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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (5 Mar 68) FOR OT RD-674193
7 March 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to AGSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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6th Battalion, 32d Artillery

TO: S2 Distribution

SECTION I (C) Significant Organization or Unit Activities

1. (C) General: As of 1 August 1967, the blue print was completed for the battalion's new base camp. Drawing plans were drafted, with appropriate changes, by representatives from Pacific Architects and Engineers located at Tay Hoa, Republic of Vietnam. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and Service Battery are still the principal tenants of the base camp. The battalion base camp also provides facilities for the rear detachments of firing batteries A, B, and C. The firing battery rear detachments consist primarily of logistics representatives. The personnel within the present base camp are still living in WAPCO buildings. In addition to providing facilities for units organic to the battalion, quarters are also furnished for attached and support units. Construction support within a new development area consists of support from Pacific Architects and Engineers and 577th Engineer Construction Battalion. The estimated date of completion for the new base camp is on or about 15 December 1967.

b. On 11 August 1967, LTC John R Frankeberger assumed command of the 6th Battalion 32d Artillery. A change of command ceremony was given in honor of the incoming and outgoing commanders. The I Field Force Artillery Commander, Brigadier General Quigley, and the 41st Artillery Group Commander, Colonel Wheeler, were the distinguished guests present at the change of command ceremony. LTC Marshall O Hays was the outgoing commander.

2. (U) Intelligence: The Battalion S2 continues to contact the MACV Sector Advisory Team located at Tay Hoa. Daily contact is made by battalion liaison team with the 28th ROKA Regiment. Other intelligence is received by a battalion liaison team with Headquarters, 9th ROKA Infantry Division at Rich Hoa. Additional intelligence information is received from the Capital ROKA Infantry Division through US liaison channels. The S2, in addition to above intelligence sources, makes a daily visit to the Tay Hoa Air Force Base where he receives daily intelligence on area wide RVN intelligence. With all of the above agencies providing intelligence information, we feel that we have, at all times, the most current intelligence available.
AVGK-23572
SUBJECT: Final Report for 8 September 1967

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities:
(a) (U) Plans: No significant activities.

(b) (C) Operations:
(1) 1 Aug 67: Reaction test given to B/6/32 by battalion. Unit received satisfactory results. Three 8" howitzers belonging to A/6/32 calibrated. Conditions satisfactory.

(2) 2 Aug 67: Three 8" howitzers calibrated at B/6/32. Conditions satisfactory.

(3) 4 Aug 67: A/3/18 (2 175mm guns) given warning order to displace on order from E906893 to Vung Ro Bay, G228228, for movement to Qui Nhon. On 6 Aug 67, loading time changed to 7 Aug 67 due to LST delay and tide conditions.

(4) 9 Aug 67: A 1st, 2d Sqd, B Btry, 41st Arty (M55 Quad 50's), attached to B/6/32, had a mining incident. Volhio bumper #843 at 00242275 at 1000 hours. Minor equipment damage, 1 XM MLA, hospitalized 3-4 days. Units organic, attached and opop as of 9 Aug 67:

(a) A/6/32 (8"), organic, GS 61st Arty, CaPROKA Infantry Division.

(b) B/6/32 (8"), organic, GS 9th ROK Arty.

(c) C/6/32 (8" & 175mm), GS US/FN/MF II Corps, reinforce 4th Arty, attached 6/14 Arty.

(d) A/4/60 (8)(175mm), DS 6/32 Arty, attached 6/32 Arty.

(e) A/E/41 (-)(.50 cal), NC Tuy Hoa Subarea Command, attached A/4/60.

(5) 12 Aug 67: A/6/32 moved from Dong Tre, E907704, to Crossroad, 00707714. Closing time 1510 hours.

(6) 13 Aug 67: B/6/32 participated in arty raid with two 8" howitzers. Unit arrived at firing position, E9342639, at 0830. Unit returned to battery perimeter 1630 hours. 25 observed missions fired for a total of 149 rounds. C/6/32 departed Oasis, Z4108274, at 0830, arrived at Qui Nhon 1815 hours.

(7) 24 Aug 67: C/6/32 departed LST Beach, Qui Nhon, at 0630. Unit enroute to Nha Trang, ETA Nha Trang 1830.

