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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAH-P (M) (21 Feb 68) FOR OT RD-674204 4 March 1968

SUBJECT: Extract from Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject extract is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraphs 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. This extract, while directed primarily toward Special Forces operations, has numerous items which are of concern to the Army as a whole. This extract is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO San Francisco 96240

SUBJECT: Extract from Operational Report - Lessons Learned, for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967(U) (WA4XATO)

SECTION 2, PART I

Commander's Observations (Lessons Learned)

Special Handling Required
Not Releasable to Executives
National

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

FOR OT RD
674204

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AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

1. (U) Personnel

   a. ITEM: CIDG Pay Cards

      DISCUSSION: CIDG pay cards were not properly filled out. Pictures, number of dependents, and weapons serial numbers were missing. This worked an extreme hardship on the pay officer.

      OBSERVATION: The Detachment S1, and respective A-Team XO's must insure that every CIDG pay card has all the necessary information filled in.

   b. ITEM: Detachment Operational Funds

      DISCUSSION: It has been the past policy of this detachment to send operational fund reports directly to the company. This resulted in numerous deficiencies not being detected until the audit was conducted at company level.

      OBSERVATION: In that the above outlined policy was very time consuming to both the company and the detachment involved, this policy has been revamped in that all fund reports are now submitted to the Funds Officer at this B- Detachment, where they are checked prior to being hand carried to the company by the Detachment S1.

   c. ITEM: Awards and Decorations

      DISCUSSION: Many recommendations for awards and decorations are being downgraded or disapproved because they do not meet the criteria, they are poorly written, and/or they do not include the key phrases required by regulation.

      OBSERVATION: The extra time and effort spent in eliminating the above discrepancies are worth while as it precludes injustices to deserving individuals.

   d. ITEM: Incorrect Death Gratuity Payments

      DISCUSSION: It has been noted that several funds officers have made incorrect death gratuity payments because they have made their own computations instead of following the regulation. 5th SF Gp (Abn) Regulation 37-1 is specific in the amounts to be paid by pay grade.

      OBSERVATION: Simply following the regulation will eliminate the possibility of an injustice through under payment to the next of kin of a CIDG member killed in action or the possibility of a funds officer having his accountability increased due to overpayment.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

e. ITEM: Accuracy in Performance of Administrative Duties

DISCUSSION: The S-1 Section of an operational B Detachment handles a voluminous amount of paperwork each month, i.e., personnel requests, Officer Efficiency Reports, recommendations for awards and various reports.

OBSERVATION: To insure this workload is processed efficiently and timely proofreading of all draft copies is essential. This is a basic fundamental in all sections; however, its importance cannot be overemphasized. Each request, report or document which has to be retyped because of improper spelling, sentence structure and other errors not only increases the volume of work, but also significantly retards the timely submission of these various reports.

f. ITEM: Loss of Correspondence

DISCUSSION: The loss of important correspondence sent from HQ's to higher and subordinate HQ's has created a serious problem.

OBSERVATION: To correct this a distribution log was established. Correspondence from all sections are channeled to the S-1 section where they are logged in and hand receipted out. Since the initiation of the distribution log there has been no loss of correspondence handled under this procedure.

g. ITEM: CIDG Supplementary Payrolls

DISCUSSION: Previously all supplementary payrolls included all personnel who were not paid on the original payrolls. Once complete the supplementary payrolls were returned to the respective A Detachments for payment. This proved highly unsatisfactory as numerous personnel received pay for soldiers, who either had deserted, were in hospitals, or on leave.

OBSERVATION: All personnel due supplementary pay are now paid at the B Detachment. The person to receive pay must have a slip from the XO of the A Detachment verifying that this man is entitled supplementary pay. The use of this system has proved highly satisfactory and has reduced the supplementary pay roll expenditures approximately 50%; while at the same time insuring the just payment of personnel not paid on the original payrolls.

h. ITEM: CIDG Strength Report

DISCUSSION: Previously acquiring accurate CIDG strength had been somewhat of a problem. Two very important functions, CIDG pay and rations, depend upon the accuracy of the strength report.

OBSERVATION: An accurate CIDG strength report can best be rendered if both USSF and LIDB jointly count and agree on the number of personnel present for duty.
By placing great emphasis on this accountability, an equitable way of handling pay and distribution of rations is guaranteed.

2. (O) OPERATIONS:

a. ITEM: ARVN Artillery Support

DISCUSSION: The 175mm gun battery at Song Be experienced an unacceptable delay in receiving ARVN countermortar fire when requesting through communication channels to B-34 and then to Sector TOC. A joint TOC is not in operation at this time.

OBSERVATION: A Vietnamese FO assigned to the 175mm battery with direct communications to the ARVN batteries alleviates this delay in receiving ARVN countermortar fire.

b. ITEM: VC Burial Parties

DISCUSSION: It has been noted that VC frequently return to a contact site to search for and evacuate the bodies.

OBSERVATION: Contact sites should be staked out whenever possible to catch or kill any VC that return to remove their dead.

b. ITEM: Stay-Behind Ambushes

DISCUSSION: Several operations have noted that VC initiate contact from the rear after a patrol has passed through a trail intersection.

OBSERVATION: A successful countermeasure to this tactic has been to leave a stay-behind ambush in vicinity of a trail intersection while the patrol searches one of the trails leading from the intersection. VC have been caught moving up the trail in the rear of the patrol.

d. ITEM: Mortar Attacks

DISCUSSION: During mortar attacks on two occasions in the past quarter in this area, 2 US have been killed and 3 seriously wounded. No ground attacks accompanied the mortar attacks. Casualties were taken, well after the commencement of the mortar attacks. Personnel were needlessly out of their bunkers.

OBSERVATION: Personnel must be disciplined to remain in a bunker once a mortar attack commences until a definite all clear is established or the tactical situation such as a ground attack dictates that personnel move from their bunkers.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

e. ITEM: USASF Augmentation (Det A-331, 5th SFSA)

DISCUSSION: After a large scale attack on a CIDG Camp, the resulting destruction of facilities and equipment, coupled with the loss of key control personnel severely affects the capability of the camp to rebuild its defenses.

OBSERVATION: As a minimum, the "B" and/or "C" detachment must provide an augmentation team to assist the camp until it can return to normal operations. The team should consist of Command and Control personnel, signal personnel, and a medical assistance team. The composition of the augmentation team will depend on the situation.

f. ITEM: Camp Recovery Assistance (Det A-334, 5th SFSA)

DISCUSSION: Past experience has shown that an influx of visitors can be expected at an "A" camp after a large scale attack. The visitors in addition to the evacuation of wounded, coordination of resupplies, supervision of defense construction, and preparation of reports is often beyond the capability of the detachment.

OBSERVATION: Every effort must be made by all concerned to avoid interfering with the "A" Detachment efforts to retain or regain complete control of the camp situation. Higher headquarters and the Command and Control augmentation personnel should assume the responsibility for receiving visitors, in the compilation of reports, and coordinating resupply and medical evacuations.

g. ITEM: Wire Barrier (Det A-334, 5th SFSA)

DISCUSSION: USASF had not checked the wire barriers around the camp in detail since 03 August prior to the 7 August attack on Tong Le Chon. It is possible that outer wire barriers were cut or marked prior to the commencement of the 7 August attack on Tong Le Chon.

OBSERVATION: Barrier wires must be checked daily.

h. ITEM: Defensive Fires (Det A-334, 5th SFSA)

DISCUSSION: VC infiltrators may be lurking near the outer edge of a camp's wire barrier in spite of H & I fire concentrations.

OBSERVATION: Close-in defensive concentrations and countermortar should be periodically included in the H & I fire concentrations both day and night, to discourage VC infiltration.

i. ITEM: Removal of C4 Explosive from Claymore Mine (Det A-334, 5th SFSA)

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DISCUSSION: During the 7 August attack on Tong Le Chon approximately 50% of the emplaced Claymore mines failed to detonate because the C4 explosive had been removed by CIDG personnel and used for cooking fires. USASF had checked the Claymore on 03 August.

OBSERVATION: Claymore mines must be checked daily.

j. ITEM: Claymore Mine M-18 Installation (Det A-334, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: Experience has proven that Claymore mines are open to pilferage, removal, or in some cases turned around to face the friendly elements when protection is not provided. The accepted method has been to place the mines in cement, however this is not always possible due to lack of cement and/or time.

OBSERVATION: An alternate method of Claymore installation is as follows: Drive two five foot "U" shaped pickets in the ground with the recessed part of the pickets facing the center. The pickets are driven into the ground side by side separated by the width of a claymore mine. The mine is installed upside down in the groove formed by the "U" of the two pickets. In this manner the fuse well is protected from the elements. The metal legs of the mine are then inserted through the picket holes and bent around the pickets. This method encloses the mine and eliminates pilferage of C-4 from the mine by the CIDG. It also requires a considerable effort to remove the mine or turn it around.

k. ITEM: Local Security (Det A-334, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: Immediately prior to the 7 August attack on Tong Le Chon listening posts and ambushes used as local security were completely ineffective. USASF personnel did not check the LP's and ambushes out the gate the evening prior to the attack and based on prior experience, it is doubtful whether the planned LP's and ambushes actually departed camp.

OBSERVATION: USASF should personally insure that planned local security measures are in fact carried out.

l. ITEM: Safe Area Security (Co C, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: On 290230 October, the safe area of Tra Bong Village was penetrated from the East and the West by an unknown number of VC. The village suffered extensive burning and the loss of eight hostages taken by the VC. Reaction patrols from camp Tra Bong failed to make contact with the VC. Investigation by the USSF detachment indicated that the PF O'T's on the periphery of the village safe area had not been manned as reported by the local district chief. The result was effective surprise by the VC and correspondingly less time afforded the camp.

OBSERVATION: Detachment commanders in the sub-sector roll cannot overlook the fundamental requirements of checking and double-checking district activities as well as those of the camp.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

ITEM: Combined Operations Employing CIDG and FMARF (CO C, 5th SFG)

DISCUSSION: Camps Thuong Duc, Minh Long, Ba To, and Gia Vuc have conducted very successful operations employing platoon or company sized CIDG elements attached to platoons of regular Army and Marine units in the area. In most cases, the CIDG were employed as additional Platoons rather than as attached squads. The major US unit provided an RTO and, in many cases, one US squad to accompany the USSF advisor. The additional US personnel enabled the CIDG to maintain 24 hour communications and reduced the number of USSF required to advise each separate element.

