**UNCLASSIFIED**

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**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

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**LIMITATION CHANGES**

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**FROM:**

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**AUTHORITY**

AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980  AGO D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation Junction City, conducted by 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

1. Forwarded as inclosure is a report, subject as above.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General
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Commanding Generals
101st Airborne Division (-)
11th Infantry Brigade (Sep)
Commanding Officers
5th Battalion, 46th Infantry
5th Battalion, 12th Infantry
6th Battalion, 31st Infantry
31st Engineer Battalion (Cbt)
5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155mm-T)
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HEADQUARTERS
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO San Francisco 96257

1. (U) REFERENCES.
   a. OPORD 05-67 (Operation JUNCTION CITY Alternate) (U), dated 17A2000
      February 1967, Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; OPORD 04-67
      dated 152000, same Headquarters.
   b. Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7043, Sheets 623 II, III, IV, 623 II,
      III, Series L7045, Sheets 6131 II, 6132 II.
   c. FRAGORDS to OPORD 05-67 (see par 2 above) 1 through 26 dated 20 Febru-
      ary 1967 to 17 March 1967, numbered consecutively.

2. (U) NAME OR IDENTIFICATION AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION.
   a. The name of the operation was Operation JUNCTION CITY I.
   b. The operation was a search and destroy operation, conducted within a
      large area sealed by friendly troops.

3. (U) DATES OF OPERATION.
   16 February 1967 to 16 March 1967.

4. (U) LOCATION.
   The area in which Operation JUNCTION CITY I was executed is known as "WAR
   ZONE C" and has long been a known stronghold of the Viet Cong. The portion of "WAR
   ZONE C" in which the Blackhorse Regiment fought and maneuvered is that area bounded
   by the 1106 grid line on the south, National Highway 1 on the east, and the Cambodian
   border on the north and west.

5. (U) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS.
   The 25th Infantry Division was the controlling headquarters for the 11th
   Armored Cavalry Regiment. The Reporting officer for this report is Colonel William
   W. Cobb, Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Subordinate commanders during the operation were as follows:

1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
LTC Martin D. Howell

3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
LTC Arthur J. Cochran

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry
CPT Marvin L. Doerr

Air Cav. Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry
MAJ Francis H. Martin

7th Medical Company
CPT Dennis J. Elias

219th Engineer Company
CPT Donald J. Crocker

659th Radio Research Detachment
CPT Lee W. Senter

3rd Military Intelligence Detachment
MAJ Carollus L. Gray

17th Public Information Detachment
CPT Owen W. Ritchfield

6. (U) GENERAL.
   a. With the exception of attachments and detachments of units on a day to
day basis the task organization was as follows:

Regimental Headquarters

Headquarters Artillery Task Force (11th Arm Cav)
Air Cav. Troop (-)
Troop C, 1st Squadron
219th Engineer Company (- 1st and 3rd platoons)
659th Radio Research Detachment (-)
3rd Military Intelligence Detachment (-)
7th Medical Company (-)
158th Maintenance Battalion (-) ES

GROUP 4

AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 22 YEARS
1st Squadron (- Troop C and Howitzer Battery)
1st Platoon, 919th Engineer Company
1st Contact Team, 551st Light Maintenance Company (DS)

3rd Squadron (- Howitzer Battery)
3rd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company
3rd Contact Team, 551st Light Maintenance Company (DS)

b. Artillery,

(1) Organisation: Task Force Artillery (Provisional) was comprised of units from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 5th Artillery Group, and 1st Battalion, 83rd Artillery (subordinate to 5th Artillery Group):

- 1 MAJ - Officer in Charge
- 2 CPT - S-3 and Asst S-3/LND
- 1 LT - Aerial Observer
- 2 E-8 - Asst Compu/Computa/RTO's

Firing elements for Task Force Artillery were:

- Howitzer Battery 1st Squadron
- Howitzer Battery 3rd Squadron
- Battery B, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery
- Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Artillery
- Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery
- Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Artillery

Units not under operational control of Task Force Artillery but who rendered supporting fires for Task Force Artillery were:

- Battery D, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery
- Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery

(b) Execution: In order to present a brief and orderly summary, the operation will be divided into three phases keyed to the occupation of fire support bases as follows:

- Phase I 22-27 February 1967 - at FSB Bravo (FSB #2)
- Phase II 27 February - 3 March 1967 - at FSB #6
- Phase III 3-15 March 1967 - at FSB Blackhorse (Tchou)

(a) PHASE I, Prior to 22 February Task Force Artillery was not operational. Howitzer Batteries of the 1st and 3rd Squadrons, 11th Armored Cavalry remained under control of their respective squadrons with Task Force Artillery providing coordination and clearance. On 22 February, Task Force Artillery assumed OPCON of these two batteries when they dispersed from TROOP KIT 30 of VIII MEB to FSB Bravo. Elements closed at 1500H. On 23 February at 0700H, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) with 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry (Mech) attacked north through War Zone 'C'. Task Force Artillery fired preparatory fires from 0600H to 0700H. As the maneuver elements pushed northward, it became apparent that displacement of Task Force Artillery would be necessary, 1st Infantry Division Artillery (Battery D, 1st Battalion, 6th Artillery) provided support to ground elements during the move of task force artillery. No significant contacts were reported.

(b) PHASE II - Task Force Artillery with Howitzer Battery 1st Squadron and Howitzer Battery 3rd Squadron dispersed to FSB #6 (adjacent to OP 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division) on 27 February. Battery B, 3/13th Artillery
remained at FSB Bravo to support 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mechanised) whose advance along the western edge of the Blackhorse AO was slowed considerably by the dense jungle and underbrush. On or about 28 February, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mechanised) was detached from the Regiment and Battery B, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery reverted to control of its parent battalion. During Phase II the two squadrons encountered moderate contact with platoon-sized VC forces. Several base camps were uncovered and Task Force Artillery fired numerous TOT's and preparatory fires in support, Task Force Artillery also provided reinforcing fires to 1st Infantry Division Artillery and 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery (with 196th Light Infantry Brigade).

One occasion (28 February) Howitzer Batteries of the 1st and 3rd Squadrons, 11th Armored Cavalry were called on to provide reinforcing fire on 2 VC Platoons vicinity XT 275976. Results were 15 VC KIA (BC) with 7 VC KIA (BC) being credited to Task Force Artillery.

PHASE 11 - Task Force Artillery displaced to FSB Blackhorse (Tahoe) on 3 March closing at 1600H. Due to the displacement, responsibility for direct support of the two squadrons was assumed by 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery (105mm Towed). It was not until 6 March that Task Force Artillery received the direct support role of the two squadrons, due to range limitations. During this time there was no lapse in the fire support available to the maneuver elements. Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery and Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery moved from FSB 137 to FSB Blackhorse on 6 March. Control was retained by Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery. With the assignment of 3rd Battalion, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the role of Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery was changed from general support reinforcing (GSR) Task Force Artillery to direct support (DS), 3rd Battalion, 11th Armored Cavalry. Here it was realised the disadvantage of 155mm unit as DS to a light infantry unit. Close support fires were not possible during contact missions, whereas the armor protection afforded 11th Armored Cavalry elements allowed the larger caliber weapon to be placed closer to the cavalry troopers. On 11 March, 1st Squadron made contact with an estimated reinforced VC company at XT 275976 contact was broken at 1915H. Initially Howitzers Battery, 1st Squadron and Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron fired in support. Soon it was evident that the entrenched VC units could not be defeated without intensive air and artillery support. Air strikes were integrated with artillery and light/heavy gunship fire teams to seal VC escape routes and maintain unrelenting pressure on the enemy. Additional reinforcing fires were provided by Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery and Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery. By the time contact was broken, Batteries A and B, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery (all 105mm Towed) were rendering valuable reinforcing fires. On 13 March, an armored column from 3rd Squadron received 80 and/or RPG-2 fire from VC in spider holes as the column was proceeding south on Route 22. Howitzer Battery 3rd Squadron and Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery provided support fires in an effort to ferret out the VC from their entrenchments.

PHASE III - Task Force Artillery was disbanded on 15 March when the howitzer batteries reverted to control of their respective squadrons for the road march to the base camp. In general, Task Force Artillery and its firing elements performed commendably during Operation JUNCTION CITY. The organisation was a polyglot of elements who had never worked together previously as a team, but through cooperation the Task Force organisation proved successful. The utilisation of the FSB has many advantages:

(a) The problem of minimum range when the battery is co-located with squadron CP is eliminated.

(b) Task Force Artillery provided a clearing and coordination station with no significant delays; although there were numerous check fires (did not hinder "contact" missions).

(c) Massing of fire as proved necessary during 1st Squadron's contact is facilitated.

The missions fired by Task Force Artillery included registration, destruction, HML and contact.

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The missions fired by Task Force Artillery included registration, destruction, HML and contact.
maneuver elements were reluctant to utilize the Task Force observer. The C-1 proved to be a superior aircraft to the helicopter for observation and adjustment of artillery due to its endurance between required refueling stops. The observer can be utilized in conjunction with the ground observer to direct supporting artillery. This procedure would allow the commander or the S-3 to concentrate on the direction and control of the ground forces.