(8) 15 Aug 67: C/6/32 departed Nha Trang at 0930 and closed at B/6/32, E992768. 5/3/29 Arty (4 sites) arrived. GS 9th ROK.
AVG-AL-OP

CONFIDENTIAL 3 Nov 67

On 6/32 Artillery Two positions at 1144,3767 and two positioned at 1207,3767. "Shark" lights arrived at 1615 hours.

(9) 16 Aug 67: C/6/32 departed 3/6/32 location, BP962768, and arrived at BP902534 at 0530 hours. C/6/32 in support of 9th ROKA Infantry Division in operation Hong Kil Dong 3-2.

(10) 25 Aug 67: 5/32 Artillery liaison section returned from tactical field location with 9th ROKA Infantry. Closed into base camp at 1900 hours.

(11) 26 Aug 67: 9th ROKA Infantry Division operation Hong Kil Dong 3-2, 39th and 30th Regiments participating, ended 1200 hours. For: M-11 Artillery, 4/6/33, attached, moved from C/6717474 to Dong Trei convoy escort for 9th NVA Subarea Command. Two M-11's departed BP903395 for C/6717474, closed at 1630 hours. A/6/32 alerted to move to Dong Trei in support of Special Forces operation. Operation cancelled on 27 Aug 67. Mission cancelled. C/6/32 alerted to move to Nha Trang to meet LS 546.

(12) 27 Aug 67: C/6/32 marched ordered from BP900534 and arrived at Nha Trang at 1215 hours. EOD 0630 hours.

(13) 28 Aug 67: C/6/32 arrived Qui Nhon. 0/5/27 went on arty raid to 9/051007.


(15) 30 Aug 67: Organic, attached and opcon units to the battalion at the end of the month.

(a) A/6/32 (37674), organic, C/971747, GSR 39TH ROA.
(b) B/6/32 (37674), organic, BP962768, GSR 9TH ROA.
(c) C/6/32 (37674), organic, BP903395, GS US/NAVY II Corps, reinforce 4th Divarty, attached 6/14 Artillery.
(d) A/4/50 (40mm), BP903395, DS 6/32 Artillery, opcon 6/32 Artillery.
(e) A/4/50 (40mm), OP252946, DS Tay Hoa Subarea Command, opcon 6/32 Artillery.
(f) A/9/31 (-)(40 cal), OP252946, DS Tay Hoa Subarea Command, opcon 6/32 Artillery.
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AVGK-47-GP

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

31 Aug 67: 6/32 got 7 KIA's by body count. VC En contact, tgt #CA63, EQ962757, 2347 hours.

1 Sep 67: ICO, Tuy Hoa Subarea Command, called yellow alert at 2200 hours. At 020200, 5/27 Arty, an adjacent unit, received a probe by an unknown enemy force. 1 friendly WIA. Area went into red alert at that time. Alert called off at 020530.

3 Sep 67: 1st platoon, A Btry, 3d En 18th Arty, arrived at Qui Nhon. Unit loaded on LST and departed Qui Nhon for Vung Ro Bay.


14 Sep 67: Warning order received for 0/6/32 to move by road to Qui Nhon to arrive on or about 17 Sep 67. Sealift to be arranged by 41st Arty Group.


17 Sep 67: 0/6/32 closed at base camp, Q025734, 1725 hours.

19 Sep 67: 0/6/32 departed battalion base camp area at 0530 for Chapel area, vicinity B945422, in support of Operation Rolling. Enroute to Chapel area, convoy made contact with unknown VC force. 0/6/32 fired observed mission and assault fire. 0/6/32 closed at Q096393 and remained at this location until approx 200030 Sep. 0/6/32 closed at LZ Basin, EQ955505, at 1330 hours.

20 Sep 67: 0/6/32 closed at Chapel area, EQ945423, at 1155 hours.

21 Sep 67: Armored convoy, from Svc Btry, 6/32 Arty, that accompanied 0/6/32 to Chapel, returned to base camp at 1235 without incident. CIDG security element arrived at 06/32 at 1830 hours.
AVOK-AI-OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967


(28) 22 Sep 67: A/3/13 departed QQ07014 at 1100 hours, arrived to Vung Ro Bay. A/3/13 closed at Vung Ro Bay 1435 hours.