OBSERVATIONS: The following advantages in conducting operations with FMARF were observed:

1. Operations were able to be of longer duration.
2. Greater air lift capability.
3. Immediate Medevac
4. Availability of aerial resupply
5. Greater fire support
6. The CIDG gained confidence by fighting along side of a major unit. The CIDG demonstrated improved discipline, enthusiasm, and cooperativeness which perhaps was produced by increased self esteem or the fear of losing face in front of foreign soldiers.

ITEM: Small Patrols to Keep Restricted Areas (Co D, 5th SFG) Free of Snipers

DISCUSSION: A pass area between two rocky hills was fortified with six PF outposts. In spite of the outposts, snipers continually harassed traffic through the pass.

OBSERVATIONS: By using small patrols of Camp Strike Force personnel mixed with local PF soldiers the snipers were effectively eliminated from the pass. This active patrolling keeps the VC off balance. Being uncertain of patrol locations the VC are reluctant to expose themselves by firing. Combining the PF soldiers with CSF not only increases the skills of the PF but also permits the District Chief to play a more active part in the defense of his district.

ITEM: VC Attempts to Divert Spooky (AC47) (Co D, 5th SFG)

DISCUSSION: When Spooky is employed immediately following an attack on an outpost, village, etc., he often draws sporadic fire from areas that appear to be likely avenues of withdrawal and spends much of his time firing into the area.

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OBSERVATION: It has been established that the VC place one or two men in covered positions far from their actual route of withdrawal with instructions to fire simply to attract Spooky's attention and divert him from the main force.

ITEM: River Operations with Assault Boats (B-35, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: Operational Detachment A's assigned to Det B-35 are currently located along a major Viet Cong river supply route. The Viet Cong utilize this route to move troops and equipment. CIDG Forces conduct offensive river patrol operations utilizing plastic assault boats with 40 HP outboard motors.

OBSERVATIONS:

1. River patrols are best conducted with a minimum of 3 boats and a maximum of 5. The lead boats should have machine guns mounted on tripods with the front leg of the tripod wired into the bow of the boat. The maximum number of persons per boat is four. Three persons per boat is more appropriate. The motor operator will have a weapon but will not fire unless it is absolutely necessary. The last boat should be r-c'd with an automatic weapon and a 60mm mortar. The base plate of the mortar is placed on a wooden platform set on sandbags. Only charge one should be fired from the assault boat.

2. The last boat should be designed as pick-up boat in case one of the other boats is disabled by enemy fire.

3. Towing of disabled boats is best accomplished by a long rope or strap, directly behind the towing craft. The engine of the towed craft should be locked in the tow position.

4. Arm and hand signals are most appropriate on the boat operations as HT-1 radios have proved ineffective due to engine noise and interference. Command radios should be provided with headsets for constant monitoring with base station.

5. Papers and ID cards of all personnel traveling on the waterways should be checked. The boats should be checked for items, especially in the least accessible places, for instance in the bilge. To preclude the movement of supplies under the boat, a rope should be passed under the boat from stern to bow.

6. Not more than 50% of the boats in the patrol should be halted and checking papers at the same time. The others should circle in front and behind the halted craft.

7. Detainees present a problem with the small assault boats. This is the best method: Tie the detainee's hands and feet and lay them in the center boat or boats. Captured or detained sampans are best towed by tying them alongside the assault boats.
When river operations are supported by FAC or LFT* aircraft, it has been found that the best results can be attained by having the aircraft proceed the boats by about 15-30 minutes along the patrol route. After they have flown the patrol route they should leave the area to a distance of 5-10 kilometers and be prepared to support on call. The boats will then proceed on the river patrol. The VC will think that supporting aircraft have left the area and will fire on the river patrol as it passes their location thereby disclosing their position. The command boat can mark this position by throwing colored smoke into the water. The best method of insuring a well marked position is to loft the smoke grenade as high as possible so that it begins to emit smoke before it hits the water. The smoke grenade will eject a scum which will be clearly visible to the supporting aircraft as they come into the area to place fire on the enemy positions. It has been found that red grenades produce the largest and most visible surface scum but other colors will work. * Light Fire Team

Boats in the river patrol should proceed at 2/3 throttle until they come under fire at which time they can operate at full throttle.

In the movement of troops with the assault boats, the same landing site should never be used two times.

Flak jackets will minimize wounds to boat patrol personnel. They should be worn unzipped with only one snap closed so they can be discarded if necessary. No belts should be worn.

When moving troops to a designated landing site at night, control over the other craft can best be obtained by having the lead boat show a filtered light just along the water line. The lead boat will be the first to land and will remain at the landing site until all craft have discharged their personnel. Only 50% of the craft will land troops at one time. The remainder of the boats circle slowly or idle off short until it is their turn to move in.

ITEM: VC Countermeasures Against Airboats (Det B-35, 5th SFK)

DISCUSSION: The VC have developed several countermeasures against airboats. Mines have been found in driver training areas and in canals and channelizing exits or entrances into the Plain of Reeds. Stakes planted just under the surface in these same areas are designed to rip out the bottom of the boat. Grenades planted just under the surface and connected to trip wires, over which the airboats must pass, have been used. At first, grenades with normal delay were used. The speed of the airboats caused them to detonate after the boat had passed by. Within two to three days the VC resorted to non-delay fuses and were able to inflict disabling damage to two airboats.

OBSERVATION: Because of restricted visibility and high speeds, navigation by the airboats is difficult and the airboats tend to utilize known channels or previously used routes. Air cover is essential to guide the boats and prevent establishment of patterns. Even in the open Plain of Reeds airboat pathways are readily apparent. Once the boats have traversed the area care must be taken to avoid using exactly the same pathway. Bank and ground reconnaissance of tree line and dikes crossing points is a must.
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r. ITEM: Airmobile Operations (Det B-34, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: CIDG are reluctant to debark from troopships when door gunners use suppressive fire on the LZ. CIDG assume that the LZ is being defended by VC.

OBSERVATION: CIDG must be thoroughly briefed on the use of suppressive fires and suppressive fires must be kept at a minimum except where warranted.

s. ITEM: Heliborne Assaults (Det B-35, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: The speed at which the assaulting troops exit the helicopter upon reaching the destination is an essential part of all heliborne operations.

OBSERVATION: At approximately 75 foot elevation and when the choppers reduce speed slightly in preparation for landing, one man from each door should stand on the skid and move forward toward the nose of the aircraft. The second man in each door should place his foot on the skid. This allows four of the assaulting troops to depart the aircraft before it touches the ground. Recommended height for the four troops to leave the chopper is between 2-4 feet depending on the terrain.

t. ITEM: Heliborne Operations (Det B-35, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: Placement of personnel in helicopter is vital to the success of heliborne operations.

OBSERVATION: During several heliborne operations conducted during the reporting period the following observations were made:

(1) To preclude key personnel from being left on the departure field assign one man not going on the operation to act as W.C.O.

(2) Key personnel should be split up and ride in the choppers nearest the front, e.g., choppers 1, 3, 4, and 7. In case the designated number of choppers does not arrive, e.g., only 8 of 10, the key personnel will not be left at the departure field.

(3) Load only one crew served weapon crew on a single chopper.

u. ITEM: Landing Zone Preparations for Heliborne (Det B-32, 5th SFSA) Assaults

DISCUSSION: The technique of lengthy landing zone preparations, either by air or artillery, prior to a heliborne assault has resulted in very little initial enemy contact during an operation.

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OBSERVATIONS: Experience has shown that a 3 minute light fire team preparation just prior to insertion decreases the chances of the enemy being able to leave the area. Another technique effectively employed with the light fire team is a C.B.U. run with TAC air along wood lines seconds prior to insertion. If the VC are in the vicinity of the landing zone, this has a tendency to keep him "bottled up" until after the initial insertion has been completed.

v. ITEM: Counter Mortar Fire (Det B-32, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: Following a mortar attack, effective counter mortar fire should be delivered without delay.

OBSERVATION: A hasty crater analysis following a mortar attack can be effectively used to bring maximum counter mortar fires on the enemy. By taking an azimuth from the mortar craters, and firing at clearings along that azimuth, fire can be brought to bear on suspected firing positions and routes of withdrawal in minimum time. In conjunction with this, organic mortar fire can be registered on likely firing positions around the camp. The azimuth, elevation, and charge are placed on aiming stakes in the mortar pit to ensure swift delivery.

w. ITEM: Communications During Airmobile Operations (Det B-34, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: The assigned primary air to ground frequency becomes too crowded when an airmobile insertion is conducted using the primary A/G as the command frequency.

OBSERVATION: An alternate frequency should be utilized for command and control during an airmobile insertion.

x. ITEM: Random Firing by Helicopters (Det B-33, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: Helicopters continue to fire on CIDG operations in the field without calling in to camps for clearance. Helicopters should be operating or at least monitoring the air-ground frequency for the CTZ; however, the operations in the field continue to be unable to contact them on this frequency.

OBSERVATION: All aircrafts operating in TAOR's of other units should monitor the primary air/ground frequency.

y. ITEM: Illumination Support (Det B-35, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: On operation Tra 4/8 the operation was outside artillery support range and had to depend on LPT and FAC for support. An ambush of four sampans was successful; however, because of the driving rain and no moonlight, no damage could be ascertained without illumination. A call for support informed us that all aircraft in the area were grounded because of the weather. No adequate survey of the ambush site could be made. In the morning 4 dead VC were located with only one weapon. It is possible that additional Viet Cong were wounded but had escaped.
On operation Tra 2/2 the night ambush had contact with an estimated VC platoon with superior automatic weapons fire. Illumination could not be called from camp artillery because high explosives were needed to support the contact. Illumination support requested from the Provincial HQ's produced three rounds in quick succession directly over friendly forces. Fire adjustment and additional illumination were refused. As a result, when the VC broke contact they were able to carry all but one of their casualties from the encounter.

**Observation:** Where artillery or mortar support is not adequate or non-existent and in areas where the employment permits, hand held illumination devices should be made available for operations.

2. **ITEM:** Raids on Individual Houses (Det B-35, 5th SFGI)

**Discussion:** Many VC consider themselves safe to enter villages and sleep with their families at night or to store weapons and equipment in certain houses.

**Observation:** By having PW's or intelligence agents draw maps of hamlets indicating the houses where VC sleep or store weapons, a small raiding party can successfully raid one specific house to kill or capture VC. These tactics not only result in many enemy kills with a minimum of friendly casualties but also demoralize the enemy to a great degree.

