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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (21 Feb 68) FOR OT RD-674203

4 March 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 41st Artillery Group, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6(f), AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6(c) and (d), AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned, during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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   41st Artillery Group
   1st Battalion, 82d Artillery
AVGK-CO 22 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS-CSPOR-65) (U) UIC: WA00-AA-A (U)

TO: See Distribution

SECTION 1: (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General

   a. During the reporting period the following organizations/units were attached to this headquarters; locations of their operational HQ are listed.

   (1) 7th Bn (105) (T) 13th Artillery, Vic Bong Son

   (2) 7th Bn (8") (SP) 15th Artillery, LZ Uplift

   (3) 2nd Bn (105) (T) 17th Artillery, An Khe

   (4) 5th Bn (105) (T) 27th Artillery, Tuy Hoa

   (5) 1st Bn (155) (T) 30th Artillery, Bong Son

   (6) 6th Bn (8"-175) (SP) 32nd Artillery, Tuy Hoa

   (7) 4th Bn (AW) (SP) 60th Artillery, Quy Nhon

   (8) HHB 8th TAB, 26th Artillery, Vic Quy Nhon

   (9) Btry B (SIL) 29th Artillery, Vic Quy Nhon

   (10) Btry A/3rd Bn (175-8") 13th Artillery (fully attached to 7th Bn 13th Artillery)

   (11) Btry C/6th Bn (155) (T) 16th Artillery (fully attached to 1st Bn 30th Artillery)
AVGK-CO 22 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

(U) RC3-CSFOR-65 (U) UIC: WAO0-A4-A

b. 41st Artillery Group, headquarters at Phu Cat Air Base, (BR 900 400) RVN, continued its mission of general support of U.S., ARVN and Free World Military Assistance Forces in II Corps Tactical Zone through the reporting period.

c. Primary activities of the group centered around maintaining liaison with and providing Artillery Support for the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) in Operations Pershing and Dazzlebug; for the Capital (Republic of Korea) Infantry Division in Operations Hong Kil Dong, Chak Chon Ueum and Hwa Mei De Flarm; for the 175d Abn Bde in Operation Bolling; for the 9th (Republic of Korea) Infantry Division also participating in Operation Hong Kil Dong; and for Binh Minh Regional Forces in Operation H.Q. Quang Trung 151. Other significant events/activities were as follows:

(1) Training assistance program for NVNAP.

(2) Base camp construction projects.

(3) All attached elements were placed under operational control of this HQ for the first time when the status of 7th Bn 13th Artillery and 1st Bn 50th Artillery was changed from "Opcon" 1st Cav Div to "Opcon" 41st Artillery Group on 1 October 1967.

(4) 2nd Bn 17th Artillery was detached from 1st Cav Div (AM) Arty and attached to this headquarters 15 October 1967, bringing the number of attached battalions to seven.

(5) PADAC computers were issued to the 1st Bn 30th Artillery on 12 August.

(6) Colonel A.V. Arnold Jr assumed command 22 October.

(7) The number of unit days HQ & HQ Btry engaged in training, movement and operations was 24, 0, and 68 respectively.

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE

a. S-2 Section initiated a vigorous program of downgrading and destruction of classified documents, thereby reducing the possibility of loss or compromise of classified material.

b. A program for more frequent inspection of subordinate units was implemented to assist units in eliminating unnecessary documents for command inspections.

c. On 16 October 1967 this unit was delegated the authority to issue final SECRET clearances. During the following two week period the section issued 49 SECRET clearances.

CONFIDENTIAL 2
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AVQK-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly 31 October 1967 (RCS-GSHK-67) (U) UIC: 22nd, 23rd (U)

d. A more aggressive program for obtaining intelligence information was initiated. Information is now received from 22nd ARVN Div; 1st Cav Div; Phu Cat AB Intelligence Agency; NET B 22, 5th Special Forces Group; AC of S Intell, USA Support Command, Qui Nhon; 52 Binh Dinh Province; Binh Dinh National Police; subordinate battalions; and Subsector Advisors.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities.

a. Operations.