(5) Liaison Activities: A liaison team from 25th Infantry Division Artillery was provided Task Force Artillery to assist in its operations and to keep Division Artillery abreast of the situation. This procedure proved invaluable; recommend that such a Liaison team be available on future operations.

(6) Ammunition Expenditures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>BATT</th>
<th>SUPPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron</td>
<td>1133</td>
<td>3925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron</td>
<td>1192</td>
<td>1636</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Total Rounds Expended: 10,811

C. Engineer. Engineer support was provided by the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) (-) and additional support was provided by the 919th by the 65th Engineer Battalion. A major responsibility of the 919th was the emplacement of Armored Vehicular Launched Bridges in support of the regiment’s maneuver units.

Six crossing fords were constructed at the following locations:

- 7T015618
- 7T015620
- 7T015621
- 7T020865
- 7T020866
- 7T020867

Two water points were established during the operation. They were located at 7T020602 and 7T020802.

During search and destroy missions, elements of the 919th found and destroyed over nine tons of rice. In addition, the company destroyed the following enemy material:

- Three 105mm rounds
- One 155mm round
- One 8 inch round
- One 250 pound bomb

Chemical.

(1) Indicated are the dates and details of the employment of riot control munitions using K159 Tactical CS Canister Clusters during Operation JUNCTION CITY I.

(a) 112030H vicinity 7T022167

1 One K159 CS tactical canister cluster delivered.
2 Effect on enemy - unknown.
3 Terrain and weather - highland forest; wind 6 knots from the southeast.
4 Ground effects - Pilot reported that munition functioned but because of approaching darkness could not determine ground coverage.

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) had been in contact with a suspected reinforced enemy infantry company. The regiment was unable to neutralize this company which was defending its positions consisting of trenches and bunkers. After withdrawing and using artillery against the enemy unit,
CS was employed to soften the objective and increase the Viet Cong's vulnerability to fragmentation weapons.

(b) 12-73-2468 via IX927787

1 Two E159 Tactical CS canister clusters were employed by manually firing explosive bolts of the strongback assemblies while flying at an altitude of 600 feet and 80 knots.

2 Terrain and weather - highland forest with a moderate inversion and no measurable surface winds.

3 Ground effect - Pilot reported good ground coverage consisting of two 100 x 200 meter rectangles spaced 50 feet apart at their longest axis.

The clusters were employed against the same troop concentration as in (1) (a) 5 above. Friendly troops did not enter the area until four hours later but this was after artillery and air strikes. Troops on the ground in the target area reported minimal contamination of ground surface with moderate contamination of subsurface structure. Few enemy bodies were found and it was presumed the enemy had withdrawn during the night.

(2) Conclusions and Recommendations.

(a) Agent CS, when employed with the E159 Tactical Canister Cluster will provide sufficient ground concentration to contaminate fortifications when employed during inversion conditions.

(b) Due to the limited availability of the E159 tactical CS canister cluster it should be employed when follow up action will be prompt and provide maximum advantage to friendly forces.

(e) Employment of CS against enemy troops should be followed by artillery and air strikes to take maximum advantage of the characteristic of CS to drive enemy personnel out of fortifications.

Army Aviation

(1) Army Aviation support was primarily provided by the organic aviation assets of the Air Cavalry Troop, Regimental Aviation Platoon and the Squadron Air Sections. Limited aerial support was required from outside the regiment and this consisted mainly of aerial resupply support.

(2) Regimental Aviation Platoon/Squadron Air Sections.

(a) OH-23

1 Employment:

a Command and control
b Reconnaissance
c Administrative and liaison

2 Sorties - 1,677

2 Hours flown - 1,055

4 Passengers moved - 1,447

(b) UH-1D

1 Employment

Page 5 of 14 Pages
a) Command and control
b) Troop lift
c) Cargo lift
d) Casualty evacuation
e) Administrative and liaison

2 Sorties - 1,303
2 Hours flown - 627
4 Cargo moved - 116 tons
2 Passengers moved - 1,977

(c) Timeliness and effectiveness. It was found when the regimental CP and the regimental and squadron trains were at different locations it was necessary to place aircraft at both locations. The OH-23D's were located with the CP while the UH-1D's remained at the trains area. This provided for effective coordination and immediate response to the needs of both areas. The majority of the observation aircraft missions originated from the command post while the resupply and troop lift missions came from the logistical complex. The arrangement proved to be quite satisfactory and responsive to the needs of the regiment.

(j) Air Cavalry Troop.

(a) Employment.

1 Reconnaissance
2 Reaction force
2 Aerial fire support
4 Artillery adjustment

(b) Statistics on support rendered on Operation JUNCTION CITY I.

1 Sorties flown - 1,785
2 Hours flown - 1,653.30
2 Cargo moved - 84 tons
4 Passengers moved - 1,256

(c) Results.

1 US
   a) WRA = 0
   b) KBA = 1
2 VC
   a) KBA (EC) = 8
   b) KBA (FCSS) = 2
   c) Structures damaged = 16

Page 6 of 44 Pages
d. Structures destroyed - 1

e. Sampans destroyed - 1

(d) Ammunition Expenditures:

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<td>1,767,700</td>
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<td>2.75&quot; rocket</td>
<td>2,289</td>
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<td>155mm CS Clusters</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>6,603</td>
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</table>

(a) Timeliness and effectiveness. The aerial support provided proved to be highly effective particularly when a specific target was uncovered or identified. However, its overall effectiveness could have been greatly enhanced if specific rules of engagement had been established. Additionally, the positioning of fire teams out with the squadron CP’s reduced the overall coverage capability of the troops. The battle area was of such a size that it presented no limitations as to appreciable time gaps between the ground commanders request and the time the aircraft were overhead. The average time was from 5 to 10 minutes.

f. Air Force. Since the regiment was OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division for the operation, close coordination and planning was required by the ALO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the ALO 25th Infantry Division. The 25th Division required all preplanned air requests to be submitted through the Division „0-3 Air Planning section so that the air support effort could be effectively coordinated for all operating units. Immediate requests would be sent in as usual through the Direct Air Request Net (DARN); however, prior to submitting an immediate request the airborne FAC would check with Issue Control (TACP, 25th Infantry Division) for possible diversion of an airborne flight. This diversion of airborne aircraft from a lower priority preplanned target to a high priority immediate target is standard practice in large operations and is highly desirable for it cuts reaction time considerably, thereby greatly enhancing the overall effectiveness of close air support. On several occasions during the operation, tactical fighter aircraft were over a target delivering ordnance less than ten minutes from the time of the request.

The Blackhorse Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) deployed with the TOC and was operational at both of the forward CP’s used for the operation. Both FAC aircraft and fighter aircraft used to support the Regiment were coordinated and controlled by this facility. FAC 0-1 aircraft escorted all Blackhorse convoys amount to end from the operational area and provided full daylight hour coverage over the area with night coverage available on request throughout the operation. Full FAC coverage was also given the 2nd Squadron which had remained at LONG QIAO as the base camp security element. Giving full FAC coverage at two widely separated locations taxed the limited resources of the TACP; however, through tight scheduling control and the maximum use of resources all requirements were met.

Due to the distance of the operational area from the normal operating location of the TACP, 0-1 aircraft, the aircraft and pilots deployed to DAÚ TIBHD and operated from that location throughout the operation.

The FAC and Tactical Air coverage provided during the operation were of the highest quality and provided a major contribution toward the success of the mission.

FAC and Tactical fighter/bomber sorties flown in support of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment operations,

(2) Total 0-1 sorties - 127 (326.605 hours)

(a) Forward Air Control - 51 (165.616 hours)
(b) Convoy Escort - 13 (31.125 hours)
(c) Visual Reconnaissance - 61 (161.308 hours)
(d) Artillery Adjustment - 2 (1.610 hours)

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(2) Fighter/Bomber Support

(a) Total strike aircraft missions - 92
(b) Total strike aircraft sorties - 231
(c) Immediate missions - 19 (111 sorties)
(d) Preplanned missions - 113 (120 sorties)

(3) Size and Composition of forces:

(a) Immediate missions - by flight

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<td>2 F-5</td>
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<td>6 MK-82 / 6 750 NAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3 F-4</td>
<td>12 MK-117 / 8 750 NAP / 3000 20mm</td>
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<td>6 MK-117 / 6 750 NAP / 1800 20mm</td>
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<th>Range</th>
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<td>6 MK-82 / 6 750 HAP / 2400 20mm</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>4 MK-82 / 2000 20mm</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>4 MK-82 / 6 750 HAP / 1600 20mm</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>6 MK-82 / 6 750 NAP / 1600 20mm</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-5</td>
<td>4 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 2000 20mm</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>6 MK-82 / 6 750 NAP / 1600 20mm</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>F-5</td>
<td>4 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 1000 20mm</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>4 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 1600 20mm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>4 MK-82 / 76 2,75&quot; RX / 1600 20mm</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC-W</td>
<td>85 FURES / 15,000 7.62mm</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-7</td>
<td>52 FURES / 12,000 7.62mm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-7</td>
<td>60 FLARES / 13,500 7.62mm</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AC-7</td>
<td>60 FLARES / 12,000 7.62mm</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC-7</td>
<td>12 FLARES / 15,000 7.62mm</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>6 MK-82 / 6 750 HAP / 1000 20mm</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-5</td>
<td>4 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 1000 20mm</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>6 MK-82 / 6 750 NAP / 1500 20mm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-5</td>
<td>4 MK-82 / 4 750 NAP / 1000 20mm</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Preplanned missions diverted to immediate targets of higher priority.