3. **ITEM:** Operations During the Monsoon Season (Det B-32, 5th SFGI)

**Discussion:** During the reporting period heavy rains have altered operational techniques. It was learned through frequent operations throughout Tay Ninh Province that the VC had displaced their base camps to the high ground. This was confirmed by the high number of contacts with the VC in those areas.

**Observation:** Operations during the rainy season should be planned so as to search all high ground within the operational area.

4. **ITEM:** Evacuation of Casualties (Det A-334, 5th SFMG)

**Discussion:** During the 7 August attack on Tong Le Chon quite a few CIDG and Mike Force soldiers who had received either very superficial, non-disabling wounds or no injury at all tried to sneak into the medevac choppers. Often they had placed bandages over areas of their bodies which had no wounds in an attempt to deceive the medics. As a result it was necessary to temporarily remove all dressings from the wounded in order to prevent desertions.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

OBSERVATION: In the future after each patient is treated or examined by a medic and slated for medical evacuation he should be placed in an isolated area near the pick-up point and no one but the prior mentioned patients and authorized personnel be allowed in that area.

cc. ITEM: Medevac (Co E, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: During the conduct of Operation Blackjack 29 a wounded CIDG died 5 minutes prior to arrival of the Medevac which arrived from An Khe two (2) hours after the request.

OBSERVATION: Coordination should be made to arrange for all medevacs to come from the nearest and same location whenever possible. Also, requests for medevac should be arranged to go directly to the medevac location and not be restricted to command channels.

3.(U) Training and Organization (Co A, 5th SFGA)

ITEM: Physical Requirements of CIDG Recruits

DISCUSSION: In the past, potential CIDG troops have been recruited, trained and sent to Special Forces Camps only to find out they are physically unable to perform duties as CIDG soldiers.

OBSERVATION: Before the man is contracted to work for CIDG (i.e. prior to transport to the Corps Area), he should be:

1) Examined with all his clothes off to detect gross physical defects, such as withered or missing limbs, blindness, etc.

2) Taken on a ½ mile run to detect those too weak for service, especially older men.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

4. (C/NOFORN) Intelligence:

4. ITEM: In the third quarter of CY 1967, a report was received stating that a VC LTC, who was the commander of a VC Arty unit, was on leave and was staying at the home of his parents in III CTZ. The report also furnished information concerning the general situation and terrain in the area.

DISCUSSION: A photo mission was flown over the above area and the resulting photos confirmed the report's description of the house and general area. A decision was made to attempt to abduct the LTC. A decision was made to polygraph the source and the polygraph was completed with favorable results. Source was reinfiltrated into the area to verify that the LTC was still there. Source determined that the LTC was still in the area, and would be for several more days. Two weeks after the initial receipt of the information an allied unit conducted an attempted abduction of the LTC. Minor resistance encountered approximately 400 meters southeast of the objective house resulted in one VC KIA. The LTC was not found at the location. His father was questioned and stated that his son had departed the area to Chieu Hoi. Tracks around the house indicated recent activity, but after a brief search the reaction team departed without taking any prisoners for questioning or counterintelligence type search. After the passage of a few days, the original source was reinserted into the area, and conversation with the LTC's father revealed that when the action unit's helicopters landed at a nearby hamlet, their approach alerted the LTC and his guards, all of whom immediately escaped to another hamlet via canals in camouflaged sampans.

OBSERVATIONS:

(1) The capture of a VC LTC, especially an artillery unit commander would, if he were fully exploited, make an extremely valuable contribution to the U.S. effort in Vietnam
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(2) Reaction to valuable and important intelligence must be a matter of high priority.

(3) Decisions concerning such targets of opportunity must be quickly and firmly made, with specific orders given to the designated action personnel or unit.

(4) In view of time factors involved in such quick reaction type activity, it is believed that resources available to the 5th SFGA should be utilized in any such future operations. This affords a direct command line between the unit developing the intelligence and the reaction element.

b. ITEM: Exploitation of Prisoners of War. (S2, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: The timely exploitation of Combat Intelligence is essential to the Order of Battle analyst, that it may be compared with and/or added to current holdings to receive the fullest benefits from the intelligence. The channel of acquisition and dissemination must be well established and effective.

OBSERVATION: All personnel should be familiar with units and agencies to be notified of the below mentioned observations, and a check list or cross reference file should be utilized to insure coordination.

(1) A proper liaison should be established between adjacent and interested units and agencies.

(2) Good rapport must be established among personnel that will have access to the PW's.

(3) A working system where timely dissemination and utilization of acquired information can be had.

(4) The disposition and condition of PW should be made known to all using units and agencies, along with final disposition, such as place of imprisonment.

c. ITEM: Preparation of Classified Documents (Co A, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: In the past, several classified documents from this headquarters have been prepared in a manner which constituted administrative security violations and which impaired dissemination and discussion of the documents.

OBSERVATION: A document preparation assistance program by S2 personnel, which at times has required inadequately prepared documents to be carried to the personnel responsible for discussion of the requirements, has had favorable results. A marked improvement has resulted in the internal protective markings on locally prepared documents.

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d. ITEM: Counterintelligence Operations (Co A, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: In the past the value of CI Operations has not been recognized to a great degree.

OBSERVATION: A recent case of VC espionage attempts against an A-Site has come to light through the efforts of LIDF CI Operations. Such examples may permit the recognition of the value of CI Operations, and obtain more support for their implementation throughout the company TAOR.

e. ITEM: Security Procedures (Co A, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: Occasional examples of relaxed attitudes toward security procedures and the safeguarding of information were brought to light in a Counterintelligence Inspection of this Hqs in Aug 67. The violations and discrepancies observed by the inspecting agents were disseminated to all B Detachments for information and corrective action.

OBSERVATION: Unannounced CI checks of staff sections have since encouraged proper security procedures to be maintained and prevent a lapse in procedures caused by personnel charges, or relaxed attitudes.

f. ITEM: Personnel Reliability Program (Co A, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: Clearing indigenous employees has been a problem in the past because occasional instances occur where individuals are granted clearances, although they are known criminals because of bribery or payoffs.

OBSERVATION: In addition to requests for investigation through agencies which may or may not be vulnerable to the above weakness, all employment applicants must also be checked against Blacklists and Greylists maintained by Allied, US, and US Advised Intelligence Agencies to remove all doubt.

g. ITEM: Personnel Reliability Program (Co A, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: Establishing the identity of job applicants beyond doubt has been a recurring difficulty.

OBSERVATION: All Vietnamese over 18 years of age are required by law to carry ID Cards. Vietnamese under 18 years of age are required by law to carry birth certificates. These documents must be used to establish the identity of job applicants. Since it is law, any person who does not have an ID Card should be questioned closely to determine the reason. If the ID Card has been lost, an application for reissue must have been initiated. The ID number is also a vital identification element in the conduct of background investigations.
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h. ITEM: Personnel Reliability Program

DISCUSSION: Corruption and theft, minor and major, is an inherent problem among indigenous workers. Places where minor corruption might occur include mess halls and clubs, re-using chits, theft of dinnerware and small amounts of rations. Large scale theft occurs more readily in the S4 area and in the lucrative area of medicines and narcotics in the hospital area.

OBSERVATION: In cases of suspected theft of a large scale within the compound, suspicion falls first on key personnel, that is, those who have knowledge of the overall operation and those who handle necessary paperwork. Next in line come the interpreter/foreman. These people control the other workers, and in many cases can be blackmailed by them for smaller thefts they may have committed in the past and of which the interpreters have knowledge. The little man may be intimidated and coerced by those who operate on a large scale. Do not let the operation of a system rest too strongly on indigenous workers, without whom the operation would cease to be effective. People with this much power can, in effect, dictate their own working conditions, resting on the knowledge that if any of their deals are discovered they are too valuable to replace. Watch for the practice of employing relatives, especially when both are connected with the same operation. Man/Wife; brother/sister and brother/brother employment can lead to a situation in which family ties can provide an excellent means of support for internal corruption. If possible, cultivate the friendship of personnel within each activity (try to make this someone other than interpreters or foreman — many Vietnamese speak passable English). These personnel can act as casual informants and provide an insight into the internal workings within your own camp. One benefit is that you can immediately determine who the key indigenous employees are and the access and capabilities that they each have.

i. ITEM: Guard Systems

DISCUSSION: A recent theft occurred within the Company A security force. The problem is how to control the guards.

OBSERVATION: People who steal generally need money. How much are guards paid? Do they earn enough to support their families or are they paid just the bare minimum on the pay scale? Security guards have perhaps the most important job on the compound since they protect both lives and property and should be paid accordingly. Do not give them reason to steal from you. If possible, they should be given new uniforms with distinctive markings, adequate mess facilities and shelter for their families. Two basic rules are that they do not lie and they do not steal; and if either rule is broken to US knowledge they should be released immediately. Watch for power plays within the platoon for positions of leadership, and separate factions or cliques. Alternate guard positions and shifts constantly so that the same group of men do not pull the same shifts and positions of duty together. If possible, gain access to an informant within the guard system to find out day to day happenings and dispersions. Stress honor among the guards and indicate the shame and loss of face that will occur if the guards allow stealing or they themselves steal. If any guard steals and is caught, bring him before the others and indicate the disgrace that he has brought on the group. Company A's security force is 100% ethnic Cambodian and the relationship is such that they like to solve problems among themselves with American advice.
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J. ITEM: Weather Reporting (Co A, 5th SFRA)

DISCUSSION: In the past, weather observations have been received late, incomplete, and in a haphazard manner.

OBSERVATION: A system of monitoring and logging the time of receipt of weather reports at all levels and increased command emphasis has greatly alleviated this problem.

k. ITEM: Collection of Information on Enemy Activities (Co A, 5th SFRA)

DISCUSSION: In the past, some intel sergeants at the A and B Detachments have not made maximum utilization of the civilian personnel living in the camp's TAOR.

OBSERVATION: A great deal of improvement in the utilization of civilian personnel as collectors of information has occurred at the B Detachment level; however, there are still some problems in the area of collection at the A Detachment level. The direction, enthusiasm, and guidance for an effective collection program at A Detachments can be provided by the CI personnel currently stationed at the B Detachments. While at the A-Site, the CI people can perform a dual mission by implementing a workable CI program. This program should include the screening of indigenous laborers employed by the camp and the establishment of an internal net to report on the disaffection, subversion, sabotage, etc. occurring among the CIDG personnel.

l. ITEM: Liaison with other Collection Agencies (Co A, 5th SFRA)

DISCUSSION: Other collection agencies should be periodically consulted by the A and B Detachments for information on VC activities in their TAOR. This is especially true of infrastructure information which has been the specialty of certain collection agencies.

