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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division (U)

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report — Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)
For Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

TO: See Distribution

SECTION 1 (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General: During the period covered by this report, the division terminated Operation PAUL REVERE IV and initiated Operation SJM HOUSTON. At the end of the reporting period Operation SJM HOUSTON continued. The 1st Brigade, operating under IFFORCEV, and 3rd Brigade, operating in the III Corps Tactical Zone under the 25th Infantry Division, are not included in this report.


      TF 2-4
      HHC
      2-8 Inf
      1-12 Inf
      1-22 Inf
      4-42 Arty
      D/5-16 Arty (OPCON)
      Plat B Co, 4th Engr Bn
      Det CA Tm #6, 41 CA Co

      Division Troops
      HHC
      4th Arm Bn (-)
      4th Engr Bn (-)
      124th Sig Bn (-)
      4th MP Co (-)
      4th Admin Co (-)
      4th Div TACP
      4th MI Det (-)
      20th FI Det
      21st FI Det

      TF 1-10 Cav
      1-10 Cav (-)
      C/3-4 Cav
      C/2-35 Inf
      CA Det G-5 Sect

      Div Arty
      HHB
      6-14 Arty (OPCON)
      5-16 Arty (-)

      TF 3-25
      HHC
      1-14 Inf
      1-35 Inf
      2-35 Inf
      M&B Co, 69th Armor
      2-9 Arty (OPCON)
      C/5-16 Arty (OPCON)
      E/3-6 Arty (OPCON)

Downgraded at 3-year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10
SECTION 1 SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

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SECTION 2 COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned)

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Part II: Recommendations
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS GSPON-65)

for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

29th Mil Hist Det
43d Cml Det
1-69 Armor (-)
33d Inf Plt (Set Dog)
41st CA Co (-)

DISCON

HHC & Band
704th Maint BN (-)
4th Med BN (-)
4th R&T BN (-)

(2) Task Force Organization as changed by FRAGO 1-1-67, effective 030100Z January 1967.

TF 2-4

HHC
2-8 Inf
1-12 Inf
1-22 Inf (-)
4-42 Arty
D/5-16 Arty (OPCON)
A/6-14 Arty (OPCON)
237 R/GAR (OPCON)
Plt B Co, 4th Engr BN
Det CA Tn #8, 41 CA Co

Div Trps

HHC
43d Cml Det
29th Mil Hist Det
1-69 Armor (-)
4th Engr BN (-)
4th Avn BN (-)
124th Sig BN
33d Inf Plt (Set Dog)
4th Div T.CP
4th Ht Det (-)
Tn #1, 41st CA Co (-)

DISCON


TF 2-4

HHC

TF 1-69 Armor

1-69 Armor (-B Co)
**CONFIDENTIAL**

20 March 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

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<td>1-12 Inf (-)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-42 Arty</td>
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<tr>
<td>B/5-16 Arty (OPCON)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plat B Co, 4th Engr Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det CA Tm #8, 41 CA Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TF 2-35 Inf</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2-35 Inf (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/1-69 Armor (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2-9 Arty</td>
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<tr>
<td>B/3-6 Arty (OPCON)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TF 1-10 Cav</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1-10 Cav (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/3-4 Cav (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2-35 Inf</td>
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<td>2-6 Arty (-)</td>
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**DISCON**

No Change

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<tbody>
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<td>HHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-8 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-12 Inf (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-42 Arty (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div Trps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 4th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st CA Co (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th MI Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Mil Hist Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43d Cal Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33d Inf Plat (Set Dog)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-22 Inf</td>
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<table>
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<td>5-16 Arty GSR 4-42 Arty</td>
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<td>6-14 Arty (-) GS</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS GSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

C/1-62 Arty DS
2-35 Inf
B/1-69 Armor (-)
C/2-9 Arty DS
B/3-6 Arty (OPCON)
1-69 Armor (-)
C/1-12 Inf (-)
C/5-16 Arty GS
1-10 Cav (-)
C/2-35 Inf (-)
C/3-4 Cav
Plat B/1-69 Armor
3-6 Arty (-) DS

(5) Artillery organization as changed by FRAGO 4-1-67, effective 30 January 1967:

TF 1-8 Inf
A/6-29 Arty
C/5-16 Arty: Reinf A/6-29 Arty
TF 1-10 Cav
3-6 Arty (-) DS

TF 1-69 Armor
5-16 Arty (-) DS
B/3-6 Arty
B/7-13 Arty

TF 2-4
4-42 Arty
A/6-14 Arty
D/5-16 Arty GSR 4-42 Arty

(6) Task Force Organization as changed by FRAGO 5-1-67, effective 31 January 1967:

TF 2-4
HHC
1-8 Inf
A/6-29 Arty
2-8 Inf
1-32 Inf (-)
1-22 Inf
4-42 Arty
Plat, B Co, 4th Engr Brn.
Det, CA Tm #8, 41st CA Co

TF 1-10 Cav
1-10 Cav (-)
C/1-69 Armor
3-6 Arty (-) DS

TF 2-35 Inf
A/1-69 Armor
A/2-9 Arty

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SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967

20 March 1967

TF 1-69 Armor
- 1-69 Armor (-)
- C/3-4 Cav (-)
- B/2-35 Inf
- 5-16 Arty (OPCON) 5-16 Arty
- B/7-13 Arty (OPCON) 5-16 Arty

DISCOM:
No Change

b. Key personnel by position as of the end of the reporting period.

(1) Division Headquarters,

MG Peers, William R.
BG Walker, Glenn D.
COL Miller, Judson F.

(2) 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

COL Adamson, James B.
LTC Duquemin, Gordon J.
LTC Lay, James R.
LTC Morley, Leonard A.
LTC Parr, Bertram L.

(3) Division Artillery.

COL Cutrona, Joseph F.H.
LTC Citrak, Michael

(4) DISCOM.

COL Bouman, Arthur B.
LTC Jaques, Jasper F.
LTC Kouchevko, Paul C.
LTC Peard, William G.

(5) 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry.

LTC Nutting, Wallace R.

(6) 4th Engineer Battalion.

LTC Schulz, Gerhard W.

(7) 4th Aviation Battalion.

LTC McDowell, William R.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned (RCS CSPOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

20 March 1967

(8) 724th Signal Battalion.
   LTC Keefer, Loren R.
   CO

(9) HHC, 4th Infantry Division.
   CPT Zwicker, Gary L.
   CO

(10) 4th Administration Company.
    CPT Terrell, Edmund D.
    CO

(11) 4th Military Police Company.
    CPT Sullivan, Gerald A.
    CO

(12) 1st Battalion, 69th Armor.
    LTC Clark, Clyde O.
    CO

c. Missions.

1. The 4th Infantry Division continued its primary mission of location and destruction of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) guerrilla forces during Operation PAUL REVERE IV. The accomplishment of assigned missions is discussed in Combat After Action Report PAUL REVERE IV.

2. On 1 January 1967, the 4th Infantry Division began Operation SAK HOUSTON. The primary mission of Operation SAK HOUSTON was the same as Operation PAUL REVERE IV. Other missions were: to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of the C.A. border and to the east within the assigned area of operations; to block enemy infiltration routes from C.A. across the highlands into the coastal provinces; to conduct spoiling attacks and ambush operations; to destroy enemy bases and supply installations; to clear, secure and assist in the development of the Tactical Area of Responsibility; to support Revolutionary Development and the Government of VIETNAM Refugee Resettlement Program; to open, secure and maintain lines of communications; to be prepared to deploy forces for the relief/reinforcement of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), Regional and Popular Forces, and critical signal sites within II Corps Tactical Zone and to provide I FFORCEV reserve on order.

   2. (C) Intelligence.

   a. General. During this period major emphasis was placed on refinement of OB holdings on the 1st and 10th NVA Divisions to accurately assess the effects of enemy losses during Operation PAUL REVERE IV, and
SUBJECT: Operational Report – Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

**b.** Development of OB covering the VC infrastructure within current and projected division area of Operations. With the cooperation of all intelligence agencies and units in the PLEIKU area extensive information on the infrastructure in the PLEIKU area was gathered and collated.

**b.** Operation PAUL REVERE IV: Reference After Action Report, PAUL REVERE IV.

c. Estimated Enemy Composition, Disposition and Strength, Operation SAN HOUSTON.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>LAST REPORTED LOCATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
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<td>1st NVA Div</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>SW KONTUM Province 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Captive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32d Regt</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>YA 6177</td>
<td>13 Dec 66</td>
<td>Captive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33d Regt</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>YA 6150</td>
<td>19 Dec 66</td>
<td>Captive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68th Regt</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>YA 8691</td>
<td>11 Aug 66</td>
<td>Captive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th NVA Div</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>KONTUM/PLEIKU 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Captive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88th Regt</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>YA 5055</td>
<td>3 Dec 66</td>
<td>Captive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th Regt</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>YA 7463</td>
<td>24 Dec 66</td>
<td>Captive</td>
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<tr>
<td>101st Regt</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>YA 7617</td>
<td>21 Nov 66</td>
<td>Document</td>
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<tr>
<td>407th MP Bn (VC)</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>PLEIKU 2</td>
<td>13 Jan 67</td>
<td>Agent</td>
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<tr>
<td>H15 LF Bn (VC)</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>E. PLEIKU 3</td>
<td>13 Jan 67</td>
<td>Agent</td>
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<td>H5 LF Bn (VC)</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>YA 9534</td>
<td>13 Jan 67</td>
<td>Agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200th NF Arty</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>SW KONTUM</td>
<td>4 Nov 66</td>
<td>Agent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bn (VC)</td>
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</table>

d. Counterintelligence.