(b) Preplanned missions by Flight:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>MK Missiles</th>
<th>HAP / MUNITIONS</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-4</td>
<td>12 MK-117 / 8 750 HAP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>6 MK-82 / 6 750 HAP / 2400 20mm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4</td>
<td>12 MK-117 / 8 750 HAP / 1200 20mm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4</td>
<td>12 MK-117 / 8 750 HAP / 1200 20mm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-5</td>
<td>4 MK-82 / 4 750 HAP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4</td>
<td>12 MK-117 / 7 750 HAP</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4</td>
<td>12 MK-117 / 4 750 HAP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>6 MK-117 / 6 750 HAP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-57</td>
<td>8 MK-117 / 8 750 HAP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-200</td>
<td>6 MK-82 / 6 750 HAP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Damage Assessment (DAS) was rather poor, particularly when compared to the large amount of heavy ordnance delivered. It does not reflect the inability of air power to hit and destroy targets, but rather the general ineffectiveness of the Intelligence Gathering System. On many occasions, different locations were targeted by multiple aircraft, but the effectiveness of the attacks was lower than expected.

(b) APCs and helicopter damage were claimed, with targets selected by the regiment. Though the specific bomb and ordnance types were not confirmed, it is likely that the ordnance was delivered in a manner that was not consistent with the typical pattern for these types of attacks. This suggests that the intelligence gathering was not as effective as intended, leading to the use of multiple aircraft to target the same area.

(c) The attack was successful in achieving its objectives, leading to the destruction of the post-strike BDA and the elimination of the enemy's ability to conduct operations in the area.

(d) The attack was successful in achieving its objectives, leading to the destruction of the post-strike BDA and the elimination of the enemy's ability to conduct operations in the area.

(e) The attack was successful in achieving its objectives, leading to the destruction of the post-strike BDA and the elimination of the enemy's ability to conduct operations in the area.

(f) The attack was successful in achieving its objectives, leading to the destruction of the post-strike BDA and the elimination of the enemy's ability to conduct operations in the area.
ground follow-up action revealed nothing in the vicinity. Many of the immediate type, close support of ground troop targets had the tactical fighter/bomber crews delivering ordnance within 100 meters of the friendly troops with excellent results. This truly is close support, and attests to the high skill level of the FAC's and strike pilots.

(a) Recap of ordnance delivered:

- 7.50" BOMBS - 313
- 500# BOMBS - 237
- 250# BOMBS - 27
- BLU-3 or BLU-27 750# W/PALM BOMBS - 383
- LBU-3 1500# (3.9 1500#) - 34
- FLARES - 38
- 20mm RDS - 96,000
- 25 OML RDS - 100
- 7.62mm RDS - 67,500

(b) Bomb damage assessment (post-strike mission reports):

- KBA - confirmed - 15 / possible - 28
- Bunkers or foxholes destroyed, damaged or uncovered - 92
- Trenches destroyed, damaged or uncovered (meters) - 825
- Secondary explosions - 7
- Secondary fires - 1
- Supply or storage structures destroyed - 4

7. (c) Civil Action/Psychological Warfare

(a) Psychological warfare support was provided by the 10th Mobile Field Propaganda Team. Daily coverage of the Regiment’s AO was made throughout the operation. In addition to leaflet drops by the team, coordination was affected with other units participating in the operation, thus insuring complete leaflet coverage.

(b) During Operation JUNCTION CITY I, a total of 29 psychological warfare missions were conducted. Twenty-two missions were made utilizing tape recordings for broadcast and seven combination (leaflet and broadcast) missions were accomplished. During the operation 160,000 leaflets were dropped and approximately 30 hours of broadcast time expended.

(c) Civil Action activities were somewhat limited in nature. This was caused principally by the lack of civilian populace in the areas of operation. However, 60 tons of rice were saved and evacuated back to LONG O14O, the Regiment's permanent base camp for later use in civic action projects in LONG KHAM Province.
(1) The area of operations (AO) for JUNCTION CITY has long been considered a Viet Cong safe haven, containing numerous base camps, hospital facilities, training sites, and supply facilities. Except for CIDQ operations and Operation ATTIRE, the area has been relatively untouched by FMAF. COSVN, controlling headquarters for all political and military activities in South Vietnam, is known to have agencies within the AO. The major headquarters of COSVN is believed to be operating from within Cambodian territory, with important subordinate elements operating along the border.

(2) Most Viet Cong facilities in the AO are believed to contain extensive underground complexes. Reliable reports indicate the Viet Cong have made a concerted effort to improve their defenses since Operation ATTIRE. All avenues of approach are expected to be heavily mined. The Viet Cong, if they are surprised or desire to fight, are expected to defend from well fortified bunker systems. The Viet Cong will probably not engage large friendly forces with direct confrontation. Harassing probes and mortar/recoilless rifle fire against forward bases can be expected.

(3) Order of Battle.

(a) Composition and Disposition: The following list indicates the last reported location of enemy units in and adjacent to the area of operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVALUATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COSVN</td>
<td>9th VC Div</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>271st Regt</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XX 210650</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 Feb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Within the AO, the 70th GD Regt and elements of the 69th Arty Regt must be considered immediately available for commitment. The regiments of the 9th VC Div, (the 271, 272, and 101 WIA) can be committed within 24-36 hours. The 273rd Regt and other regiments throughout the XII CTZ would take 72 hours or more to reinforce. Status of units available for commitment from locations in Cambodia is unknown; however, it does not seem probable that trained combat units in any measurable force would be held in Cambodia in preference to Vietnam where employment could be much more quickly accomplished with no threat of political overtones.

(c) It can be assumed that the VC will make extensive use of mines and booby traps to slow and canalise the FMAF operating in the area. The VC can also be expected to defend his supply areas, base camps, and headquarters areas from heavily fortified positions. Recently, information from all sources indicated increased activity in the building of fortifications in War Zone "D" Area.
(d) Major Units:

1. COSVN Headquarters and its many subordinates, although present within War Zone "C" for approximately four years, have maintained extremely tight security control, consequently little intelligence is known on the exact location and disposition of the headquarters and its subordinate elements. It is believed that the entire northern portion of War Zone "C" along the Cambodian border is utilized by COSVN, with a majority of the installations being underground and heavily fortified. Analysis of all available information indicates that COSVN has a headquarters complex within a 3000 meter radius of XT 2193. Additionally, a map captured by Project Sigma and a rallier who had been to COSVN HQ indicates that elements of the headquarters are located vicinity XT 6387.

2. Information on the 9th VC Division, though fairly new (early 1966) to War Zone "C", is more prevalent. Prisoners of War, ralliers, and documents captured during engagements with elements of the division have provided fairly accurate hard intelligence data on the division and its current locations and structure. The division can be expected to defend the base camp areas in War Zone "C" and PHMAF can expect attacks by division elements as they close on these base areas.

3. Additional units that operate within War Zone "C" are the 70th Guard Regiment, Group 69 Artillery Regiment, and 68th Training Regiment.

   a. The 70th Guard Regiment generally provides security within the War Zone "C" area, and elements of it can be expected to be found guarding important base and headquarters areas.

   b. Group 69 Artillery Regiment performs a mission similar to a US Type Corps Artillery in that it provides artillery battalions as required to support the main force infantry units. Any encounter with main force units of the 9th VC Division would probably turn up elements of one of the Group 69 Artillery Battalions in support.

   c. The 68th Training Regiment is believed to be located in the western portion of War Zone "C" area running the training areas and facilities utilized by the VC in their training program. Normally those areas and facilities are located near water (as are most VC supply installations) and established infiltration routes for ease of access and resupply. The 30,000 VC uniforms located northwest of TRAI BI on 6 Dec 66 are thought to have been part of the 68th supplies for new VC trainees.

b. Actual enemy situation:

The intelligence estimate proved to be quite accurate. Sophisticated fortifications, extensive base camps and training facilities were encountered during the operation. Small unit actions (platoon and troop sized) characterized the contacts. For the most part only security and delaying forces were experienced. The anticipated mines, booby traps, sniper fire and harassing mortar fire materialized. The majority of the mines encountered by the Blackhorse was the US M5A1 MINE or a VC/MINE version of it.

