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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division

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Commanding Generals
101st Airborne Division (-)
11th Infantry Brigade (Sep)
Commanding Officers
5th Battalion, 46th Infantry
5th Battalion, 12th Infantry
6th Battalion, 31st Infantry
31st Engineer Battalion (Cbt)
5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155mm-T)
1st Infantry Division
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"Operational Report—Lessons Learned"
(ROS CSFOR-65)
1 February 1967 – 30 April 1967

I. Significant Organization and Activities

A. Introduction

1. This Operational Report—Lessons Learned covers the reporting period 1 February – 30 April 1967. During this period the 1st Infantry Division continued to conduct combat operations designed to locate and destroy Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces and installations in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Operating in the LONG MOUNTAIN area and in the Michelin Rubber Plantation, the Division conducted Operation TUCSON to preposition forces and equipment for participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY. Operating under the control of II Field Force Vietnam (IIFV) in the largest search and destroy operation to date of the Vietnamese War, the division fought four major battles in War Zone C during Operation JUNCTION CITY and defeated in turn all four regimental elements of the 9th VC Division. The division's activities in War Zone C were focused initially upon the Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN) and VC/NVA forces. During Operation MAINHATTAN the division, under IIFV control, returned to the jungle area northeast of the "Iron Triangle" to exploit the intelligence gained since Operation CEDAR FALLS.

2. The Indirect Support of the GVN Revolutionary Development Program by the 1st Infantry Division under Operation IAM SON II and IAM SON 67 continued on a greater scale. The task of the Revolutionary Development Task Force (2DTF) was assigned permanently to the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. The IAM SON 67 program continues to play a key, integral role in the division's counterinsurgency effort.

3. Base camp security continued. Numerous resupply convoys were conducted without a major engagement through areas that were formerly under Viet Cong control. Snipers and mines continued to be major road hazards.

4. On 10 February 1967 Major General John L. L. DePuy who was reassigned to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C.

B. Organization

1. The 1st Infantry Division continued to occupy four major base camps at DI AN (X7893065), PHU LOI (X7854180), LAI KHE (X7853680), and PHUOC VINH (X7843080), and a forward base area at QUAN LOI (X7859050). On 15 March the division forward command post deployed from LAI KHE, where it had been since the beginning of the reporting period, to VINH THANH (X7853675). The command post moved back to LAI KHE on 16 March and on 15 April returned to BI AN.

2. The 8-6 Artillery completed on 15 March its transition from a towed 155mm howitzer battalion to a self-propelled 155mm howitzer battalion.

3. There were no other major changes in the internal structure of the 1st Infantry Division during this reporting period.
C. Intelligence

1. Enemy Order of Battle

   a. The total estimated enemy strength in the 1st Infantry Division area of interest is 73,343. This figure represents a combat strength of 32,502 military; 17,650 militia; 8,540 political cadre; and 14,651 in administrative services.

   b. Reinforcements are available from outside the division's area of interest. From the IV Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), the enemy is capable of reinforcing with one main forces (MF) regiment and one MF battalion. From the II CTZ he is capable of reinforcing with one MF artillery battalion and two MF infantry battalions.

   c. The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units are:

      (1) 9th VC Div - Northeastern TAY NINH Province

         (a) 271st Rogt - Southwestern PHUOC LONG Province
         (b) 272d Rogt - Unlocated in BINH LONG Province
         (c) 101st Rogt - Northeastern TAY NINH Province
         (d) 273d Rogt - 80th western BINH LONG Province

      (2) 7th VC Div - Northeastern TAY NINH and west central BINH LONG

         (a) 165 NVA Rogt - Unlocated in PHUOC LONG Province
         (b) 161st NVA Rogt - Unlocated, possibly in southern War Zone D
         (c) 52d NVA Rogt - Unlocated
         (d) 76th Training Rogt - Unlocated in western QUOC DUC or eastern PHUOC LONG Province

      (3) 5th VC Div - PHUOC TUY Province

         (a) 274th VC Rogt - PHUOC TUY Province
         (b) 275th VC Rogt - Northern PHUOC TUY Province
         (c) 89th Artty Gp HQ - PHUOC TUY Province

      (4) 69th VC Artty Rogt - Unlocated in northern TAY NINH

      (5) 70th Guard Rogt - Northeastern TAY NINH Province

      (6) 80a VC Tag Rogt - Western TAY NINH Province

      (7) Independent Main Force Units

         (a) Dong Thap II Rogt - HAU NHHLA Province
         (b) Dong Hai (ARA DBDO) Inf Bn - LANG KHIN Province
         (c) C12 Sapper Bn - 900 GOC Area
         (d) 1st Lay Bn - BINH THUONG Province
         (e) 2d VC LF Inf Bn - GO THU District
         (f) 3d VC LF Inf Bn - DL AN District
         (g) 4th VC LF Inf Bn - THU DUC District
         (h) 5th VC LF Inf Bn - NHA HG District
         (i) 6th VC LF Inf Bn - BINH THU District
         (j) 7th VC LF Inf Bn - CU GI District
         (k) 2d Indep VC LF Inf Bn - LANG AN Province
         (l) 506th VC LF Inf Bn - LANG AN Province
         (m) 14th VC LF Inf Bn - 207 BINH Province
         (n) 94th VC LF Inf Bn - PHUOC TUY Province
         (o) 1st VC MF Inf Bn - Northeastern HAU NHHLA
         (p) 8th VC MF Inf Bn - Northeastern HAU NHHLA

   ...
2. Of particular interest, and in contrast to the local guerrillas, it was found that equipment captured from main force units, particularly weapons, were in excellent condition and in many cases new. The main force VC units appeared well trained and led. They showed remarkable determination during their attacks on friendly defensive positions.

3. VC losses for the reporting period include:
   a. 1,936 VC KIA (Killed in Action)
   b. 45 FN64 captured
   c. 272 individual weapons captured
   d. 34 crew served weapons
   e. 1,876 tons of rice captured or destroyed
   f. 2,912 grenades captured or destroyed
   g. 32.15 tons of salt captured or destroyed
   h. 63,918 rounds of small arms ammunition captured or destroyed
   i. 32.15 tons of small arms ammunition captured or destroyed

D. Combat Operations

1. General: During the reporting period the 1st Infantry Division continued military operations to extend and consolidate the government of Vietnam’s control and influence in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Five operations were conducted within and outside of the division’s assigned Tactical Area of Responsibility (TACAN). The operations were LAM S.N II/67, NUSA, JUNTIN CITY, HANOI, and MANHATTAN.

2. Operations LAM S.N II and LAM S.N 67: Operation LAM S.N II, a continuous revolutionary development support program, started at 230015H May 1966 and terminated at 080700H February 1967; the program recommenced immediately on 8 February as operation LAM S.N 67. During February a total of 13 villages were sealed and searched in the LAM S.N area. Jungle areas which formerly had provided a haven for Viet Cong guerrillas were stripped by bulldozers and large plows. An added benefit was derived from the jungle clearing—Vietnamese peasants moved to the cleared sites to cultivate the ground now open to agriculture. Seal and search operations were conducted to destroy the local VC infrastructure. Search and destroy operations were conducted to deny jungle and other base camps areas. As a result, the local VC are finding it increasingly difficult to find well concealed areas in which to build bases, a fact attested by captured VC documents. Main force VC units are being forced to operate in less heavily populated areas away from the 1st Infantry Division TACAN. During March, US and ARVN forces sealed and searched a total of 11 villages. The 2d Brigade controlled the operation until 17 March, then relinquished control temporarily to the 3d Brigade. Three infantry battalions, one mechanized infantry battalion, and one cavalry squadron were employed at various times throughout the month. Through continuous experience in the area of operations, the 1st Infantry Division’s Revolutionary Development Task Force developed several useful techniques, one is to search hard-core VC villages on a continuous basis from month to month. The results achieved are significant. For example, the village of H.A NGUYEN (XT8516) was sealed and searched on 16 February, yielding 21 detainees. On 5 March, the same village was again sealed and searched yielding 20 detainees. After interrogation, both cases, the detained groups produced confirmed Viet Cong. A second technique is to seal and search the same village twice during a very short period of time. For example, the village of DIA MY (XT8418) was sealed and searched on 14 March and again on 19 March. The first seal and search yielded no detainees. It was suspected that the Viet Cong would return to the village once the seal forces departed. The second seal and search yielded 6 VC, 24 draft dodgers, and 176 detainees. Operation LAM S.N 67 continues under the control of the 3d Brigade until 17 April when the 2d Brigade resumed control of the operation. The 1st Infantry Division’s Revolutionary Development Task
Force (TF) was absorbed by the 2d Brigade when, on 17 April 1967, the 2d Brigade was designated as the permanent command and control headquarters for Revolutionary Development Support operations. This action was taken to provide greater continuity in control, liaison, and coordination in Operation LAI S.N. 67. The following additional assets were attached or placed OCONUS to 2d Brigade for this mission: 2 HU Teams, the 44th Public Information Detachment, USA Combat Tracker Team Number 5 (consisting of ten men and two dogs), a FSTOWS Team, and two civil affairs teams. Gordon and search operations were conducted during April in eight villages.

Jungle clearing activity was centered on the THUL N GIN. Jungle (196 acres of jungle were cleared during April). There were no major contacts during the reporting period.

3. Operation TUCSON: Operation TUCSON was initiated on 142500H February 1967 and terminated on 212500H February 1967. This operation was a search and destroy operation in the northern section of the L.NG NGUYEN Secret Zone and the Michelin Rubber Plantation. The VC "Northern Rice Route", which is also a VC route for troop movement between War Zones C and B, lies in these areas. Operation TUCSON was planned to accomplish the following two-fold task: first, to apply pressure to and disrupt VC troop supply, and communications-liaison movements along the "Northern Rice Route"; second, to cover the preparations for Operation JUNCTUR CITY. Operation TUCSON did not produce a great number of enemy killed, but it sharply reduced the VC food supply. VC supply installations discovered during this operation yielded 1,700 tons of rice. Many storage and base camp areas were found and destroyed. Control of the operation was exercised from the 1st Division Forward CP at LE MINH. The forward CP was replaced to LE MINH THUC in 18 February in order to assure adequate communications with division elements during the first phase of Operation JUNCTUR CITY.

4. Operation JUNCTUR CITY: Operation JUNCTUR CITY was initiated by LIFP at 222500H February 1967. The division participated in the first two phases of the operation. The first phase concluded through 172500H March 1967; the second phase was conducted from 18000111 March 1967 until 152400H April 1967. The operation had two main objectives: to destroy or capture the Headquarters, Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN) and the Headquarters, 9th VC Division as well as the destruction of VC/NVA tactical forces. Units under 1st Infantry Division operational control initiated the operation by conducting airborne, airmobile, and ground assaults into War Zone C. LE MINH Province was the central area of operations. The participating brigades were given the task of blocking escape routes in the northern and eastern portions of the division AO and of conducting limited search and destroy operations against COSVN and VC/NVA tactical forces and installations. Intelligence reports indicated that elements of the 70th Guard Regiment, units of the 272nd Artillery Regiment, the 271st VC Regiment, and the 101st NVA Regiment were occupying positions in central LE MINH Province. Battalions of the 272nd Regt and LE MINH Mobile Force (3, 14 Bn) could be called upon by the VC for purposes of reinforcement. The 3d and 3d Brigades of the 1st Infantry Division, the 1st Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division (GODAM), and the 173d Airborne Brigade (OICON) participated in the first phase of Operation JUNCTUR CITY. The operation included the first US mass combat parachute assault since the Korean War; the 2-503 Infantry and elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade of jumped into LE MINH (27369992) within three kilometers of the Cambodian border on the morning of 22 February. The objective of the assault, the establishment of an effective blocking position in the shortest time possible, was achieved.

Airmobile forces and armored/mechanized forces were deployed into blocking positions that resulted in a horseshoe configuration with the open end to the south. Casualties and mechanized units conducted operations at the rear end of the horseshoe. The 1st Division had one significant battle with the enemy during February. On 28 February 1967, the 1-16 Infantry was
conducting search and destroy operations east of route TIA when, at 1052 hours, B Company made contact with a force then estimated to be a VC platoon at XT2872. The company became heavily engaged. As the contact progressed it became apparent that B Company 2-16 Infantry was engaged with a battalion sized VC force. Intelligence later indicated that the VC force was a battalion of the 101st NVA Regiment. Numerous airstrikes and artillery fires were directed into the area. B Company 2-16 Infantry and the 1-16 Infantry (-) were airlifted to an LZ near the contact to reinforce B/1-16 Infantry. Contact was broken at 1600 hours. The results of the battle were 127 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC IW, 25 US KIA, and 27 US WIA. (Operation JUNCT1N CITY continued during the month of March. The first phase continued until 17 March with search and destroy operations being conducted in the area. A Class II airfield capable of handling C-130 aircraft was constructed at KATUN (XT2778), engineers constructed a Special Forces-CIDG camp and another airfield. Two significant engagements with multi-battalion sized VC units occurred during March. On 10 March 1967, at the 5TH KIAK (XT2778), engineers constructed a Special Forces-CIDG camp and another airfield. The second phase of the operation had as its major target the VC/NVA forces in eastern War Zone C. The 2d Brigade and the 173d Airborne Brigade moved to the eastern portion of War Zone C and were deployed on VC lines of communication. The 1st Brigade, 1st Division secured QUAN LAN (10) to the 1st Infantry Division, secured Route 246 area to QUAN LAN, search and destroy operations were conducted in an area 1D (VC) to QUAN LAN. (Mutually supporting fire support bases provided 1st Division troops 105mm and 155mm artillery support wherever they moved in War Zone C. The VC tried to counter this by conducting ground and heavy mortar attacks against the fire support bases. (20 March 1967) The 273d VC Regiment reinforced with local guerrillas attacked Fire Support Base LAI at XT7875. Numerous mortar attacks were directed against Fire Support Base CH-YNE (XT68925) and several infantry battalion night defensive positions. At Fire Support Base LAI, A Troop, 3-5 Cavalry had been positioned to secure the perimeter of B Battery, 7-9 Artillery (105mm towed) in the vicinity of the destroyed village of QA BuBU. 3-5 Artillery was inside a perimeter of 20 M-113 armored personnel carriers and six M-48A3 tanks. Prior to midnight the VC conducted a reconnaissance by fire of the perimeter with a caliber .50 machine gun; return fire silenced the enemy gun. At 0030 hours the base came under heavy caliber .50 machine gun, mortar, and recoilless rifle fire; then, at 0600 the enemy launched a heavy ground attack against the entire perimeter with the main attack coming from the southeast. Immediately following this ground assault, friendly forces rallied with intensive fires; sustained small arms, M-60 anti caliber .50 machine gun, and 90mm fires; 105mm mortar and artillery fires; and tactical air fighter support. A small armored relief force attacking north from LAI KIA conducted an armored sweep to the south of the perimeter and then joined the forces inside the perimeter. By 0630 hours the main battle was over; contact with the VC. 5
terminated at 1210 hours. A police of the battle area disclosed 227 VC KIA (BC) and 3 PWs. US casualties were 3 KIA and 63 WHA (26 of whom required evacuation). The division continued to sweep War Zone C during March, moving throughout the length and breadth of the War Zone destroying base camps and gathering vital information about the area. The next significant engagement occurred in the vicinity of LZ GEORGE at coordinates XT428847. The 1-26 Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into the area on 30 March. On the morning of 31 March 1967 the battalion provided security at LZ GEORGE for the air movement of the 1-2 Infantry. After landing, the 1-2 Infantry moved three kilometers to the southwest. At 1255 hours the reconnaissance platoon of the 1-26 Infantry made heavy contact north of the LZ with an unknown force of VC. Companies A and B reinforced the reconnaissance platoon and encountered heavy enemy resistance. Extensive air and artillery were placed on the VC until the end of the day when contact was broken. The 1-26 Infantry then consolidated its perimeter and prepared for an attack on the enemy force the next morning. The 1-16 Infantry (-) had been helilifted into the area by 1730 hours to reinforce the 1-26 Infantry. At 0500 hours on 1 April a well coordinated enemy mortar barrage began to fall simultaneously on the 1-26 Infantry, 1-16 Infantry (-), and Fire Support Base CHARLIE. The mortar attack lasted for 15 minutes. At 0532 hours enemy ground attacks were launched from the north and east against the 1-26 Infantry. US ground forces returned a heavy volume of small arms fire while artillery was massed on the east of the attacked position. When the cloud cover parted at about 0700 hours, airstrikes were placed on the enemy attacking from the north. The VC managed to penetrate the C/1-26 Infantry portion of the LZ, but counter-attacking US forces forced a VC withdrawal. Immediate interrogation of a captured VC indicated that the enemy reassembly area was to the east of the battle site. Air and artillery were shifted to the area and were followed by an infantry exploitation employing the 1-2 Infantry and the 1-16 Infantry. The B-52 strikes were placed on the enemy withdrawal route, northeast of the battle area, approximately three kilometers south of the Cambodian Border. Enemy losses during the two day battle near the village of AP GU were 609 VC KIA (BC) and 3 VC PWs. US losses were 10 KIA and 64 WHA (23 of whom required evacuation). The 26th Brigade continued to conduct search and destroy operations in the eastern portion of War Zone C, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade under 1st Division operational control conducted search and destroy operations in the southeastern portion of War Zone C. Base camps, VC headquarters areas, and tunnel complexes were found and destroyed. During Operation JUNCTION CITY I and II the 1st Infantry Division engaged in combat all four regiments of the 9th VC Division. The 60th North Vietnamese Regiment and the 27th, 271st, and 272nd VC Main Force Regiments lost a combined total of 1,203 combat soldiers killed in four separate battles. The entire operation accounted for 1,809 VC soldiers killed or captured during phases I and II of Operation JUNCTION CITY. In supporting the operation, the 1st Beginners Battalion, constructed two new airfields in War Zone C and erected a class 45/55 Bailey bridge capable of carrying tanks across the SAIGON River into War Zone C. Highway 13 from SAIGON to QUAN LOI was held open for military traffic almost continuously for three months by mechanized armored forces. During the operation there was a marked increase of VC mining incidents. Mines were found to be larger than those previously employed. They were also more difficult to detect, since in many cases they were non-metallic. VC landing zone (LZ) denial techniques were more sophisticated than those previously encountered. LZs were found with command detonated mines connected in series across and around the available landing space. The main objective of phase one, the capture or destruction of COSVN and Headquarters, 9th VC Division, was not achieved during
Operation JUNCTION CITY. This can be attributed to the following factors: first, the close proximity of a privileged sanctuary; second, the extreme difficulty of gaining complete surprise as a result of the extensive repositioning of troops and logistical support prior to D day, in spite of efforts devoted to deception measures.

5. Operation HARVEST MOON: On 5 April 1967, the 1-16 Infantry began participation in support of Operation HARVEST MOON. This operation was a IIFFV directed operation at BUNARD (YT270888). The battalion's mission was to secure the engineer construction site at BUNARD. C Company, 168th Engineers was building a Special Forces-CIDG camp and an airfield capable of landing C-130 aircraft at that location. On 6 April, B Battery, 1-5 artillery and Platoon C, Light Horse Airmobile Artillery (4.2" mortar) were airlifted to BUNARD to provide indirect fire support for 1-16 Infantry. No significant engagements with the Viet Cong occurred; however, the threat of a Viet Cong attack continued in the area. The operation continues. The operation is characterized by local patrolling which has found enemy base camps in the area.

6. Operation MANHATTAN: Operation MANHATTAN was officially initiated on 23041H April 1967 with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) (attached to 1st Division) and the 3d Brigade. The latter conducted air assaults into multiple landing zones within the area of operations. The general area of operations encompassed a strip extending northwest from the "Iron Triangle" to the Moc Hoa Plantation between the SAIGON River and Highway 13. The purpose of the operation was to destroy the Binh Duong Province Committee and elements of Military Region IV and VC/NVA installations. Intelligence indicated the Viet Cong has numerous logistical bases and installations in the area. Operation MANHATTAN was preceded on 22 April 1967 by Operation SENECA FALLS, a deception operation intended to establish the "Iron Triangle" as the next area of operations. Operation SENECA FALLS was conducted by the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division with Companies A and B, 3-16 Infantry conducting simulated air assault landings into two different Lzs in the "Iron Triangle". No significant contact was made during the one day operation. Although no significant enemy contact was made on Operation MANHATTAN during April, the division has located and destroyed many VC base camps, installations, and supply caches. The operation continues.
E. Training

1. For the period 1 February - 30 April 1967, the following is the breakdown of battalion days which units spent in training, troop movements, and operations:

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2. Listed below is the breakdown of battalion days by mission:

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3. The training posture of the division remained excellent throughout the reporting period. The division replacement training program was revised during April. The five major subordinate command's replacement training schools will implement a new training directive that establishes a 61 hour course of instruction for replacement personnel. Practical work consumes 75% of the course, night instruction consumes 25% of the course. A minimum of 30% is conducted outside base camp areas.

4. A division Mobile Training Team is being organized to train junior leaders serving above grade as fire team leaders and squad leaders. The MTT will train at battalion locations in the field during periods of stand down or where the battalion's mission requires it to be in a semi-static posture. The course will emphasize major points: ambush, weapons, defense, movement, and inspection as applicable to a junior leader's responsibility to his men, equipment, and missions.

5. The following number of people attended replacement training during the reporting period:

- 1st Brigade: 723
- 2d Brigade: 613
- 3d Brigade: 838
- SPT CMD: 736
- DIV ARTY: 573
- TOTAL: 3,685

6. Personnel attended TDY schools in and out of Vietnam as listed below:

- PAGAF Jungle Survival School (Philippines): 8
- Helicopter engine and airframe maintenance (VUNG TAU): 20
- NCO Records School (HCM: TRINQ): 14

7. The following numbers of individuals have been trained on new equipment as indicated:

- Nightingale Device: 15
- Anti-Intrusion Device: 48
F. Psychological Operations and Civic Action, Revolutionary Development Support

1. General. During the past quarter the Division G-5 section was completely reorganized. To support the merger of the Revolutionary Development Task Force and 2d Brigade the G-5 sent three officers, one NCO, and two enlisted men to the 2d Brigade. The Division printing press and supplies were also turned over to 2d Brigade along with the psychological warfare support building, the civil affairs warehouse, and all civil affairs commodities and supplies. The 2d Brigade is now responsible for all Division civic action support. G-5 will retain staff supervision of the civil affairs program. The responsibility for conducting psychological operations was decentralized to brigade level. G-5 will continue to exercise staff planning and supervision while brigade S-5's will be responsible for conducting psychological operations.

2. Psychological Operations.

a. During the past quarter the primary psychological efforts of the Division were focused on undermining the morale of VC and NVA forces; encouraging defection under the CHIEU NOI program; and assuring the civilian population of the ultimate success of the GVN and FMAR while winning their support.

b. A total of over 19,000,000 leaflets were dropped, and over 350 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts were flown during the quarter. During February the Division had 228 ralliers; there were 65 ralliers in March, 31 in April, and a total of 324 ralliers during the quarter.

c. In addition to standard leaflets and tapes, G-5 developed over twenty special leaflets, many of which were the "quick reaction" type, and several special loudspeaker appeals to support tactical operations. These were primarily designed to exploit ralliers, prisoners, and recent victories.

d. Significant progress was made in integrating artillery leaflet shells into night destruction fires, and into fires whenever solid contact with enemy forces is established. Artillery leaflet shells are now being fired whenever feasible.

e. The Division also conducted an intensive psychological program in the village of CHMN LUU during TET. This program was directed at the PHU 111 Battalion, using face to face communications with their families and friends as the principal means of communications. The people generally received the visit with warmth and gratitude.

f. Approximately 450,000 TET greeting cards were also air dropped and hand distributed by the Division. These cards were directed at the PHU 111 Battalion, and at the people of BINH DUONG, and were signed by the Commanding General.

h. Operation JUNCTION CITY, the major tactical operation during this period, produced seven ralliers. The fact that there were few ralliers is attributed primarily to the fact that the operation was directed at main force VC and NVA units, and the fact that there is not a continuous, on-going, psychological operations program directed at the area this operation was conducted in.
3. Civic Action.

a. During the past quarter the Division civil affairs support branch completed construction of the first warehouse and the office building. This enables storage of commodities for rapid reaction to brigade requirements and allows storage and resupply of larger quantities of supplies and more varied items.

b. In February the primary civic action effort was concentrated in the village of CHANH LUU. A Unicorn dance team from SAIGON presented a two-hour show which was well received. All people in the village were given Tet gifts. These gifts included toys, rice, sewing kits, cigarettes, T-shirts, balloons, money, and joss sticks. The 1st Engineer Battalion erected a playground set for the children.

c. All units in the Division made extensive distribution of gifts in their areas during the Tet holiday.

d. Two new wells were dug at the BINH DUONG CHIEN HOI Center.

e. Over 7,000 people were given medical and dental treatment under the NEDChP program. In addition eight classes on oral hygiene were held with over 2,200 people attending.

f. Over 100 tons of commodities consisting of canned goods, rice, sheet, milk, and cooking oil were distributed to Division sponsored orphanages and schools, to needy families, and in support of the hamlet festival program. Also distributed were 250 school kits, 1,000 bars of soap, 7,000 board feet of lumber, 2,000 pounds of cement, and 150 sheets of sheet metal.

g. Considerable damage was caused by artillery incidents in all MI village and at St Joseph's leprosarium. Cement, roofing tile, lumber, and other necessary supplies were delivered for reconstruction of this damage.

4. Revolutionary Development.

a. (C) During the period from 1 Feb 67 to 30 April 1967, (with the exception of 17 Mar 67 to 17 Apr 67 when the 3d Bde assumed the responsibility), the 2d Bde continued Operation LIM SON II and its continuation, LAM SON 67. During the reporting period, the 2d Bde in conjunction with 5th ARVN Division and BINH DUONG Sector, 18th ARVN Division and BINH HOI Sector, Capital Military District and GIA DINH Sector conducted tactical operations in designated area locating and destroying VC/NVA main face units, guerrilla units, and VC infrastructure; and continued, by constant application of combat fire power, to cause individual organizations to rally to SVN control and thus stimulate further Revolutionary Activities in these areas. Emphasis was continually placed on strengthening local defenses (insuring a secure environment) and in extending developmental projects. During the three-month period the 2d Brigade's Revolutionary Development program included search and destroy operations, cordon and search operations, platoon-sized ambushes and saturation patrolling, providing security for engineer efforts, jungle and road clearing operations, providing security for designated village chiefs, conducting revolutionary development self-help projects, civic action programs, population control activities, and ground and psy ops operations.

b. (C) There were thirty cordon and search operations, some of which included hamlet festivals and/or population control.
activities conducted during the reporting period. Civic Affairs and Psychological Operations for the individual months were as follows:

(1) In February Civic Action projects within the Brigade TAOR continued with support of orphanages and schools by Brigade units, distribution of food stuffs and miscellaneous items to ARVN/SP dependent; and assistance to District Advisors in Lai Thieu and DI An District. The attitude of VN civilians in the southern portion of the AO continues to be quite favorable toward US troops. In the northern portion of the AO, the attitude seems to be one of watchful waiting. Personnel are unwilling to commit themselves until they see whether US troops will remain in the same area to protect them from VC activities. RDTF continues to support the BINH DUONG CHIEU NOI Center, while Brigade maintains liaison with the THU DUC/GI BINH CHIEU NOI Center. MOQAP II operations during the reporting period treated 1,122 personnel, with another 226 personnel receiving dental care. While on operations in support of the 2d Brigade, RDTF held hamlet festivals and fed and entertained an estimated 2,200 personnel. Items distributed were as follows: 75 cases of Keen, 2,000 lbs corn meal, 3 cases cooking oil, 30 cases oranges, 15,000 lbs polished rice, 600 lbs rolled wheat, 12 trash barrels, 2,250 calendars, 100,000 TET greeting cards, 60 bags cement, 200 lbs clothing, 7,000 children’s TET gifts, 103 cases insecticide, 100 health kits, 7 carpenter’s kits, 6 teacher’s kits, 3,500 bd. ft. lumber, 400 bars of soap, 200 T-shirts (Flag), 2 cases parachute flares, 19 frag grenades, 11 claymore mines, 2,150 sand bags, 1/2 case star clusters (red), 400 meters concertina wire. Psychological operations during the reporting period consisted of ground and aerial loudspeaker/leaflet missions in support of Brigade Tactical Maneuvers throughout the LAM SON area of operations. A total of 5,311,000 “Chieu Hoi” leaflets were dropped. Twenty-one (21) loudspeaker missions were flown, for a total of 120 hours of broadcast time. A total of 218 Hoi Chanhs were received at the BINH DUONG Chieu Hoi Center during the reporting period. Approximately 20 Hoi Chanhs come into the THU DUC center as a result, at least in part of 2d Brigade Psy Ops missions in support of the District Advisory Group. Information received from HOI CHIEUH indicates that psychological operations throughout the area are well coordinated with tactical operations throughout the area, and that morale of VC units within the TAOR is sagging, as indicated by the increasing number of Hoi Chanhs received.

(2) For March Civic Action project included: The treatment of 200 persons by MEDCP, 24,000 $ VN Voluntary payments, 230,350 $ VN voluntary contributions for education of orphans, swings and seesaws built in two playgrounds, and distribution of the following items: 11 cases insecticide, 21 bags cement, 20 trash barrels, 2,000 lbs rice, 75 ft manila rope, 200 board feet scrap lumber, 60 health kits, 450 lbs clothing, 15 loads laterite, 11 bicycles, 111 asbestos roof sheets, lumber (6"x8"x16"), lumber (29"x10"x12"), 7 loads of sand and gravel, 150 packs Cambodian (captured), 300 calendars, 700 free south newspapers, 200 T-shirts, 200 bags of toys, 2 cases luncheon meat, 4 ping-pong sets, 160-1 kilo bags of rice, 4 cases dehydrated soap, 900 lbs powdered milk, 10 cases cooking oil, 1,200 lbs corn meal, 25 cases canned food, 10 cases assorted individual cereal, 20 cases (120 gallon) canned milk. Operations supported during this time were LAM SON and JUNCTION CITY II, with support of RDTF within Bde TAOR. During the reporting period 5,311,000 leaflets were dropped. The total amount of loudspeaker missions were 69, with a broadcast time of 150 hours.
G. Aviation

1. The 1st Aviation Battalion furnished general aviation support to the 1st Infantry Division throughout the period cited. In essence, this general support can be further defined as:
   a. Planning, coordinating, and executing air mobile assaults with organic and non-divisional aviation assets;
   b. Furnishing organic aircraft to units within the division requesting aviation support (i.e., resupply and command and control (C&C) aircraft) on a daily basis;
   c. Providing direct fire support in the form of gunships from the organic armed helicopter platoon.

2. During Operations TUCSON and JUNCTION CITY I and II, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Battalion initially furnished mostly its command and control group to plan, coordinate and execute the air assaults and extractions that took place. A and B Companies mostly furnished general support (i.e., command and control aircraft (C&C), and resupply aircraft). "The Rebels", the gunship platoon from A Company, and the Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon (ASTA) from B Company were noteworthy in their support furnished to the division. "The Rebels" furnished almost continual gunship coverage to the various fire support bases and base camps throughout the division area. The ASTA platoon provided photographic coverage, aside from their normal mission of electronic surveillance, of proposed landing sites and tactical areas of interest. A forward battalion tactical command post was provided to the division headquarters for aviation advice and technical guidance. Additionally the battalion furnished Pathfinder support whenever requested. Toward the end of JUNCTION CITY II, Company A did participate in some of the air assaults and a good part during the multiple extractions that took place in closing out Operation JUNCTION CITY.

3. In Operation MANHATTAN, the 1st Aviation Battalion continued to provide general support to the division as defined above.

   a. Elements Affecting the Action

      (1) Enemy information and prior reconnaissance proved to be extremely helpful in selecting landing zones for the air assaults. Sufficient time, prior to the air assaults for Operation JUNCTION CITY, allowed the aviation battalion commander adequate time to closely plan, with the Brigade commanders and infantry commanders involved, in selecting landing zones (LZ) for the air assaults. Available enemy information furnished by the "2" personnel at division and brigade level was analyzed and then verified by aerial reconnaissance as to where the touchdown spots should be to avoid enemy concentrations or suspected defensive positions. Enemy information furnished, and prior reconnaissance, was also effective in selecting flight routes and minimum safe altitudes to fly toward suspected VC gun positions capable of bringing fire against the air mobile task force. The enemy information furnished was also used by the air mission commanders in briefing the gun ships so as to set up effective LZ suppressive fire patterns.

      (2) The nature of the terrain in some cases dictated the method in which the aircraft were brought into the LZ's. The operational areas during most of the time frame cited in this report, were for the most part open spots surrounded by high jungle. Compounding this were the surfaces of these areas—in many there was either grass of sufficient height to cover the surface so the pilots were unable to see the ground on which they were to land, or there was shrubbery high enough to cause damage to highly susceptible moving parts such as tail rotors.

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To handle the above problems, helicopters were loaded with only sufficient fuel to complete the required lifts leaving in some cases only marginal fuel reserve. This was considered as a tactical necessity and a better approach to the problem rather than cut down the amount of troops to be carried into battle. This reduced fuel load then gave the pilots flexibility in which to maneuver their helicopters in and out of those "confirms' areas.

(3) The weather associated with the Northeast Monsoon Season is extremely dry and hot. This, added to the terrain problems mentioned above, further magnified the difficulties of getting helicopters safely into and out of LZ's. The vegetation in most of the LZ's was either tall dry elephant grass, just plain dry grass, or combinations of both, and shrubbery of varying heights. The dry season already mentioned made all this vegetation highly susceptible to burning if exposed to fire.

(a) To reduce the possibility of not being able to get into the cleared LZ (due to probable fires that could be caused by the air and artillery props), just prior to JUNCTION CITY, any likely area for an LZ was burned by use of thorite grenades thrown out of helicopters. The Air Force FAC's also assisted in the burning by firing their white phosphorus marking rockets at likely LZ's. In all, prior to "D" Day JUNCTION CITY I, a good area of War Zone 'C' was burned by these methods.

(b) This proved to be effective in reducing the chances of having the LZ's catch fire. However, on D-Day another problem presented itself — that of ash brought about by the burning. The first ten aircraft into one of the "pre-burned" LZ's were quickly obscured and surface visibility approached zero when the effect of their rotor down-wash raised clouds of ash and dust. This situation was immediately recognized as a serious threat to the entire lift, thereafter the remaining aircraft of the airmobile assault forces were put into an orbit until much of the ash and dust had settled. Subsequently, aircraft were sent in only five at a time and in very loose formation. In departing the LZ, aircraft left one at a time and only after the aircraft in front of them had cleared the area. From this experience evolved the "dust landing formation". It proved to be successful in handling this problem of dust which was to plague most of the air assaults and extractions conducted during Operation JUNCTION CITY I and II.

(c) Other effects of weather, such as clouds, were not of any serious nature to cause the air assaults to be excessively delayed. In only one case was there a delay and it was only for one hour.

(4) Civilian reaction to battalion operations played no discernible role during this period.

b. The Action

(1) Mission: The missions of the 1st Aviation Battalion were as stated earlier in this report. The mission of general support was accomplished by daily meeting the requirements received from the Aviation Coordination Center (ACC) collocated with the division tactical operation center (DTOC). Additionally, periodically the requirement was placed upon the battalion to provide a control group to plan, coordinate, and execute airmobile assaults or extractions throughout the time period of this report. This normally means the 1st Aviation Battalion utilizes aviation resources provided to the division from IIFFV assets. As indicated in previous paragraphs, concerning enemy information and terrain and weather, the operation plans and orders were published with sufficient flexibility to react to any sudden changes, which is normally the case when operating in a counterinsurgency environment.
(2) Gunships throughout the period were provided to units within the division, as well as those attached, to cover convoy movements and mostly to act as rapid reaction forces against enemy attack. Much of the gunship support was furnished by staging the helicopters at advanced bases nightly, ready to react whenever called upon.

(3) Decisions made by the 1st Aviation Battalion were generally recommendations to the supported unit. As example:

(a) The landing of only five aircraft at a time to reduce the hazardous conditions encountered going into extremely dusty areas. This of course required the ground commander concerned to pay particular attention to his supporting fires for at this slow rate of putting troops into an area the possibility of being "defeated in detail" was a major tactical problem to be considered.

(b) Ground commanders would of course want gunship support, especially at night, to be readily available. The argument of placing gunships on standby, say at an advanced base, where the probability of mortar attack was high and gunship reaction time is short goes without saying. The 1st Aviation Battalion's approach was to accept a 5-10 minute delay by placing the gunships in a more secure area less susceptible to enemy mortar attack. This was a constant problem to be wrestled with.

(c) C&C aircraft: Commanders naturally want to have these aircraft readily available, in case of enemy attacks or the like, in their areas of operation, for time is generally of the essence. Rapid decisions have to be made, guidance offered, etc. However, here again major points for consideration were aircraft vulnerability to enemy ground fires and that of extremely poor conditions to complete required maintenance. These considerations dictated the necessity for aircraft to be flown back to more secure and suitable areas where maintenance could be performed. Again, the decision of time versus "able to insure" aircraft safety and availability had to be made for each specific situation.

(4) Logistical support of the battalion was generally provided from the base camp. A good part (on those missions where distances were involved) of Class III A and Class V requirements were met by drawing from prepositioned stocks at LAI KHE, MINH THANH and QUAN LOI. Early in Operation JUNCTION CITY Class III A and V were also provided from SUOI DA. (Class V in this case refers to those 2.75 rockets and 7.62 ammunition used by the gunships).

(5) Combat efficiency of the battalion at the end of the reporting period is rated as excellent.

(6) Statistics on operations conducted during the period:

(a) 30 Combat assaults and/or extractions
(b) 8,458 Rotary wing combat hours flown
(c) 908 Fixed wing combat hours flown
(d) 17,170 Rotary wing sorties
(e) 2,183 Fixed wing sorties
(f) 31,233 Passengers moved
(g) 652 Tons of cargo moved
4. Discussion and Recommendations:

a. Discussion:

(1) Operations were conducted during the Northeast Monsoon Season, an extremely dry period. The effect it had on aviation operations was quite evident by the amount of accidents that occurred during the period. A majority of the accidents were caused by landing or taking off in extremely dusty areas. To prevent these accidents, increased emphasis was placed upon pilot techniques in dusty conditions. Engineer support was requested to provide dust suppressants in those areas of likely take-off or landing. Commanders at all echelons were briefed as to exercising extreme care in selection of areas of helicopter operations; that is to keep to a minimum vehicular traffic or any other type of activity that would ruin the surface of helicopter landing or take off areas.

