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AGAM-P (M) (15 May 67) FOR OT

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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1st Battalion, 50th Infantry (Mech)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

SECTION 1 SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

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SECTION 2 COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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SECTION: (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General:

   a. Elements of the Brigade force were involved in combat operations during the entire reporting period. Training was conducted concurrent with combat operations and during periods when units were refitting and preparing for operations.

   b. The Brigade task-organization is as follows:

      (1) Organic or assigned units

         HHC, 1st Bde
         1/8 Inf
         3/8 Inf
         3/12 Inf
         6/29 Arty

      (2) Attached units

         A Battery, 5/16 Arty
         A Trp, 1/10 Cav
         A Co, 4th Engr Bn
         B Co, 4th Med Bn

Group 4
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Declassified after 12 years
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21st PIO Det
TM, 4th MI Det
HHC, 4th S & T Bn
1st Plt, Fwd Comm Co, 124th Sig Bn
1st Plt, 4th MP Co
Admin Sect, 4th Admin Co
1st Bde TACP
CA Team #9, 41st Civil Affairs Co

2. (C) Intelligence:

a. The enemy order of battle within the area of operation has not significantly changed during the reporting period. Major enemy units within the area of operations, and their estimated strengths, are as indicated below:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ESTIMATE STRENGTH</th>
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<tr>
<td>95th NVA Regt</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th VC MF Bn</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307th VC LF Bn</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 VC District Companies</td>
<td>700 (100 ea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Guerillas</td>
<td>7000</td>
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<td>(Platoon or smaller size)</td>
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b. The political infrastructure within the area of operations remained unchanged during the reporting period; however, a con-
siderable amount of information concerning its composition, activities, and functions has been gained.

c. Enemy tactics and techniques have undergone no major changes. NVA and VC Main Force units have avoided contact with US Forces.

During January 1967 there was a definite increase in firing on aircraft and mining of the principal roads in the area of operations. Enemy units continued to operate in smaller than company size formations.

d. Enemy losses during the reporting period:

(1) KIA 283 (BC)
(2) Captured 133
(3) Returnees 25
(4) Small Arms Captured 126
(5) Crew Served Wpons 1
(6) Signal Equipment 2 Transistor radios
   2 civil band radios
   1 AN/PRC 10 Radio
(7) Ammunition 7349 rds small arms ammo
   20 lbs TNT
   105 hand grenades
   10 rds 60mm mortar ammo
   4 bangalore torpedoes

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(8) Other equipment 2 typewriters
   1 rice milling machine
   1 binoculars

(9) Food stuffs 94 tons rice, 1.5 tons corn

e. Intelligence agencies contacted on a daily basis:
   (1) CRD
   (2) Embassy
   (3) CID
   (4) CI
   (5) National Police
   (6) Sector and Subsector Advisors
   (7) JUSPAO
   (8) RRU
   (9) Friendly forces operating within or in the vicinity if the area of operations (ARVN, ROK, USSF, USAF).

f. Enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable course of action.
   (1) Capabilities:
      (a) Attack: To provide, within 24 hours, installments anywhere within the area of operations with up to one understrength regiment of three battalions.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS (SPOR-65) (U)).

(b) Defend: To defend any desired area with up to one understrength regiment of three battalions.

(c) Reinforce: To reinforce with up to two full strength battalions within 72 hours, and one additional combat effective regiment of three battalions within seven days.

(d) Retrograde: To withdraw or conduct a delaying action with up to one understrength regiment of three battalions.

(e) Guerrilla Operations: To conduct guerrilla operations on a full time basis throughout the area of operations at any time.

(2) Vulnerabilities:

(a) The supply lines that support the NVA and VC Main Force units are long and utilize primitive means of transportation making them susceptible to attack by air and artillery or interdiction by ground units.

(b) Heavy reliance on the local population for food and medical supplies forces major enemy units to operate close to population centers, thus increasing the possibility of detection.

(c) The lack of NVA replacements from North Vietnam and the generally unsuccessful recruiting campaign within the area has resulted in the NVA units remaining at reduced strength.
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Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSPDR-65) (U).

(d) The enemy is susceptible to artillery and air
attack whenever he masses.

(e) The apparent shortage of ammunition for mortars
and recoilless rifles restricts the type of operations the enemy can
conduct.

(3) Probable courses of action: The enemy retains the
capability to attack GVN or FWMAF installations at any time; however,
his most probable course of action is to continue to avoid decisive
engagements with his main force units until they can be brought up to
effective strength to conduct battalion or larger size offensive
operations, and to increase the scale actions to include harassing and
mining activities. The enemy is expected to continue attempts to procure
portions of the rice harvests as they come due in each of the districts
within the area. An increased attempt to interdict vehicular movement
along Highways 1 and 6B is expected with the dry season approaching in
late February 1967.

g. New techniques and requirements for changes in organization:

(1) New techniques: Since the enemy has operated in
small groups, usually no larger than squad size, extensive use of Long
Range Reconnaissance Patrols has been required to locate these small enemy
units. Saturation patrolling of known VC controlled areas and base areas
has been emphasized. To reduce mining incidents, daily, extensive,
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...engineer mine sweeps have been initiated along Highways 1 and 6B; tanks have been used to precede convoys. In addition, a reward system for information on VC mines has been initiated and disseminated to the local population along Highways 1 and 6B.

(2) Requirements for changes in organization: The Brigade S-2 Section requires augmentation when operating as a separate brigade. The administrative and liaison/coordination activities that are normally handled at division level must be accomplished at brigade level while the personnel needed for these tasks are not available at brigade.

h. Intelligence estimates from US military agencies have been fairly accurate when compared with the actual enemy found in an area. However, intelligence estimates from GVN or ARVN sources are generally inaccurate with respect to major enemy units.

i. The weather had a significant effect on operations during the December-January period. High winds, low ceiling, and limited visibility sometimes restricted or cancelled helicopter visual reconnaissance, IR, air strikes, and photo missions. The weather is expected to moderate in early February with the passing of the monsoon season.

j. No photos were taken of POW's, captured weapons, material or documents.
3. (C) Operations and Training Activities:
   
a. Plans. Based on mission assignment and the assumption that the Brigade will continue to conduct combat operations throughout PHU YEN Province, the following OPLANS and OPORDs were published during the reporting period:
   
   (1) FRAG ORDERS #5-66 thru 13-66 and FRAG ORDER #1-67 to OPORD 3-66 (ADAMS), dated 22 October 66, covering search and destroy operation in PHU YEN Province.
   
   (2) OPLAN 1-67 (RATTLESNAKE), dated 3 January 1967, covering an airmobile assault into western part of OPERATIONS ADAMS AO to exploit enemy intelligence.
   
   (3) OPLAN 2-67 (VICTOR FORCE), dated 25 January 1967, covering 1st Brigade mission as I FFORCEV VICTOR FORCE. The Brigade was called upon to execute phases I and II of the OPLAN on 26 January 1967.
   
   b. Operations.
   
   (1) The Brigade continued OPERATION ADAMS throughout the reporting period with emphasis placed upon locating and destroying forces in the area. In close coordination with the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and the 4/7th ARVN Regiment, the Brigade acted as a block-force during OPERATION GERONIMO I, and for a period of nine days one battalion was OPCON to the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. On 3 December, the Brigade established a TAC CP at the Dong Tre Special Forces
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Camp (Inclosure 1, Arrow 8); The Brigade CP was moved from vicinity of BQ 143542 to Tuy Hoa North Airfield on 8 December (Inclosure 1, Arrow 10).

(a) The Christmas and New Years truce occurred during the reporting period. On 25 December, at 0930 hours, B Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received automatic weapons fire wounding one helicopter crewman and three infantrymen vicinity BQ855781 (Inclosure 2, Arrow 4). Other enemy contact during the truce was limited to a few sniper rounds and sightings of enemy troops.

(b) In mid-January 1967, the 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry was in direct support of a search and destroy operation conducted by the 47th ARVN Regiment in the vicinity of SONG CAU (inclosure 3, Arrow 1).

(c) On 21 January 1967, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division at Tuy Hoa was assigned the mission of providing the Victor Force for FFORCEV.

(2) 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Operations:

(a) During the reporting period, the Battalion's mission was to conduct search and destroy operations within the assigned area of operation and be prepared to assume mission as reserve reaction force for 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

(b) During the period 1 November - 7 November, the unit conducted operations in Tuy AN District, PHU YEN Province, generally west of Highway 1 and south of Highway 6B. On 6 November, C

Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry discovered a large weapons cache at vicinity CQ047633 (Inclosure 1, Arrow 2). The cache contained 22 weapons, including one BAR and one 60mm mortar complete.