A total of 106 facilities of all types were found by 69 being discovered in the first area of operations and 36 in the second. A comparison of each of these locations with all previously reported intelligence information, principally the Viet Cong Installation List, indicated that 29 of 69 and 11 of 35 fell within 500 meters of a reported installation or 12.0% and 31.4% respectively. Overall the average was 10 out of 126 or 8.0% with the average error 133 meters (NW) by 178 meters (NE) or a 225 meter radial error. The correlation between reported and discovered installations was not nearly as apparent as during Operation CEDAR PAILS. Of these facilities found fall within 500 meters of a reported installation. Much of this can be attributed to the lack of sufficient detailed reports on War Zone "C" as well as the nature of the terrain which undoubtedly prevented units from easily uncovering installations without a thorough, time consuming search. The correlation is still high enough to warrant detailed consideration of the Viet Cong Installation List when targeting for or searching during operations.
d. Sources of Information:

Various intelligence sources were utilized before and during Operation JUNCTION CITY I. Preliminary intelligence estimates were gleaned from Viet Cong Installation lists (1st Infantry Division), SPAR and agent reports, Periodic Intelligence Reports (21 Field Force V), terrain studies and reports received through Vietnamese intelligence channels. Daily intelligence was obtained from FW interrogation reports and ground (ambush and sniper patrols) and aerial reconnaissance activities. Reconnaissance operations were also supplemented by night vision devices. Only one Red Rase mission was flown in support of the regiment during the operation. Captured enemy documents also provided information particularly concerning the Viet Cong’s organization and order of battle.

d. Terrain analysis.

(1) General.

The area of interest for Operation JUNCTION CITY I, known as War Zone Alpha, is located north of the city of TAY NINH in TAY NINH Province. It is bordered on the north and west by the Cambodian border and Highway 13 to the east.

(2) Observation.

Observation throughout the area is largely dependent upon vegetation. In those areas where rice is grown, the observation is good during this period. Areas of dry crops and grasslands are to be found scattered throughout the area and in those regions observation may range from good to poor. In the remainder of the area, the observation is poor both ground and aerial, due to dense undergrowth and forests.

(3) Fields of Fire.

Fields of fire are extremely limited in areas of dense forest and heavy undergrowth. The rice growing and dry crop areas offer the best fields of fire. The dikes in the rice growing regions limit fields of fire somewhat for flat trajectory weapons. Weapons positioned on Nui Ba Den control the approaches to this feature very effectively. The only limitations to fields of fire for high trajectory weapons are the reverse slopes of Nui Ba Den.

(4) Cover.

Individuals and small units may obtain cover from flat trajectory weapons by utilizing the rice paddy dikes, shell craters, and ravines. The principal cover afforded from high angle fire weapons are caves in Nui Ba Den and extensive bunker and trench systems located throughout the area.

(5) Concealment.

All forested areas offer good concealment from both ground and air observation. Concealment in bamboo areas is considered good, from ground observation. The small villages located within the area offer good concealment for small foot mobile units.

(6) Obstacles.

Dense forests and bamboo in the central and eastern portions of the area are formidable obstacles to both foot and vehicle movement. The small streams in the eastern portion are fordable by foot troops. Rice growing areas do not present obstacles to either foot troops or armor and the mountain can be used as a weapons base to interdict any routes within range.

(7) Movement.

The area as a whole provided only poor to unsuitable terrain for cross-country movement. During the period November thru April, cross-country movement for tracked vehicles is locally good. Dense undergrowth is normally the only limiting factor. From May to October, cross-country movement for tracked vehicles is primarily limited to roads and well drained trails.
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(8) Terrain Features.

Mau Bo Den is the dominating geographical feature in the surrounding lowland area. The roads, airfields and cleared areas (potential LZ's, fire support bases, forward supply areas) in the area are considered essential terrain features in as much as they are critical to any operations conducted in the area.

(9) Avenues of Approach.

(a) General. Possible vehicular approaches into the area from the north (Cambodia) are limited to Highway 22 and Route 1 and T113. Principal foot avenues of approach limited to jungle trails and stream beds traversing the area.

(b) Roads in the area.

1. Highway 22 ranges from a single lane, laterite surfaced, all weather road in good condition near TAT MINH (XT115707) to an overgrown route not usable in its present condition. It is a fair all weather route up to within 5 kilometers of the Cambodian border. The one bridge (XT097753) along the route has been destroyed, leaving a water gap of 12 meters. The superstructure is still in place.

2. Route T11 is a single lane surfaced all weather road in fair condition from TAT MINH to XT280683. From that point to the Cambodian border it deteriorates to a fair weather road. During the dry season (November thru April) the route is normally trafficable to both wheeled and tracked vehicles. Three bridges are located along the route and are generally in need of repair and strengthening prior to sustatined use.

3. Route T113 as a single lane laterite surfaced road in very poor condition. Approximately 300 hasty or deliberate road cuts exist that would require major engineer effort to repair. All the bridges along the route have been either destroyed or damaged. An on the ground reconnaissance must be made to determine the capacity of each bridge.

8. (C) MISSION.

The mission assigned to the Blackhorse Regiment was to move to a forward position and then attack in one to destroy OQBN facilities and VC/WA forces and then to conduct search and destroy operations in assigned areas of Operation (AO's).

9. (C) CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION. The operation was planned in three phases:

a. Phase I was to be executed from D-1 to D-Day. At D-1 the 1st Bn, 31st Inf (M) and B Battery, 3rd Bn, 13th Artillery became OPCON to regiment and moved from TAT MINH to secure a Forward Support Area (FSA) in the vicinity of XT28068 and to establish a temporary Fire Support Base (FSB) at the same location. The regimental headquarters and maneuver elements was to deploy on D-1 to forward assembly areas south of Phase Line BASE and to establish FSB BRAVO (see Phase I overlay).

b. Phase II began on D+1. The regiment was to attack in zone to the north with the three task forces authorized to destroy OQBN facilities and VC/WA forces and to seize Objectives BLUE, GREEN, and RED. (see Phase II overlay)

a. Phase III was to begin, at the earliest, on D+2. The regiment, in order, was to conduct search and destroy operations in assigned AO's to destroy OQBN facilities and VC/WA forces.

10. (C) EXECUTION.

18 and 19 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

The regimental headquarters with normal attachments, the 1st Squadron and the 3rd Squadron departed the Blackhorse Base Camp beginning 1800H. The 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M) became OPCON to regiment 1900H.
1st Squadron.

Commencing at 182200H, the Squadron, assuring the regimental headquarters and normal attachments, departed the Blackhorse Base Camp and conducted a night tactical road march to a forward assembly area, in the vicinity of XT36W (near TAT NINH, NVN). There were no incidents during the march and the squadron and its escorted elements closed at 191030H.

2nd Squadron.

During the morning and early afternoon hours the squadron prepared to move forward to the area of operation. The squadron (escorting elements of the 189th Maintenance Battalion) departed the Blackhorse home station at 192300H and conducted a night tactical road march, closing at a forward assembly area (in the vicinity of XT036) at 201100H without incident.

20 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

The 3rd Squadron continued its move to its assembly area (closing at 201100H). The 1st Squadron conducted search operations in Area JOHN (center of mass XT361) under OPORD CAV-67. Elements of Troop C, 1st Squadron provided security for the regimental command post at XT361036.

1st Squadron.

Troops A and B conducted area reconnaissance and route clearing in Area JOHN. Troop C (-) conducted aordon and search operation of a village at XT361025, and conducted convoy escort from the regimental combat base and for a water point in the vicinity of XT376025.

at 0850H, Troop A discovered one 105mm artillery round at XT333137 and one 60mm defused round. Both projectiles were destroyed in place. At 1225H, the troop encountered a large log roadblock. A 90mm round was fired at the barricade resulting in a large secondary explosion (at XT323067). Elements of the 1st Platoon, 929th Engineers, attached to the troope detonated a large booby trap in a cut in the road at XT323067, and a large secondary explosion resulted from the detonation. At 1330H, near XT336010, Troop A destroyed one 60mm round and uncovered a hole 9 by 3 feet, and a large secondary explosion resulted when a grenade was thrown into the hole. At 1405H, two detainees were apprehended at XT326032 and evacuated to the regimental combat base.

Troop B found an unused trench line one hundred meters long at XT281110.

Troop C apprehended two detainees at 0945H. The individuals were discovered at XT372025 without ID cards.

2nd Squadron.

The squadron continued its tactical road march from the Blackhorse Base Camp closing its destination at XT03691, at 1405H.

4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (A)

Commencing at 200700H, the battalion began to move from TAT NINH Base Camp to a forward support area at XT2868, arriving at 1115H, after clearing the route. At 0930H, at XT286619 elements of the battalion discovered one hundred graves, of which about 25 appeared to be fresh. Approaches to the grave site were booby trapped with a claymore mine. The mine was neutralised.

21 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

The regiment continued combat operations in accordance with OPORD CAV-67 with reconnaissance, and search and destroy operations in AO BENG southeast of TAT NINH. Much of the day was utilised by elements of the regiment to position themselves for Operation JUNCTION CITY.
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1st Squadron

The squadron conducted reconnaissance, search and destroy missions in the northern sector of AO BREVET, area JOHN with Troops A and B. Troop C remained OCPON to regiment and provided security for the regimental headquarters/trains location, and escorted convoys to and from support base locations. Company D continued to secure the water point at XT397468 and acted as a blocking force for the search and destroy mission assigned to Troop B. Howitzer Battery continued to provide fires in direct support of the squadron.