(1) VC activities during the report period were characterized by increased integration with NVA units, emphasis on economic and logistical activities, and conduct of harassing attacks and small unit operations culminating in the 7 January attack on Camp Holloway, PLEIKU. The main force VC units generally have consisted of small units with some integration of NVA personnel into these units. VC economic and logistical activities involved an increase in rice and tax collection and purchase of foodstuffs and supplies from merchants in the built up areas.

1The 1st and 10th NVA Divisions and their subordinate units are believed to be in Cambodia.

2The 407th MP Bn normally operates in platoon or company size elements.

3The H15 Bn has company size elements in dispersed locations to the east and northeast of PLEIKU city.

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(2) The VC infrastructure in the northwestern portion of VC GIA LAI Province has suffered some disruption during the conduct of Operations PAUL REVERE IV and SAM HOUSTON. This has been indicated by agent and detainee interrogation reports revealing that VC District IV headquarters directed turn-in and concealment of weapons and avoidance of contact with US forces. VC District V indicated a degree of recovery from the damage incurred during Operation PAUL REVERE II and appeared to have been used as a staging area for future operations. VC District VI which was forced to move its headquarters from the DAK PAYDU Valley (BR 1435 - BR 1545), due to intensive US bombings and air attacks, remained quiet during the report period. There have been repeated reports of VC activity in VC District III. This district is believed to have provided personnel and logistical support for the 7 January attack on Camp Holloway and appears to be the strongest district in PLEIKU Province. VC Special District IX, with headquarters in PIEIKU City was reported as having provided espionage and sabotage support for the attack against Camp Holloway.

(3) Enemy espionage, sabotage and subversion activities are expected to continue. The broadening patronage by US personnel in local establishments and the large number of indigenous laborers employed by US forces in the local area provide the enemy with excellent opportunities.

e. Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques.

(1) Operation PAUL REVERE IV. Reference After Action Report, PAUL REVERE IV.

(2) Operation SAM HOUSTON.

(a) General. Although Operation PAUL REVERE IV was characterized by large scale NVA operations, Operation SAM HOUSTON has been characterized by intensive VC guerrilla activities. These activities have shown heavy emphasis on minings and harassing fires along highways within the area of operations, and have included the VC attack on Camp Holloway. This attack demonstrated thorough planning and preparation and swift execution to include effective use of mortars. The enemy achieved successful withdrawal of all attacking and supporting elements following the attack.

(b) Enemy Use of Imitative Communications Deception: Several instances of enemy use of imitative communications deception were noted during the report period. Prior to and during the attack on Camp Holloway imitative deception was exercised on the Camp Holloway internal telephone circuit. Several calls were noted in which the caller, speaking fluent English, determined the number of US personnel in certain bunkers and then informed the Camp Holloway control tower that an attack was imminent. Investigation later revealed that the telephone lines had
been tapped near the Camp Holloway perimeter fence. Subsequent to the
Camp Holloway incident, enemy use of imitative deception was confined to
use on FM radio nets. In one instance false information was relayed to
two separate US units in an apparent effort to cause them to commit reaction
forces in a specific location. Another incident indicated an attempt to
obtain tactical information. Both incidents were recognized as deception
by the units concerned.

(c) Harassing Attacks. The increase in mining, harassing
fires, and harassing attacks on US and ARVN installations was probably in-
tended to divert US and ARVN attention from VC/NVA staging areas. The VC
appear to have created several mining incidents south and west of PLEIKU
City in order to focus the attention of friendly forces to that area while
the enemy located north and east of PLEIKU City prepared for the Camp
Holloway attack.

(d) NVA Technique in Defending a Landing Zone: The basic
NVA procedure for defending landing zones used by US forces has been to
maintain surveillance by reconnaissance teams of selected landing zones.
Contact between the reconnaissance teams and the main enemy defense unit was
maintained by field phone or radio. The reconnaissance teams reported the
arrival, strength and composition of the US air-assault units. Following
an estimate of the situation by the enemy unit commander an order to attack
or to continue surveillance was issued. If the enemy commander decided to
attack, his unit would approach the landing zone by prepared routes and
launch a short, concentrated attack against the US forces, withdrawing
under cover of supporting mortar fire. Defending enemy units were usually
placed approximately one to three kilometers away from the landing zone.
This allowed surveillance and defense of several possible landing zones
by one enemy unit, by positioning the unit midway between these landing
zones. Enemy antiaircraft weapons were placed along likely helicopter
flight paths leading to or from the landing zones.

(e) Enemy Propaganda.

1. Enemy propaganda directed toward the civilian
population during the report period followed the theme that the war would
be long and hard, that much sacrifice would be required, but that the
cause was just and would bring freedom to VIETNAM.

2. Enemy propaganda directed toward US forces
during the report period followed the theme that the United States was
waging an unjust war in VIETNAM, that the US soldiers were being misled
by their superiors, and that all honorable soldiers should refuse to
fight and seek their repatriation (sic) to the United States.

2. Enemy propaganda leaflets recovered during this
period showed improvement in composition and printing over leaflets discovered
in the early phases of Operation PAUL REVERE IV.
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f. Recapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses.

(1) Personnel.

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<th></th>
<th>Sam Houston</th>
<th></th>
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<td>740</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>745</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) NVA</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) VCC</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Detainees</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>238</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>1,035</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Weapons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Paul Revere IV</th>
<th></th>
<th>Sam Houston</th>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Small Arms</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>159</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Crew-Served</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>176</td>
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</table>

(3) Ammunition.

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Small Arms</td>
<td>17,531 rds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) TNT</td>
<td>50.25 lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) 81/82mm Mortar</td>
<td>191 rds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) 60mm Mortar</td>
<td>2 rds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Grenades</td>
<td>251</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(f) B-40 Rockets</td>
<td>43 rds</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(4) Selected Items of Equipment Captured.

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Packs</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Ponchos</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
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(c) Protective Masks 7
(d) Uniforms 37
(e) Magazines 167

(5) Other Selected Items Captured.
(a) Rice 62.07 tons
(b) Medical Pump 1

(6) Materiel Destroyed.
(a) Huts 3,896
(b) Bunkers 719
(c) Foxholes 211
(d) Rafts 30
(e) Rice 9.72 tons

f. Significant Sources and Collection Techniques. In the course of an average month, the G2 section received at least 40 different types of reports from higher, lower and adjacent units, and civilian agencies. During an operation, however, the majority of information of immediate tactical value came from the division's own collection agencies and particularly from the interrogation sections of the 4th Military Intelligence Detachment at division and brigade level.

h. Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Probable Courses of Action.

(1) Enemy Capabilities.
(a) Infiltrate back into Southern KONTUM and/or PLEIKU Province with up to six NVA regiments.
(b) Re-establish base areas in the Area of Operation.
(c) Attack Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps, outposts, district headquarters, support installations and isolated units with a reinforced VC battalion size force.
(d) Attack single or multiple targets in the Area of Operation with up to six NVA regiments, supported by local VC units.
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(c) Continue harassing fire, sabotage, subversion, espionage and abductions throughout the Area of Operation.

(f) Reinforce those units presently in the vicinity of the Area of Operation with the 24th NVA Regiment from northern KONTUM, with unidentified units from CAMBODIA, and with other units from neighboring provinces, such as BINH DINH.

(2) Enemy Vulnerabilities.

(a) Enemy forces, when discovered massed, are vulnerable to air strikes, artillery concentrations and vertical envelopment by air-mobile forces.

(b) The enemy's extensive preparations for offensive operations and frequent inflexibility in execution are vulnerable to pre-emption by spoiling attacks.

(c) NVA forces are vulnerable to malaria and pulmonary diseases due to their long exposure to the elements, incomplete acclimatization and inadequate medical support.

(d) Low morale makes the NVA draftees particularly vulnerable to psychological warfare operations.

(e) The VC to a very large extent are dependent upon the local populace. US/ARVN civic action programs and psychological operations directed toward the local populace tend to remove support from and isolate the VC.

(3) Probable Courses of Action.

(a) From present indications it appears that the enemy will commit his forces (both NVA and VC) in several widely scattered locations concurrently to offset US reaction capabilities. Likely areas of operations are the KONTUM "panhandle" and the IA DRANG River Valley for the NVA units, the center of the PLEIKU Province for VC main and local forces units.