(2) Ground traffic around airfields continued to present problems during Operation JUNCTION CITY. The hazards of vehicles driving in close proximity to runways during landings and take-offs of aircraft is fairly self evident. Aircraft can communicate with one another or with a ground controller but in no way with vehicles that decide to cross runways. In too many cases vehicles were allowed to run hazardous around the major airfield used, i.e., MINH THANH and QUAN LOI. The problem of MINH THANH was fairly well resolved, by appointing a Pathfinder Lieutenant as Airfield Commander. The Military Police aided as well by "ticketing" any vehicle driven on the airfield. Barricades were also put up, QUAN LOI, however, remained a dangerous area.

(3) Associated with this is the damage continuous vehicular traffic does to the surface of an airfield. Example was MINH THANH, initially in the operation. The engineers covered much of the runway with pene-prime where helicopters were to land and take off. This proved to be quite effective, however, wheeled vehicles, and even in some cases tracked vehicles, destroyed all the dust suppressant cover in short order. On by barricading and Military Police patrolling was the situation eventually brought under control. This was not the case at QUAN LOI.

(4) Better coordination must be effected by units providing air traffic facilities to airfields. The 12th Aviation Group provided air traffic control teams for the major fields as did the Air Force with their Combat Control Zones. These proved to be extremely helpful, however when there were for these teams to be moved the necessary coordination to advise people concerned was not always done. In one case a hurried call to USARV stopped one movement. The system of providing and removing air traffic controllers needs to be tightened up. Another result of this poor coordination was the convergence of more teams than were necessary on an airfield.

(5) One of the most pressing problems that presented itself during the reporting period was the question as to whether or not to burn LZs prior to conducting airmobile assaults into them.

(a) In relation to the problem of dust hazards encountered during this period, there was the continuous threat of LZs catching fire as a result of air and artillery prep fires. Most of the LZs used contained either tall grass or dried out shrubbery, highly susceptible to burning; therefore prior to conducting an airmobile assault into these LZs decisions had to be made prior to the air assault as to the possibility of "pre-burning" the LZ to preclude the chance of it burning at the planned time of landing.
(b) If the decision was made to "pre-burn" the LZ the problem of "tipping one's hand" then presented itself. This was solved to some extent by setting f.r.s to many possible LZs throughout the area. However, this was only feasible if time was available. In those cases where time was not available the necessity or requirement of having alternate LZs was then used.

(c) In essence advantages versus disadvantages had to be weighed. These were as follows:

Advantages:

1. Removes the possibility of burning during "H-Hour".
2. By burning out the tall grass and clumps of shrubbery it gives the pilots a better view of the landing area; also exposes any areas where booby traps may have been laid; and in some cases detonates them.

Disadvantages:

1. The necessity for time prior to H-Hour to "pre-burn" likely areas to confuse the enemy as to the actual LZ.
2. The dust hazard caused by the charred material lying in the LZ must be planned for, i.e., aircraft must land in loose formation; not as many can land in the LZ at the same time; strict control must be maintained at all times.
3. The slow process of bringing in troops as described in item 2 above means that the ground commander does not get the chance, initially, to "drop" his troops in with sufficient force to meet the challenge if a strong enemy force is encountered within the LZ area.

b. Recommendations:

1. Engineers in bulldozing areas, must whenever possible attempt to only knock down trees and not scrape up any natural vegetation that might "knit" the soil together.
2. During the planning phase of tactical operations, and as soon as the fact is discovered that a requirement exists to operate for any length of time from an outlying airfield without air traffic controllers, action should be initiated to provide necessary controller personnel. This must be pursued and coordinated through both Army and Air Force channels to insure that adequate facilities will be available as well as to prevent duplication of effort.
3. A more positive approach by the commander responsible for an airfield must be taken to prevent what may be a costly accident in terms of lives and equipment. It is not sufficient to appoint only an airfield commander, he must be given assistance to perform this job, i.e., men and equipment.
H. Logistics

1. General: During the reporting period the 1st Infantry Division Support Command provided division-wide combat service support to all divisional units and other units attached during operations. The logistical support operations were primarily for Operations: WILLISTON, 2-12 February; TUCSON DELTA, 14-21 February; and JUNCTION CITY, 22 February to 15 April 1967.

2. Logistical Situation: The location of subordinate battalions and the methods of support are outlined below for each operation.

a. Operation WILLISTON.

(1) General: The operation involved clearing and securing Route 13 for ARVN and US convoys. 1st Infantry Division units in conjunction with ARVN forces conducted the operation from 2-12 February.

(2) 1st Supply and Transport Battalion: The battalion provided timely and effective support of tactical units being staged at MINH THANH. A Temporary Forward Support Element, consisting of 1 officer and 15 enlisted men with necessary equipment, was established at MINH THANH. The element was capable of providing Class I, II & IV, III, and Graves Registration support. Supplies were transported to MINH THANH by air and by two convoys from DI AN. The 1st Logistical Command furnished two 600 cubic foot reefers with generators. However, these did not become fully operational until 19 February. The 1st Logistical Command also furnished a shower unit. The 1st Engineer Battalion provided a water purification unit.

(3) 1st Medical Battalion: This operation was supported by Company D, 1st Medical Battalion. Company D deployed a forward clearing station to MINH THANH which provided medical and dental treatment for elements of the 1st Brigade and other US forces operating in that area. One Air Ambulance was in direct support of the MINH THANH operational area and co-located with the forward clearing station. The forward clearing station remained in location at the termination of the operation. All other elements of the 1st Medical Battalion remained at their base camps.

(4) 707th Maintenance Battalion: Due to the small size of the single brigade task force involved, the maintenance support was proportionately small. A section-sized team under an NCO was dispatched to MINH THANH from the company normally supporting the 1st Brigade, D Company, 707th Maintenance Battalion. Normal backup support was furnished by the Maintenance Battalion.

(5) Division Ammunition Officer: Class V support was provided in the conventional manner. In addition to the LONG BINH Ammunition Depot, the 3d Ordinance Battalion operated a forward ASP at LAI KHE to support units in that area. Since WILLISTON was a localized, relatively small-scale operation, separate records were not maintained isolating ammunition issues in support thereof.

(6) Division Transportation Office: The DTO operated in two locations, LIT KHE and DI AN. At LIT KHE the Logistics Operations Coordination Center was the nerve center for all logistical support in the division. From the LOC, the DTO controlled all convoy movement in the division and all fixed wing airlift. The DI AN echelon of the DTO was responsible for the operation of the DI AN airfield, to include supervision of all on-loading and off-loading facilities in order to expedite these functions. Airfield personnel under the direction of the airfield commander also insured that a continuous flow of replacements to the forward areas was maintained. All convoys going to the forward

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area originated at DI AN, which served as the control center for the organization and departure of these convoys. The Traffic Control Center at DI AN granted clearances to all units, including clearances through SAIMON. Assistance was rendered by SAIMON Support Command who provided truck support for movement of supplies to the forward areas. An Air Force liaison team, working in direct coordination with DAO at LAI KHE assisted in airlift control and in the solving of various problems.

b. Operation TUCSON DELTA

(1) General: The lst Infantry Division conducted operations in the vicinity of MINH THANH and Michelin Plantation to destroy VC/NVA forces and bases.

(2) 1st Supply and Transport Battalion: The Battalion supported tactical units in the vicinity of MINH THANH and Michelin Plantation, and prepositioned personnel, stocks and equipment for the support of Operation JUNCTION CITY at MINH THANH, DAO D1, and DAO TENG. At DAO TENG, Class I support only (from lst Infantry Division assets at DI AN) was provided by the battalion, while Class III support was the responsibility of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. Support operations at DAO TENG took place during the period 17-21 February. Class I, limited Class IV and medical support was available at MINH THANH throughout the operation, and at SOKI D1 from 17 February. Support facilities at MINH THANH, with the exception of lst Logistical Command Shower facilities, were operated by the lst Supply and Transport Battalion. At SOKI D1, they were operated jointly by the lst Supply and Transport Battalion and comprising 21 February by the lst Logistical Command. The lst Supply and Transport Battalion element of the LOGC moved to MINH THANH from LAI KHE on 18 February. Only limited support was provided from lst Supply and Transport Battalion forward support sections at TRN BOI LOI and LAI KHE.

(3) lst Medical Battalion: Company B, lst Medical Battalion supported the operation from their base camp at LAI KHE and Company D provided support with a forward clearing station at MINH THANH. These elements were in direct support of the lst and 3rd Brigades. One air ambulance, controlled by Company D, was located at MINH THANH in area support for the operation.

4) 701st Maintenance Battalion: The operations were supported by the 701st Maintenance Battalion in two spheres of support. The normal division complement was supported by the base camp concept. In addition, a platoon size team under an officer was established at MINH THANH from Company 701st Maintenance Battalion. Normal backup support was furnished by the Maintenance Battalion.

(5) Division Ammunition Officer: Class V support of Operations TUCSON DELTA was provided in a most unorthodox fashion. Units operating in the vicinity of MINH THANH were supported almost entirely by a small supply element operated by DAO personnel at MINH THANH. Ammunition was programmed in by air from LONG BINH by the Ammunition Supply Officer, operating from the LOGC. Some artillery ammunition was conveyed in by land LOC from the lst Logistical Command JSP at LAI KHE. Class V operations were managed by the D/O from MINH THANH as a part of the Logistics Operations Coordination Center. The DAO also furnished personnel to receive and account for ammunition flown into MINH THANH and furnished representation at LONG BINH Air Base and the LONG BINH Ammunition Depot to facilitate timely and efficient smoke grenades, were prestocked by the DAO at DI AN and delivered by helicopter to fill specific requirements. The LAI KHE ASP was available as a back-up capability but was rarely used.
6. Operation JUNCTION CITY

(1) General: The basic concept used was to distribute high tonnage items from division supply points to the 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Areas located as far forward in the tactical areas of operations as practical. The impetus of supply was from the rear and focused on maintenance of adequate stockages at all forward supply locations to meet peak unit demands.

(2) Forward Command Post: The Support Command Forward Command Post was established at MINH THANH during Phase I, and LAI KHE during Phase II. It was co-located with the ACofS G-4 element in the LOC at Division Headquarters (Forward). Support Command Coordinator was established at SUOI DA during Phase I to coordinate the activities of subordinate elements at the location.

(3) Method of direct support and resupply:

(a) 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

The battalion utilized existing base camps as logistical bases when they were accessible to the planned disposition of tactical units. When, for either time or distance factors, one of the base camps became inaccessible, a temporary forward support section or a POL "jump team" was established to provide continuity of operations. During JUNCTION CITY, the permanent base camps at LAI KHE and MINH THANH were used as logistical bases.

(2) Support Locations utilized were:

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<td>1 Off 22 EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Mar - 15 Apr</td>
<td>MINH THANH</td>
<td>III 1111</td>
<td>11 EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Feb - 12 Mar</td>
<td>KITUM (X1490)</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1 Off 5 EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Mar - 28 Mar</td>
<td>FSB &quot;A&quot; (X1020)</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1 Off 3 EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Mar - 5 Apr</td>
<td>FSB &quot;C&quot; (X1589)</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1 Off 3 EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Apr - 7 Apr</td>
<td>NUI B R (X153072)</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1 Off 3 EM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) A combination of task and unit support was used during this operation. Class I and II supplies were normally provided on a unit basis. Class II supplies and GRIND service were normally provided on an area basis. Although infrequent, task support was provided also.

(4) 701st Maintenance Battalion: Maintenance Contact Teams furnished support on an area basis and provided service to both divisional and non-divisional customers. Teams were established in initial positions, and then moved with their supported densities of equipment as the situation dictated. The chronological disposition of the teams is shown below.
DATE | LOCATION | T.E.M. COMPOSITION | SUPPORTING |
--- | --- | --- | --- |
2 Feb - 16 Mar | MINH THANH | Co D - 14 men | 1st Bde TP |
14 Feb - 21 Feb | MINH CHI | Co C - 20 men | 3rd Bde TP |
21 Feb - 14 Mar | QUAN LOI | Co C - 20 men | 3rd Bde TP |
22 Feb - 15 Mar | QUAN LOI | Co C - 12 men | TP Dixie |
11 Mar - 7 Apr | FSB "H" | Co A - 10 men | Engr/Arty Bn's |
19 Mar - 14 Apr | QUAN LOI | Co B - 25 men | 2nd Bde TP, ARTY |
7 Apr - 14 Apr | QUAN LOI | Co A - 13 men | Engr Bn |

Additionally, technical assistance teams were operational for short periods at the following locations:

LOCATION | COMPOSITION | SUPPORTING |
--- | --- | --- |
ARTY Base VI | Co D - 4 men | 3rd Brigade |
FSB "G" | Co B - 3 men | DIV ARTY |
Obj Thrust | Co B - 3 men | DIV ARTY |
PHU LOI | Co A - 12 men | DIV ARTY, 1-4 Cav |
PHU LOI | Co B - 8 men | 1-4 Cav, 2-2 Inf (Mech) |

Repair parts requests were forwarded from each contact team to its parent unit. These requests were then filled by the parent unit or sent back to battalion headquarters for fill by Company A or backup support. Aircraft maintenance support was provided by Company B at PHU LOI, and contact teams were sent on request to on-site locations. 83 such visits were made during the period. One combat assault mission was escorted and emergency repairs made on one aircraft.

(4) 1st Medical Battalion: Forward Medical treatment and supply facilities provided area support to all organic and attached units of the division. The chronological disposition of terms is shown below:

DATE | LOCATION | UNIT |
--- | --- | --- |
20 Feb - 14 Mar | SUDI DA | Co C (-) |
20 Feb - 14 Mar | SUDI DA | Hq & Co A, Forward Medical Supply Point |
20 Feb - 5 Mar | MINH THANH | Co B, Clearing Plt Section - 4 Off, 23EM |
6 Mar - 15 Apr | QUAN LOI | Co E, Clearing Plt Section |
21 Mar - 15 Apr | QUAN LOI | Hq & Co A, Co C, Rapid Reaction MedTeam |
22 Feb - 15 Apr | LAI XHE | Co B |

In addition to these forward medical treatment facilities, area support was furnished from base camps at DI AN, LAI XHE, and PHU LOI. A portion of the division medical supply was moved forward to SUDI DA. It was set up in proximity to "G" Company and provided medical supplies to all divisional units in the area plus the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 73d Airborne Brigade. Requests for resupply items were sent via landline or radio to the battalion S-4 from the forward depot. Supplies were shipped forward either by road or air. The S-4 had operational control over the depot. This was the first time the forward medical depot concept was utilized within the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam. On previous operations, "Dust Off" helicopters were used for transportation of personnel, equipment, and medical supplies from DI AN to the forward area. During this operation, convoys and non-medical helicopters were used more than in the past.

(4) Division Transportation Office: The Division Transportation Office was organized into two sections, one forward and one rear. The forward element was concerned with direct transportation support to all units in the forward area. This included scheduling and controlling of all convoys from the forward area to other locations and scheduling and
controlling all fixed wing airlift, both tactical and logistical. The rear element handled the same convoy functions in the division rear. All convoys departing D1 AN were controlled and coordinated from there. All convoys departing through SAIGON were cleared through the rear office. All traffic out of D1 AN was controlled from the DI AN airfield. All units in the division desiring to move a convoy were required to obtain clearance through the DTO, either forward or rear. A clearance number was issued to the unit and this number, along with the time cleared for movement, was given to the Military Police. DI KHE was used as a coordination point for all convoys, both those originating in DI KHE and those passing through from other areas. All convoys were stopped, re-grouped, re-embled, and tied in with new security elements. All major convoys reported checkpoints to the Division Transportation Office Forward, and the Provost Marshal flew convoy control over all resupply convoys and some tactical convoys. While in the air, the PM representative was able to report the progress to the DTO by radio.

Division Ammunition Office: During Phase I of Operation JUNCTION CITY, Class V support was provided through a 1st Logistical Command ASF located at SUDI DA for artillery units and elements of the 3d Brigade and 1st Brigade operating north of SUDI DA to the Cambodian border. At the same time units of the 1st Brigade, whose trains were located at MINH THAN, were also supplied by a small supply point at MINH THAN operated by the Division Ammunition Section. During Phase II of the operation, the main logistical base was shifted to QUAN LOI where the 1st Logistical Command again operated an ASF. Also included in the Class V support provided by the 1st Logistical Command was explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) service. A team from the 42d Detachment was stationed at MINH THAN during Phase I and at QUAN LOI during Phase II. The DI KHE operated a supply point at MINH THAN with additional manpower assistance from DI AN. Stockage of this supply point was coordinated by the DI KHE, the LONG BINH DAO, and the DI AN DSO team. The DI KHE operated an office at both the 1st Logistical Command ASF's, SUDI DA and QUAN LOI, in order to authenticate and approve transportation orders and to relay timely stockage data back to the DI KHE at the LOC.

General Support and Resupply Sources:

(a) 1st Supply and Transport Battalion: Requirements generated by supported units were routed to the Assistant Division Supply Officer at DI AN. For those items not available, or for future programmed requirements, a request was placed on the 506th Field Depot in Saigon. The 1st Logistical Command provided a Forward Support activity at SUDI DA from the 3d Ordnance Battalion. This FSA used a land LOC to bring forward all classes of supply. The 1st Logistical Command also provided an FSA at QUAN LOI from the 29th Group. This FSA used air and land LOC to provide Class I & III supplies.

(b) 1st Maintenance Battalion: The majority of parts were obtained from the normal supply source, 506th Field Depot in Saigon, although some parts were obtained from the 185th, 723rd, and 610th Maintenance Battalions.

(c) 1st Medical Battalion: The advanced platoon of the 32d Medical Depot provided medical resupply to the Division from its location in Saigon. This support was excellent. Patients care was provided to the division by hospitals under the control of the 44th Medical Brigade. The 3rd Field Hospital in Saigon, 93rd Evacuation Hospital and 24th Evacuation Hospital in LONG BINH, 3rd Surgical Hospital in Tay MINH provided this care. Aeromedical evacuation was provided by the 283d Medical Detachment, 254th Medical Detachment, and 57th Medical Detachment from LONG BINH. Area
aeromedical evacuation was provided by the Air Ambulance Company (Prov) by locating standby "Dust Offs" at SUDI, BAU DINH, and MINH THANH.

(d) Division Transportation Office: Airfield operations were controlled by the US Air Force 6th Aerial Port, teams on location and by DTO personnel operating on the strip, during peak periods of activity. This became the case at MINH THANH and LAI KHE during the time when the division was located there.

(e) Division Ammunition Office: The LONG Binh Ammunition Depot, operated by the 3d Ordnance Battalion, was the backup source of all ammunition support for the operation.

(7) Unit resupply concepts: Supply point distribution was used approximately 95-98% of the time. Unit distribution was made for emergency requests and for a limited amount of perishable Class I supplies. Small part of high priority items were delivered directly to field positions using the Support Command helicopter. Unit trains were located at 3001 Da, MINH THANH, and QUAN L01. Units picked up supplies at the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion forward support sections situated at those locations. During Phase II, numerous throughput issues were made wherein ammunition was delivered by Logistical Command transport to artillery units at FSB "Charlie", and to units along Highway 13 between CHON THANH and CHIN LOC.

J. Supply

a. Supported strength: 24,156 average for period

b. Supply levels

(1) Class I - Adequate

(2) Class II & IV: Following is a list of the 17 critical items in short supply:

(a) Armor, aircrew - 62 each
(b) Generator set, FU32/PPS - 3 each
(c) Loader, scoop - 2 each
(d) Bridge, Armored Vehicle Launched - 1 each
(e) Detecting sets, mine - 16 each
(f) Mortar, 4.2 inch - 14 each
(g) Carrier, Personnel, M13 and M13A1 - 5 each
(h) Tank, M48A3 - 9 each
(i) Truck, wrecker - 1 each
(j) Forklift, 6000 lb - 3 each
(k) Machinegun, M-60 - 102

(3) Class III: Adequate

(4) Class V: No supply levels within the division; following is a list of items in short supply:

(a) 40mm HE cartridge
(b) Green smoke grenades
(c) M681 Claymore mines
(d) White star illumination cluster
(e) M82 percussion primers
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(5) During the reporting period, the 1st Infantry Division was issued 37,451.22 short tons of ammunition. This tonnage was issued in support of the following operations:

(a) WILLISTON 1357.66 s/t
(b) TUCSON DELTA 1274.95
(c) JUNCTION CITY 16243.60
(d) OTHER DIVISION SUPPORT 18275.01
TOTAL 37,451.22

(6) Medical supply: The Division medical supply activity maintains a 45 day level of supply which includes over 2300 line items. Each company within the 1st Medical Battalion maintains a 15 day level of supply.

4. Evacuation of Casualties: Evacuation of patients was accomplished by ground and air. Difficulty was experienced during Operation JUNCTION CITY due to the heavy commitment of aeromedical airlift; therefore, it was necessary to utilize other types of aircraft to evacuate routine casualties from the forward areas to medical treatment facilities.

5. Transportation

a. Highway

(1) Supplies transported:

(a) Class I: Tons shipped to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Bde</th>
<th>2nd Bde</th>
<th>3rd Bde</th>
<th>DIV ARTY</th>
<th>QUAN LOI</th>
<th>Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DI AN</td>
<td>174710</td>
<td>932.0</td>
<td>518.0</td>
<td>145513</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Class II & IV: Tons shipped to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Bde</th>
<th>2nd Bde</th>
<th>3rd Bde</th>
<th>DIV ARTY</th>
<th>QUAN LOI</th>
<th>Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DI AN</td>
<td>28615</td>
<td>618.3</td>
<td>138.9</td>
<td>948.6</td>
<td>216.1</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Class III

Gallons shipped by road: 1st Bde QUAN LOI 3rd Bde DIV ARTY DI AN DI AN

Mogas: 56000 56265 387950 419000 494000 422527
Diesel: 39000 5618 317715 604000 573519 509519
Avgas: 13000 27335 530000 177500 66900 66386
JP-4: 37000 155000 395000 259000 260000 258711
Package POL: 83610 198652 108448 465296 408363
(2) The following is a list of convoys consisting of ten or more vehicles in which 1st Supply and Transport Battalion participated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>VEHICLES</th>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
<th>UNIT SUPPORTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>3d Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 &quot;</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>3d Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 &quot;</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>QUAN LOI</td>
<td>Dixie North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 &quot;</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>3d Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 &quot;</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>QUAN LOI</td>
<td>Dixie North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 &quot;</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>MINH THANH</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 &quot;</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>3d Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 &quot;</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>MINH THANH</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 &quot;</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>MINH THANH</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 &quot;</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>SOUI DA</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 &quot;</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 &quot;</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Mar</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 &quot;</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 &quot;</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 &quot;</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>QUAN LOI</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 &quot;</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 &quot;</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 &quot;</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 &quot;</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 &quot;</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 &quot;</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 &quot;</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>PHUOC VINH</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 &quot;</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>PHUOC VINH</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 &quot;</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Apr</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>QUAN LOI</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 &quot;</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 &quot;</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 &quot;</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 &quot;</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 &quot;</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 &quot;</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 &quot;</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>3d Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 &quot;</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>3d Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 &quot;</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>PHUOC VINH</td>
<td>1st Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 &quot;</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>PHUOC VINH</td>
<td>1st Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 &quot;</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>3d Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 &quot;</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>3d Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 &quot;</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>3d Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 &quot;</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>LAI KHE</td>
<td>3d Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 &quot;</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>PHUOC VINH</td>
<td>DIV ARMY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Extended dispatches of cargo vehicles during the reporting period from the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>VEHICLES</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-28 Feb</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Support of Operation CEDAR FALLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-27 Feb</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Support of Company B Forward Support at SOUI DA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Feb</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Support of Operation JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4 March</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Support of Operation JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-16 March</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Support of Operation JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-15 April</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Support of Operation JUNCTION CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-29 April</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Support of Operation MANHATTAN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(4) The following were recurring dispatches during the reporting period from the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VEHICLES</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Temp hire personnel</td>
<td>THU Duc &amp; DI An Mon-Sat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Perm hire personnel</td>
<td>SAIGON, THU Duc &amp; DI An Mon-Sat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bread Transport</td>
<td>LONG BINH Mon-Sat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ration Transport</td>
<td>PHU LOI Mon-Sat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ice Transport</td>
<td>SAIGON Mon-Sat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>POL Transport</td>
<td>DI An Airstrip Mon-Sat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Transport of RAR Personnel</td>
<td>TAN SON NHUT Mon-Sat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Rail Tons/Received at DI An: Class I: 235.8
    Class II & IV: 1403.7

(6) Water - N/A

d. Air: Supplies transported:

(1) Class I: Tons shipped to:

(a) DI An 0
(b) 1st Bde 635.1
(c) 2nd Bde 0
(d) 3rd Bde 667.6
(e) DIVARTY 0
(f) QUAN LOI 979.9
(g) Operations 617.5

(2) Class II & IV: Tons shipped to:

(a) DI An 0
(b) 1st Bde 103.5
(c) 2nd Bde 0
(d) 3rd Bde 20.1
(e) DIVARTY 0
(f) QUAN LOI 226.5
(g) Operations 181.8

(3) Class III:

Gallons shipped by air:

- Gas: 131250 71706 80265
- Diesel: 181155 16900 24020
- Avgas: 44650 27190 4500
- JP-4: 391070 37764 113950
- Package POL: 29623

6. Service: Services rendered as part of the three operations were:

a. Operation WILLISTON

(1) Medical: 1st Medical Battalion treated the following patients at MINH THAN:

(a) Deb - 8
(b) Cho - 78
(c) NE & Diseases - 1064
(d) Whole Blood (Units) - 21
(e) Medical Supplies (lbs) - 9,400

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(2) Maintenance: 701st Maintenance Battalion processed the following number of job orders at MINH THANH:

(a) Signal 33
(b) Small Arms 0
(c) Vehicles 18
(d) Artillery 0
(e) Engineer 7
(f) Serv/Equip 0

TOTAL 78

(3) Laundry and Bath: Non-operational

(4) Graves Registration: The 1st Supply and Transport Battalion processed two remains at MINH THANH:

b. Operation TUCSON DELTA

(1) Medical: The 1st Medical Battalion treated the following patients at MINH THANH:

(a) ERHA & DOW
(b) ERHA
(c) NBI & Disease
(d) Vietnamese Civilians
(e) Whole Blood (Units)
(f) Medical Supplies (lbs)

(2) Maintenance: 701st Maintenance Battalion processed the following job orders at MINH THANH:

(a) Artillery
(b) Track
(c) Wheel Vehicle
(d) Service
(e) Instruments
(f) Radio
(g) Wire
(h) Engineer
(i) Small Arms

(3) Operation JUNCTION CITY

(1) Medical: The following statistics reflect only patients processed by elements of the 1st Medical Battalion, and do not reflect patients evacuated directly to general support medical facilities supporting the division:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PATIENTS TREATED</th>
<th>SIWN LOK</th>
<th>MINH THANH</th>
<th>PHUOC VINH</th>
<th>LAI KHE</th>
<th>SAI DA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ERHA</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>518</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERHA</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>this' operation</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBI &amp; Disease</td>
<td>1365</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>2741</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>4738</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>care, in for</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA - NBI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ward areas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole Blood (unit)</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Supplies</td>
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<td>8300</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL
2) Maintenance

2. 27th Maintenance Battalion

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<td>108</td>
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Chief MNC 3,156 job orders completed

(c) Significant Maintenance Services Summary:

1. The self-propelled, 155mm howitzer, M109 was introduced into the operation, replacing the 155mm Howitzer batteries of the 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery. The personnel were given orientation training on proper operation and maintenance procedures. Personnel from the 701st Maintenance Battalion also received instruction from the Technical Representative. Parts for stochc of the M109 were on requisition since October 1966, but a satisfactory level of parts on hand was not available. In order to alleviate this situation, a master list of zero balance items was submitted to the K06th Field Depot. These items the Depot could not provide were referred to the Director of Maintenance, 1st Logistical Command for expedited action.

2. Two M-110, 8X10 replacement chassis were received, inspected, and mounted during the first week of March for 84 Battery, 3-6 Artillery.

3. A maintenance stand-down was conducted to assist the 1-4 Cav and the 2-2 Mech Infantry. In a four day period, an average of four engines or transmissions were changed every day.

4. During the operation, two officers of the 701st Maintenance Battalion flew to CAN BAY to look for badly needed parts for repair bulldozers, M580 tanks, and signal items. They arranged for the transfer to the division of over 2,000 M583 track blocks, 20 repair parts for bulldozers, and 250 signal repair parts which removed 50 end items from deadlines.

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A potential equipment problem was avoided when the 2-2 Mech Infantry discovered an apparent fault in a blower drive shaft on M113A-1s. The faulty shafts were breaking, apparently because of a structural weakness caused by a hollow shaft. Solid replacement shafts were located at 1st Logistical Command and replacements were furnished to the 2-2 Mech. Stockage quantities were also obtained as back-up within the 701st Maintenance Battalion.

A special air-courier system, using the Support Command helicopter, has been devised to expedite the handling of "Red Ball" requisitions. Requisitions are picked up at special "Red Ball" helipads. This is done on a daily basis, and allows "Red Ball" requests to be in 506th Field Depot hands within 24 hours.

(d) Laundry and Bath

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locations supporting operations</th>
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(e) Graves Registration

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(f) Salvage Collection

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1. Personnel and Administration

1. Personnel:

a. Authorized:

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b. Gains, Qualifications and Status:

(1) There were 5386 replacements received during the period.

(2) There were 1575 persons returned to duty during the period.

(3) Qualifications: A significant number of replacements are being received in grades lower than those requisitioned and lack the experience required to fill positions at advanced skill levels.

(4) The replacement status in the lower grades is good, but there is a definite shortage of company grade infantry officers, company grade artillery officers and infantry NGOs.

c. Losses:

(1) There were 4140 losses during the period due to assignments within Vietnam, rotation, ETS and board actions.

(2) Casualties (by Month):

(a) February:

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(c) April:

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2. Discipline, Law and Order

a. The discipline in the Division has been excellent the past quarter. There were no stragglers apprehended. There were 16 serious incidents and 54 AGOs reported during the period.

b. There were 8 General Courts-Martial tried during the quarter. 64 records of trial for Special Courts-Martial and 56 records of trial for Summary Courts-Martial were received for review.

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c. The Division IG handled 117 requests for assistance and 13 complaints, 3 of which were justified.

3. Graves Registration: During the quarter the Graves Registration Platoon processed and evacuated 147 remains.

4. Development and Maintenance of Morale:

a. Finance: A liaison NCO has been attached to the 1st and 3d Brigades to facilitate the handling of pay problems.

b. Chaplain: During the quarter there were 1565 religious services conducted, (all faiths), with a total attendance of 48,262.

c. Special Services: During the quarter the Division utilized 3218 out of country R&R allocations and 836 in country R&R allocations. There were 11 USO Shows that performed in the Division area during the quarter.

d. Awards and Decorations:

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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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5. Civilian Personnel:

a. At the end of the quarter the Division employed 1912 temporary hire local nationals.

b. There were 1647 permanent hire local nationals employed at the end of the quarter.

J. Chemical Operations:

1. Listed below are the activities of the Division Chemical Section during the reporting period 1 February 1967 to 30 April 1967.

a. On 2 February 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI Air helipad via CH-47 helicopter loaded with thirty (30) fifty-five (55) gallon drums of CS-1 for a target located on a line between coordinates XT 619373 and XT 615385. While airborne, the Division G-3 assigned another target on a line between coordinates XT 669377 and XT 667391. The team dropped sixteen (16) drums on the initial target and fourteen (14) on the second target. Mission completed, the drop team returned to DI Air Base Camp.
b. On 2 February 1967, the Tunnel Team departed DI AN Base Camp and linked up with the 1-18 Infantry just north of the DI AN perimeter to investigate and destroy a reported tunnel complex. Upon arrival it was disclosed that there were no tunnels but merely a series of bunkers. The team returned to DI AN Base Camp after assisting in the destruction of the bunker system.

c. On 4 February 1967, the Division Chemical Officer departed LAI KHE helipad via UH-1D aircraft carrying incendiary grenades for the purpose of burning landing zones (LZs). One grenade was dropped from an altitude of 500 feet on the upwind side of each target LZ. With a surface wind of five (5) knots, an area of 100 meters by 50 meters was cleared of grass in approximately 30 minutes.

d. On 5 February 1967, the Division Chemical Officer departed the LAI KHE helipad and burned four (4) landing zones in the same manner and with the same results described above.

e. On 6 February 1967, the Division Chemical Section conducted a CS drop utilizing the E-159 experimental clusters mounted on a UH-1D gunship. The target was a VC Base Camp located in the vicinity of coordinates XT 095345.

f. On 6 February 1967, the Division Chemical Officer departed LAI KHE helipad and linked up with the 2-2 Infantry, vicinity of coordinates XT 667266, to advise on the disposition of a 55 gal drum of CS found by the unit. This was a drum that failed to function during a drop conducted in the area on 27 December 1966. The area where other drums had detonated was still heavily contaminated.

g. On 7 February 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via two (2) CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty (30) 55 gallon drums of CS-1 each. The 60 drums were dropped on a line between coordinates XT 660380 and XT 649404. One CH-47 received AV fire but was not hit. The aircraft returned the fire with unknown results.

h. On 7 February 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team attempted its first drop during the hours of darkness. Two (2) CH-47 aircraft each loaded with 30 drums of CS-1 departed DI AN helipad for the target area which was located on a line between coordinates XT 743320 and XT 745334.

i. On 8 February 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team attempted its first drop during the hours of darkness. Two (2) CH-47 aircraft each loaded with 30 drums of CS-1 departed DI AN helipad for the target area which was located on a line between coordinates XT 983333 and XT 983335. Illumination of the area was provided by aerial flare ships but this was insufficient to penetrate the extreme ground fog making visual spotting of the target area impossible. After thirty (30) minutes of orbiting on station the mission had to be abandoned to clear the area for planned air strikes.

j. On 8 February 1967, the Division Chemical Officer departed DI AN helipad via UH-1D and burned four (4) landing zones with incendiary grenades and returned to DI AN Base Camp upon completion of the mission.
On 12 February 1967, the Chemical Section was assigned three (3) targets within the same general vicinity to contaminate with CS. The Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via four (4) CH-47 aircraft flying in a box formation; 104 drums were dropped simultaneously from coordinates XT 649779 to XT 650342 at 0830 hours. The team returned to DI AN helipad, reconvened the aircraft, and departed for target #2 located on a line between coordinates XT 679389 and XT 705489. With the four (4) aircraft flying in a box formation, 104 drums were dropped simultaneously at 1000 hours. The team again returned to DI AN helipad to prepare for target #2 located on a line between XT 700045 and XT 690475. At 1120 hours 104 drums were placed on target from the box formation. Mission completed, the team returned to DI AN helipad at 1210 hours. The combined total of Riot Control Agent used was 24,960 pounds, or approximately 12.5 tons.

On 18 February 1967, the Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via one (1) CH-47 aircraft each loaded with thirty (30) drums of CS-1. Fifteen (15) drums of CS-1 were placed on a target between coordinates XT 520580 and XT 528590, and another fifteen (15) drums on a target between coordinates XT 518582 and XT 525592.

On 19 February 1967, the Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via two CH-47 aircraft each loaded with twenty (20) drums of CS-1. One of the helicopters dropped their drums on a target between coordinates XT 605555 and XT 705465, and the other helicopter between coordinates XT 600570 and 600580.

On 20 February 1967, the Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via two CH-47 aircraft each loaded with thirty (30) drums of CS-1. Each aircraft dropped 15 drums on a target between coordinates XT 683530 and XT 670540, and the remaining fifteen drums on a target between coordinates XT 652520 and XT 640530.

On 23 February 1967, the Division Tunnel Team departed DI AN via C7-1 for KHEM THANG. From there they were flown by UH-1D to Company 4, 2-28 Infantry, where they explored three wells with small tunnels on their sides. A bag of documents was found in one tunnel and the others were empty. After destruction of the tunnels the team returned to DI AN.
a. On 3 March 1967, the Division Tunnel Team departed DI AN Base Camp to assist the ARVN Advisory Team #1 in the exploration of a tunnel in their area. Two shafts approximately 20 meters deep with rooms at the bottom were examined. One room contained a VC body that had been there approximately one week. The second room was empty. Both rooms were contaminated with CS-26 and destroyed with 45 pound cratering charges.

b. On 9 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad (early morning) in two CH-47 aircraft each loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1. With the two aircraft flying side by side, they simultaneously dropped their loads on a target between coordinates XT 610377 and XT 623368.

c. On 9 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad (early morning) in two CH-47 aircraft each loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1. With the two aircraft flying side by side, they simultaneously dropped their loads on a target between coordinates XT 614337 and XT 626350.

d. On 10 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad with two CH-47 aircraft, each loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1, and dropped on a target between coordinates YT 060410 and YT 050425 at 1730 hours. Significantly this resulted in "gasing" BIEN HOA, PHU LOI, and DI AN, which are about 40 Kms downwind of the target, about an hour after the drop. Calls were received from SAIGON indicating that traces of the "gas" reached that city 56 Kms downwind of the target. The surface winds of the target were from 010° at 10 knots, and at 1000 feet were from 020° at 10 knots with gusts to 20 knots.

e. On 12 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via one CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1 for a target on a line between coordinates YT 072425 and YT 080428. Two passes were made over the target dropping fifteen drums on each pass.

f. On 13 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section CS Drop Team departed DI AN helipad via one CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1 for a target on a line between coordinates YT 055430 and YT 050435. Two passes were made over the target dropping fifteen drums on each pass.

g. On 14 March 1967, LTC Hylton returned from Division Forward and SFC Bullard left DI AN for Division Forward to assist SFC Wilson in the CP movement to LAI KHE.

h. On 16 March 1967, the Chemical Section Forward displaced with the 1st Infantry Division CP from MINH THANH arriving at LAI KHE re-establishing the Division Chemical Section Forward.

i. On 17 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN helipad in one CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1 for a point target located at coordinates XT 057326. This target was a suspected meeting place of the provincial mortar conference. Two (2) passes were on the target and fifteen (15) drums were dropped on each pass forming an X. The following is a complete agent report regarding the drop: "Twice during the middle of the night of 17 March and once during the early morning of 18 March air attacks were conducted near the site of conference on mortar techniques attended by military leaders of MINH DUONG Province from 16-18 March. The bombs missed the conference site by about 200 meters. Six guards were killed and four wounded. The bombs seemed to explode in series: 'Boom-boom-boom-boom.' The people of the area also suffered choking, vomiting,
itching skin and a flow of tears. These symptoms lasted one or two days for most people, as long as a week for the old and infirm. Source did not know what caused these symptoms; the Viet Cong said it was one of the effects of the bofbi g. The people in the area, including the leaders, had no means of defence against these symptoms. After the attacks, the site of the conference was moved to XOM NUOC TROG (XT 972372), PHU GIANG District. Source reported that some installations of the Binh Duong Provincial Committee in the vicinity of the conference also suffered from airstrikes and artillery at the same time, but he did not know the results. Source said that the Viet Cong in Tan Uyen had ordered their security and military intelligence organizations to watch the people closely. Eight villagers (source did not say of which village) were imprisoned and two administrative cadre of VINH TRUONG (vico XT 866 173) and TAN HIEP (vico XT997216) were arrested by the Viet Cong on suspicion of betrayal.

bb. On 19 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI ALN helipad via one (1) CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty (30) 55 gal drums of CS-1 for a target located on a line between coordinates XT 966990 and XT 971981. Two passes were made on the target and fifteen (15) drums were dropped on each pass. The mission originally called for two (2) CH-47 aircraft, however one (1) developed mechanical trouble at DI ALN helipad and could not take off.

c. On 21 March 1967, the Division Tunnel Team departed DI ALN Base Camp for A Company, 2-2 Infantry, located at XT 885211. One (1) tunnel fifty (50) meters long was found and explored with negative results.

d. On 21 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI ALN helipad via one (1) CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty (30) 55 gal drums of CS-1 for a target located on a line between coordinates XT 972372 and XT 997387. Two passes were made on the target and fifteen drums were dropped on each pass.

c. On 23 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI ALN helipad via one (1) CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty (30) 55 gal drums of CS-1 for a target located on a line between coordinates XT 972372 and XT 997387. Two passes were made on the target and fifteen drums were dropped on each pass.

e. On 30 March 1967, the Division Tunnel Team departed DI ALN Base Camp in APCs with A Company, 2-2 Infantry, for a tunnel located at coordinates XT 895145. The tunnel had been partially destroyed previously by the tunnel team. It was not destroyed but left for experimental CS contamination studies. The team then departed for two walls located at coordinates XT 905180. Enroute, the lead APC hit a pressure type mine, resulting in heavy damage to the APC and two WA. The team transferred to another APC and proceeded to the location of the walls, explored them with negative results and contaminated them with CS.

g. On 31 March 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI ALN helipad via one (1) CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty (30) 55 gal drums of CS-1 for a target at coordinates XT 972372. Two passes were made over the target dropping fifteen drums on each pass forming an X pattern.
On 1 April 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI JN helipad via two CH-47 aircraft each loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1. One aircraft dropped on a line between coordinates XT 626517 and XT 637528, and the other dropped on a line between coordinates XT 661524 and XT 681531. On both targets, FAC reported excellent coverage.