(c) During the period 8 November - 16 November, the Battalion participated in OPERATION GERONIMO I under OPCON 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division. The mission was to assist the 101st Airborne in finding and destroying elements of the 95th NVA Regiment by conducting a deliberate search of all trails, streambeds and probable avenues of egress along the SONG KY LO River in northwest DONG XUAN District (Inclosure 1, Arrow 3). The mission was accomplished by three companies operating in parallel areas of operation driving generally north to south; the SONG KY LO extended along the east flank of the operation. Light contact was made with parties of a large VC detention complex; a manufacturing site containing two forges and an extensive hospital-dispensary were discovered.

(d) During the period 17 November-21 November, the battalion (-) conducted operations in DONG XUAN District, PHU YEN Province, generally west of Highway 6B and north of the SONG KY LO. B and C Companies, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, moving clandestinely from high ground to low ground and then driving against a blocking force of CDIG personnel disposed along the south bank of the SONG KY LO, conducted sweeps of PHOUS HUE and TRIEN DUC Hamlets (Inclosure 1, Arrow 6).

(e) From 22 November to 2 December, the Battalion (-) conducted search and destroy missions in southeastern TUY AN District. One company was provided as the Brigade forward CP security and Brigade reaction force. On 3 December, the unit moved west into DONG XUAN District, southwest of DONG TRE Special Forces Camp, to relieve the 2d Battalion, 327th Airborne Infantry, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. The mission was to locate and destroy the elements of the regimental CP 95th NVA Regiment. Only light contact was made.

(f) An airmobile assault was conducted 12 December as the Battalion moved into northern DONG XUAN District to sweep PHUAC LANH Village. During the sweep 700 villagers and 130 cattle were evacuated to VANH CANH Special Forces Camp for resettlement.

(g) On 11 January the Battalion conducted airmobile assault to vicinity CQ0141 and started to move north toward the 3rd Battalion, 8th Infantry. Three Regional Force Companies from TUY HOA screened the right flank for the operation while a CIDG Company from CUNG SON Province screened to the left (Inclosure 3, Arrow 8).

(h) The unit continued search and destroy operations throughout DONG KUAN and SON HOA Districts until 25 January 1967. Moderate sniper fire was received throughout the area of operation during the reporting period.

(i) On 25 January 1967, the Battalion was deployed in the vicinity of PLEIKU, as I FFORCEV Victor Force, to support OPERATION SAM HOUSTON. Upon arrival at the destination airfield the Battalion reverted to command of Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division.

(3) 3rd Battalion, 8th Infantry Operations:

(a) Search and destroy operations were conducted in the TUY AN area with moderate contact until 21 November. During this period, the Battalion served as a blocking force for the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, which was operating along a north-south axis in the western portion of the ADAMS Area of Operation. (Inclosure 1, Arrow 4).

(b) On 4 December, the Battalion conducted an air-mobile assault to relieve the 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division in place (Inclosure 1, Arrow 11). Search and destroy operations were conducted in the new area with moderate contacts.

(c) On 9 December, an air assault was conducted to an area approximately 10 kilometers northeast of CUNG SON (Inclosure 1, Arrow 1). Following this operation the Battalion returned to the Brigade base camp to undergo refitting and retraining in preparation for future operations. During this period, one company was provided as the Brigade Forward CP security and Brigade reaction force.

(d) On 27 December, the Battalion made an air-mobile assault into "Hub" area (Inclosure 2, Arrow 5) with three companies two artillery batteries, and battalion headquarters. Enemy contact was
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experienced starting this date and continued for several days. During the first week of the New Year the unit continued saturation patrolling, experiencing heavy contact, even during periods of bad weather when VC operations were at a minimum. For the remainder of the reporting period, the Battalion continued search and destroy operations and saturation patrolling in the "Hub" area (Inclosure 3, Arrow 2) with moderate contacts.

(4) 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry Operations:

(a) For 11 days during the beginning of the reporting period the Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in its area of operation (Inclosure 1, Arrow 1) while blocking for the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division which maneuvered to the west of the ADAMS Area of Operation. Enemy contact during this time was light.

(b) On 15 November the Battalion conducted an air-mobile assault to the high ground approximately 5 kilometers northwest of DONG TRE (Inclosure 1, Arrow 5). Enemy contact continued to be light.

(c) At 012150H December, C Company was probed by a small enemy force and received small arms fire and six hand grenades in the vicinity of CQ044766 (Inclosure 1, Arrow 60).

(d) On 5 December the Battalion (-) returned to the Brigade base camp to refit and retrain in preparation for future operations. C Company remained in the Battalion's area of operation and conducted search and destroy operations for two additional days. C Company moved overland to the Brigade base camp on 7 December.

(e) The Battalion resumed combat operations on 10 December in the vicinity of TUY AN. The following day the 3rd Company, 3rd Battalion, 47th ARVN Regiment, conducted an airmobile assault to act as a blocking force in conjunction with an operation concluded by B Company. Enemy contacts were light during the four days that followed (Inclosure 2, Arrow 1).

(f) The Battalion (-) in coordination with the 47th ARVN Regiment, conducted an airmobile assault on 16 December to locate and destroy enemy forces in the area with a secondary mission of providing security to 39th Engineer reconnaissance parties (Inclosure 2, Arrow 2).

(g) During the last week of December, the Battalion and elements of the 47th ARVN Regiment conducted joint search and destroy operations. Coordination and cooperation between US and ARVN units continued to be excellent.

(h) On 9 January, the Battalion conducted a joint airmobile assault in conjunction with the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry to an area some 25 kilometers west of DONG TRE. The two battalions experienced light contact while conducting search and destroy operations for several days in this new area (Inclosure 2, Arrow 6).

(i) The Battalion returned to TUY AN by helicopter on 12 and 13 January (Inclosure 2, Arrow 7). For the next several weeks

the unit again worked in close harmony with the 47th ARVN Regiment, with A Company conducting search and destroy operations in direct support of the 22nd ARVN Ranger Battalion and the 2nd Company, 4th Battalion, 4th ARVN Regiment. With the departure of the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry the Battalion assumed the mission of I FFORCEV Victor Force.

(5) A Troop, 1st Quadron, 10th Cavalry Operations:
During the reporting period, the Troop provided route and mine sweep security for engineer work parties, and security for artillery and engineer sites when required during periods of reduced visibility. During mine sweep operations, three armored personnel carriers were damaged or destroyed. Two personnel were killed and eight wounded.

(6) S-3 Air and TAC Air Control Part Operations:
(a) Tactical Close Air Support was employed by the Brigade as follows:

| Spooky Flare Ship | 1 |
| VR Missions      | 520 |
| FAC Sorties      | 55 |
| Fighter SORTIES  | 155 |
| Combat Proof Missions | 8 |

Results of these missions were 108 huts destroyed, 3 secondary explosion, and 18 VC KIA.

(b) Close Air Support was employed twice when troops were in contact. The response time for immediate air requests varied from 5 minutes to 30 minutes with the average being 20 minutes. All immediate requests were approved.

(c) Close Air Support Operations are conducted in accordance with Joint Air Ground Operations Systems (JAGOS).

(7) US losses in OPERATION ADAMS through 31 January were:

26 KIA
190 WIA

3 APC's Damaged/Destroyed
3 2 1/2 ton trucks Damaged/Destroyed
2 UH-1D's Damaged/Destroyed
7 M-16 Rifles Damaged/Destroyed
1 M-79 Grenade Launcher Captured
2 Bayonets Captured
2 Scabards Captured
1 Compass (milgrad) Captured
4 Compass (lensatic) Captured
1 AN/PRC 25 Radio
1 Scope VM/49 Captured
1 Binocular Captured
3 CVC Helmets Damaged/Destroyed
15 Machetes Captured
1 Case, Carrying, Ammo Captured

c. Training. The majority of the reporting period was spent in the conduct of tactical operations. During periods of refitting and preparation for combat operations, units concentrated their efforts in the areas of in-country lessons learned, small unit tactics, and patrolling. The following training was organized and conducted:

(1) All incoming personnel, officers and enlisted men, continued to be processed through the replacement detachment at 4th Infantry Division before being sent to the Brigade. Individuals received training in patrolling, artillery adjustment procedures, land navigation, survival, mines, etc.

(2) The Brigade began sending men to the 4th Division Recondo Preparation Course in December. To date 12 individuals have attended this course.

(3) The Brigade sent its first volunteer to the MACV Recondo School on 6 November 66. To date ten men have completed this course. These men are all being used in the Brigade's 12 Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol teams.

(4) A combat NCO leadership school has been set up at division level. Thirteen men have been sent to this course.

(5) Units continued firing of small arms, machine guns, grenade launchers, hand grenades, and mortars to maintain individual proficiency.

(6) Units have initiated formal unit training programs, including instruction on mandatory subjects, as per 4 Div Reg, No 350-3, dated 26 December 1966.

(7) Artillery forward observers continued giving in-field classes to members of units on how to request and adjust artillery fire.

