" ration meats were issued in sufficient quantities to supplement all but 5 "MP" ration meals. However, fresh vegetables and bread issues were extremely limited.
   
   (2) **Class II and IV:** Class II and IV supplies were shipped from the Brigade Support Battalion in PHAN RANG and QUI NHON and CAM RANH BAY Area Support Commands. However, jungle fatigue and boots were in short supply throughout the operation.
   
   (3) **Class III:** 211 short tons of Class III and IIIA were issued during the operation (excluding JP-4), to include 39,500 gallons of AVAS, 9,500 gallons of DIESEL, and 15,900 of AVAS (115/145). Supporting aviation units used 204,250 gallons of JP-4 (392 short tons).
   
   (4) **Class V:** 149 short tons of Class V were issued during the operation. The following items remained in short supply during the operation.
   
   (a) Hand-Held Flares
   
   (b) White Star Cluster
   
   (c) Green Star Cluster
   
   (d) White Star Parachute Flares
| Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report |
| Operation BEAUGARD (Eagle Bait) |

| (4) Lower extremities | 31 |
| (5) Abdomen | 2 |
| (6) Neck | 0 |
| **Total** | **42** |

4. **(U) SUPPLY:**

   a. Supply operations continued to be simplified by collocating the FSA, USAF, USAF/MD and the Brigade Support Battalion. Common Supply Points were used for Class I, III and V. Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division provided Class II and IV supply.

   b. Helicopter Hoist: Operations in mountainous and/or heavily forested terrain continue to necessitate fitting medevac helicopters with a winch capability.

5. **(U) CONCLUSIONS:**

   a. Duplication of effort is reduced by collocating the Forward Support Area with the organic Forward Support Element.

   b. Medevac helicopters equipped with winch capability are a necessity when operating in mountainous and/or heavily forested terrain.
## CLASS I

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Pounds</th>
<th>Tons</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Pounds</th>
<th>Tons</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17 July</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>91,670</td>
<td>45.82</td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>6400</td>
<td>3.20</td>
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</table>
Inclosure 5 (Communications) to Combat Operations after Action Report, Operation BEAUREGARD (ENGLISH DRAFT)

1. (U) Background:

The 1st Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company Communications Platoon and the 1st FACCP had the joint mission of continuing the communications support of the Brigade Headquarters as initially established for Operation HAITHORNES.

2. (G) Operations:

a. VHF Section - Not committed.

b. Communications Center Section - Provided motor messenger service and secure teletype service to a FFGFCSV.

c. Switchboard/Sec. Section - A two-position switchboard was operated terminating to command-net circuits. Additional lines installed increased the wire in use in the 7460 area to 20 miles.

d. FM Radio Service - Per FM net were needed for operational traffic. Splitting the units on two nets eased the traffic flow during peak periods. A FM relay site was operated using normal and automatic retransmission.

e. Vehicle radio section - Continued to provide maintenance support for Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company and attachments.

f. FM Radio Service - Continued to operate a secure ITT net between DM TO, VM RNQ, and 785 FM.

g. Corps Signal Det. - 56th Signal Battalion provided VHF circuits into the Corps area synch and secure ITT to FFGFCSV, and operate a Single Side Band Phone Patch at link 24, VM RNQ, and MNA TRAO.

3. (G) Problems:

a. Personnel shortages - Shortages in skilled MOS's are becoming critical, especially 31RSP, 72B2P and 72B2P, affecting communication center operations and repair capability.

b. Equipment shortages - 12 35W AC generators were requisitioned on "02" priority in November 1965 as a replacement for the PE-75 generators, which have proved unreliable. Only one has been received.

c. TTY teleprinters continue to be a critical maintenance problem. Insufficient floats are available to maintain a continuously operational machine.

d. T195 Transmitters continue to be a critical maintenance problem. Insufficient maintenance floats are available to maintain a continuously operational system, even though all AH Radios are consolidated under Brigade control.

e. FM communications between the Brigade and Battalion TAC Command Posts were not reliable. This can be improved by the use of ground-mounted AH/VRC-66, radio sets and Remote Control Unit AH/GRC-35, and training of RTO's.

f. Several units laid wire through the Brigade Command Post area using unsatisfactory wire laying techniques. Units should review FM 21-20 with changes.

g. Telephone subscribers often did not use direct numbers. Asking for parties by name constitutes a security violation in some cases, and delays the operation of the switchboard. Directories are available from Strike 18.
Inclusion 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation ALUMAE (GHET BOO)

1. (C) During Operation ALUMAE (GHET BOO) this Brigade's Civil Affairs Civic Action program was directed in July at assisting the D.C. TO District Chief in his efforts to accomplish the missions assigned to him as part of the Revolutionary Development Program. Because the Brigade remained in the area from that it had been in for Operation HURRICANE, the Civil Affairs effort was primarily a continuation of earlier programs designed to lessen the friction between this Brigade and the people of the area.

2. (C) In an effort to support the Revolution of Development Program objective of the D.C. TO District, this Brigade worked closely with the Sub-District Advisor, Capt. Draug, and the UNID representative Mr. Sandik. A list of projects, in order of priority, was drawn in and as time, man, and equipment became available the projects were undertaken and completed. Some of these projects were:

a. Grading and improving the Central Market Place in T.I. G.M.
b. Road and bridge repair; 24 mi road 3 bridges.
c. Grading ground for a new school in D.C. G.M.
d. Cutting timber for District use.
e. Clearing the growth along the sides of Route 59.
f. Donating school supplies and furniture to the schools in D.C. TO and D.C. G.M.
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Inclusion 7 (Pay War) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RESTRICTED (SACLANT)

1. (U) Psychological Objective: To promote native civilian support, to induce civilian consent with and in support of the Brigade's mission, to demoralize the enemy, and promote rallies and revolts.