On 2 April 1967, the Division Tunnel Team supported the 2-28 Infantry in exploration of a tunnel just north of DI JN Base Camp. The tunnel team found the following enemy items of equipment: 3 bags of documents, 1 French 7.5mm M 1924/29 with 4 magazines (excellent condition), 1 French MAT 1999 (excellent condition), 15 rifles including US M 1903 Springfield, German Kar 98k, CHICOM 7.62 (very poor condition), 1 US 12 gauge shotgun (poor condition), 1 US PRC-25 radio (set on frequency 46.60), 3 US grenades, 1 US burner-type stove, 2 VC Claymores, 1 VC flag, 3 portable typewriters (fair condition), 1500 rounds of assorted ammunition, small amounts of web gear, 6 rusted magazines and 300 lbs of rice. Equipment was turned over to 2d Bn, 28th Inf. The team returned 3 April for further exploration.

On 3 April 1967, the Division Tunnel Team again explored a tunnel found by the 2-28 Inf north of DI JN Base Camp. Approximately 100 meters of tunnel was investigated without finding any material of military value.

On 4 April 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI JN helipad via two CH-47 aircraft each loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1. One aircraft dropped fifteen drums on a line between coordinates XT 610974 and XT 616977 and then moved with the second aircraft to a linear target between coordinates XT 596730 and XT 575945. Both ships dropped on this target resulting in 45 drums on target. The FAC reported excellent coverage.

On 6 April 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI JN helipad via one CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1. All drums were dropped on a line between coordinates XT 592935 and XT 876569.

On 8 April 1967, the Division Chemical Drop Team departed DI JN helipad via one CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1. All drums were dropped on a line between coordinates XT 865975 and XT 876569.

On 10 April 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI JN helipad via one CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-1 and dropped on a target between coordinates XT 850527 and XT 872520 resulting in excellent target coverage.

On 13 April 1967, the Division Tunnel Team departed for a tunnel complex discovered by the 1-16 Infantry. Two tunnels were explored and the bodies of two VC who had been killed by the Infantry were removed.

On 14 April 1967, the Division Tunnel Team departed DI JN Base Camp for a mission with the DI JN District Advisor northeast of DI JN. Three small tunnels were found and one German F-38 pistol and one US Cal .30 carbine were captured. The tunnels were destroyed with 43 pound cratering charges resulting in two VC KIA.
rr. On 15 April 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN Base Camp via CH-47 aircraft with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-I and dropped on a line between coordinates XT628523 and XT646526. The team returned to LEI NE, reloaded thirty drums and dropped on the same target resulting in excellent coverage with sixty drums of CS-I.

ss. On 18 April 1967, the Division Tunnel Team supported the DI AN Advisory Group in the exploration of four tunnels, each approximately thirty meters long. Two VC bodies were removed from one tunnel and the remaining three were empty.

tt. On 19 April 1967, the Division Tunnel Team again explored three small tunnels for the DI AN Advisory Group. One bag of documents, one bag of magazines, two pair of wire cutters and three homemade grenades were captured.

uu. On 21 April 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN Base Camp via two CH-47 aircraft each loaded with thirty 55 gal drums of CS-I. One ship dropped its drums on a line between coordinates XT488822 and XT500888, and the second aircraft dropped on a line between coordinates XT520889 and XT530869. Both aircraft returned to QUAN LOI and each reloaded with thirty drums of CS-I and dropped on a target between coordinates XT485845 and XT465860 simultaneously.

vv. On 21 April 1967, the Division Chemical Section Drop Team departed DI AN Base Camp via one CH-47 aircraft loaded with thirty (30) 55 gal drums of Riot Control Agent CS-I. Ten (10) drums were dropped in the vicinity of coordinates XT9221 and the remaining twenty (20) drums were dropped ten (10) at a time forming an "X" pattern on coordinates YT032331.

ww. On 22 April 1967, the Division Tunnel Team explored one (1) 300 meter tunnel in support of the 1-26 Infantry. Six (6) eight inch Howitzer rounds wired for command detonation were found and turned over to the infantry for destruction.

xx. On 29 April 1967, the Division Tunnel Team explored 400 meters of tunnel in the vicinity of coordinates XT805265 while in support of 1-28 Infantry. Nothing of military significance was found.

3. (C) Listed below are the activities in support of the Division Chemical Section, of the 242d Chemical Detachment during the reporting period 1 February to 30 April 1967.

a. During the entire reporting period, the 242d Chemical Detachment was commanded by ILT Charles P. Barber who led his "tunnel rats" on all tunnel exploration missions in support of the 1st Infantry Division and in many cases in support of IIFFV units.

b. The 242d Chemical Detachment maintained the status of all defoliation requests and progress of 1st Infantry Division defoliation projects and also those of III Corps which lie within the 1st Infantry Division Area of Responsibility.

c. The detachment provided crew personnel acting as tail-gaters and pushers in CS-I drum drops conducted by the 1st Infantry Division Chemical Section.

d. The 242d Chemical Detachment provided a team which travelled to Divisional units performing hydrostatic tests on all organizational flamethrowers.
Members of the 242d Chemical Detachment assisted the Edgewood Arsenal CS Test Team currently in Vietnam studying the persistency of various types of CS.

Listed below are the activities of the 266 Chemical Platoon (DS) commanded by LT Charles Auslander during the reporting period 1 February 1967 to 30 April 1967 in support of the Division Chemical Section.

a. The Chemical Platoon has had maintenance contact teams at 1st and 3d Brigades of the 1st Infantry Division during the entire reporting period. They have provided the Brigades with chemical maintenance, assistance in CS operations, ground based defoliation and insect control.

b. The Chemical Platoon has served as the Division Base Camp Area Rapid Reaction Force and also conducted reconnaissance and ambush patrols in the areas of the 1st Infantry Division Headquarters Base Camp, DI AN, RVN. On several occasions, the platoon has had to extract patrols that have come under fire or become lost. This has always been accomplished without incident.

c. The Chemical Platoon has provided personnel for tunnel operations with the Division Chemical Section Tunnel Team whenever additional personnel have been needed. They have also checked out many reports of tunnel systems reported around the DI AN Base Camp. Many of these reports turned out to be old wells and have no connection with tunnel complexes. On several occasions the platoon has provided security for the Division Chemical Section Tunnel Team while operating in the vicinity of DI AN Base Camp.

d. The Chemical Platoon has held an active part in all CS aerial drops conducted by the 1st Infantry Division during this reporting period. They have maintained a supply of CS drums ready for aerial delivery. These drums are requisitioned, prepared, and held in the platoon storage area for all missions. The platoon also provided the Division Chemical Section with personnel to participate in aerial CS drops on enemy targets.

e. The Chemical Platoon modified the M-4 Burster by removing the incendiary mix substituting Composition C-3 in its place. This improved the reliability of proper functioning and reduced the amount of CS-1 that is “burned off” when the standard incendiary mix is used.

f. On 3 January, the Chemical Platoon began a persistency test of Riot Control Agent CS-1. Several methods of bursting 55 gal drums of CS and several different jungle conditions were selected for conduct of the test. After dissemination of the CS a periodical check was made on its persistency. The results appear as Observations in paragraph II A. (Lessens Learned).

g. The Chemical Platoon has provided personnel, equipment, and materiel for defoliation missions of all 1st Infantry Division Base Camps during the entire reporting period.

h. The Chemical Platoon has assisted in providing needed items in a civic action project. They have provided firewood, school supplies, food stuffs, and toys to the children at the Salesian Sisters Self Help School located in THU DUC, RVN. Many of the items were gifts from friends and families of the platoon in the United States.

i. Members of the 266 Chemical Platoon assisted the Edgewood Arsenal CS Test Team currently in Vietnam studying the persistency of various types of CS.
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II. Commander's Observations and Recommendations

A. OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS

ITEM: Personnel with physical profiles precluding utilization in combat elements are being assigned to the Division.

DISCUSSION: HQ, USARV, has authorized immediate reassignment of such individuals, but the administrative excess and loss of man-days is significant. A limited number of profiled personnel can be used within base camps in support type activities.

OBSERVATION: A thorough screening of personnel records at transfer stations and processing centers for physical profiles prior to assignment will preclude the assignment of such individuals to the Division.

CHAPLAIN

ITEM: Full Sunday religious coverage during intensive operations is possible.

DISCUSSION: On Easter Sunday (26 March 1967) the entire Division was at the height of activity in Operation JUNCTION CITY. In addition to services which should be held for combat units in the field, the large number of support personnel at base camps required full programming. The challenge was to conduct Easter Sunday services for all troops. The cooperation of the Aviation section and the efforts of all chaplains to move from place to place rapidly resulted in services for Protestants and Catholics at all Division locations except one, where sporadic VC mortaring made the gathering of men inadvisable.

OBSERVATION: While the regular practice of holding services on weekdays instead of Sunday is advisable in some instances, it is possible to program Sunday services for all even in the midst of extensive operations.

PAYROLLS

ITEM: To expedite the returns of military payrolls to the Division Finance Office.

DISCUSSION: The requirement for Class A Agent Officers to return their payrolls to the Division Finance Office frequently resulted in delayed returns because of non-availability of transportation from the Agent Officer's location to DI AN. Payroll turnback teams were established and sent out to the three forward base camps for the purpose of taking the payroll returns.

OBSERVATION: This procedure proved to be quite satisfactory in expediting returns of the payrolls. This permitted the Finance Office to hasten the transmission of the payrolls to the servicing accounts office and to make prompt payments to hospitalized personnel and personnel in the stockade. Earlier receipt of the payrolls has also permitted the office to begin the payroll cycle for the current month much earlier than before.

FINANCIAL INQUIRIES

ITEM: To better coordinate finance matters at base camps and to insure that expeditious action is taken on finance inquiries.

DISCUSSION: Since finance service is so important to the morale of the troops it was determined that an NCO with considerable finance experience should be attached to the base camps at LAI KHE and PHUOC VINH. This NCO could provide more personal attention to the financial problems of the troops.
OBSERVATION: Both NCOs were attached for the specific purpose of providing finance service, thereby freeing them to provide more extensive service than the unit PSNCOs. The liaison NCOs made frequent trips to forward unit locations and reported their findings directly to the Finance Office so that corrective action and follow-up action could be taken. The processing of allotments, pay change data, and copies of the morning reports were expedited by being routed through the liaison NCO directly to the Finance Office. Some unit rosters were also obtained by the NCOs, which aided in ensuring that all personnel assigned to the units were on the proper payrolls. The overall quality of the payrolls has been significantly improved by the utilization of the Finance Liaison NCO.

AB-216 TOWER

ITEM: Erection of AB-216 tower at Division Forward CP.

DISCUSSION: One of the major accomplishments of the 121st Signal Battalion during this period was the strategic use of an AB-216 tower in a tactical situation. The signal battalion demonstrated its versatility and capability during Operation JUNCTION CITY. The tower was airlifted by Chinook from DI AN to HNKH THANH, where the division would establish its CP, and in less than 24 hours the tower was completely erected to a height of 120 ft. This clearly demonstrated the versatility of the tower, the ease with which it could be erected and most importantly, the short length of time it required.

OBSERVATION: By means of the tower, the signal battalion was able to establish all the VHF systems necessary to tie in the division and non-divisional units which otherwise would either have been marginal or inoperative in terms of effective communications.

TRC-24 TRANSMITTER

ITEM: Minimum Voltage on TRC-24's.

DISCUSSION: A policy put into effect during this reporting period was the method of reducing the heat and power consumption on the TRC-24 Transmitter. By tuning up for maximum signal strength at the receiver end, the distant transmitter would cut back on its 750V until the strength at the distant receiver just starts to fall off. At this point, the 750V adjust is set for minimum power at maximum signal strength.

OBSERVATION: The decrease in high voltage, while still maintaining a maximum signal level, has cut down on the number of power units and transmitters being dead-lined for overheating and overloading.

CIRCUITS

ITEM: Priority Circuits.

DISCUSSION: When moving circuits while the Division Forward CP disperses, practice has been to place a priority on those circuits to be re-established. Common practice was to give a high priority to the teletype circuits serving the Division Com Center; however, all of the teletype circuits are speech-plus, and the voice side was a lower priority. This resulted in confusion and, in many instances required the patch to be broken and later the voice side added again.

OBSERVATION: Priority circuits in the future will be established with the voice side on, therefore, alleviating any confusion and breakdown of speech-plus patches. Instruction will be issued to this effect.
ITEM: RC-292 Antennas.

DISCUSSION: It was noted that by placing RC-292 antennas on top of the AB-216 tower, the range of the RT-524 radio set was greatly increased. At the same time, however, the long coaxial cables sometimes tended to act as antennas themselves and frequently caused spurious radiation that interfered with adjacent radios. By utilizing the PP-2959 power supply, the RT-524 could be mounted on top of the tower along with the matching unit and antenna, and remote from this location as well as from the base of the tower.

OBSERVATION: In so placing the radio on top of the tower, better range was achieved, no loss of power resulted from excessively long antenna cables, and spurious radiation was eliminated.

ITEM: B+ Setting on R-417 Receiver.

DISCUSSION: At the beginning of the reporting period, the VHF systems were found to have crackling and popping noises on the receiver which was a carryover to the channels. It was determined that the cause of this was the setting of the B+ on the receiver in conjunction with the extreme climatic heat. If the B+ was set at 30 or more, excessive voltage on the plates of the tubes plus the heat in the rigs caused saturation and consequently built up a space charge which was amplified and fed onto the channels with the carrier.

OBSERVATION: By reducing the B+ setting slightly below the 30 mark, the tubes will not overconduct and the noises from the receiver are eliminated.

ARTILLERY COMMUNICATIONS

ITEM: VHF Communications for the GS Artillery Battalion.

DISCUSSION: "VHF communications for the general support artillery battalion headquarters is essential to the efficient control of its widely dispersed batteries. VHF use includes coordination for ammunition resupply, maintenance and logistics support, unit movement, target clearance, data, and other administrative traffic. Whereas direct support artillery battalions are generally in a position to tie into a brigade signal center, the GS battalion frequently is not."

OBSERVATION: The 1 ton truck and trailer mounted VHF terminal set is ideally suited for employment with the general support artillery battalion.

DETECTION OF MINES

ITEM: Detection of Newly Placed Mines.

DISCUSSION: Experience from Operations Tucson and Junction City indicates that jungle clearing should continue as long as the road is open and the area is secured. Jungle clearing must be preplanned and integrated into the security plan for the route being opened. While clearing jungle along side of roads the detection of mines is facilitated.

OBSERVATION: Clearing of jungle from both sides of a route which has been secure is essential for detection of newly emplaced mines.
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FOXHOLE DIGGING

ITEM: Hard Ground Foxhole Digging.

DISCUSSION: During a recent operation, the 1st Engineer Battalion learned that two man foxholes could be dug in extremely hard soil in one hour by two men. First, dig a hole the diameter of the shovel and 1/2 to 2 feet deep, place one pound of C-4 with a foot of time fuse at the bottom, backfill the hole. After the explosion the ground is soft and easily removed. Depending on the foxhole size desired, place successively two pound charges at the same depth and about 1/2 feet from the foxhole which had been dug. This second detonation will enlarge the foxhole for two or three more personnel.

OBSERVATION: The shape and depth of foxhole are limited only by the ingenuity of the personnel digging them. Normal demolition safety procedures will be used.

JUNGLE CLEARING

ITEM: Jungle Clearing Operations.

DISCUSSION: Jungle clearing techniques were refined during a clearing operation, 2-13 April, near PHU L01. Windrowing was eliminated; cutting of jungle was organized. This increased the acreage/dozer/day from about 8 to 17, allowing the vegetation to lie for two or three days following clearing permitted it to dry sufficiently for generous small fires to effectively destroy this waste material. During clearing operations, the dozer and plow teams should have a 250 cfm air compressor, and a sufficient supply of oil, transmission fluids, oil filters, and blade sharpeners. For proper maintenance, blades should be sharpened once during the two hours of concentrated maintenance which should be conducted each evening while in the field.

OBSERVATION: The only time windrowing should be used is when clearing fields of fire. Proper utilization of the two hour maintenance period will increase work time and prevent unnecessary delays.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

ITEM: Continuous Psychological Operation Campaigns.

DISCUSSION: During Operation JUNCTION CITY it was confirmed that main force VC and NVA units are not susceptible to intensive short-term PSYOPS campaigns, even when these campaigns are combined with large scale military operations. To establish the required credibility and to influence effectively an individual's mind it is necessary to conduct continuous PSYOPS.

OBSERVATION: Continuous PSYOPS programs are required to influence effectively a target audience. Even continuous programs will not be effective unless the proper environment is established by effective US/PHIL combat actions.

CHIEU NOI

ITEM: Chieu Hoi Appeals to NVA.

DISCUSSION: It appears that soldiers and cadre of NVA units are not influenced by the normal Chieu Hoi appeals directed at VC units. A primary selling point of these appeals is that by rallying, individuals have the opportunity to return home to their families and friends. This does not apply to soldiers from North Vietnam.

OBSERVATION: Special attention must be devoted to developing new, attractive appeals if we are to convince members of the NVA to rally.
ITEM: Requirement for School Trained PSYOPS Personnel.

DISCUSSION: With the decentralization of the psychological operations program within the Division, necessitated by loss of key personnel, Brigade S-5's have assumed increased responsibility for conducting PSYOPS. The division currently has only two PSYOPS school trained personnel. The lack of training, particularly at brigade level, is certain to have a temporarily adverse effect on the quality and effectiveness of the division psychological operations program.

OBSERVATION: School trained PSYWAR staff officers are needed at all levels of command within the division.

USE OF HOI CHANH

ITEM: Use of Ho Chi Minh (former VC who rally under the Chieu Hoi Program).

DISCUSSION: During Operation MANHATTAN the value of Ho Chi Minh personnel employed by the Division G-5 Section was highlighted when one of these ralliers led division elements to a large weapons cache.

OBSERVATION: Some ralliers have detailed knowledge of VC methods, beliefs, and operations. They can, in many instances, furnish valuable intelligence information or help on tactical operations.

CHEMICAL

Burning Landing Zones

ITEM: Landing Zone (LZ) Clearing.

DISCUSSION: A requirement exists for an adequate means to clear an unoccupied LZ of grasses and shrubs to facilitate heliborne assaults. Several methods were employed, only one which is feasible, and simpler: starting fires with incendiary grenades dropped from aircraft.

OBSERVATION: One incendiary grenade dropped from a helicopter flying 500 feet above the ground is sufficient to burn grassy areas 100 meters by 50 meters in a 5 knot wind within approximately 30 minutes during the dry season.

Aircraft Mounted E-63

ITEM: Aircraft Mounted E-63 Manpack Personnel Detector (Chemical).

DISCUSSION: Upon learning of recent success by other units in the employment of the E-63 Manpack Personnel Detector installed in army aircraft, the Division Chemical Section initiated an airborne personnel detection program. To date, the program has furnished the following results:

a. With some modifications, the detector can be operated from either the UH-1D or OH-13 helicopter. Power can be furnished to the detector by the aircraft's electrical system instead of by the rechargeable nickel-cadmium batteries furnished with the instrument. This type power supply allows the detector to operate for longer periods and cuts down on instrument weight—an important factor in OH-13 operations.

b. The instrument has detected personnel on a number of tests. These tests were usually conducted during high speed, low level flight in either UH-1D or OH-13 aircraft. These tests have indicated that the detector appears to have a high potential for successful operations in remote jungle areas which are uninhabited except for enemy troops utilizing the cover of the jungle canopy. Tests have also indicated that successful operation of the detector is more difficult during periods of cool weather, or during the hours of darkness.
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OBSERVATION: Tests reveal that personnel hiding under a jungle canopy can be detected by electrical-chemical means such as the E-63 Personnel Detector mounted in aircraft.

ITEM: CS Persistency Test.

DISCUSSION: The results of the persistency test referred to in the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period 1 November - 31 January 1967 have been completed.

OBSERVATION: During the lst Infantry Division CS Persistency Tests (January - April 1967) five separate areas in the jungle southwest of Dl AN, RVN were contaminated with chemical agent CS-I. These areas, indicated below, were then examined daily periodically between 1300 and 1430 hours to determine the degree of CS Persistency: Area 1 - 80 lbs CS-I in 55 gal drums was detonated with an M-4 incendiary burster under the jungle canopy, Area 2 - Same type of drum and agent, detonated on the forest floor. Area 3 - As in Area 1 above, except that the CS drum was detonated with Composition C-3. Area 4 - As in Area 2 above, except that the CS drum was detonated with Composition C-3. Area 5 - Ten 8 lb bags of CS-I were bursted on the ground with detonator cord. The degree of CS contamination (persistency) in each of the five test areas was designated as follows:

**** = heavy contamination (cannot walk through the area).
***** = moderate contamination (cannot camp or work in the area).
** = light contamination (can work in the area, but mask required).
* = slight contamination (can camp or work in the area without mask, but still some irritation).
- = no contamination.

Results of these tests are indicated in the following tables:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA 1</th>
<th>Days Following Initial Contamination</th>
<th>Degree of Persistency</th>
<th>Surface RH</th>
<th>Camp % O2</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tr>
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<td>79</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Trace of rain previous night</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Trace of rain previous night</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>Trace of rain 4th night</td>
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</tr>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>0.5&quot; rain 43rd and 46th days respectively</td>
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+ Area examined in AM
### Area 2

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<td>****</td>
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<td>***</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>85</td>
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<td>23</td>
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</table>

+ Area examined in AK

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

+ Area examined in JK

AMMUNITION RESUPPLY

ITEM: Heavy Drop of Artillery Ammunition.

DISCUSSION: During Operation JUNCTION CITY, some ammunition resupply was accomplished by means of heavy air drop. Ammunition (105mm) so delivered was in jungle sack containers and was un-fused. Fuses were dropped separately. This resulted in the components becoming widely scattered over the drop zone, creating difficulty in recovering complete rounds of ammunition. Additionally, the use of jungle packs created a considerable 'back haul' problem for the firing units.

OBSERVATION: A method for dropping fused ammunition in palletized fiber containers would greatly expedite recovery of complete rounds and would virtually eliminate back-haul problems. This is particularly important when the firing unit is in an airmobile configuration with little or no ground transportation capabilities.

TRANSPORT OF ARTILLERY AMMUNITION

ITEM: Transport of 155/3" ammunition.

DISCUSSION: 155mm How/3" how batteries are required by tactical necessity to carry zero ammunition than their organic transportation will allow. Thus, when displacing a battery, or for the purpose of resupply, vehicles from several batteries may have to be pooled in order to move or resupply one battery. This seriously impairs mobility of the 155/3" battalion as a whole since batteries may be unable to react quickly to a requirement to displace because of nonavailability of transport.

OBSERVATION: Medium and heavy artillery units in Vietnam should be authorized additional 5 ton trucks for the purpose of hauling ammunition. A 50% increase would be sufficient.

AIRCRAFT RON

ITEM: RON of aircraft in field locations.

DISCUSSION: During Operation JUNCTION CITY, an OH-13 aircraft remained overnight at FSB "C" (255585). The purpose was to provide a means whereby an air observer could be airborne immediately if the base came under mortar or ground attack. On one occasion where the base came under such attack, the aircraft was craned below it could become airborne.

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OBSERVATION: Aircraft should not remain at threatened bases if a better alternative is available. If possible, they should be on standby alert at a nearby location which combines a higher degree of safety with adequate response time.

VT ARTILLERY

DETAILED: Firing of VT fused artillery on roads to prevent laying of mines.

DISCUSSION: The technique of firing VT fused artillery on roads during hours of darkness is effective; however, the fragments imbedded in the road surface create an almost insurmountable obstacle to mine detection the following day.

OBSERVATION: When a supported unit requests VT fire on roads, the artillery unit should apprise them of the fact that their road clearing operation will be hampered by fragments the following day.

DOCTOR ATTACK

DETAILED: Vehicle damage during mortar attacks.

DISCUSSION: Recent experiences have indicated that the predominant vehicular damage sustained during mortar attacks is damaged tires.

OBSERVATION: Tires should be sandbagged on a priority basis upon occupation of positions. During the dry season, a better solution is to dig vehicles in to the top of the tires; however, with the advent of the monsoon rains, this is unsatisfactory. Vehicles must be sandbagged.

AB YAMBO-AL

DETAILED: Unit Strength.

DISCUSSION: Even though the 1st Military Police Company is presently overstrength, the company has been decreasing in manpower for the last three quarters. This has adversely affected the number of missions which the company is able to perform. The TO&E is not adequate to support the division in the manner in which it is currently deployed with widely separated bases connected by unsecured roads. The company must maintain personnel in six separate locations performing both garrison and combat service support functions on a twenty-four hour basis.

OBSERVATION: Either of two courses must be taken in order to continue the effectiveness of Military Police support. The strength of the company could be kept at the level of previous quarters. This would require additional replacements above the current force. Alternatively, the company could be augmented on a semi-permanent basis with additional platoons from the 18th Military Police Brigade, their number dependent upon the stabilized strength of the company.

TIMBER TRUSSLE BENT

DETAILED: Timber trussle bent replacement in mud.

DISCUSSION: During JUNCTION CITY, a company, 1st Engineer Battalion, constructed footings for timber trussle bent in soft mud. Five foot sections of creosoted 3" X 12" lumber were driven vertically into the ground with an 85 pound air hammer. These five foot sections formed a crib which was bound with 5/8" cable. The mud was removed and replaced with rock and laterite which was tamped in place to form 100 square feet of hard surface. This should be adequate in all but the most intensive conditions.
OBSERVATION: This technique could be used not only in soft stream beds, but also where there is a possibility of erosion.

LOGISTICS

ITEM: Failure to Coordinate Changes in Airlift Cargo.

DISCUSSION: When a unit's airlift request reaches the Air Force, aircraft are "fragged" according to the amount of cargo and passengers to be moved. If the requesting unit makes no changes to its request before the day of the lift, it is assumed that the cargo brought to the airstrip is the same as that which is on the airlift request. Units will sometimes make changes without informing the DTO. This delays the established airlift schedule. It is not usually difficult to change an airlift request, provided the changes are requested in sufficient time to alert the Air Force.

OBSERVATION: Unit planners must make an effort to determine exactly what equipment is to be moved with their unit and to insure that changes, if they occur, are promptly reflected in amended requests for airlift.

AIRLIFT REQUESTS

ITEM: Excessive Delay in Submitting Airlift Requests.

DISCUSSION: At times during Operation JUNCTION CITY there was a considerable delay between the time a unit received notification of a planned move and the time at which it submitted its requirements for airlift. Requests for airlift must be submitted a minimum of 72 hours prior to the required delivery date of the unit at its destination. If this 72 hour lead time is not met it becomes necessary for the priority on the lift to be raised to a CS (combat essential). This disrupts airlift scheduling and often results in a delay of other division lifts of lower priority.

OBSERVATION: Units must submit their requirements immediately upon notification of a future move. Careful prior planning will allow much of the required information to be readily available.

DISPOSITION OF UNSERVICEABLE AMMUNITION

ITEM: Disposition of Unserviceable Ammunition During and After Operations.

DISCUSSION: Ammunition supply doctrine presently directs that unserviceable ammunition be documented by using units and turned in to the nearest ASP. However, on more than one occasion, after closure of Log Command operated ASPs at QUA and UDC, all unserviceable ammunition has been left to be disposed of by the division. This presents problems in obtaining backhaul transportation and it also leads to the destruction of much unserviceable ammunition which could be renovated if it were evacuated to the Ammunition Depot.

OBSERVATION: After each operation a period of time should be set aside for the Logistical Command to clean up the ASP and to evacuate or destroy all unserviceable Class V material.

FORWARD SUPPLY POINTS

ITEM: Evacuation and Back Haul from Forward Supply Points.

DISCUSSION: During Operation JUNCTION CITY the movement of unserviceable vehicles, ammunition residues, salvage, and supplies from 500th KAI by the 1st Logistical Command presented several coordination problems:
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a. Unserviceable Vehicles: Items collected at 1st Supply and Transport Battalion SPMage Collection Points were processed for turn-in to the 1st Logistical Command for further evacuation to the L.HW/SHW/SGW area. Initially, 1st Logistical Command did not feel it was their responsibility. This was resolved and arrangements were made to obtain transportation from 1st Logistical Command sources. Loading and tie-down were accomplished by Support Command. Planning for this evacuation was complicated when it took the Highway Traffic Center four days to determine that there was a height obstruction on the road, and to designate another usable route.

b. Ammunition Residue: Great quantities of howitzer cartridges and packing material were at this position. When the 1st Logistical Command vehicles arrived to back-haul these items there were no side panels on the trailers. This required expedient methods using wooden pallets which proved to be less than satisfactory.

c. On Hand Supplies: The evacuation of SUQI DA at the termination of Phase I was made difficult by the lack of prior knowledge of the termination date. Supplies were still being hauled into the area. When it was evident that evacuation was required, 1st Logistical Command was left with a large stock on the ground. Eventually this location remained open to support elements of the 25th Infantry Division.

OBSERVATION:

a. That operations plans include specific responsibilities for evacuation, to include units supporting the division.

b. That division procedures be developed to ascertain highway height obstacles when information is not available from normal sources.

c. That particular arrangements be made to insure that trailers selected to back haul ammunition residues be specifically equipped with necessary side panels which can readily be picked up at the point of origin.

B. Recommendations: None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

J. C. FISCHER

Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: Special
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1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Infantry Division, 30 April 67 (RCS GFOR-65)

DA, HQ II FFORCEN, APO San Francisco 96266 30 JUN 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USAVE, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96307


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.

2. (O) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference Section II, Pg 45, Item - Heavy Drop of Artillery Ammunition: Air Force regulations prohibit the transportation of explosives and their fuzing devices in the same airplane unless the item is normally shipped assembled and considered safe for shipment. The Air Force will accept for air drop C443 (105mm HE w/fuze MTUQ) and C444 (105mm HE w/fuze PD). C445 is 105mm HE round without fuse. Almost 90 percent of the 105mm received in-country during this period was C445. There was a production stoppage of the M557 fuse which prevented the mating of the fuse at the projectile production line. Within CY67 the percentage of fused ammunition should increase, and the use of the jungle pack should decrease.

   b. Reference Section II, Pg 45, Item - Transport of 155/8" Ammunition: The requested vehicles have been received.

   c. Reference Section II, Pg 47, Item - Disposition of Unserviceable Ammunition During and After Operations: Concur in observation, provided adequate division security forces remain in place to protect the ASP personnel during the "cleanup" operation.

   d. Reference Section II, Pg 47, Item - Evacuation and Back Haul from Forward Supply Points: Concur in observation. This problem will receive specific attention in future logistical planning conferences preceding large-scale operations.

3. (U) Concur with the other comments, recommendations and actions taken.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

JAMES A. ULVENES
CPT, AGC
Asst AC

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AVHGC-DST (6 Jun 67) 2d Inc
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: UPO-OR, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning need for school trained PSYWAR staff officers, section II, part I, page 42: This headquarters has no record of authorization for PSYWAR staff officers within the unit. If a change in personnel authorization is required to add PSYWAR staff officers, MOE must be submitted IAW AR 310-31. If the MTOE reflect an overall increase in space, the availability of trade-off spaces should be addressed at each level of command. Unit will be informed of procedure via the routine indorsement which returns the report to the unit from this headquarters.

b. Reference item concerning MP unit strength, page 47: Nonconcur that the strength of the MP Company should be left at the level of previous quarters. The unit is being used in part to perform non-military police missions normally assigned to combat elements, and a review and realignment of missions must be accomplished in accordance with the anticipated overstrength reduction announced in Confidential USARV message AVHCC 49010 dated 14 July 1967. It is recognized that the Division MP Company TCE, 19-27G, is not adequate to provide military police support as outlined in FM 19-1 under conditions requiring multiple base camps and extended combat operations by all brigades. Both paragraphs 5b(1) and 20c of FM 19-1, Military Police Support, Army Division and Separate Brigades, in addition to paragraph 4-31a(4), FM 61-100, The Division, reflect that it will often be necessary to rely on backup support from non-divisional MP resources or augmentation teams from TOE 19-500 under such conditions. Since MTOE augmentation is not feasible under the current space moratorium, support must be sought from non-divisional MP resources. Division units have been temporarily augmented for major operations by platoon sized units from the 18th MP Brigade and full consideration will continue to be given 1st Division requests.

c. Reference item concerning heavy drop of artillery ammunition, section II, part I, page 45 and paragraph 2a, 1st Indorsement: Concur with 1st Indorsement comments. This headquarters has requested a larger quantity of fuzed 105mm HE ammunition be included in future USARV shipments. Until this requirement is met, ammunition could be fuzed prior to air drop by either the rigging crew or ammunition personnel. The jungle pack container will no longer be utilized once present in-country stocks are exhausted.
AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 30 April 1967 (HS CSFOR-65) (U)

d. Reference item concerning backhaul from FSA, section II, part I, page 46 and paragraph 2d, 1st Indorsement: Concur. If properly coordinated, the utilization of 1st Logistical Command vehicles for the movement of retrograde cargo results in efficient use of transportation. In most cases vehicles used for resupply return to the Saigon/Cholon area empty. Local arrangements will have to be made to insure that trailers are configured with side boards, as they are not normally used due to the high percentage of palletized cargo being transported.

FOR THE COMMANDEER:

1 Incl
nc (wd dupes)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 from HQ, 1st Infantry Division (RGCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning reorganization of Division G5 Section, Section I, page 9: The assignment of the responsibility for all division civic action support to a brigade instead of to SUPCOM is a new approach. The G5 will retain staff supervision of the civil affairs program evidently without controlling any resources. This headquarters will make this organization an item of interest on the next scheduled visit to USARV.

   b. Reference item concerning establishment of a civic action commodity storage facility, Section I, page 9: the 1st Infantry Division is the second division to establish a civic action commodity storage facility. The 25th Infantry Division established the initial one with their Helping Hand warehouse. By establishing a warehouse and civic action supply point, a unit can insure that those items which have a high usage factor are restocked from the International Voluntary agencies and USAID. With this large storage capability, the units will be able to react rapidly to civic action requirements. In a conflict such as Vietnam, the civic action supply requirements are so great that the establishment of civic action commodity storage point is a necessity. From the division standpoint, the civic action supply requirement necessitates the establishment of another class of supply.

   c. Reference item concerning Hamlet Festival, para 9b(7), page 7 of Inclosure 3, 1st Infantry Division Revolutionary Development Support: The term "Hamlet Festival" is used for a county fair type operation in villages that are not Viet Cong controlled. Units in the II FFV area of operations have found that county fair operations as conducted by the Marines tend to alienate the people of neutral or pro-government villages; therefore, a Hamlet Festival was devised which did not completely disrupt the daily lives of these villagers.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst. Ad
Incl 1 to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Key Officer Personnel

Following is a roster of key officer personnel in the 1st Infantry Division during the reporting period, 1 February 1967 - 30 April 1967.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>POSITION NAME, GRADE, SN</th>
<th>DATES</th>
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<tr>
<td>HQ, 1st Inf Div</td>
<td>DEPOT, WILLIAM S. MG, 025290</td>
<td>1 Feb 67 - 10 Feb 67</td>
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<td>HAY, J. H. MG, 025290</td>
<td>10 Feb 67 - 16 Mar 67</td>
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<td>HOLLINGSWORTH, JAMES F. BO, 034155</td>
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<td>KITCHENS, EDWARD B. JR. COL, 040352</td>
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<td>GORMAN, PAUL F. LTC, 0602379</td>
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<td>2-33 Arty</td>
<td>Danel, Charles D. JR.</td>
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20 March 1967

SUBJECT: 1st Infantry Division's Revolutionary Development Support

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) The following report concerns a search and seal operation of the village of TAN BINH XT 855360, South Vietnam conducted by the 1st Infantry Division in support of Revolutionary Development on 26-27 December 1966. The requirement for this report was MACRS.