(29) 29 Sep 67: 0/6/16 closed at LZ Sen BQ928324, at 1000 hours.

(30) 13 Oct 67: CWO Samuel, Metro Officer, departed for Phan Rang with Rawin set. Metro Officer took Rawin set on mission to check out GCA system at Phan Rang.

(31) 7 Oct 67: C/6/32 and A/4/60, Sec 240 and 241, closed at Tuy Hoa North Field, Q152482, at 1605 hours. C/6/32 had to return from Chapel area because of heavy rains and had to be ferried out by 577th Engineer Battalion.

(32) 19 Oct 67: CWO Samuel, Metro Officer, returned from Phan Rang with Rawin set at 0935 hours. Two sections, 221 and 222, A/4/60, closed at 0/32 base camp, Q254342, 1600 hours. Duster #3 positioned at OP #5 and Duster #1 positioned at OP #2. Both M42's integrated with base camp perimeter defense.

(33) 20 Oct 67: Two sections, 241 and 242, A/4/60, went on operation with 47th ARVN Regiment. Both M42's were controlled by Tuy Hoa Sector (MAST) Advisers. Dusters returned by 1200 hours on 21 Oct 67.

(34) 28 Oct 67: Two 175mm guns from C/6/32 departed QG92432 at 0500 hours for arty raid. Closed at firing position located at 0935335 at 0625. Laid and ready to fire at 0630. Fired 193 rounds. 175mm platoon returned to base camp, Q254852, at 1350 hours.

(35) 31 Oct 67: Units organic, attached and open as of this period:

(a) A/6/32 (P), organic, Q37714, 325, 255TH INF DIV,

(b) C/6/32 (P), organic, WP82766, 59TH ROK ARMY,

US/FAMILY XII Corps,

(c) C/6/16 (P),有机, Q802468, reinforces 3/319 ARMY,

open 6/32 Arty.
AVN 85-6P
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(e) A/4/60 (-)(40 mm), DP562763 (2 Sec), CQ254342 (2 Sec), CQ152532 (2 Sec), CQ0771714 (2 Sec), DS 6/32 Arty, opcon 6/32 Arty.

(f) A/5/41 (-)(.50 cal), CQ256346, DS Tuy Hoa Sub-area Command, attached A/4/60 (-).

(g) HHE/8/26 Arty, Metro 1, CQ254342, GS, opcon 6/32 Arty.

Training: The majority of training at the firing batteries consists of live fire missions. Ninety-five percent of the missions fired are unobserved and HAi targets. Emphasis is placed on speed and accuracy of gun section and FDC personnel. Additional emphasis is given to cross training of other personnel. By cross training other battery personnel in FDC procedures and as gun crew members the battery greatly enhances its productive capabilities as a whole. This is necessary and has proven most beneficial since the firing batteries must be capable of delivering accurate and timely fires at any time. As of 31 October 1967, the 6th Battalion 32nd Artillery has fired a total of 63,243 rounds. Normally, the firing batteries test fire their crew served weapons daily in conjunction with HAi scheduled fires. By this writing, at its present location, is unable to fire its organic crew served weapons. Headquarters and Service Batteries, located at the battalion base camp, test fire individual and crew served weapons prior to winning night outposts. HAi fires are fired each night outside the base camp perimeter. A free fire zone is received from the 28th Regiment ROKA. HAi's are fired by two M19 Dusters that are located on the base camp perimeter. Some of the FDC personnel that were sent out to the firing batteries have been brought back to the base camp. By having Battalion FDC personnel at the Battalion Operations Center, the battalion has the capability of checking fire missions that are received by the batteries. Battalion FDC personnel will continue to train at the firing batteries to the greatest extent possible. By having the Battalion FDC personnel train with the firing batteries, personnel are able to maintain their MOS proficiency under actual tactical conditions. A firing range has been completed near the battalion base camp. Personnel are able to zero and fire familiarization fire with their individual weapons. Emphasis has been given to each battery conducting mandatory training in military subjects, i.e., CBR, Military Justice, Squad Tactics, Character Guidance, Command Information, Intelligence Training and other related subjects. FDC and Forward Observer training is being scheduled for ARVN forces through MACV channels. The battalion is to schedule classes whenever called upon in order to broaden the knowledge of other Free World Forces in the proper techniques of delivering accurate and timely artillery fire.

d. Chemical: No significant activities.

