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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 13th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1967(U)

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The Adjutant General

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Commanding Officers
US Army Aviation Test Activity
13th Combat Aviation Battalion
AVBA-DB-3

22 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS CS For 67)

TO: Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

Forwarded herein is the Operational Report on Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 October 1967. (RCS CS For 67)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JERRY L. PATTON
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS, 13TH COMBAT AVIATION (DELTA) BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96215

AVDA-DB-3

15 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1967, MAX-FA-A (RCS-CS for 67)(U)

SECTION I

Significant Organization or Unit Activities

A. Organization: See Incl 1

B. Significant Changes:

1. (U) Phantom Combat Aviation Battalion (Provisional)

   a. The Phantom Combat Aviation Battalion (Provisional) was organized by General Order 3602, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO San Francisco 96307, dated 1 August 1967. The activation date of the Battalion was 25 August 1967. On this date the 199th Aviation Company (Lt), the 221st Aviation Company (Lt) and the 244th Aviation Company (Aerial Surveillance) were assigned to the Phantom Battalion. Its functional mission is to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance within the IV ARVN Corps Tactical Zone.

   The activation of the Phantom CAB relieved a span of control problem in the 13th CAB occasioned by the influx of new aviation companies to the Delta. Due to its provisional nature the personnel and equipment for the Battalion headquarters came from the resources of the 13th CAB. For this reason the Phantom CAB staff was maintained at reduced strength and many of the administrative functions normally performed by a Battalion Staff were handled by Headquarters, 13th CAB with information copies of transactions provided to the Phantom Battalion. This provided for the establishment of a complete working file for future use when the Headquarters becomes completely functional.

   b. The Vietnamese National Election of 3 September generated the requirement for increased reconnaissance during the hour of darkness in the immediate vicinity of the major IV Corps airfields and installations. This requirement was initially for the period 31 August to 15 September. The Reconnaissance Airplane Companies were tasked for six hours of security flying per night over the Can Tho, Vinh Long and Soc Trang airfields. During this period of time none of the airfields were attacked by Viet Cong units.

   At the expiration of the above requirement it was directed that 0-1 coverage over the three major Delta airfields be continued indefinitely and that coverage be provided from 2000 hours to 0600 hours daily. Ships flying this mission would be flare equipped and would remain in the immediate vicinity of its respective airfield (10-15 km radius) with the mission of checking out intelligence reports requested by the Sector TOC. In event of an attack on the airfield by Viet Cong units.
direct or indirect fire weapons the 0-1 would proceed to the source of fire, illuminate the area and direct armed helicopters or adjust artillery to neutralize the source.

An additional value of the 0-1 coverage was psychological in that throughout the night there were lights of an aircraft circling the airfield. This may very likely discourage a Viet Cong attack by the mere presence of the aircraft and the VC not knowing of the aircraft's next actions or capabilities. This program has been in effect for two months to date (end of reporting period) and there have been no attacks on the three airfields.

This additional night flying increased 0-1 flying hours in the Delta by 900 hours per month (10 hours per night per airfield), however, the companies have absorbed this requirement without curtailing appreciably their other support commitments.

c. The Phantom CAB, S-3 office assumed responsibility for the Daily and Weekly OPREP-5 report during the first week of September relieving the 13th CAB of this administrative requirement. This assumption of reporting placed all fixed wing asset reports under the Phantom CAB while rotary wing reporting could then be handled exclusively by the 13th CAB.

d. On 16 September the 244th Aviation Company (Aerial Surveillance) became operational in support of IV Corps. It supports the 0-2 AIR, IV Corps, with an electronic and photographic intelligence acquisition capability. In order to fully utilize this equipment it was proposed that the OV-1 SLAR and IR capability of acquiring moving targets and reporting their location could be incorporated with a reaction force of two UH armed helicopters and one searchlight helicopter (Firefly Team) to proceed to the target area and engage the targets. Assisting in directing the firefly to the target area would be an 0-1 aircraft of a Reconnaissance Airplane Company and Air Force area radar which has the capability of vectoring the 0-1 and/or Firefly team to the coordinates located by the OV-1 SLAR ship. This plan, named "Nighthawk", was practiced on numerous occasions during the later part of September and October with results varying from excellent to poor. The major drawback noted was the elapsed time from SLAR acquisition to Firefly arrival in the objective area. This time allowed the target (the majority of which are sampans) to proceed away from the acquired coordinates and in some cases escape detection by the responding 0-1 and Firefly team.