(1) Although the group initiated no operations of its own, a marked increase in operational activities occurred during this reporting period. This headquarters was engaged in tactical operations the entire 92 days of the reporting period. Elements of attached battalions were dispersed from the northern II CTZ boundary vicinity BATO to Phan Thiet, a distance of 360 KM. Movement of elements from the coastal plains to the highlands and back to meet enemy threats in Dak To and Thi Nai increased. None of the battalion CPs were moved, however, all firing batteries except one displaced within the area of operation to provide required support to maneuver elements. In addition, several batteries were displaced to different AO’s for extended periods of time and were often split. A listing of these displacements follows:

(c) Btry A, 3rd Bn, 18th Arty (175mm-8”).

1 Aug
1 Platoon (175MM) vicinity 80 905 715, GS CAP ROK Inf Div; Btry (-) on route An Tho, two 8” moved to 175mm on route

5-7 Aug
Btry (-) reinforced 2/17 Arty vicinity An Khe.

7 Aug
1st Platoon moved from Bn 905 705 to Phu Cat closing 8 Aug on route forching 10.

8 Aug
Btry (-) closed Camp Townes from An Khe.

10 Aug
Btry (-) moved to Van Canh BR 835 051 on 1st platoon closed LZ Pony GSR 1st Cav Div Arty.

26 Aug
Btry (-) released GSR GRID closed LZ Pony Reinf 1st Cav Div 31 Aug bringing battery together for first time since 1 Aug.

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Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

10 Sep

1st Platoon GSR CAP ROK Inf Div
Arty VCC CQ 071713; returned to LZ English Pershing AO 4 Oct re-joined parent battery at LZ Pony 6 Oct.

27 Oct

Btry motor marched to Ploiku, attached for operational control to 52nd Arty Gp and further Opcon 6th Bn, 14th Arty GSR 4th Inf Div Arty for operations in Kainwright and Neumthir AO's.

(b) Battery B, 7th Bn, 13th Arty (105mm)

12 Aug

Motor marched from Pershing AO to Ploiku, attached for Opcon to 52nd Arty Gp for employment in Kontum area. Returned to Pershing AO and parent unit 31 Aug.

(o) Battery C, 6th How Bn, 32nd Arty (8"-175mm)

1 Aug

Remained attached for operational control to 52nd Arty Gp, Ploiku-Kontum area.

13 Aug

Moved to Qui Nhon, enroute to 9th ROK Inf Div AO under control of parent battalion. Arrived Nha Trang by sealift 14 Aug. Closed BP 906 834 16 Aug for support of 9th ROK Inf Div in Operation Hong Kil Dong.

27 Aug

Btry camp moved by seal to Qui Nhon enroute Ploiku area. Closed LZ Oasis (ZA 108 274) 29 Aug, Opcon 52nd Arty Gp Reinf 4th Inf Div Arty.

16 Sep

Btry moved to battalion base camp area CQ 257 342 VDC Tuy Hoa via Qui Nhon by sealift. Closed 17 Sept. Btry remained in Tuy Hoa area supporting Operation Boling from various locations for the remainder of the reporting period.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (KOS-COSOR-65) (U) UIC: VAOO-AM-A (U)

22 November 1967

(d) Battery C, 6th Bn 16th Artillery

17 Sep
Motor marched from LZ Ollie (BR 912 848) to Qui Nhon for airlift to Vung Ro Bay. After motor march to Tuy Hoa airlifted to LZ Basin (BQ 954 505) Rein 5/319th Arty in Operation Boling.

29 Sep
Btrty airlifted to Lc Peak (BQ 983 364) and continued to support Operation Boling, Opoon to 6/32 Arty.

(2) Due to the dispersion of units, variety of support requirements, fire planning by this headquarters was decentralized. Maximum use was made of the reinforcing mission.