(8) Training emphasis has been placed on on-the-job training. Improvements in proficiency, supervision, and technical skill have been training objectives. Training in weapons familiarization has been continuous.

d. Chemical

(1) The Brigade Chemical Section conducted rice crop destruction missions utilizing one CH 47 aircraft and chemical spray apparatus of the 1st Calvery Division (Airmobile) chemical section. Herbicide agent used was "purple".

(2) On each of 3 separate days 12, 20, and 21 January 1967 one sortie was flown. Agent (1500 gallons) was sprayed over an area of 1,100 hectares covering 3 separate targets. The first two target areas were rice seedling beds and planted crops areas. A suspected VC MSR was the third target area.

(3) Although the optimum altitude and speed of the CH_47 aircraft for this type mission is 50 feet at 50 knots, the missions were flown at 100 feet and at 100 knots, as the risk to the aircraft flying at the optimum speed and altitude was not justified in terms of the target. The coverage of the target areas was considered adequate from observation during flight; however, it cannot be fully determined until the effects of the herbicide become evident.

(4) The first target of rice seedling beds and planted areas was flown with no difficulty. The area was a valley enclosed on three sides by mountains. Three runs along the length of the area were made.

(5) The second target area was circular with the rice beds laid out in separate and irregular patterns. Some difficulty was encountered in this area due to maneuverability of the aircraft; some of the agent was expended over areas other than the intended rice crops.

(6) The third target, a suspected VC MSR, was the most difficult to fly while trying to maintain the 100 knots air speed. Several times the trail was lost and the aircraft had to circle to relocate, increasing its vulnerability to enemy fire, and causing some loss of agent. No enemy fire was received, however and the coverage of the trail was considered adequate.

e. Psychological Operations.

(1) On 25 November 1966, responsibility for psychological (psyops) operations was assigned to the Brigade S-5 Section. A psyops field team from the 245th Psyops Company, in support of the 1st Brigade, came under the staff supervision of the S-5. At this time the team consisted of two personnel, a sergeant E-5 and a specialist fourth class. A first lieutenant joined the team as OIC on 1 December 1966. The brigade psyops officer (captain) was appointed on 7 January 1967. Staff supervision remained under the S-5.

(2) During the period 25 November to date, 67 missions were flown in PHU YEN Province. 44 were directed at VC, 16 at NVA, and 7 directed at the civilian population. A total of 3,206,000 leaflets and NSCP's were dropped and 18 hours of live and taped messages broadcast.

(3) The majority of propaganda themes directed at Viet Cong and NVA targets stressed the government's Chieu Hoi program. Utilizing the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of particular enemy units, specific propaganda messages emphasized the inevitability of death and defeat hunger and hardships, comparison with life of government supporters, strength of FWMAF, nostalgic themes, general harassment, and the government supported desire to help those former VC and NVA who rally. The local population (the political commitments of which are uncertain) were reminded that the VC steal their rice, conscript their youths, force them to labor, extract their taxes from them, and destroy their roads and buildings. Psychological operations were also used to issue warnings and curfews as well as to control group movement.

(4) Additional propaganda was disseminated by providing battalion S-5's and the Brigade Civil Affairs team with posters and leaflets to distribute in conjunction with civic action programs. Primary themes stressed the contrast between the concern of the GVN and its allies for civil welfare as opposed to Viet Cong terrorism, conscription and extortion. Throughout, the psyops program of the brigade has operated in coordination with that of the sector command and JUSPAO.
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f. Army Aviation Operations.

(1) The Brigade Aviation Section consists of six organic OH-23's, two of which are assigned to the direct support artillery battalion. The other four are utilized by the Brigade Headquarters in support of combat and logistical requirements. Presently the section has been augmented with a UH-ID command and control ship from division plus three Ol-E's from the 219th Aviation Company. The Ol-E's are utilized for visual reconnaissance and artillery adjustment. In addition, the Brigade has in direct support the 48th Light Helicopter Company which is, in turn, augmented with four CH-47's.

(2) During the current reporting period, army aviation assets have lifted each infantry battalion and its direct support artillery battery for an average of six lifts. For the month of December 1966, the 48th Light Helicopter Company flew over 2300 hours in support of this Brigade. In addition, the four CH-47's averaged over 60 hours each during the same period.

4. (C) Logistics: Significant logistical activities from 1 November 1966 to 31 January 1967 are as follows:

a. The relocation of field trains from TUY AN to North Field (TUY HOA).

(1) Initially the Brigade trains were co-located at TUY AN and DONG TRE. All classes of supply for the TUY AN trains area were drawn by battalion personnel and transported daily to the trains area by vehicle. Units were supported by the S&T element attached to the Brigade and the 39th Truck Battalion from the TUY HOA Sub Area Command.

(2) During the latter part of December, the decision was made to relocate TUY AN field trains to North Field (TUY HOA), 1st Brigade CP. The movement was completed on 21 December with the exception of one unit 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry trains, remained at TUY AN. North Field offered several advantages as a field trains location. Vehicle and helicopter turn around times were greatly reduced.

b. The establishment of an FSE (forward supply element).

(1) In view of the general north westerly movement of the Brigade forces, it was necessary to locate a second supply base at DONG TRE. The FSE at DONG TRE became operational as of 7 December 1966, and became the primary source of resupply for units operating in the DONG TRE area. The FSE consists of a class I distribution point (C-Ration), limited II and IV, class III and IIIa (JP-4, MO/GAS, AV/GAS, and diesel), and class V. The FSE also has the capability for direct exchange of clothing and provides limited graves registration, bath, and laundry service. Also located at DONG TRE is a forward medical clearing station, to include Medivac (dustoff), and a maintenance contact team from 704th Maintenance.

(2) Class I and V are drawn for the FSE from the TUY HOA Sub Area Command. Resupply to all combat maneuver battalions from both of these supply areas has been effected largely by helicopter or air drop except for two convoys, road conditions stemming from the monsoonal rains have precluded overland convoys to the FSE at DONG TRE. All classes of supply have been airlifted to DONG TRE by helicopter, and on two occasions air drops have been used. Air drops of ammo and

C-Rations were adequate and air drop is a good method for emergency resupply. However, the most effective means of resupply is by convoy or helicopter air lift.

c. Logistical Area:

(1) Supply

(a) Class I: Class I has steadily improved since arrival in-country. Many items which were not available are present now in a greater quantity. The addition of fresh fruits and vegetables toward the latter part of the year greatly enhanced the menu and was a definite morale booster. The installation of approximately 2,000 cubic feet of refrigerator capability for perishable items will prove invaluable during hot weather.

(b) Class II and IV: The receiving and transporting of supplies from CAM RANH BAY has been the biggest problem in the area of II and IV. The use of liaison personnel at CAM RANH BAY has resulted in close coordination between depot and brigade to insure that supplies are obtained and transported to TUY HOA. Convoys are sent to CAM RANH BAY every 10 days. CH-47 Chinooks returning to TUY HOA from CAM RANH BAY are also used to transport supplies. High priority items are shipped by CV-2 courier aircraft. Support from the CAM RANH BAY depot continues to be good. A minimum of supply requests were submitted during the period utilizing OPERATION ADAMS as a priority.

(c) Class III: supply points for class III have
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been established at TUY HOA base camp, TUY AN, DONG TRE, and at North TUY HOA Airfield. MO/GAS and diesel are airlifted from base camp, while JP-4 is airlifted from North TUY HOA Airlifted. Strategic location of POL points has considerably reduced the number of hours flown by supporting helicopters with pay loads.

(d) Class V: A class V supply point was established at DONG TRE. The 1st Logistical Command operates the ASP at TUY HOA Sub Area Command. The system for resupply of class V is the same as for class I-V. Two modes of transportation are used: airlift by helicopter to outlying units or transportation by 2 1/2 ton trucks. The line battalions of the brigade have evaluated the following munitions:

- 40mm White star cluster and parachute flares
- 7.62 Duplex
- 90mm Cannister
- 40mm Buck shot
- 10.5mm Beehive

The results of each have been forwarded to Division G-4 or other requesting headquarters.

(2) Medical Service: The general health and conditioning of the troops in the command remained good throughout the reporting period, and evidenced by their completion of 92 days of combat without undue illness or injury.

(a) Sanitation: The entire brigade has undergone sanitation inspections throughout the reporting period.
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(b) Immunizations: With the arrival of a new supply of vaccine, the immunization program increased from 790 immunizations in November to 5,360 in December.

(c) Dustoffs: 184 Dustoffs were conducted during the reporting period.

(3) Transportation: Trucks from all sources have logged over 150,000 miles in meeting brigade transportation requirements. In most cases, organic vehicles (2½ ton trucks) are sufficient to meet units needs; however, occasions arise when additional vehicle requirements exist. These requirements are generally met through 4th S& T or the 39th Transportation Battalion.

(4) Roads: Except for four closures totaling a six work period for repairs, Route 1 from TUY HOA North to TUY AN has been open during the entire reporting period. Route 6B was opened from TUY AN to LA HAI on 22 November 66 and has been closed four times for a total of 11 days for road repairs. Route 2D from LA HAI to DONG TRE was opened on 22 November 66 and has not closed for an appreciable period of time. Although open as indicated road conditions during the monsoon season have precluded extensive multi-vehicle convoy operations.