(b) It is likely the enemy will make maximum use of the forthcoming truce period for TET (8-12 February), either by committing his forces just prior to the truce and thereby curtailing our retaliatory effort, attacking during the truce, or by deploying his forces during the truce so as to be in position for offensive operation as soon as the truce ends.

(c) Until such time, the NVA will continue to train, reindoctrinate and re-equip his forces preparatory to infiltration, while the VC will continue to conduct small scale guerrilla operations in the Area of Operation.

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i. Recommended New Techniques and Changes in Doctrine and/or
Organization.

(1) Aerial photography taken of areas covered by heavy vegetation
at scales which normally reveal enemy positions in more open areas is ineffec-
tive. Although enemy positions cannot be detected in the more heavily forested
areas, interpreters can detect enemy positions through breaks in the canopy on
photography taken at scales of 1:3,000 to 1:5,000.

(2) It is recommended that each battalion have at least two
Montagnard and two Vietnamese interpreters attached to the battalion during
any operation. This would allow for rapid exploitation of information gained
from POW's.

(3) As a result of PAUL REVERE IV it was ascertained that much
information on the enemy could not be confirmed or verified as rapidly as
necessary. The establishment of a Division Intelligence Net (FM) has re-
sulted in considerable improvement in reporting and dissemination of infor-
mation.

(4) The attack on Camp Holloway demonstrated the effectiveness
of VC intelligence in using the indigenous labor force to insert agents into
the installation. After the attack certain laborers failed to appear. It
was later determined that these people had used false identity cards in
obtaining employment. A vigorous counterintelligence program and civilian
labor force control program must be maintained in base camps and supply
installations.

j. Comparison of Intelligence Estimates Versus Actual Enemy Found.

(1) Operation PAUL REVERE IV (1 November - 19 December):
An addendum to the original Intelligence Estimate for OPERATION PAUL REVERE
IV was published on 29 October. This addendum confirmed the locations of
the 95B and 32d NVA Regiments within the Area of Operation, listed the 33d
NVA Regiment as probable, and considered the 66th NVA Regiment in the possible
category. Subsequent action confirmed the location of the 33d Regiment, but
failed to substantiate the commitment of the 66th Regiment. Instead, contact
was established with the 88th NVA Regiment, which had been predicted in the
original intelligence estimate. Therefore the original estimate, with the
addendum, correctly reflected the enemy unit identifications and strengths
in the Area of Operation, except in reference to the 66th NVA Regiment, which
was never encountered.

(2) Operation PAUL REVERE IV (continued) (19 - 24 December):
The intelligence estimate for the operation in the CHU PA Mountains (IA9568)
correctly concluded that there were no sizable or identifiable enemy units
in that portion of the Area of Operation, although there were indications
of enemy activity. Several minor contacts with local VC, and with remnants
of the 2d Company, 1st Battalion, 95B Regiment, which had become dispersed
at the outset of Operation PAUL REVERE IV, verified this estimate.
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(3) Operation PAUL REVERE IV (continued) (27 - 31 December): It was estimated that the VC had long maintained a base area in the CHU PONG Mountains (AR7764). Furthermore, it was known that elements of the 407th MF Sapper Battalion and H,15 LF Battalion frequently operated in this vicinity. The ensuing operation, which partially encompassed the suspected base area, failed to uncover anything more than indicators of recent VC occupation and evacuation. Contacts were infrequent and resulted primarily in the apprehension of several local VC.

(a) Operation SAM HOUSTON (1-31 January): The estimate of enemy activity during this portion of Operation SAM HOUSTON was that the VC would continue small guerrilla operations, whereas the NVA would devote this time to regrouping, retraining and reindoctrinating their personnel in CAMBODIA, preparatory to launching offensive operations in February. This estimate proved accurate.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities.

a. Plans.

(1) OPORD 1-67 (PAUL REVERE V), 1 January 1967. The division mission included the following tasks: to detect NVA infiltration into Republic of VIETNAM; to destroy NVA/VC troop concentrations; to provide security for engineer construction and logistical installations; to provide convoy security of land lines of communications; to provide security for Government of VIETNAM resettlement within the area of operations and to provide security for Highway 19 east of PLEIKU.

(2) On 18 January 1967, PAUL REVERE V was renamed SAM HOUSTON with no change in mission or area of operation.4

(3) OPLAN 2-67 (Road Runner), 7 January 1967, outlines plans for the conduct of operations along main and secondary roads with mixed teams of infantry and armor/cavalry to prevent tax extortion and restore Government of VIETNAM control of the roads.

(4) OPLAN 3-67 (Famous Friend), 8 January 1967, outlines plans for cordon and search operations to eliminate VC influence within the hamlets. Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Medical and Intelligence activities are conducted concurrently to promote Government of VIETNAM and United States political and military objectives.

(5) OPLAN 4-67 (Bushmaster), 8 January 1967, prescribes the conduct of ambushes outside the tactical area of responsibility.

(6) OPLAN 5-67 (Kiwi), 9 January 1967, prescribes the procedures for the rescue of personnel, the security of sensitive documents and equipment and recovery operations for downed aircraft.


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(7) OPLAN 6-67 (Franklin), 25 January 1967, provides for the relief/reinforcement of Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camps, Regional and Popular Force Outposts, critical signal sites, and district/sub-district headquarters in II Corps Tactical Zone.

(8) OPLAN 7-67 (Hancock), 31 January 1967, outlines plans to conduct an operation in the BAN ME THOUT area to eliminate VC tax collection in the coffee and rubber plantations. The operation will be jointly conducted on order with units of the 23d VIETNAMESE Division.

(9) OPLAN 8-67 (Chase) (draft), outlines division plans for the conduct of joint operations for the relief of installations in the PLEIKU complex. VIETNAMESE forces pursue and drive enemy forces into blocking positions established by 4th Division units.

(10) FRAGO 2-3-67 (Good Neighbor), prescribes the frequency of visits to the hamlets within the hamlet Camp Tactical Area of Responsibility by division units. The purpose of the visits was to increase the security and surveillance of the area; to increase participation and association of Government of VIETNAM officials with people in the hamlets; to reduce VC influence; to gain intelligence and to help the people of the hamlet solve their problems.

(11) FRAGO 11-1-67 (Omega), outlines plans for the relief/reinforcement, exploitation of enemy contacts and destruction of enemy forces resulting from Project Omega Operations in KONTUM.

b. Operations.

(1) General.

(a) Operation PAUL REVERE IV was conducted during the period 1 November through 31 December 1967. The detailed record of division operations is contained in Combat After Action Report PAUL REVERE IV, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division.

(b) The 4th Division began Operation SAM HOUSTON (originally designated PAUL REVERE V) on 1 January 1967. The area of operations for SAM HOUSTON remained the same. At the beginning of the period, major elements of the division were disposed as follows: 2d Brigade on the northwest near PLEIKU; 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division on the southwest near Oasis; 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry west of PLEIKU along route 509 and 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry on route 19 east of PLEIKU.

(2) 1 January. During the New Year's truce, the division conducted local reconnaissance and prepared for future operations.

(3) 2 January. 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry conducted a helicopter assault at YK77504. Division units continued patrolling activities.
and 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry began security operations along route 509, 19 west and 14B.

(4) 3 January. The 2d Brigade CP located at YA850455 was hit with approximately 40-82mm mortar rounds during a 15 minute period. Twelve soldiers were wounded, 22 vehicles were damaged and two individual weapons were destroyed. The 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division moved by road to Hammond Airfield and came under OPCON of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (AM).

(5) 4 January. Two Long range reconnaissance patrols were inserted at YA692565 and YA704528. At 1204 hours an APC from B Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry struck a mine at YA765218, resulting in heavy damage to the APC and two US WIA. A squad from B Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received 10-15 rounds of mortar fire west of New PIEKU DJERENG. Total US losses for the day were two WIA and one vehicle damaged.

(6) 5 January.

(7) 6 January. A Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received four rounds of small arms fire from an unknown size force at Ys850375. A search of the area produced negative results. A Company, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry received 12 rounds of enemy mortar fire at BR299525. A 2d Brigade IRRP was fired on by three NVA at YA677518 with no casualties. US losses—none. Enemy losses—a VMCS captured, one hospital building, 52 huts, and 51 bunkers destroyed by artillery and air strikes.

(8) 7 January. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry assisted a VIETNAMESE radio station under ground attack by providing supporting fires. The 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry captured six VCS and 7300 pounds of rice. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor received five rounds of friendly artillery fire at YA794518 resulting in nine US WIA. The division base camp went on an alert status in conjunction with an enemy mortar attack on Camp Holloway. B Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was airlifted to AR796466 to aid in the defense of Camp Holloway. Total US losses for the day were nine WIA. Enemy losses were 7300 pounds of rice captured and six detainees apprehended.

(9) 8 January. The 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received sporadic small arms fire from several locations during security operations west of PIEKU. B Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry located 11 tons of rice at YA974335.