OBSERVATION: This problem of liaison applies mainly to the B Detachments. However, at the A-Teams level there are instances in which the District Chief operates out of a village located within the Camp's TAOR. In such a situation, the Executive Officer or the team commander should establish rapport with the District Chief. Generally, these people are thoroughly knowledgeable of all VC activities in their area. The amount of information volunteered by the District Chief will often depend on his working relationship with the team commander or executive officer. Emphasize the use of an officer in dealing with a District Chief since some District Chiefs feel they should be dealing with someone of their own level, an officer rather than an NCO.

m. ITEM: Proper Coding of Agents (Co A, 5th SFRA)

DISCUSSION: There have been many instances of improper coding or the lack of any coding of people being used as agents or informants.
OBSERVATION: There has been some improvement in the coding of
agents. However, Name Trace Requests and Source Data Reports often have been
incomplete, improperly completed, or lacking a signature of any kind. The S2
section at the B Detachments should review NTR's and SDR's before sending them
to C Co. Secondly, there are still quite a few A Detachments which have
not submitted any NTR's or SDR's. These are A Detachments which have a civilian
population living in the Camp's TAOR. Either the intel sergeant has failed to
exploit these people for information or he is using agents and informants in
violation of 5th Group Regulation 381-3 which requires that all sources used on
a recurring basis be coded.

n. ITEM: Evaluation of Agents  (Co A, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: In the past Special Forces had no system for the
proper evaluation of information submitted by their agents and an evaluation
of the agents themselves. This has resulted in the payment for useless or
false information.

OBSERVATION: This problem can be eliminated by the proper
maintenance of an Agent Master Dossier at the B Detachments level. The dossier
should contain a copy of the agent's SDR and a copy of every intelligence
report submitted by the agent. The purpose of the dossier is to evaluate the
agent on the value and quality of information he has submitted.

o. ITEM: Extraction of Specific Intelligence  (Det B-32, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: In addition to VC/NVA Military Order of Battle and VC
political infrastructure Order of Battle Books and Maps it is necessary to
have some means of retaining information of an intelligence nature in a form which
will allow the extraction of specific information on the entire TAOR or the
extraction of all available information on a specific portion of the TAOR
for either analytical or operational purposes.

OBSERVATION: A method used with satisfactory results is essentially
a geographical system in which a 1:50,000 map of our entire TAOR is sectioned into
blocks ten kilometers by ten kilometers. This ten by ten block bears a two-
digit identification number such as 27. The first digit (2) is the first
digit of all vertical grid lines in that ten by ten block. The second digit is
the first digit of all horizontal grid lines in that particular ten by ten
block (e.g. in a six-digit coordinate such as XT203759, the two digits used
to indicate the ten by ten block, and consequently the general geographic area
you are referring to is the first digit (2) and the fourth digit (7). This
gives you a block identification number of 27). The identification numbers
from all of the ten by ten blocks covering your TAOR are then placed in numerical
order on five by eight card tabs. Behind each of these five by eight tabbed cards
are additional cards labeled by activity (e.g., CONTACTS, SIGHTINGS,
IRs, etc.). As these activities occur you enter them on the appropriate activity
card located behind the block identification card of the area in which the
activity occurred. This allows you to extract either all enemy activities which
have occurred in a given block, or a specific type of enemy activity which has
occurred in a given block. In addition it is easy to take one specific type of
enemy activity, for example CONTACTS, and by going through your card file extract
all contacts for the entire TAOR.
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p. ITEM: Receipt of Intelligence from A Detachment Combat Operations

DISCUSSION: In the past there has been a noted lack of feedback of information of an intelligence nature from A Detachment Combat Operations.

OBSERVATION: In order to increase feedback and insure that information is not lost, no enemy activity is included in the information from each operation, we have included one paragraph in the Operation Termination Report entitled "Intelligence." When an operation has terminated the individuals who conducted the operation submit a termination report which now includes a summation of all enemy activity, suspected enemy activity, indications of enemy activity, or lack of indications of enemy activity within that AO. This provides both operational and intelligence information in a complete usable form which can be easily plugged into sitreps, reports and INSUMS thus giving the reader a much more complete picture of what happened on a particular operation.

q. ITEM: 912 Fund

DISCUSSION: The present 912 Fund is established as a set of 16,000$ VN amount for both "A" and "B" Teams to use for intel purposes. It is felt that intel operations are not uniform from camp to camp and that one amount cannot be made universal for an entire area such as Vietnam. The "A" Teams usually will not use this amount whereas certain "B" Teams have a need for more. Since intel operations are flexible and peculiar to an area, so should be the amount they are authorized to spend.

OBSERVATION: The amount of a particular camp's intel fund should be based on the scope of the operations and not be a pre-arranged sum.

r. ITEM: Interrogation of P's

DISCUSSION: The most frequently asked questions of local VC POW's and especially Hoi Chanh's is the location of their base camps and AO's. It has been found however, that two frequently used methods (map study and aerial observation) are unsuccessful. Most POW's and Hoi Chanh's do not know direction, cannot read a map, and when they are taken aloft for a VR, it is usually their first flight and they cannot associate an aerial view with what they saw on the ground. However, most of these people won't admit they can't read a map, tell direction or do a terrain analysis from the air and readily reply in the affirmative when questions are asked. When detainees are re-interrogated by higher or lateral organizations using the above mentioned conventional methods, the information received in the second interrogation may not concur with information received in the first interrogation.

OBSERVATION: The method most successful uses a map study by the interrogator based on terrain information received from the detainee. The detainee is first asked in what direction the sun was when he last left the base camp.
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From this information a general direction can be determined. The subject is then
asked how long it took him to walk to the point where he Chieu Hoild or was
captured. Judging from the terrain and health of the subject a general radius
can be determined in which the base camp will be found. The subject is then
asked to enumerate significant terrain features he saw on each day of his
journey, such as rivers, open areas, rubber lots, hills, rice paddies, swamps
etc. As the subject speaks and his memory is jogged, the interrogator finds
these terrain features on a current map and gradually plots the subject's
route and finally the base camp can be located.

s. ITEM: Using Intelligence on Way Station Locations (Det B-33, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: The VC (local force) are known to use way stations at
night and less frequently during the daylight hours.

OBSERVATION: It is thus best to leave a way station undisturbed when
it is located by friendly ground troops. The station should then be plotted
on a map and when intel relates a unit in this area, the way station should
receive artillery at night. This method proved highly successful during one Loc
Ninh operation in which a way station received a pre-planned Sky Spot which
captured several VC in the way station.

t. ITEM: Ideal Interrogation Team (Det B-33, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: Interrogations have proved highly fruitful when the
interrogator, who can't speak Vietnamese, is assisted by a recorder and a
Vietnamese interpreter who has been briefed beforehand. If the interrogator
is not familiar with the area etc. he should be briefed, prior to the interro-
gation, by personnel familiar with the area, who should then join the interrog-
ation team. The recorder allows the interrogator a more free flowing interro-
gation and the knowledgeable interpreter, who has been briefed beforehand, can
elaborate on points the subject has mentioned without the interrogator
interrupting the continuity established during a given sequence. The
interpreter can also question certain inaccuracies, keeping pressure on the
subject. This means the interpreter and interrogator have to be well trained
to work as a team and the interpreter has to be familiar with the interrogation
procedures. His pre-interrogation briefings should include information on
the health of the subject, the circumstances resulting in his detention and
general specific information desired. Possible pitfalls foreseen in this
particular interrogation should also be discussed and countermeasures preplanned,

OBSERVATION: A successful interrogation is contingent upon continuity
and a well trained interpreter. Continuity is enhanced by having a recorder take
notes and free the interrogator from the time consuming and interruptive
administrative tasks. The interpreter becomes a valuable assistant only when
well briefed and trained.
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u. ITEM: Air Drop Courier System for Timely Distribution

DISCUSSION: Certain types of distribution of a timely nature, such as INTSUMS, were taking too long to reach the A-Camps using the Safe Hands distribution method because helicopters were not available more than twice a week and ALOFT/FAC aircrafts were too busy to land at each camp and make distribution. A system of delivery was initiated that brought daily, timely distribution to the camps without requiring the aircraft to land. Distribution was secured to an empty hand flare cannister which had fluorescent streamers attached. The delivery aircraft alerted the camp and the USSF waited on the airstrip to retrieve the cannister as the pilot flew over the strip at 50 feet elevation and dropped it. Cannisters were returned to S2 with the mail for re-use.

OBSERVATION: To expedite timely Safe Hands type distribution an air delivery system should be initiated using FAC aircraft and flare cannisters.

v. ITEM: Exploitation of POWs and VC Suspects (Det B-35, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: On Operation WHIRLWIND V, a helimobile search and destroy operation, a VC suspect was found hiding in a hole adjacent to a rice paddy in VC territory. Upon questioning at Det A-352 he would reveal only that he was not allowed to become a VC because he was an ARVN Marine deserter. Upon further questioning at Det B-35 revealed that he knew VC locations and caches. This resulted in operation WHIRLASH I which resulted in 9 VC KIA, 7 VC CIA and numerous miscellaneous articles captured. On heliborne operation Tra 9/8 (WHIRLASH III) in the Xom Coc Ring area near the Cambodian border two women were found hiding in a waterhole breathing through plastic tubes. When they were sent forward a message was relayed through the helicopter company describing the circumstances of their capture. This information was not passed on to Det B-35 S-2 and they were released. Had this information been relayed on time these women could have been retained and questioned for possible disclosure of weapons and equipment caches undisclosed by other prisoners. Since this time a more effective spot reporting has been introduced to prevent the pre-releasing of suspected VC base area and cache stay-behinds.

OBSERVATION: The use of POW's and VC suspects in directing friendly elements to cache sites and base areas has proven valuable and very effective. Information obtained from POW's should be exploited to the maximum and should be acted upon as soon as possible.

w. ITEM: Reaction to Intelligence (Det B-35, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: In average of 12 operations per month acting on current intelligence and contacts resulted in nothing substantial. Many patrols took all day to get to an area that had been shot up with claimed kills by fire teams operating in the area. However, when a recon of the area was conducted, even within 24 hours, nothing was at the scene upon arrival of the recon element.
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OBSERVATION: Current Intelligence information can be best exploited if the troop assets evaluating the information are helilifted to the area of interest. The use of the helimobile concept in reaction to current intelligence will serve two functions: i.e. instant read out on the intelligence information in question and provide the commander with fresh troops with which to evaluate the area of interest. The second point cannot be over emphasized especially in inundated areas such as lower III Corps and IV Corps in the RVN.

x. ITEM: Combat Intelligence

DISCUSSION: In this day and age of sophisticated collection devices the basic principles of intelligence collection are often forgotten.