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SUMMARY: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

a. Psywar: No significant activities.
b. Others: (1) The organic meteorological section, co-located with B/6/32, is operational and continues to send out metro messages four times a day with a six hour interval between messages.

(2) EFQ, 8th TF, 26th Army meteorological section, which is located at the base camp, provides metro information for eight artillery units in the immediate area. This metro station provides daily electronic metro messages at 0400, 1000, 1600 and 2200. The following units benefit from the local messages sent: A/6/32 (8") 0/6/32 (8" & 173mm), 1/5/27 (105), 0/5/27 (105), A/3/319 (105), B/3/319 (105), 0/3/319 (105) and C/6/16 (155).

4. (U) Logistics: No significant comments.

5. (U) Civil Affairs: The battalion currently has a full time SJ, Civil Affairs Officer. The Civic Action effort is divided into two basic programs, Medcap and Self-Help.

a. Medcap: The Battalion Surgeon and aid men hold two sick calls each week at Dong Tau refugee village near Tuy Hoa. An average of 350 general medical patients and 22 surgical patients are treated each month.

b. Self-Help: During the reporting period, the battalion has participated in one major project, i.e., assisting the residents of Tho Lam Hamlet in building a culvert on the only access road leading into the hamlet. Other projects include, but were not limited to, transporting Revolutionary Development supplies and commodities, hauling dirt and road building materials, distributing food, soap, clothing and building materials to local inhabitants.


(2) WIA: 5.

b. During the period, the following personal actions occurred:

(1) Personnel losses: 237.
(2) Personnel gains: 164.
(3) Present for duty strength at the end of period: 23 Officers, 4 NO, 469 RL.

(4) Promotion allocations:

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(a) To E4 - 84.
(b) To E5 - 55.
(c) To E6 - 2.
(d) To E7 - 2.
(e) To E8 - none.
(f) To E9 - none.

7. (U) Artillery rounds expended during period:

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8. (U) Other: No significant activities.

SECTION II (C) Commander's Observations and Recommendations


Discussion: The Azimuth Gyroscope has continuously brought excellent results, however, getting the instrument repaired while in the Republic of Vietnam is extremely difficult. Units should make every attempt to insure the Azimuth Gyroscope is in excellent operating condition prior to departing CONUS. Units departing CONUS should also bring more light bulbs for the night lighting devices on the aiming circle. There is a problem in replacing them here.

Observation: Having the Azimuth Gyroscope saves considerable time and provides greater accuracy.

b. Item: Organization of Battery Positions.

Discussion: Battery installations should be carefully selected, keeping in mind that drainage is a must in order to circumvent floods.

Observation: In preparing gunpits using a bulldozer, one must keep in mind to push the dirt up from the outside as opposed to
scooping out a pit. This procedure will give much better drainage. In some areas, where, because of unsuitable rainfall, gunpits do not offer the drainage desired, howitzers must be removed from pits to be improved and the pits allowed to dry out. All howitzers must be taken out at the same time. When howitzers/guns are taken from primary pits, they should be taken to an alternate firing area. Section bunkers and bivouac areas should be sandbagged after guns are laid and ready to fire. It has been observed that, occasionally, sections take a couple of days before preparing individual bunkers. Battery installations should be built above ground and with heavy reinforcements rather than dug in underground. This method circumvents having flooded bunkers. Underground bunkers offer many advantages, but only if prepared correctly.


Discussion: Firing batteries continue to operate independently of each other. Very seldom are heavy artillery batteries close enough for central control.

Observation: Since the batteries are often spread out considerable distances from battalion headquarters, every effort must be made to avoid becoming to routine in FDC and gun crew procedures. Even though a shortage of personnel exists because of having to maintain a twenty four hour capability, repeated checks must continue to be made by supervisory personnel.

b. Item: Firing Battery and FDC.

Discussion: Large propellant lots should be designated and kept separate for registrations and "danger close" missions. Locations of Surveyed Registration Points - Firing Across Grid Conversions - Methods for Decreasing Time for Laying the Battery - New Registration Procedures.