(3) Though this headquarters assigned tactical missions only to battalions, the battalions found it advantageous to further assign tactical missions to battery level. Due to the prevalence of separate small unit operations in the semi-static revolutionary development areas, divisional batteries were employed in direct support of maneuver battalions. Non-divisional artillery batteries often reinforced divisional battalions. For example, the mission assignments for the 7th Bn 13th Artillery in the Pershing AO included: Btry A GSR 1st Bn 21st Arty, Battery B GSR 2nd Bn 19th Arty and Btry C GSR 1st Bn 77th Arty. These missions were assigned within the battalions overall mission of reinforcing 1st Cav Div Arty.

(4) Automatic Weapons and Searchlights were deployed as follows:

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<td>Bolling AO</td>
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<td>CAP ROK Inf Div</td>
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<td>Byrd AO</td>
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Those elements were predominantly attached to other artillery elements in their respective areas for purposes of control and were assigned normal artillery tactical missions. The M-42's and M55's were used for convoy security, perimeter defense, bridge security and for firing local H & I missions in connection with the perimeter defense mission.

(5) This headquarters maintained a liaison team at 1st Cav Div LZs. Group liaison at CAP ROK Inf Div was accomplished by the Liaison Officer from 5th Bn, 27th Arty and the 9th (ROK) Inf Div by 6th Bn, 52nd Arty. Liaison was maintained with 22nd ARVN Division, Binh Dinh Sector HQ, Tuy Phuoc, An Nhien, and Phu Cat Subsectors through regular weekly or biweekly visits by staff members.

b. Training

(1) A training program for six newly organized L/H MP/4 radar detachments was initiated at Camp Townes by HMB 8th TAB 26th Arty. Fifty-four enlisted men were trained in the operation and maintenance of the countermortar radar. The POI consisted of classroom and field training which began 27 September and ended 15 October. The training was conducted by personnel from the 8th TAB 26th Arty. Training program at Inol 1. Invaluable assistance for the training program was provided by the Capital ROK Inf Div Arty and the U.S. Air Force. The CAP ROK Artillery fired 150 rounds of 155 ammunition on three successive nights for high-burst and MFI registrations and weapon location practice. The Air Force provided 81mm mortar fire for detection practice at Thu Cat Air Force Base.

The Radar personnel were assigned to HMB 8th TAB 26th Arty pending organization of the radar detachments by general order. They continued training by operating three MP/4 radars nightly at Camp Townes, while awaiting deployment.

(3) RVNAF Training

An aggressive program to provide training assistance to RVNAF was undertaken in compliance with IFFORCEV Reg 350-1. Each attached battalion organized an instructor team to teach observed fire procedures. In addition, the medium and light battalions provided a firing battery training team, and the heavy battalions were tasked for a Fire Direction Team.
Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS-OSFOR-65) (U) UIC: WACO-00 (U)

Liaison was established with the Artillery Advisor, 22nd ARVN Division to ascertain the need for training assistance. On 23, 24, 26 and 27 October a 16 hour course in adjustment of artillery fires was held for 15 ARVN Infantry commanders and platoon leaders from the 41st ARVN Regiment. ARVN Artillery support and ARVN training site was used. Instructors were provided by 7th Bn 15th Artillery. Subsequently the 1st Bn 50th Artillery held a similar course for Infantrymen from the 40th ARVN Regiment. The 6th Bn 32nd Artillery duplicated the class for members of the 47th ARVN Regiment. The 5th Bn 27th Artillery provided fire direction and firing battery instructional teams for the Cung Son CIDG company for 10 days. This team presented 40 hrs of training, enabling the CIDG forces to effectively employ two 105mm howitzers located at the camp. The 2nd Bn 17th Artillery, stationed on enlisted instructors at the Vinh Thanh Special Forces Camp for the same purpose.