2. (C) Background: TAN BINH XT 855360 is a village in North Central BINH DƯƠNG Province located on the margin of US-CVN influence. On 23 February 1966 the Viet Cong 272d Regiment reinforced the BINH DƯƠNG guerrilla units for an assault on elements of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division who were securing the road through TAN BINH. Since then the village has been a focus of VC mining incidents on Route 16, and a link between main force and/or guerrilla units and the peasants of the area. The populace of TAN BINH was early established as an objective of Operation LAMSON, the BINH DƯƠNG Revolutionary Development Campaign supported by 1st Infantry Division; however, the village's remotesness and vulnerability precluded other than infrequent forays until the last quarter of 1966. By then Operation LAMSON had progressed sufficiently in organization and area of influence to contemplate a systematic attack on VC control over TAN BINH. One should note that the unique organizational arrangements and sophisticated operational techniques that were implemented on the 26-27 December 1966 period, here described, are still evolving.

3. (C) ORGANIZATION: To provide a clutch and gear mechanism to match the speed and power of the 1st Infantry Division to the slow, arduous pace of Revolutionary Development, the Commanding General created the the Revolutionary Development Task Force (RDTF), with the primary mission of planning and executing LAMSON. The RDTF consists of a commander and staff equivalent to that of an infantry battalion in grade experience, and responsibility, plus a modest compliment of communicators, intelligence specialists, drivers, and other mission essential personnel. RDTF strength in late December 1966 was Officers--15; EM--32; it possessed 12 trucks, 1/4 ton; 2 trucks, 2½ ton; miscellaneous small arms and 11 radios. Personnel spaces for the RDTF were drawn in part from the Division Headquarters, Division Artillery, TO&E units, but mainly from the division overstrength resources. Some members of the RDTF are Vietnamese language trained; others are drawn from the division's trained intelligence and psywar assets; most, however, possess no particular qualifications for their task. The equipment is hand receipted from diverse sources. The RDTF functions as a staff to plan and coordinate operations, providing the division with a corporate memory of the minutiae of BINH DƯƠNG Province which our brigade and battalion staffs, moving from mission to mission, are unable to develop. RDTF functions also as a headquarters to establish liaison with and to obtain cooperation from the ARVN Provincial and other Vietnamese units, in conjunction with which our LAMSON operations are usually conducted. During an operation RDTF is attached to one of the TO&E brigades or battalions thereby augmenting the tactical commander's capacity to know and understand the BINH DƯƠNG situation, and to dovetail his efforts to those of GVN units.

4. (C) SITUATION: 26 December 1966, RDTF maintained a continual watch in the BINH DƯƠNG CHIEU NOI (Open Arms) Camp in an effort to gain intelligence from ralliers undergoing rehabilitation training. One of the NOI CHANH
SUBJECT: 1st Infantry Division's Revolutionary Development Support

(Ralliers) who was selected for a special interview in December was an ex-VC Recondo from the village of TAN BINH. During his interview he stated that there were VC in his village and that they controlled the people. According to his statement, the Viet Cong re-entered the village at approximately 1700 hours daily along with the local farmers leaving their fields at the end of the working day. The VC would eat supper and occasionally conduct propaganda meetings in the village. Having been shown an aerial photo, the rallier pointed out some of the houses belonging to the VC and some of their favorite meeting places. The rallier verified that there were no tactical defensive positions within the village, only a few foxholes in a rubber plantation which bordered the village. He further pinpointed the escape routes which the VC intended to use in cases of attack by US or ARVN forces. The ralliers further indicated that the VC normally departed the village at 2400 hours.

5. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION: 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division was assigned the mission of executing a seal and search of TAN BINH immediately after the Christmas truce. The RDTF, two infantry battalions, one cavalry troop (v:inf) and one artillery battalion were attached to the 1st Brigade for the operation. 40 UH-1D helicopters and three CH-47 helicopters were placed in support. RDTF arranged for the participation of the local district intelligence platoon augmented by the 10th National Police (aggregate strength 55) and the 5th Reconnaissance Company of the 5th ARVN Division (strength of 60). RDTF furnished these units communications, transportation, and liaison with US units. As had been its practice, the 1st Brigade further organized into (a) Seal Force and (b) Search Force.

a. Seal Forces: The two US infantry battalions (1-26 and 1-28 Inf) and the cavalry troop were assigned to surround the town. This external positioning put US firepower and mobility where it would do the most good against VC and the least harm to the peasant's property or lives. US troops are readily trained for this role, which is only slightly different from other military operations.

b. Search Forces: The RDTF and the GVN forces were assigned to search the village. Use of Vietnamese for the task offered important advantages. First, the Vietnamese are familiar with local customs and culture and are readily able to detect matters out of the ordinary. Such as hidden items located in wells, latrines, furniture, manure heaps, storage areas, or other common place facilities. They have proven to be indispensable in uncovering hidden weapons, equipment, and personnel. Secondly, the presence of Vietnamese Forces projects an image of GVN efficiency, professionalism, and self-sufficiency. Thirdly, the practice of the Vietnamese searching the homes of Vietnamese avoids for the US the stigma of "foreigners" imposing their power and might on the people.

6. (C) CONCEPT: Colonel S.B. Berry, CO, 1st Brigade recognized that surprise was central to the success of his plan. This plan provided that the infantry seal forces would be introduced into the area by simultaneous heliborne assaults into four LZs directly from the 1st Brigade's base camp at PHUOC VINH XG 9649. Cavalry forces would move overland from their base at PHU LOI XT 8116, arriving at H-hour to reinforce the infantry battalions. H-hour would be 1800H 26 December 1966. Both the selected hour and date were significant. The Christmas Truce period ended at 0700H that day and it was believed that the Viet Cong least expected the initiation of a major US operation between the Christmas and the New Years "Truces." The H-hour of 1800H was selected to allow the Viet Cong to enter the village as they normally did at the end of the day. The search plan was based on the population, size, and physical layout of the huts within the village. Photo reconnaissance established that a thorough search could be accomplished by using the search forces initially, each force responsible for a zone within the village. Search forces would
be committed simultaneously with seal forces to allow an immediate
search of selected houses before the VC could take evasive action.
All males aged 15-45 would be assembled and evacuated. Additional
search forces would be employed on order. Flares dropped by Air Force
aircraft and tank search lights would be employed throughout the
night to enable search forces to continue an effective search during
the hours of darkness. Additionally, the illumination would deny the
VC freedom to move undetected around the village throughout the night.

7. (C) DECEPTION: Previous experience had indicated that seal
and search plans were often compromised. Therefore, deception measures
were made an integrated part of the plan. The operations order cited
HOC VAN, XT 9951, 20 km from TAN BINH, as the objective. This plan
was then coordinated with local ARVN and GVN forces. Even US troops
were not informed of the actual objective area, and all orders were
issued on diagrams rather than on maps. It was not until a few hours
before the operation was to begin that the actual target, TAN BINH,
was announced, and troops were informed only at the latest feasible
time.

8. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Seal: The seal forces landed on all four landing zones
at precisely 1800 hours. Two aerial rifle platoons gave an added
degree of airmobile reaction to the troops on the ground by conducting
"eagle flights" designed to pounce on VC fleeing the village while
ground forces tightened the seal and completed their link-up. Search
forces were airlifted by CH-47 helicopters and were landed outside of
the village between the groups of seal forces. The seal of the village
was completed at 1829 hours.

b. Search: The search forces entered the village at 1915H.
All males between the ages of 15 and 45 were instructed to report to
the village school-house for screening. At this location all males
were screened by a rallier from the village in an attempt to identify
known VC. Three US and Vietnamese IPW teams interrogated the males
at the school-house, and names were compared with a prepared black
list. Five 1-ton vehicles were airlifted in with the search forces.
Three of the vehicles were used as command vehicles. One of the
command vehicles remained stationary at the search force command post
while the other two vehicles were used to move detainees found by the
search forces. The two remaining vehicles were gun jeeps used to
provide security and to man check points within the village. Ralliers
were used with all of the search teams. Some of these ralliers were
from the renowned Viet Cong PHU LOI Battalion and were especially
useful since TAN BINH was an old PHU LOI Battalion refuge. The rallier
who had furnished most of the intelligence for the operation accom-
pounded RDTF and GVN personnel on raids of VC houses he had identified
earlier. Prepared speeches were made by other ralliers to the villagers.
They cited reasons why they had returned to the side of the government,
the warm welcome and kind treatment that they had recived when they
were accepted back with open arms under the CHIEU NH program. A US
officer and radio operator of RDTF accompanied each search force. In
conjunction with the US advisors to participate with ARVN forces, these
RDTF people monitored the activities and rendered progress reports to
the RDTF tactical command post within the village. Another liaison
party remained at the US 1st Brigade command post to keep the brigade
commander abreast of the internal search and to advise the RDTF command
post of the seal forces' activities. Because of the late initial
search on the evening of 25 December 1966, a fresh search force was
introduced on the morning of 27 December 1966. Two platoons from the
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Binh Long Province intelligence company accompanied the new search forces. Two mobile interview teams roamed throughout the village interviewing approximately 40 persons. Through questioning they acquired information on VC forces operating in the area and on VC tax collection activity. It was learned that taxes are collected on a monthly basis and range from 5 to 35 piasters per person. Homes of known VC were visited and the inhabitants questioned as to why their relatives had joined the VC. Few of the persons interviewed showed any signs of fear and many talked openly. The usual answer was that their sons had refused to obey parental authority and then had joined the VC. Many of the families expressed their desire to be reunited with their relatives who had been recruited or drafted by the Viet Cong. Answers such as these led into discussions of the CHIEU HOI program.

c. Psychological Operations: As the village was sealed, a PsyOps helicopter equipped with loudspeakers made its initial broadcast by informing the villagers that they were surrounded and warning them that anyone trying to escape would be considered as Viet Cong and would be engaged by fire. Upon introduction of search forces, an intensive PsyOps program was directed toward the villagers by using a platoon of 20 ralliers from the Binh Long Province CHIEU HOI center. These individuals were separated into two groups to accompany the search forces through the two search zones. The ralliers moved through the village distributing leaflets and a safe conduct pass to each of the inhabitants. The people were questioned by the ralliers in regard to VC activities in the area and were told of the CHIEU HOI program and all its benefits. After the 26 February 1966 attack, the village males had been rounded up and the women had rioted in protest against their removal. To preclude a recurrence of this disorder, a PsyOps team broadcasted a message by helicopter reassuring the women that the men would be returned to the village within two days. It further warned that if the women protested or demonstrated, the men would be detained longer. Subsequent PsyOps messages were delivered as the operation progressed. Messages were aimed at enhancing control of the populace and issuing warnings of the consequences for harboring Viet Cong forces or allowing guerrillas to use the village as a staging area for harassing US and GVN forces.

d. Evacuation: CH-47s were utilized to evacuate detainees gathered by the search forces. National Police provided security during the flight to the Province Headquarters. At the National Police Headquarters all detainees underwent a thorough interrogation to identify VC and VC sympathizers and to build the police dossier on each inhabitant ofTan Binh.

e. Results: the Tan Binh seal and search terminated at 1100 hours on 27 December 1966 with the following results:

4 VC KIA (killed attempting to escape the seal)
9 PW (captured by the search force)
6 Draft Evaders (turned over to GVN)
1 ARVN Deserter (turned over to ARVN)
201 Detainees (turned over to the National Police for further questioning)

9. (C) ASSESSMENT: The results of the Tan Binh undertaking when measured against the body-count of certain two-battalion operations are most unspectacular. However, the seal and search and Operation LAM SON of which it was a part must be evaluated in a larger context.
a. Strategy: The Division Commander interpreted his mission as necessitating two differing coincident campaigns: one campaign against the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army Main Force units and a second campaign aimed at wresting control over the people of BINH DUONG Province from the VC local guerrillas and cadre. He conceived these campaigns as interrelated, interacting military operations. A systematic offensive against the Viet Cong 9th Division and the Viet Cong BINH DUONG Province Battalion served to drive these units from the centers of population, depriving the local VC guerrillas of military support, and permitting our use of smaller, less well armed forces in the inhabited areas. Simultaneously, a campaign of attrition aimed at the local irregulars and cadre acted to deprive main force units of guides, communication and liaison and sources of money, food, women and other comforts of civilization. The latter campaign, named TAN SON, consisted not only of search operations in hamlets, but of systematic reduction of the Viet Cong's nearby jungle redoubts.

Thus, the TAN SON operation of December 1966, took place after three successive BIG RED ONE victories over the VC 272d Regiment and two victories over the 511th Battalion, all in the period since the 24 February 1966 Battle of TAN BINH. Moreover, during the same eight month period the BONG TRAM Jungle lying immediately north and west of TAN BINH had been subjected to an intensive, scheduled destruction program which integrated B-52 strikes, tactical air and artillery with troop search and destroy operations. Two very large base camps therein had been destroyed, as well as nine smaller ones. The forest had been defoliated chemically and torn by fire to the point that aerial surveillance over its entirety was possible. Gravel mines were periodically laid on the trails of the BONG TRAM Jungle, and were still active during late December 1966. PayWar of the division stressed the futility of living like a monkey in the Jungle, and pointed out each successful VC KIA or capture in BINH DUONG hamlets to convey the reality of no refuge for the Viet Cong, and to urge them therefore to rally to the GVN. TAN BINH, 26 December 1966, was one small part of this larger design. Some statistical comparisons between the two campaigns for the last ten weeks of 1966 follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ops Against</th>
<th>Revolutionary Development Ops</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US KHA</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US WHA</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC P5WI</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIEN HOI</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETAINES</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRAFT DODGERS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESERTERS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANEUVER BN-DAYS**</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: (*) = Hailiers in 1st Infantry Division TACR
** = Battalion-days of active operations in field; does not include training or preparation for operations.

As one can see from this experience, Revolutionary Development operations have a smaller amount of carnage than main force operations, and are less rewarding in terms of per maneuver battalion-day, but experience shows that such as the one breeds progress in the other. VC losses for the subsequent five week period of early 1967 amounted to 1,216, as follows:
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Main Force Ops  Rev Icyv Ops  Total

VC KIA (RT)  389  65  454
VC PW  180  155  335
CHUY HOI  471  

TOTAL  1,235

b. Tactics and Techniques

(1) Intelligence: Sound intelligence for targeting is still scarce now; its acquisition is a cumulative and localizing process, underlining the necessity for an agency to provide a continuity of the intelligence support for the target area. Use of ralliers and VC PWs in the collection effort has proven invaluable. Tactical maps, even the 1/25,000 picto-map, lack the detail for planning house-to-house, police actions, and aerial photos are especially important. One result of the December 1966 raid is a set of aerial photos on which are marked each VC house in the village, now being used to plan a new seal and search. Another important intelligence task is to identify VC routes to the target, and to the nearby base camps.

(2) PsyWar: Seal and search operations require strong PsyOps support, particularly of aerial loudspeakers. It is especially important to announce to villagers early in the operation that their town is sealed, and to instruct them how to behave. Promptly and properly delivered, that early message simplifies greatly the rules of engagement. The entire operation should be conceived as an opportunity to indoctrinate the villagers politically and should be conducted accordingly.

(3) Coordination: By their nature, seal and search operations involve the province, district, and the ARVN division in whose TACR the village lies, as well as the ARVN and civil agencies and units. One persistent problem is motivating Vietnamese participation without involving them intimately in the planning and accepting the consequent risk of compromise. That motivation can be sustained only in the presence of a great deal of Vietnamese trust, patently not reciprocated, which can be created only through demonstrated overall US good faith and repeated success.

(4) Surprise and deception: The VC intelligence net must be respected. Measures to confuse the enemy and to deprive him of the advantage of warning are an important part of all operations. Guile is important, but a high pace of operations is no less so.

(5) Training: US line troops readily adapt to the seal role in seal and search operations, but they must be instructed that their demeanor is critical to the success of the mission. They must be required to maintain an attitude of professional detachment and efficiency. They should be friendly but not patronizing, holding themselves apart from the people without evidencing hostility or disdain. The RDAF personnel, of course, are cast in quite a different role and may behave accordingly. Their missions of cooperation and intelligence warrant an involvement with the populace and a latitude not permissible for the tactical troops: the latter should be respected by the people, and not necessarily liked. The most critical training problem is presented by tactical commanders who fail to grasp the utility of the RDTF and to exploit its capabilities.
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(6) Combined Operations: Seal and search operations offer a rare opportunity for US-GVN cooperation with the US cast in an auxillary role to GVN searchers. They provide a village-level demonstration of the vacuity of the VC’s "puppet" characterization of ARVN forces. Moreover, in our experiences these operations have done much to build respect among American soldiers for their Vietnamese counterparts in arms—more than any other operation we conduct. Finally, they contribute directly to the training of ARVN forces in the sort of operations essential for long-term policing of the countryside.

(7) Hamlet Festival: The TAN BINH operation of 26-27 December 1966 did not include a "Hamlet Festival", but since these are usually a part of the RDF techniques, it should be noted that in less hostile, more GVN-controlled villages, RDFD normally provides entertainment which includes bands, clowns, and parades. The "Festival" eases tensions, keeps the populace occupied while the search is in progress, and facilitates identification-paper checks and intelligence collection among the villagers.

c. Personnel: It is an unusual US Army officer who can adapt readily to RDFD assignments. Each officer's personality must be carefully evaluated and his background and inclinations considered before he is selected for an RDFD slot. LAM SON pivots around the initiative, imagination, intelligence, goodwill, and zeal of the RDFD commanders, and it depends heavily on the same qualities in many of his subordinates, officers and enlisted men. The 1st Infantry Division is preparing a table of distribution and allowances proposed for bringing this activity within the recognized structure of the division. Such an entity is probably essential for any division conducting revolutionary development type operations anywhere in the world.

d. Equipment: Even the very modest equipment of the RDFD suffers from its irregular maintenance support. The TDA submissions will seek to obtain an austere kind and amount of equipment, together with a complement of maintenance personnel and an appropriate PLL.

FOR THE RECORD:

[Signature]

E. J. HEACOCK
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

S/LTRD: Special

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MORTAR ATTACKS 1 DECEMBER 1966 - 30 APRIL 1967

Number of attacks

Dec 66  Jan 67  Feb 67  Mar 67  Apr 67

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62
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
1ST BRIGADE, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

3 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (RCS) CSFGO-2

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AGIB-T
APO San Francisco 96345

1. INTRODUCTION.

a. During the previous reporting period, 1 Nov 66 to 31 Jan 67, the 1st Bde participated in six brigade- and one division-level operations. Highlights of that period were Operation BATTLE CREEK (OPORD 42-66), a multi-brigade operation in TAY NINH Province north and west of DAU TIENG which terminated in the middle of November. The brigade closed the reporting period with Operation SARATOGA (OPORD 3-67). SARATOGA culminated the Brigade's activities for the period with a series of three seal and search operations (BHNG, HU DAT, and CWAH LUU) while conducting search and destroy operations in conjunction with the 3d Bde in the BONG TRANG jungle, followed by the opening of Route 16 for re-supply of FUSOC VINH.

b. Principal headquarters and commanders of the task force during this reporting period were:

(1) Operation WILLOWS (OPORD 1-67), Headquarters, 1st Brigade, Colonel Sidney F. Perry Jr., 1 Feb 67 to 13 Feb 67; Colonel William E. Caldwell, III, 3 Feb 67 to 13 Feb 67.

(a) 1st BN, 24th Inf, LTC William C. Simpson, 1 Feb 67 to 13 Feb 67.

(b) 1st BN, 28th Inf, LTC Jack G. Whitten, 1 Feb 67 to 5 Feb 67; LTC Stanley J. Kieck, 5 Feb 67 to 13 Feb 67.

(c) 1st Sqn, 14th ACR, LTC Martin D. Howell, 2 Feb 67 to 12 Feb 67.

(d) 1st BN, 5th Arty, LTC Thomas J. Dimick, 1 Feb 67 to 12 Feb 67; LTC William L. Depew, 12 Feb 67 to 13 Feb 67.


(2) Operation TUCSON DELTA (OPORD 3-67), Headquarters, 1st Brigade, Colonel William E. Caldwell, III, 14 Feb 67 to 21 Feb 67.

(a) 1st BN, 24th Inf, LTC William C. Simpson, 14 Feb 67 to 21 Feb 67.

(b) 1st BN, 28th Inf, LTC Stanley J. Kieck, 14 Feb 67 to 21 Feb 67.

(c) 2d BN, 2d Inf, LTC Edward J. Collins, 14 Feb 67 to 17 Feb 67.

(d) 2d BN, 18th Inf, LTC Lewin R. Eemann, 14 Feb 67 to 21 Feb 67.

(e) 1st Sqn, 4th Cav, LTC Thomas W. Pife, 14 Feb 67 to 17 Feb 67.

(f) 1st BN, 5th Arty, LTC William L. Depew, 14 Feb 67 to 21 Feb 67.

(g) 1st BN, 1st Engr BN, CPT Wayne L. Lucas, 14 Feb 67 to 17 Feb 67.

(h) Co A, 1st Engr BN, CPT Larry A. Blair, 14 Feb 67 to 17 Feb 67.

(3) Operation JUNCTION CITY-1 (OPORD 3-67), Headquarters 1st Brigade, Downgraded at 3 yr Intervals (Declassified After 12 Yrs)
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SUJE: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (RCS) CSFGO-2


(a) 1st Bn, 2d Inf, LTC William C. Simpson, 22 Feb 67 to 6 Mar 67.

(b) 1st Bn, 26th Inf, LTC Alexander N. Haig, Jr., 22 Feb 67 to 6 Mar 67.

(c) 1st Bn, 28th Inf, LTC Stanley J. Kuick, 22 Feb 67 to 6 Mar 67.

(d) 2d Bn, 16th Inf, LTC Lewis R. Eveman, 22 Feb 67 to 6 Mar 67.

(e) 1st Bn, 5th Arty, LTC William L. Depew, 22 Feb 67 to 6 Mar 67.

(4) Operation JUNCTION CITY-2 (OPORD 7-67), Headquarters, 1st Brigade, Colonel William B. Caldwell, III, 7 Mar 67 to 15 Apr 67.

(a) 1st Bn, 2d Inf, LTC William C. Simpson, 7 Mar 67 to 27 Mar 67.

(b) 1st Bn, 16th Inf, LTC Rufus C. Lazzell, 7 Mar 67 to 15 Apr 67.

(c) 1st Bn, 26th Inf, LTC Alexander N. Haig, Jr., 7 Mar 67 to 27 Mar 67.

(d) 1st Bn, 26th Inf, LTC Lewis R. Eveman, 7 Mar 67 to 27 Mar 67.

(5) Operation HARVEST MOON, 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, LTC Rufus C. Lazzell, 8 Apr 67 to 26 Apr 67; 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, LTC Joseph P. Ulatowski, 26 Apr 67 to 30 Apr 67.

2. (C) TACTICAL OPERATIONS.

a. Elements Affecting the Operation.

(1) Effectiveness of Intelligence: Defoliation and aviators' familiarity with the area resulted in increased effectiveness of aerial reconnaissance in the Ia Dr TAOR and the JUNCTION CITY area of operations. SLAR and RED HAZE returns were successfully used for target acquisition and indicators of enemy activity in both areas. No contact was made with VC/WVA main force units that were expected in the JUNCTION CITY AO. Local force units encountered proved well armed and trained and adept at evasive maneuvers and ambush operations. Intelligence prior to JUNCTION CITY indicated elements of COSVN and the 9th VC Div headquarters were in the Division AO in northern TAV Ninh Province. No contact was made with the headquarters or security elements of either headquarters. Numerous captured documents indicated elements of COSVN headquarters were in the area as late as Jan 67.

(2) Nature of Terrain: In northern TAV Ninh Province, the terrain was a mixture of primary and secondary jungle growth and large rice paddies. The TOHLE CAM/ON/AN IDI area of JUNCTION CITY-2 contained a mixture of heavy primary and secondary growth and extensive rubber plantations. There were relatively few open clear areas that could be used as landing zones. Jungle areas provided excellent concealment for both friendly and enemy units, but restricted movement, fields of fire, observation, resupply, and evacuation. February and March were very dry months and ground trafficability was excellent. Light rains in early April did not seriously affect the trafficability.

(3) Weather: There was no precipitation in February and March. In early April there were occasional light showers. Daily light to heavy rain showers predominated the last half of April. The showers did not affect ground operations. The temperature ranged from 65° to 100°; the relative humidity ranged from 40% to 65%. Although extremely uncomfortable, the weather did not affect the operations of ground units.
Operational Report of Lessons Learned: CSPMO.2

Attitude of the Civilian Population: Based on civic action operations in the AN LOC/QUO area and in HUOG VINH during the quarter, the attitude of the people has been most receptive, cordial, and warm.

Combat Actions: Operations during the period consisted of:

1. Operation WILSTON, OFFORD 4-67, a brigade-size, road clearing and search and destroy operation along Route 13 south of AN LOC and Route 245 between AN LOC and VINH THANH.

(a) The mission stated in the order was to clear and secure Rte 13 north of CHANH THANH to AN LOC, clear and secure Rte 245 from AN LOC to VINH THANH, while securing the logistical bases at QUAN LOI. The brigade was to conduct search and destroy operations in the VINH THANH area 2-12 Feb 67.

(b) The operation was divided into two phases:

1. Phase I (2-6 Feb 67): 1st Bde was to airlift 2/16 Inf to QUAN LOI, 1/Inf to VINH THANH, clear and secure Rte 13 from XT76574 to XT767800, employing TF LION (1/Inf with attached cavalry elements), clear and secure Rte 245 from VINH THANH to VINH than, employing 1/11 Cav (+), and 1/26 Inf was to conduct search and destroy operations west HUOG VINH.

2. Phase II (7-12 Feb 67): 1st Bde was to secure Rte 13 from CHANH THANH to QUAN LOI, employing TF LION; was to secure Rte 245 via XT76484 with 1/11 Cav (+); was to continue security of QUAN LOI and VINH THANH log bases; was to secure engineer work parties in AO, and conduct search and destroy operations in the VINH THANH area.

(c) Upon completion of Operation SARAOTA, the brigade stood down for two days, then moved to VINH THANH on 1 Feb 67 in preparation for Operation WILSTON, which started on 2 Feb 67. 1/2 Inf moved by fixed-wing aircraft on 1 Feb to VINH THANH and assumed defense of the log base and CP at that location. 1/28 Inf was airlifted from QUAN LOI on 2 Feb and assumed its road security mission on Rte 13 between CHANH THANH and AN LOC. 1/11 ACR joined the Brigade on 2 Feb, securing Rte 13 for 1/28 Inf as it moved to its HRF via the intersection of Rte 245 and Rte 13. 1/2 Inf remained in the VINH THANH area during the entire operation providing security and local patrols. 1/28 Inf secured Rte 13 from XT765800 to XT767614 2-10 Feb. On 10 Feb 67, 1/28 was relieved in place by 2/16 Inf. 1/28 moved A/11 Cav and A/11 Engr by vehicle to CHAN LOI. 2/26 Inf secured the sector of Rte 13 from XT765800 to XT767614. 2/16 Inf reverted to 3d Bde control on 12 Feb and moved to LAI KHE on the southbound resupply convoy. 1/11 ACR in addition to sec-ring a portion of Rte 13 from XT764700 to XT765600; secured Rte 245 from AN LOC to VINH THANH. The 1/11 ACR also conducted search and destroy operations in the following areas on the dates indicated: AO FLUOR (via grid square XT6685) on 4-5 Feb; recon in force to XT69764 on 5 Feb; Objective RAT (via XT601234) on 6 Feb; Objective S'TURREL (via XT65980) on 7 Feb; and 2/11 BLACK (via XT7797) on 8 Feb. Thunder runs were used extensively by all units on the road. Operation was terminated on 12 February 1967 with the move of 1/11 ACR down Rte 13 to LAI KHE; 1/11 ACR escorted the southbound convoy, picked up 2/16 Inf and returned them to LAI KHE.

(d) Results:

1. Friendly Losses.
   a. Personnel: 6 KIA.
   b. Equipment: 1 2½ ton truck, 1 engr front loader destroyed.

2. Enemy.
   b. Equipment Destroyed: 3 booby-trapped grenades, 1 200-lb bomb, 20 12-lb AT mines, 25 bunkers, 1 AP mine, 600 CBU bomblets, 3 lbs TNT.

(e) The operation was supported by 1/5 Arty (+) in direct support.
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C3/53 Art'y, A6/27 Art'y, B8/6 Art'y, and I2/33 Art'y were in a GSR role. The artillery was used primarily for specified targets and H&I fires. The Air Force flew 15 pre-planned, 6 immediate, and 3 diverted airstrikes in support of the operation. The 62 Air Force sorties resulted in the destruction of 8 bunkers destroyed, 75 meters of trench discovered and destroyed, and 12 fighting positions uncovered and destroyed.

(2) Operation TNCOON DELTA, JORD 5-67, was conducted from 13 Feb to 21 Feb 67. This was a division-directed, multi-brigade operation between the MINH THANH and MICHELIN rubber plantations.

(a) The lst Brigade's mission was to conduct search and destroy operations in the jungle area north of the MICHELIN plantation bordered by Route 86 on the east and Routes 13, 242, and 239 on the west. A secondary mission was the seal and search of the villages in the northwest portion of the MICHELIN rubber plantation.

(b) The operation was initially conceived with armored cavalry units establishing blocking positions along Route 245 (Axis X-RAY) on the west and Routes 13, 242, and 239 (Axis YOKE) on the east. Two infantry battalions were then to sweep the jungle from south of the MINH THANH rubber plantation with the blocking positions established by the cavalry being used as markers. After securing axes X-RAY, the cavalry unit on that axis was to search and seal the villages in the northwest section of the MICHELIN plantation. Change 1 to the GORDON resulted in 2/2 Inf (a) assuming the cav mission along Axis YOKE.

(c) The operation was initiated on 140347H Feb 67. 1/4 Cav occupied blocking positions along Axis YOKE by the afternoon of the 14th. 2/2 Inf occupied blocking positions along Axis X-RAY by early evening of the 14th. Both units found their respective axes heavily mined with pressure-type mines. Art'y bases were established on both axes via XT565880 and XT662786. 1/2 Inf and 2/18 Inf started their sweeps of the area bordered by Axes YOKE and X-RAY during the late morning of the 14th. On the 15th, as the 1/2 Inf had the 2/18 Inf continued their sweeps north toward the MICHELIN plantation, the 2/2 Inf sealed and searched the villages in the northwest section of the MICHELIN plantation in preparation for movement of elements of the division from MINH THANH to DAU TIEFG. The only significant contact of the operation was the ambush of a small resupply convoy from 1/4 Cav. The encounter resulted in 5 VC KIA (10), 1 KIA (Prob) and several weapons captured. On 17 Feb, 2/18 Inf completed sweep of its assigned sector and was helilifted to MINH THANH. 1/4 Cav and 2/2 Inf moved from field locations along Axis X-RAY escorting art'y and engr units to DAU TIEFG. On the afternoon of the 17th, the 1/28 Inf, having been relieved of the security of MINH THANH by 7/2 Inf, was helilifted into the 1/2 Inf assigned sector of responsibility to assist in the search of a large base camp uncovered by 1/2 Inf. The resulting search yielded a large quantity of rice, some of which was evacuated. The search of the base camp and area north of the MICHELIN plantation was completed on 19 Feb 67, and both infantry battalions were helilifted to MINH THANH, where local patrols and preparations for Operation JUNCTION CITY were conducted until 21 Feb 67.

(d) Results.

1. US Losses.

   a. Personnel: 29 WIA.

   b. Equipment Destroyed: 2 21/2 trucks, 2 APC (M-113).

2. Enemy Losses.

   a. Personnel: 8 VC KIA (BO).

   b. Equipment Captured: 1 US M-1 carbine, 2 SKS carbines, 75 rds SA ammo, 3 entrenching tools, 1 IWP, 1 RPG launcher, 9000 vials of medicine, 1 PRC-10 radio, 135.3 tons of rice (2.5 tons extracted), and miscellaneous documents.

   c. Equipment Destroyed: 1 81mm mortar rd, 63 GI's, 21 AT mines, 10 AP mines, 5 body traps, 302 Chicom grenades, 149 bunkers, 1 boat, 5 desks, 10 chairo, 3 dispensatories, 1 hospital, 22 hits, 10 ducks, 45 chickens, 131.2 tons of rice, 40 gals of cooking oil, 10 cases of condensed milk, 6 55-gal drums of tar, 5 gals of sodium glutamate, 1 training area, 3 classrooms, and miscellaneous clothing.

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(c) Supporting Forces: 1/5 Army provided direct support for the brigade and its attachments. 2/3 Army, 1ACR, 6 Arty, and 22/35 Arty supported the Brigade in a GRE role. 1/5 Army fired 16,796 rounds of 105mm on preplanned, on-call, and MAC targets. The Air Force supported the Brigade with 76 preplanned, 6 immediate and 7 diverted sorties. BDA included 55 bunkers destroyed, 18 fighting positions destroyed, 95% mortar of trench destroyed, and one roof sunk.

(2) Operation JUNCTION CITY was a two-phase operation: OPORD 6-67 was published 1 May 67 and OPORD 7-67 with frag orders for Operation JUNCTION CITY. Phase 1 was conducted from 22 Feb 67 to 6 Mar 67. Phase 2 was conducted from 7 Mar until 15 Apr 67.

(a) The mission for the operation was:

1. Phase I is the conduct of search and destroy operations while occupying blocking positions along the Cambodian border in northern TAT NINH Province (see map C).

(b) Concept of the Operation.

1. Phase I: 1st Inf would conduct an airmobile assault with 1/2, 1/26, and 1/28 Inf, landing in multiple LZs in northern TAT NINH Province along the Cambodian border. From these LZs, the Brigade was to block in, conduct search and destroy operations to destroy VN/VVA forces and installations, and secure engineer work parties, as required.

2. Concept (b): The Brigade was to secure Rte 246 from AN LOC to the bridge site via XT62815; employ TAC 1/2, secure landing zones via XT62815 for airlanding of 1/26 Inf; provide security for engineer work parties, conduct search and destroy operations via of Rte 246 and secure Fire Support Base HANOI on order. TF 1/2 was to be employed in the west until 1/2 Inf to the west of the SAIGON River, with 1/28 Inf, Div RBP, at HAT TAY 20th Mar 67.

(c) Operation Summary.

1. Phase I: This phase of the operation found 1/26, 1/28, and 1/2 Inf in blocking positions along the Cambodian border. Brigade TAC CP was located in 1/28 Inf and 1/5 Arty NBP. 1/2, 1/26, and 1/28 Inf occupied blocking positions and conducted search and destroy operations in their respective sectors. This phase of the operation was characterized by daily flying and enemy activity conducted by elements of COVN rear security elements. 1/2 Inf landed from the 26th on 2 Apr followed by 1/28 Inf on 3 Apr and 1/26 Inf to the end of the 4 Mar. 1/2 Inf existed in the security of COVN LOC upon closing from the 26th on the 20th of March and required for Phase II of Operation JUNCTION CITY. 1/26, 1/28, and 1/2 Inf TAC CP dislocated to HAT TAY and activated for Phase II of Operation JUNCTION CITY.

2. Phase II: The Brigade provided security for Special Forces camp and bridge that were constructed via XT62815. The Brigade also secured the LOC between the artillery bases west of AN LOC and AN Loc. As such, 1/2 Inf from AN LOC to XT62825. Contact was made with the brigade could be classified as harassing. Attacking forces were sound-sized, with the enemy employing numerous pressure-type mines and very limited mortar attacks. During this operation, the Brigade's ability to attack and destroy divisional and non-divisional elements resulted in a flexibility that increased the Brigade's ability to successfully accomplish its mission.

(e) Results.

1. Phase I.

(a) US Personnel Losses: 101KH, 33 WIA.

(b) US Equipment Damaged: 2 M-48 tanks, 1 M-113 APC.

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\* TRUCK (all light damage).

- Enemy Personnel Losses: 29 VC KIA (IC), 9 VC KIA, 4

CHIEN HOI.

1. Enemy Equipment Captured: 12 Chicom rifles, 1 Soviet
carbine, 3 US carbines, 4 Chicom SPS, 1 Uzi (Chicom manufacture), 1 .50 cal MG (anti-aircraft), 3 7.62
machines, 1 June recorder, 1 Philco portable radio, 3 hp
riggs and Sr...; walk... in Car. 1 rifle grenade launcher, 1 HRO-10 radio
7.62 MG car... 1 25 barrel 12... .

2. Enemy Equipment Destroyed: 86.3 tons of rice, 3300
lbs of salt, 17 frog grenades, 248 rifle grenades, 7 8mm mortar rds, 1 60mm mortar
3 3 concussion grenades, 4 pigeons, 5 claymores, 4 RPG AT rds, 800 lbs of dynamite,
1,000 ft of detonating cord, 217 lives with tubes, 57 bicycles, 34 cans of condensed
milk, 12,275 lbs of dried fish and rice, 700 lbs of dried beans, 200 lbs of presents, 4
pigs, 78 chickens, 200 lbs of cloth, 255 gals of fuel oil, 1 machine, 4,200 meters of
wire, 100 entrenching tools, 3900 pr of HO CHI MINH sandals, 3074 BA-30 batteries,
4 axes, 70 reams of writing paper, 0 pencils, 1750 erasers, 80 oil lamps, 78 sheets of tin,
6 00 units of penicillin.

Phase II.

a. US Personnel Losses: 4 KW, 83 WFA.

b. US Equipment Destroyed: 1 8T truck, 2 M-113 APC's.

c. US Equipment Damaged: 7 M-413 APC's, 5 148 tanks,
1VTR, 1 tank dozer.

d. Enemy Personnel Losses: 21 VC KIA (IC), 7 VC KIA.

e. Enemy Equipment Destroyed: 2 bridge frames (42'x12'),
AK-47 rifles, 2 claymores, 140 M-16 rds, 4... can 13,000 plasters, 1 Mosin
model 98 rifle, 1 AK-50 rifle, 1 B-24 pic... 12 katrin, 1 2-1b block
of TNT, 15 lbs of medical supplies, 23 lbs of clothing.

f. Enemy Equipment Destroyed: 30 huts, 33 bunkers, 5
large buildings, 8 grenades, 20 AT mines, 14 AP mines, 2 claymores, 1 155mm rd, 2000
lbs of unpolished rice, 1200 lbs of polished rice.