e. A more desirable OV-1 Firefly team effort is afforded by an OV-1 IR ship and a Firefly team working together. In this effort the Firefly follows the IR ship and as the IR ship acquires targets it relays this information directly to the Firefly lead who, using an aircraft mounted searchlight, locates the target and his following gun ships engage the target. This system of acquisition is more desirable because of the close proximity of the reaction Firefly team and the instantaneous target display in the OV-1 cockpit as compared to the three minute delay in the display of SLAR imagery in the cockpit. Live fire trials of this concept were made during the month of October with favorable results. Trials of both systems coupled with experimental modifications are continuing.
On 21 October the 235th Armed Helicopter Company advance party arrived in country and was assigned to the Phantom CAB. This unit, an addition to this battalion, will provide a "destroy" capability to the fixed wing units "seek" ability. Planning was in progress during the period for the receipt and training of this unit.

During the reporting quarter the 199th RAC and 221st RAC were operational for the entire period in support of the ARVN Divisions and Sectors within the IV Corps area. The 244th Aviation Company (Aerial Surveillance) was operational for the last forty-six days of the reporting period while the first half was devoted to pre-operational readiness training.

On 28 August 1967 four CH-47's from the 147th Support Helicopter Company arrived at Can Tho to furnish direct support to ARVN IV Corps under the operational control of the 13th CAB. Three helicopters are available for missions while the fourth is a maintenance back-up. This arrival culminated weeks of detailed planning with the MACV Aviation Office and 12th Aviation Group to provide assets which would temporarily alleviate the lack of medium cargo helicopter support in the IV Corps Area. Previously, CH-47's were dispatched from Vung Tau on a daily basis from FFVII resources. The disadvantages were many. Out of a programmed daily five hours of flight time per aircraft, one hour and 20 minutes were consumed in transit to and from the area of operation. Mission requests from IV Corps took a minimum of twelve hours to be processed through channels to the CH-47 unit. Changes in mission requests placed additional burdens on the operations. This method administratively unsound and degraded the lift capability through lack of close coordination. All the advantages of an organic unit have now been realized by the attachment of these aircraft to this headquarters.

During this reporting period a re-evaluation of Firefly techniques has been conducted. Previous experience had shown that the use of white light or flares was giving the Viet Cong ample warning of the approach of the aerial search team. Tests were run using the Xenon aerial light. Canals and rivers were searched with the light in the IR mode. Runs were made at varying altitudes. It was determined that 700 feet provided the observers with the best viewing picture. Sampans and moving personnel were clearly visible when fog or haze was not present. IR binoculars were found to be unsatisfactory because of the high vibrations encountered from the helicopter platform. Two driver's head mounted IR viewing devices, obtained from ACTIV, proved to be the temporary solution. Additional problem areas will have to be solved before this system can be permanently adopted. Repair for the aerial mounting and control systems are not presently available in the supply system. Two of the three systems issued to this organization are deadlined for parts. A more sensitive viewing device needs to be developed with the same weight limitation of the night driver's viewing goggles to enable aviators and observers to realize the same or greater sight picture from 1500' or higher. Requisitions are being submitted to acquire three sets of Driver's Night viewing devices for each Assault Helicopter Unit equipped with a Xenon light.
C. Administrative Aviation Support:

(U) The 13th Combat Aviation Battalion assigned and attached units continued to provide direct support to ARVN IV Corps, the IV Corps MACV Advisory Force, Special Forces and CORDS. The missions included command liaison, outpost resupply, medical evacuation, radio relay and aerial escort. Statistics generated in support of these assigned missions are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hours Flown</td>
<td>10,161</td>
<td>11,413</td>
<td>11,177</td>
<td>32,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>24,332</td>
<td>28,928</td>
<td>27,124</td>
<td>80,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAX Moved</td>
<td>55,248</td>
<td>71,612</td>
<td>63,025</td>
<td>189,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo (Tons) Moved</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>1,425</td>
</tr>
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</table>