(5) Maintenance: Co D, 7056th Maintenance Battalion furnishes direct maintenance support to the Brigade. All repair parts are requisitioned through that unit. Second echelon repairs are performed at unit shops at base camp. On occasion, the deadline rate has been rather high:

however, this was due primarily to the non-availability of repair parts in-country.

(6) Graves Registration: Graves registration operations are located at base camp under 4th S&T. A graves registration team has also been located at DONG TRE. A three-man team from the 1st Logistical Command augments the base camp operation. Graves registration operations have been performed in an outstanding manner.

(7) Bath: Shower points have been established at North TUY HOA and DONG TRE. Points are operated by the 4 S&T and 1st Logistical Command. Hot showers are provided for the troops whenever possible. Co-located at DONG TRE is a laundry point and direct exchange clothing point.

(8) Base camp construction: a program for base camp development was initiated upon arrival in-country, and has been continuous throughout the reporting period. A listing of projects and the status of completion of each is in Inclosure 4.

5. (U) Civil Affairs:

a. During the reporting period, increased attention was afforded civil affairs at all echelons of the Brigade. Primary emphasis was placed on the development of a detailed SOP and increased participation in the Revolutionary Development Program. Three additional officers were assigned to the section to fill the positions of Assistant S-5, Psyops Officer and Civil Affairs and Revolutionary Development Officer. Throughout the period, Civil affairs Team #9 conducted numerous sick calls in hamlets throughout PHU YEN

Province and treated over 7,000 Vietnamese civilians. Special projects for the team included the construction of a playground for the NINH TINH Refugee Camp during Christmas. A similar playground is being constructed for the Buddhist Orphanage in TUY HOA for TET.

b. At all times, close coordination was effected among military forces in the area, as well as with USAID, JUSPAO, and the Province Advisory Team. A major accomplishment was the movement of over 50,000 pounds of food to approximately 15,000 refugees in SONG CAU District at the request of USAID on 24 January 1967.

c. In early January, the S-5 conducted a liaison visit to the 25th Infantry Division to observe Civil Affairs operations of the unit.

d. In accordance with GVN policy, assistance in the GVN Chieu Hoi Program was increased markedly. This assistance included not only commodity distribution to the PHU YEN Chieu Hoi Center, conduct of sick call, and the giving of several truck loads of lumber, but also most notable, the initiation of a Chieu Hoi OJT Program.

e. This program presently consists of the training of selected Ho Chi Chanh as both carpenters and mechanics by units within the Brigade. Ho Chi Chanh are teamed with US mechanics and carpenters on various projects and paid from 90 to 110 piasters per day. Although this program is presently in the pilot stage and is limited to 12 Ho Chi Chanh plans are being made to increase this to 60 Ho Chi Chanh.

f. Projects presently in the planning or initial development phase include a school-milk-lunch program, the development and building of a

"friendship center" for refugees, and the construction of a mobile shower unit to be used by Civil Affairs Team #9 in their conduct of sick calls. Plans are also being made to have specific US units adopt Vietnamese RF and PF units and Revolutionary Development Teams in assisting the overall Revolutionary Development Program.

g. Reaction of the indigenous population of PHU YEN Province to the presence of US troops has been favorable.

   (1) Local merchants and laborers are eager to deal with and work for Americans.

   (2) Response to sick calls and civic action self help projects has been cooperative and appreciative.

   (3) Villagers have identified VC and VC suspects during sweeps by US troops.

   (4) Response has been enthusiastic to rice harvest protection operations conducted by US units.

6. (C) Personnel:

   a. General: Colonel John D. Austin reassumed command of the Brigade on 1 December 1966 following the departure of Brigadier General David O. Eyars, Jr.

   b. Strength: The strength of the Brigade task force is shown in Inclosure 5. There has been a total of 224 battle and nonbattle casualties: 26 KIA, 190 WIA, 10 Nonbattle deaths, 35 nonbattle injuries. A graph depicting enemy KIA by body count is shown at Inclosure 6. There have been 60 cases of malaria. Thirty-three officers, one warrant officer and 216 enlisted men were assigned as replacement personnel.

c. Personnel management: The following promotion allocations were received/used: E-4-789/441, E-5-1358/115, E-6-149/52. The following officer promotions were made: MAJ to LTC-1, CPT to MAJ-2, 1LT to CPT-9, 2d LTC to 1LT-17. Eighteen personnel have reenlisted. There were 19 congressional inquiries. One request for extension of tour has been approved and nine are pending.

d. Development and maintenance of morale: Morale is "excellent" in all units. The R&R program is in full operation. Although the brigade did not have 90 days in-country, 56 allocations were requested and received in November in order to test and work out any obstacles in our R&R program. A total of 625 allocations were received during the period for out-of-country R&R, 88 being additional allocations. Sixty-six allocations were received for in-country R&R at VUNG TAU. No difficulties have been encountered in either program. Three USO shows were performed in base camp. A breakout of awards and decorations is provided at Inclosure 7. Post exchange cash sales were $207,424. Net worth of the exchange is nearly $365,000. On 1 December 1966, the PX obtained a tailor concession from the Sang Woo Company of HONG KONG. On 19 January 1967, a Korean concession was obtained to provide sewing and alterations. Postal money orders sales amounted to $631,993. Red Cross processed 375 cases, 58 being emergency leaves. Chapel attendance: Protestant-5,586, in 195 services; Catholic 6,324 in 135 services; Jewish-25 in 3 services.

e. Maintenance of discipline, law and order: Summary courts-20; Special courts-8; class I offenses-13; Class II offenses-6; Traffic violations-43; traffic accidents-20; off limits violations-41. Rabid dogs have bitten

several people; consequently the MP's are apprehending and destroying all dogs without tags.

f. Headquarters management: CP displaced twice.

g. Commanders and principal staff:

(1) Brigade Headquarters:
Col John D. Austin
LTC Charles J. Simmons
MAJ John L. Hastie
MAJ James R. Wessel
MAJ Herbert L. Avcock
MAJ Robert J. Sunell
MAJ William E. Long

(2) Battalion Commanders:
LTC Harold H. Lee
LTC Thomas P. Lynch
LTC David M. Peters
LTC Lynwood B. Lennon

(3) Separates Companies:
CPT Thomas G. Green
CPT William E. McAllister
CPT John A. Knutzen
CPT Robert E. Mehler
CPT Joseph M. Bennet

CPT Charles H. O'Dell CO, HHC, 1st Bde
CPT William F. Daly CO, HHC, 4th S&T Bn

7. (C) Artillery

a. DS mission for the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery and GS mission for A Battery, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery remained unchanged during the quarter. On separate occasions, two howitzers from A Battery, 5th Battalion 16th Artillery have been attached to B and C batteries, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery to achieve additional fire coverage and flexibility. During the quarter, A Battery, 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery relieved A and B Batteries, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery, as DS for 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry and 3rd Battalion, 12 Infantry allowing A and B Batteries to return to base camp for maintenance.

b. The 6th Battalion 29th Artillery has engaged in tactical operations during the entire quarter. The firing batteries collectively displaced 29 times in support of operations during the quarter. The Battalion Operation/FDC displaced 4 times. A total of 19,757 105mm HE rounds and 4,028 155mm HE rounds were fired this quarter with a breakdown of missions as follows: 2528 H&I, 693 will adjust, 172 registrations, 175 illuminations, 86 preparations, and 190 defensive concentrations. Artillery fire accounted for 45 enemy KIA (BC), 31 KIA (estimated), and 16 WIA.

c. Howitzer deadline rate has been greater than anticipated, but, due to excellent support maintenance response, has not seriously affected mission accomplishment. Deadlines were attributable to part/component wearout and damage resulting from air movement. Majority of deadline resulted from damage/failure of the following parts components:
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(1) Recoil mechanism assembly failure on both M101 and M109.
(2) Turret electrical system failure on M109.
(3) Wearout of recoil slides on M101.
(4) Bent sight mounts on M101 resulting from air movement.
(5) Elevating worn gear wearout on M101.

8. (C) Engineer:

a. Primary engineer support for the Brigade has been provided by
Company A, 4th Engineer Battalion, the attached engineer unit. Additionally,
support was provided by the 45th Engineer Group. The 39th Engineer Battalion
(CBT) assisted the Brigade primarily with combat support activities while the
577th Engineer Battalion (Const) was responsible for coordinating base camp
construction.

b. Two platoons of Company A were committed to the support of
OPERATION ADAMS continuously from the beginning of the reporting period
until 23 December at which time one of these platoons was returned to base
camp. Additionally, during various times throughout the period, squad size
elements of the company have been attached to the infantry elements.

c. On 10 November 1966, one section from Company E, 4th Engineer
Battalion was attached to Company A giving the Brigade an organic bridging
capability.

d. The 39th Engineer Battalion began combat support for OPERATION
ADAMS on 18 November 1966 with one company. This was augmented by portions
of a second company on 26 December 1966.
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e. Those elements of the Brigade engineer company not involved
in combat support worked on base camp construction. Higher priority
projects occupied the 577th Bn (Const) and their assistance in base develop-
ment was limited to procuring construction materials.

f. The main engineer effort in support of OPERATION ADAMS has
been in opening, clearing and maintaining supply routes.