(c) Supporting Forces: 1/5 Arty supported the 1st rd in both
phases of JUNCTION CITY. The battalion fired 113,000 rds of 105mm in direct support
of Frong operations. General Support and GSR units in support of the 1/5 Arty
fired 13,000 rds of 4.2" mortar, 2900 rds of 155mm, 736 rds of 81", and 96 rds of
75mm. Air Force support during the period consisted of 161 preplanned, 63 immediate,
and 25 diverted airstrikes with a total of 611 sorties. Bomb damage assessment in-
cluded:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uncovered</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Demand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting pens</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trenches</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Airstrikes also resulted in 17 KBA, 1 12A, 6 secondary fires, and destruction of one
footbridge.

(A) Operation HARVEST MOON, Frag 0 6 to OPORD 7-67 (Operation JUNCTION
CITY-2).

(a) By the mission stated in the OPORD, 1/16 Inf was to se-
cure US Army elements, including artillery positions, 1/5 Arty, and engineer work
parties of G/168 Eng, in support of construction at the USSR camp at BERNARD (TT2768)
until relieved by another unit or the termination of the operation.

(b) The operation was conducted using extensive small unit patrolling
in the area of operation. No major contact was made in the area. Many small

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base camps and rice caches were discovered in the area. 1/16 Inf was replaced by 2/16 Inf on 25 Apr 67.

(c) Results.

1. US Losses.
   a. Personnel: 1 KIA, 6 WIA.

2. Enemy Losses.
   a. Personnel: 2 VC KIA (PC), 1 KIA, 5 Detainees.
   b. Equipment Destroyed: 17,200 lbs of unpolished rice, 00 lbs of polished rice, 26 huts, 9 55-gal drums of rice, 2 bicycles, 20 Chimic grenades, numerous cooking utensils.

3. Combat Efficiency. The Brigade and attached units accomplished each of their missions during the reporting period with an increasing degree of efficiency and professional pride. Operation JUNCTION CITY-C was the culmination of the reporting period, with the Brigade attaching and detaching units two and three times with a high degree of efficiency. Helicopter assaults, armed helicopters, and tactical air support were employed in all operations with utmost proficiency. The Brigade continued to effectively coordinate the moves of assigned and attached units by Army and Air Force aircraft.

4. Results throughout the Period.

(1) 1st Bde demonstrated its ability to conduct sustained operations in the field. Brigade moved to the field at the start of Operation WILLISTON, 2 Feb 67, and did not return from the field until the termination of JUNCTION CITY, 15 Apr 67.

(2) Although enemy contact during the period was squad size or smaller information obtained from enemy installations provided significant intelligence and yielded a large number of rice caches as well as medical storage areas.

(3) Care must be exercised when preparing to enter an area for an operation. A case in point is the large number of pressure-type mines found along axes X-RAY and YOKE during Operation TUCSON DELTA, 14-22 Feb 67. The 6 Feb reconnaissance in force by elements of 1/11 ACR on Operation WILLISTON along axis YOKE may have provided an indication to VC in the area that the route would be used for future operations, hence the large number of mining incidents, which resulted in numerous casualties the first two days of Operation TUCSON DELTA.

3. (c) INTELLIGENCE.

a. The major operation of this period, JUNCTION CITY-1, was conducted in the northern TAY NHIE Province against COSVN headquarters and the 94th VC Division headquarters. The 70th Security Guard Regt and the 101st NVA Regt were reported in this area and could be immediately employed to cover the withdrawal of the two above mentioned headquarters. Order of battle information on the 70th Guard Regt was relatively scarce. The 101st NVA Regt was estimated below strength with about 10% sick with malaria and other diseases. JUNCTION CITY-2, conducted around QUAN LOI in BINH LONG Province was primarily a security operation: clearing roads, securing fire support bases, and securing engineer work sites. Only VC local forces were carried by the order of battle in this area.

b. During both phases of Operation JUNCTION CITY, very little contact was made with VC units above squad size and VC units avoided contact whenever possible. A large number of base camps, ranging from squad to battalion size, were uncovered. These camps yielded large numbers of documents, supplies, and equipment. One large rice cache and a large number of smaller rice caches yielded over 120 tons of rice. The documents captured identified administrative and logistical units of COSVN headquarters, 4th VC Div HQ in northern TAY NHIE Province. The 70th Guard Regt and the 101st NVA Regt were not located, contacted, or identified. Enemy initiated actions...
c. The VC very seldom defended from fortified positions. They primarily used the dense undergrowth to conceal their locations and cover their withdrawals when breaking contact. The VC employed booby traps, usually grenades, around their base camps. Sweeps of roads became a daily operation because of AT mines emplaced each night.

d. The majority of enemy documents, POW's, and equipment were captured by platoon-size units on search and destroy missions in inaccessible terrain, creating problems in expediting the intelligence to higher headquarters. The unit cannot discontinues the search and destroy mission to return the captured intelligence. This problem was partially solved by utilizing command IO's to extract the captured intelligence to resupply areas. Commanders, however, were reluctant to release their pilots for this mission. Once removed one step to the rear, captured intelligence was transported primarily by resupply aircraft. This usually involved diverting a resupply craft. Evacuation of captured intelligence in the Brigade's operational area is dependent upon the availability of aircraft.

4. (C) PERSONNEL.

a. Strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>4329</td>
<td>4499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>4379</td>
<td>4332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>4329</td>
<td>4432</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Replacements Received.

(1) February: 267; March: 469; April: 266.

(2) Replacements continue to arrive well trained, but needing an area orientation and introduction in combat techniques peculiar to the IEd and Div TAOR. The replacements received in the 1st Edt must complete a five-day course on techniques and procedures mentioned above. This quarter, 837 replacements were trained in the 1st Edt Jungle Devil School. During this reporting period, there has been a drop in the lieutenant and junior and senior NCO strengths.

c. Discipline: This is no problem; there have been less than two curfew violations per week this quarter.

d. Enemy Personnel Captured and/or Detained.

(1) POW's: 1.

(2) Civil Defenders: None.

(3) Detainees: 28.

(4) Draft Dodgers: 5.

(5) Deserters: 1.

e. Burial and Graves Registration: There have been no separate burials for members of the 1st Edt.

f. Civil Assistance.

(1) Under the MEDCAP II program a total of 5361 RVN patients were treated by medical personnel of the 1st Edt. This includes all patients treated at the PHUC VINH dispensary, Go'Dy 1st Med En, and unit dispensaries in the PHUC VINH area. This total figure also reflects those patients treated on MEDCAPs in QUAN LOI, CHIN THANH, POA MY, MINH Y LANG, VINH HOM, AN LINH IV, TO MIA, and LE THANH.

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The following relief commodities were distributed during the reporting period: 12,000 lbs of rice, 20,375 lbs of Bulgur wheat, 4,000 lbs of rolled wheat, 117 cases of powdered milk, 179 cases of cooking oil, 54 cases of fresh milk, 400 cans of whole milk, 1150 pairs of shower shoes, 1275 T-shirts, 1225 shorts, 1200 bars of soap, 3350 balloons, 17 sewing kits, 340 GVN flags, clothes for 600 people, and 200 bags of cement.

(3) 1st Ede S-5 Section.

(a) A total of 13,700 local nationals were hired during the reporting period. 13,823 local nationals were hired under Division-approved funds.

(b) The 1st Ede participated in TET celebrations hosted by the District Chief and attended by the 5th ARVN Div Commander, the Senior Advisor, 5th ARVN Div, and numerous American guests from the PHUOC VINH community. The District Chief gave rice, Bulgur wheat, cooking oil, Tyra, and candies to 618 needy families in the PHUOC VINH community. All items were provided by the Ede S-5 Section.

(c) The Ede S-5 coordinated with the Special Forces A Detachment in BINH THANH reference control of civilian personnel moving and working outside the BINH THANH rubber plantation. Visits were paid to all hamlet chiefs with an appeal to the leaders to control their people and keep them within the confines of the plantation during daylight hours. This was done to minimize casualties resulting from US operations during February and March.

(d) The RF/PF post in the village of NUOC VANG was completed on 20 Mar 67. Supplies were provided by the Brigade S-5 and the 6/27 Arty.

(e) A dispensary is in the process of being built in the village of NUOC VANG. The dispensary is approximately two-thirds complete. Supplies for this dispensary have been provided by the Brigade S-5 and the 6/27 Arty. Dispensary operation will be supervised by the 6/27 surgeon and will be staffed with a trained public health worker.

(4) Psychological Operations.

(a) Psychological operations by the 1st Ede in BINH LONG Province appear to have little or no effect on VC or NVA forces. These elements appear to be well disciplined, thoroughly indoctrinated, and not receptive to psychological appeal. In direct contrast, the Brigade has enjoyed excellent results in PHU GIAO and TAN VINH Districts of BINH LONG Province. Local force VC units operating in these districts are much more receptive to psychological operations as indicated by the number of CHU BOIS credited to psychological operations during the late calendar year of 1966 and in January 1967.

(b) A total of 2,263,000 leaflets were dropped over the Ede TAOR and in forward areas of operation.

(c) On 19 Apr 67, the 1st Ede commenced delivering leaflets into selected target areas, using artillery leaflet shells. These fires are part of the 1/5 Arty ADP. A total of 49 rounds have been fired in the Ede TAOR.

(5) Revolutionary Development Support.

(a) PHU GIAO District, BINH Duong Province, is not a major priority area as far as revolutionary development is concerned. Little or no support is provided to the district for civic action, and little or no voluntary support is received from civilian agencies to include USAID. The Revolutionary Development Program of the PHU GIAO District is jointly sponsored and executed by the 1st Ede and the MACV Advisory Team. It consists of a RICECAP II program, operation of a Vietnamese dispensary, and the building of a second, the training of Vietnamese nationals as health workers, the employment of over 500 nationals, to include those hired by PA&E, the building and maintenance of schools and churches, improvement of drainage and sanitation conditions, and the improvement of existing road networks. Considering the proximity of over 90% of the district's population to PHUOC VINH, the Revolutionary Development Program now in progress has done much to improve the standards of living of the people and make them loyal to the government of South Vietnam.

(b) 1st Ede, 1st Inf Div, has operated extensively during the calendar year of 1967 in BINH LONG Province. Although not a major priority area as far
as the Revolutionary Development Program is concerned, the province does possess an excellent program. This program consists of:

- the employment of Revolutionary Development cadre teams,
- a well-organized preventative medicine program,
- training of national health workers,
- the operation of a 60-bed hospital,
- distribution of relief commodities as required,
- maintenance of routes of communications,
- and the running of a CHUPOC center.

1st Div has enjoyed considerable success in execution of joint USN and US civic action projects. The attitude of the people toward the increased presence of US troops in the area can best be described as most friendly and warm.

g. Morale and Personal Services.
   (1) Morale is high in the 1st Id. Factors responsible for this are:
      (a) Outstanding leadership at all levels.
      (b) USO shows.
      (c) Active Service Club program.
      (d) Outstanding training.
      (e) Outstanding personnel management.

   (2) Personal Services: 1st Division Finance Officer has attached a contract NCO in PHUOC VINH. This NCO answers many pay questions and handles most pay complaints, thus eliminating the need for supplemental pay officers.

   (3) Problem Area: Lack of lieutenants and junior and senior NCO's.

5. (C) CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS.
   c. Operation JUNCTION CTY.
      (1) Phase I: 22 February to 6 March 1967.
      (2) Phase II: 7 March to 15 April 1967.

6. (C) LOGISTICS.
   a. Logistics Situation: Not used.
   b. Supply.
      (1) Class I.

      (a) B-rations: authorized-15 days, on hand-30 days.
      (b) C-rations: authorized-5 days in unit basic load and 5 days in Brigade trains, on hand-6 days in Brigade trains.

      (c) During the quarter, the best available rations were on hand in the operational area. This apparently was done to the detriment of the PHUOC VINH base camp. During most of the time the Brigade was in the field, personnel at PHUOC VINH subsisted on a reduced quality of rations.

      (2) Class II and IV Items in Short Supply.

      (a) Headsets and handsets for PRC-25 radios.
      (b) Lensatic compasses.
      (c) Antennae for PRC-25.
      (d) Cleaning rags for H-16.
(c) Sandbags were still in short supply.

(3) Class III,

(a) Kerosene stockage objective: 20,000 gals; on hand: 49,283 gals.

(b) Diesel stockage objective: 10,000 gals; on hand: 15,000 gals.

(c) JP-4 stockage objective: 50,000 gals; on hand: 11,118 gals.

(d) Avgas stockage objective: 10,000 gals; on hand: 12,649 gals.

(e) During the last operation in this quarter, stocks of Class III were not adequate to meet all demands at forward locations. Further requirements place stocks of Class III at a forward location beyond the capabilities of support elements to handle. The product in most cases was available, however, pumping equipment, hoses, connectors, and trained operators were not available. As a result, the Brigade C-4 Section, which is not staffed for such an operation, was forced to personally load, off load and pump large quantities of Class III at the forward location. Recommend that all requirements to maintain POL points in the forward be thoroughly staffed to determine if the SET in can provide all support necessary. If it is impossible for the SET in to do this, then support from an outside agency should be requested.

(f) PHOC VINH is still faced with the problem of double handling of POL in 55-gal drums. Most problems in this area could be reduced if the drums were palletized at the loading point, or delivered in 500-gal bladders.

(4) Class V: Colored smoke and trip flares were short during the quarter.

c. Local Procurement: 1000 loaves of French bread are purchased daily for distribution to units at PHOC VINH.

d. Evacuation: Support rendered by the medical units during the quarter was excellent. Three problems in this field are still prevalent.

(1) Initial requests for dustoff often claimed to have a priority of urgent, although many cases the nature of the wound was minor. Medically trained personnel, if available, should be the ones to determine the priority of a dustoff request.

(2) slick aircraft often beat a dustoff aircraft to the scene of a pick-up. In most cases, the dust-off is never more than 10 minutes behind and the results of a wounded man being moved by untrained personnel and being deprived of the emergency medical treatment available aboard dustoff aircraft could be fatal.

(3) Weapons, web gear, and personal equipment should be left with parent unit and not accompany the casualty being evacuated. This equipment sometimes becomes lost despite the effort of the medical companies to return it to the proper unit.

c. Transportation.

(1) Routes 1A, 2A, 7B, and 15 were used as the KSR for the 1st Bde.

(2) Supplies transported during the quarter totaled 9706 tons in all classes of supply.

d. Miscellaneous: The QM shower/laundry point personnel at PHOC VINH have morale problems during the quarter. Supervisors from their parent unit, 266th Supply and Service Battalion, visit too infrequently. As a result, they have no one to turn to for mail, promotions, and other such administrative matters. Maintenance of the obsolete equipment at this location is left to the ingenuity of the NCOIC of the 437th Field Service Laundry Detachment. It is only through the aid of D Co, 701st Field Service Launay Detachment that the laundry detachment is capable of keeping the equipment operating for adequate laundry service. It is recommended that if the 266th Supply and Service Battalion, which has ignored previous correspondence and inquiries, cannot exercise its responsibility, that this detachment be attached to the SET in, 1st Inf Div, for
7. (C) DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Contact teams from Division Finance and Division TSD are beneficial for close and continued liaison with units in field locations. These teams must remain at the field locations more than one day to be of value.

b. USO shows are a definite morale booster. The show does not have to be comprised of well known stars, but the entertainers must want to be with the troops. The one experience where the female entertainers voluntarily visited the troops in the field provided a definite uplift in troop morale. More USO shows are needed for troops.

c. Service Clubs definitely enhance troop morale, offering a place for troops to get away from the military routine. The Service Club in PHUOC VNM now offers Vietnamese and karate lessons. Over 500 troops have visited the Service Club this past quarter.

d. Enlistment in the 1st ID has been the best in the 1st Division for the months of February, March, and April. This is due to active support at all levels of command.

e. Training in the Jungle Devil School instills confidence in the replacement and enables him to be a "veteran" when he formally joins his unit in the field.

f. Personnel management at unit level is improving daily. The primary goal is to alleviate as many problems for the troops as possible. This enables soldiers to perform at maximum potential at all times.

g. The operational efficiency of small units is affected by a lack of junior officers and NCO's. This reporting period has illustrated a serious drop in lieutenant and non-commissioned officer replacement.

h. Lessons Learned.

(1) The use of a finance NCO attached to Brigade HQ provides more personal service to the men. Moreover, he must be attached for rationing and quarters. This enables him to have a base of operations from which he can move to the units in their field locations.

(2) Units conducting operations near a boundary or adjacent to another unit must try to maintain a 1000-meter zone around their operational area to facilitate the immediate employment of artillery and close air support in the event of enemy contact. It was learned on Operation JUNCTION CITY-1 that when units were too close together, the response time for artillery and close air support was lengthened because of the longer time period necessary to identify and locate friendly units in or adjacent to the target area.

(3) The employment of the 4.2" mortar greatly reduced the problem of minimum range artillery limitations on Operations JUNCTION CITY-1 and -2, and permitted great flexibility between mutually supporting fire support bases.

(4) To accomplish rapid, yet effective, minesweeping of the road on a road clearing operation, minesweeping teams should start at as many points along the road as permitted by route security. This could best be accomplished by lifting elements and minesweeping teams by helicopter, provided such transportation is available.

(5) During Operation JUNCTION CITY-2, patrolling along routes to be cleared often times proved more effective than outpostting. However, due to the resources available, experience on JUNCTION CITY indicated that the 1st ID could best achieve its mission by a combination of patrolling and outpostting. Moreover, thunder runs at night along routes secured during the day aided in effectively reducing mines emplaced during the night along the route.

(6) Clearing of jungle from both sides of a route which has been secure is essential for the detection of newly emplaced mines. Experience on Operations TIGER DELTA and JUNCTION CITY indicates that jungle clearing should continue as long as the road is open and the area secured. Jungle clearing must be preplanned and integrated into the security plan for the route to be opened.
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7 May 67

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Areas previously occupied by US combat vehicles are likely to be heavily mined. During Operation TUCSON DELTA, numerous mines were located in the vicinity of Artillery Base III (406656). Each area should be thoroughly swept by mine detector teams and should be completely traversed by tanks prior to being traversed by other vehicles. In addition, several casualties (arty personnel) were sustained as a result of personnel gathering too close to the vehicles moving through the area. A mine detonated by a passing tank injured five arty officers standing in a group nearby. The particular mine was the third or fourth that exploded within the immediate area during a one-hour period.

Small groups of vehicles travelling without an armored escort invite an ambush.

Reported use of an entrance or exit to a main road invites mining of the area. If the main road must be paralleled due to damage or other causes, the bypass must be mineswept.

The technique of moving arty fire units secured by armor and infantry to a forward firing position for the purpose of striking areas beyond the normal artillery fan has been very effective.

A sheep's-foot roller mounted in front of a VTR was employed during the April convoy resupply and road security operation to detect mines placed in the road. This principle is sound and should result in an effective means of locating mines. No mines were detected in the road area covered by the sheep's-foot roller during the April operation.

If troop resources for route clearing and security operations are limited, a satisfactory method for added security is the use artillery down both sides of the route being secured. Constantly shifting artillery fire 1000 meters on either side of the road moving just ahead of the resupply convoy proved very effective in reducing VC initiated convoy harassing actions.

FOR THE CONSUMER:

WILLIAM S. TURNER
Major, Infantry
Adjutant
TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
AFO U.S. Forces 96345

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (IGS CIG 10-25 (RZ)(U))

TOR: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
AFO U.S. Forces 96345

1. (C) Part I. INTRODUCTION:

a. Background: During the preceding period 1 February 67 - 30 April 67, 2d Brigade participated in one division size operation, six brigade operations and five battalion operations. The Division operation in which the Brigade was committed was Opn JUNCTION CITY II (21 March 67 - 14 April 67). All six Brigade operations were part of Opn LAM SON II and Opn LAM SON 67. The Battalion operations controlled by the 2d Bde were Opn UNIONTOWN, NORTH FLAT and three LAM SON 67 operations: Search and seal operations at VINH TRUNG (X1866171) on 4 Mar 67, HUA NHU (X1863175) on 5 Mar 67 and at old BUNG DIA (X1865175) on 27 Apr 67. The reporting period began with 2d Bde participating in LAM SON II and terminated on 8 Feb 67. From 8 Feb 67 and through part of March the Brigade continued LAM SON 67, LAM SON 67, LAUREL, SUITLAND, and CUMBERLAND. On 17 Mar 67, 2d Bde terminated participation in LAM SON 67 (the 3d Bde assumed the responsibility) and prepared for Opn JUNCTION CITY II. The 2d Bde moved by road from DII AJ to QUAN LOI (X1821903) on 18 Mar 67 and moved from QUAN LOI to FSB CHARLIE (X7568851) by CH-47 on 20 Mar 67. Opn JUNCTION CITY II was initiated by the 2d Bde on 21 Mar 67 and was terminated on 14 Apr 67. On 17 Apr 67, the 2d Bde assumed Opn LAM SON 27 ftm 3d Bde. The 2d Bde continues Opn LAM SON 67. During the reporting period, at varying times, the following battalions participated in 2d Bde operations: 2-16 Inf, 1-18 Inf, 2-18 Inf, 1-26 Inf, 2-2 Inf, 1-2 Inf, 1-16 Inf, 1-28 Inf. The 1-7 Artillery was in direct support of the Brigade throughout the reporting period.

b. Brigade Organization: (Units and Commanding Officers)

(1) 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division:
   (a) Col James A. Grimsley: 1 Feb - 1 Apr 67
   (b) LTC Alexander M. Haig: 1 Apr - 30 Apr 67

(2) 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry:
   (a) LTC Bruce E. Wallace: 1 Feb - 9 Mar 67
   (b) LTC Joseph R. Ulatoski: 9 Mar - 30 Apr 67

(3) 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry:
   (a) LTC Earl L. Denton: 1 Feb - 29 Mar 67
   (b) LTC Richard T. Cavasos: 30 Mar - 30 Apr 67

(4) 2d Battalion, 18 Infantry:
   (a) LTC Lewis R. Baumann: 1 Feb - 30 Apr 67

(5) 7th Battalion, 7 Artillery:
   (a) LTC George L. McFadden, Jr.: 1 Feb - 30 Apr 67

(6) Headquarters Company, 2d Brigade:
   (a) Capt Sherwood D. Goldberg: 1 Feb - 15 Apr 67

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(b) Capt Gerald E. Tillieux: 16 Apr - 30 Apr 67

(c) Capt Robert C. Lee: 1 Feb - 30 Apr 67

(d) Capt Shelton R. Baker: 1 Feb - 30 Apr 67

(e) Co B, 701st Maintenance:

(f) Capt Andrew J. Serenath: 1 Feb - 9 Apr 67

(g) Capt Michael F. Gandee: 10 Apr - 30 Apr 67

2. (C) Part II Tactical Operations:

a. During the reporting period the Brigade participated in one Division operation, JUNCTION CITY II; the LAM SON II and LAM SON 67 operations; Brigade-size operations included LAM SON, SOUTH JU, CURE JU, and seal and search operations with population control activities at BINH TRI (TX920090) 22-23 Apr 67 and at BINH HAD (TX947045) 24-26 Apr 67. Battalion-sized operations included Opn NORTH FLAT and search and seal operations at VINH TRUONG (TX856172) on 4 Mar 67, HCA RHUT (TX831798) on 5 Mar 67 and Old BUNG DIA (TX805215) on 27 Apr 67; and Opn UNIONTOWN.

b. Chronology of Tactical Operations:

(1) Operation LAM SON II 1-8 Feb 67

Continuing Opn LAM SON II, the 2d Bde in conjunction with 5th ARVN Division and BINH DUONG Sector, 18th ARVN Division and BIEN HOA Sector, Capital Military District and CIA BINH Sector, conducted tactical operations in designated areas to locate and destroy VC/NA main force units, guerrilla units, and VC infrastructure, continued, by constant application of combat fire power, to cause individual members of these VC organizations to rally to GVN control in order to stimulate further Revolutionary Development Activities in these areas. Operation LAM SON II continued placing emphasis on strengthening local defenses insuring a secure environment and extending development projects. At the beginning of the reporting period, 1-18 Inf, 2-18 Inf, 2-2 Mech with B 2-34 Armor attached and an Engr TF were conducting LAM SON II operations under Brigade control. Operation LAM SON II terminated on 8 Feb 67.

(2) LAM SON 67 8 Feb - 17 Mar 67

Opn LAM SON 67 was a continuation of Opn LAM SON II. Opn LAM SON 67 began on 8 Feb 67 with 1-28 Inf, 2-18 Inf, 2-2 Mech with B 2-34 Armor attached, and an Engr TF conducting LAM SON 67 operations under 2d Brigade control. From 8 Feb 67 to 17 Mar 67, elements of the Brigade conducted search and destroy operations, seal and search operations, platoon and squad size ambushes and saturation patrolling; provided security at Rock Quarry; secured and cleared roads and forward support areas, provided security for designated village chief; conducted revolutionary development projects; civic action programs, population control activities and ground and air PSYOp operations; and directed airstrikes and conducted artillery concentrations on VC base camps, supply areas, suspected VC locations and ADP Targets. All operations were accomplished in close cooperation and coordination with elements of 5th ARVN Division and BINH DUONG Sector, 18th ARVN Division and BINH HOA Sector and Capital Military District and CIA BINH Sector respectively.

(3) Operation UNIONTOWN

The Brigade continued Opn UNIONTOWN (which began on 28 Jan 67) employing 2-28 Inf to secure and defend the BIEN HOA Air Base, LONG BINH Post and the NUI CHUA CHAIHN Relay Site (TX552100). The operation consisted of extensive patrolling, the establishment of LP's and OP's and the conduct of ambushes and "Eagle Flights". This operation involved detailed coordination with the following agencies: G-3, II FFV, the LONG BINH Post Operations

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The mission of Operation LAUREL (Opn LAM SON 67) was to seal and search the village of TAN PHUC KHANH (XC891467) and HOA NHUT (XC882177) and to position battalions for future LAM SON 67. The operation was conducted in two phases. Phase I was conducted at night to a phase line at 162300H Feb 67 and affected seal of assigned sector. The search forces from 5th ARVN Division and Binh Duong Sector entered and deployed in the two villages. The 1-16 Inf and 2-16 Inf maintained the seal throughout the day while RDTF with element from 5th ARVN Division searched the village, assembled and screened all males, ages 15-45 years, and interrogated the detainees. A total of 497 males, ages 15-45, were screened and 297 were evacuated to National Police HQ, for further interrogation. The seal was lifted at 171300H Feb 67, thus terminating the operation.

(6) Seal and Search at VINH TRUNG (Opn LAM SON 67) 2d Bde, in conjunction with RDTF and elements of 5th ARVN Division and Binh Duong Sector conducted a seal and search operation at VINH TRUNG, via XU05172. 2-16 Inf completely sealed VINH TRUNG by 040000H Mar 67 and RDTF with Search Forces from Binh Duong Sector entered and deployed in the village at 040100H Mar 67. The 2-16 Inf maintained the seal while RDTF with elements from 5th ARVN Division and Binh Duong Sector searched the village, assembled and screened all males, ages 15-45 years, and interrogated the detainees. A total of 59 males, ages 14-45, were screened and 28 were evacuated to National Police HQ, Binh Duong for further interrogation. The search terminated at 041000H Mar 67. The seal was broken at 041100H thus terminating the operation.
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The seal was broken at 051145H Mar 67. Co C 2-16 Inf conducted a sweep, researching the hamlet from 051010H Mar 67 to 051130H Mar 67. The seal was broken at 051145H Mar 67 thus terminating the operation.

(8) Operation CUMBERLAND (Opn SON 67)

In Opn CUMBERLAND, the 2d Bde working in close coordination with 18th ARVN Division, BIEN HOA Sector and DONG NAI Sensitive Area conducted a seal and search operation with population control activities of TAN HIEP (XT953136) and BINH TRI (XT925090) and a systematic three-day search and destroy operations in eastern CO MI Jungle to deny area permanently for local guerrilla forces. The operation was conducted in three phases. In Phase I, 2-16 Inf conducted aerial assaults into multiple LZ's NE of TAN HIEP/BINH TRI and sealed the east portion of LK HIEP/BINH TRI. Concurrently, GVN Forces (58th RF Bn (-) and 35th ARVN Ranger B n ) moved to assembly areas via DL AN and from there by truck and by foot to seal the west portion of TAN HIEP/BINH TRI. TAN HIEP/BINH TRI was sealed at 071830H and cordon was maintained throughout the night. D Cty Comd (13th N & NW Bn) moved by N to a NW portion of the objective area between 071830H-071930H. Phase II: 2-16 Inf in conjunction with GVN Forces maintained the seal while RDTF with elements from BIEN HOA Sector and DONG NAI Sensitive Zone searched the village, conducted population control activities, assembled and screened all males (ages 15-45 yrs), and interrogated detainees. A total of 99 males, ages 15-45 yrs, were screened and 14 were evacuated to National Police HQ for further interrogation. The population control activities were terminated at 071500H Mar 67 at 071500H Mar 67, RDTF with elements of BIEN HOA and DONG NAI Sensitive Zone terminated their search. At 071500H Mar 67, the 2-16 Inf broke the seal and re-searched the hamllets and afterwards moved to position south of a phase line. During the search of TAN HIEP/BINH TRI, Tm BRAVO (D 1-4 Cav (-) and Plat C 5-2 Arty) and Tm CHARLES (C 5-2 Arty (-) and Plat D 1-4 Cav (-)) screened along Route ORANGE and Route 313 in zone. Phase III: On 09 Mar 1967, 2-16 Inf commenced search and destroy operations in assigned zones of CO MI Jungle (East) until 11 Mar 67 after closing at PHU LOI. Tm BRAVO and Tm CHARLES continued to screen Route ORANGE and road north of CO MI Jungle respectively until 11 Mar 67. Operation CUMBERLAND terminated at 111646H Mar 67.

(9) Operation NORTH FLAT (Opn SON 67)

In Opn NORTH FLAT, the 2d Bde working in close coordination with 5th ARVN Division, BIEN DUONG Sector, BIEN HOA Sector and DONG NAI Sensitive Zone conducted a seal and search operation with Hamlet Festival at DM Bi (XT933126). The operation was conducted in two phases. The 2-16 Inf at 121600H moved by wheel vehicles along Route GREEN to a release point and then by foot and sealed BINH CHANH by 131200H Mar 67. 2-16 Inf maintained the cordon while RDTF (-) with elements from BIEN DUONG Sector entered and deployed at 121600H Mar, searched the hamlet, assembled and screened all males, ages 15 to 45 yrs, and interrogated the detainees. A total of 94 males, 15-45 yrs, were screened, 40 of which were evacuated to National Police HQ for further interrogation. The search was terminated at 121730H Mar 67 and the seal was released at 121750H Mar 67.

Phase III: At 18101H Mar 67, 2-16 Inf (-) moved by foot and sealed the west portion of TAN BA. GVN Forces (58th ARVN Bn, 57th ARVN Bn (-), Company 502 FF, and 2 Boat Patrol from DONG NAI S-2) moved by motor vehicle to a Phase line and then by foot to seal the east portion of TAN BA. TAN BA was sealed by 121800H Mar 67 and the cordon was maintained throughout the hours of darkness. The cordon remained in place on 13 Mar 67 while RDTF with Search Forces from BIEN HOA Sector entered and deployed at 130200H Mar 67, conducted an intensive search, assembled and screened all males, ages 15-45 yrs, and interrogated the detainees. A total of 267 males, 15-45 yrs, were screened with 15 detainees being evacuated to National Police HQ for further interrogation. The search was terminated at 131200H Mar 67. The seal was broken at 131220H Mar 67, and the operation terminated at 131400H when the 2-16 Inf closed PHU LOI.

(10) Operation JUNCTION CITY II

2d Bde participated in Opn JUNCTION CITY II at 210300H Mar 67 and the operation was terminated at 141344H Apr 67. This operation proved to be by far the most singularly productive operation in which the Brigade participated during the reporting period. The 2d Bde's participation in the operation was
characterized by rapid movement and precise planning for massive and accurate fire control of both air and artillery. Opn JUNCTION CITY II missioned the 2d Brigade to conduct brigade airmobile assaults into eastern War Zone C

comprising on 2 Mar 67; to conduct search and destroy operations; to conduct search, fix, and destroy GSCW/FV/TKA forces and installations in AO DAGGER; and concurrently to conduct ground assault along Axis PANZER; to secure FSB CHARLIE on order and conduct search and destroy operations Obj FAUST area; to secure FSD THRUST on 29 Mar 67; to conduct airmobile assaults into Obj SIOUX area on 30 and 31 Mar 67; to continue search and destroy operations in AO DAGGER; to continue to secure FSD THRUST and CHARLIE and on order open and outpost Route YELLOW in sector between bases during daylight hours; and to continue conducting search and destroy operations in AO DAGGER until termination of the operation. Opn JUNCTION CITY II was conducted in three phases. Phase I

(21 - 29 Mar 67): 2-16 Inf conducted airmobile combat assault into LZ Quiet at 2111H Mar 67; conducted search and destroy operations in western Objective FAUST area and seized Obj 1, 2, 3, and 4; conducted operations south to Route 246, 2-16 Inf conducted airmobile combat assault onto LZ Quiet at 2114H Mar 67; conducted search and destroy operations in eastern Objective FAUST area and seized Obj 2, 4, and 6; continued operations south to Route 246, 1-26 Inf

remained at FSD CHARLIE as 2d NR; secured the east portion of FSD CHARLIE (secured entire perimeter on 29 Mar 67) cleared and outposted Route 246, conducted road clearing operations between check points, and conducted search and destroy operations and ambush patrols in AO. 36th ARVN Drn secured west portion of FSD CHARLIE until 27 Mar 67 and conducted search & destroy operations in assigned AO. 2-11 ACR conducted ground assaults along Axis PANZER and Axis 688, secured support bases of these objectives, and conducted search and destroy operations in AO. Phase II

(28 - 29 Mar 67): 2-16 Inf continued search and destroy operations in eastern Obj FAUST area through 2817H Mar 67; moved to secure pick-up point via XH341 at 0200H 29 Mar 67, relieved 1-15 Inf in place and was attached 1st Brigade 2813H Mar 67. 1-10 Inf (attacked after relief by 2-16 Inf) moved Ln (-) to field runs via XT57246 closing at 2815H Mar 67 and moved Gp 0 into FSD CHARLIE at 2815H Mar 67; assumed OIC of 2-11 Cav at Obj THRUST at 2915H Mar 67; inserted and secured an airmobile land run into Obj THRUST at 2916H Mar 67; opened and outposted Route YELLOW in sector until passage of last convoy on 29 Mar 67; and secured and outposted security of FSB THRUST. 2-16 Inf continued search and destroy operations in western Obj FAUST area; 1-26 Inf continued search and destroy operations via FSD CHARLIE; opened and outposted Route YELLOW in sector on 29 Mar 67 until relief of 1-10 Inf by 2-16 Inf had been completed and on 29 Mar until passage of last convoy; and assumed OIC of C 5-2 Arty for road security missions. 1-12 Inf conducted search and destroy operations via FSD CHARLIE. Phase III (30 Mar - 15 Apr 67): 1-10 Inf (4) (2 Trp, 2-11 Cav OIC) daily outposted Route YELLOW in sector and coordinated security of FSB THRUST. At 0217H 30 Mar was attached 1st Bde and security of FSB THRUST was also assumed by 1st Bde at that time; was returned back to control of 2d Bde at 0512H Apr 67; secured FSB BIVO; secured and outposted Route 246 in zone and conducted search and destroy patrols; conducted search and destroy operations N of FSB CHARLIE; was airlifted from FSB CHARLIE and attached 1st Bde 1302H Apr 67. 2-18 Inf continued search and destroy operations in western Obj FAUST area; at 3010H Mar 67 was airlifted to FSD CHARLIE clearing responsibility of the east portion of FSB CHARLIE, coordinated security of FSB CHARLIE; cleared and outposted Route YELLOW in sector (commencing on 31 Mar 67) with C 5-2 Arty; and was attached to 1st Bde at 0136H Apr 67; reverted back to 2d Bde control at 0611H Apr 67; secured FSB CHARLIE; secured and outposted Route 246 in zone; conducted recon patrols of FSB CHARLIE; 1-26 Inf conducted an airmobile assault into LZ George at 3013H Mar 67 in Obj SIOUX; secured LZ until arrival of 1-2 Inf on 31 Mar 67; conducted search and destroy operations in eastern Obj SIOUX area, seizing Obj 11, 13, and 15; and conducted S & D operations on Obj SIOUX and at 0214H was freed from LZ George and upon closure QUAN LOI reverted 1st Bde control. 1-2 Inf cleared and outposted Route YELLOW in sector; was airlifted from FSB CHARLIE at 310930H Mar closing LZ George at 3117H Mar 67; conducted search and destroy operations in western Obj SIOUX area seizing Obj 12, 14, and 16; conducted search and destroy operations south and east of HBO (XT41897, XT44289, XT46280, XT46319); and was airlifted to FSB BIVO on 7 Apr 67 and attached 3d Brigade. 1-16 Inf was airlifted from FSB VINH to LZ George and became OIC to 2d Bde upon closure at 3117H Mar 67; conducted search and destroy operations in zone via XH365, NQ VV, and HBO of HBO (XT44137), HBO of HBO (XT44137), and was airlifted from LZ George at 0405H and attached 1st Bde upon closure at QUAN LOI. 2-16 Inf reverted back to 2d Bde control at 0211H Apr 67 and
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at 021500H Apr 67 airlifted from FSB BRAVO to LZ GEORGE closing at 021657H Apr 67; conducted search and destroy operations NS & E of LZ GEORGE, SW of NDF (XT264407), NE and SE of NDF (XT189020) and NS of NDF (XT141927). On 16(Apr 1967), was airlifted from NDF (XT240020) commencing 070300H Apr 67, closing FSB BRAVO at 071115H Apr 67 relieving 1-26 Inf in place; secured FSB BRAVO; cleared and outpatient Route 26 in zone; and conducted combat recon patrols and positioned night ambushes; became OCON to 1st Bde at 131200H Apr 67; 1-26 Inf was attached 2d Bde at 071015H Apr 67 and airlifted from FSB BRAVO to FSB THUNDER; conducted search and destroy operations N of NDF (XT251760), NS and SW of NDF (XT240787), SE of NDF toward XT5117; and was airlifted commencing 130900H Mar 67 and reverted 1st Bde control upon closure at 131500H Apr 67; 2d Inf was placed OCON 2d Bde on 070000H Apr 67; assumed area N of FSB CHARLIE and conducted aerial recon N and SW of FSB CHARLIE.