D. Tactical Aviation Support:

(U) Tactical Army aviation support was provided to ARVN IV Corps, Special Forces, Division and Sector Advisory Teams. Specific support during the period consisted of airlanded assaults, aerial direct fire support, reconnaissance and surveillance of the battle areas, aeromedical evacuation, canal curfew enforcement (Firefly) and aerial delivery of riot control agents. Statistics generated in support of these missions are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>OCTOBER</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Heliborne Assault Miss</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours Flown</td>
<td>4,893</td>
<td>6,693</td>
<td>6,085</td>
<td>17,671</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>9,749</td>
<td>14,289</td>
<td>13,030</td>
<td>37,068</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troops Moved</td>
<td>41,050</td>
<td>51,856</td>
<td>43,847</td>
<td>136,753</td>
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<tr>
<td>Firefly Miss</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-Ke#AA</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>1,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Sampans Destroyed</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>1,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Structures Destroyed</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>1,069</td>
</tr>
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</table>

E. Significant Operations Conducted During This Period:

1. (C) Dan Chi 295/B/SD. Search and Destroy Operation conducted by the 21st ARVN Division. See Inclosure 2

2. (C) Cuu Long 45/10/67. Search and Destroy Operation conducted by the 7th ARVN Division. See Inclosure 3

3. (C) Dan Chi 306/SD. Search and Destroy Operation conducted by the 21st ARVN Division. See Inclosure 4

F. Enemy Tactics:

1. (C) General Enemy Situation: The VC initiated 1,693 incidents during the quarter, essentially the same number as the previous quarter. The majority of incidents reported this quarter took place just prior to
or during the Presidential elections on 3 September. During the last week in August and the first week in September there were 609 incidents reported with the major incident being the shelling of Can Tho City. The attack was launched with 82mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle with fire directed at the River Assault Group boat base, the MACV Compound and the Province Chief's house. These stand-off barrages did succeed in inflicting some military casualties, 18 ARVN killed, 5 U.S. and 19 ARVN wounded, but the civilians in the area suffered more. There were 28 civilians killed and 203 wounded. Except for slight increases near the end of October, VC activity decreased sharply after the election and remained unusually low throughout the rest of the quarter. Numerous reports indicated major attacks were to be launched during the period of the House of Representatives election and the investiture of President Thieu but these attacks failed to materialize. Lack of arms and supplies and the increased alert status of allied forces throughout this period were estimated to be the main deterrent to terrorist activities and attacks.

2. (C) Order of Battle:

a. The 295X Main Force Battalion has been added to the Order of Battle by MACV J2. The 295X Main Force Battalion was first organized as one company designated C.274 early in 1960. At the beginning of 1965 the battalion recruited additional personnel and established three companies designated C.411X, C.413X (formerly C.274) and C.416X. The primary mission is to protect the base areas and installations of MR2 Headquarters. They also have the secondary mission of training Main Force units in MR2. During the dry season the companies operate in Kien Riong Province to conduct harassments or attacks, terrorist activities and counter GVN operations in the Province. The 295X Bn is composed of a Hqs element and three guard companies. The reported strength is 450 equipped with 57mm RR's, 60mm mortars and heavy machine guns. Agent reports state that they have good esprit and are well disciplined.

b. The 274 Bao Ve M Trung Co has been dropped from the OB holdings following its redesignation as the C.413X Co and incorporation into the 295X Main Force Battalion.

c. The VC 509th Provincial Mobile Battalion has been reorganized into a company sized unit subordinate to the Tra Vinh Province Headquarters. This reorganization took place in late 1966 and now designates the unit as the C.509 Company.

3. (C) Tactics:

a. Employment of the Soviet Anti-tank Grenade RPG-7 has been confirmed in the IV Corps area for the first time. The VC launch the grenade using a RPG-2 grenade launcher which gives it a range of 500 meters with penetration power capable of penetrating 12.6 inches of armor. These have been used successfully as a diversionary weapons position with 75mm recoilless rifle attacks.
b. Several reports were received stating the VC are attempting to use bees and hornets as an anti-personnel and boobytrap device. Quotas have been given as to the number of bee hives and nests each village and hamlet will maintain.

c. The VC are now using the following items as camouflage for boobytraps:

(1) Tin cake boxes
(2) Cigarette lighters
(3) Ball point pens
(4) Cigarette packages