OBSERVATION: The gathering and recording of combat intelligence must be re-emphasized in CONUS training centers. In-country, personnel must be debriefed after each combat patrol and action, regardless if contact is made or not, since no intelligence is intelligence. This is not a new theory - merely the application of an old principle.

y. ITEM: Intelligence Collection

DISCUSSION: Often intelligence personnel fail to utilize all of the tools available to them here in South Vietnam. Intelligence collection efforts frequently take on the form of a "fad". Instead of using all sources and resources available the collection efforts become channelized, or restricted to the use of agents, photo studies, radar and so forth.

OBSERVATION: All tools must be utilized if a well-rounded, functional and timely intelligence picture is to be developed.

z. ITEM: Photo Intelligence

DISCUSSION: Though the convenience of a half-frame automatic 35mm camera cannot be discounted, this detachment has found that much better results are possible using a single-lens reflex 35mm camera.

OBSERVATION: With the advent of new automatic metering devices, which are available on most single-lens reflex cameras, anyone who can use a camera similar to a PEN-EE can now use the more sophisticated single-lens reflex model. This gives the photographer the advantage of a greater selection of lenses and the use of newer high-speed films (500 ASA speed film is now available and is well suited for black and white photos under minimum light conditions, while the PEN-EE is restricted to using film which has an ASA rating of 200, at the maximum).
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aa. ITEM: Exchange of Intelligence (Det B-35, 5th SFMA)

DISCUSSION: One of the real keys to successful intelligence efforts is the mutual exchange of intelligence information between higher and lower headquarters as well as adjacent and interested agencies. All too often intelligence information is jealously guarded by the gaining agency in hopes that it will be able to respond, using its own resources.

OBSERVATION: While it is understood that each unit’s intelligence section has the mission of collecting intelligence so that the parent unit can act on this information it can never be overstressed that the real object is to use this information to destroy the enemy. Combat successes in Vietnam are determined not so much on the “who” as they are on the “when” factor. This “when” factor can only be favorable once there is a real and meaningful (no lip service) exchange of information.

bb. ITEM: Interrogation of VC Suspects (Det B-35, 5th SFMA)

DISCUSSION: Whenever a suspect is apprehended while on an operation a hasty interrogation should be conducted in an attempt to gain immediate information that could be of tactical value.

OBSERVATION: Each maneuver element should have one member, assigned or attached, who has at least an S-1 level (limited fluency) language capability. Ideally, each separate maneuver element would have either an interpreter or an indigenous soldier attached.

cc. ITEM: Military Intelligence Training (Det B-35, 5th SFMA)

DISCUSSION: Most newly graduated military intelligence students arrive in Vietnam with the misconception that the sophisticated European type intelligence guidelines, which are still taught in COMUS, are applicable in Vietnam. Unfortunately, the use of clandestine transmitter by an action agent living in a small hamlet is not the case here.

OBSERVATION: Military intelligence training at COMUS training centers must be geared for the low-level insurgency problems which are inherent in a situation such as exists here in the Republic of South Vietnam today.
5. **Logistics**

a. **ITEM:** Single Line Item Requisition.  (S-4, 5th SFSA)

**DISCUSSION:** Processing time for multi-line requisitions was not expeditious in many instances. The requisition had to be passed between stock record clerks and warehouses several times prior to completion of the issue of all items on the request. This prolonged the processing of the items requested.

**OBSERVATION:** It was determined that a better and faster requisition/issue system should be established within the 5th Special Forces Group. To solve this problem a conversion to a single line item requisition system was effected. Under the provisions of this system only one line item is listed on the single line item requisition allowing faster and more accurate processing by the stock record clerks and the warehousemen. Better control is also established by using a single document for each requisition. Tracing action is also easier with the single line requisition.

b. **ITEM:** Truck 2½ Ton M35A2

**DISCUSSION:** 2½ ton multifuel trucks, model M35A2 were starting spontaneously when the ignition switch was turned on. Injuries were experienced when spontaneous starting occurred with the transmission engaged.

**OBSERVATION:** Had the fuel safety lock been in place the spontaneous starting could not have occurred. Improper starter switches were discovered in some M35A2 vehicles. These incidents could have been prohibited if the safety lock had been in place. To prevent future occurrences, all vehicles now must be parked with the transmission disengaged. A decal with these safety instructions is being prepared and is to be placed on the door of each multifuel vehicle.

c. **ITEM:** Concrete Construction  

(Staff Engineer, 5th SFSA)

**DISCUSSION:** Concrete aggregates are difficult to obtain. Reliance on concrete hardening of CIDG camp bunkers creates a demand for sand and gravel which is not available at most camp sites. This fact has necessitated air shipment of these heavy and bulky items. Aircraft are not designed for this type of cargo handling. Thus concrete construction is slow and inordinately expensive.

**OBSERVATION:** The same degree of protection can be obtained with local materials (earth) in a shorter time using prefab componentized bunkers made of timber or salvaged conex containers.

d. **ITEM:** Continual Maintenance of Living Compound  

(Det B-33, 5th SFSA)
DISCUSSION: A program to continually maintain the compound and its facilities needed to be implemented. It was found that verbal requests were not always valid and were easily forgotten. "Self-Help" forms were distributed to all section heads with the necessary information to accomplish the deficient item. The completed forms are placed in a box located in the S4 office. Each morning these forms are reviewed by the S4 and given a priority before being distributed to the laborers.

OBSERVATION: To insure an effective maintenance program a system utilizing written requests is imperative.

e. ITEM: Aerial Resupply by Helicopter (Det B-35, 5th SFSA)

DISCUSSION: Units in contact quite often require resupply of ammo and/or rations. The effectiveness of aerial resupply methods used often determined whether or not contact can be maintained.

OBSERVATION: Aerial resupply has been accomplished quite successfully in the following manner: The unit on the ground places a panel at the desired point of drop which should be at least 50 meters from any friendly troops and behind some type of vegetation if available. The aircraft is loaded with all supplies stacked in the doors. Extra ammo boxes are placed in the center of the cargo compartment. Two men sit on the floor with the backs braced on the ammo boxes. The chopper pilot will fly at maximum speed across the panel. At about 30-40 meters distance from the panel, the pilot or co-pilot will give the command to push the load out the doors. The two men with their backs braced against the ammo boxes will push vigorously against the supply boxes with their legs causing them to be jettisoned in the location of the panel. Height of the drop should be 5-10 feet to preclude boxes from bounding up into the tail rotor.

f. ITEM: Expedient Air Delivery (Det B-32, 5th SFSA)

DISCUSSION: During the rainy season many operations encountered unfordable "large streams and swamps that are not shown on the map. This unexpected obstacle can cause considerable delay without proper equipment.

OBSERVATION: A drop rig has been devised which consists of a 100' rope contained in a sand bag with a brightly colored drag chute attached. This rig can be dropped by OKE aircraft and is easily located even in dense jungle.

g. ITEM: Loss of Supply Items (Det B-35, 5th SFSA)

DISCUSSION: It has been noted that many items were missing from the ready line at the Company Forward Supply Point.

OBSERVATION: A new system has been inaugurated by marking each box with the voucher number on the outside and not listing the nomenclature or the stock number, thus helping to prevent pilferage.
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h. ITEM: Resupply (Det B-35, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: Normal supply methods may not always be expedient enough to meet emergency needs of a unit in the field.

OBSERVATION: Detachment A's should have an emergency supply of ammunition, rations, communications equipment and medical supplies prepacked and located where it can be taken out of storage immediately and airlifted to a unit in the field should an emergency resupply be necessary.

6. (c) Other

a. ITEM: Narcotics and Sensitive Drug Accountability (Group Surgeon)

DISCUSSION: This organization accounts for narcotics and sensitive drugs in a manner based very closely on USARV Regulations. Due to the organization of the unit, its deployment, and the grade of personnel involved, the system is extremely unwieldy.

OBSERVATION: This unit could account for narcotics and sensitive drugs in a more efficient and simpler manner; however, this system would not follow USARV Regulations. (See paragraph 8d, Section I: Significant organization or Unit Activities)

b. ITEM: Epidemics in Indigenous Personnel (Group Surgeon) Near CIDG Camps

DISCUSSION: Outbreaks of diseases such as cholera and plague have occurred among the indigenous population of the Republic of Vietnam for some time. It cannot be expected, in the case of Special Forces Detachments, that a handful of American advisors can suddenly persuade indigenous personnel to accept US standards of sanitation and hygiene. Tradition precludes this.

OBSERVATION: Only over a period of years, with repetitive instruction, construction of facilities and the use of the principle of example, will adequate sanitation be accepted by the various populations from and in the rural areas of Vietnam. In spite of Special Forces' efforts, epidemics among indigenous personnel will continue to occur, although in decreasing frequency, for some time to come.

c. ITEM: Medical Treatment of CIDG Personnel (Det B-35, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: Infections are a recurring problem; the slightest scratch, laceration or wound will, in most cases become infected.
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Observation: After initial treatment has been administered to Civilian Irregular Defense Group personnel by Special Forces medics, it has been noted that the CIDG patients do not take care of themselves nor seek additional medical help. The addition of antibiotic therapy to the initial treatment of significant wounds has shown a marked reduction in secondary infections.

d. Item: Respiratory Diseases (Co B, 5th SFGA)

Discussion: On operations of long duration, colds and coughs frequently among the CIDG troops

Observation: CIDG troops should be issued jungle sweaters. This would cut down on respiratory type infections and contribute to better troop health and morale.

e. Item: Malaria (Co F, 5th SFGA)

Discussion: Malaria has been a problem among CIDG troops during approximately the third week of a continuous operation.

Observation: It is believed that after a period of time in the field their resistance decreases and due to fatigue and stress become more susceptible to illnesses.

f. Item: Loss of Communications During Mortar Attacks (Det B-35, 5th SFGA)

Discussion: Communications are most difficult to maintain during mortar attacks.

Observation: (1) By having the antennas attached to heavy poles and extended to a height of 60 feet there was less chance of a hit resulting in a collapsed antenna and loss of commo.

(2) By having the lead-in wire high and coming into the commo bunker from a 20 foot pole directly adjacent to the bunker, it was relatively secure from ground level mortar explosion.

(3) The first commodity that is always lost in an attack is the electrical system, leaving the commo to work with batteries. We found that:

(a) By using two 12-volt batteries we are able to use FM continuously for a period of twelve hours.