1-7 Artillery (4) remained in NS of 2d Bde throughout all phases of the operation firing disruptive fires, targets of opportunity, preparations and defensive concentrations. On 15 Apr 67 the Brigade CF moved by road from FSB BRAVO and closed QUAN LOI at 131513H Apr 67; and then moved by road to DI AN base camp, closing at 161444H Apr 67 thus terminating JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf and 2-18 Inf were airlifted from FSB BRAVO and QUAN LOI respectively to DI AN and both stood down for maintenance. The 1-18C Infantry remained attached to the reporting period, WAi attached personnel in the theory and practice of revolutionary development, and Dde. The Bde oriented upon Viet Cong local forces in the operation 1AM and kept a small detachment at HUE on 061500H. Gen Hollingsworth, Asst Division Commander assume Command of the Brigade. At 010000H Apr 67 LTC Hoig CO 1-26 Inf assumed Command of the 2d Brigade. The results of OPN JUNCTION CITY II were as follows: 79 VC killed, 12 captured, 23 wounded, 1500 lb bombs, 1 heavy MG, 4 LAWs, 8 CHARON LMKs, 1 machine gun, 9 CHARON carbines, 2-60mm mortars, 2 rifles, 5 cases M16, 1-65 cal pistol, 10 RPGs, 33-81mm mortar rds, 50-60mm mortar rds, 6-75 HR rds; 5-57mm rds, 22 AT mines, 1 CHARON mine, 6 AP mines, 3 plastic mines, 6 CHARON grenades, 26 rifle grenades, 3,000 hand grenades w/ fuses, 90 rds SA ammo, 7 cases smoke, 12 CQDs, 2-105mm rds (shells), 3 booby trapped CHARON grenades, 1 booby trapped 81mm rds, 1 booby trapped 82mm rds, 3 cases TNT, 5 cases C-4, 10 lbs black powder, 933 bunkers, 165 mortar pens, 24 tunnels, 70 foxholes, 9 bomb shelter, 3 underground rooms, 2 classrooms, 2 mess halls, 13.7 ton rice, 50 lbs sug, 17 gals cooking oil, 1 gals alcohol, 5 cans milk, 6 cans MRE rations, 75 lbs pork seed, 1 pig, 12 chickens, 31 ponchos, 8 uniforms, 2 packs, 3 VQ helmets, 14 haversacks, 2 pistol belts, 3 canteens, 1 canteen cup w/cooler, 7 truck axles, 8 sweat shirts, 5 pr black pajamas, 6 pr civilian clothes, 10 gas mask, 1 AM radio, 1 xm, 2 shovels, 2 typewriters, 1500 lbs wire, 13 cooking pots, 21 bicycles, 1 printing press, 1 barber kit, 700 packs cigarettes, 3 dos "J" boxes, 3 oars, 331 empty ammo boxes, miscellaneous documents and medicines.

(11) Operation LAN SON 67

On 17 Apr 67, 2d Bde assumed Operation LAN SON 67 from the 3d Bde. The Bde ordered upon Viet Cong local forces in the operation TACR, supplying GVN Revolutionary Development within TACR in coordination with appropriate GVN, ARVN, PAVN and U.S. organizations, trained assigned and attached personnel in the theory and practice of revolutionary development, and furnished forces to other brigades as required. From 17 Apr 67 to the end of the reporting period, LAN SON 67 operations consisted of cordon and search operations, search and destroy operations, harassment, jungle clearing, population control activities, civic action/psychological warfare operations directed against priority targets as developed from current intelligence, search and destroy and Platoons and sound siege ambushes and patrol operations stressed maximum use and integration of GVN forces. OCN LAN SON 67 continued to improve the secure environment in the vital central U.S. Army Province between the AUKON and long NAL rivers. On 19 Apr 67, 2d Bde became attached to 2d Bde at 0700H (continuing LAN SON 67) — was airlifted.
from THU LOI to LAM SON at 180000H to become attached to 3d Bde on closure.
On 20 Apr 67 at 0739H 2-16 Inf was airlifted from THU LOI to LAM SON and
was attached to 3d Bde upon closure. Beginning on 17 Apr 67 and during the
remainder of the month, the 2d Bde continued Operation LAM SON 67. Elements of
the 2d Bde conducted SAD and jungle clearing operations in the LAM SON 67 AO,
secured engineer efforts at bridge site (XY909189) and laterite pit (XY909169),
provided security for village chief at THU TRONG, conducted road clearing
and jungle clearing operations along Route CHAM, directed airstrikes and
conducted artillery on VC base areas, supply areas, suspected VC locations and
as a DIF group, conducted "Eagle Flights" throughout LAM SON 67 AO, and
conducted platoon size sweeps, saturation patrols, and platoon size and squad
size ambushes. The 2d Bde in conjunction with elements of 9th Division SW, 10th
Division ARM, and forces from BENH TRONG conducted seal and
search operations with population control activities at BIEN TRONG, via XY920097,
on 23 Apr 67 and at DON AO, via XT909505 on 26 Apr 67. Also, a seal and
search operation was conducted at OLD DUNG DIA, via XY920195, by 2d Bde in
conjunction with elements from BENH TRONG. Results from Operation LAM SON 67
from 17 Apr to 30 Apr 67 were as follows:
14 KIA, 3 FM, 12 EAs, 153
detainees, 1-60mm mortar, 6-50cm mortar rds, 10 grenades, 101 claymore wire,
2 French rifles, 1 APC, 1 bicycle, 1 AT weapon, 1 pressure mine, 14 bunkers, 22 tunnels, 8 underground rooms, 8 mortar rds (unknown type),
3-8" rds, 4-2.25" rds, 3 huts, 1 caser, 7,62link linked ammo, 1-105mm rd, 4-155mm
rds, 15 huts, 1-2Kg HE, 1-175mm rd, 1 mine rigged for caser, detonation, 4 claymores, 5 rds 20 cal ammo, 7-45 20mm rounds, 1 trench, 2 pr black
pajamas, 8 base camps, 3 CHEM Grenades, 6 RGD rds,
6-79mm rds, 6 booby trapped hand grenades (US), 3-105mm rds (HE), 1-155mm rd
(HE), 106 fighting pans, 3 WD gas masks, 1 punji pit, 1 pr binoculars,
1 typewriter, 2-14.5 cal, 1 carbine mag, 10 lbs salt, 25 lbs tobacco, 15 cooking
pots, 3 rolls 60mm wire, 1 gas stove, 45 gal cooking oil, 3 gal kerosene, 3 pr sandals, clothing, 1 AK47 rifle, 1 U.S. carbine,
1 French carbine, 250 lb bomb, 2-20mm rds, 250 lb polished rice, 1 rifle grenade
3-25mm rds, 3 booby trapped CHEM Grenades, 1 diary, 4 ponchos, 1 pk leaflets,
1-55 gal drum, 4-1 gal can, miscellaneous documents.

c. Results of operations during the period of this report.

885 KIA (245), 12 EAs, 15 FM, 325 detainees, 1 MIA, 1-350 MGM, 4
BAs, 34 AK47s, 1 Russian assault rifle, 4 rifles, 1-45 cal pistol, 10 MG34,
US grenades, 26 rifle grenades, 5 820 rds 56mm, 12 GIs, 3 cases TNT,
5 cases 0-4, 10 lbs black powder, 31.3 tons rice, 100 lbs sugar, 42.5 gal
cooking oil, 2 pr black pajamas, 10 20mm rounds, 75 lbs distilled water,
1 pig, 12 chickens, 2 micrograph machine, 35 ponchos, 8 uniforms, 3 WD helmets,
14 haversacks, 2-50cal belts, 3 gas masks, 1 can gas mask w/cover, 7 sack
mats, 8 sweat shirts, 7 pr black pajamas, 8 pr civilian clothes, 5 gas masks, 1 AN
radio, 20 1950s era shirts, 1 typewriter, 12000lcl oil, 1 motorcycle,
1 typewriter, 38 bicycles, 1 printing press, 1 barber kit, 702 packs cigarettes,
assorted food stuffs, 3 dos "TM" beans, 3000 pack atro boxes,
missile cases, general missile balls, 1001 claymore wire, 1 case 7,62 linked
ammunition, 110 W/rd ammo, 1 US field pack 5 rds 30 cal, 204 US field pack 30 cal, 1044 US field pack 20mm, 5 rds 155mm howitzer, 1 pr
binoculars, 1 typewriter, 1 M16 mag, 10 carbine mags, 110 lbs salt, 25 lbs
tobacco, 15 sets chopsticks, 6 rolls WD-1 wire, 1 gas stove, 3 gal kerosene,
dresses, 3 pr sandals, clothing, 1 US carbine, 1 French carbine, 250 lb bomb,
2-20mm rds, 250 lbs polished rice, 1 rifle grenade
3-25mm rds, 3 booby trapped CHEM Grenades, 1 diary, 4 ponchos, 1 pk leaflets,
1-55 gal drum, 4-1 gal can, miscellaneous documents.
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a. February 1967: There were 54 VC initiated incidents during the month of February 1967. Twenty-four involved vehicles detonating pressure mines. There were twelve reports of small arms fire being received and thirteen incidents involving booby traps. On 11 Feb 67, 1-16 Inf received approximately 70 rounds 82mm mortar via XT02378 between 1930H and 1940H. The only other incident of note occurred via XT911335 on 28 Feb when a tank from 3rd Sqdn, 6th Cav had two rounds of RBU-2 fired at it. One round struck the tank causing minor damage, the other one missed. The remaining incidents in the Feb 67 period indicated that the VC were firing B-52 from its junction with Hwy QL 13 via XT976199 to via XT025361 and all secondary roads leading away from TL 2A. The exception to this is via XT434113 to via XT952403; no mines have been found on this road. For the past month, either a mechanized battalion or cavalry squadron has been in the northern LAM SON AO. During the early portion of the reporting period the VC were able to inflict casualties and damage by using maximum use of mines without endangering their own personnel. However, as the mechanized elements continued intensive operations in the northern LAM SON AO there was a significant reduction in VC activity in the area. This is significant in that the northern LAM SON AO has been an area dominated by the VC. A valid evaluation of small arms fire and booby trap incidents cannot be made. The incidents occurred over a wide area and at various dates and times. The VC continue to use grenade booby traps throughout the area to slow movement and cause casualties. Small arms fire has been extremely ineffective. Two or three rounds are fired and the individual immediately disappears. The mortar incident on 11 Feb 67 demonstrated the VC capability to mortar installations wherever they desire. The 81mm rds fired at 3-5 Cav on 26 Feb indicate that, following a month of our using armor in the northern LAM SON AO, local force units may have been supplied with light antitank weapons in an effort to provide them with greater antitank capability.

b. March 1967: VC initiated incidents remained normal in the LAM SON operational area. The significant trends in incidents were noted. The use of B-40s in the northern portion of the LAM SON AO noted in early March. B-40s were used to attack tracked vehicles in defensive positions as well as during movement. They were employed only during hours of darkness and by individuals or small teams. In attack on HU 601 base camp 10 rounds of M16 and three rounds of M60 fired; two rounds of 82mm indirect fire were used as well as mortars. The Chieu Nho's from C 65 Co, 11th TMLC Dist Co indicated that this company was far below strength and that morale was very poor due to fear of artillery. Also there were several agent reports stating that C 61, DHQ Cat Dist Co, had been built up to fill up other units. Although not presently confirmed this would indicate personnel problems within VC units in the LAM SON area and correspondingly a decrease in VC influence and control. In War Zone "C" the following incidents were noted. A likely LZ had been prepared with a demolition charge. It consisted of 4 holes containing 100-150mm mortar rds, 7 rifle grenades, 6 cases C-4, 1 case TNT, 8-75mm rounds, 12 blasting caps, all connected for simultaneous detonation.

c. April 1967: There were approximately twenty-five VC initiated incidents during the month of April. These have been broken into two groups. The first from 1-13 April 67 occurred in the area of FSB CHARLIE (XT5689) in War Zone "C". The second group, 14-30 April 67, took place in the LAM SON AO, center of mass XT6255. During the first period there were 9 mortar attacks conducted by the VC. Six of these were at FSB CHARLIE. Significant attacks occurred on 1 Apr 67 on 0300H and on 6 Apr 67. The attack on 1 Apr consisted of 200 rounds of 82mm mortar and 75 8放在 fires. At the same time the 1-4 Inf received 200 rounds of mortar rds, 14 rounds of 120mm mortar rds, 17 rounds of 30mm. After 6 Apr 67 FSB CHARLIE received direct fire from a mortar attack on 1115H and 1800H, both 81mm rounds of 82mm mortar. The remaining were SA fire, 12586mm and 3 mortars and mining of roads directed at units in the field. In the LAM SON AO the VC 5th Cav attempted to seize the AN VC outpost (XT025173) at 0300H 2 Apr 67. The attack was unsuccessful. On 282200H, units at FSB 630310 reported incoming 82mm mortar fire. The remainder of the attacks were small arms fire directed at vehicles and personnel and 2 end deb mines. There were no significant patterns established. The frequency and size of the mortar attacks carried out against FSB CHARLIE indicate a high rate of resupply for mortar ammunition and a willingness to use the mortars both day and night in that area. There were no further incidents in either area from which a valid conclusion could be drawn.
4. (C) Part IV, Personnel:

a. Present Strength: The assigned strength of the Brigade at the beginning of the reporting period was 130 Officers, 6 Warrant Officers and 2,459 Enlisted Men. The strength of the Brigade at the end of the reporting period was 121 Officers, 9 Warrant Officers, and 2,304 Enlisted Men.

b. Replacements: The Brigade received 1,121 personnel replacements and lost 1,214 personnel during the reporting period, resulting in a net loss of 93 personnel.

c. Military Discipline: Military discipline has been excellent. There were no unusual problems concerning law and order.

d. Burials: All grave registration activity is handled by the Forward Supply Section, 1st Supply and Transportation Detachment and also the 506th Quartermaster Company. All deceased have been evacuated through channels with no burials in the field.

e. Civilian Employees: At the present, the Brigade hires 150 unskilled laborers for each day, under the temporary hire program, for tasks such as clearing fields of fire, filling sand bags, draining ditches, and leveling ground for foundation pads. 216 local nationals are employed under the permanent hire program for jobs such as laborers, water carriers, gardeners, and janitors.

5. (C) Part V, Logistics:

a. February 1967: During the reporting period logistical support was provided for Opn IM SCN by both helicopter and land transport. An MSR was opened and secured each day. The health of the Command and the physical condition of the troops remained good.

b. March 1967: The logistical situation remains good. During Opn LAM SON from 1 March 67 to 17 March 67 logistical support base was established in HU LOI. No major problems were encountered during Opn LAM SON 67; however, some problems were encountered in support Trp 3-4 Cav in the repair of track vehicle equipment. Parts were not readily available causing vehicles to be impounded for excessive time. On 16 March the 3rd Train was ordered to QUAN LOI for Opn JUNCTION CITY II. The convoy encountered no major difficulty. On 19 and 20 March 67, the 3rd Train commenced aerial resupply of units on closure in the forward area. To reduce aircraft turn around time, a forward resupply base was established at FSB CHARLIE. In this area 2 DOS of Class V, "C" rations and units firms were stored. Supplies and ammunition are being transported by vehicle to FSB CHARLIE by controlled convoy. Water was a big problem at FSB CHARLIE because of the limited source. In future operations, when there is a limited water supply, the S & T should provide sufficient 5000 gal water tankers to provide the necessary water resupply. Units kitchens were located at 3rd Train at QUAN LOI. Class 'A' rations are provided at 3rd Train and airlifted to
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forward units. One major supply problem encountered during the period, 2d Bde 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was attached to 2d Bde. The unit moved deep into the objective area. The existing road was not cleared and maintained resulting in a major resupply effort in moving 105mm howitzer ammunition, Class III and water into the area. Due to the tonnage requirement, this required CH-47 support. 5-2 Arty has had excessive engine failure in their track vehicles (MSA1). Purchase of ice through the imprest fund has become necessary since there is not sufficient ice issued through FSB at this location.

c. April 1967: Period 1 April to 14 April (Opn JUNCTION CITY II): During this period the Brigade logistical support base was established in QUAN LOI. Collocated at the base was a support element of the 1st Logistical Command. Overall storage levels of all classes of supplies were sufficient to meet the demands of the tactical units, in some cases even items were not readily available. However, once the requirement placed on the appropriate agency, the problem was resolved as quick as possible. One major problem was encountered with prepurchased 4-22 ammunition bags. Initially, the bags were packed with approximately 1000 to 1200 lbs of various Class III and Class V. During the operation, attempts were made to pick the bags up using the HUEC helicopter exterior sling capability. Due to weather conditions, fuel aboard, the mechanical condition of the aircraft, many of the loads could not be picked up. By reducing the weight of the bags to 600 lbs, the helicopter was able to lift the ammunition into the operational area with no difficulty. Supporting the attached cavalry troop continued to be a problem, primarily that of transporting the quantities of Class III and Class V requirements from QUAN LOI to FSB THRUST. When the MSR was open, a small resupply convoy was dispatched each day, carrying sufficient supplies for the Troop. If the road was closed due to enemy action, approximately 10 sorties were used to resupply the Troop with Class III and Class V. Water continued to be a problem at FSB CHARLIE and FSB THRUST. Insufficient water was available at FSB CHARLIE to support the troops at both positions. An additional 5,000 gallon water trailer was obtained from 1st S & T Zn which relieved the problems to a large extent. Maintenance of equipment was supported by Company 70th contact teams. No difficulty was experienced in this area. On 14 April the Brig de returned to base camp at DI AN.

b. Period 15 April to 30 April 67: The Brigade stood down for maintenance for approximately 5 days while preparing to assume the LAM SON 67 mission. During this period all Battalions performed maintenance on all equipment. Company 70th Maintenance inspected and repaired signal, small arms and automotive equipment. In addition to maintenance, each unit had an opportunity to inventory all equipment prior to going on the next operation.

A problem during this period was obtaining sufficient trucks to move battalions from DI AN to air head at PHU LOI. Also the problem exists when transporting units from one location to another in conducting the LAM SON mission. A limited number of cargo trucks were left in base camp by the battalions for support of the rear detachment and maintenance. During this period supply activities remained normal and met the operational requirements.

6. (C) Part VI, Chronology.

a. 1 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON II and UNIONTOWN, 2-16 Inf remained at 1st AN Base Camp as Bde Hq, 1-16 Inf, 2-16 Inf (+) (with 1 plat Co D 2-34 Arm), and 2-2 Mech (+)(with D 2-34 Arm(-)) continued Opn LAM SON II, 2-28 Inf continued Opn UNIONTOWN.

b. 2 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON II and UNIONTOWN, 1-16 Inf (+) (with 1 plat Co B 2-34 Arm), 2-16 Inf, and 2-2 Mech (-)(with 2-34 Arm(-)) continued Opn LAM SON II, 2-16 Inf was airlifted from DIEN BAC and became attached to 1st Bde upon closure at QUAN LOI at 1415H, 2-28 Inf continued Opn UNIONTOWN.

c. 3 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON II and UNIONTOWN, 1-16 Inf, 2-16 Inf, and 2-2 Mech (-)(with Co B 2-34 Arm(-)) continued Opn LAM SON II, 2-28 Inf continued Opn UNIONTOWN.

d. 4 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON II and Opn UNIONTOWN, 2-16 Inf (+)(with 1 plat Co B 2-34 Arm) and 2-2 Mech (+)(with Co B 2-34 Arm(-)) continued Opn LAM SON II, 1-16 Inf moved Marched from DI AN Base Camp
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commencing at 0925H closing 14th Bn at 1215H at which time became attached 3d Bde. 2-20 Inf continued Opn UNIONTOWN.

5 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON II and UNIONTOWN. 2-16 Inf (+)(with 1 plt 60mm 2-34 Arm) and 2-2 Mech (+)(with Co D 2-34 Arm(-)) continued Opn LAM SON II. 2-20 Inf continued Opn UNIONTOWN.

6 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON II and UNIONTOWN. Bde of CT COM displaced from XT863254 to XT824203 closing at 1215H. 2-16 Inf (+)(Co D 2-34 Arm) 3-2 ARVN, and 1-1 Tank Trp (CRVN) and 2-2 Mech (+) continued Opn LAM SON II. 2-28 Inf continued Opn UNIONTOWN.

7 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON II and UNIONTOWN. 2-16 Inf (+) and 2-2 Inf (+) continued Opn LAM SON II. 2-28 Inf continued Opn UNIONTOWN.

8 Feb: 2d Bde terminated Opn LAM SON II and UNIONTOWN and initiated Opn LAM SON 67 (the continuation of LAM SON II). 2-16 Inf (+)(with Tp of 1148H) and 2-2 Mech(+)(--) terminated Opn LAM SON II and 1-10 Inf and Opn UNIONTOWN. 2-20 Inf terminated Opn UNIONTOWN. 2-60 Inf, 9th Division assumed at 1400H. 2-28 Inf was airlifted from LAM SON at 1500H closing LAM SON at 1700H and reverted CTCON 3d Bde.

9 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16Inf(+)(+)(with Tp of 1148H). 2-18 Inf continued Opn UNIONTOWN and terminated Opn LAM SON 67. 2-18 Inf and 2-2 Mech (+) continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-10 Inf and 2-2 Mech (+) continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf and 2-2 Mech (+) continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-10 Inf and 2-2 Mech (+) continued Opn LAM SON 67.

10 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-16 Inf, 2-16 Inf (+) and 2-2 Mech (+) continued Opn LAM SON 67.

11 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67, 1-10 Inf, 2-10 Inf and 2-2 Mech (+) continued Opn LAM SON 67.

12 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67, 3rd Co displaced at 1300H to vic XT845245 closing at 1500H. 1-10 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf was airlifted from LAM SON at 1500H to LAM SON and was attached 1st Bde upon closure. 2-16 Inf moved by road from field positions closing at which time reverted attachment 2d Bde, 2-2 Mech (-) completed and outposted Bn 13 between LAM SON and CT CON by 0215H. On 1500H 2-2 Mech was attached 1st Bde. Bty C 5-2 Arty moved from field positions closing 2d Bde CF at 1600H.

13 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf, 1-10 Inf and 2-16 Inf. 2-10 Inf and C 5-2 Artillery continued Opn LAM SON 67.

14 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf, 1-10 Inf, and C 5-2 Artillery continued Opn LAM SON 67.

15 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf and C 5-2 Artillery continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-10 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 participating in a seal and search of village of AN SON (XT862295).

16 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67 and initiated Opn LAUREL. 2d Bde CT COM was established via RUK LOS at 1235H. 2-16 Inf and C 5-2 Artillery continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-18 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 and initiated Opn LAUREL as part of Opn LAM SON 67 at 2200H.

17 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67 and terminated Opn LAUREL. Bde CT COM displaced at 1221H from vic XT864506 closing to AN SON Base Camp at 1410H. 2-16 Inf and C 5-2 Artillery continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-10 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 and terminated Opn LAUREL at 1200H.

18 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf and C 5-2 Artillery continued Opn LAM SON 67. 1-16 Inf stood down at AN SON Base Camp andcontinued care and maintenance.

19 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67 and initiated Opn SUITLAND as part of Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 and initiated Opn SUITLAND with Bn (-) moving toward village of RFQ SON by 1300H. 1-10 Inf moved to AN SON Base Camp closing at RFQ LOS at 0915H and at 0925H was airlifted to FRBCO VINH closing 1700H at which time the Fm assumed responsi-
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sibility for security of HUOC VINH (1st Bde) base camp. C 5-2 Arty stood down at HU LOC and conducted care and maintenance.

20 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn SUIJLAND and continued Opn LAN SON 67. Bde TAC CT departed DI-AN JU66 closing at 0900H and returned to DI-AN closing at 1200H, 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAN SON 67 and terminated Opn SUIJLAND at 1330H. 1-16 Inf continued HUOC VINH security missions. 1-16 Inf became OCON 2d Bde at 0900H and assumed security of LAN SON base camp. 3-5 Cav became OCON 2d Bde at 0930H and closed HU LOC at 1132H. C 5-2 Arty stood down at HU LOC and conducted care and maintenance.

21 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAN SON 67. Bde FWD CT deployed from DI-AN Base Camp at 0940H and closed via XT817253 at 1130H. 1-16 Inf continued LAN SON 67 security missions. 2-16 Inf and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAN SON 67. 1-16 Inf continued HUOC VINH security mission. 3-5 Cav stood down for maintenance at HU LOC.

22 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAN SON 67 participating in a seal and search at HUOC VINH (XT86142) which terminated at 1055H. 2-16 Inf continued LAN SON 67 security missions. 1-16 Inf continued HUOC VINH security mission. 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued participation in Opn LAN SON 67.

23 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf, 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued LAN SON 67. 1-16 Inf continued LAN SON 67 security mission of LAN SON 67. 1-16 Inf continued LAN SON 67 security mission. 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued participation in Opn LAN SON 67.

24 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf, 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAN SON 67 participating in a seal and search at HUOC VINH (XT82265) which terminated at 1250H. 1-16 Inf continued LAN SON 67 security missions.

25 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAN SON 67 participating in a seal and search at HUOC VINH (XT82265) which terminated at 1250H. 1-16 Inf continued LAN SON 67 security missions.

26 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAN SON 67 participating in a seal and search at HUOC VINH (XT82265) which terminated at 1250H. 1-16 Inf continued LAN SON 67 security missions. 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAN SON 67.

27 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAN SON 67 participating in a seal and search at HUOC VINH (XT82265) which terminated at 1250H. 1-16 Inf continued LAN SON 67 security missions. 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAN SON 67 participating in a seal and search at HUOC VINH (XT82265) which terminated at 1250H. 1-16 Inf continued LAN SON 67 security missions. 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAN SON 67 participating in a seal and search at HUOC VINH (XT82265) which terminated at 1250H. 1-16 Inf continued LAN SON 67 security missions. 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAN SON 67.

28 Feb: 2d Bde continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAN SON 67 participating in a seal and search at HUOC VINH (XT82265) which terminated at 1250H. 1-16 Inf continued LAN SON 67 security missions. 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAN SON 67 maintaining seal at DI-AN. 2215H. Sd Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAN SON 67 maintaining seal at DI-AN. 2215H. Sd Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAN SON 67 maintaining seal at DI-AN.

1 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAN SON 67 for care and maintenance. 2-16 Inf continued LAN SON 67 and continued LAN SON 67 security missions. 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAN SON 67 maintaining seal at DI-AN. 1230H, thus terminating the

2 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAN SON 67 for care and maintenance. 2-16 Inf continued LAN SON 67 and continued LAN SON 67 security missions. 3-5 Cav and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAN SON 67.

3 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAN SON 67. 1-16 Inf continued LAN SON 67 and continued LAN SON 67 security missions.
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4 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. At 1355H Bde CP convolved move from 1st CP to DI AN base camp closing at 1600H. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 participating in a seal and search operation of VINH THUOC (XT933175) which terminated at 1155H. 1-16 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67. B 1-4 Cav closed into HU LOI at 1035H becoming OPCON 2d Bde. 3-5 Cav commenced road clearing and movement from 1st CP to LAM SON at 0635H. At 1112H the Bde closed LAI KHE and was released operational control of 2d Bde.

5 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 participating in a seal and search operation of HOA NHIU (XT933176) which terminated at 1200H. 1-16 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. B 1-4 Cav and C 5-2 Arty (-) stood down for maintenance at HU LOI.

6 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 conducting search and destroy operations. 1-16 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. B 1-4 Cav and C 5-2 Arty (-) stood down for maintenance at HU LOI.

7 Mar: 2d Bde initiated Opn CUMBERLAND as part of LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf (-) initiated Opn CUMBERLAND conducting an airmobile assault and sealing E portion of TAN HIEF/DINH TRI (XT925100) at 1200H. B 1-4 Cav screened N and NW portion of TAN HIEF/DINH TRI between 1300-1500H. 1-16 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. B 1-4 Cav and C 5-2 Arty stood down at HU LOI for maintenance.

8 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn CUMBERLAND as part of Opn LAM SON 67. Bde TAC CP departed DI AN base camp 0328H becoming operational at 0359H. Bde TAC CP displaced to NDP vic XY911001. 2-16 Inf (-) continued Opn CUMBERLAND maintaining seal on TAN HIEF/DINH TRI in conjunction with GW forces. Seal was broken at 1300H and Bn (-) conducted search with negative results. 1-16 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. B 1-4 Cav and C 5-2 Arty (-) continued Opn LAM SON 67.

9 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn CUMBERLAND as part of Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf (+) with 1 platoon B 1-4 Cav continued Opn CUMBERLAND conducting search and destroy ops in CO KI Jungle (east). 1-16 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. B 1-4 Cav (-) and C 5-2 Arty (-) continued Opn LAM SON 67.

10 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn CUMBERLAND as part of Opn LAM SON 67. Bde TAC CP closed to DI AN at 0330H. 2-16 Inf (+) continued Opn CUMBERLAND conducting search and destroy operations in CO KI Jungle (east). 1-16 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. B 1-4 Cav (-) and C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67.

11 Mar: 2d Bde terminated Opn CUMBERLAND and continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf (-) continued Opn CUMBERLAND conducting search and destroy operations in CO KI Jungle (east). Bn (-) closed HU LOI at 1645H thus terminating Opn CUMBERLAND. 1-16 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. B 1-4 Cav stood down at HU LOI until 1515H. Departed HU LOI to LAM SON and upon closure at 1632H was OPCON to 9th Inf. C 5-2 Arty continued Opn LAM SON 67.

12 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf (-) continued Opn LAM SON 67 participating in a seal and search operation at VINH CHUAN (XT933100) which terminated at 1755H. At 0030H (+) retook to participate in a seal and search operation of TAN DA (XT930135). 1-16 Inf continued LAI KHE and THUOC VINH security missions. C 5-2 Arty stood down for maintenance at HU LOI.

13 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf (-) maintained seal on TAN DA in conjunction with GW forces and terminated the operation upon closure HU LOI at 1600H. 1-16 Inf airlifted from THUOC VINH and LAI KHE closing CHUAN LOI at 1500H. At this time the Bn was attached 1st Bde. Rear elements at DI AN base camp established a squad size night ambush vic XT914089. 2-16 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. A squad size night ambush was positioned E of DI AN base camp vic XT917076 by rear elements. 1-16 Inf airlifted from SOE IA to LAM SON and THUOC VINH closing at 1545H at which time Cn assumed both bases.
14 Mar: 2d Bde continued Omp LAM SON 67, 2-16 Inf (-) with C-5-2 Arty continued Omp LAM SON 67, 1-16 Inf continued HUOC VINH security missions at 1225H. 1-10 Inf and 2-16 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde with their rear elements positioned and sun night ambushes at DI AN Base Camp.

15 Mar: 2d Bde continued Omp LAM SON 67, 2-16 Inf (-) continued Omp LAM SON 67, 1-16 Inf and 2-16 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde with their rear elements positioned and sun night ambushes at DI AN Base Camp. 1-16 Inf (-) continued HUOC VINH security missions at 1225H reverting to 3d Bde control. C-5-2 Arty stood down at HUOC VINH and was RRF for HUOC VINH 13 convoy. D-4 Cav became OCON 2d Bde at 1500H and conducted Eagle Flights via XTO002325 based on intelligence. Trp reverted to 1-4 Cav control at 1700H.

16 Mar: 2d Bde continued Omp LAM SON 67, 2-16 Inf with C-5-2 Arty continued Omp LAM SON 67, 1-16 Inf and 2-16 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde.

17 Mar: 2d Bde terminated participation in Omp LAM SON 67 at OCON. 3d Bde assumed responsibility for 2d Bde CH-47 operations. 2-16 Inf moved by road from HUOC VINH to DI AN closing at 1130H and stood down for maintenance for the remainder of the dry. 1-10 Inf and 2-16 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde. C-5-2 Arty stood down at HUOC VINH for maintenance.

18 Mar: 2d Bde continued preparing for Omp JUNCTION CITY II. At 0900H Bde CP moved by road from DI AN to QUAN LOI (XT21900) closing at 1225H. 2-16 Inf stood down at DI AN base camp and prepared for Omp JUNCTION CITY II. 1-10 Inf and 2-16 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde. C-5-2 Arty moved by road from HUOC VINH commencing at 0945H and closed DI AN to 1225H at which time Btry came under CP control. C-5-2 Arty continued to prepare for Omp JUNCTION CITY II. 1-10 Inf and 2-16 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde.

19 Mar: 2d Bde continued preparing for Omp JUNCTION CITY II. The Bde CP remained operational at QUAN LOI (XT21900). 2-16 Inf moved from DI AN to DI AN by truck at 0900H, closing HUOC VINH at 0945H. At 1130H the 3d Bde was placed under control of 1st Bde FA from 0500H. At 1200H 1st Inf was placed under control of 1st Bde FA at HUOC VINH. 3d Bde continued to prepare for Omp JUNCTION CITY II. 1-10 Inf and 2-16 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde.

20 Mar: 2d Bde continued to prepare for Omp JUNCTION CITY II. Bde CP moved by CH-47 at 1500H closing FS CHARLIE (XT560050) at 1730H. 2-16 Inf continued preparing for Omp JUNCTION CITY II. 1-10 Inf and 2-16 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde.

21 Mar: 2d Bde initiated Omp JUNCTION CITY II. Bde CP moved by road from QUAN LOI (XT560050) to 1700H. At 1700H 1st Inf was placed under control of 1st Bde FA at HUOC VINH. At 1200H 1st Inf moved by road from QUAN LOI to DI AN closing at 1315H and continued to prepare for Omp JUNCTION CITY II. 1-10 Inf and 2-16 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde.

22 Mar: 2d Bde continued Omp JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued Omp JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued Omp JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D ops south from CH-47 FA at 1600H. At 1600H 1st Inf was placed under control of 1st Bde FA. 3d Inf remained attached to 3d Bde. 1-16 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde FA at 1600H. 2-16 Inf continued Omp JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D ops south from CH-47 FA at 1600H.

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23 Mar: 2d Dde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II, 2-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting plat size cloverleaf patrols via Obj 2 (XT521660). 1-16 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting cloverleaf patrolling S from LZ ECHO towards LZ ENVO (XT505-507). Trp E 2-11 ACR reverted to Dde control at 0900H. 1-26 Inf with C 5-2 Arty continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II, in (-) cleared and outposted Route YELLOW (Route 246) commencing 0900H. Co C with Recon Plat cleared and outposted Route 246 from FSB CHARLIE east to via XT97340 at 0900H. All elements closed FSB CHARLIE at 1040H. 36th ARVN Ranger Bn continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II securing W portion of FSB CHARLIE. 5th ARVN Ranger Bn continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II securing W portion of FSB CHARLIE. Trp E 2-11 ACR reverted OCON 2d Dde at 0900H.

24 Mar: 2d Dde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II, 2-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting cloverleaf patrols S from Obj 2 (XT521660) towards Obj 4 (XT514855) commencing at 0900H. 1-16 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting cloverleaf patrols SW of LZ HIBR (XT533667) commencing at 0917H 1-26 Inf (-) continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D ops via XT533609 and XT546101 Co C elements of C 5-2 Arty cleared and outposted Rt 246 from FSB CHARLIE to via XT97340. All elements closed FSB CHARLIE by 1010H. En (-) continued to secure E portion of FSB CHARLIE. 36th ARVN Ranger Bn continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II defending W portion of FSB CHARLIE. Trp E 2-11 ACR continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. Trp (-) stood down for maintenance at FSB CHARLIE. C 5-2 Arty continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II defending perimeter at FSB CHARLIE.

25 Mar: 2d Dde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II, 2-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D ops in zone towards Obj 6 (XT530667) commencing at 0744H. 1-16 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D ops in zone towards Obj 3 (XT495587) commencing at 0749H. All elements closed NDF (XT516663) by 1609H. 1-26 Inf with Trp E 2-11 ACR and 1 section C 5-2 Arty continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II, Co A with 1 section C 5-2 Arty cleared and outposted Rt 246 from FSB CHARLIE to XT531600. Trp C (Co B and 1 plat Trp E 2-11 ACR) began S&D ops in AO JUNCTION CITY II, 2-11 ACR (-) and Recon plat outposted E portion of FSB CHARLIE. 36th ARVN Ranger Bn continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. At 0844H a company size patrol was conducted SW of FSB CHARLIE (via XT560660). En (-) continued to support W portion of FSB CHARLIE. C 5-2 Arty continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II providing section to 1-26 Inf for road clearing. Dtrly (-) continued to secure portion of FSB CHARLIE.

26 Mar: 2d Dde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II, 2-16 Inf continued S&D ops in western Obj FAUST area with B and A Cos moving to SE from NDF at XT516663 and conducting cloverleaf patrols S toward Obj 4 and 5, and with Co C and Recon plat in reserve. Opn commenced at 0833H. 1-16 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-16 Inf continued S&D ops in western Obj FAUST area. 1-26 Inf continued Opns via FSB CHARLIE. At 0749H Co E with section of C 5-2 Arty on CON continued road clearing ops between 0749H and 1010H. At 0759H Dn (-) began S&D ops and local ambush patrols around FSB CHARLIE N of Route YELLOW. En (-) stood down for maintenance and participated in defense at FSB CHARLIE. C 5-2 Arty furnished a section to 1-26 Inf for road security. 36th ARVN Ranger Bn participated in defense of FSB CHARLIE, 36th ARVN Ranger Bn participated in defense of FSB CHARLIE and dispatched company size patrol to S of Route YELLOW.

27 Mar: 2d Dde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II, 2-16 Inf continued S&D ops in zone; oriented patrols to SSE, 1-16 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde. 2-16 Inf continued S&D ops in zone; oriented towards Obj 3 and base camp to west. 1-26 Inf continued S&D ops in zone; secured entire perimeter until relieved by 1-2 Inf (-); and cleared and outposted N of Route YELLOW from 0140H to 1200H. At 0752 Co C moved out for road clearing. At 0759H 3rd Arty continued S&D ops and ambush patrols via FSB CHARLIE. 1-2 Inf (-) was 2d Dde at 1202H. At 1202H Dn (-) remained off closure at FSB CHARLIE. 36th ARVN Ranger departed FSB CHARLIE at 1224H reverted to Dde of 1st Dde at 1200H at CUAN LOI. E Trp 2-11 Cav cleared Route YELLOW from 1214H to SE, W-5-Stream line commencing at 0759H for passage of 5th Inf convoy coming from FSB-CHARLIE. After cancellation of convoy troop (-) returned to FSB CHARLIE. At 1400H plat was placed OCON 1-26 Inf for action to N; reverted Trp control at 1425H. C 5-2 Arty furnished one section.
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to 1-26 Inf for route security, one section to 1-26 Inf for action to N
without contact.