4. Other Activities

During this period two experimental artillery procedures emanating from the Gunnery Dept U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School were tested. These were a simplified registration procedure and proposed method of locating an observer by timing the sound interval between two simultaneously bursting artillery projectiles. Results of the registration procedure trials proved successful, while the observer locating tests were not considered to be conclusive due to limited opportunity for evaluation. Results of these tests were forwarded to the Artillery and Missile School. Further experiments are expected to be held when operations permit.

4. (U) Logistics

a. All units with M16A1 Rifles completed the exchange of the Buffer Assembly 2.

b. Some difficulty was experienced in obtaining test equipment and repair parts for PAL-1S. It has been determined however that stocks of parts are in country and will be available in the near future.

c. Plans were developed during August for construction of M87 and M110 gun platforms. Progress was delayed pending approval of the project. A further delay was caused by a shortage of material. Construction was eventually begun in early October.

d. Food Service Program

Two ration breakdown points were consolidated during the month of September reducing the personnel requirements by 50%.
AVG-230

22 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS-CSPFOR-65) (U) 

AIC: HADO-ΔΔ-Δ (U)

The Camp Townsend action breakdown is now operated by 3 enlisted men serving 6 units.

The Food Service inspection program was curtailed from 24 September thru 28 October, due to hospitalization of the Group Food Service technician and absence of the food service supervisor.

5. Medical

The health of the Command was excellent during the reporting period. During the months of August and September 2077 patients required medical attention by the surgeon. The majority were seen for minor problems, such as skin diseases, heat rash, and minor injuries. Ninety-nine patients were admitted to the hospital for ailments of a minor nature and most were returned to duty after short hospitalization. During September Battery B 1/30th Arty experienced an outbreak of infectious hepatitis. An epidemiological study failed to establish a common source for this outbreak. All battery personnel were given gamma globulin. The battery was semi-isolated for a short period, e.g., persons from other units were not allowed to eat in its mess hall or to associate closely with the battery. During the month of September, there were 16 animal bites reported. All victims were administered rabies shots. A program of stray animal destruction was instituted. Continued emphasis was placed on use of ear plugs, and malaria prophylactic medication. Malaria constituted no significant problem.

Two dentists from the 518th Medical Detachment, 59, were attached to the 41st Group during the month of July. They have been active in surveying the attached battalions. Personnel were classified according to dental needs and were programmed to be seen in the group dental dispensary.

5. (U) Civil Affairs

a. The Medical and Dental Action Program continued in the villages of Da Canh and Van Thuan. U.S. Advisory personnel to An Nhun District Headquarters have been very helpful in providing interpreters and guards when required. During the reporting period a total of 280 patients were treated. In addition, medical personnel continued to monitor and advise MEDCAP activities of attached units.

b. The Civic Action Program continued to be well received by the local Vietnamese. During the reporting period the following programs were undertaken:
AVUK-CO
22 November 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS-CSFOR-65) (U) UIC: WA00-AA- A (U)

(1) Clothing, food, soap, and candy were donated to the Qui Nhơn Orphanage.

(2) Edible garbage was provided and transported for swine feeding.

(3) A scrap lumber program was initiated. All lumber, not suitable for construction purposes, was collected and transported to Phu Cat Air Force Base. Sizable amounts of lumber were collected and transported to surrounding district headquarters for distribution.

6. (U) Personnel

a. Forty-seven men were given the High School GED test and seven were given the 1-year college equivalency test. In addition, nine personnel enrolled in USAFI correspondence courses.

b. During the period this headquarters supervised the infusion of 396 officers and enlisted men. This involved obtaining rosters, directing reassignments, and arranging transportation.
SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part 1, Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (U) Personnel.

   Item: Personnel Management

   Discussion: Management of personnel is a continuing problem. Imbalances occur due to reassignments, reassignments and extensions. The SI section is not staffed to permit personnel management, yet the mission is self evident.

   Observation: An additional administrative NCO and a personnel technician (WO) are considered necessary to monitor personnel actions. These spaces will be included in MTOE action under preparation.