(10) 9 January. At ZA120512 an APC from C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry struck a mine causing hull and suspension system damage. Three tons of rice were found at YA9735. A Company, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry received two mortar rounds at BR190570 resulting in three US WIA. At 2220 hours, a base camp patrol apprehended 27 detainees at AR806405. US losses for the day were five WIA and one APC damaged. Enemy losses were 30 detainees and three tons of rice.
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(11) 10 January, Riot Control Agents (RCA) were used to contaminate caves at Y893536. The Base Camp Reaction Platoon working with C Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry captured 15 detainees during a search of four villages (AR778430, AR773418, AR813534, and AR785443).

(12) 11 January.

(13) 12 January, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry provided 4.2 inch mortar support to a VIETNAMESE radio station being attacked by an estimated company size force. The 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry located five tons of rice bringing the total for Operation SAM HOUSTON to 33.25 tons.

(14) 13 January.

(15) 14 January. A helicopter received automatic weapons fire at Y4771401 with no damage to the aircraft.

(16) 15 January. A Company, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry received small arms and automatic weapons fire at 2030 hours. A Company returned the fire and the enemy broke contact.

(17) 16 January. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor moved from their base camp to ZA402362 to initiate search and destroy operations. C Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry discovered a VC/NVA hospital site consisting of 45 huts at Y.685538.

(18) 17 January. A Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry fired on five NVA at Y4656497 with no results. B Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry discovered and destroyed six huts at ZA099240. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor assumed the contingency mission of reinforcing Task Force LUAT and/or DUC CO Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp.

(19) 18 January. B Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry fired on a complex of eight foxholes and machine gun emplacements surrounded by punji stakes near ZA154267. C Company, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor destroyed five bunkers at Y.891358 and one bunker at Y.914361.

(20) 19 January. One helicopter from the 4th Aviation Battalion received small arms fire at ZA172586, causing one US KIA, three US WIA and damage to the helicopter's hydraulic system. A base camp patrol received small arms fire at AR781387. The reaction force was air-lifted to the area and a sweep of the area yielded negative results.

(21) 20 January. A 4th Aviation Battalion helicopter was fired on at ZA2150. B Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received small arms fire at ZA105250. They destroyed an enemy complex of eight foxholes and machine gun emplacements surrounded by punji stakes near ZA154267. C Company, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor destroyed five bunkers at Y.913538 and one bunker at Y.914361.

(22) 21 January.

(23) 22 January.
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(25) 24 January. D Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry provided armed helicopter support to the PHU NHON area with action resulting in two VnC KIA. Other elements of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry located a 1000 lb rice cache at ZA003331.

(26) 25 January. 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry moved from the Oasis to ZA062448. A helicopter crashed at ZA025326 from mechanical failure resulting in two US WIA.

(27) 26 January. 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry moved from TUY HOA by air to the 4th Division area of operations on 26 January. C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry apprehended three suspects at YA998403. The 2d Brigade conduct a village sweep at YA827456 and apprehended two detainees.

(28) 27 January. A LRRP at YA631511 received small arms fire from three NVA. C Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry destroyed seven huts and captured 2500 lbs of rice.

(29) 28 January.

(30) 29 January. Task Force 1st Battalion, 69th Armor assumed the security operation along route 19 east of PLEIKU. Task Force 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry moved to ZA110277 and initiated search and destroy operations.

(31) 30 January.

(32) 31 January.

(33) The disposition and activity of division elements at the end of the reporting period were as follows:

(a) 2d Brigade. CP at YA850455. Search and destroy operations were being conducted with three infantry battalion task forces and one infantry battalion task force provided local security.

1. Task Force 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry provided Brigade Fire Support Base (FSB) security and conducted local patrolling.

2. Task Force 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, (YA767495), 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (YA72544), 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry (YA786234), conducted search and destroy operations.

(b) Task Force 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry (ZA110277) conducted search and destroy operations.

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(c) Task Force 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry (ZA090446) provided security and convoy escort for routes 14B and 509 west of PLEIKU and conducted patrolling north and south of route 509.

(d) Task Force, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor (BR034534) provided security along Highway 19 east of PLEIKU.

c. Training.

(1) During the reporting period the division replacement training program was established. The 58 hour program, conducted over a five day period, includes orientation in the political, military and geographic aspects of the Republic of VIETNAM, with emphasis on the areas in which the division operates. Additionally, refresher training in selected general subjects, weaponry and tactics is conducted. Emphasis throughout this training program is on lessons learned as a result of combat operations in VIETNAM.

(2) In early January, the division's Combat Non-Commissioned Officers Leadership School was initiated. The purpose of this 122 hour course, oriented to infantry fire teams and squad leaders, is to produce effective combat leaders and instructors. The program of instruction includes 71 hours of tactics training (30 hours at night); 14 hours of weapons training; the remainder (38 hours) in general subjects with particular emphasis on map reading, first aid and communications. The course is conducted twice monthly and has a maximum capacity of 45 students.

(3) A Recondo Preparatory School of two days duration has been established. The purpose of the school is to evaluate potential candidates and provide refresher training in map reading, physical training, and other selected subjects.

(4) New Equipment Training Teams (NETT) provided valuable instruction in "Beehive" munitions, XM16E1 maintenance, and XM148 operation and maintenance. Instruction was presented to selected cadre who in turn conduct instruction for subordinate units.

d. Chemical.

(1) During this reporting period, the Division Chemical Section assumed operational control of the 43d Chemical Detachment (Chemical, Biological, Radiological Center). This attachment will increase the division's capability of conducting chemical operations.

(2) The division chemical section continued developing systems and techniques of delivery of defoliants, riot control agents, smoke, and flame. The following systems were completed and tested during the period:

(a) Aerial Riot Control Agent Delivery System. An aerial
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Drop of 55 gallon drums (80 pounds) of CS-1 (an irritant and incapacitating riot control agent) was accomplished in December in support of the 2d Brigade. A total of 30 drums were dropped from a helicopter on a suspected NVA bunker complex. The drums were rigged with time fuses and non-electric blasting caps attached to detonating cord. The detonating cord was rigged to set off two M10 Destructors placed in the center of each drum. The two M10 Destructors satisfactorily dispersed the RCA and destroyed the drum. The target area was hit with artillery fire immediately after the CS drop.

(b) Smoke and RCA Grenade Dispenser. A dispenser system, consisting of metal mounting frames and 2.75 inch rocket shipping tubes, was completed and tested on 18 January. The system uses two 32 tube rocket dispensers mounted one in each door of a UH-1D helicopter. The system has the capability of dispensing up to 448 grenades on a point or line target. These grenades are best delivered at tree-top level and at a speed of 80-100 knots for maximum area coverage and safety to the aircraft and crew.

(c) Helicopter-Mounted Defoliation Spray System. A defoliation spray system, consisting of one 55 gallon drum, a bottle of compressed air, a spray boom (a one and one-half inch pipe 12 feet in length, with one-eighth inch holes five inches apart), a pressure regulator and two rubber hoses from an M27 Portable Flame Thrower (PFT) Service Kit, was fabricated and tested on 17 January. This system is capable of spraying 50 gallons of defoliant mixture over a 10 x 4500 meter strip of terrain. Insufficient time has elapsed to make a final evaluation of the effectiveness of the system. A second spray system will be completed and tested in the near future.

(d) Flame Field Expedients. A new flame mine has been constructed and tested. It consists of a 55 gallon drum, 50 gallons of napalm, two M4 Incendiary Bursters, one M10 Universal Destructor, one white phosphorous grenade, detonating cord and electric blasting caps. Bursting radius of the mine is approximately 15 meters. A total of 32 of these flame devices were installed around the division base camp perimeter.

e. Psychological Warfare Operations. G5 coordinated and organized psychological operations for the 4th Infantry Division. There were 15,700,000 leaflets circulated, 79 hours of broadcasting, 61,000 newspapers and posters distributed and 23½ hours of motion pictures were shown in support of psychological operations. Further details are covered in the Combat After Action Report PAUL REVERE IV.

f. G3 Air Operations.

(1) Close Air Support was a vital part of the firepower used by the division during this quarter, as indicated by the following statistics:
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions Flown</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>FAC Controlled</th>
<th>Combat Proof</th>
<th>Spooky</th>
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<tr>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>2,572</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>51</td>
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</table>

(2) Large numbers of huts, bunkers, and weapons positions were destroyed by air strikes. There were numerous confirmed secondary explosions caused by strikes on enemy bunkers and huts.

(3) Combat Air Support has proved to be a very responsive and flexible weapon capable of placing tremendous firepower in close proximity to supported troops. The psychological value of this type firepower is also a powerful influence during a battle.

(4) B-52 bomber strikes were used to support the maneuver plan and to harass and destroy targets developed by intelligence. These aircraft are capable of placing devastating firepower over an extensive area. Lead-time required to initiate these strikes necessitates maximum use of intelligence in order to integrate them with ground maneuver plans.

4. Army Aviation Operations.

(1) The 4th Aviation Battalion has continued to improve division responsiveness with timely aviation support. Staff planning has been directed toward improved use of assets available and support provided to include the excellent general support provided by the 52d Aviation Battalion.