9. (U) Public Information:

   a. The 21st Public Information Detachment conducted combat report-
ing missions in the 1st Brigade Area of Operation from 1 November 1966 to
31 January 1967. During this time 175 news stories and 797 Hometown News
Releases were processed.

   b. Three civilian correspondents, Mr. Al Chang and Mr. Bob
Ambandiers, representing the Associated Press and the Columbia Broadcasting
System, respectively, and Mr. Charles Flood, a free lance writer, visited
the Brigade during the reporting period.

   c. The detachment combat correspondents spent an average of three
or four days a week in the field with each line battalion during the report-
ing period. News stories were distributed to approximately 30 major United
States newspapers. Representatives of the news media stationed in Saigon,
the Army Reporter (USARV), and the Observer (MACV), received copies of all
stories. In addition, every news story contained the hometown of the
individuals involved. Distribution was made to news media in or near these
cities by the 4th Division Information Office. As required by MACV Direc-
tives, all news stories released were previously cleared by MACV IO.

SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I, Observations Lessons Learned

1. (U) Personnel:
   a. Item: Consolidated payroll for hospitalized personnel of the Brigade Task Force.

      Discussion: The battalions and separate companies submit a roster of their hospitalized personnel to the Finance Officer who makes up a separate payroll for these personnel. An MSC officer is appointed Class "A" Agent to pay hospitalized personnel. This one pay officer negates the possibility of having 27 separate pay officers traveling about Vietnam to the various hospitals. This policy was initiated by this Brigade in October 1966.

      Observation: More efficient use of officer personnel is effected plus a higher percentage of hospitalized personnel are actually paid. The use of an MSC officer is more efficient as he knows his way around medical facilities and evacuation channels.

   b. Item: Alleged non-receipt of allotments by service members dependents.

      Discussion: In several instances, it was alleged that dependents were not receiving their monthly allotment checks. Unit commanders were directed to conduct a survey and submit a report of personnel having difficulty. Report was to include name, rank, serial number, and unit of service member, amount of allotment, and complete name and address to which the allotment check was to be sent.

Observation: By instituting this procedure, finance was able to take decisive action. Results were positive in that allotment problems of this nature in the Brigade are now negligible.

2. (C) Operations:
   a. Item: The advantage of new squelch and 50 kc spacing in the new series radios has proven of little value.

   Discussion: Because of the requirement to net with aircraft using old series sets (AN/ARC-44), only even numbered frequencies (i.e. 36.70, 36.80, etc.) can be used. This is critical in heliborne operations.

   Observation: The full potential of the new series radios cannot be exploited. All nets must operate using old squelch. This requirement exists so long as there is a possibility of an old series radio set trying to enter any net. Of a possible 900 FM frequencies available, only 42 frequencies actually can be used due to the restrictions of the limited number of channels available for use with the ARC-44 radio set.

   b. Item: In order to extend the range of Brigade FM nets and to provide continuous FM communications to units located in areas inaccessible to vehicles and semifixed installations, radio sets have to be dismounted from the vehicles.

   Discussion: It was found after continuous operation of the new series radio sets in the vehicle for extended periods of time using the vehicular engine to maintain the battery charger, regulators and generators would burn out. Also, it has become necessary to dismount these sets in order to airlift them to remote hilltop locations. Radio sets also are dismounted.
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from the vehicle and installed at semi-fixed installations, generally at CP locations. Radios for hilltop locations (used as relays) are dismounted and packaged for airlift. Power sources for these dismounted radio sets are 1.5 kw 28 v and 3 kw 28 v generators which are used to keep the 24 v batteries charged. No extra generators are provided in the TOE for this type of operation. One source has been the 3 kw units used with the AN/GRC-46 radio set.

Observation: In order to utilize these radio sets in this environment, additional 1.5 kw 28v generators are required. They are used in conjunction with the AN/VRC-49 in the commo platoon. AN/VRC-46's in the S-2 and S-3 Sections, aviation section and the S-4 Section. Power supply PP-2953/W, should be used at semi-fixed installations where an adequate source of 110v AC power is available.

c. Item: Insufficient automatic retransmission sets (AN/VRC-49) are assigned to an Infantry Brigade Headquarters.

Discussion: The Brigade operates four major FM nets: Command, intelligence, administrative/logistical, and aviation. The one AN/VRC-49, TOE, is used on the command net. Manual relay is used on the other nets. The manual relay method has not been entirely satisfactory because of the delay experienced when passing traffic. AN/VRC-49 sets have been withdrawn from the line battalions in order to provide the proper service on Brigade nets.

Observation: The Brigade headquarters should be equipped with a minimum of three AN/VRC-49's for employment in the command, intelligence,

and administrative/logistical nets.

d. Item: The one 3 kw generator, a component of the AN/GRC-46 radio set, is not a reliable source of power when this equipment operates continuously for an extended period of time.

Discussion: During fixed operations, the normal power source is the 3 kw generator; the alternate source is the vehicular power plant, which is equipped with a 100 amp alternator/rectifier unit. During a 24-hour period the 3 kw generator and vehicular engine are alternated in order to distribute the drain on these two power supplies. Continuous operation of the vehicular power sources causes numerous breakdowns. This unit cannot be relied on for continuous service.

Observation: Each AN/GRC-46 radio set should be equipped with two 3 kw 28v generators. This would permit continuous operation using a power source other than the vehicular engine. This engine can be used during periods of maintenance and/or repair of the portable 3 kw units.

e. Item: Reduction in weight carried by individual soldier.

Discussion: Units should reduce weight loads of individual soldiers by maintaining no more than 300 rounds of ammunition per man. Experience has proven that more than 300 rounds per man is excessive weight and reduces his efficiency in movement over rough terrain. Further, consideration should be given to the issue of a lightweight poncho, lighter rucksack frame, lightweight rations (possibly dehydrated) and a lightweight (quick-dry) sweater.
Observation: A minimum of weight carried by the individual soldier will increase efficiency in tactical situations.

f. Item: 7.62 Duplex ammunition.

Discussion: A need for a greater issue of 7.62 duplex ammunition is evidenced by the excellent results obtained with the initial issue in terms of target area coverage and increased fire power.

Observation: A more liberal issue of 7.62 duplex ammunition would result in increased fire power and better results in target area.

g. Item: Recon by fire.

Discussion: An element on the move with high ground to its flank should consider recon by artillery or mortar fire on the high ground. Further, when approaching likely ambush sites, recon by fire will reduce the possibility of ambush.

Observation: Recon by fire has proven highly effective in combating ambushes and to search out enemy elements on high ground.

h. Item: Airmobile assault operations.

Discussion: Coordination for airmobile assault operations should include, in addition to essential information, i.e., personnel, lifts, sorties, etc., information pertaining to equipment drops subsequent to the landing zone being secured. Dropping of equipment at locations far from point of use causes both delay and hardships for operational personnel.

Observation: After completion of initial lifts, when landing zone is considered secure, cargo aircraft should be on the command radio
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frequency and should coordinate landing instructions with personnel on the ground. Command personnel on the ground should establish the landing areas by use of identification panels or pre-established smoke signals.

i. Item: Protection of elements (transmitter and receiver) of H138 handset.

Discussion: It has been noted that elements of the H138 handset become water-logged during wet weather. This renders the handset inoperative.

Observation: A small piece of plastic, placed over the elements, will reduce the amount of moisture absorbed, thus enabling the handset to operate and prolonging its use.

j. Item: Radio communication within rifle companies.

Discussion: Each company size unit should be required to carry the RC-292 antenna for better communications during long halts. AN/PRC-25 radio sets should be constructed from a lightweight material and permanently waterproofed. Instruction for radio operators should include the connection of hand sets to radios; i.e., not remove gasket from connection when difficulty arises making the connection. A good field expedient is to dampen the rubber gasket. Further, instruction on how to waterproof radio sets with tape, and use of waterproof plastic bags, should be emphasized.

Observation: Better communications have been realized since RC-292 antennas have been carried by companies, instruction given to RTO's on waterproofing of radio sets, use of plastic bags, and field expedients for connecting hand sets.
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k. Item: Increased instruction on adjustment of artillery fire.

Discussion: Prior to assignment to Vietnam all NCO's should receive instruction or refresher training in adjustment of artillery fire. Experience has shown that adjustment of artillery is required down to, including, squad leaders.