Observation: When large powder lots are received, this powder should be kept separate for registrations and firing "danger close" missions. There have been cases where lots have been overlooked and mixed lots have been fired inadvertently. Surveyed registration points are few, however, many firing positions at fire support bases have been surveyed. These abandoned positions can be used when within range. The surveyed battery centers make excellent registration points. The proposed procedure for precision firing was tested by the firing batteries and aerial observers of this battalion. The results were shorter registrations and fewer rounds fired. As compared to the current accepted precision procedures, the new procedure tested showed a 20 to 30 percent decrease in total number of rounds.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

c. Registrations have shown variations in VE. This is particularly true with the 175mm gun near the end of tube life. Check rounds, after considering piece displacement, can be used to verify the difference in VE. If the tube is cold, two or three rounds are better than one round. As a minimum, one over and one short is necessary.

d. When shooting across a grid conversion, cutting and slipping grid sheets has been found to be easier than using multiple battery centers. This can be done quite easily by plotting several points on each side of the grid conversion, determining the grid of the points, reference both grid systems and sliding the grid sheets until the points match. Once the chart has been set up, it can be checked easily by measuring the grid conversion angle which can be readily determined. Checks for accuracy should then be made into each sector using trigonometry and logarithms.

c. To decrease the time for laying, the instrument setting for the aiming circle (at 100 mil increments) can be computed and recorded. One recorded copy can be put under acetate and attached to the aiming circle. Other copies can be given to the Executive Officer, Chief of Firing Battery and the Fire Direction Officer.

f. The use of remote units or radio speakers, when attached to telephones or intercom units, allow all personnel in the area to hear commands. This can be used very effectively in the fire direction center, on the guns and at the aiming circle.

g. In command posts and fire direction centers, where continuous communication is required, radios should be rotated and rested. In hot areas, or when radios are mounted in a corner, a fan should be used to circulate the air and cool the radio. Adequate ventilation and air space behind the equipment should be maintained.

h. An excellent booby trap and perimeter lighting device can be made using 175mm powder cannisters with unused powder increments and a trip flare. The trip flare, which is used to ignite the powder in the cannister from the rear, should be set up so it can be set off by a trip wire or command fired from a nearby outpost.

3. (U) Intelligence: No significant comments.


Discussion: With the batteries widely dispersed from the battalion, resupply of ammunition becomes critical especially if the battalion ammunition train is all ready committed in another direction. When bridges are washed out and roads closed the problem is amplified.
Observation: Battery and battalion ammunition sections should have on hand slings, clevises and other aerial resupply rigging gear to handle aerial ammunition resupply which is frequently used when units are located in remote areas and when roads are closed.

b. Item: Limitation of XM548 as Cargo Carrier.

Discussion: It has been discovered that the XM548 full track cargo vehicle performs well, however, it does not have the overall load capability of the 5 ton cargo truck.

Observation: While the XM548 in a very versatile cargo carrier, it must be noted that when continuous resupply runs must be made with ammunition, the 5 ton cargo carrier is more desirable. This is particularly true with the rough roads in the Republic of Vietnam.

d. Item: Maintenance.

(1) Discussion: Loading trays on M110 and M107's have not been holding up under continuous and heavy use.

Observation: When loading trays crack, support reinforcing strips are welded to give added strength. Recommend that loading tray arms be constructed of solid steel rods instead of tubing.

(2) Discussion: Firing batteries have experienced the M110 slamming into battery after prolonged firing of low charges.

Observation: By firing a few rounds at full charge, this problem was eliminated.

(3) Discussion: The slide rammer on M110 and M107, FSN 1025-864-0319, on loader-rammer, cracks easily.

Observation: The slide rammers should be reinforced where needed.