(2) Continuous coordination between aviation and intelligence staff personnel has proved invaluable in maintaining hostile fire charts and helicopter landing zones.

(3) The primary type of support provided by the 4th Aviation Battalion and the 52d Aviation Battalion has been command and control, administrative liaison, resupply, night illumination, reconnaissance, and armed helicopter support.

4. (C) Logistics.

a. General. Significant logistical activities during the reporting period were:

(1) Support of Operation PAUL REVERE IV.

(2) Expansion and improvement of the division logistics base at Dragon Mountain Base Camp.

(3) Completion of movement of unit impediments from the port of QUI NHON to the Division Base Camp.
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b. Logistical support of Operation PAUL REVERE IV:

(1) Logistical support of tactical operations was initially provided from Forward Support Bases located at Oasis and PLEI DJERENG. The Forward Support Base at the Oasis was subsequently closed in conjunction with the relocation of the supported brigade to PLEI DJERENG.

(2) Logistical operation at the forward support activity bases were performed by combining elements of the 1st Logistical Command, Forward Support Activity (FSA) and logistics elements of the Division Support Command. The FSA provided Class I, Class III and Class V supply support, laundry, bath and graves registration service support. The Division Support Command provided clearing station medical support, on site maintenance support, operation of a direct clothing exchange facility as well as contributing personnel to augment the supply and service functions of the FSA.

(3) A detailed report of the logistics support of tactical operations is contained in the After Action Report PAUL REVERE IV.

c. Base Camp:

(1) Continued improvements were made in logistics support facilities of the Division Base Camp. Significant accomplishments were:

(a) Laundry. 1st Logistical Command assigned an Army Laundry Detachment to support the division base camp. At the close of the reporting period, construction of a building to house the laundry was nearing completion.

(b) Ice Plant. Construction of a 15 ton per day ice plant was initiated.

(c) Cold Storage Plant. Four 1600 cubic foot walk in type freezers were constructed in the Division Class I Distribution Point.

(d) Medical facilities. Construction of a quonset style, 60 bed hospital and pharmacy was completed during this period. Work was also initiated on construction of a semi-permanent dental facility.

(e) Automation of Repair Parts Stock Control. Stock control of repair parts was switched from a manual to a fully automated operation when 704th Maintenance Battalion received two NCR 500 Machines. Insufficient time has elapsed to measure benefits from the new system, however, early indications are that benefits will accrue through the enhanced management capability provided by these machines.

d. Transportation. Prior to 9 December 1966, the Division was charged with the responsibility of transporting supplies from the supporting
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depot at QUI NHON and of moving unit impediments from the port at QUI NHON
to the Division Base Camp. As of 9 December 1966, the 1st Logistical
Command initiated a system of unit distribution for supplies. Throughout
this period, tactical units of the Division were levied for personnel and
vehicles to meet the heavy transportation demands. By the end of the re-
porting period transportation demands on the Division, except for occasional
troop movement demands, were moderate.

5. (U) Military Civic Action Program (MILCAP).

a. During December 1966, the 4th Infantry Division adopted the
Highland Junior Military Academy in PLEIKU as a civic action project. The
division was able to provide technical assistance in the Academy's expansion
program for 1967.

b. Civic action activities conducted during the months of November,
December and January were short-range, high impact projects such as medical
aid, distribution of materials to relieve privation, and a limited number of
water resource improvements. During the month of January, the division began
to shift its emphasis to long-range projects in the Tactical Area of Respon-
sibility (TAOR) as security was expanded and tactical conditions became more
stabilized. The main effort was geared to "nation-building" projects designed
to support the Government of VIETNAM Revolutionary Development program.
School buildings were renovated or constructed in hamlets that had teachers.
Cottage industries were encouraged in order to establish a money economy to
replace the barter system. A pilot project was initiated to improve the
health and breeding of the local livestock.

c. The success of the civic action effort was reflected in the
increasingly enthusiastic participation of the villagers in self-help
projects. Whether the business at hand was the recruitment of nursing
trainees, or requests for volunteers for instruction in improved farming
techniques, the response was immediate and positive. The numbers of people
reporting for Medical Civil Affairs Program (MEDCAP) decreased as personal
and village health standards improved. As villagers became aware of the
progress in other hamlets, they began to request support for similar projects
in their own village. Basic designs for spillways were revised by the workers
from the hamlets to improve filtration and volume. As they become convinced
of the Government of VIETNAM'S interest in their problems, the villagers
requested assistance in previously unexplored areas. For example, after a
Montagnard hamlet reported that several cattle were missing, the village
chief asked for the District Chief to send a National Policeman to investigate
-- an unprecedented act. Such occurrences were true indicators of the pro-
gress made in convincing the people of the sincerity of the Government of
VIETNAM in its attempts to work for the people of the highlands.

6. (C) Personnel.

a. Strength. Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning
and close of the reporting period were as follows:
Operational Report -- Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1967 (U)

(1) Beginning of reporting period

Authorized: 994 143 14341 15478
Assigned: 982 115 14773 15870

(2) Close of reporting period

Authorized: 768 164 10097 11829
Assigned: 820 130 11713 12663

(3) The significant drop in authorized and assigned strength is due to the loss of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, which was attached to the 25th Infantry Division during the period.

b. Replacements. A total of 1618 enlisted replacements was received. During the same period division losses were 952.

c. Morale and Personnel Services.

(1) Morale throughout the division and attached elements was excellent.

(2) Decorations and Awards:

Silver Star 8
Distinguished Flying Cross 5
Legion of Merit 0
Bronze Star w/V Device 80
Air Medal 210
Army Commendation Medal w/V Device 25
Army Commendation Medal 23
Purple Heart 163

TOTAL: 514

(3) Combat Badges:

Combat Infantry Badge 1109

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Combat Medical Badge 93
Aircraft Crewman Badge 1288

(4) There were 113 emergency leaves processed during the period.

d. Promotions. During the reporting period there were 2404 promotions.

e. Reenlistments. The enlistment/extension breakdown was: 18 first term RA reenlistments, seven AUS reenlistments, four RA extensions and one AUS extension. Counselors continuously visited units both at base camp and in the field.

1. Postal.

(1) Money Order Sales $2,383,679.00
(2) Postal and Parcel Post Fees $36,041.00
(3) Incoming Mail (sacks and pouches) 25,658
Daily Average (sacks and pouches) 288
(4) Outgoing Mail (sacks and pouches) 7,662
Daily Average (sacks and pouches) 83

(5) While mail was dispatched on all 92 days of the period there were 12 days in which no mail was received.

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g. Special Services. During the reporting period a total of 312 movies and TV films were distributed throughout the division. Four USO shows played to an attendance of 14,600. 1854 out-of-country R&R quotas were received. However, due to turn-back allocations received from other units, the division was able to send 2623 personnel on R&R during the period. Additionally, the division was allocated 244 in-country R&R quotas.

h. Chaplain activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DENOMINATION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SERVICES</th>
<th>ATTENDANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>18,035</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1057</td>
<td>37,502</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. Maintenance of discipline, law and order.

   (1) Discipline. A total of 259 incidents were reported to the Provost Marshal's Office during the reporting period.

   (2) Military Justice.

      (a) General Courts Martial
      (b) Special Courts Martial
      (c) Summary Courts Martial

7. (c) Artillery.

   a. General.

      (1) During the reporting period, Headquarters Division Artillery and the 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (-) participated in base camp defense exercises, Operations POUER REVERE IV and SAM HOUSTON.

   (2) Organic Units.

      (a) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 4th Infantry Division Artillery.

      (b) 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (-) (155/8 inch).

   (3) Units Under Operational Control (OPCON).

      (a) 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105 SP).
      (b) 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175/8 inch).
      (c) A Battery, 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105 T).
      (d) A Battery, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155 T).
      (e) C Battery, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (175/8 inch).
      (f) B Battery, 29th Artillery (SLT).

   (4) Detachments.

      (a) 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery (105 T): Attached to 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

      (b) 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105 T): Attached to 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.
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(c) 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105 T): Attached to 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

(d) A Battery, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155 SP): Attached to 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

b. Intelligence.

(1) Base Camp Defense: Division Artillery had the mission of base camp defense coordination. In mid-November patrolling tactics were revised to include night reconnaissance and combat patrols as well as ambush patrols. During the night of 25-26 December, one patrol engaged an estimated 16 VC. In the four hour engagement the patrol was reinforced by the base camp reaction force and was supported by gun and fire ships. The action resulted in no US casualties and no known VC losses.

(2) Survey: Fourth order survey was performed from the junction of highways 14 and 19 (AR780381) west to a fire support base (Y.676526), for a distance of approximately 60 kilometers. Because of the nature of the terrain, triangulation was not possible and the survey was conducted by a series of traverses down highways. Convoys, engineer work parties, and extreme dust conditions increased the overall time required to complete the survey. Bunker locations and firing positions within the base camp were established on a common grid by survey control.