(b) By the use of the batteries the maintenance and repair of the AN/PRC-46 can be cut down considerably.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

g. ITEM: Use of AN/PRC-25 Under Wet Conditions (Det B-35, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: From past experience we have found during operations in a marsh or rice paddy area that if the handset to the AN/PRC-25 radio becomes wet it will usually short out thus eliminating vital communications with the base station, supporting artillery, and aircraft.

OBSERVATION: This can be overcome very simply by using the plastic wrapping from a PRC-25 battery to cover the handset. Secure the wrapping with two rubber bands. Always carry an extra battery. Simply secure it to the radio with the straps of the carrying device. Along with this an extra antenna should be carried in the carrying case attached to each carrying device. There are times when water will seep into the base of the antenna and the metal wrapping on the antenna base is separated causing the antenna to become inoperable. An extra antenna would immediately remedy this situation.

h. ITEM: Communications Frequency Interference (Det B-35, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: Frequently communications are often disrupted by frequency interference on the FM net by friendly units operating on our frequency and by static interference from electrical storms.

OBSERVATION: All forms of interference can be combated by using an AN/VRC-46 radio with a RC-292 antenna placed 60 feet above the ground level of interference. This procedure also gives you a range capability equal to any frequency on the radio.

i. ITEM: Transmitter Patch Panel (Co A, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: A transmitter room with too many antenna cables results in operators becoming confused and connecting the wrong antenna to the transmitters, causing damage to transmitters and loss of operating time.

OBSERVATION: Install a patch panel in the transmitter room and terminate all antenna cables behind the panel with the front side of the panel having only male connectors. Write the frequency above each corresponding connector, thus allowing the operator to select the proper antenna for the frequency desired with no difficulty. In addition, erect a separate receive antenna and connect it to the patch panel. Interconnect this antenna to four separate receive posts on front of panel and a better incoming signal is obtained, plus a capability of three additional receive positions.

j. ITEM: Distribution of Power (Co A, 5th SFGA)

DISCUSSION: Overloading of old power switches on the generators serving the compound and Comm Center caused a fire hazard and unreliable power for the Comm Center.
Observation: A separate switch and independent wiring were installed to provide power to the Comm Center, thus providing reliable separate power to the Comm Center and relieving the load on the other switch and wiring.

2. Item: Apparent shortages of Civic Action Supplies (S-5, 5th SFSGA)

Discussion: Investigations conducted by the S5 (RDSA) section revealed that a majority of CA supplies reported as shortages were either not shipped to the detachments due to shortage of aircraft, or due to the low priority assigned to movement of CA supplies. In some cases, the supplies were delivered and simply placed in warehouses, not distributed. Some of the supplies were being diverted and sold by LLDB personnel, or stolen from the air strips by local villagers.

Observation: This problem has been alleviated to a large degree by having USSF personnel meet all incoming shipments, and constantly supervising distribution and use of supplies. An improved system of shipment directly to the "A" detachments was initiated by S5 Logistical Support Center in Saigon. He would hold the CA supplies until he had a plane load for a specific detachment, then ship them by Air America directly to the detachment site. This system has greatly reduced pilferage and loss during shipment, and has shortened normal delivery time considerably.

1. Item: A Shortage of School Trained CA/PSYOs (S5, 5th SFSGA) Personnel Exists at All Levels

Discussion: CA/PSYOs slots are being filled by "additional duty" personnel who do not have sufficient time to fulfill the obligations of their primary duties. Some detachments do not have even additional duty personnel assigned to CA/PSYOs slots.

Observation: A concentrated effort is being made by the S5 to identify all vacant CA/PSYOs slots. The S1 is screening all incoming personnel and if possible assigning school training personnel to fill vacant slots.

m. Item: Shipment of Civil Affairs Commodities (Det B-35, 5th SFSGA)

Discussion: On several occasions shipments of civil affairs commodities intended for Detachment Alts and which originated from B Detachment or company level, did not arrive or were missent to the wrong detachment. Pilferage has also been noted. In most cases the originating Detachment was not informed of the problem in time to trace its cause.
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OBSERVATION: These problems have been solved by notifying the receiving detachment of the shipment's contents, quantity and arrival time at their location. A confirmation report is required from the receiving detachment to include the quantity and condition of the commodities received. When possible, critical supplies are now accompanied by one member of this detachment to insure arrival and are personally turned over to a member of the receiving detachment.

n. ITEM: Dissemination of Propaganda Media (Det B-35, 5th SFCA)

DISCUSSION: An important area under Psychological Operations is the dissemination of propaganda media utilizing to the maximum extent all methods available. Since Psychological Operations aircraft are not always available when requested, many times leaflets were not delivered on the target at the time planned.

OBSERVATION: Detachment B ships the leaflets on regular resupply missions to the detachment A's who deliver them while on ground combat operations, thereby bringing the leaflets to the target as planned and providing us an additional delivery capability.

o. ITEM: Psychological Operations (S5, 5th SFCA)

DISCUSSION: Attendance at village rallies is greatly increased when American movies are shown and this overwhelming acceptance of American movies assists in attracting the local population in order to present other PSYOPS material.

OBSERVATION: American movies should be used whenever possible to draw an audience for presentation of PSYOPS material.

p. ITEM: Subsistence Costs Reduction (Det B-35, 5th SFCA)

DISCUSSION: A civilian food contractor supplies subsistence for two of our subordinate detachment A's. A study of the funds expended on subsistence for these camps revealed that the contractor was extremely overpaid.

OBSERVATION: This problem was solved by notifying the contractor on a weekly basis of the exact number of CIDG personnel in the two camps and the amount he could spend by regulation. The system has proved successful in that subsistence costs have been reduced approximately by one-third.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

SECTION 2, PART II - RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) Personnel Assignment Instructions Upon DERCS.
   a. This command continues to experience late receipt of assignment instructions for officers. The delay could possibly be caused by method of transmission of assignment instructions by higher headquarters.
   b. Recommend that \textit{HQ, USARV} transmit all officer assignment instructions by electrical means as soon as possible upon receipt from DA.

2. (U) 2-Ton Multifuel Trucks.
   a. 2-ton multifuel trucks, model M35A2 were starting spontaneously when the ignition switch was turned on. Injuries were experienced when spontaneous starting occurred with the transmission engaged. Had the fuel safety lock been in place the spontaneous starting could not have occurred. Improper starter switches were also found in some M35A2 vehicles. These injuries could have been prevented if the safety lock had been in place. To prevent future occurrences, all vehicles now are parked with the transmission dis-engaged. A decal with these safety instructions is to be placed on the door of each multifuel engine.
   b. Recommend that instructions be published concerning the problem of spontaneous starting of the multifuel engine. Action should be taken to insure that all vehicles have proper starter switches and safety locks. A decal explaining these hazards should be placed on each vehicle where the driver can see it each time he entered the vehicle.

3. (U) Tra Bong Sawmill.
   a. One of the most successful civic action programs undertaken to date by 5th SFMA was the establishment of a cooperative sawmill at Tra Bong. This sawmill provided an income and useful vocational training for the Montagnard villages in the area and provided an inexpensive, reliable source of lumber to the ICTZ. The sawmill has been closed down due to a variety of reasons.

4. (C) Shortage of School Trained CA/PSYOPS Personnel.
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a. A shortage of school trained CA/PSYOPS personnel exists at all levels. Those positions are currently being filled by "additional duty" personnel who do not have sufficient time to fulfill the obligations of their primary duties. Some detachments do not even have additional duty personnel available for assignment to CA/PSYOPS slots.

b. Recommend that a detailed study of procurement and assignment procedures now being used by 5th SFDA, MACV, and USARV be conducted to determine if this critical shortage of train 1 personnel can be avoided in the future.

Incls

JONATHAN F. LADD
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

1. Troop Disposition List and CTZ Maps
2. Statistical Data
3. Visitor Briefings
4. Combat Developments
5. 5th SFDA Personnel Requirements, Personnel Status and Assigned Missions
6. ROSA Organisation Chart, 5th SFDA
7. Plan for the Organisation and Operation of CIDC Canteens
8. Civic Action Successes
9. Progress and Problems of Tra Bong Sawmill
10. After Action Report, Attack on Tong Le Chon

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AVHOC-DST (15 Nov 67) 1st Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DTG
APO 96358

Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces (A4YA).

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning personnel assignment instructions upon DEROS, page 60, paragraph 1: Nonconcur. Electrical transmission of reassignment instructions has resulted in a high error rate and has required retransmittal of basic instructions for clarification. This headquarters forwards sequentially numbered officer reassignment letters by courier to each major subordinate command. The 5th Special Forces Group liaison officer monitors the status of officer reassignment instructions and in most instances handcarries those letters pertaining to 5th Special Forces Group personnel.

b. Reference item concerning 2½ ton multi-fuel truck, page 60, paragraph 2: Concur. This is the first report received by this headquarters of such an accident with this vehicle. Similar accidents with the 5 ton multi-fuel truck have been investigated and it was found the cause was due to unauthorized modification to the starter switch. The report of the 5th Special Forces Group will be investigated and instructions, if appropriate, will be disseminated to all concerned.

c. Reference item concerning TRA BONG sawmill, page 60, paragraph 3: Concur. Recommend that units requesting lumber, specifically request that the appropriate procurement office purchase the lumber from the TRA BONG sawmill, as an exception to MACV Directive 715-2. Procurement officers may then request that MACV grant an exception in accordance with paragraph 5 of that directive.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report – Lessons Learned (U)

d. Reference item concerning shortage of trained CA/PSYOPS personnel, page 60, paragraph 4: Nonconcurs. A detailed study of procurement and assignment procedures is not required. A review of 5th Special Forces Group personnel requisitions reflected that special qualification identifiers and “Z” coding had not been used. Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group has furnished guidance on the use of special qualification identifiers and the procedures for “Z” coding personnel requisitions to indicate any additional training requirements. This will result in the procurement of personnel with the required qualifications through normal replacement channels. Requisitions will be monitored by this headquarters to ensure sufficient personnel are requested.

3. Correct UIC number is WAKYATO.

4. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

'OR THIS COMMANDER:

[Signature]
C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, 5SF
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy Furnished:

HQ, 5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years

DOD DIR 5200.10

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GPOP-DT(15 Nov 67)  2d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period  
Ending 31 Oct 67 from Hq, 5th Sp Forces Gp  
(UIC: WA4XAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)  

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558  14 FEB 1968  

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,  
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310  

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and  
forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as  
indorsed.  