PART II Recommendations

1. (U) Operations. a. Recommend that the new registration procedures be utilized by heavy units, especially 8" artillery units. With good initial data, met data and well trained gun crew, many rounds are saved thereby cutting down expenditures.

b. Recommend that heavy batteries by split half 8" and half 175mm. In view of the fact that most units have semi-permanent firing positions and usually remain at a set location for extended periods, it
is felt that greater flexibility and versatility is attained without sacrificing fire power. The majority of targets are unobserved. While the 8" is a very accurate system, its limited maximum range is somewhat of a short coming. With organic aerial observers and having 175mm guns, a large area can be covered without having to displace. This is further justified during the monsoon season when roads and bridges are inaccessible. Intelligence targets and targets of opportunity often have to be cancelled because they cannot be reached. Displacing 175mm gun platoons two hundred miles or more merely to cover intelligence targets is unrealistic. With increased emphasis on reducing the number of rounds fired on unobserved/HIS targets, this combination of 8" howitzer/175mm gun is quite noteworthy. The maintenance problem (175mm gun vs 8" howitzer) is negligible. Keeping sufficient quantity of replacement 175mm gun tubes is a supply problem and not actually a problem of maintenance. The dead space common to the 175mm gun can be adequately covered by the 8" howitzer. There is a requirement for maintaining separate firing charts and cross-training personnel. The matter of cross-training personnel can either be accomplished prior to deployment or already formed 8" and 175mm units can be interchanged. Interchanging sections also helps with infusion of personnel which is also desirable.

2. (U) Training and Organization. a. Recommend that more emphasis be placed on battery training and firing prior to deploying to RVN.

b. Personnel should be thoroughly familiar with the construction of personnel bunkers. Emphasis should be placed upon bunkers being prepared to withstand heavy rain during the monsoon. If possible, guidance should be received from competent engineer support personnel and personnel who have had experience in this area of construction while previously stationed in RVN.

c. Recommend that more emphasis be placed on demolition training, i.e., installing claymore mines, proper identification and handling of explosives, etc.

d. More emphasis should be placed on cross-training battery personnel in the duties of gun crews. Where possible, other competent personnel, i.e., battalion survey personnel, can be cross-trained in FDC since very little is done in surveying.

e. Recommend that all observers receive as much training possible in aerial observer adjustment procedures since 98 percent of the missions adjusted are adjusted from the air.
AVGH-4L-OP
5 Nov 67
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

3. (U) Intelligence: Recommend that intelligence personnel make
daily contact with adjacent battalion and brigade units nearby. This
daily contact is very essential with units conducting operations. Con-
tact must also be made with liaison personnel in order to compile as
much intelligence as possible.

4. (U) Logistics. a. Even though the below listed items are
MTOE items, recommend that each unit, prior to deploying, make every
effort to get at least one 600 gallon gasoline pod added to TOE. Since
heavy units are generally spread great distances from the battalion
supply element, if each battery had two 600 gallon pods, one for mogas
and one for diesel, a mc or advance and improvement will be accomplished.

b. Recommend that each battery size unit to everything pos-
sible to get one additional water trailer. Locating water is no real
problem. Having a container to transport water is a problem.

c. Recommend that, for each 600 gallon petroleum pod, consi-
deration be given to getting 1½ ton trailer to transport said pod.

d. Each firing battery should make every effort to get two
additional aiming circles prior to deploying. Each platoon should have,
as a minimum, two aiming circles. Batteries frequently send platoons
out on artillery raids. Many firing positions are such that two or more
aiming circles are needed. This is especially true for a night mission
and for separate units split into 8⁻/175mm. Several missions may be in
progress simultaneously, also.

5. (U) Other: Recommend that, if heavy artillery units cannot
get an additional M578 or M543 wrecker added to the TOE before deploying,
batteries design a lifting device, "A" frame type, that can be mounted
on the body of a 5 ton truck. Ammunition resupply alone would justify
the suggested improvement, not to mention the needs involved with main-
tenance, i.e., changing tubes, cradles, etc.

John R Frankenberg
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

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AVGK-CO (5 Nov 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (ROG GSFOR-65) (UIC: WAITAA) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 41ST ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96366, 23 November 1967

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96550

1. (U) The operational report from 6th Bn, 32nd Arty is approved and forwarded with the following comments:

   a. Reference Section II, Part I, para b and Part II, para 1: New registration procedure referred to, is one tested at the request of USAAMS, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

   b. Reference Section II, Part I, para d(1) and (3) unit has been advised to submit KIR.

2. (U) The unit identification code is WAITAA.

3. (U) The number of unit days this organization engaged in training, movement and operations is 15, 16 and 61 respectively.

4. (U) Regraded unclassified when separated from classified documents.