2. (C) Operations.

   a. Item: Aircraft Support

   Discussion: (1) Aircraft support continues to be insufficient. Presently available on a daily basis are two "H-1D's from the 117th Avn Co, one of which is used for command and control by the group commander and staff. The other is shared by two battalions in the Tuy Hoa area for similar use. A third UH-1 has been made available two days per week. It is used by the 4th Bn 60th Arty, HEB 8th TAB 26th Artillery and Battery B, 29th Artillery for command, control and resupply of their widely dispersed elements.

   (2) Three O-1 aircraft are also available from the 23rd Avn Co, daily and are shared by four battalions. Limitations on flying time and lengthy flights from the 219th Avn Co to the supported battalions in the Pershing A0 each day limit the usefulness of these assets. This headquarters and CG IPFORCEN Artillery have requested additional aircraft on the basis of one O-1E daily for each cannon battalion. With the recent arrival of the 203rd Avn Co it appears that the request for O-1E's will be filled. The equivalent of two additional UHLD's per week has also been requested.

   Observation: Organic aviation sections are necessary at battalion and group, to permit visual reconnaissance, observation and command-control.
b. Item: Split Batteries

**Discussion:** Because of enemy unwillingness to mass and his penchant for launching small unit and mortar attacks in the coastal region of II CTZ, artillery has been employed for area coverage rather than for mobility or massing of fires. This has engendered the use of widely separated battery fire bases to make full use of range capability. In many cases batteries have been fragmented for extended operations into Platoons separated by as much as 35 kilometers. The command, control and resupply activities of the parent battalion are complicated by this employment, as are effects of personnel shortages since each platoon normally requires a full fire direction capability and sufficient personnel for 24 hour operation.

**Observation:** Commanders must pursue a very aggressive program of supervision and control to maintain discipline, standardization of procedures, welfare and maintenance in their widely separated units. Battery PD personnel must be augmented from battalion resources.

c. Item: Artillery Organization for Combat, Missions and status.

**Discussion:** Because of dispersion for area coverage, the desire for mixed calibers and the necessity for decentralized control, tactical missions normally assigned to battalions have in some cases been assigned to batteries. For example, to provide support for small unit operations, battalions which have a reinforcing mission for the 1st Cav Div Artillery have further assigned to their batteries mission of GS - Reinforcing divisional Artillery battalions. In one case a non-divisional battery was given the mission of direct support of a maneuver battalion. Batteries which are employed in a reinforcing role for operations at a considerable distance from their parent battalion were normally attached to other artillery battalions in the area of operation.

**Observation:** The battery rather than the battalion is in most cases regarded as the integral fire unit and is called upon to perform for maneuver battalions the role traditionally performed by the artillery battalion for brigade size forces. Adjustments in personnel and equipment are necessary.

d. Item: Airlift - Sealift

**Discussion:** Due to bridge and road limitations between Qui Nhon and Tuy Hao, all heavy artillery moves between these points are made by sea. For each sea lift a complete listing of vehicles, equipment, ammunition, POL and personnel is required, to include dimensions, weight and cube. For all major equipment items.

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Since the moves are generally on short notice, delays have been experienced while units determine this loading information.

Observation: In each unit a current pre-computed chart or list of all major equipment items, their cube, normal maximum weight, and dimensions should be maintained to expedite the documentation required for sea and air lifts.

Item: MTCE

Discussion: Due to distance, the span of EFFORGEV Artillery administrative control and the current tactical employment of artillery, the group headquarters staff has assumed many more administrative duties than normally expected. Staff augmentation needed includes a personnel warrant, pay specialist, an S5, and several clerks.

Observation: A group headquarters, though designated a tactical headquarters must perform administrative functions in this environment, which it is not staffed to do. An MTCE, with additional spaces for administrative personnel is being prepared.