At 0900H, Troop C found two homemade AT mines, while on a convoy escort mission, at XT900261. The mines consisted of three pounds of TNT each and were encased in bamboo. The mines were neutralized and removed.

3rd Squadron

Troops J, K, and L, and Company M conducted patrolling in the southern sector of AO BREVET (area PAT). At 1250H, elements of Troop K discovered an anti-personnel mine in the road at XT188447 and destroyed the mine in place.

1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M)

The Battalion prepared for Operation JUNCTION CITY I at a FSA at XT2856. At 0900H, a reconnaissance vehicle truck a mine fifty meters east of the road in the vicinity of XT282621. The incident resulted in one US WIA and damaged the front suspension system.

22 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

At 0700H, the Blackhorse Regiment initiated Operation JUNCTION CITY I (in accordance with OPCORD 05-67 Operation JUNCTION CITY Alternate). At 0900H, the 1st and 3rd Squadrons Howitzer Batteries became OPCON to the Blackhorse Regiment Task Force Artillery (TF ART; 11 ACR). The regimental headquarters and regimental logistical elements moved to a forward location at XT277486 known as the "French Fort", while Task Force Artillery deployed to Fire Support Base Brave. The 1st and 3rd Squadrons and the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry moved to forward assembly areas. At 1000H, an Air Cavalry Troop truck hit a pressure type mine at XT215678 resulting in moderate vehicle damage but no casualties.

1st Squadron

The squadron moved to its forward assembly area at XT2573 beginning at 1116H. Company D escorted regimental headquarters to its forward location, and upon completion of that move, became OPCON to the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M).

2nd Squadron

The squadron moved to a forward assembly area at XT2372, commencing the move at 1025H.

At 1150H a tank from Company K hit a mine at XT260701 with damage resulting to the right track and road wheels. One US was WIA.

4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M)

The battalion moved to a forward assembly area at XT2075. At 1040H, an ACV from Company B hit a mine at XT202697 resulting in three US WIA and heavy damage in the vehicle's suspension system and fuel. The mine left a crater twelve feet wide and four feet deep. Three rounds of small arms fire were received immediately after the mine was detonated and was returned with unknown results.

23 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

CONFIDENTIAL
At 0700H, the regiment jumped off in the attack, moving north in some to seize objectives in the northern portion of AO TIGER. The 1st Squadron was the right flank unit, the 3rd Squadron was in the center and the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M), was on the left.

1st Squadron

The squadron attacked at 0700H and reached Objective RED by dark.

At 0955H, Troop B destroyed four foxholes with overhead cover at XT278837. At 1020H, the troop destroyed seventeen two man foxholes at XT227539. An AAV from the troop hit a pressure type mine destroying six road wheels with negative casualties. At 1035H, the troop destroyed thirty spider holes that were camouflaged at XT275858. The troop found and destroyed at 1600H, eight rows of punji stakes that were camouflaged in the ground. A freshly dug grave was found at XT278899 at the same time. At 1650H, elements of the troop found a trail in a ravine. The trail led to two camouflaged bunkers (XT278899) with firing ports. The bunkers were destroyed at 1650H. At 1200H, an AAV hit a mine at XT259525, resulting in light vehicle damage and three US WIA. At 1255H, an AAV from the troop hit a mine which resulted in three US WIA. At 1310H, Troop B destroyed two covered foxholes connected by trenches at XT260415. At 1200H, an AAV from the troop detonated a pressure type mine at XT265820 damaging 1 road wheel and unseating the 50 Caliber Cupola.

Troop C received fire from a claymore at 1015H. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 1205H, the troop destroyed a Viet Cong Base Camp at XT228787 which contained a table and several food rations at 1230H. The troop, at 1300H, destroyed a 250 pound bomb that had apparently been carried to XT278837 by hand.

3rd Squadron

At 0700H, the squadron moved to attack north in the center of the regimental sector.

A Troop K AAV hit a mine at 0855H. The mine blast caused suspension system damage and four US WIA. The troop found two bunkers and six foxholes at 1135H at XT225829. At 1200H, the troop received two rounds of sniper fire at XT225624. Fire was returned with unknown results. There were no casualties resulting from the incident.

Troop L found a Viet Cong Base Camp at XT228787 which contained a table and several food rations at 1300H. The troop, at 1400H, destroyed a 250 pound bomb that had apparently been carried to XT278837 by hand.

1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M)

The battalion crossed the line of departure and attacked slowly towards the north commencing at 0700H.

At 1300H a Company D tank attached to the battalion hit a mine at XT2235064 damaging the road wheels and track on the left side of the vehicle. There were no casualties. A second tank from the company then hit a mine at XT278836, resulting in moderate damage, but no casualties. Yet another tank struck a mine at XT237805 at 1417H resulting in moderate damage but failed to produce any casualties. At 1900H, the company found and destroyed a Viet Cong Base Camp of four bunkers at XT238808.
February 1967

IXth Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment continued to attack north in some and to seize Objectives GREEN and BLUE. Objective RED, having been seized the day before, was the scene of search and destroy operations.

1st Squadron

The squadron maneuvered within the general area of Objective RED conducting search and destroy operations.

At 0800H, a POL truck from Headquarters Troop hit a mine at XT263704. The truck was damaged and three individuals were WIA.

Troop A, at 0900H, received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated two or three Viet Cong at XT269003. The enemy fire was returned with unknown results. At 1000H, an ACV from the troop was struck by an RPG-2 round at XT3905. The vehicle was damaged and one individual was KIA. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 1045H the troop found an underground VC Base Camp. The fortifications consisted of five huts and five bunkers located at XT299917. At 1100H, an ACV was fired at with an RPG-2 round but no casualties or damage resulted. Fire was returned at XT285291 with unknown results. At 1300H, dismounted personnel from the troop engaged an unknown number of Viet Cong in a brief but sharp firefight. The troopers were wounded in the skirmish but enemy losses were unknown. At 1600H, elements of the troop spotted and engaged two Viet Cong as they ran east vicinity XT3905 resulting in two VC KIA (BO). An additional three VC were taken under fire (XT3905) with M-79 and automatic weapons with unknown results.

Troop B discovered twenty freshly dug bunkers at 1200H. The structures, located at XT266922, were destroyed. Thirty-five minutes later the troop found a base camp at XT2691. A search of the area was conducted; a base camp containing a bunker with a dispensary inside of it was discovered. Inside were radio parts, poncillia, OP key and a tunnel which led to the northeast for a distance in excess of one kilometer. Search of the area continued by the troop. At 1155H, a claymore mine was detonated against elements of the troop at XT25097 and resulted in two US WIA.

Troop C received automatic weapons fire from a Viet Cong Base Camp at 1100H. Fire was returned at XT269005 with unknown results. The troop discovered a large enemy facility with eighty bunkers and twenty-five huts, a dispensary with medical equipment, showers, livestock and weapons parts at XT25075 late in the morning and remained in the area for much of the day.

2nd Squadron

The squadron continued to attack center of sector towards Objective GREEN.

Troop K, ACV struck a pressure type mine which damaged the track but produced no casualties at 0700H. The mine was emplaced at XT266826. A tank attached to the troop struck a mine at 0830H which resulted in damaged tracks and roadwheels. The incident occurred at XT272890. At 1100H, the troop discovered three 30 pound mines which had been booby trapped. They were blown in place at XT272890. At 1600H, the troop received fifty rounds of automatic weapons fire but suffered no casualties. The fire had come from XT26907.

4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry

The battalion continued to attack north in the western sector of the zone. At 1200H, Company B, 1st Squadron (attached) discovered a mine (XT262822) in a small wooden box and it was destroyed in place. The company found an anti-tank mine at XT269866. The mine was blown in place at 1300H.

Company D found bomb shelters and trenches at 1200H. The fortifications, located at XT260000 were destroyed. At 1730H, the company discovered an old platoon sized base camp at XT297810.

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At 1900H, Company B located a VC training center vicinity XT288692, with one hut and a rifle range with silhouette targets. The site, at XT288692 appeared not to have been used for several weeks.

25 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The Blackhorse Regiment continued to conduct search and destroy operations while participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY I.

1st Squadron

Continued search and destroy operations in conjunction with Operation JUNCTION CITY I. At 1000H, elements of the troop came upon a complex which included 15 bunkers and 5 structures with sleeping quarters. A homemade claymore mine and clothing were also found. Two graves containing 2 dead VC (25) were uncovered and one body was marked with the identification number "B5649" and contained documents with the number "B360.221" written on them.

At 0830H, Troop B located seven bunkers on the edge of a small clearing vicinity XT290905. The structures were destroyed. At 1000H, the troop found an extensive bunkrow and tunnel system. It was unoccupied and appeared to have been so for several weeks. The area was subjected to incendiary and area fires for the next 2 nights.

At 1335H, Troop C found a complex of 10 bunkers. The fortifications were destroyed.

3rd Squadron continued search and destroy operations while participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY I. In an effort to determine trafficability and access routes to the northwest of AO TIGER, a reconnaissance mission was conducted to the west. At 1701H, a dozer tank operating with the 3rd Squadron hit a pressure mine, vicinity XT290901 resulting in damage to the track and suspension system and negative casualties.