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:  

HEAVIN SMIDER  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL
II CORPS

LEGEND

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INCLUSION TO OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 OCT 1967
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HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO 96240

AVOB-C 3 November 1967

SUBJECT: Quarterly Combat Development Report

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Inclosed is a summary of the highlights of the 5th SFCA Combat Developments Program for the period 1 August - 31 October 1967.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

1 Indl:
List of CD Projects

D.R. BROOK
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
"A"

REDRADE UNCLAS WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE

Incl 4 to 5th SFCA CRLL, 1 Aug to 31 Oct 67

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1. (C) Seven mine firing switches, M55-E2, were received by the 5th SFQA on 24 October for test and evaluation. This switch, developed due to a request put in by 5th SFQA to the Limited Warfare Laboratories, provides a lightweight, battery powered (four BA-30's) device that will detonate the M66 Claymore, or similar anti-personnel mines, or any explosive devices that employ the M-5 or similar electric blasting cap. The switch consists of a waterproof case with connectors to accommodate the firing leads to 10 explosive devices, which may be fired individually, in selected combinations, or all in salvo. The switches have been sent to all the CTZ's for evaluation which will end in December. This item promises to provide an excellent means for camp defense and ambush operations.

2. (C) Three thousand rounds of Number 4 Special Buckshot, XM-257 for 12 gaug shotgun were received in August 1967 for evaluation and sent out to all companies. This round was developed when a requirement was generated for a special shotgun round capable of engaging area targets. A flechette type round was developed and extensively tested, however it was found that a Number 4 buckshot round proved to be superior to the flechette round. This round looks like any standard commercial 12 gaug shotgun shell, however inwardly it differs by containing hardened buckshot instead of soft commercial lead shot; by having voids between shot filled with granulated plastic; and by having the shot column inclosed by a polyethylene sleeve. Shot is hardened and cushioned to obtain pattern uniformity and decreased dispersion over standard shotgun shells. Shot liner reduces barrel wear and maintains shot package configuration during bore travel. When the XM-257 is fired in the hand cocked, 20 inch barrel, riot type shotgun, all of the shot pellets will be in a 40 inch circle at 40 meters. The evaluation is due to be completed in December 1967.

3. (U) Portable HF Antenna AN-3 for PRC-64. 5th SFQA received five AN-3 antennas which is a lightweight, compact, highly efficient loop antenna. The external tuning and matching network provided will cover the frequency range from 2.0 mhz to 8.5 mhz thus making it compatible with the AN/PRC-64 radio, and the corresponding range of other HF radios. A lightweight mast and guides are provided for use when trees are not available for installation. This antenna during CONUS tests in mountainous terrain has proven to work at ranges in excess of 200 miles with the AN/PRC-64 radio. The antennas will be distributed for testing in early November 1967.

4. (C) Airboat Communications System. The interim system developed by the 5th SFQA Signal Maintenance Facility using the AN/PRC-25 radio and additional modules mounted in a waterproof ammunition box has proven to work relatively satisfactory. An ENSURE request that had been submitted to NSA/ML is being worked on, with two sets of the systems becoming available after 15 January 1968. This system will use the VRC-12 radio transmitters and will feature CVC helmets with the built in headset and microphone for the operators.
5. (C) Mini-Grenade System. USAIML has developed a series of miniaturized chemical grenades. These are small lightweight items designed to supplement the standard chemical munitions and to enable the soldier to carry a greater variety of munitions without having to increase the weight he must carry. These grenades are built into a small aluminum container similar to the can 35mm film is packaged in; measuring 1.2" by 1.8". The XM-165 white smoke is being received on a monthly allocation and is being distributed to selected units for evaluation. The XM-167 green smoke, XM-168 red smoke, XM-169 yellow smoke have not been received yet, but will be available in the future for evaluation. Other items of this system under development are a white phosphorous and a thermite-incendiary grenade.

6. (C) Gunship II Project (Super Spooky). The 5th SFGA is assisting the US Air Force in an evaluation program of the Super Spooky aircraft. This aircraft is a modified C-130 which has four 20mm gailing gun cannons, four 7.62mm mini-gun systems, an improved searchlight for both infra-red and visible ground illumination and electronic target acquisition equipment, which gives the aircraft an all weather capability. The Super Spooky not only carries more ammunition but also has the ability to remain over the target for several hours longer than the present C-47 "spooky. The 5th SFGA portion of the evaluation consists of emplacing ground radar beacon equipment in five "A" camps in II CTZ. This equipment will give the aircraft an accurate position location on the ground, thereby permitting accurate fire support in any weather, day or night. To date this equipment has not been subjected to test under actual conditions. The evaluation period for Super Spooky will last until mid-December 1967 when the aircraft will return to CONUS.

ITEMS ON WHICH THE EVALUATION HAS RECENTLY TERMINATED

1. (C) Manpack Personnel Detector (MPD). The MPD is a device intended to alert the operator to the presence of concealed humans by detecting certain human chemical effluvia. The results of the tests conducted on the ground determined that in the manpack role the MPD would be of very limited use due to weight, battery life, and changing wind direction. However the devices have given good results when modified and installed on helicopters. Due to lack of assigned aircraft the 5th SFGA has not been able to effectively employ this method. Therefore all the detectors but two, which will be used by B-52, have been turned in at the request of USARV for issue to conventional units.

2. (C) Linear Power Amplifier for AN/PRC-74 radio. The power amplifier is designed to increase the wattage output of the AN/PRC-74 radio from 30 to 100 watts thereby providing a much greater range. The tests conducted determined that the amplifier when it works, is effective in increasing the range of the radio. However eight of the 13 sets blow out, burnt up, or otherwise failed during the evaluation program. This, plus the fact that the amplifier weighs 10 pounds and is a full load for one man while the AN/PRC-74 is another, limited its use, and is presently considered unsuitable for Special Forces operations.
3. (U) 30mm Chaff Rocket and Rocket Launcher. This 30mm rocket is fired from a modified XM-148 grenade launcher, which mounts on an M-16 rifle, to an altitude of 7,500 feet carrying a chaff payload which upon dissemination in the air provides a cloud of X-band radar reflecting chaff. This system used in conjunction with the US Air Force skyspot radar is supposed to give a grid coordinate readout of chaff cloud and of the rocket launcher on the ground. The 5th SFCA tested this system at Duc Co and Dak Pak. Good results were obtained at Duc Co. The radar was masked by the mountains around Dak Pak and no reading was obtained even though the rocket reached 7,500 feet altitude. 5th SFCA recommendations were, that while the system, as a position locator, was technically feasible, several problems had to be overcome before this system could be put into general use. The two major problems being that there are many areas not covered by the skyspot radar or are masked, and that there is no communications set up which will allow direct commo between the elements on the ground and the skyspot radar personnel which is mandatory for the system to work.

ITEMS DUE IN FOR TEST AND EVALUATION BY 5TH SFCA (ABN)

1. (C) Position Marker, PM-3. The PM-3 is a modification of the PM-1 previously tested by the 5th SFCA, which has had the smoke payload greatly increased. This marker system is an expendable smoke signal for use in areas having a dense jungle canopy. When the signal is fired the signal assembly penetrates the canopy and travels to an altitude of 300 feet. A parachute stabilizes its fall back into the canopy where two grapnels ejected during flight snag, suspending the signal so the smoke is visible to aircraft. This item was due for testing in September 1967 however it has not yet been received.

2. (C) Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector. The detector is a sensor system small and light enough (each detector weighs 8 ounces and is the size of a paperback book) to be carried by a patrol. Each system contains four detectors and one monitor. The detector is sensitive enough to detect footsteps at 30 meters and capable of giving alert to monitor unit over a distance of one mile. There is no indication as to when this item will be available.

3. (C) 40mm Rapid Fire Grenade Launcher Systems. The SFCA was originally scheduled to receive three systems of the rapid fire grenade launcher:

   a. Handcranked, low velocity.
   b. Automatic, low velocity.
   c. Automatic, high velocity.

These systems all fire the standard high explosive 40mm grenade as used with the M-79 grenade launcher. However the handcranked low velocity system was found to be faulty and has been eliminated. This has held up final development and acceptance of the other two systems, but the 5th SFCA is still scheduled to receive them for evaluation when they become available.
4. (C) Anti-disturbance Firing Switch. This self contained firing switch, about the size of a pack of cigarettes has a built in power supply and trembler device. It will detonate an electric cap hooked up to its terminals when, 80 seconds after the activation switch is turned on, the device is disturbed by moving or turning in any manner. Once the switch is turned on the battery is good for 90 days. The 5th SFGA is attempting to procure these firing devices through CPO from the Navy laboratories where they were developed for the SEALs.

5. (C) This same organization has also developed a lightweight (mostly aluminum) 40mm pump, four round shotgun which fires the standard 40mm high explosive grenade. No further details are available at this time. The Group is trying to procure several of these weapons for evaluation.

OTHER ITEMS OF INTEREST

1. (U) Battery Powered Fluorescent Lamp (Safari Light). This nine pound lamp has an 11 inch miniature fluorescent tube powered by a 110 volt external AC source or by two 69 volt batteries. Battery life is between 1/2 and 80 hours depending on high or low intensity use. The lamp is ideal for emergency lighting of TOC's, medical and commo bunkers, landing marking, etc. The lamp has been ordered and is due in on or before 30 November 1967. Recommended basis for issue is: A Detachment - 4, B Detachment - 4, C Detachment - 3.

2. (C) Battlefield Illumination System. This system had been tested and ordered by the 5th SFGA. However the unit cost on this one time use munition was found to be so great as to be prohibitive and the order was cancelled.

3. (C) Trace Metal Detection Kit. This detection kit, which uses an ultra-violet light and a chemical solution to determine if a suspect has been in contact with a weapon by means of characteristic residue on skin and clothing, is no longer an experimental item. A quantity of these kits have been procured and are being issued for use by the G-2.