Observation: For faster artillery fires and reduction of escape possibilities, the maximum number of personnel within a unit should be capable of adjusting artillery fire.

l. Item: Use of stay-behind forces.

Discussion: In many instances, local VC will move into areas previously occupied by US troops. This is particularly true of areas where command posts were located. Small forces can be left behind to set up ambushes once the main body has departed. Operations of this type have resulted in several VC KIA's and captured weapons.

Observation: Small unit elements can effectively be employed as stay-behind forces and will usually make contact with local VC.

m. Item: Small unit operations during periods of darkness.

Discussion: It has been noted that local VC move in small groups extensively during periods of darkness. During periods of good visibility, the local VC will normally hide out or greatly reduce his activity. Elements operating in small groups during periods of darkness have made many contacts with small local VC groups.

Observation: Small units can move more effectively during periods of darkness and are more likely to make contact with VC elements than during daylight.
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n. Item: Aircraft disclosing friendly locations.
   Discussion: Helicopters are used extensively for resupply. When aircraft land at friendly locations, this indicates that elements are in the area and generally pinpoints their location. Units carrying a 2 or 3-day supply of C-Rations have operated without need for resupply by helicopter. As a result, the VC did not know unit's location by aircraft landings.
   Observation: Unit can eliminate the need for resupply for short periods, thus not disclosing their locations by aircraft landings.

o. Item: Integration of RVN and US Forces
   Discussion: RF units have been integrated with elements of this unit for joint operations. Operations took place generally in built-up areas where it is difficult for us personnel to distinguish between friendly civilians and local VC.
   Observation: RVN Forces have been extremely helpful in identifying local VC and gaining timely information which could be acted on immediately. Additionally, RVN Forces were able to point out hiding places, suspected ambush sites and booby trapped areas.

p. Item: Reconnaissance of proposed areas of operations.
   Discussion: Proposed areas of operations are normally reconnoitered by air for CP locations, unit positions, and landing zones.
   Observation: Extensive reconnaissance by air gives warning to enemy forces of planned operations giving him time to escape. Early reconnaissance of AO's in conjunction with normal flight patterns can provide
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sufficient information to obviate reconnaissance immediately prior to air operation.

q. Item: Booby-trapped gates.

Discussion: Frequently, VC will booby-trap gates in areas where they expect US troops to conduct operations. This has resulted in injury to several personnel.

Observation: A rope with a hook can be used to pull open suspected booby-trapped gates from a safe distance.

r. Item: Point teams.

Discussion: Units should use point teams rather than point men. Teams should include one man with shotgun or M-16 rifle (automatic fire), one man with M-79 grenade launcher, and one or two men with M-16 rifles (semi-automatic fire) personnel utilized as point men should be given special instruction to improve reaction. Emphasis during trainfire instruction should be placed on reaction course with surprise targets. Further, consideration should be given to supplying point teams with a radio for quicker reaction by main element.

Observation: For better results and faster reaction, well-trained point teams supplied with a radio should be utilized by platoon size elements.

s. Item: Immersion foot prevention.

Discussion: More emphasis should be placed on instruction in care of feet by the individual soldier. Commanders should require elements to halt every two hours, depending on the tactical situation, and have platoon leaders check feet. Personnel should utilize foot powder at this time.
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Further, the quick-dry sock should be issued all personnel prior to departure from CONUS or upon entry in-country.

Observation: Placing, more emphasis on basic foot care, use of foot powder, and quick-dry socks, has reduced the incident of immersion foot.

3. Item: Issue of machetes and plastic bags.

Discussion: The terrain in Vietnam makes it necessary to forge trails from jungle terrain and cut landing zones for resupply and medical evacuation. Also, the dampness of the area is a factor in the short life of equipment and material.

Observation: Consideration should be given to the issue of one (1) machete for every two men in a company size unit and plastic bags be an item of bulk issue through supply channels to units.

3. (C) Training and Organization:

Item: LRRP's

Discussion: The VC tactics of dispersion and avoidance of contact create difficulties in finding enemy units and in bringing effective fire to bear on the target once it is located. The employment of LRRP's assists in overcoming these problems. During a recent operation a LRRP discovered 20 VC with weapons immediately after insertion. The patrol observed the VC throughout the night. At daylight the LRRP was extracted without casualties and the VC unit strafed by gunships and hit with immediate air strikes.

Observation: LRRP's are essential for locating elusive guerrilla and NVA units. The patrols can effectively find and adjust long range fire or air strikes on these targets.
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4. (C) Logistics:

a. Item: Exchange of clothing in field.

Discussion: One major problem that has existed and will continue to be a matter of concern is the exchange of clothing items for the troops in the field. This exchange is further complicated by the type of clothing that is being exchanged. Socks seem to be the most sought after item in relation to prevention practices concerning foot diseases. This unit has attempted to exchange socks on a daily basis and has met with moderate success in reducing the number of personnel lost from the fighting strength.

Observation: To accomplish this, socks (3) pair, were collected from each man in the combat units and an additional 5 pair were requisitioned and issued to supplement each unit. This amount on hand is sufficient to allow for laundry of these items without restricting the exchange. The wear on trousers causes the next largest problem in the field and the ratio between pairs of trousers required as opposed to shirts is 6:1. Trousers remain serviceable for about three weeks in our area of operation. Shirts and underwear have caused little problem other than the initial availability. Clothing, with the exception of socks, has been exchanged at least once weekly.

b. Item: Repair parts shipment.

Discussion: This unit has experienced losses of repair parts being shipped via air from depots and other supply sources. 

Observation: To insure safe arrival at destination all cargo being shipped must be escorted by responsible unit personnel who are charged
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR -65) (U)

with maintaining visual observation of the cargo at all times.

c. Item: Damage to signal equipment in transit.

Discussion: This unit has evacuated items of signal equipment for repair. It has been noted that occasionally the equipment is received back in unserviceable condition as a result of improper packing for shipment or improper loading on vehicles for transportation.

Observation: Evacuation signal equipment must be packaged with sufficient cushioning material to preclude damage in transit. Further, container must be marked in such a way as to indicate susceptibility of the contents to damage from shocks in transit.

d. Item: Artillery repair.

Discussion: Because of the tactical dispersion of artillery pieces throughout the Brigade area of operations, timely repair of dead lined artillery pieces is sometimes difficult.

Observation: Timely on-site repair can be expedited by use of Brigade organic air transportation to deliver maintenance personnel and parts to the site and extract them when repairs are completed.

e. Item: Requesting and receiving of supplies from CAM RANH BAY.

Discussion: Due to lack of proper communication and geographical location of the CAM RANH BAY Depot in relation to TUY HOA, it was foreseen that problems could arise pertaining to the requesting and receiving of supplies.

Observation: Liaison personnel were assigned at CAM RANH BAY and TUY HOA South Airstrip. This has precluded the loss of requisitions and has been a definite success.
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f. Item: Coordination between Brigade Supply office and Liaison personnel at CAM RANH BAY.

Discussion: A system was needed which would enable liaison personnel at CAM RANH BAY to determine actions taken on supply requests.

Observation: A duplicate copy of the document register was provided on a daily basis. The liaison team cross referenced the requisitions, thus ensuring that the document register in CAM RANH BAY and at base camp balanced.

g. Item: Shortage and repair of tentage.

Discussion: Shortage of tentage appears to be a command wide problem. At present the Brigade has on request a total of 13 each GP large, 87 each GP medium, and 33 each GP small tents. Repair of tentage at this time is critical.

Observation: The availability of a tent repair capability would tend to alleviate the problem to some extent; however, the problem will exist until ample stock(s) is(are) available.

h. Item: Leakage of tentage.

Discussion: Even new tents will leak at the seams during heavy wind and rain.

Observation: Waterproofing of all seams in tentage is advised prior to departure from CONUS.

i. Item: Vehicle requirements of graves registration.

Discussion: The assigned 3/4 ton truck did not prove well suited to transport remains.
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Observation: A 3/4 ton ambulance was laterally transferred from the Medical Company for the 3/4 ton truck. This proved satisfactory.

j. Item: DX of graves registration supplies.

Discussion: Blankets, litters, and remains pouches are not a DX item.

Observation: Items used in connection with GR should be so certified and accountability dropped.

k. Item: Motor pool operations.

Discussion: Because of poor road conditions and inclement weather, special precautions must be taken to insure that vehicles are properly maintained.

Observation: Lubrication specifications must be carefully followed and a constant emphasis put on driver maintenance. An informal system of driver time accountability should be set up to insure that trucks are being properly utilized. Proper log book entries are essential and should be checked daily.

l. Item: Insufficient generators.

Discussion: Unit TO&E authorization for generators is not sufficient.

Observation: Lack of generators causes the unit to overwork the ones they have causing an early wear out.

m. Item: DX clothing.

Discussion: A need exists for convenient laundry units for field operations and DX clothing exchange.
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Observation: It is difficult to exchange personal laundry in field operations. In most cases personal are not being returned the same bundle of laundry that they have turned in.

n. Item: Conservation of helicopter time.