At 1705H, Troop F was engaged by two VC, vicinity XT265920, who fired 4 or 5 rounds of small arms. Fire was returned and one RPO-2 weapon and one RPO-2 round was captured as was one CHICOM type automatic weapon.

At 0930H, Troop L came upon a well traveled trail running in an east-west direction in the vicinity of XT268690. It appeared that it had been heavily used. At 1100H, and again at 1120H, in the vicinities of XT268690 and XT279933 respectively, Troop L found numerous punji stake pits. The stakes were subsequently crushed by the tracked vehicles. At 1300H, Troop L found one bunker at vicinity XT268690 and destroyed it. At 1100H, vicinity XT268690, two ACAV's from Troop L hit pressure detonated mines. The first incident resulted in four US WIA and damage to the track while the second resulted in damage to the track and suspension system and no US casualties. At 1512H, a tank from Troop L hit a pressure mine vicinity XT268690, resulting in a damaged track and negative casualties. At 1705H, vicinity XT268690, Company L received 15 rounds of small arms fire. There were negative casualties and fire was returned with unknown results.

4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M)

The battalion continued under operational control of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Company K continued to provide security for the regimental command post and the regimental trains.

At 1900H, Company B located a VC training center vicinity XT288692, with one hut in good condition. Rifle range equipment and silhouette targets. The area appeared not to have been used for some weeks. At 1200H, vicinity XT290905, a M113 from Company B hit a mine resulting in 1 US WIA and damage to the track suspension system, final drive and roadwheels.

Task Force Artillery

Continued to support the regiment and the 4th Bn., 23rd Infantry while participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY I.
26 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment attacked west through Area L to seize Objective GLOBE, and to conduct search and destroy operations in the vicinity of XT245935 and in Fire Support Base FOCH.

1st Squadron

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in the general area of XT245935.

Troop A found two bunkers with overhead cover at 0730H. The bunkers, at XT 266926, contained expended .30 Caliber brass, fresh cigarette butts and signs of whittling. Two trails leading north from the area were found. An ACAV from the troop hit a mine, breaking the track, at XT289938. The incident occurred at 1011H and produced no casualties. Sniper fire was received by the troop at XT245935 at 1111H. Fire was returned; there were no friendly casualties. An ACAV hit a mine at XT245935; the incident occurred at 1200H, and no casualties resulted. The track on the vehicle was broken. At 1622H, an ACAV struck a mine at XT245935, but there was no damage to the vehicles and no casualties were incurred. At 1715H, a bunker was found by the troop. The structure contained a telephone and batteries, wire and ten RPG-2 rounds.

Troop B at 1100H, destroyed a mine at XT289938. An hour later the troop found a Viet Cong Base Camp at XT245933 as they maneuvered to apprehend two Viet Cong spotted earlier by an air observer.

Troops A and B, at 0900H, engaged in a sharp firefight with an unknown size Viet Cong force that was estimated to be either a reinforced platoon or company. Small arms, automatic weapons fire and RPG-2 fire was received by the two troops resulting in one US KIA and nine US WIA. A rice cache was found during the engagement. The troops returned fire and artillery and TAC AIR were placed on the enemy's position with unknown results.

3rd Squadron

The squadron attacked to the west through Area L to seize Objective GLOBE and to link up with the 5th Vietnamese Marine Battalion. The squadron closed on Objective GLOBE at 1530H without incident.

4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M)

The battalion conducted search and destroy operations in FSB FOCH. Company D, 1st Squadron (attached) found and destroyed, at 1100H, five foxholes at XT222890. The battalion reconnaissance platoon destroyed two bunkers and a short trench at XT202857. The structures were found at 1200H.

At 1300H, Company C found numerous footprints on and around a trail and oxcart tracks made by heavily loaded oxcarts.

27 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment continued to conduct search and destroy operations in sector. The 3rd Squadron cooperated with the Vietnamese Marine Task Force ALPBH in search and destroy operations in Areas L and P. The 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M) (-) was released from OPCON 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at 1100H for movement to their base camp at CU CHI. Company A of the battalion remained OPCON to the regiment for regimental command post security. At 1100H, a Chinook helicopter flying in support of the regiment received 200 to 300 rounds of automatic weapons fire from XT255935. The incident, resulted in no damage to or casualties within the helicopter. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 1300H, a FAC aircraft received small arms fire from a bunker at XT229946. The aircraft was not hit, and the FAC retaliated with an air strike on the enemy. At 1515H, an air cavalry troop light fire team...
observed three Viet Cong running west at XT29700. The enemy fired three rounds of the aircraft. The light fire team answered the fire with unknown results.

1st Squadron

The squadron executed search and destroy operations in the vicinity of Objective BLUE in coordination with Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. Company D, which was released from OPCON, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry at 0800H, remained in PSI FOB (XT203865) area until relieved by elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M) and closed on the squadron command post at 1200H. At 0800H, the squadron evacuated 1500 pounds of polished rice from an enemy base camp at XT215933. At 1005H, the squadron command post received an unknown number of sniper rounds from XT255295. An air strike was called in with unknown results. At 1500H, a light fire team flying in support of the First of the Blackhorse observed nine unattended Viet Cong cattle grazing at XT229929.

At 1300H, Troops A and B, Company D, and Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, engaged an unknown size Viet Cong force in trenches and bunkers at XT299412. The ensuing firefight killed one VC KIA and one VC WIA.

Troop A received sniper fire at XT25923 resulting, however, in no US casualties. The fire was received at 0955H. At 1300H, the troop captured a Russian rifle. The weapon, found at XT25923, was a MASANAGE rifle with a scope mounted on it.

Troop B found a base camp at 0955H. The camp, positioned in a heavy jungle at XT205912, contained fifty-one gallon cans of oil and two fifty-five gallon drums of rice. The troop discovered an enemy graveyard at XT229230. The site was found at 1136H and appeared to be six months old. At 1553H, the troop discovered and destroyed, at XT228947, one trench, five uncovered structures, and three bunkers five by twelve feet.

At 1030H, Troop C discovered one can containing medical supplies and documents at XT259913. The troop engaged three Viet Cong running toward the northeast in a woods vicinity XT212910. The enemy was engaged by small arms, automatic weapons and fire from the light fire team. Results were unknown.

2nd Squadron

During the day the squadron consolidated Objective BLUE in coordination with Task Force ALPHA, executed search and destroy operations in the northern portion of Area L, and conducted reconnaissance operations of crossing sites across the SVO CALON in the vicinity XT172894. At 1000H, the attached Engineer Platoon found and destroyed several bunkers with a trench system at XT172894. Items found at the location included a bicycle and a claymore. At 1030H, an OH-23D received two rounds of small arms fire from XT259216. There were no hits on the aircraft.

Troop L, at 1300H, destroyed twelve bunkers with trenches at XT175912. Six bunkers were on the north side of a river in the area, and six covered a crossing site over the river. Six of the bunkers were so emplaced as to be a "second line of defense", and all were oriented to the north. At 2100H, Troop L found a sign which indicated the presence of a minefield on the northern side of a stream near XT175912.

Company M accounted an enemy base camp consisting of large bunkers. The area, at XT159921, was thoroughly searched.

3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M)

The battalion, released from OPCON of the Blackhorse Regiment at 1100H, passed through the regimental area as it conducted a tactical road march to CU GRI. At 1100H, an M577 command post vehicle was struck by an RPG-2 round at XT279700 resulting in four US WIA. Fire was returned with unknown results.

28 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
The regiment concentrated the efforts of its maneuver elements on road clearing and search and clear operations. The search and clear operations were carried out in A0's BRK, MIB, and LIM in coordination and cooperation with the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division along Route 719, at 0000H, and 0230H helicopters, while flying at 1600 feet, received fire from XT185935. Two rounds pierced the helicopter bubble but the aircraft continued its mission without difficulty. At 0900H, an AH-64D VAMRN armed VHEL received intense ground fire in the vicinity of XT157935. The light fire team, of which the BRK was element, made two firing passes on the enemy. On the second pass the co-pilot of one ship was wounded and died on 1 March.

Company A, 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M) remained OP/CON to the Blackhorse Regiment.

1st Squadron

The squadron executed search and destroy operations in A0's LIM and MIB.

At 0000H, Troop A discovered a VC Base Camp at XT221930. Fifteen minutes later, other elements of the troop discovered an enemy base camp at XT215911. In a firefight with three Viet Cong in a bunker, at XT203929, the troop suffered two WIA. The engagement occurred at 0930H. At 1230H, the troop was fired on by fire from one VC ELR (RC) and one VC ER (ROS). At 1200H, the troop found documents in a base camp at XT213931 inscribed AUTHORITY. Medical supplies were found in a bunker and trenches at XT213931, at 1200H. In the same location the troops found, in addition to one GEPON carbine and one Mauser rifle, a 250 pound bomb marked BON CHIN TRI DOAN B2. The bomb was destroyed in place. The troop continued to turn up diverse material. At 1500H, they found a commercial radio receiver in a bunker at XT221930, along with a telephone, operating table, medical supplies, and fresh bread. At 1700H, two rifles, one with a folding bayonet, and women's clothing to include twelve small mixed bosomieres were found in the same area. Troop A, at 1830H, found a large hospital complex at XT215911. The area contained a VC uniform on a straw dummy, two operating rooms, two treatment rooms, one ton of polished rice, one hundred pounds of rock salt, six hundred rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, sixty pounds of documents, 250 pounds of medicine and one hundred pounds of clothing. The southwest corner of the complex had room for sixty patients and a room nearby had space for another fifty patients. This information was indicated on a map found in the area.