20 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf concluded
S&D opns in Obj THRUST area at 0700H; moved by truck to FSB設備 at 1440H;
relieved 1-18 Inf in place; and was attached Ist Bde at 1300H. 1-16 Inf
reverted to 2d Bde control at 1330H. After relief by 2-16 Inf, En (-) moved
to field pens via XT536044, closing at 1530H and Co C moved into FSD CHARLIE
at 1500H. En (-) occupied NDF via XT536044. 1-16 Inf continued S&D opns
in zone; oriented ops toward Wg base camp complexes located SW and SSW, 1-26
Inf conducted S&D ops N of FSD CHARLIE; opened and outposted Rt YELLOW from
OF 10 to via XT536044; and outposted NDF via XT536044 until closure of
1-16 Inf. 1-2 Inf (-) conducted S&D ops to W of FSD CHARLIE. 2-11 Cav
pushed through 1-26 Inf and opened Rt YELLOW from XT53-241 to link-up with
2-11 Cav (-) at 1555H; and reverted toSqns (-) control upon upon link-up,
1-21 Cav obtained 2d Bde at Obj THRUST at 1440H; secured area for engineer
LZ clientele team; and remained via XT500796 in NDF. 2-5-2 Arty outposted
perimeter during day; provided elements for 1-26 Inf for road clearance and
outposting; placed one platoon O'CON to 2-16 Inf (attached 1st Bde); and
received O'CON of platoon A 1-4 Cav.

20 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf remained
attached to 1st Bde. 1-16 Inf (-) secured and outposted Rt YELLOW from CP 153
(via NDF) to XT500799. En (-) commenced ops at 0645H and moved SW. At 0700H
Bn assumed responsibility for security of Obj THRUST; at 1900H Bn closed
NDF via XT500796. 2-16 Inf (-) continued S&D opns in zone; oriented ops to W, as
1-2 Inf conducted S&D ops W of FSD CHARLIE. 1-26 Inf with 5-2 Arty secured
and outposted Rt YELLOW from CP 16 to CP 137. At XT500794 2d Bde departed
on road clearing ops and by 0850H linked-up with 2-16 Inf on east. At 1020H
Bn linked-up with 1-16 Inf.

20 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf remained
attached to 1st Bde. 1-16 Inf (-) with G 2-11 4CR secured and outposted Rt YELLOW
(Rt 246) from THRUST (XT500799) to CP 137 (XT520033) with Tn C (1 plat CoA,
1 plat B, 1 plat Co G, 2 plate Trp G 2-11 4CR). 2-16 Inf (-) conducted S&D opns
via NDF (XT496664). At 1500H Bn was airlifted to FSD CHARLIE closing at
1611H and assumed responsibility for the E portion of FSD CHARLIE. 1-2 Inf
cleared and outposted Route YELLOW from CP 10 (XT57342) to CP 137 (XT500793)
at 1532H and remained attached Ist Bde at that time. 2-16 Inf conducted S&D opns
in zone at 0850H; and reverted to Sqns (-) control upon upon link-up.
1-2 Inf conducted ops to 1-26 Inf to CP 137 with Tm G commencing at 0649H. 2-16 Inf
remained attached Ist Bde at CP 137 with Tm G commencing at 0649H. After relief by 2-16 Inf, Bn (-)
occupied NDF via XT500799. At 0700H Bn (-) commenced ops to W, 1-2 Inf conducted S&D ops W of FSD CHARLIE. 1-26 Inf with 5-2 Arty secured
and outposted Rt YELLOW from CP 16 to CP 137. At XT500794 2d Bde departed
on road clearing ops and by 0850H linked-up with 2-16 Inf on east. At 1020H
Bn linked-up with 1-16 Inf.

20 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf remained
attached to 1st Bde. 1-16 Inf (-) with G 2-11 4CR secured and outposted Rt YELLOW
from THRUST (XT500799) to CP 137 (XT520033) with Tn C (1 plat CoA,
1 plat B, 1 plat Co G, 2 plate Trp G 2-11 4CR). 2-16 Inf (-) conducted S&D opns
via NDF (XT496664). At 1500H Bn was airlifted to FSD CHARLIE closing at
1611H and assumed responsibility for the E portion of FSD CHARLIE. 1-2 Inf
cleared and outposted Route YELLOW from CP 10 (XT57342) to CP 137 (XT500793)
at 1532H and remained attached Ist Bde at that time. 2-16 Inf conducted S&D opns
in zone at 0850H; and reverted to Sqns (-) control upon upon link-up.
1-2 Inf conducted ops to 1-26 Inf to CP 137 with Tm G commencing at 0649H. 2-16 Inf
remained attached Ist Bde at CP 137 with Tm G commencing at 0649H. After relief by 2-16 Inf, Bn (-)
occupied NDF via XT500799. At 0700H Bn (-) commenced ops to W, 1-2 Inf conducted S&D ops W of FSD CHARLIE. 1-26 Inf with 5-2 Arty secured
and outposted Rt YELLOW from CP 16 to CP 137. At XT500794 2d Bde departed
on road clearing ops and by 0850H linked-up with 2-16 Inf on east. At 1020H
Bn linked-up with 1-16 Inf.

31 Mar: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf remained
attached to 1st Bde. 1-16 Inf (-) with Trp G 2-11 4CR cleared and outposted Rt YELLOW
from FSB THRUST to CP 137 with Tn G commencing at 0645H. 2-16 Inf (-) conducted ops
to secure FSD CHARLIE and cleared and outposted Route YELLOW from CP 18 to
CP 137. 1-2 Inf (-) conducted S&D ops (-) to FSD CHARLIE; closed and cleared
of LZ GEORGES (XT120827) at 1013H. At 1013H Bn (-) conducted S&D ops to SW. 1-26 Inf
remained attached to 1st Bde. 1-16 Inf (-) conducted S&D ops N of LZ GEORGES. 1-16 Inf (-) became O'CON 2d Bde upon closure LZ GEORGES at 1733H and
established NDFs via XT475656.

1 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 1st Bde assumed
responsibility for security of FSD CHARLIE at 1236H. At 1307H, 1st Bde
commanding at 1307H. At 1327H Bde CP of was established at LZ GEORGES (XT475656). 2-16 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 1-16 Inf (-) continued to secure FSD THRUST (XT475656). 2-16 Inf (-) with
G 5-2 Arty continued to secure FSD CHARLIE and cleared and outposted Rt YELLOW
from CP 18 to (XT475656) to CP 137 (XT520033) by 0851H. At 1234H En (-) was attached
to 1st Bde. 1-16 Inf (-) conducted S&D ops N of LZ GEORGES. 1-16 Inf (-) conducted S&D ops N of LZ GEORGES commencing at 1135H.

2 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf remained
attached to 1st Bde. 1-16 Inf (-) conducted ops to 1110H and at 1330H (-) repositioned from FSB THRUST to LZ CHARLIE (XT220827) closing at 1437H. 1-16 Inf (-) with Trp G 2-11 4CR continued to secure FSD THRUST and cleared and outposted Rt 246 from FSB THRUST to CP 137 (XT520033). 1-16 Inf (-) was attached 1st Bde and security of FSD THRUST was also assumed by 1st Bde at that time. 2-16 Inf (-) remained attached 1st Bde.
FSD returned to control at 1200H. Dn continued to outpost RT 246 between Ops vic OBJ 12 (XT406824), 14 (T419019) and 16 (XT41400) at QUAN LOI. 1-2 Inf conducted airlifting from LZ GEORGE and continued at 0902H. 1-18 Inf and 2-18 Inf remained attached to Ops at JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D ops NNW of COMINC at 0000H. 1-28 Inf was attached to Ops at JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D ops ESE of OBJ 14 and S and E of NDP (XT623815) commencing at 0830H. 1-28 Inf continued conducting local combat recon patrols vic XT55176. Dn departed from NDP (XT441857) commencing at 0100H, 1-2 Inf conducted S&D ops from NDP (XT441857) commencing at 0830H.

3 Apr: 2d Dde continued Ops JUNCTION CITY II, 2-16 Inf continued Ops JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D ops NE and NW of NDP (XT623815) commencing at 0900H, 1-16 Inf and 2-16 Inf remained attached 1st Dde. 1-16 Inf continued conducting local patrols via NDP. 1-13 Inf conducted OPN JUNCTIO CITY II conducting S&D ops NNW of NDP (XT43005) commencing at 0900H. 1-2 Inf continued airlifting from LZ GEORGE and remained attached 1st Dde. 1-2 Inf conducted S&D ops from NDP (XT441857) commencing at 0830H.

4 Apr: 2d Dde continued Ops JUNCTION CITY II, 2-16 Inf conducted S&D ops via Obj 12 (XT623815), 14 (XT419019) and 16 (XT441857). 1-13 Inf remained attached 2d Dde at 1200H. Dn continued to control RT 246 between FSB THRUST and CP 137 (XT530033) with G 2-11 Cav (1-13). 2-16 Inf remained attached 1st Dde. 1-2 Inf conducted S&D ops SE of NDP commencing at 0900H.

5 Apr: 2d Dde continued Ops JUNCTION CITY II, 2-16 Inf conducted S&D ops via Obj 12 (XT623815), 14 (XT419019) and 16 (XT441857). 1-13 Inf remained attached 1st Dde. 2-16 Inf continued to control RT 246 at 1200H. Dn continued to control RT 246 between FSB THRUST and CP 137 (XT530033) with G 2-11 Cav (1-13). 2-16 Inf remained attached 1st Dde. 2-16 Inf conducted S&D ops NE and NW of NDP (XT63005) commencing at 0900H and was attached 1st Dde. 1-16 Inf conducted S&D ops NW of NDP (XT623815) commencing at 0900H.

6 Apr: 2d Dde conducted Ops JUNCTION CITY II, 2-16 Inf remained attached 1st Dde. 1-21 ACR continued to secure FSB THRUST, cleared and outpost RT 246 from FSB THRUST to CP 137 by 1055H and conducted local patrols. 2-16 Inf with C 5-2 Artillery continued to control RT 246 at 1130H. 1-16 Inf conducted S&D ops NE and NW of NDP (XT623815) commencing at 0900H. 2-16 Inf conducted S&D ops NW of FSB CHARLIE at 1155H and was attached 1st Dde. 2-16 Inf conducted S&D ops NW of NDP (XT63005) commencing at 0900H.

7 Apr: 2d Dde continued Ops JUNCTION CITY II, 2-16 Inf conducted S&D ops NW and SE of NDP (XT63005) commencing at 0900H. 1-10 Inf with Trp G 2-11 ACR continued to secure FSB THRUST, cleared and outpost RT 246 from FSB THRUST to CP 137 by 1055H and conducted local patrols. 2-16 Inf with C 5-2 Artillery continued to secure FSB THRUST, cleared and outpost RT 246 from CP 137 to CP 137 and conducted local patrols NW of FSB CHARLIE. 1-2 Inf was airlifted to FSB BRAVO and attached 2d Dde. 1-26 Inf was attached 2d Dde at 1015H and was airlifted from FSB BRavo to FSB THRUST and conducted close-in local recon patrols. Trp D 1-4 Cav was placed OCON 2d Dde at 0900H.

8 Apr: 2d Dde conducted Ops JUNCTION CITY II, 2-16 Inf continued to secure FSB BRAVO, cleared and outpost RT 246 in zone, and conducted combat recon patrols via XT5902, XT6122, and XT6302. 1-10 Inf with G 2-11 ACR continued to secure FSB THRUST, cleared and outpost RT 246 in zone, and conducted local combat recon patrols. 2-16 Inf with C 5-2 Artillery continued to secure FSB CHARLIE, cleared and outpost RT 246 in zone, and conducted a platoon size combat recon patrol NW of FSB CHARLIE. 1-20 Inf conducted S&D ops NE and SE of NDP towards XT531760. D 1-4 Cav continued to screen area NW of FSB CHARLIE.

9 Apr: 2d Dde continued Ops JUNCTION CITY II, 2-16 Inf continued to secure FSB BRAVO, cleared and outpost RT 246 in zone, and conducted combat recon patrols via XT5902, XT6122, and XT6302. 1-10 Inf with G 2-11 ACR continued to secure FSB THRUST, cleared and outpost RT 246 in zone, and conducted local combat recon patrols. 2-16 Inf with C 5-2 Artillery continued to secure FSB CHARLIE, cleared and outpost RT 246 in zone, and conducted a platoon size combat recon patrol to the NW of FSB CHARLIE. 1-28 Inf conducted S&D ops NE and SE of NDP towards XT531760. D 1-4 Cav continued to screen NW of FSB CHARLIE. At 0915H Trp was placed OCON 1st Dde and reverted to 2d Dde control at 1415H continuing screening NW without incident.

10 Apr: 2d Dde continued Ops JUNCTION CITY II, 2-16 Inf continued to secure FSB BRAVO, cleared and outpost RT 246 in zone, and conducted local combat recon patrols. 1-16 Inf w/G 2-11 ACR continued to secure FSB THRUST and cleared and outpost RT 246 in zone. Dn departed from FSB THRUST at 1330H and closed FSB CHARLIE at 1017H. Trp G 2-11 ACR reverted SdN control at 1545H.
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2-16 Inf with C 5-2 Arty continued to secure FSD CHARLIE, cleared and outposted Rt 246, and conducted local recon patrols. 1-28 Inf conducted S&D ops NE and SW of NDF (XT545777). D 1-4 Cav continued to conduct aerial recons N of FSD CHARLIE.

11 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II, 2-16 Inf continued to secure FSD BRAVO, cleared and outposted Rt 2A6, and conducted combat recon patrols. 1-15 Inf conducted S&D ops N of FSD CHARLIE commencing at 0830H. 2-10 Inf continued to secure FSD CHARLIE, cleared and outposted at 246 from FSD CHARLIE to Vic TX530693, and conducted a company size S&D ops of FSD CHARLIE. 1-26 Inf conducted S&D ops NE of NDF. D 1-4 Cav conducted aerial recons N of FSD CHARLIE.

13 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. Bde GF moved by road from FSD CHARLIE and closed QUAN LOI at 1513H. 2-16 Inf continued to secure FSD CHARLIE, cleared and outposted Rt 2A6 in zone, and conducted combat recon patrols. At 1725H, Bde assumed control of the area with security of FSD BRAVO. 1-15 Inf was airlifted from FSD CHARLIE and attached 1st Bde at 0933H. 2-10 Inf with 1st section C 5-2 Arty continued to secure FSD CHARLIE and cleared and outposted Rt 2A6 in zone. 1-22 Inf was placed OCON 2d Bde upon closure FSD BRAVO, airlifted commencing at 0920H and reverted 1st Bde control upon closure at FNUOC VINH. D 1-4 Cav continued to conduct aerial recons N and W of FSD CHARLIE. One section, C 5-2 Arty remained OCON 2-16 Inf until 1720H at which time it reverted to Btry control.

14 Apr: 2d Bde Fwd GF moved by road from QUAN LOI to DI AN Base Camp, closing at 1511H thus terminating Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf airlifted from FSD BRAVO and reverted to 2d Bde control upon closure DI AN at 1533H and stood down for maintenance. 1-10 Inf remain attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf airlifted from QUAN LOI, closing DI AN at 1619H and stood down for maintenance.

15 Apr: 2d Bde stood down for care and maintenance. 2-16 Inf stood down for care and maintenance. 1-10 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf stood down for care and maintenance.

16 Apr: 2d Bde stood down for care and maintenance. 2-16 Inf stood down for care and maintenance. 1-10 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf stood down for care and maintenance.

17 Apr: 2d Bde assumed Opn LAN SON 67 from 3d Bde at 0700H. 2-16 Inf stood down for maintenance and conducted range firing at DI AN. 1-16 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf stood down for maintenance at DI AN. 2-28 Inf became attached to 2d Bde at 0700H, and continued Opn LAN SON 67. Co A conducted S&D operations in assigned AO (center of mass XT7115), destroyed secondary jungle along the north/south road in sector in coordination with 2d OAD, and Division engineers, and maintained a show of force in sector via XT906137.

18 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf stood down for maintenance at DI AN. 1-10 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf stood down for care and maintenance at DI AN. 2-20 Inf continued S&D and jungle clearing operations in the LAN SON AO and conducted security missions at the laterite rite (XT906010) and TAN HUOC KHANH.

19 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf stood down for maintenance at DI AN base camp and positioned a sqd size night ambush via XT9051770. 1-10 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf stood down for maintenance at DI AN Base Camp, 2-28 Inf airlifted by C-123 from THU LOI to LAI KHE and reverted OCON 3d Bde upon closure at 1040H. 1-26 Inf was attached 2d Bde upon closure THU LOI at 1155H. Co A relieved Co A 2-28 Inf in NDF via XT904145. Co A's B and C (-) and I-11 bat platoons at THU LOI. One platoon 2-16 Inf continued Rock Crusher sety mission via XT90601D and one sqd provided a village chief of "AN HUOC KHANH". B 1-4 Cav secured NDF via XT904146 while Co A 1-26 Inf relieved Co A 1-26 Inf in place.

20 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAN SON 67. 2-16 Inf moved by road from DI AN at 0735H closing THU LOI at 0926H then airlifted to LAI KHE being attached to 3d Bde upon closure at 1026H. Rear elements at DI AN conducted a sqd size
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recon patrol to the Wnf, positioned a scd size night ambush via XT994074, 2-16 Inf continued to stand down for maintenance at DX AN, conducted range firing, and prepared for future ops. 1-26 Inf continued Opn LAK SON 67. A search was made via XT992100, area of contact 19 April. Co A continued jungle clearing ops along BOLDE GELENE in 4G LCUS (center of mass XT981060), B-4 Cav moved by road from FHU LOI at 0735H and upon closure of LAI KEI at 0915H was attached 3d Bde.

21 Apr. 2d Bde continued Opn LAK SON 67, 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. Rear elements positioned a scd size night ambush via XT994064, 1-12 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-16 Inf continued to stand down for maintenance and conducted range firing at DX AN base camp. 1-26 Inf continued Opn LAK SON 67 with Co's A and D clearing and securing Route ORANGE in sector. Co A secured engineer efforts and Bde continued Optrn LAK SON 67. One plat waw ORCON 1-26 Inf at 0745H with both companies closing FHU LOI at 0801H and secured engr work parties clearing jungle clearing areas and sealed BINH TRI by 2200H. The seal was maintained throughout the night. 2-2 Mech (-) was attached to 2d Bde upon arrival at FHU LOI at 0807H and relieved 1-26 Inf in place by 0832H. B-4 Cav was placed OCON 2-2 Mech at OCCHY. Co (-) screened Route ORANGE throughout the night while 1-26 Inf and 4-52 Inf (ARVN) sealed BINH TRI. D-1-4 Cav (-) was OCON 2-2 Mech. One plat was OCON 1-26 Inf between 0716H-1200H for tunnel exploitation. A 5-2 Arty (-) stood down for maintenance at FHU LOI, B-2-34 Arm (-) was attached 2d Bde upon closure of DX AN at 1423H and stood down for maintenance.

22 Apr. 2d Bde continued Opn LAK SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached to 3d Bde. Rear elements conducted a scd size recon patrol to the W of DH AN base camp. 1-10 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-10 Inf moved by road from DX AN to FHU LOI at 0913H and was airlifted to LAI KEI commencing at 0923H and attached 3d Bde upon closure. 1-26 Inf continued Opn LAK SON 67 with Co's A and D clearing and securing Route ORANGE in sector by 0923H. Co A and B were relieved in place by 2-2 Mech (-) at 0923H with both companies closing FHU LOI by 0945H. C-84 Inf and 4-52 Inf (ARVN) began moving from respective assembly areas and sealed BINH TRI by 2200H. The seal was maintained throughout the night. 2-2 Mech (-) was attached to 2d Bde upon arrival at FHU LOI at 0907H and relieved 1-26 Inf in place by 0932H. B-1-4 Cav was placed OCON 2-2 Mech at OCCHY. Co (-) screened Route ORANGE throughout the night while 1-26 Inf and 4-52 Inf (ARVN) sealed BINH TRI. D-1-4 Cav (-) was OCON 2-2 Mech. One plat was OCON 1-26 Inf between 0716H-1200H for tunnel exploitation. A 5-2 Arty (-) stood down for maintenance at FHU LOI, B-2-34 Arm (-) was attached 2d Bde upon closure of DX AN at 1438H and stood down for maintenance.

23 Apr. 2d Bde continued Opn LAK SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-10 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-10 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-26 Inf continued to seal BINH TRI (XT9238) in conjunction with 4-52 Inf (ARVN). The area was cleared at 1511H with the search resulting in 16 detainees evacuated to DX AN Sub Sector. Of the 16, 2 were VC, 7 draft evaders, and 7 un categorized. Bn moved to DX 24 then by truck to FHU LOI closing at 1022H. A 5-2 Arty (-) stood down for maintenance at FHU LOI and at 1655H moved to vic XT903168 and ROK'd. B-2-34 Arm (-) was OCON 1-26 Inf and reverted to 2d Bde control upon closure of DX AN at 1634H.

24 Apr. 2d Bde continued Opn LAK SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. Rear elements conducted a scd size recon patrol to the W of DH AN base camp between 0937H-1025H. 1-10 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-10 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-26 Inf stood down for maintenance at FHU LOI. One plct Co A relieved the plct Co C at Frechawon's Flint rock quarry (XT956011). 2-2 Mech (-) with D-1-4 Cav (-) cleared and outposted Route ORANGE between FHU LOI and DX AN by 0911H. Bn also secured engr work parties clearing jungle along Route ORANGE to vic XT967179. B-1-4 Cav remained OCON 2-2 Mech (-). A 5-2 Arty (-) remained OCON 2-2 Mech (-). B-2-34 Arm (-) stood down for maintenance at DX AN.

25 Apr. 2d Bde continued Opn LAK SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-10 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. Rear elements conducted a scd size recon patrol to the W of DH AN base camp between 1305H-1355H. 2-10 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 2-2 Mech (-) with D-1-4 Cav (-) continued jungle clearing ops along Route ORANGE, secured engineer efforts at bridge 8H (XT991319) and laterite pit (XT991319), and continued to secure village. 2-16 Inf was attached 2d Bde upon closure FHU LOI at 1500H and stood down for maintenance. B-1-4 Cav (-) remained OCON 2-2 Mech (-). A 5-2 Arty (-) - one section remained OCON 2-2 Mech (-), one section remained at FHU LOI under Bde control. B-1-4 Cav was OCON 2d Bde at OCON. Aerial recon plct conducted Eagle Flights via XT9032 and XT9030.
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26 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. Rear elements at DI AN positioned a sqd size night ambush via XT909175. 1-16 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. Rear elements at DI AN established a sqd size night ambush via XT902091. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-26 Inf in con with 1-52 Inf (SAW) sealed the village of BANG XA (XT900321) by 0351H. A search of the village commenced at 0700H. The seal was broken at 1100H with 1-26 Inf returning to DI AN. 2-2 Mech (-) with D 1-4 Cav (-) continued jungle clearing ops, secured engineer efforts at bridge site (XT909199) and laterite pit (XT909169), and continued to secure village chief of Tan THUOC KHANH. 1-26 Inf stood down for maintenance at THU DOI, D 2-2 Mech. A 5-2 Art (-) one section remained OCON 2-2 Mech (-) and another section remained under Bde control at THU DOI. D 2-34 Arm (-) continued to stand down for maintenance at DI AN. D 1-4 Cav conducted Eagle Flights via XT0223, XT1522, and XT0222.

27 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-15 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 1-26 Inf relieved 2-2 Mech (-) at 1200H of jungle clearing ops, securing engineer efforts at bridge site (XT909199) and laterite pit (XT909169) and the security of the village chief of Tan THUOC KHANH. 2-2 Mech (-) with D 1-4 Cav (-) continued present mission along Route ORANGE until relieved by 1-26 Inf at 1200H. At 1200H based on intelligence Da (-) with D 1-4 Cav (-) and B 2-34 Arm (-) commenced a sqd pass to seal village of OLD LON DUN (XT93219). Seal was complete at 1515H with search resulting in 65 detainees. 1-26 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 1-4 Cav (-) conducted VRs throughout LAM SON 67 AO. B 2-34 Arm (-) conducted VRs and Eagle Flights via XT9224, XT1222, XT2191, XT2191, and XT0225.

28 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-16 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-26 Inf with one section A 5-2 Art (-) continued Opn LAM SON 67 securing engr efforts along Route ORANGE, bridge site and laterite pit, securing chief of Tan THUOC KHANH and the Frenchman's Flat rock quarry. 2-2 Mech (-) with D 1-4 Cav (-) and C 2-34 Arm (-) continued Opn LAM SON 67 conducting S&D ops via XT9223. (-) 26 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 conducting S&D ops in HOA LOK woods (XT0226) commencing at 0001H. B 1-4 Cav remained OCON 2-2 Mech (-) one section remained OCON 2-2 Mech until 1200H at which time it was OCON 2-15 Inf; one section remained at THU DOI under Bde control. D 2-34 Arm (-) was OCON 2-2 Mech at 1200H. D 1-4 Cav conducted VBS and Eagle Flights via XT7924, XT1622, XT2191, XT2191, and XT0225.

29 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-16 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-26 Inf with one section A 5-2 Art (-) continued Operation LAM SON 67 securing engr efforts along Route ORANGE, bridge site and laterite pit, securing chief of Tan THUOC KHANH and the Frenchman's Flat rock quarry. 2-2 Mech (-) with D 1-4 Cav (-) and B 2-34 Arm (-) continued Opn LAM SON 67 conducting S&D ops via XT9215. 1-26 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 conducting S&D ops in HOA LOK woods (XT0226) and with Division 4 Tunnel Route (-) conducting tunnel via XT02470. B 1-4 Cav (-) remained OCON 2-2 Mech. A 5-2 Art (-); one section remained OCON 1-26 Inf and one section remained at THU DOI under Bde control. D 2-34 Arm (-) remained OCON 2-2 Mech. D 1-4 Cav conducted VBS and Eagle Flights throughout LAM SON 67 AO. At 1030H Aerial Recon Flat (ARF) was inserted via XT95344.

30 Apr: 2d Bde continued Opn LAM SON 67. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. Rear elements conducted a squad size recce patrol to the W of DI AN base camp. 1-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-16 Inf remained attached 3d Bde. 1-26 Inf with one section A 5-2 Art (-) continued Opn LAM SON 67 securing engr efforts along Route ORANGE, bridge site and laterite pit, securing chief of Tan THUOC KHANH and the Frenchman's Flat rock quarry. 2-2 Mech (-) with D 1-4 Cav (-) and B 2-34 Arm (-) continued Opn LAM SON 67 conducting S&D ops via XT9215. 1-26 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 conducting S&D ops via XT9215. 1-26 Inf continued Opn LAM SON 67 conducting S&D ops in HOA LOK woods (XT0226) and with Division 4 Tunnel Route (-) conducting tunnel via XT02470. B 1-4 Cav (-) remained OCON 2-2 Mech. A 5-2 Art (-); one section remained OCON 2-2 Mech and one section remained at THU DOI under Bde control. D 2-34 Arm (-) remained OCON 2-2 Mech. D 1-4 Cav conducted VBS and Eagle Flights throughout LAM SON 67 AO.
7. (C) Part VII

a. Discussion

Training

The 2d Brigade Replacement Training School continued to provide transition training for replacements in the Brigade. Personnel on their first tour in RVN in the grade of E-7 and below and officers in the grade of O1 and O2 attend the school. During the reporting period, a total of 13 classes were conducted and 820 personnel were graduated. Selected personnel in the Brigade received instruction on the characteristics and employment of the "Nightingale - Small Arms Simulator" and on the Detector, Intrusion, AN/FSQ-1 during the reporting period. In accordance with 1st Infantry Division LOD 2-67, dated 17 April 67, a command orientation program was prepared for the training of commanders and members of their command prior to undertaking the mission of revolutionary development support. The instruction is designed to develop understanding of the LAM SON 67 area, the protagonists in the area, and principles and techniques in revolutionary development. During the reporting period, 555 personnel received the command orientation. As units are attached to the 2d Brigade, the orientation will be conducted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CHARLES F. BAFFORD II
Major
Adjutant

Distribution:
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1. (C) During the initial employment of the Detector, Intrusion, AN/FSR-1, it was revealed that the device is extremely sensitive to the vibrations caused by friendly artillery as projectiles pass in the vicinity of the seismometers. It is recommended that the seismometers be dug into the ground at least two (2) feet to eliminate excessive vibrations. Vibrations caused by firing and impact of projectiles must be allowed so as to maintain sensitivity of device. Device is proving most useful on listening posts and ambush positions.

2. (C) Landing zones must be thoroughly checked for possible explosive devices. These consist of mines buried and on top of the ground. JUNCTION CITY

3. (C) To get captured documents and material evacuated rapidly, S-2s should have a length of rope with a sand bag attached so these items can be lifted by LH through the trees. JUNCTION CITY

4. (C) Bunkers, large crates of rice, trenches and other VC installations can be destroyed more rapidly and efficiently by the use of bulldozers.

5. (C) Each rifle platoon and weapons platoon within the rifle companies must designate one man to give the mortar alert. When possible, the same individual will shoot an azimuth to the sound of the mortars being fired. This will assist the units in obtaining early warning and rapid employment of counter-mortar fire.

6. A minimum of four chain saws must be available at the battalion field trains location for immediate use in the forward area, to cut landing zones and dust off sites. A minimum of four 120 foot lengths of rope must be on hand in order to lower the chain saws through the jungle canopy.

8. (C) A-22 bags containing ammunition required by the maneuver elements should not exceed 800 lbs or the UH-1D cannot lift them.

9. (C) Unit trains should accompany the maneuver elements moves when a unit is committed, its trains should be in a position and postured to support them.

10. (C) When units are committed to a location which requires a long aerial turn-around time, if possible, an intermediate log base should be maintained in a secure area for movement of prepared Class L and Ordnance and accompanying Class V which is normally evacuated to the En trains upon movement of maneuver elements. Resupply from the Supply Point to this intermediate base can be accomplished by either wheel or aircraft, however the situation dictates. The overall resupply time is considerably reduced in this manner.

Enclosure I

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SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RG 59 PO-28 (N))

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

1. PART I. INTRODUCTION:

a. During the quarter just prior to the reporting period five major unit operations were conducted with a major engagement being fought on 6 November 1966. During the reporting period five major unit operations were conducted and major engagements were fought on 28 February 1967 and on 10-11 March 1967. On 28 February 1967, while participating in Operation JUNCTON CITY, Company D 1/16 Infantry made contact with elements from two battalions of the 101st Airborne Division. The immediate employment of close air support and artillery fire combined with Company fire power resulted in an enemy loss of 167 KIA (KIA) and 46 assorted weapons. On 9 March 1967, also during Operation JUNCTON CITY, 2/2 Infantry was attacked by at least 2 battalions of the 272d Airborne Division. Well prepared positions combined with close air support and responsive artillery fire assisted the defenders in inflicting 197 KIA and 5 WIA on the enemy while suffering only light casualties. There was no major contact during the remainder of the operation, but great quantities of VC food and supplies were captured or destroyed.

b. Component Units and Commanding Officers:

1/16 Infantry: LTC Rufus C Laws, 26 November 1966, present
2/2 Infantry: LTC Edward J Collins, 22 December 1966, present
LTC Jerry S Edwards, 15 March 1967, present
2/33 Artillery: LTC Charles D Daniel, 1 August 1966, present

2. PART II. REVIEW OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS:

a. Major operations conducted by the 3d Brigade during the reporting period included the following:

(1) Operation WILSON (1-12 February 1967): The mission was to conduct road clearing and security operations on Ht 13 between Dorn TAN and CHAN TANH. Information received prior to the operation confirmed that civilian travelers on Ht 13 were paying VC tariff collectors. Also VC mines, booby traps, and road blocks, on Ht 13 were common occurrences. Although no large VC units were known to be permanently stationed around LAT VC, several supply routes were known to cross Highway 13 and the 3d Brigade TAN. Operation WILSON was conducted in the BINH DUCI Province between DORN TAN and CHAN TANH on 13 to keep the highway open to military traffic. The terrain in the area is mostly dense with some open areas and rubber trees. The dense jungle afforded excellent cover and concealment, but fields of fire and observation were limited. There were no major obstacles in the area of operation. The weather was dry throughout the operation. The mornings and evenings were cool but the days were hot. Civilians encountered in the area were mostly women, children and old men. In the village of BIN TANH and CHAN TANH the people were cooperative and sometimes friendly.

During the period 1-9 February 1967 1/16 Infantry and 1/3 Cavalry secured Ht 13 from LAT VC to CHAN TANH with 2/28 Infantry replacing 1/16 Infantry on 10 February 1967. The road was cleared and secured each morning and extensive patrolling was conducted during the hours of daylight while resupply convoys were run daily

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between LAK NIN and GUNN LOI. The Brigade suffered 3 KIA and 33 WIA. VC losses were 15 KIA (6G), 1 WIA, 1 detainee, 7 individual weapons; 23 bags assorted clothing, 2 chrome grenades, 8 fire grenades and assorted documents.

The operation was supported by Air Force close air strikes and artillery operating out of LAK NIN, BAU BNG and GUNN TENG.

(2) Operation TUSCH D (15-21 February 1967). The mission assigned the 3d Brigade was as follows: Move to assigned AO with 2/28 Infantry and 1/2 Infantry Battalions conducting a combat assault into LZ's 1 & 2 respectively and 3/3 Cavalry to move overland to position Delta, 3d Brigade conducting combat reconnaissance within assigned the 3d Brigade was: 3d Brigade conducts a ground assault 7,267 rounds of 105 tni in support of the C 8/6 Artillery (155) out of Base IV (XT7661). The artillery was used extensively continuous support thi 2/33 Artillery (105) o erpted out of Base III (XT6658) and 3 lanterns, 23 huts, 9 base camps, 37 bunkers, miscellaneous cloiling and documents, 1 rounds, 2 82

the VC lost 1,622.2 tons of rice, 170 villages in the aera was mortared 25-30 meters off the road without discon-

ning new caches of rice. Since there were no villages in the area, no problem was presented by the civilian populace.

The 1/16 Infantry and 2/28 Infantry conducted air assaults into LZ's Northwest of LAK SH. Neither landing was opposed, 3/3 Cavalry began moving West from vicinity BAU BNG and Southeast from NHN TOWN. The 2/28 Infantry conducted combat reconnaissance toward the northern boundary of Binh Duong Province while 1/16 Infantry began moving southwest along the same boundary. The operation to the VC refused to make contact and continued to conduct harassing

the 1/16 Infantry NDF was mortared on the morning of 15 February and again on the 17th. The battalion sustained 6 wounded on the first and no casualties on the second. The 3d Brigade moved 250 m and 30 m. The VC looted 1,622.2 tons of rice, 160 tons of which was extracted; 27 tons of salt, 70 lbs fish 1-12 gauge shotgun, 7 AP mines, 126 booby trapped grenades, 6 H-79 rounds, 2 82 HN mortar rounds, 295 small arms rounds, 1 76 protective mask, 1 wagon, 1 sewing machine, 60 gal tar, 25 gal oil, 25 gal coal oil, 2 bicycles, 5 oz carts, 3 lanterns, 23 hats, 9 base camps, 37 bunkers, miscellaneous clothing and documents. 3d Brigade units were supported on Operation TUSCH D by 2/33 Artillery (105), 60mm Mortar Battery (81AR) and 81mm Mortar Battery (81AR). In order to prevent close and continuous support to 2/33 Artillery (105) supported out of Base III (XT6658) and 3d Brigade Artillery (155) supported out of Base IV (XT6621). The artillery was used extensively in LZ preparation and for blocking fires. The 2/33 Artillery fired a total of 7,667 rounds of 105 tni in support of the 3d Brigade during the operation. The Air Force flew a total of 71 close air support sorties in support of the Brigade.

(3) Operation JUNCTION CITY (22 February - 1 March 1967). The mission assigned the 3d Brigade was: 3d Brigade conducts a ground assault along XOM XOM on 220630 February 1967; opens and secures Highway L from TAY MINH to VINH conducts combat reconnaissance within AO to destroy VC/NVA forces and bases; secure work portions in zone; prevents utilization of VC/NVA forces along the return portion of the AO. Operation JUNCTION CITY was a division operation with the 3d Brigade operating in TAY MINH Province North and East of TAY MINH City. Intelligence received prior to the operation was based upon confirmed information gained during Operation ATCHUK in November 1966. The area of interest to the 3d Brigade was generally the Eastern and Northeastern sector of War Zone C along Route 14. Throughout the area, which has been under VC control for many years, there were numerous base camps, supply depots, training sites, and various camps. It was known, from documents, villagers reports and captured enemy material that both 29th and 94th Division Headquarters were situated in the area of operation. Terrain in the area of operation was low flat land with very gentle slopes. Elevation was less than 100 meters. Most of the area was dense jungle interspersed with many clearings, marshes, ponds, waste land, and streams. Concealment and cover were generally excellent but fields of fire and observation were limited. Weather was hot and humid throughout and did not cause any significant change in plar-9 or conduct of the operation.

The operation began with 1/3 Cavalry, followed by 2/2 Infantry (Ninh), making a thrust from 50° N. North along Route 14 to vicinity of KONG. 2/2 Infantry
3. PART III. INTELLIGENCE (Tactical order of Battle):

a. Enemy activity during the reporting period was characterized by small unit actions involving sniping, mining, booby trapping, road block building and other harassing activities. There appeared to be a desire on the part of enemy main force units to avoid engagement with US Forces with the exception of the period 70 February and 10 March 1967 when battalion size forces initiated large scale attacks against 3d Brigade elements in T'Y THIN Province. Principal units in the area of interest of the 3d Brigade which could have possibly influenced any battle situation in an area around the Brigade TAOR included the following:

(1) 9th VC Division-The regiments of the division are deployed primarily in T'Y MINH Province and the LONG NOUEN area of PHUOC LONG Province.

(2) 101st NVA Regiment in T'Y MINH Province believed to be subordinate to the 9th Division

(3) 273d Regiment believed to be in PHUOC LONG Province.

(4) 165 A Regiment: PHUOC LONG Province.

(5) PHU LOI Battalion: LONG NOUEN Province.

(7) C 61 District Company: PHN LONG District.