2. (U) Psychological Themes Used:
   a. Demoralize NVA and VC orders.
   b. Rally to GVN/Allied Forces.
   c. Grain Ho.

3. (G) Target Audiences:
   a. NVA
      (1) 10th Regiment.
      (2) 24th Regiment.
   b. Viet Cong/Coord.

4. (G) Statistics
   a. Total Operation Hours: 40 hours
   b. Total Leaflets: 13,456,000
   c. Special Leaflets Produced: 3
   d. Rollouts: 63
   e. Special Types Produced: 3

5. (G) Lessons Learned:
   a. That the effectiveness of a tactical Pay War campaign depends on the use of military force in the operations area. Military pressure is necessary to insure response in the target audiences.

   b. That complete saturation of a target with leaflets is only a partial solution for an effective Pay War campaign. It must be the combined effort of leaflets and tactical pressure.

6. (G) Conclusions:
   a. That the results of the Pay War effort in Operation DESTRUCTION would have been more effective if strong military contact had been made.

   b. The long range results of the Pay War effort cannot be determined, but it has been the rule in the past that the full effects take 4 - 6 weeks after a Pay War campaign.

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Inclusion 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, 
Operation ENLISTED (XANG WITZ)

1. (G) Missions: 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery Bn of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. 51st Battery, 1st Battalion (Paced) 320th Artillery reinforced 3d Mortar Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery.

2. (G) Execution: 24 - 30 Jun: All units were placed on standby alert. Units continued to maintain equipment. A service practice was conducted on 26 - 27 Jun to familiarize the Forward Observers and Liaison Officers with the problems of Artillery adjustment in jungle.

   a. 1 - 5 July: 1 July L/5/320th Arty deployed at 1000 hrs from Z001252 to 17064553 to support screening mission of the 1/327th Infantry. By L/5/30th Arty began deploying to 17064553 at 1300 hrs to support screening mission of 2/506th Infantry. Both units closed at 1800 hrs. During this period, two batteries of the 2/320th Arty were deployed. During this period, the PAVN gunner was fired at 101 targets, expending 402 rounds. On 05/30th Arty closed to 17064553 in support of the 1/327th Infantry. Unit closed at 1500 hrs.

   b. 7 - 15 July: 4 July L/9/320th Arty deployed to 17066521 to support 2/506th Infantry. Unit closed at 1745 hrs. On 8 July L/9/320th Arty deployed to 17064553 in support of 2/327th Infantry. Unit closed at 1745 hrs. On 12 July L/7/320th Arty deployed to Z001252 in support of 2/506th Infantry. All elements closed back to base area by 2100 hrs. On 13 July all units closed.

3. (G) Supply and Administration: There were adequate W-I-I's to provide the required resupply of the battalion during the operation.

4. (G) Problem Areas:

   a. Displacement by two (2) C-47's. Artillery batteries can be deployed by utilizing only two C-47's. However, this places definite limitations on timely support of the infantry and delays the initiation of ground operations by supporting elements. Depending on distance of displacement, the move takes from six to nine hours. During this period the battery is operating in two positions, with minimum support. Additionally, the security core for the battery is divided and in some instances two forces will be required, one to secure the forward position and one to remain in the present position until displacement is complete.

   b. Positioning of Radio Relays: The Battalion, during the latter phase of the operation, experienced difficulty in communicating with forward batteries because of the location of the Brigade radio relays.

5. (G) Comments:

   a. The battalion for the first time deployed utilizing the "piggy-back" system. By allowing ammunition under the mortars to land and time on the ground by the C-47's is minimized. The battalion has the capability of moving nine mortars by "piggy-back" and by 5 August all be capable of moving all mortars in this manner.

   b. In LST was placed in support of the R.N. F.O. Special Force. Scout during the operation. The LST provided instruction in ship direction procedures, crew drills on the 105mm mortars, maintenance procedures, and the crew handling and safety procedures of ammunition. Additionally, limited maintenance was performed on the mortars and ship's direction forms and records were provided to the artillery element of the army.
Enclosure 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation 3-4-71

a. One CIDG company was provided as a security force for 5/3/71. This force proved adequate and performed its mission in an efficient and willing manner.

d. The 4-4 Gunner-Pilot was positioned at 23013013 for the entire period of the operation. The primary sector of responsibility was the Brigade Taskforce Operations Center and the adjacent helicopter pads with secondary sections being each of the firing batteries. From 24 June to 25 July this order was non-operational for 12 hours. Operating periods for the order were from 1600 hrs to 0600 hrs daily, this being the most likely period of mortar attacks.

c. (U) Recommendations: A minimum of four (4) CH-47's be placed in support of the battalion during future airborne operations.
**Enclosure 1 (List of Positions Occupied and Ammunition Expended) to Enclosure 2 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RHINEFORD (Cont'd)**

**C-08/3041 Later**

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>Conducted</th>
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<th>2nd Def Cont</th>
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Surveyed all batteries: 1 sniper sil & 1 Ordnance Complex destroyed.

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# Inclusions

1. (Keep of Positions Captured and Ammunition Expended) to
2. (Artillery) to Ochuka Operations Action Action Report,
3. Operation 735/11/19

## Battery A

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<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 July - 7 July</td>
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<td>8 July - 13 July</td>
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## Battery B

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## Battery C

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<td>27 Svo Practices</td>
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