Troop B suffered one WIA when, at 0500H, a friendly claymore that had been returned was detonated against the troop, at XT203929. The troop found a trench system at XT10297, at 1325H. The troop killed four Viet Cong (RC) and one VC (ROS) at XT215911. In a brief encounter without suffering any casualties. At 1700H, in a bunker at XT215911, the troop killed a VC (RC). Troop B experienced protracted contact along a trail commute to the west along a trail. Five enemy troops were in trenches along the side of the road and jumped up to fire at vehicles as they passed by. The enemy seemed inexperienced and one of the four VC EIA (RC) had documents on his body indicating his membership in the 600th Training Regiment. The enemy troops were using CS gas west to east moving. At 1720H, the troop encountered CS gas moving west to east approaching their positions. A check with adjacent units and supporting artillery indicated that friendly forces had not used CS gas. At 1726H, the troop engaged two Viet Cong in a bunker with a tank, resulting in two enemy KIA (BC) at XT213929.

Troop C, at 1332H, destroyed an M1A1 mine at XT208965.

Company D found bunkers, foxholes, clean clothing, and a woman's diary at XT213921. The items were discovered at 1600H. At 1800H, the company found a sub-machine gun at XT213929. Company D, at 1830H, discovered a clothing factory with sewing machines at XT208950.

3rd Squadron

The squadron, in coordination with the VN Marine Task Force ALPHA, executed search and destroy operations in A0 LIM and A0 HEB. In addition, elements of the squadron reconnoitered crossing sites of the BON KAI at XT126925. At 0230H received small arms fire while flying at an altitude of 1800 feet from XT197928 at 0915H. The aircraft received three hits but continued to operate. At 1600H, elements of the squadron discovered an extensive base camp of trenches, bunkers, foxholes and anti-aircraft gun positions in two concentric circles.

CONFIDENTIAL
An ACAV from Troop L hit a mine at XT165929 resulting in track damage and three US WHA. The incident took place at 0910H.

A tank from Company M hit a pressure mine at XT165927 resulting in vehicle damage, but no US casualties. The mine was struck at 0910H. The company discovered a base camp/training area at XT159916. The camp was located at 0905H, and contained thirty-five 60mm mortar rounds, three Russian 7.62mm rifles, one RPO-2 round, 10,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, a wooden model of an O-1 aircraft, blackboard, paper, and small arms targets. The area also included an extensive fortification system.

1 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Their segment continued to execute missions initiated on 28 February.

1st Squadron

The squadron continued operations as initiated on 28 February.

Troop L, at 1600H, found thirty huts, a sewing machine, a can of cigarettes, fifteen cans (five gallon size) of medical supplies. At 2200H, members of the troop found a set of dogtags inscribed: “Vanneman, Robert G., 098987, Episcopalman,” at XT759912.

Troop H, at 1010H, received heavy automatic weapons fire from what proved to be an enemy base camp at XT215912. During the fight, an ACAV was struck by an RPG-2 rocket on the .50 Caliber hatch armor, injuring two crewmen. Suspected enemy location engaged with M60s and automatic weapons with unknown results. At 1000H, elements of the troop discovered an enemy hospital at XT212919. At 2110H, a diary was found in the area. The diary contained an entry to the effect that all personnel were to cease work and prepare for US operations in the area. The item was dated 27 February.

At 1120H, an ACAV from the troop struck a mine at XT223932. Though the track was damaged there were no casualties. Within minutes another ACAV struck a mine in the immediate area as the first mine incident. As with the first incident, the track was damaged, but there were no casualties among the crewmen.

Company D received automatic weapons fire from XT210935 at 1150H, resulting in two US WHA. Fire was returned with unknown results.

Three support squads from the squadron moved under the escort of the 2nd Platoon, Troop I to the regimental command post, closing their destination at 1117H, at which time they become OPCON to regimental headquarters troops. The 3rd Platoon, Troop L relieved the 2nd Platoon, Troop I, of its security mission at Fire Support Base L at 0935H.

2nd Squadron

The squadron continued to operate in coordination and cooperation with the Vietnamese Marine Task Force ALPHA, in AO’s LIMA and BAOR.

At 1720H, Headquarters Troop, observed an individual outside their perimeter at XT170926. The individual was engaged with automatic weapons fire and was soon to fall. The area was checked at first light, with negative results.

Troop L, at 1115H, destroyed a recently occupied bunker at XT140921. At 1130H, the troop destroyed two bunkers about four feet square, four "V" type trenches, three feet long, and one foxhole. The fortifications, all at XT142919, appeared to have recently been used.

At 1215H, Troop L found two bunkers and a trail running along a stream at XT151921.

Company M, at 1335H, destroyed four protective shelters made of logs at XT155927. At 1500H, Company M found an unused company sized base camp at XT152928.

CONFIDENTIAL
2 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment continued search and destroy operations in AO's BEAK, LIMA, and MIKE. In addition, the regiment continued road clearing operations in coordination with the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division along Route TLU. Troop I and Company A, 11th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M) remained OPCON to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during the day as they protected the regimental command post and logistical base. The regimental headquarters prepared to move from the position it had occupied since D+1 (the "French Fort") to a new location in AO Blackhorse (see Annex A). The regimental trains and squadron trains dropped off at THAI KI (XVII5705) at the 25th Division logistical support base.

At 1030H, a UH-1E from Air Cavalry Troop received four rounds of fire but no hits were received. The incident took place near XT29929.

1st Squadron

The squadron executed search and destroy operations in AO MIKE. Troop A (-) conducted road clearing and mine sweeping operations along route TLU in coordination with the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.

Troop A discovered an enemy base camp containing 250 pounds of medical supplies at XT21973. The camp, found at 0805H, contained four cases of condensed milk and four GHQ20 grenades.

Troop B, at the same time and in the same general area, found fifty pounds of medicine, eleven grenades and one typewriter. Troop B, at 1200H, discovered a possible hospital complex consisting of trenches and bunkers and patient recovery rooms. The hospital was located at XT21793H. At 1227H, the troop found seven boxes, five pounds of rice and old medical supplies at XT21972. A small Viet Cong Base Camp was destroyed at 1300H. The camp had been found at XT21795. The troop found female clothing and personal items in the same area later in the afternoon.

At 1000H, a Troop C AOR struck a mine at XT230910. The vehicle burned but was recovered. There were no casualties.

Company D, found two M16 rifles and one light anti-tank weapon (LAW), bandages, and fresh blood at XT201943, at 1444H. Later, in the same area, a ten man bunker and one Russian rifle were found.

3rd Squadron

The squadron continued operations begun on 1 March. The river crossing site previously secured was improved. Landing Zone RSD was secured for the helicopter extraction of the Vietnamese Marine Task Force ALPBA. The extraction was completed by 1100H.

Troop K at 0805H, discovered two bunkers and two foxholes in the vicinity of XT21973. The fortifications were destroyed. At 0900H, the troop discovered and then destroyed a platoon sized delaying position at XT19917. At XT19921, three spider holes, seven two man foxholes reinforced with logs, and two trenches were found and destroyed late in the morning. A small base camp containing fifteen bunkers was discovered at 1330H. The camp, emplaced in the jungle at XT19790, was destroyed.

3 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment's maneuver elements conducted search and destroy operations in Areas of Operation G and R. Regimental headquarters and supporting elements, and Troop I deployed to move by tactical road march to XVII9595. Troop I, departed at 0700H to secure the new location (within AO BLACKHORSE) and struck a mine two kilometers south of the old regimental command post, at 0714H.
The tank suffered light track damage but there were no casualties. Company A, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry, was released from OPCON I Armored Cavalry Regiment at 0700H, and followed Troop I until such time as it could move to TAI NINH and return to its parent unit. Regimental headquarters and supporting units departed the 1st French Post at 1600H, and proceeded without incident to move to new command post location in AO Blackhorse. Regimental trains and support elements dropped off at TBH BI as the regimental headquarters was moving. Task Force Artillery departed FIRE SUPPORT BASE 7, and escorted by a platoon from Troop A closed in the regimental headquarters at 1600H.

Within twenty-four hours after occupation at the new location, regimental headquarters was surrounded by a total of nine batteries of artillery firing in support of the 25th Division.

1st Squadron

The squadron conducted a sweep in AO N (See Annex B) and then executed detailed search and destroy operations in the same area.

Troop A, at 1130H, discovered and evacuated a small amount of unknown type medical supplies from XT15400H.