G. Logistics:

1. (O) Expenditures of Ammunition and POL

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<tr>
<th>Item Type</th>
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<th>OCTOBER</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
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<td>7.62mm (LKD)</td>
<td>7,628,633</td>
<td>2,384,525</td>
<td>2,491,095</td>
<td>7,046,250</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.75 Rockets</td>
<td>9,278</td>
<td>13,348</td>
<td>13,284</td>
<td>35,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm Grenades (LKD)</td>
<td>6,464</td>
<td>9,227</td>
<td>15,739</td>
<td>31,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP/4 (Gals)</td>
<td>1,523,404</td>
<td>1,592,664</td>
<td>1,661,636</td>
<td>4,777,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS (Gals)</td>
<td>323,405</td>
<td>231,160</td>
<td>321,326</td>
<td>875,891</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (U) During most seasons of the year the majority of the IV Corps land area is either submerged or partially submerged in standing water, this situation requires special consideration when ground marking devices are selected for use. The most satisfactory marking device used by this battalion has been and continues to be the floating smoke pot DO DAC-K867. Unfortunately this pyrotechnic has been available in only limited quantities which has restricted its use. It is recommended that this item be made available in sufficient quantity to permit increased use for both screening and marking.

3. (U) Difficulty has been encountered during the last quarter receiving requisitioned ammunition on a timely basis. All categories of ammunition and pyrotechnic items have been delivered long after established required delivery dates. When required delivery dates are not met, resupply planning cannot provide the desired results. In three separate instances it has been necessary to request combat essential resupply to provide ammunition for locations at which requisitioned ammunition was due-out weeks beyond the required delivery date.

4. (U) The problems described in the Operational Report Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967, concerning ration movement from the 1st Logistical Command Class I ration Breakdown Point at Can Tho to Soc Trang and Vinh Long Installation continued without change.
or improvement through this reporting period. Efforts initiated by TMA will hopefully provide for an improved ration movement capability when initiated on 15 November 1967. The new plan will provide for ration movements twice per week via "Dedicated" Air Force C-123 aircraft. This plan can eliminate problems encountered in the past only if the "Dedicated" aircraft are immune to CE diversions.

H. Training:

1. (U) Decentralized unit training continues with mandatory recurring training being presented as operational commitments allow. These classes are normally scheduled in the early evening hours with a make up class scheduled the following morning to accommodate the night crews. Flight training is conducted continuously. Instructor Pilots are scheduled to fly with each aviator once monthly to meet the requirement of a quarterly standardization ride. During administrative missions one of the aviators must be flying the aircraft under the hood. This method serves to maintain minimal basic instrument proficiency.

2. (U) VNAF Transition training continues. There are presently six aviators in training. All are participating as unit members, flying all missions except that of an armed helicopter pilot.

SECTION II PART I

A. Observations (Lessons Learned):

1. (U) Item: Replacement of armament subsystems

a. Discussion: Presently all helicopter armament destroyed or turned in as FWT is reported through maintenance channels for replacement. Invariably the records maintained at maintenance supply agencies are not in agreement with the unit supply records. This contributes to a shortage in armament subsystems at unit level.

b. Observation: By allowing the requesting unit to submit a priority 02 requisition to the supply agency charged with replacing aircraft armament subsystems, a correct current status can be maintained. This will provide an accurate and faster means of replacing subsystems when available.

2. (U) Item: Detailed Target Information

a. Discussion: The need exists during all operations for USAF TAC aircraft to have detailed information on any prospective targets.

b. Observation: This information can best be acquired by armed helicopters operating in the area. After a low recon of the target, they can quickly furnish a detailed description to the USAF FAC.

3. (U) Item: Close Coordination between USAF TAC aircraft and armed helicopters.
a. Discussion: Extremely close coordination between armed helicopters, USAF TAC aircraft and the FAC is most necessary during airstrikes supporting troop lift operations. This problem has been solved quite effectively by allowing the USAF FAC and the armed helicopter leader to coordinate airstrikes using one of the five VHF channels available in the armed helicopter. In this way, time and radio traffic is reduced when the troop transport leader receives 12 instructions from the armed helicopter to include the location and type airstrike.

b. Observation: Close coordination and liaison can be effected between Army Aviation and USAF. The Command and Control helicopter, armed helicopter leader and transport helicopter leader utilize one UHF channel. The armed helicopter leader and the USAF FAC can then make direct coordination on the same VHF channel (preferably the armed helicopter's operational VHF channel).