A.V. ARNOLD JR.
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding
TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam


Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350, 8 December 1967

1. Concur in the observations and recommendations contained in basic communication and previous indorsement.

   a. An objective analysis of this shortcut to grid conversion indicates the recommendation is not sufficiently accurate or predictable enough to be utilized as a field expedient for zone to zone transformation. The scaled and FADAC computed distances between battery centers and targets using this method can differ noticeably. Such differences may be positive or negative and cannot be correlated to the range fired.
   b. Sliding grid sheets under field conditions would tend to introduce human error. Although the plotting of two battery centers and two sets of deflection indices may be tedious, it is safer, more practical and an acceptable solution to the problem of firing from one grid zone to another.

3. Reference: Section II, Part II, paragraph 5, page 13. This information was disseminated in the November 1967 issue I FFORCEV Arty Newsletter.

FOR THE COMMANDER

DONALD L. BURTON
MAJ, Arty
Adjutant
AVFA-CC-OT (5 Nov 67) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 RCS CSFOR-65 UIC WAITAA 6th Bn, 32d Arty (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350 14 DEC 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

This headquarters has reviewed the 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 and concurs with the basic document and previous indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JAMES R. CANTON
Colonel, AVGC
Assistant Adjutant General
AVHGC-DST (5 Nov 67)       4th Ind (C)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO 96375       30 JAN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (A1TA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning survey by azimuth control, page 8, paragraph 1a: Concur. The azimuth gyroscope provides accurate azimuth control and has proven to be extremely effective in RVN. The low equipment density in RVN, however, causes occasional extended downtime for repairs. Therefore, every effort must be exerted to prevent downtime through an aggressive PM program.

   b. Reference item concerning organization of battery positions, page 8, paragraph 1b: Concur. The preparation of howitzer/gun pits as described in this paragraph is highly desirable and should be used when ever feasible. It is imperative that the battery position area be improved and sandbagging of howitzer/gun pits, ammunition, and personnel bunkers commence immediately after the battery has been prepared to fire. Where possible, all personnel bunkers should be dug-in with reinforced timbered ceilings covered with sandbags. Adequate drainage should be considered during the construction of each bunker.

   c. Reference item concerning firing battery positions, page 9, paragraph 2a: Concur. Independent operation of artillery units has become the rule rather than the exception in RVN. A system of double checks to insure firing data accuracy must be established and rigidly enforced by all personnel on the gunnery team.

   d. Reference item concerning limitation of XM548 cargo carrier, page 11, paragraph 1b: Concur. The recommendation to split the heavy batteries half 8" howitzer and half 175mm gun cannot always be maintained. The dual capability to mount the 8" howitzer and 175mm gun on the same carriage provides a capability heretofore unknown; however, the tube mix is primarily dependent upon the unit's mission.
AVHGC-DST (5 Nov 67)

e. Reference item concerning training, page 12, paragraph 2:

(1) Nonconcur in subparagraph 2a. The recommendation is too general to comment on. Unit will be queried for additional information upon which to take appropriate action if considered necessary.

(2) Construction of personnel bunkers is normally a local problem peculiar to a geographical area and training should be conducted in the unit. Training assistance should be requested of combat elements in the area if considered necessary.

(3) Concur. Personnel should have a basic knowledge of demolitions prior to arriving in RVN for assignment to USARV units. Due to extensive use of mines in artillery defensive positions in RVN, land mine warfare should be included in artillery AIT.

(4) Concur with paragraph 2c. Cross training of personnel should be accomplished on a priority basis in the unit, time permitting.

(5) Concur in more emphasis on aerial observer training. Practical exercises in aerial observation for observers bound for RVN should be conducted as frequently as time and availability of equipment permit.

f. Reference item concerning logistics, page 13, paragraph 4. Standardized MTOE 6-436G, 6-437G, and 6-439G were approved by DA on 27 November 1967 to be implemented by General Orders effective 15 June 1968. Any recommendations or requests for changes to authorizations in a standardized MTOE must be supported by overriding factors as set forth in USARV message 66711, DTG 100458Z Oct 67. This message was addressed to all Army commands.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
HQ, 6th Bn, 32d Arty
HQ, I FFORCENV
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 from HQ, 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (UIC: WAITAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 23 FEB 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations Aug - 31 Oct 1967**

**CO, 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery**

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**ABSTRACT**

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