(3) Radar. One long-range ground surveillance radar (AN/TPS 25), one countermortar radar (AN/APQ 4), two medium range ground surveillance radars (AN/TPS 33) and four short range ground surveillance radars (AN/TPS 4) were employed in a base camp defense role. The AN/TPS 25 established 383 contacts, operated for 999 hours and required 27 hours of maintenance. The AN/APQ 4 was employed habitually for high burst registrations, operated for 1190 hours and required six hours of maintenance.

(4) Searchlights. Two searchlights were used in the area of operations and three remained at the base camp. Two of the lights in the base camp were on stationary locations while the third, mounted in a 1/4 ton truck, was employed to illuminate dead-space between stationary searchlights. There were 913 searchlight missions at the base camp.

(5) Air Observers. The five officer air observers conducted an average of one visual reconnaissance mission per day under the staff supervision of G2. In addition, they acted as radio relay, adjusted artillery fire and coordinated air strikes. One air observer was wounded by ground fire on 28 January.

c. Operations and Training Activities.

(1) Plans. Detailed defensive target lists for Civilian
Irregular Defense Group Camps and land lines of communication in Pleiku Province were developed by supporting artillery units as they occupied positions throughout the Area of Operations. The consolidated list was approved by I FFORCEV Artillery and was submitted to I FFORCEV for distribution to all artillery units within the II Corps Tactical Zone.

(2) Operations.

(a) Paul Revere IV: (18 October 1966 to 31 December 1966)

1. Concept of Operations. The concept of artillery employment was to provide light, medium and heavy artillery fires to maneuver elements, command/control headquarters, logistical installations, district headquarters, Regional and Popular Forces outposts and Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camps throughout the Area of Operations.

2. Execution.

a. Direct fire support was provided to the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division by the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105 T) and to the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division by the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (105 T). Reinforcing and general support fires were provided by the 5th Battalion, 126th Artillery (-) (two 155 SP and one 9 inch SP battery) and units of the 52d Artillery Group. Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camps were supported by co-locating 175/8 inch batteries of the 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (one of the 52d Artillery Group units) at Duc Co, Plei Me and Plei Djereng. Road security missions were supported, when resources were made available by 105mm SP units. Headquarters Division Artillery functioned by positioning and allocating artillery assets and by giving planning guidance for employment of available artillery. Artillery, both organic and OPCON, was formed into mixed caliber battalion groups. The controlling battalion headquarters provided tactical fire direction and control of the OPCON units.

b. Fire Support Bases (FSB) of one to two batteries supported operations and were secured by division and Government of Vietnam units. Where possible, FSB's were located to provide mutual support.

c. From the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camps at Plei Djereng and Duc Co, 175mm guns were able to fire up to the Cambodian border to suppress anti-aircraft and mortar fires and to harass and interdict border crossing sites.

2. Although a precise assessment of enemy KIA and WIA as a direct result of artillery fire is difficult to determine, there is general agreement that these fires, augmented by tactical air, contributed significantly to the success of all operations. On the night of 12-13 November, an estimated two battalions of NVA, supported by mortar fire, assaulted the FSB occupied by the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry. Initial direct fire of B Battery, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery disorganized the attack. Fires from mutually supporting fire bases and 175mm general
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support weapons suppressed mortars which were fired from positions along the border. These fires, in conjunction with air strikes, contributed greatly to the successful defense of the US position.

(b) SAM HOUSTON (1 January - 31 January 1967): Concept of Operations: (Sam as PAUL REVERE IV).

(c) Ammunition Expenditures: (PAUL REVERE IV and SAM HOUSTON):

1. By Caliber:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>PAUL REVERE IV</th>
<th>SAM HOUSTON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>31,900</td>
<td>2,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>40,122</td>
<td>10,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 in</td>
<td>2,637</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>4,072</td>
<td>7,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. By Unit:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PAUL REVERE IV</th>
<th>SAM HOUSTON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-9 Arty (105T)</td>
<td>31,900</td>
<td>2,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-42 Arty (105T)</td>
<td>40,122</td>
<td>10,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-13 Arty (105T)</td>
<td>2,637</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6 Arty (105T)</td>
<td>4,072</td>
<td>7,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-16 Arty (155SP)</td>
<td>17,775</td>
<td>2,054</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-16 Arty (8 in)</td>
<td>7,097</td>
<td>1,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-30 Arty (155T)</td>
<td>1,007</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-18 Arty (175/8 in)</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-14 Arty (175/8 in)</td>
<td>12,349</td>
<td>3,282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Air Operation:

as follows:

1. Disposition of aircraft during the period was

2. OH-23: 4th Division Artillery.
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b. UH-1B: Attached to 4th Aviation Battalion.

c. Summary of aviation operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMBAT MISSIONS</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>BLADE TIME</th>
<th>AVAILABILITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>624</td>
<td>1219</td>
<td>594 hours</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) (C) Engineer.

a. Combat Support. The 4th Engineer Battalion provided continuous support during Operation PAUL REVERE IV. The unit primarily concerned with this support has been B Company, 4th Engineer Battalion. Additional Support has been provided on a mission basis from all elements of the battalion. Major accomplishments in support of PAUL REVERE IV have been:

(1) Bridging of the SE SAN River.

(2) Installation of six armored vehicle launched bridges and three M476 dry span bridges on Route 509.

(3) Extension of Route 509B west of SE SAN River a distance of 22 kilometers.

(4) Clearing of helicopter landing zones in support of infantry operations.

(5) Bridge support to 927th Engineer Group in the form of 155 feet of M476 bridging.

b. Base Camp Development. The 4th Engineer Battalion has continued to expend a major portion of its effort on base development. C and D Companies augmented with personnel from E Company, 4th Engineer Battalion have accomplished the following projects during the quarter:

(1) Thirty-one kilometers of road in the base camp have been graded and ditched. Seventeen kilometers of road now has a six inch laterite cap. Numerous culverts were placed consistent with the base camp drainage plan.

(2) Thirty-two quonsets were constructed. They were occupied by the dental clinic, division medical clearing station, special staff, and signal facility. Twenty-four of the quonset huts were constructed as double quonset buildings.

(3) Construction of permanent troop barracks with concrete floors was initiated.

(4) The airfield was extended to 1500 feet.
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5. Potable and non-potable water was available at the water supply point centrally located in the base camp. The raw water was stored in a 40,000 gallon tank. Another tank was constructed and will be used for the laundry now under construction.

9. (C) Signal.
   a. General.

   (1) On 4 November the 124th Signal Battalion successfully transferred all communication lines and equipment when the Division Tactical Operations Center moved from temporary quarters to its permanent location.

   (2) Work began on 16 November to level a portion of Dragon Mountain for the installation of the AFRTS TV station. The station made its first successful "on the air" tests from Dragon Mountain on 26 January 1967. The AFRTS radio station, located at Dragon Mountain Base Camp continued its 24 hour schedule.

   (3) The 124th Signal Battalion provided the signal support for Bob Hope's Christmas show in the Ivy Bowl on 19 December. The following day, the Dragon Mountain radio station rebroadcast the show to outlying units.

   (4) Construction of the communication center complex was started on 28 December and completed on 28 January. Installation of wiring and teletype equipment was begun and the communication center was scheduled to be operational in February.

   (5) C Company, 459th Signal Battalion assumed operation of MARS radioteleotype for sending MARS-Grams to the states.

   b. Plans and Operations.

   (1) Plans.

   (a) A revision of the existing base camp cable plant was planned. The planned system will consist of 50-pair and 100-pair underground cables interconnecting base camp switchboards and major signal complexes. The planned system will replace much of the existing spiral-four cable.

   (b) Since Dragon Mountain was an excellent area for communications equipment, plans were developed to improve the top of the mountain to enable more units to utilize the area.

   (c) All tactical VHF radio systems were planned to accommodate tactical moves of division, and/or brigade forward command posts.

   (2) Operations.
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(a) VHF systems were established at Dragon Mountain and Signal Hill providing communication between 4th Infantry Division Base Camp and the following.

1. 4th Infantry Division Forward TAC CP - this system was installed the first week of November and remained in operation until 13 December. It provided five hot lines and two common user trunks.

2. PLEIKU - A third system from PLEIKU to the Dragon Mountain Base Camp was installed the first week of November. A fourth system between the two points was terminated during the latter part of November.

3. 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry TAC CP - On 1 December, a four-channel system (VHF) was installed providing two hot lines and two common user circuits. The system was established using the newly-acquired air mobile VHF radio AN/MRC-112's. The system remained in operation until 5 December.

4. 1st Battalion, 69th Armor Forward CP - On 8 December a 12-channel system was established providing two hot lines and two common user circuits. This system was closed on 26 December after supporting the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor for approximately three weeks.

5. 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division - On 14 December a second system from base camp to the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division Forward CP was established. The two systems to the forward CP provided eight hot lines, eight common user and three teletypewriter circuits.

6. 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Forward CP - On 26 December a 12-channel system providing two hot lines and two common user trunks was activated for a five day period.

7. 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry - On 4 January a four-channel system, terminated by Fm. radios AN/MRC-112's, was installed to provide two common user circuits and two hot lines to 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry. The system was operated until 29 January.