4.(c) Item: Photography scales with the KA-30 cameras

   a. Discussion: TM-11-6720-208-12, Camera, Still Picture KA-30A, prescribes certain minimum scale for identifying and interpreting various military structure and terrain features. Mission planning has been done utilizing the chart on page 2.

   b. Observation: Practical experience has shown that in the "Delta" large scale photos are needed to identify and interpret VC structures and activities when utilizing the KA-30 camera. For identifying VC structures a minimum scale of 1:4000 has been required. Ideal scale for location of VC camouflaged structures, tunnel entrances, etc. is between 1:2-3,000.

5.(c) Item: Use of IR imagery in conjunction with photography for plotting purposes.

   a. Discussion: Photography of areas consisting of marshes, rice paddies and thick jungle is very difficult to plot due to a lack of definite and prominent terrain features.

   b. Observation: Using IR imagery in conjunction with the KA-30 photography gives the imagery interpreter a considerable assist in plotting the imagery. Since most photography must be flown at relatively low altitudes, the ground covered to the flanks by the IR will be greater than that of the photographs. The use of IR and photography (both day and night) decreases the time taken to plot the photos.

6.(c) Item: Visual Training of Imagery Interpreters.

   a. Discussion: School trained imagery interpreters (I.I.'s) do not have enough training on interpretation of Vietnamese photography targets. Many VC camouflaged structures are not detected because I.I.'s do not know what to look for. Taking I.I.'s in aircraft over known VC areas will give them first hand knowledge of what the VC do to camouflage their structures and defensive works.
b. Observation: The policy of having periodic aerial reconnaissance flights for I.I. personnel serves to materially improve their effectiveness. The use of binoculars on these flights is a great help. These flights also serve to boost the morale of the I.I. personnel.

7. (U) Item: Accidents involving inadvertent entry into instrument conditions.

a. Discussion: Two accidents have occurred as a result of helicopter pilots flying into instrument or marginal VFR conditions and finding themselves unable to retain control of the aircraft. A lack of instrument flying proficiency appears to have been a contributing factor in both instances. Two of the pilots involved had tactical instrument tickets and one pilot had a tactical instrument ticket which had expired.

b. Observation: The urgency of selected tactical missions will continue to require flights through marginal weather conditions. A unit's effectiveness can be greatly increased by maintaining a high state of proficiency, especially in night and instrument flying. All administrative flights and, when feasible, tactical flights must be utilized to attain this goal. As an approach to the solution of this problem area this Battalion has issued instructions requiring:

   (1) Pilots to perform hooded flight on command and logistical missions.

   (2) Instrument tickets will be renewed and maintained except for individual cases where waivers have been granted.

   (3) A hooded flight proficiency check requirement has been added to the ninety day standardization ride.

8. (U) Item: Inspection of Bomb Shackles

a. Discussion: Several in flight emergencies have occurred during rocket firing from O-1 aircraft. Rockets have lodged in the tubes after firing. To prevent fire or possible detonation of the rocket, the tubes had to be solvoed. When the salvo button was pushed the bomb shackles stuck due to poor maintenance.

b. Observation: During each intermediate inspection bomb shackles should be solvoed to insure proper working condition. They should also be cleaned and oiled to prevent carbon build-up from the rocket exhaust.

9. Item: (C) Airmobile extractions

a. Discussion: Our experience in the Mekong Delta has confirmed that the extraction phase of airmobile operations is the most critical. The initial assault receives the greatest attention with tactical air strike, artillery preparations and two platoons of armed helicopters providing escort and suppressive fire in the LZ. The Viet Cong have
learned to follow friendly forces back to the pickup zone and set up automatic weapons and sniper positions. The troops awaiting pickup assemble in loading sticks with little or no perimeter security other than air cover armed helicopters.

b. Observation: The vulnerability of pickup zones requires the same careful planning and fire support provided for assaults. The use of preplanned interdiction fire along avenues of approach and in surrounding tree lines is recommended. Air Cap tactical air should be on station and employed in preplanned bomb zones around the PZ perimeter. The troops designated for the final lift should be dispersed in sticks of 10 each around the perimeter oriented on the tree lines for defense of the PZ. As the final lift approaches the PZ the troops detonate Claymore mines oriented on avenues of approach and possible sniper positions then move to preselected pickup points behind a screen of smoke, artillery fire and armed helicopter suppression.