Discussion: Establishment of multiple fueling points throughout the area of operations would greatly reduce turn around time for helicopters.

Observation: Helicopters are taking 25-30 minutes turn around time for refueling.

o. Item: TOE equipment.

Discussion: Due to the type of terrain, weather, and tactical situations that exist in RVN the Brigade has a vast amount of TO&E equipment in excess of its needs.

Observation: 4-ton trucks, mountain sleeping bags, and other items of equipment are not being utilized. Consequently a storage problem arises.

p. Item: Base camp development.

Discussion: The Brigade is presently working toward the development of a base camp with one battalion area to house rotating battalions. This will be used as transit quarters.

Observation: This system will reduce the cost of construction material and allow other personnel to perform other missions, and reduce the need for maintenance of equipment and materials.

q. Item: Tentage.
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Discussion: The shelter half now being issued, when combined with other required combat items, is too weighty for tactical operations.

Observation: A light weight expendable tent is required for the individual soldier for operations in RVN.

5. (C) Artillery:

a. Item: Utilization of infantry personnel as artillery forward observer backup.

Discussion: METT frequently requires the infantry companies to conduct concurrent decentralized platoon operations. When this occurs artillery forward observer personnel are not available for each element. To provide the necessary fire support coverage, infantry personnel are utilized as forward observers. Each artillery battery has conducted forward observer training for their respective infantry battalion down to squad leader level. The result of this training has been very effective and has presented no training problem.

Observation: The training and utilization of key infantry personnel as forward observer backup permits the company greater operational latitude thereby enhancing their counterinsurgency capability.

b. Item: Artillery used as economy of force measure in village clearing operations.

Discussion: In a village clearing operation several males were observed escaping down a corridor formed by a river and a mountain. Artillery fire was adjusted to block the corridor forcing the enemy to turn back for subsequent capture.
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Observation: Artillery fire is a useful economy force measure when terrain permits its employment to block avenues of approach or escape.

c. Item: Cross attachment and control of mixed artillery calibers.

Discussion: METT frequently necessitates cross attachment of different caliber artillery weapons to achieve greater range coverage and flexibility. Fire direction and control of mixed calibers requires only limited additional training and orientation, and presents no unusual control problem once familiarity is achieved.

Observation: Cross attachment provides a commander a simple method to provide greater range coverage and flexibility without the displacement of entire units.

d. Item: Searchlights.

Discussion: The 3d Platoon, B Battery, 29th Artillery (SLT), has been attached to the battalion during the quarter. The assigned searchlights consisted of one 30" carbon arc light and one 18" l/ton mounted xenon light.

Observation: Three types illumination have been used: direct, diffused, and indirect. Direct illumination has proved to be the most effective. Searchlights have been used for illumination of the battlefield, perimeter defense, and for H&I. High percent of searchlight downtime is attributed to the wet climate adversely affecting the electrical system, and the difficulty in obtaining repair parts.

e. Item: Countermortar radar, AN/MPQ-4.

Discussion: The radar has had limited use due to excessive downtime attributed to electrical shorts and component failure, particularly
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in the scanner assembly. Lack of timely support maintenance and poor availability of spare parts have contributed to excessive repair time.

Observation: To be effective the AN/MPQ-4 must receive timely maintenance support and issue of necessary repair parts.

f. Item: Airmobile operations using the CH-47 helicopter.

Discussion: The artillery battalion received only limited airmobile training in CONUS and only with UH-ID helicopters. Since arrival in RVN over 90% of artillery movement has been by air utilizing the CH-47 as the prime mover. The UH-ID has not been used as an artillery prime mover.

Observation: Airmobile proficiency utilizing the CH-47 was easily acquired. By the second move each unit was highly proficient in the techniques of airmobile operations.

g. Item: Self-illumination of position utilizing organic artillery.

Discussion: Experiments conducted on backup close-in self illumination using data from USAAMS firing shell illuminating charge 1, at maximum elevation using short time settings have proved very successful. Effective backup self illumination can be provided as close as 250 meters from the gun position.

Observation: Artillery has the capability to provide effective close-in illumination of position areas.

h. Item: Availability and utilization of OH-23 helicopter in command and control of artillery.

Discussion: Due to the terrain and widespread tactical situation it is impossible to reach all artillery units by road. The only means to
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achieve adequate command and control of widespread units is by helicopter aircraft.

**Observation:** The two OH-23 helicopters attached to the artillery battalion have received maximum utilization with outstanding results. In several cases the OH-23 has been used to haul small quantities of rations and other equipment when resupply aircraft were not available. Both OH-23's have been used as fixed wing backup to adjust artillery fire.

6. (C) Engineer:
   a. **Item:** Chain saws.

   **Discussion:** Carrying of present TOE chain saws along with fuel is highly fatiguing for engineers who must accompany infantry line units in the field.

   **Observation:** A lighter model chain saw than those presently authorized would be of great benefit to units involved in direct support of infantry.

   b. **Item:** Demolition teams.

   **Discussion:** Demolition teams found that they initially tried to carry far too much equipment with them in support of infantry operations.

   **Observation:** Teams that are to be operating for prolonged periods on foot with infantry should limit equipment to the essential items and only enough demolition for small clearing and destruction missions.

   c. **Item:** Loss of tactical bridge pins.

   **Discussion:** Bridge pins in M476 tactical bridging may be removed during the night if bridges are not secured.
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Observation: It is imperative that a close check of all tactical bridging be made daily in order to insure that the bridges have not been weakened by loss of pins. Also, check clamps on strut braces and anchorage cables for these may be loosened.

d. Item: Mine sweep.

Discussion: Mine sweeps were conducted along major routes in the AO daily. The sweep team consisted of detector and probing elements on foot as well as a security element. Sweep teams were started at various points along the routes in order to cut down the time required in opening these routes.

Observation: While sweeping for mines on foot does pick up some of the mines which may have been laid, the very small amount of metal in the typical VC mine and the speed with which a sweep must necessarily be conducted results in some mines being missed. Therefore, the use of a heavy vehicle such as a tank in conjunction with the sweep team has proved effective.

e. Item: Variations in water level at bridge sites.

Discussion: The water level at several bridge sites was found to rise as much as 6 feet in a period of a few hours. This large variation naturally has a great effect on abutments and on the bridge support structure.

Observation: Anchorage systems for tactical bridging must be reinforced to prevent shifting and damage to the bridge.

7. (C) Civil affairs:

a. Item: Issue of commodities to indigent Vietnamese.
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Discussion: Large quantities of commodities have been distributed through the reporting period to refugees, RF/PF units, orphanages, and needy families. Whenever items were distributed to large groups of Vietnamese people there was a tendency for a large number of people to collect around the distribution point in an attempt to obtain any and all items. Since no distinction could be made between those requiring basic items and those not requiring them, control of distribution was extremely difficult. It was found, however, that a system of preparing lists of names in advance and having the hamlet and/or village chief read off the list was the best measure for controlling the people. A simple announcement to the people that only those who were listed as needy village/hamlet or other officials would receive commodities allowed for much better control.

Observation: It is recommended that lists of personnel to receive commodities be prepared by units through hamlet/village leaders whenever items are to be distributed.

b. Item: Harvesting of rice in VC controlled areas.

Discussion: While operating in their AO, a battalion observed a substantial rice-producing area not being harvested by the Vietnamese. It was determined that the reason for no harvest was that the area was VC controlled. It was decided that the area would be secured by US troops and that a group of refugees would be brought in to harvest the rice. This was accomplished and not only denied the rice to the VC, but also provided food for the refugees.
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Observation: During the actual conduct of the harvesting VC opened fire on the harvesters, US troops returned the fire, gunships were called in, and the psyops team dropped leaflets following the incident encouraging the refugees to return and complete the harvest. Refugees, observing the US strength, returned and completed the harvest. Psyops personnel and local officials accompanying security units were pivotal in convincing harvesters that adequate security was insured.

PART II, Recommendations

1. (U) Operations:
   a. Areas contemplated for the insertion of LRRPs should be reconed jointly by the platoon leader and the pilot who will actually make the insertion. Sufficient notification must be given to the aviation element to insure that qualified aviators will be assigned to these missions.
   b. If at all possible a landing zone should not be utilized for a second time.
   c. An aircraft suitable for psyops should be situated in the TUY HOA area to be immediately available to support psyops missions for this unit and the PHU YEN military sector.