(8) C 63 LI TUYEU District Company

b. During the specific operation conducted by the Brigade in the reporting period, enemy actions and reactions varied according to the type of operation being conducted. For each operation, a brief summary of enemy activity is presented as follows:

(1) Operation JUILLISTON:

Unidentified battalion size units were reported to be crossing HWY 13 in the operational area. These units had been reported to be selecting ROK positions three to four kilometers from known crossing sites. Local force units and local guerrilla bands were known to be operating the entire distance along HWY 13 from LIT HIE to THIN THIN. The missions of the units were to collect taxes, construct roads, cut the highway and report US and RVN activities in the area. The entire area was known to be a VC east to west supply route, crossing HWY 13 at several points. No major contact was made during the operation. There were numerous isolated harassing incidents from snipers, booby traps and mines. The layout units contacted were squad size. Although no unit designations were made it was evident that forces encountered were local guerrilla type units. Several small base camps were located and were believed to be stopping off places for supply units passing through the Brigade XCP.

(2) Operation TUCSON - D:

The general area of operation was reported to be habitually used by the 272d VC Regiment whose base areas are in the LONG NOUEN rubber zone and North of the T'Y MINH rubber zone and the 272d VC Regiment whose base areas are in the LONG NOUEN rubber zone and North of the T'Y MINH rubber zone. Elements of the 331st NVA Regiment also reported to be operating in this area and harass traffic on HWY 13. It was believed that the 272d VC Regiment would defend against searches, sweeps or penetration attempts in the T'Y MINH, HONG MINH, and LONG NOUEN areas. Several VC political headquarters were believed to be located in the operational areas. These elements were the PHUOC LONG Province Command and the PHUOC THIN District Committee. It was reported that there were heavy concentrations of VC installations in the Northern LONG NOUEN and T'Y MINH Plantation areas. Little was known of VC installations in the PHUOC THIN District East of HWY 13. Numerous base camps, fortified positions and supply caches were expected to be found during the operation. During the operation the enemy employed harassing tactics. Isolated snipers and numerous booby traps were encountered. On two occasions VC positions were mortared with 122 mm mortars resulting in 3 KIA's. No major contact was made and the largest VC unit encountered was approximately 20 men in strength. Many large rice caches and storage
secured and established Artillery Base 1, II, & III at X2869, X2879, & X29015 respectively. 2/28 Infantry air landed vicinity X321872 the following day and secured the road in sector. The 1/16 Infantry was air lifted into LZ's AFPCL and HOG (X266788 & X276723) on 28 February and secured HTP 237 sector. On 28 February Company B 1/16 Infantry made contact with an estimated two VC battalions of the 101st NVA Regiment. Responsive artillery and close air support enabled Company B to be extracted with moderate casualties, while heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. On the night of 10-11 March 3d Brigade launched two separate attacks from 272d VC Regiment attempted to overrun Artillery Base II. The base defended by 2/2 Infantry (-), 156th Engineer Company and 2/33 Artillery. The determined defense by these units and the outstanding support provided by artillery and close air support soundly defeated the VC. While receiving only 1 KIA and 31 wounded the defenders killed 197 of the attackers, and captured 5. These were the only major contacts made by the 3d Brigade. The enemy confined himself to harassing with sniper fire, booby traps and land mines. The Brigade losses during this operation were 35 KIA and 167 WIA. VC losses were: 4th KIA, 5 FOI, 5 WIA, assiorted weapons, ammunition, signal equipment and food stuff were captured during the operation that greatly depleted the VC's stores and supplies in Dien Bien Phu Province and weakened his ability to dominate the area.

(4) Operation LAMSON-67 (17 March - 17 April 1967). The assigned mission: 3d Brigade will conduct Revolutionary Development Operations in the LAMSON South and control area; secure Divisional base camps at LT, THUC, THAI, BIA, and PHU LOI and secure the villages of THUU THAI and HAI. Operation LAMSON-67 was a 1st Infantry Division operation with 3d Brigade working in Southeastern Dien Bien Phu Province and Western THAI Mien Province in the THAI, BIA, DI An area. As a result of previous operations it was known that the area contained numerous base camps, supply depots, tunnels, bunkers, and other Installations. Terrain in the area was flat to gently rolling. The vegetation was made up of few open areas. Weather was hot and dry and did not affect the operation. During the initial period (17-22 March) the Brigade scaled and searched a number of villages with exceptional results. In all instances the road was not penetrated and from ten to fifteen suspected VC were called from the villages. While the Brigade secured the road from HEN CAY to "PHUC VINH" (23-28 March) all convoys passed without delay and with no loss to the convoy itself. During the later period (1-27 April) the Brigade cleared the THAI, BIA Jungle area finding base camp areas and tunnel complexes that had previously gone undetected by other units. VC losses during the operation were 2 KIA and 75 WIA. VC losses were 7 KIA (50), 30 bandits, 59 draft evaders arrested and 4 deserters apprehended. 1 AK 50, 21 assorted rifles, 1 French M16 rifle, 1 French M1903 rifle, 191 M79, 2 107mm mortars, 2 7.92 mauser rifles, 12 VC gas masks, 500 lb of cooking oil, miscellaneous clothing and equipment captured.

(5) Operation NUMSEM (22 April 1967 - present). The assigned mission: 3d Brigade will conduct a multi-battalion assault operation on 23 April 1967; conducts combat reconnaissance and jungle destruction in assigned AO; destroys VC/NA forces and installations within the operational area. Operation NUMSEM is a joint operation with the 3d Brigade in the WOMI Division. The area of operation is known to have been partially covered during Operation O192. However, intelligence reports indicated increased activity in the area prior to the operation. Terrain in the area is flat to gently rolling and covered mostly with dense jungle and open marshy areas. Many areas are flagged since August past are considered part of the main growth vegetation. The principal stream in the area is the SAI River but it presented no obstacle to the tactical plan. Weather during the operation has been hot and humid with occasional thunder showers.

22 April 1967 the 3d Brigade began Operation NUMSEM with disentanglements on 22 April 1967. On 23 April 1967 1/28 Infantry and 2/28 Infantry conducted an assault on LT X122. On 24 April 1967 the 3d Brigade conducted an assault on LT X122. The battalions then began combat reconnaissances in sector. In the operational area the battalions are finding mostly small base camps and small campos of ammunity, food, and supplies. So far in the operation the VC have refused to become engaged in a major contact but have continued harassing sniper and booby trap operations. So far in the operation 3d Brigade has lost 5 KIA and 24 WIA. VC losses have been 30 KIA and 150 WIA, 4 chicom 7.62 rifles, 1 M77 grenade launcher, 2 7.62mm machine guns, 100 Soviet SMGs, 1 Thompson SMG, 1 Springfield rifle, 1 M1903 pistol, 12 US MG's, 12 US rifles, 1 drill press, 127,150 lbs of rice, miscellaneous documents captured, 200,150 lbs of rice, 205 lbs salt, 30 chicom claymores, 915 chicom grenades, 300 lbs Tnt, 250 gal of oil, 60 50 kilo bags of cement, 18 AP mines, 1 250 lb bomb, 300 82 mm mortar rounds, 500 gallons of cooking oil, miscellaneous clothing, equipment and ammunition destroyed.
areas were found and one POW camp with accommodations for approximately 30 POWs. There were numerous bunkers, huts, tunnels, and fortified positions throughout the area. Most of the bunkers discovered were either supply or bomb shelter type. Each base camp had an abundance of one- to two-man foxholes.

3 Operation JUNCTION CITY:

(a) Information received prior to the operation was based upon confirmed information gained during Operation ATTLBORO in November 1966. Through the area of interest there were numerous base camps, supply depots, training sites, medical complexes and many permanent type fortified defensive positions. There were indications that the VC would defend the area. It was known, from documents, collateral reports and captured enemy material, that both COSVN and 9th Division Headquar ters controlled the largest VC Division in the III Corps and presented the greatest threat to friendly operations. Of information listed the following units in the operational area:

1 Main Force Units: The 271, 272, and 102nd NVA Regiments of the 9th Division and the 70th Security Guard Regiment supported by elements of the 69th Artillery Group, and the 680th Training Regiment.

2 Reinforcements: The 53d, 961st and the 35th NVA Regiments, of the 7th Division, although weakened, were available to reinforce the 9th Division.

3 In addition, the 11th Local Force Battalion and TAY NINH Local Force Companies and other guerrilla units could be expected to employ harassing tactics or be on the limiting reinforcing role.

(b) The VC initially did not defend base camps or supply installations. Numerous small contacts were made with fleeing VC squad size elements. Most base camps showed signs of recent use. Bunkers of all descriptions were found throughout the area. Most were foxhole type with overhead cover. Numerous trenches, storage bunkers containing rice and arms caches were also located. It appeared that the VC were well prepared to defend against armor and mechanized units. This was evidenced by the extremely heavy volume of AT fire directed against US tracked vehicles. The majority of AT fires were from RG 2 rockets. Numerous AT mining incidents were recorded. Heavy volume of AT fire continued throughout the operation.

(c) Major contact was made with elements of the VC 9th Division on 28 February 1967. Three elements of 1/16 Infantry, while on combat reconnaissance made contact with an estimated multi-battalion force believed to be from the 102nd NVA Regiment. The action by 1/16 Infantry disrupted what appeared to be a staging area for a planned attack on a US convoy passing thru the area. On the evening of 10 March 1967, the 2d Battalion (Mech) 2d Infantry and elements of the 160th Engineer Battalion, located at Artillery Base II, were then under heavy mortar and automatic weapon fire by a multi-battalion force from the 272 Regiment. The VC attempted to overrun the base with a grand attack but were repulsed and suffered heavy casualties. The 272 Regiment was supported by the 90th Artillery Group and local VC who supported the attack with 120 MM mortars. A substantial amount of weapons, ammunition and explosives were captured during the operation.

4 Operation LAMSON:

Numerous unidentified units were reported to be in the area of interest. Specifically to the East of HAT LEEE and along HAT LI and HO, the PHU LOC Battalion, 610 (PHU LOC Company) the 651 (PHU LOC Company), 652 (CHIN THIEN Company) and 653 (LAI THIEN Company) had been known to operate in the area. Additionally numerous small guerrilla units habitually operated throughout. Reports also indicated that a new company known as the LII KIE Company was operating in the area. Base camps, supply depots and training areas were spotted throughout the LAMSON area. A major contact was made, however numerous squad size elements were engaged as they attempted to employ harassing tactics. None in the area were found to be very heavily mined. The mines consisted of both command detonated and pressure type AT mines. Base camps, two of which were battalion size, consisted of well prepared fighting hole with overhead cover. In the LAMSON South area a large box camp complex which included a medical facility and extensive tunnel networks was discovered. Documents found in the base camp indicated that it was a finance and supply depot used by the LII KIE District Command. Numerous weapons, medical supplies, miscellaneous equipment and documents were captured as a result of the operation. Threeordon and search operations were conducted during LAMSON.

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These operations netted a total of 16 VCS, 12 whom were released and 4 whom were released to the LOI District for further interrogation.

(5) Operation MANSETEN:

The area of interest was penetrated during Operation CIGA FALLS which ended on 26 January 1967. Although Operation CIGA FALLS disrupted the operation of the 83d Logistics Group, indications were that the 83d Logistics Group had re-established supply bases throughout the area. The area was reportedly covered with small supply facilities, base camps, tunnels, bunkers, and other allied installations. It was expected that all areas were heavily mined and booby trapped. Political elements that could have been encountered were: MR IV, XTV and U HST Province Committees, MR IV, XTV and U HTG District Committees on their subordinates. During the initial days of the operation numerous base camps, supply installations, and medical facilities were located. The amounts of weapons, equipment, documents, and rice which were located substantiated the fact that this area was a logistical complex operated by the 83d Logistics Group. No major contact was made, however, sniper incidents, booby trapping, and peculiar tactics were encountered. 

The operation continues and follow up reports will be submitted as they occur.

PART IV PERSONNEL:

a. Strength:

(1) Authorized: Officers 13, WO: 12, SM 296

(2) Assigned: as of 28 February - Officers 125, WO 6, SM 2697
   as of 31 March - Officers 124, WO 8, SM 2229
   as of 30 April - Officers 125, WO 8, SM 2558

(3) Replacements gained during the period 1 February to 30 April-1966.

(4) Hospital returns during the period 1 February to 30 April-1967.

(5) Other troops authorized and assigned during period: one (1) liaison officer (ARVN), one (1) driver (ARVN), and twelve (12) interpreters (ARVN).

b. Replacements: Presently, this unit is short 8 officers, short 2 WO, and over 143 M. All newly assigned SM in the grade of 5-7 and below and officers in grades O-1 and O-2 attend the "Combat Indoctrination Course" conducted by the Brigade S-2.

c. Discipline: During the period 1 February through 30 April 1967, one (1) enlisted man was tried by Summary Court Martial, sixteen (16) enlisted men were tried by Special Court Martial, and Four (4) enlisted men were tried by General Courts Martial.

d. Prisoner of War: 15 VCS and 12 WCO were processed through US and ARVN channels. 2 ralliers were returned to government control.

e. Burials and Grave Registration: None

f. Civil Assistance: See S-5 portion attached.

g. Morale and Personnel Services: Morale of the Brigade continues to be high. 2 Distinguished Service Crosses, 10 Silver Stars, 11 Soldiers Medals, 5 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 2 Legion of Merit, 120 Bronze Stars (Value), 199 Bronze Stars (Merit), 17 Army Commendation Medals (Value), 230 Army Commendation Medals (Merit), and 60 Air Medals have been recommended for awarding to members of the Brigade. The facilities of the Red Cross Recreation Center were rejuvenated and a new filter unit was added to the pool. The pool is currently closed for a complete renovation and will be reopened in the near future. A new swimming pool is planned.

h. Personnel Management: Assignment of newly arrived replacements has been altered when necessary to allow an equalization in the distribution of personnel within the battalions normally attached to this headquarters.
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1. Civilian Employment:

(1) 1,034 Vietnamese personnel are employed within the base perimeter.

(a) 25Q are employed by the firm of Pacific Architects and Engineers,

(b) 169 are employed by concessions, clubs, or individual groups as caretakers.

(c) 615 are employed as permanent and temporary laborers.

(2) Additionally there are 35 Koreans, 15 Filipinos and 9 US citizens employed within the base camp.

f. Psychological Operations: During the quarter February to 30 April a total of five (5) leaflet drops were made. Due to the W/V Psywar Campaign for TET in February only one (1) leaflet drop was made. A total of 50,000 leaflets were dropped in support of TET festivities and operation "KENTROOP". Among the leaflets were 50,000 TET greetings from the 1st Infantry Division Commander, 100,000 Safe Conduct Passes, 50,000 Weapons Reward, and 200,000 Special Map Leaflets for operation "KENTROOP". 10 & 1/2 hours of taped loudspeaker broadcasts were conducted during the quarter. Among the tapes played was one made by a POW and another made by a Chieu Hoi. All target areas for leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts were selected in conjunction with and upon recommendation of the 3d Brigade S-2.

(2) During the quarter sixty-two (62) tons of commodities and 150 cases of food were distributed to local Vietnamese living within the 3d Brigade TAOR, with the majority going to refugees in the BM CAT area. Among the commodities distributed were TET presents, cooking oil, corrugated tin. In addition, seventy (70) tons of captured rice and 500 lbs of captured salt were returned to JVN with the majority going to refugees in the BM CAT area.

(3) One hundred twenty (120) houses have been completed at the BEN CAT Refugee Center. UNRRA has been unable to supply enough aluminum roofing and 1st Division GS has not delivered approximately 5000 board feet of lumber that was purchased from GMS. Other projects undertaken are the painting of the LAI KIP dispensary ward and cimbraam block factory. The dispensary ward is 25% complete. 300 cimbraam blocks have been produced so far in the factory.

(4) 1974 patients from the FJN CAT and LIT CAT areas were treated during the quarter under the Priydi/St. John program.

(5) Two (2) Solatium Payments were made during the quarter.

PART V: LOGISTICS:

a. The majority of operations during the reporting period was resupplied from the LAI KME base. On two occasions a forward supply base was established near the operations area. The majority of resupply was affected by helicopter, although road resupply was used extensively. No significant problems were encountered.

b. Supply:

(1) Supported strength: 1,200 average.

(2) Supply levels: On Hand

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<th>Class</th>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
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<td>15 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II &amp; IV</td>
<td>drew as needed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>3 days</td>
<td>3 days *</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>21,500 Gallons 24,500 gallon</td>
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<tr>
<td>N90</td>
<td>50,000 Gallons 52,000 gallon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>65,000 Gallons 68,500 gallon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Items in short supply: Engines, heavy equipment, bulldozers, road graders, and front and rear loader loaders. Also electrical wiring.
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flashlights, and water trailers.

(3) Local Procurement: Ice purchases constitute the principle purchase made from the local economy. Small amounts of electrical items and building materials (bricks) have been purchased. Quality is acceptable.

e. Evacuations:
(1) Casualties:
(a) From Hostile Actions: 135
(b) Disease: 65
(c) Injury: 75

(2) Prisoners of War:
(3) Refugees: No refugees were evacuated during the reporting period.

d. Transportation:
(1) Highway - 5000 tons of cargo were moved to LAI KHE over Highway 13. Minor repairs were required to keep the road in a passable condition.
(2) Air: 2100 tons of cargo were airlifted into LAI KHE.

e. Services:
(1) Maintenance: The direct support ordnance unit has been able to keep abreast of maintenance problems in the vehicle category. The number of jobs awaiting parts has dropped considerably. Engine and Signal equipment has been the source of most problems, but the backlog of jobs has also decreased. PLLs and ASLs are approximately 70% of their authorized levels.
(2) Construction: Approximately 67% of the currently approved base plan has been completed.
(3) Miscellaneous: N/A

6. PART VI CHRONOLOGY:

1 February 1967: Operation WILLISTON commenced
12 February 1967: Operation WILLISTON terminated
15 February 1967: Operation TUSON commenced
23 February 1967: Operation TUSON terminated
22 February 1967: Operation JUNCTION CITY commenced
15 March 1967: Operation JUNCTION CITY terminated and LTC James S. Roentgen replaced LTC Eiler D.
17 March 1967: Operation LITON II commenced
17 April 1967: Operation LITON II terminated
22 April 1967: Operation JUNCTION

7. PART VII DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATION:

a. Lessons Learned:
(1) Operation WILLISTON: Since Operation WILLISTON consisted of normal road runner and security operations no significant lessons learned.
(2) Operation TUSON:
(a) Armored fighting vehicles should not be utilized for transporting rations. The rations tend to interfere with the movement of the tank turret and leaves the vehicle vulnerable to ambush.
(b) There is an urgent requirement for a practical and effective method of destroying rations.
(3) Operation JUNCTION CITY: When used in conjunction with infantry patrolling the flanks, road runner operations greatly assist in keeping a road clear of mines. However, when used exclusively to secure an area, road runner operations cannot protect a convoy from sniper and anti-tank fire and the unit conducting the operation will probably suffer numerous losses to mines planted between runs.
(b) Operation LAWSON-67: None

b. Recommendations:

(1) Operations should be planned so that in the event a large base camp, tunnel system or supply cache is found, additional time can be allotted to thoroughly search and destroy the area.

(2) When assigning ADs to units clearing and securing roads, enough area must be assigned to allow for adequate patrolling on both sides of this road. The unit should never be assigned less than 2500 meters from the road.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Robert D. Munro

Major, Infantry
Adjutant
Horseshoes with Charlie

On 22 February 1967 a gigantic military horseshoe was pitched into the pit of War Zone C and the largest operation of the Vietnamese war was underway. (See JUNCTION CITY I map attached) By evening of the 22d, a casual observer flying over War Zone C would have spotted settling dust as the well-aimed horseshoe slid into place. That settling dust was a direct result of mechanized, airmobile, and airborne forces of the US 25th Infantry Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade and the BIG RED ONE. The western and northwestern portions of the horseshoe were occupied by the 25th Infantry Division. The northeastern and eastern portions of the horseshoe were occupied by forces of the 1st Infantry Division and 173d Airborne Brigade.

From MINH THANH the 1st Bn, 2d Inf, 1st Bn 26th Inf and 1st Bn, 28th Inf conducted heliborne assaults in the north along Route 246. From QUAN LOI, the 4th Bn, 503d Inf and 1st Bn, 503d Inf of the 173d Airborne Brigade under the operational control of the 1st Division, conducted heliborne assaults in the northeast along Route 246. From BIEN HOA the 2d Bn, 503d Inf conducted the first battalion-size parachute assault since the Korean War. Their drop zone was north of KATUM along Route 246.

As those forces charged north, let's consider some of the reasons which brought about Operation JUNCTION CITY. In November 1966, the 1st Infantry Division entered the southern portions of War Zone C on Operation
ATTLEBORO. The operation yielded large stores of VC foodstuffs and munitions and uncovered extensive logistical, administrative, and training complexes. In addition, forces of the 9th VC Division were encountered in well-fortified base areas. ATTLEBORO yielded 1136 tons of rice and 845 VC killed. If southern War Zone C was so productive, northern War Zone C, along the Cambodian border, was probably an equally ripe target. To confirm this, during the months of December, January, and early February, a thorough evaluation was made of documents captured during ATTLEBORO; a concentrated intelligence-gathering effort was focused on War Zone C. Captured enemy material, documents, prisoners, and ralliers indicated that both the Central Organization for South Vietnam (COSVN) and the 9th VC Division Headquarters were located in northern War Zone C. In short, the most logical pit for that giant horseshoe was northern War Zone C.

The forces pouring into the open end of the horseshoe continued their thrust northward. The 2d Bn, 28th Inf was helilifted into the area, and in coordination with all forces around the horseshoe, conducted search and destroy operations. On 28 February, just east of Route TL 4, Co B, 1st Bn, 16th Inf engaged two battalions of the 101st North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment. The brief engagement cost the NVA Regiment 167 killed. All units continued their missions, locating rice, supplies, munitions, base camps, and training areas throughout the zone of operations.

As JUNCTION CITY entered its third week with only one major enemy encounter and sizeable but unspectacular equipment finds, a prominent news magazine in the United States asked its readers, "Whatever became of JUNCTION CITY?" An answer developed as the BIG RED ONE prepared to charge into phase II of JUNCTION CITY and encounter three additional regiments of the 9th VC Division. However, before JUNCTION CITY I was finished an additional major engagement took place. On 10 March 1967 the 2d Bn (Mech), 2d Inf, minus Co B, was attacked at a fire support base along Route TL 4 by the 272d VC Regiment. The attack was initiated by a heavy 30 minute mortar, recoiless rifle fire preparation, employing 120mm, 82mm, and 60mm mortars and 57mm recoiless rifles. Near the end of the barrage the enemy launched a two battalion ground attack on the eastern portion of the perimeter. The attack met withering US caliber .50 and M60 machine gun fire from armored personnel carriers and ground-mounted positions. As the battle continued, mutually supporting artillery bases rained over 5000 rounds of artillery into the area surrounding the base being attacked. Forward air controllers directed over 100 sorties of tactical fighter support. The battle ended at 0500 hours. A police of the surrounding area revealed 196 VC killed and five wounded PW's. Friendly casualties were three killed and 38 wounded. Only ten of the wounded required evacuation. One week later, the 1st Infantry Division terminated Phase I of Operation JUNCTION CITY.

On 180001 March 1967 the Division initiated Operation JUNCTION CITY II. The area of operations was immediately east of the JUNCTION CITY I area, extending into the eastern portion of War Zone C between KATUM and Route 13. (SEE JUNCTION CITY II map attached) This area was selected for
a number of important reasons. First, a CIDG compound and airstrip were to be constructed along Route 246 west of AN LOC. Forces in the area would provide security for engineer work parties. Second, this area was the only remaining portion of War Zone C which had never before been searched by US forces. In mid-February 1967, Operation TUCSON had covered the area south of MINH THANH between the Michelin Plantation and Route 13. JUNCTION CITY I covered the western portions of Zone C. To completely blanket the zone, the JUNCTION CITY II area was selected. Third, intelligence gathered from documents, informers, ralliers, aerial observers, and airborne radar indicated substantial VC traffic flowing northeast and southwest in the same general direction as the SAIGON River, north of DAU TIENG. JUNCTION CITY II was the last phase of a plan designed to sweep through War Zone C in TAY NINH Province and to demonstrate to the VC that an area they use as their major stronghold and headquarters for all South Vietnam is vulnerable to entry by American forces. Prior to this time no American forces had ever operated in eastern War Zone C.

The plan for the second phase in War Zone C was quite simple: place two brigades of infantry, reinforced with armored and mechanized forces, across the flow of VC traffic. The 2d Brigade and 173d Airborne Brigade, under operational control of the 1st Division, were chosen for the task. They executed search and destroy operations in the general area indicated on the JUNCTION CITY II map, attached. The 1st Brigade secured QUAN LOI, Route 246 to the bridge site, and Route 245 to MINH THANH. The 1st Brigade of the 9th Division, also under 1st Division control, secured Route 13 from LAI KHE to QUAN LOI. During this phase of the operation the 1st Infantry Division controlled five brigades and an armored cavalry regiment in addition to supporting artillery, engineer, aviation, signal, and logistical units.

Two significant enemy contacts occurred during JUNCTION CITY II. The first took place at a destroyed village named BAU BANG, eight miles north of LAI KHE along Route 13. At that location, the 3d Sqdn, 5th Cavalry was securing B Battery, 7th Bn, 9th Artillery inside a perimeter of 20 M113 armored personnel carriers and six M48A3 tanks. At ten minutes past midnight on 20 March the base came under heavy caliber .50 machine gun, mortar, and recoilless rifle fire. At 0135 hours the perimeter came under heavy ground attack from two battalions of the 273d VC Regiment reinforced with local guerrillas. Heavy enemy machine gun fire was directed into the perimeter from along a railroad track embankment 50-100 meters east of the perimeter. Friendly forces replied with intensive, sustained small arms fires, M60 and caliber .50 machine gun fires, 90mm tank fires, 4.2 inch mortar fires, 3000 rounds of 105mm, 155mm, 8 inch, and 175mm artillery fires, coupled with 87 sorts of tactical fighter support. A police of the battle area the following morning revealed 231 VC killed and three wounded PW's. US forces sustained three killed and 63 wounded; 26 of the wounded were evacuated. As in the 10 March battle, the ability of the mechanized/armored perimeter to fight off repeated attacks kept the VC in position for friendly artillery and air attack.
The second major enemy contact involved the 1st Bn, 2d Inf, the 1st Bn, 16th Inf and the 1st Bn, 26th Inf. On 30 March the 1st Bn, 26th Inf conducted a heliborne assault east of KATUM along Route 246. On the following day, the 1st Bn, 2d Inf landed in the same area. At 1255 hours on 31 March, the reconnaissance platoon of the 1st Bn, 26th Inf made heavy enemy contact with an unknown VC force. Co B was sent to reinforce the recon platoon and encountered caliber .50 machine gun fires, recoilless rifle fires, claymores, and mortars, indicating a main force VC unit. Extensive artillery and air strikes forced the VC to break contact at 1700 hours. All elements of the 26th Inf returned to night defensive positions, dug in, and waited for morning. The 1st Bn, 16th Inf (-) had been helilifted into the area by 1730 hours to reinforce the position, At 0500 hours on 1 April a heavy enemy mortar barrage began to fall into the 16th and 26th Inf positions. The firing lasted for 15 minutes. 1st Bn, 2d Inf to the southwest also came under mortar attack. At 0522 hours enemy ground attacks were launched from the north and east against the 26th Infantry. US ground forces returned a heavy volume of small arms fires while artillery was massed on the east and air strikes delivering anti-personnel bomblets and napalm in the north. The massive US response broke the enemy contact. Immediate interrogation of a captured VC indicated that the enemy reassembly area was to the east of the battle site. Air and artillery were shifted into the area and followed by a sweep, employing the 1st Bn, 2d Inf and 1st Bn, 16th Inf. A total of 491 bodies were counted in and around the defenses of the 1st Bn, 16th Inf and 1st Bn, 26th Inf. The final count after a sweep of the area was 609 VC killed and three PW's. Friendly casualties were 10 US KIA and 64 WIA. 

JUNCTION CITY I and II achieved very significant results. The tabulated material results are attached as the last page of this narrative. Not all of the units participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY had a chance to participate in one of these pitched battles. Those who did made the VC pay dearly for the mistaken idea that they could overrun a BIG RED ONE position. Other units contributed in other important ways. The 1st Engineer Battalion, for instance, constructed two new airfields in War Zone C and erected a new bridge capable of carrying tanks across the SAIGON River into the zone. Highway 13 was held open for military traffic almost continuously for three months from SAIGON to QUAN LOI. 

Most important, the 1st Infantry Division and other US units marched at will throughout the length and breadth of War Zone C destroying base camps and gathering vital information. No longer can the VC regard this area as a "safe haven". Incidentally Operation TUCSON from 14 to 22 February deprived the VC of 1700 tons of rice and JUNCTION CITY deprived them of 311 tons more for a total of 2011 tons. That is enough rice to feed 15 VC battalions of 500 men each for one year.

Most significant of all, four regiments of the 9th VC Division were engaged in combat and resoundingly defeated. The 101st North Vietnamese Army Regiment and the 271st, 272d, 273d VC Main Force Regiments lost a combined total of 1203 combat soldiers killed in four separate battles.
That is a substantial chunk of the fighting strength of any division. JUNCTION CITY permanently removed 1809 enemy soldiers from the field of battle. The enemy wounded figure could easily be twice that number. In the past two months the BIG RED ONE has dealt a staggering blow to the 9th VC Division from which it will take a long time to recover. "Whatever happened to JUNCTION CITY?" Ask Charlie; he may know!

Prepared by the
G-3 Section
1st Infantry Division
### Operation JUNCTION CITY Totals

**VIET CONG KILLED** 1781  
**VIET CONG CAPTURED** 25  
**VIET CONG RALLIERS** 3  
**TOTAL** 1809

### WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

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### FOODSTUFFS

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Subject: 1st Engineer Actions on Operation Junction City

To: All Men 1st Engineer Battalion

1. Operation JUNCTION CITY has been the largest, and in all probability, the most significant operation in all of Vietnam to this date. From an engineering viewpoint, we have done more construction in less time than ever before. The battalion has been continually over committed, working day and night under fire, to build three (3) C-130 airfields; open, clear, improve and maintain over 74 kilometers of roads on a daily basis; build three timber trestle bridges and two major Bailey bridges, one being the largest and most sophisticated structure built by an engineer battalion since World War II. In addition, tactical support of the infantry brigades included numerous landing zones constructed by engineers descending from CH-47 by ladder and by bulldozers, as well as preparing many fortifications and clearing fields of fire for infantry units in dense jungles. The battalion also supervised construction of two Special Forces camps and an additional C-130 airstrip, the actual construction being done by supporting engineers. JUNCTION CITY, which extended from 22 February to 15 April, has also been one of our more costly operations with 1 KHA and 42 WIA. Casualties occurred principally from mining incidents, mortar and sniper fire. Determined probes against perimeters, particularly B Company, accounted for a number of V.C. (body count included in larger unit reporting). During this period the battalion separately was given credit for 48 V.C.

2. The stage was set for the opening of JUNCTION CITY as A and C Companies moved directly from Operation TUCSON and D Company completed the C-130 field at Suoi Da. On TUCSON, A and C Companies had constructed two timber trestle bridges, put in and maintained six fords and three VLB sites, and improved 33 kilometers of road. They also redelivered two steel truss bridges to permit withdrawal of 1st Infantry Division troops thru the Michelin plantation en route to the JUNCTION CITY operational area. In the meantime D Company completed the compacted silt C-130 strip and placed T-17 membrane to provide a logistical base for the 1st Division (primarily 3d Brigade) thrust north from Suoi Da to Katum. The airfield started by A Company in December before tactical reasons required their presence elsewhere - was another "first" for the "Always First" battalion. It is the only compacted silt field in II Field Force area and with proper maintenance will provide continuing service for a prolonged
period. Few believed when the project was conceived that we could get CDR's up to 100 (averaging 35-40) out of what is commonly referred to as "elephant manure".

3. Phase I of JUNCTION CITY commenced on 22 February as the 1st Bde and 173d Airborne Brigade air dropped and landed in the vicinity of Katum and to the northwest of Katum and the 3d Bde thrust north along the road from Suoi Da to Katum. The objective was to provide blocking forces on the east and north for an attack by the 11th ACR and 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division to the north in the westernmost portion of War Zone C. Engineers with the lead elements (naturally) of the 3d Bde Task Force found the going rough "as we lost two tank dozers the first morning to mines (one later salvaged). By that evening the force reached Katum to link up with the 173d Airborne Brigade.

4. Engineer tasks assigned during this first phase (see sketch map attached) were for A and C Companies, along with the 173d Engineer Company to provide combat support to their brigades and open and improve the roads in their brigade sectors including any necessary bridging. D Company was to build the airstrip at Katum and our supporting engineers to build an airstrip and Special Forces Camp at Prek Klok and improve the road south of Prek Klok.

After A Company opened the road to Katum, C Company immediately set about making a 500' corduroy road and building a 60' timber trestle bridge to keep a fast flowing section of road open to convoy traffic and replace a hasty AVLB site. On 24 February, D Company moved to Katum and was shortly followed by the Battalion Headquarters. D Company set to work on the Katum strip on 25 February and in six days it was fully opened to C-123 traffic (type II) and C-130 traffic on an emergency basis (type I). This strip of compacted silt overlaid by a coarse grade of laterite was literally hewn from the jungle as fighting continued. While searching for a source of laterite a party was attacked suffering three casualties within 200 yards of the Battalion CP. Surveying was interrupted several times by sniper fire and each night the engineer base at Katum was mortared. Similarly, C Company providing local security to its work parties suffered casualties from V.C. snipers 20 meters from their work site. A Company's work was stopped in several instances either by mortar attack or to permit infantry to clear out local ambushes. Regardless of enemy action the work progressed and the six day record for the D Company airstrip will be remembered for a long time. As the field was opened and the first C-123 landed a small celebration including cake and champagne was held to commemorate the occasion.

5. On completion of the Katum field the 1st Engineers were withdrawn south to refit for Phase II operations. The 168th Engineers continued work on the airstrip and special forces camp at Prek Klok which were completed about a month later.

6. After a day's standdown for maintenance A Company, B Company, E Company (-) w/Battalion Headquarters (being flown directly from Suoi Da to
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Quan Loi), moved into Phase II establishing an engineer base in the rubber about 5 kilometers west of An Loc. During this phase B Company was to open the road west to the Saigon River; A, B and E Companies were to work on a 220' Bailey bridge to enter War Zone C; D Company was to build yet another C-130 strip at the bridge crossing site; and the 27th Engineers were to put in the Special Forces Camp at the site. B Company was to push on west after the crossing with the 2d Brigade.

7. On 7 March A Company engineers accompanied the infantry to the Saigon River Bridge site and attempted unsuccessfully to extract the existing collapsed 160' DD Bailey from the stream bed to permit erection of a pier. The alternate plan of constructing a bridge just up stream of the existing bridge using a sand bar as a base for the pier was implemented and on 8 March layout and construction began. As A Company and B Company alternated working day and night pouring a concrete foundation for the pier, the new extensive approaches and abutment retaining walls were constructed. E Company installed a high line to transport concrete to mid stream and as soon as the near shore approach was completed they commenced assembly of the Bailey structure consisting of 2 spans of 120' DD and 100' TS. The morning of 11 March the nose of the 100' TS was launched to the Bailey pier and by noon on 12 March the bridge was completed and opened to traffic. Considerable additional effort was required to provide an adequate road net work on the far shore and to replace a concrete and timber fender around the supporting Bailey pier. F Company moved from the Bailey bridge to a 50' timber truss bridge so that the 27th Engineers could commence clearing operations at the special forces camp.

8. On 14 March, D Company rolled north to the engineer camp west of An Loc and the next day commenced clearing for the C-130 airstrip west of the bridge site. This field required considerably greater earth moving than the Katum field but fortunately we were blessed by abundant laterite sources. Cuts up to 8' and fills to 4½' were required over extensive areas of the field to provide proper alignment and profile. Earth moving went on day and night through the construction period. On 1 April the field was accepted and D Company shortly withdrew to Di An (loss a platoon to up grade the Quan Loi airstrip) to perform maintenance on some weary bodies and pieces of equipment.

9. Battling Bravo Company, which was not actively engaged in Phase I, soon found much action as they were heavily mortared on 5 nights and witnessed probing attacks on their perimeter in the 2d Brigade base camp. After completing the Saigon River Bridge they pushed forward along route 246 to Fire Support Base Charlie and later to Objective Thrust where major jungle clearing for artillery and fields of fire for the infantry were required. Road work continued to take considerable effort particularly as the showers commenced after the long dry season. From controlling dust (about 50,000 gallons of palliatives used by B Company alone) to suppressing mud became the name of the game.
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10. Since engineers are never in reserve, particularly the First Engineers, A Company on completion of the fender for the Saigon River bridge was road marched to Lai Khe and thence to their home base of Phuoc Vinh (they've been there for 1 week since last October) to prepare for the Song Be bridging job. (We are checking records but it is understood that this is the longest (437') and most sophisticated (110' DD single span cantilevered off of two 163.5' DD spans) bridge constructed since World War II). Calculations for the bridge design were made by LTC Smith, Battalion Executive Officer and considerable technical assistance was provided by B Company in modifying existing Bailey parts for the modified bridge (a requirement was to place the DD trusses within the 17' 8" clearing between the old French concrete trusses - normal clearance required is 21' 10"). A unique method of construction was used wherein the modified trusses and transoms were erected in skeleton form on the existing steel bridge truss whose capacity was rated as 30 tons. Specially fabricated pinned joints were emplaced and braced while the skeleton frames were jacked up from the old steel truss and the older truss dropped into the river 100' below with a beautifully executed demolition charge. The new truss was then jacked down into final position, the cantilevered spans completed, abutments and approaches prepared, the pinned joints freed to permit the center section to act as a simple 110' span, and the double story emplaced on the 110' span. This structure was completed as Operation JUNCTION CITY came to a close and enabled the next Division operation for the Phuoc Vinh area to employ tanks and fully loaded resupply vehicles whereas before Class 23 was the maximum allowable load. While initial estimates by other organizations proposed a double-triple design using a Company-month of effort, the "Always First" battalion accomplished the job using a double-double cantilever (saving 1/3 of the panels) and a Company (-) for 10 days.

11. Including bridging in JUNCTION CITY, you have now constructed more than one half of all Bailey Bridging employed to date in Vietnam (in comparison with the accomplishments of 20 engineer battalions of the Engineer Command plus all divisional engineer battalions and separate companies). You have constructed half of all C-130 airfields built by U.S. Engineers in the II Field Force area. You have literally changed the face of the map in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

"Always First"

J.M. KRAMER, JR.
LTC, CE
Commanding

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