4. (U) Alarm Set, Anti-Intrusion Restricted Area AN/IGS-9. This set is a lightweight, battery-powered device, about the size of a cigarette package. Principal components are an alarm set (buzzer and light) and a 3,000 meter length of fine wire. Wire can be extended to any convenient length from its spool when the wire is broken, the alarm set is triggered. The set, no longer an experimental item, has been obtained and is being issued by the Group S-4. The recommended basis of issue is: A Detachment - 8, B Detachment - 5, C Detachment - 5, Special B Detachment - 20, Mobile Strike Force Company - 5.
CIVIC ACTION SUCCESSES

1. (U) A-333, Chi Linh, 20 August 1967

Shortly after the establishment of the CIDG dependent housing area, the Special Forces Detachment at Camp Chi Linh purchased and distributed rice and sweet corn seed to the villagers. They were encouraged to plant small plots next to their dwellings. This modest initial effort proved to be so successful that the people began cultivating entire fields. Late this month the first crop will be ready for harvest and the area surrounding Camp Chi Linh will be well on its way to becoming a productive region once again. With the USAF camp providing local security and medical and material assistance as needed, the program has been enlarged to include the civilians, who are returning now to the area which the Viet Cong had once forced them to leave. With the continued efforts of the Special Forces Detachment to assist and advise these people, the re-establishment of villages and hamlets in this area can be foreseen.

2. (U) B-34, Phuoc Binh District, 24 July 1967

During the past three months, vegetable seeds were distributed to the hamlets in Phuoc Binh District. The seeds have matured into plants and the plants are doing fine. The significance of the project is that the people have shown a great interest in improving and supplementing their diet. The people have taken great pride in their gardens and they are in fine shape. Within the next few months the vegetables will be ready for harvest and should be on their dinner tables.

3. (U) A-351, Hiep Hoa, 15 August 1967

The Hiep Hoa market place was once a very muddy and quite unsanitary place due to the heavy rains turning the market place floor into a thick black mud. Through the cooperation of the United States Special Forces, the Office of Civil Operations, the District Chief of Duc Hue District and the Village Council of Hiep Hoa Village, a shelter with a concrete floor has been constructed in the market place. The shelter will provide the people who use the market a place to sell their goods, a place where they can be out of the weather and their goods will be off the mud on a floor that is clean and dry. This shelter is a very good beginning in the campaign to "clean up" the market place. The second part of this story is about the road leading to the market place. The road is heavily used by buses, carts and taxis. The road had many large ruts and potholes in it that impaired travel on this road. On rainy days the buses are unable to travel on the road and the passengers, most of whom were going to the market place, had to walk and carry their goods. The road was repaired by filling in the ruts and potholes and then graded so that a crown existed to let the water run off. The important aspect of these projects, other than their completion, is that they were accomplished with a minimum of United States help. Local civilians aided the workers on both projects. The projects were completed with Vietnamese labor and equipment, and this is a big step forward in this area toward convincing the District and Village leaders to rely more on the Government of Vietnam and less on United States aid.
CIVIC ACTION SUCCESSES (CONT'D)

4. (v) A-101, Gia Vuc, 13 September 1967

In early June, 912 Hre Montagnards were moved from Viet Cong controlled territory to the secure area near the Special Forces camp at Gia Vuc. Due to the remoteness of the Gia Vuc camp—the District Chief in Ba To, which is isolated itself, seldom visits Gia Vuc on the border of the province. The lack of GVN officials, and activities in other parts of I Corps, little attention could be given to the refugees. Everything has had to be done by Special Forces, the CIDG, and most important, the refugees themselves. There is a Troop Son team in Gia Vuc which was inactive at the time of the refugees arrival. After being motivated by proving that they could get support for projects if they would work and warning them that a report would be sent to province recommending their pay be discontinued if they didn’t, the team is now active. The man most responsible for coordinating support from government agencies and Company C in Danang is Lt Warren R. Orr, CA/PO officer of Det A-103. The first requirement was to provide the immediate necessities—food and clothing—for the newly arrived refugees. A total of 18,595 pounds of CA supplies were shipped from Danang in June. This was followed by 13,503 pounds in July and 31,675 pounds in August. The refugees were allowed to return to their original homesites accompanied by security forces to bring in the large quantities of rice that they had stored. To build temporary storage bins in Gia Vuc, 110 rolls of rattan and 400 feet of three-foot wide screen were sent from Danang. The temporary bins consisted of a cylinder of rattan or screen three feet in diameter. Approximately 250 cylinders were made and stored in the village dispensary, village chief’s house, and school. Rather than live in the tin-roof communal dwellings typical of refugee camps in Vietnam, the Montagnards preferred to build individual houses on stilts, a design they are accustomed to. Bamboo and thatch were purchased by Special Forces from local villagers using salt and rice as a barter item. Rattan and resettlers kits were shipped from Danang. The refugees began construction on 15 June and to date have completed 163 homes. The Hre work in teams of ten to twenty men to erect a house in a single day. While the men put up the framework, their wives tie the bundles of thatch for the roofing. The rapid rate of construction is slowed by the fact that on the day following the completion of each house, the workers do nothing but admire their accomplishment and celebrate. Nevertheless, in addition to completing their homes, the refugees have also helped repair a bridge and refurbish a school. One of the major problems now is to obtain textbooks and secure a GVN-recognized teacher who will instruct the Montagnard children. The refugees are presently receiving commodities support under the Catholic Relief Service program and will receive enough rice to satisfy thirty percent of their total rice needs under a new CARE rice assistance program. Support from CORDS in Quang Ngai Province has been infrequent and irregular. Self-sufficiency is the ultimate aim and a demonstration farm project is being planned with AGR/CORDS and SCA (Highland Affairs)/CORDS. All this was not accomplished without numerous threats to the refugees, especially prior to the national elections, that their new homes would be mortared or burned. None of the threats have materialized as yet. One unfortunate incident did occur at election time. After a PSOPS campaign encouraging the people to vote, the detachment reported that no ballot box was sent to Gia Vuc, therefore no voting could take place.
PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS OF TRA BONG SAWMILL

1. (U) After four months of operation, it is possible to make an evaluation of the progress of the Tra Bong sawmill and some of the problems that must be solved to insure its continued operation. Mr. Jay H. Cravens, Chief of the Forestry Branch/CORDS/Saigon returned to Tra Bong on 17 August for a follow-up evaluation.

2. (U) Mr. Cravens reported on 1 September that although the sawmill was operable and in good condition, it was shut down due to a lack of money to pay the mill operators and loggers. A load of lumber delivered to the Quang Ngai Province Chief by armed convoy had never been paid for while marketing and transportation difficulties were holding up lumber sales. Urgently needed operating capital was unavailable. Tin roofing sheets and cement to complete construction of a shed for the mill, promised three months ago by CORDS/Quang Ngai Province, were never delivered. Members of the cooperative had completed the framework of the shed. The loggers also needed a trailer to ease the task of bringing heavy logs down to the mill.

3. (U) Captain Jenkins, the Company C S5, discussed these problems with Mr. Cravens at Tra Bong and the following steps have been taken:

   a. Despite Mr. Cravens' appeal to CORDS officials in Quang Ngai, by 1 September, the tin and cement had not arrived in Tra Bong. We have subsequently sent the materials from Danang. Additional tin will be sent to construct covered drying racks.

   b. The lightweight log trailer which was designed by the forestry branch and built by the Danang Technical School was completed on 17 August and picked up the following day. Due to a lack of aircraft, it was not delivered to Tra Bong until 9 September.

   c. Subsequent to the conversation with Mr. Cravens, an order for $70,000 VN worth of lumber was placed by the S5. This lumber was backloaded on the Caribou which brought the cement, tin, and log trailer, and delivered to Minh Long for the construction of two schools. The order was paid for on 16 September.

   d. The S5 will continue to place orders as needed for CA projects. Payments will be made in piastres and gasoline ensuring the sawmill of an adequate supply of fuel.

4. (U) Based upon a regular production capacity of 1,200 board feet a day or approximately sixty cubic meters a month, the sawmill needs about $600,000 VN worth of sales monthly to maintain production. Local requirements do not exceed $30,000 VN worth a month and we are buying about $70,000 VN worth. Another half million is needed.

5. (U) The S5 is making an effort to publicize the sawmill and attract customers. The US Marines have placed a tentative order for 150,000 board feet for the construction of bunkers for their rubber fuel tanks. This would keep

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the sawmill in production for several months. The order was disapproved, however, by the USMC procurement office which quoted MACV Directive 715-2 prohibiting the purchase of lumber on the local market. The Marine project officer and the S5 have requested that an exception be made on the basis of the necessity of the bunkers, the Tra Bong price is lower than the prevailing price, and spending piastres in Tra Bong which is isolated and where the sawmill is the sole source of employment will improve the economy of the area while not greatly adding to inflation in Vietnam.

6. (U) The Company C S5 has assumed the role of unofficial agent for the sawmill in Danang. He will continue his campaign to publicize the sawmill, secure orders and convert them to cubic meters in order to give cost estimates, and send confirmed orders to Tra Bong.

7. (U) Transportation of the cut lumber will continue to be a problem. There are two methods open. The first is armed convoy to Quang Ngai. Two convoys have reached Tra Bong already and have carried back lumber. This method is preferable to air transport and certainly closer to a normal economy, however, the necessary troops and coordination to secure the route may be considered too costly to affect frequent operations of this type. The second method is to backload all Caribous arriving at Tra Bong with supplies. A banding machine has already been sent and a ramp with rollers should be designed to facilitate the loading of the larger size cuts. The major objection of the pilots is not the cargo, but the amount of time lost in loading, which cuts down the number of sorties.

8. (U) It is strongly recommended that action be taken to except the Tra Bong sawmill from the restrictions established in MACV Direction Number 715-2 "Procurement". Restricted Purchase of Commodities in RVN (MACV Direct 715-29), 8 October 1966. The exception which would require the approval of the MACV General Purchasing Agency Council could be justified on the following basis:

a. The Tra Bong sawmill was established by CORDS/Region I as a project to develop the economy of the area.

b. The Tra Bong sawmill cooperative was formed with the assistance of Mr. Archie Hogan, the cooperative's advisor, CORDS/Region I. It consists of 110 members who share the profits and employs a total of 800 workers and loggers, half of whom are Montagnards.

c. The majority of the cooperative members and employees are refugees who cannot return to their land. The sawmill is their sole source of income.

d. The price charged by the sawmill in Tra Bong is lower than the prevailing prices in I Corps.

e. The convenience and savings offered by purchasing lumber in Tra Bong as opposed to shipping it from the Philippines or the United States are obvious.
f. The introduction of this sawmill is an experiment based upon the proposition that a lumber industry could become a major contributor to the economy of Vietnam.

g. Based upon the above considerations, it is felt that the advantages to the Free World Military Armed Forces as well as local economic development outweigh the remote inflationary threat to the Vietnamese economy.

Any comments or inquiries regarding information contained in this report should be directed to: Commanding Officer, Company C, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, APO US Forces 96337, ATTN: S5.
Extract from Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) 1st Special Forces

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967

CO, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) 1st Special Forces

15 November 1967

N/A

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