3. (U) Training and Organization.
   a. Item: RVNAF Training

Discussion: The training program described in part 1, has been implemented only a short time, however some lessons learned are contained in the reports from participating organizations. One is attached at enclosure 2.

Observation: That, patience, imagination and tenacity are required to attain success in this training program.

b. Item: Artillery Mechanic Training

Discussion: Presently there is no course designed to train artillery mechanics in OCMUS. Personnel must be given on-the-job training which is not as desirable as school training. Lack of proficient artillery mechanics is a serious handicap to units operating independently at great distances from DS maintenance units.

Observation: A formal artillery mechanics course is considered necessary.
4. (U) Intelligence (None)
5. (U) Logistics (None)
6. (U) Other (Communications)
   a. Item: Plastic Tape
      Discussion: Standard friction tape has proven to be unsatisfactory for use in the Vietnam climate because of the heat and humidity. The tape loses its adhesive quality and rots very quickly.
      Observation: Plastic Insulation Tape, P/N 5970-664-3178 offers the best protection against the weather and the greatest durability.
   b. Item: TSEC/KY-8 Speech Security Device
      Discussion: The major problem concerning the KY-8 has been the fragility of the individual conductors in the X-Mode Cable. The points of greatest strain are at the connectors. Flexing causes the conductors to break or causes the insulation of the conductors to fail, producing shorts. A new stronger eight conductor cable has been introduced into the inventory and is expected to be available through supply channels soon.
      Observation: It has been found that reinforcing the cable with tape near the connectors will remove the strain and reduce failure.
   c. Item: AM Communications
      Discussion: Difficulties with cables connecting the TT-76 and TT-98 have been experienced. Excessive flexing of these cables causes the insulation on the individual conductors to fail.
      Observation: A spare set of cables should be kept on hand for each piece of equipment. They should be taped approximately six inches from each end to reduce flexing.

Part II, Recommendations

1. (U) Recommend that TOE aviation sections be authorized for fill (Ref Sec 2, part 1, par 2a.)

2. (U) Recommend that a formal course be established in CONUS for training artillery mechanics. (Ref Sec 2, part 1, par 3b.)

Incl 1
 withdrawn,
 Hqs, DA

A.V. ARNOLD JR.
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350, 1-December 1967

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATT: AVFA-CS-OI, APO 96350

1. Concur in the observations and recommendations contained in basic communication.

2. Reference: Section 2, Part II, paragraph 1, page 13. Currently this headquarters is staffing a study in order to request additional aircraft assets for I Field Force Vietnam Artillery units.

3. Reference: Section 2, Part II, paragraph 2, page 13. Concur with the need for school trained qualified artillery mechanics. Information cannot be determined at this headquarters whether such a course of instruction is in existence.

FOR THE COMMANDER

DONALD L. BURTON
MAJ. Arty
Adjutant
AVN-CC-47 (22 Nov 67) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1967, BOS G7406-65 UIC WACOAAA, 41st Arty (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350 10 DEC 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHQC-DST,
APO 96375

(C) This headquarters has reviewed the 41st Artillery Group Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 and concurs with the observations and recommendations and the previous endorsement with reference to observation in Section II, Part I, paragraph 2a (page 10): Aircraft support for artillery units is under study at this time.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JAMES P. GASTON
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

2 Incle

Downgraded at 3 year Intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR: 5200.10
AVHGC-DET (22 Nov 67)  3d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U) UIC: WACO-AA-A (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375  26 DEC 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96559

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 41st Artillery Group (ACOA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning aircraft support, page 10, paragraph 2: Concur. Current DA policy is that non-divisional Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units deploying to RVN will have their aviation sections at zero strength and no aviators or aircraft will be requested for these units. Therefore, CS and CSS units must be provided aviation support from current assets on a priority basis.