10. (U) Item: Water pickup in inundated landing sites

a. Discussion: During rainy seasons the water level in landing and pickup zones is deep enough to flood the lower fuselage of UH-1 helicopters. Long pauses in LZ's and PZ's allows water to enter openings occasionally up to the floor of the cockpit. The added weight of the water on lift out often requires unloading passengers in order to fly out by normal techniques.

b. Observation: It is probably not feasible or possible to completely seal off water seepage. A temporary solution to this problem employed in the Delta is to bring the flight to a very low hover and allow most of the water to drain. Even then a formation can be observed trailing water as the flight climbs out and it continues to drain even after a flight altitude of 2500 feet is reached.

SECTION II PART II

Commander's Recommendations

NONE

Incl 2, Withdrawn, Hqs, DA; CAAR 67X183
Incl 3, Withdrawn, Hqs, DA; CAAR 67X184
Incl 4, Withdrawn, Hqs, DA; CAAR 67X185

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-C (15 Nov 67)
1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1967 WAX1-AA-A (AGS-0S for 67) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVIGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GOF-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, DA (ACSFOR DA), Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report of the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion and considers it to be adequate and concurs with the contents.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

   a. Reference Section I, paragraph G2, page 6: Saigon Support Command Ammunition Division confirms that the depot at the Vung Tau Sub-area Command frequently has zero balance of this item. The stockage level at the Vung Tau Depot is 750 and may not be increased except by USARFAC. To increase the stockage level, a letter must be initiated by the 13th CAB stating that a shortage of these items is having an adverse effect on the operational capability of the unit. The 13th BN has been telephonically informed of this requirement and will prepare a letter to this effect.

   b. Reference Section I, paragraph G3, page 6: A team from USAAV and Saigon Support Command visited the 13th BN on 18-19 Nov 67 to discuss ammunition problems. As a result of this visit, action will be initiated to resolve the difficulties cited by the 13th CAB.

   c. Reference Section I, paragraph G4, page 6: It is expected that the new program initiated by TMA will resolve the difficulties that have been encountered in the movement of Class I supplies. This program will provide no improvement unless the aircraft are immune to CE diversions.

   d. Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph A1, page 7: The procedure for obtaining replacement armament systems is to obtain a turn-in voucher number and notify battalion, who will notify brigade. Brigade allocates subsystems in accordance with priorities established by Brigade S-3. Armament systems cannot be requisitioned.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES M. GOLDBERG
1LT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 13th Combat Aviation (Delta) Battalion (AK1A) as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning movement of rations, page 6, paragraph 4: Concur. A plan was developed and action initiated on 19 November 1967 to provide delivery of Class I, II and IV supplies to MACV advisors in eleven sectors of the IV CTZ. This includes those sectors in which Vinh Long and Soc Trang are located. The plan provides "scheduled" deliveries each Thursday and Sunday by C-123 Aircraft. TMK cannot provide "dedicated" aircraft and combat essential missions do have priority. TMK provides the aircraft under the common user system and these aircraft are available for use by the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion. The plan was designed primarily for the support of the IV CTZ advisors.

   b. Reference item concerning replacement of armament subsystems, page 7, section II, part I, paragraph A1; and paragraph 2d of 1st Indorsement. The procedure for units obtaining replacement aircraft armament from USARV stock is specified in USARV Message AVHAV-LOG 91245, dated 12 December 1967. If stock is available, prompt action by units will result in replacement armament being issued within 10 days of the loss.

3. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies Furnished:
HQ, 13th Combat Avn Bn
HQ, 1st Avn Bde 12
GPOP-DT (15 Nov 67)  3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 from HQ, 13th Combat Aviation Battalion (UIC: WAX1AAA) (RCS CSPOR-65)
HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558  23 FEB 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 13th Combat Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967

CO, 13th Combat Aviation Battalion

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