8. 1st Battalion, 69th Armor - On 17 January a 12-channel system was installed which provided two hot lines and two common user circuits. On 22 January and again on 27 January, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor moved their location and the VHF terminal, an AN/MRC-34, was utilized to provide VHF radio communications. This support continued until 29 January when three hot lines and one common user circuit were provided through the end of the reporting period.

9. 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry - On 29 January a 12-channel system was established, using the AN/MRC-34, providing two common user trunks and three hot lines.
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10. Oasis - At the end of October, a 12-channel system was installed. The system provided five hot lines and two common user trunks to support the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, the 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery and the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery.

11. During the quarter the 124th Signal Battalion maintained a 12-channel VHF system from the base camp to 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division Rear CP.

12. On 7 December a VHF repeater was installed on Dragon Mountain to improve the quality of the system from the base camp to the Division Forward TAC CP. Since that time, the Signal Battalion has used Dragon Mountain as a repeater site for several VHF systems.

(b) AM Radio Operations.

1. On 1 December, Division Command Net #4 (Administration/Logistics Radio-Teletype) was activated with three stations in the net. The 124th Signal Battalion provided an HF radio AN/GRC-26 at Support Command and HF radio AN/GRC-46 at the Support Command FSA. The net remained operational until 4 January.

2. The 124th Signal Battalion operated and maintained an Armed Forces Radio Retransmission Station (APRTS) during November, December and January.

(c) FM Radio Operations.

1. During the first week of November, a retransmission station for Division Command Net #1 was located on Dragon Mountain.

2. On 4 January a retransmission station was established for the 4th Medical Battalion on Dragon Mountain.

(d) Wire Operations.

1. During the months of November and December the base camp cable plant was installed to include pole lines with spiral four cable interconnecting the base camp switchboards.

2. On 29 November a three position switchboard (AN/KTC-1) was installed at Support Command.

3. As a part of the plan on improving base camp communications a 50-pair cable was installed between 4th Division Main switchboard and 4th Division Support Command switchboard.

4. Installation of three underground spiral four cables between 4th Division Main switchboard and Dragon Mountain was completed. This provided a minimum of six voice circuits.
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2. Field telephones (TA-312/PT) were replaced by telephone sets TA-236/FT for subscribers in the division TOC area.

10. (U) Information Activities.

a. On 4 November the first issue of the division weekly newspaper, the IVY LEAF, was published. During the reporting period a total of 13 issues were printed. There were 5,000 copies of each issue with a distribution of one copy per every three men assigned to the division.

b. During the reporting period the Information Office had 385 news feature stories and 118 photographs released to the various news media in CONUS and SOUTH VIETNAM. There were 3,301 Hometown News Releases and 563 Hometown News Tapes forwarded to the Hometown News Center.

c. There were 123 correspondents and/or authors who visited the division during the reporting period.

a. A forward information press center was established with the division forward command post in the vicinity of the 2d Brigade CP. This center was staffed by one officer and three informational specialists.

b. During the last week of November, radio broadcasting of 4th Infantry Division activities began. This was accomplished over the AFRTS radio transmitter located at Dragon Mountain. Radio broadcasting continued Monday through Friday each week.

f. A weekly Command Information Newsletter was initiated in January. Its purpose was to keep commanders informed of the latest DA, USARV and MACV regulations, directives, and other items of importance from this headquarters. Also, a quarterly Command Information (CI) training schedule was published to inform commanders of CI topics published by USARV, MACV, and this headquarters.

g. In January, plans were formulated to begin television programming on the AFRTS (Channel 11) television station. The plans called for one ten minute program weekly on the activities of the 4th Infantry Division to begin on 12 February.

SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (U) Personnel.

a. Item: Postal finance service to forward elements.

Discussion: Personnel assigned to units in forward areas often find that it is difficult to purchase money orders, mail parcels, or...
obtain stamps on a regular basis. Even though committed to the forward area of operations, soldiers often pick up articles which they desire to mail home. This is particularly true where field PX’s have been established. The demand for postal finance services is the greatest during the first seven days of the month.

Observation: A 2½ ton truck mounted with a shop van (authorized each division postal section) completely equipped as an APO operating unit can effectively provide postal finance services to forward units. Where forward areas are inaccessible by trucks postal clerks can be lifted into forward areas by helicopter.

b. Item: Personnel processing teams to forward area of operation.

Discussion: Composite personnel teams were formed by Personnel Services Division to go forward to areas of operation and accomplish the updating of personnel and finance records. This negated the return of many men to the base camp to accomplish needed changes. Teams to take photographs and issue new identification cards were also operating in the forward areas.

Observation: This concept of moving a few to serve many has obvious advantages.

2. (C) Operations.

a. Item: Countermortar planning.

Discussion: When a unit moves into a battalion fire support base or company night position, immediate action must be taken to plan for reaction against enemy mortar attacks. Experience has indicated that an effective means to counter enemy attacks is to immediately place 81mm and 4.2 inch mortar fires 360° around the perimeter, at ranges varying from 200 to 1500 meters. It is essential that the 81mm mortar and the 4.2 inch mortar register immediately upon closure of a unit into its defensive position. In addition, artillery defensive concentrations should be registered as soon as possible after closure into a position. The effectiveness of the mortar and artillery fires can be enhanced by a hasty aerial reconnaissance to determine possible enemy mortar locations. During this reconnaissance the range and azimuth from the friendly position to the possible enemy mortar locations can be determined and should be used in preparing the countermortar defensive plan.

Observation: Means are available to a commander to counter enemy mortar attacks if planned during the early stages of the occupation of a position.

b. Item: Overhead protection for personnel and ammunition.

Discussion: During one engagement in November, enemy fires hit
a 105mm artillery supply of ammunition in a fire support base causing it to explode. The ammunition had been delivered by helicopter to the fire support base late in the afternoon and had not been moved into a dug-in ammunition resupply point.

Observation: It is essential to provide a storage area to include overhead cover for all mortar and artillery ammunition. In addition all ammunition resupply should be effected early enough in the day to permit the storage prior to darkness.

c. **Item:** Identification of friendly elements on the ground.

**Discussion:** The thick jungle canopy in the central highlands makes identification of friendly ground elements difficult when conducting air strikes and/or adjusting artillery fire. The common method used is to mark friendly positions with smoke. Experience has shown that in many instances, the smoke could not be clearly seen from the air. A hand held flare which will penetrate the jungle canopy before igniting has proved to be effective when used in conjunction with the smoke grenades.

Observation: There still exists a requirement for a more effective means to mark the location of friendly elements in dense jungle terrain.

d. **Item:** Helicopter landing zones.

**Discussion:** During the dry season in the central highlands, helicopter landing zones become extremely dusty and present hazards to flying as well as blowing dust on equipment and personnel located in the area. Peneprime has been used in suppressing the dust in the forward landing zones. It is transported in 55 gallon drums by helicopter and no special equipment is required to dispense it. Its use on landing zones proved most effective and requires little effort.

Observation: Dust suppression in landing zones is necessary for safety and peneprime has proved effective.

c. **Item:** Selection of landing zones.

**Discussion:** During one operation a combat assault was made into a landing zone which was ideal with regard to aviation and ground defensive characteristics. In fact, it was the best landing zones in the assigned battalion area of operations. The day following the initial occupation, the enemy launched a mortar and ground attack, which in the opinion of the commander, had been very thoroughly rehearsed prior to the friendly element's arrival. During a second operation this same unit selected what the commander considered to the third best landing zone in his assigned area of operations. It was later determined through ground operations that the most suitable landing zone in the area had extensive enemy fortifications prepared approximately 1000 meters away.
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Observation: It appears that the enemy anticipated that US forces would select the best landing zones in conducting a combat assault; therefore, it is concluded that if other landing zones can be used and still accomplish the mission the more obvious and best landing zones should not be selected.

f. Item: Casualty evacuation.

Discussion: Rapid evacuation of friendly casualties is a major problem to commanders at all levels. During tactical operations, evacuation of casualties in many instances has dictated the tactical employment of forces and in many cases halted offensive actions. The problem is that of extracting personnel from the jungle containing thick undergrowth and trees ranging in height up to 100 feet. The preparation of an extraction area is time consuming and in most cases requires extraction using a helicopter with a winch capability. During the dry season the problem is compounded by density altitude which affects the hover capability of the UH-1D. In almost all instances, the UH-1D with winch has proved unsatisfactory and extraction has been done by CH-47. The CH-47 has proven to be satisfactory; however, when used it must be deferred from its primary mission of resupply and its size presents a vulnerable target to enemy fire.

Observation: Continuing emphasis to include improvement of ways and means of casualty evacuation must be pursued.

3. (U) Civic Actions.

a. Item: Mine incidents.

Discussion: Enemy mines have frequently been placed in roads near villages. The villagers knew of these mines in many instances. In areas where intensive civic actions have been conducted, villagers have responded by warning convoys of mines on the road near their hamlet.

Observation: Special emphasis should be placed on civic action activities in all villages adjacent to convoy routes or frequently used roads.

b. Item: Night activities.