   b. Reference item concerning artillery mechanic training, COWUS, page 12, paragraph 3b; page 13, paragraph 2; and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3: Concur. DA Pamphlet 350-10 lists courses for turret maintenance (643-45020) and Air Defense Artillery Automatic Weapons Repair (642-45P20). These courses do not appear to qualify an individual as an artillery mechanic as specified in AR 611-201.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies Furnished:

HQ, 41st Arty Gp
HQ, IPPV

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 from HQ, 41st Arty Gp (UIC: WACQQAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)(U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 14 FEB 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as endorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
BEAVRIN SNYDER
CPT, ASC
Asst AG
1. In reference your message cite 10/153 subj: ARVN Training, the following report is submitted. This organization conducted Forward Observer Training for all company grade infantry officers of the 41st Regt, 22d ARVN Division on 23, 24, 26 and 27 Oct 67. Two separate two day sessions were held in order to assure that all of the officers would have the opportunity to receive the instruction.

2. The program included 10 hours of instruction conducted with the objectives first of teaching the students to adjust artillery fire in their own language and second to call for fires in English. Three hours were classroom type instruction and seven hours were practical exercises. The classroom instruction covered the following subjects: Artillery Characteristics and Target Location; Initial Fire Request; and subsequent corrections. The next two hours were spent in practical exercises in the conduct of fire; using a mock-up of a binocular reticle and a map, students were required to locate targets, prepare an initial fire request and send it in English. Students were then required to make appropriate corrections when the instructor designated the position of the burst on the mock-up binocular reticle. The final five hours of the course consisted of a Ft Sill style observed fire service practice in which each student fired one mission. Two 105mm howitzers of C Btry 222d ARVN Battalion supported this shoot. Students were required to give the fire request and corrections to the instructor first in English; then they sent the commands to the ARVN FBC in Vietnamese. A copy of all lesson plans has been included as Incl 1. A list of recommended bilingual training aids is enclosed as Incl 2.

3. Problem areas associated with the instructional program fell generally into three categories. First, obtaining artillery qualified and properly motivated interpreters. Second, the tardiness and truancy of the students. Third, the failure of students to bring necessary equipment. The Division Artillery Executive Officer was appointed to interpret for these classes; he was present for the first three hours of class but was unwilling or unable to interpret. A Vietnamese Artillery forward observer, who spoke fair English, was also asked to interpret. Initially he also
refused, however, he later agreed to participate and performed well. As a result, initial interpretation was accomplished by the regimental interpreter who spoke English very well; however, his lack of understanding of basic artillery terms hampered the instruction. The second problem was tardiness and absenteeism for the afternoon classes. Classes were scheduled from 1400 to 1600. No afternoon class ever begun before 1430. Class strength for the first cycle was 24 and for the second, 15. However, the afternoon classes on each day were poorly attended and the final class of the second cycle had only two students in attendance. The exact cause of this behavior is unknown, for it was certainly not from lack of command emphasis. The regimental commander was eager to have this instruction and visited the classes on several occasions. The third difficulty was that the students did not have sufficient maps, compasses, and binoculars with them even though this had been previously arranged for. This caused a conference each time a target was to be located. Also the students were not able to follow the adjustments as well as if they had had binoculars.

4. Overall, the primary objective of the class was accomplished. Students used proper procedures, however, they require more practice before they will be able to adjust fire rapidly and to select fuse actions properly for the various types of targets. The secondary objective, to teach the students how to call for and adjust fire in English, was successful only in those cases where students had a prior basic knowledge of English. The overall results were gratifying and it is felt that considerable headway was made.

5. Recommend the following actions be taken in the future to improve instruction. First, that closer liaison be established to insure availability of suitable interpreters. Second, that closer coordination be made to insure that students are properly equipped to participate in the instruction.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Not received, Hqs, DA

KARLHEINZ PFERP
Capt, Artillery
Adjutant

A TRUE COPY

GAROLD B. SLAVENS
Major, Artillery
Adjutant
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 41st Artillery Group

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967

CO, 41st Artillery Group

22 November 1967

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N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310