2. (U) Logistics:
   a. It is recommended that sundry packs contain no more than 20 bars of soap per 100 men and that the writing material be increased to 10 tablets and 100 envelopes.
   b. It is recommended that in the repair of small arms, contact teams be organized which could go forward to a unit in the field with the
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required parts to repair the equipment and evacuate (DX) the faulty parts.

c. Recommend that sufficient quantity of clothing remain on hand
in the unit to facilitate a weekly exchange of items for laundry and direct
exchange.

d. Recommend that tent repair capability be established in all
sub area commands.

e. The recommended ratio of flack vests is one per man or one for
every two men.

f. Recommend that present vehicle requirements of graves registra-
tion be changed to add an ambulance on a permanent basis.

g. It is recommended that at least two UH-ID helicopters be
assigned to each infantry battalion, one for use as command and control and
one for logistical transportation.

h. It is recommended that indoctrination of personnel on proper
skin and foot care should be emphasized strongly during formal classroom
sessions in CONUS. These classes should be followed by practical exercises.

i. To facilitate direct exchange of clothing, it is recommended
that name tags, unit insignia, etc. be deleted from the uniform in the field.

j. It is recommended that materials that were to be used for con-
struction of battalion areas be used to build hospitals and better post
exchange and recreation facilities.

k. It is recommended that a survey be conducted to determine the
non-utilization of TOE equipment with the object of tailoring down the TOE
to in-country operational requirements.
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1. It is recommended that a light weight tent be developed to replace the shelter half. The tent should be disposable.

8. (C) Engineer:
   
a. A heavy vehicle, such as a tank, with a roller to cover the entire width of a road, should work in conjunction with mine sweep teams. This equipment should precede all convoys.

b. An extra supply of bridge pins should be maintained to replace pins which may be removed. If tactical bridging is considered to be semi-permanent, the pins can be spot welded to prevent easy removal.

c. Reinforcement of bridge abutments and anchorage systems must be planned for in areas where there is likely to be high variation in water level and stream velocity.

d. Demolition teams should carry only a minimum amount of explosives on infantry support operations. Additional explosives must be brought in by helicopter for missions such as cave and tunnel destruction.

e. A lighter model chain saw should be provided for engineer units which have the mission of direct support to infantry units in the field.

/s/
JOHN D. AUSTIN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - ACSFOR - DA
2 - CINCSARPAC
3 - DCG, USARV
2 - CG, I FFORCEV
2 - CG, 4th Inf Div
1 - CG, ea Bn

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Listing of Projects, Requirements, Completions, and Percentages.

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Temporary mess facilities, showers, and latrines are in operation and will continue until replaced by permanent construction.

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KIA

300
190
250
200
150
100
50
26
0

Friendly

Enemy

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Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR -65) (U)

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

AWARDED:

DENSFORD, Charles F
MAJ 083195 HHC 1st Bde DFC

PECK, Jerome D
PFC US 55847519 HHC 3/8 BSM "V"

CAMPOS, Richard F
SGT RA19616680 C 1/8 BSM (Post)

DICKEY, Forrest P
SP4 US55825040 C 3/12 BSM (Post)

HARTMAN, Nicholas M
SP4 US56397973 B 3/8 BSM (Post)

JACKSON, Donald E
SSG RA13505886 A 1/10 BSM (Post)

IBROM, Adrian J
SP4 US54374262 B 3/12 BSM (Post)

MC MASTER, Charles A
PFC US56398735 HHC 3/12 BSM (Post)

WISE, Donald A
SP5 RA19638788 A 5/16 BSM (Post)

MOUNCE, Barry M
SP4 US55864819 A 3/12 BSM (Post)

LEWIS, Willie J
PFC US53436832 HHC 3/8 ARCOM "V"

KILMER, Carleton F
Lt 05020151 HHC 1/8 ARCOM

EDELHEIT, Howard M
SGT RA12534844 HHC 3/8 ARCOM

FINERAN, William D
PFC US55855382 HHC 3/8 ARCOM

CIB (1st Awd) 1834
CIB (2nd Awd) 26
CIB (3rd Awd) 5

FORWARDED TO DIVISION:

Air Medals 5
Soldiers Medal 2
BS (Post) 8

ARCOM W/V 2
BS W/V 3
Bronze Star 1

Incl 7
1. (U) This headquarters concurs with the contents of the Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division with the following exceptions and comments.

2. (C) Reference Section 2, Part I - Observations - Lessons Learned.

   a. Reference paragraph 2b, 2c and 2d: This brigade is organized and equipped to operate as part of an infantry division and not as a separate brigade. Currently it has TOE equipment, augmented by an appropriate signal slice from the division signal battalion. If the equipment thus provided is not adequate to support brigade operations, request for additional capability should be appropriately addressed to the division. USAV form 47 and MTOE action are available if the division cannot provide adequate resources from organic assets.

   b. Reference paragraph 6d: The practice of using heavy vehicles, such as tanks, to locate and detonate mines should not be considered as a substitute for mine detectors and probing regardless of the amount of time involved. While this practice may be warranted when dictated by the tactical situation, it is at best an expedient, costly, and dangerous method of mine clearing.

3. (C) Reference Section 2, Part II - Recommendations.

   a. Reference paragraph 1a: It is the policy of this headquarters to encourage joint reconnaissance by the platoon leader and the pilot who will actually make the insertion. Whenever possible, maximum notification should be given the aviation element to provide sufficient planning time to select pilots who are experienced in IRRP operations and techniques.

   b. Reference paragraph 1b: The requirements of certain operations will necessitate use of some landing zones for several days, or for more than one occasion; however, in cognizance of enemy tactics, capabilities, and US/ARVN unit experiences, landing zones are seldom used for more than one occasion.

   c. Reference paragraph 1c: A psyop aircraft, immediately
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responsive to the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and to Phu Yen Sector Advisor, was based at Tuy Hoa North Airfield.

d. Reference paragraph 2a: Sundry pack contents are determined and procured by the Office of Chief of Support Services, Department of the Army, through exchange facilities. Visits to units in field locations have revealed a lack of writing material and an excess of soap. The addition of a supplement package of writing material would improve the situation. Consideration should be given to reducing the quantity of soap to two bars per man per month.

e. Reference paragraph 2b: Contact teams are required to go forward to units in field locations for the purpose of repairing small arms, and to evacuate (DX) faulty parts. The organization has the organic capability to establish contact teams by using personnel from the attached forward maintenance company.

f. Reference paragraph 2c: Tent repair facilities are available at Cm Ranh By Support Command to assist units in the Tuy Hoa area. The extreme climatic conditions, combined with constant exposure to salt water spray, has decreased the normal canvas life to approximate 10 months. Recommend Ist Logistical Command investigate the requirement for a tent repair facility at Tuy Hoa.

h. Reference paragraph 2e: CTA 50-901 authorizes one flak vest per individual assigned to category I units in the theater of operations, WAECO. The required quantity of flak vests need only to be placed on a normal requisition, citing appropriate authorization, to be obtained.

j. Reference paragraph 2g: An appropriate number of organic and direct support UH-1D helicopters are available to the
organization. The specific manner of employment, command guidance considered, is within the prerogative of the commander concerned.

k. Reference paragraph 2h: Cases of tropical immersion foot can be minimized if each soldier knows how to properly care for his feet. Education must be stressed to the point where personal hygiene is maintained at a high standard. I FF/JCEV surgeon will recommend to USAV surgeon that greater emphasis be placed on proper skin and foot care during basic training.

l. Reference paragraph 2i: Recommend consideration be given to adopting USMC procedure for marking of field uniforms, to alleviate problems encountered in making direct exchange of items that require name tages, organizational patch, etc.

m. Reference paragraph 2j: Use of construction materials and priorities for construction projects are established by USAV. The organization should initiate action through engineer channels to have project priorities revised.

n. Reference paragraph 2k: USAV (U) message 13239, subject: Excess Equipment, dtg 270654Z May 1966, established provisions by which an organization may determine and turn in authorized TCE equipment on hand that is in excess of operational requirements in RVN. Authority may be requested through command channels to turn in items considered excess. Justification for each item of equipment must be included in the request, to include why it is not needed at the time, and the reason it will not be needed in the foreseeable future.

o. Reference paragraph 2l: A disposable shelter tent would reduce the total weight an individual is required to carry into combat.

p. Reference paragraph 3a: At present, several 20-ton mine rollers are in RVN, but have proven to be of limited value because of restrictive roadways and width of bridges.

q. Reference paragraph 3b: The maintenance of stocks of extra pins for floating bridge and/or the spotwelding of these pins should not be considered in lieu of providing adequate security. The welding of bridge pins is not a sound practice, because of difficulties that will be encountered when it becomes necessary to remove the pins for repair, maintenance or bridge removal.

r. Reference paragraph 3c: Engineers on site are responsible for adequate design of bridge and anchorage systems to cope with changing conditions.
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s. Reference paragraph 3d: Accurate intelligence and experiences will indicate the quantity of explosives, as well as other items of engineer equipment, to be carried by supporting engineers. Other organizations have found it advantageous to have engineer loads divided among the supported infantry element, for more efficient balance of load.

t. Reference paragraph 3e: Provided a lightweight saw can be fabricated without reduction in efficiency. If, the efficiency of the saw is reduced, additional explosives will be required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CHARLES L. JOHNSON
CPT, AGC
Asst A7