Discussion: The VC generally conduct propaganda visits to hamlets, under the cover of darkness. The VC tell the villagers that the Government of VIETNAM and allied troops are incapable of providing the hamlets with security at night. An effective counter-measure to such propaganda has been initiated with a combined team of US Army and ARVN CA/Psychos personnel making unannounced visits to hamlets during the hours of darkness, which frequently extend until midnight. During their stay in the village, the team shows entertaining movies and conducts psyops lectures to impress upon the villagers the willingness of the Government of VIETNAM and allied forces to help them, and their ability to enter the area at night, despite VC threats.

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Observation: Night visits to hamlets are an effective countermeasure to VC claims of Free World Military Assistance Forces' weaknesses.

c. **Item:** Government of VIETNAM participation.

**Discussion:** The goal of all MILCAP activities should be the strengthening of the people's support for the Government of VIETNAM. The US Army's role in civic action should be that of advising and assisting the people to help themselves. Close coordination must be effected at all times with the Province and District chiefs.

Observation: The approval and active participation of Government of VIETNAM representatives must be solicited in every civic action project.

d. **Item:** Visits to hamlets.

**Discussion:** The process of establishing rapport with the people involves frequent visits, and an attitude of sincerity in inquiring about their problems and in seeking the approval of Government of VIETNAM officials for civic action projects in the hamlet. Frequent visits by US and Government of VIETNAM teams to hamlets that the VC enter, disrupts the plans of the enemy, imperils his infrastructure, and makes the VC very susceptible to exposure by the villagers during a visit by these teams.

Observation: Visits by small teams on a basis of five times a week are producing the desired results in improving relations with hamlets near the division's main base camp, and in disrupting the activities of the VC infrastructure and forage parties.

e. **Item:** ARVN CA/Psyops teams.

**Discussion:** Attachment of ARVN CA/Psyops teams to forward units gives the commander an immediate response capability. Initially, commanders feared that use of ground loudspeakers would give away friendly positions. By thoroughly briefing the team on operational plans, and keeping them informed of the tactical situation, commanders found that "face-to-face" psyops missions were effective in reaching the target audience with timely propaganda appeals with no sacrifice of security.

Observation: ARVN CA/Psyops teams are of value to the commander and should be attached to the lowest operational level possible.

f. **Item:** Production of psyops leaflets.

**Discussion:** In order for a leaflet to be most effective, it must be timely, and be based on current intelligence. The unit supporting the division's psyops effort also has the requirement to support the entire II Corps area. This sometimes results in a delay in leaflet printing.
Observation: The division should have the capability to print "operational immediate" leaflets to insure timely reaction to psyops requirements.

4. (C) Intelligence.

a. Item: Location of enemy unit areas.

Discussion: During Operations PAUL REVERE IV and SAM HOUSTON, enemy assembly areas and rest areas habitually were located close to main streams.

Observation: Patrols dispatched to seek out enemy unit positions in the enemy's rear area should generally be oriented along fresh water streams.

b. Item: Timing of enemy attacks.

Discussion: Enemy attacks against US units and fire bases during the report period apparently were timed to provide the enemy with adequate time to police the battlefield following his attack and prior to initiation of US ground force reaction. Most attacks were initiated at dusk or in the very early morning hours, prior to 0300/0400. The enemy always attempted to police his casualties and weapons following his attacks. On several occasions, US units achieved good results in preventing the enemy from recovering his dead and wounded and inflicted additional enemy casualties by maintaining artillery and mortar fire in and beyond attack positions used by the enemy.

Observation: As a minimum following enemy attacks, harassing and interdictory fires should be maintained in all attack positions from which enemy attacks are launched and along likely routes of enemy withdrawal.

e. Item: Enemy reconnaissance techniques.

Discussion: During PAUL REVERE IV, FW interrogation reports indicated that enemy reconnaissance elements who observed a US unit moving would follow the unit until it established a defensive position for the night. The reconnaissance team would then return to its parent unit, laying field wire from a position several hundred meters outside the US defensive position to a point several hundred meters outside the enemy unit location. The wire was then used as a guide to the US position. Following an enemy attack, the wire was picked up by the rear enemy element.

Observation: Moving US units can effectively counter enemy reconnaissance "trail" units by:

(1) Posting small "stay-behind" ambush elements to destroy any following enemy reconnaissance teams.
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(2) Establishing a temporary defensive position after movement, using only the rear friendly element, while the rest of the unit prepares the main defensive position. After dark, the temporary position can be abandoned or evacuated and used as an ambush site against possible enemy reconnaissance or assault elements.

d. Item: Positioning of enemy anti-aircraft weapons in defense of possible landing zones.

Discussion: In defending possible landing zones against air assault by US forces, NVA units have emplaced automatic anti-aircraft weapons in covered, well camouflaged and concealed positions along the edges of landing zone areas and along probable helicopter flight paths. The weapons emplaced along the edges of possible landing zones were positioned to be used in anti-aircraft and anti-personnel roles.

Observation: Long range reconnaissance patrols employed prior to air assaults and units conducting air assaults must search the edges of the landing zones and deep into the area surrounding the landing zones to uncover enemy anti-aircraft weapons and emplacements.

5. (U) Logistics.

Item: Malaria.

Discussion: An increase in malaria cases was noted. The malaria cases increased in relation to the length of time troops were committed to operations. Contributing factors include troop fatigue, inadvertent loss and/or destruction of malaria protective supplies, contact with highly infected NVA and difficulties associated with environmental control.

Observation: Periodically combat battalions must be rotated back to base camp for a period of rest and refit.

Part II: Recommendations,

Appropriate recommendations are covered in Combat After Action Report PAUL RE/ERE IV.

9 Inclosures
1. SAM HOUSTON Area
2. Picture, B-52 Crater
3. Picture, Local Hut
4. Picture, NVA foxhole
5. Picture, NVA covered position
6. Picture, NVA trenchwork
7. Picture, Enemy area after B-52 strike
8. Picture, Enemy area after B-52 strike
9. Picture, NVA tunnel after B-52 strike
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1 - CO, DISCOM
1 - AGofS, G1
1 - AGofS, G2
1 - AGofS, G3
1 - AGofS, G4
1 - AGofS, G5
7 - CO, 29th Mil Hist Det
Inclosure 2, B-52 Bomb craters cleared the area.
Inoueure 3, This hut could contain friendly or enemy personnel or equipment.
Inclosure 4, Typical NVA foxhole.
Inclosure 5, Typical NVA covered position.
Inclosure 6, NEA trenchwork and fighting positions.
Inclosure 7, B-52 Strike area revealed this tunnel entrance. Close inspection of the opening discloses a rope ladder.
Inclosure 8, Tree blow down as a result of B-52 bombing.
Inclosure 9, B-52 strike exposed an N.W. tunnel entrance.
Avfa-GG-GT (20 Mar 67) 1st Inf
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Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 18 Apr 1967

To: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. (U) Concur with the contents of the Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 of the 4th Infantry Division with the following comments.

2. (C) Reference Section 2, Part I: Commander's Observations.

a. Paragraph 2f: Concur. Request to USAF for "HUSKY" aircraft support was not favorably considered by 7th US Air Force. CH-47 helicopters are available to the organization in instances where the UH-ID helicopter is not capable of hovering above the jungle canopy. Other actions taken to alleviate this problem were submission of an equipment improvement recommendation on the UH-ID winch system, and an endeavor to assign incoming UH-ID aircraft equipped with more powerful "dash 13" engines to the highlands.

b. Paragraph 3e: Command emphasis should be placed upon maximum utilization of ARVN CA/PSYOP teams. Requests for ARVN CA/PSYOP teams should be forwarded to the Propaganda Support Center which is located at Pleiku, Republic of Vietnam, for coordination and implementation.

c. Paragraph 3f: Psychological operations printing set (LT) (MBL) has been programmed on the basis of one per division. This will provide a division size organization the organic capability to print over 5,000 leaflets in one hour. The printing set is designed for quick response to immediate needs, but not for volume printing. Although the ETA of the printing sets is May 1967, the final delivery date will be determined by availability of printing supplies.

d. Paragraph 5: Concur. Experience statistics developed by this headquarters reflect that units operating in the jungle highlands of Pleiku Province developed an increasingly high malaria rate with each passing month. It is believed that the effect of continuous mosquito bites by infected mosquitoes is accumulative, so that in time protective powers of the anti-malaria drugs are overcome. It is for this reason that units which get short periods of relief from combat can be expected to have a lower disease rate. It should be noted, however, that units that are rotated to or near base camps are still exposed to the same general environment, notwithstanding efforts to provide a relatively safe area, e.g., spraying of the base camp, use of mosquito...
nets, and replenishing of individual anti-malaria supplies, etc. In addition, even though the unit has an operational mission of training and refitting, and of providing forces for perimeter defense, individual soldiers are provided an opportunity to recuperate from the rigors of search and destroy operations, thereby, lessening the probability of an individual contacting malaria.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CHARLES L. JOHNSON
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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