Troop B, at 0950H, had a tank fall into a tank trap turning the vehicle on its side. There was no damage to the vehicle and it was recovered.

Troop C, made the major contact of the day in support of an artillery/aviation Cordon at 1533H. The enemy was well entrenched at XT15793S. Air strikes and artillery were called in to the firebases. In 4000H, the results of the engagement were two VC KIA (BO), one VC KIA (CC), and one VC KIA (MM). There were no friendly casualties.

2nd Squadron

The squadron maneuvered within AO O (See Annex C) in search and destroy operations.

At 1100H, Troop I received two RPO 2 rounds fired from XT159913. The rounds caused no damage or casualties and were answered by small arms and mortar fire.

Troop L, at 0833H, found two tons of polished rice and 200 pounds of salt in several bunkers at XT159911. At 1130H, the troop discovered five gallons of kerosene, three hundred rounds of 7.62mm ammunition and 10 pounds of polished rice at XT157911. All the material was destroyed. The troop made a rare find at XT157934, when it located an operational OBCOM radio and cases. The radio was evacuated at 1300H. At 1520H, thirty-five GIW Dumbbells were found in the area and destroyed.

Company M, was fired on by an unknown type of antitank round at 0800H. The round fired from XT159913 missed the tank, but was 03 was WIA. No fire was returned with unknown results. At 0911H, the company found two bunkers with overhead cover, one rifle of unknown type, a small amount of flour and an extensive wire system at XT166917. The company then made contact with an estimated VC platoon at 0930H. The engagement resulted in three VC KIA (CC), and one VC KIA (CC), and took place at XT169764. By 1200H, the company had discovered an enemy base camp in the same general area. The camp contained seven rifle positions, numerous foxholes, seven claymores and five GIW 25mm rifles.

March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Maneuver elements of the regiment conducted search and destroy operations in Area of Operation O, and protected the helicopter extraction of elements of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Division and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. The regiment was given OPCON of the 1st Battalion, 25th Infantry (M) effective 0700H. The 1st Battalion, 25th Infantry was released from OPCON of the Blackhorse Regiment after the helicopter extraction of the battalion from Position COMIN at 1100H. Troop I, one platoon of Troop A, and three support squads from the 1st Squadron remained OPCON to the Regiment, and provided security for the regimental headquarters and Task Force Artillery.
1st Squadron

The squadron secured the extraction of the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry, at Position COUGAR and the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry from Position PANTHER.

At 1405H, Troop A, reported punji stakes lined both sides of a road at XT 142000.

At 1430H, a tank attached to Troop E hit a pressure type mine at XT02960. Vehicle damage was light and there were no casualties. At 1455H, an ACAV from the troop hit a pressure mine about 500 meters east of the mined tank. The vehicle burned and was destroyed. One US was WIA. At 1520H, an ACAV from the troop was hit by an RPG-2 through the right side of the vehicle resulting in two US WIA.

2nd Squadron

The squadron continued the same operations as the day before.

At 1000H, Troop F found three CHICOM grenades, three magazines, five pounds of documents and a shower stall at XT12912. Punji stakes four to six feet high were emplaced throughout the area. The shower and grenades were destroyed. Followup action by the troop in the same area (XT11912) uncovered a battalion sized base camp. Included in the complex were bunkers with connecting trenches, dining room, sleeping quarters with cots, kitchen, a number of pigs and chickens, five pounds of documents, medical supplies and a sampan.

3rd Battalion, 5th Infantry (M)

The battalion moved to Position OLQ85 where it co-located with the 3rd Squadron.

5 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Operations in AO O and N continued from the day before. Elements of the regiment protected the helicopter extraction of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Division. The Blackhorse assumed operational control of the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry effective 0700H. They were to be extracted at XT1394. The regiment also provided security for the extraction of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry from an LZ at XT099215. The regiment's maneuver and support units prepared to enter the 'ElephantEar' sealing the Cambodia border and conducting search and destroy in sector beginning 7 March.

1st Squadron

The squadron displaced to Objective PANTHER and protected the extraction of the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry, and Battery C, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery. Elements of the squadron also secured an LZ at XT099215 for the extraction of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry.

2nd Squadron

The squadron established a combat base at XT092663 and prepared for maneuver on 6 March.

Troop L, at 1340H, hit a pressure type mine at XT093850. The incident resulted in no casualties to US personnel and only minor track damage to the vehicles.

At 1340H, Troop L, found one butterfly type mine by the side of the road at XT091850 and destroyed it in place.

1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M)

The battalion displaced from Objective OLQ85 to AO Blackhorse at XT099295. At 1400H, an armored personnel carrier from the battalion was struck by a 75mm recoilless rifle round resulting in one US KIA and two US WIA.
Company B, found an enemy base camp at XT069218 and engaged an estimated four Viet Cong engaged therein, resulting in one VC KIA (DC). The VC had one M16 rifle and one RPG-2 weapon with two rounds.

6 March 1967
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment prepared to maneuver into the "Elephant Ear". At 0700H, the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M) was released from OPCON of the Blackhorse Regiment, and Company B, assigned control of perimeter security for the regimental command post and Task Force Artillery. Troop I, was released from OPCON 11th Armored Cavalry at 0700H and returned to its parent unit.

At 0725H, a UH-1D helicopter landing at the regimental command post received fire in the vicinity of XT0692. A light fire team was assembled and returned fire with unknown results. At 0955H, an Air Cavalry Troop gunship was fired at from XT058973 while flying at 1,100 feet. Fire was returned but enemy losses were unknown. At 1045H, a FAC reported a small trench system at XT029853 five to seven meters in length.

1st Squadron

The squadron moved from Objective PANTHER to Objective MUSTANG at XT095975, and prepared for maneuver on 7 March.

Troop A, at 1425H, observed a Viet Cong running in the vicinity of XT065857, but could not fire on the VC because of the proximity of friendly troops.

At 1637H, a tank from Company D, hit a mine at XT057871 resulting in only minor suspension system damage and no casualties. At 1900H, an AV from the 939th Engineers attached to the company struck a mine resulting in four US WIA and moderate damage to the suspension system.

3rd Squadron

The squadron prepared for operations from a combat base at XT02863.

Troop L, upon release from regimental control moved to secure a stream crossing at XT02863.

Troop E, at 1700H, discovered a series of ten two man bunkers from XT098162 to XT078562. In addition a four man bunker was found. The fortifications were destroyed. At 1720H, a tank attached to the troop received automatic weapons and RPG-2 fire at XT05862. No hits were sustained and there were no casualties. Fire was returned with unknown results.

1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M)

The battalion arrived at its combat base at XT097789 until released from OPCON, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. From 0230H until 0237H, the battalion was attacked by the VC using 60 and 82mm mortars. Approximately 120 rounds were received and forty-one infantrymen were wounded. Patrols discovered the mortar firing site at XT097789. During the attack counter mortar fires were shot by Task Force Artillery. An Air Force C-17 Gun and Flareship called to the scene could not orient itself and was released by the regiment.

3rd Battalion, 2nd Infantry

The unit remained at a combat base at XT126676 and prepared for operations on 7 March.

7 March 1967
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
Attached and assigned maneuver elements attacked in zone (See Annex D) and established blocking positions along the Cambodian border. The ID was crossed at 0730H.

At 0908H, an Air Cavalry Troop light fire team engaged two Viet Cong at XT08856 resulting in two VC KIA (2). Intense ground fire was received at 1130H from WT953777. The fire came from an extensive bunker system in an area. The aircraft had one rocket pod hit which it was forced to jettison. A second gunship was hit at the same time resulting in minor aircraft damage. There were no casualties in either instance. Artillery fires were placed in the area as were the fires of the gunship. The enemy force engaged was estimated to be an enemy platoon.

At 0827, an armored personnel carrier from Company C, 5th Infantry (M), hit a mine at XT022597, damaging the suspension system. There were no casualties.

A CH-47 "Chinook" helicopter received ground fire at 1730H. The aircraft was hit numerous times, but was not forced to land. The fire was returned at WT912801.

1st Squadron

The squadron attacked west in sector following the Cambodian border west and then south to the boundary with the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, establishing blocking positions.

At 0815H, Troop A, engaged one VC at XT025655, with unknown results.

3rd Squadron

The squadron attacked west along the Cambodian border after initially securing an LZ, and a ford site at XT090863 until the site security mission was assumed by the 3rd Battalion, 25th Infantry.

Troop K, destroyed a box mine at 0752H at XT090857. At 1025H, the troop destroyed two CM-336 antitank mines found along a trail near XT090857 and XT090863.

Company M, found a small storage bin, recently used pots and pans, and a four by five meter garden plot at WT970897. The storage bin was destroyed. The company found two knapsacks and a hut at WT976899, along with four fishtraps in a river at 1150H.

3rd Battalion, 25th Infantry

The battalion conducted an airmobile assault at XT01860 to secure a ford site at XT01865, and establish blocking positions along the Cambodian border. The assault began at 0720H, and was completed by 0937H without incident.

8 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment continued operations initiated on 7 March by conducting search and destroy operations along the Cambodian border.

At 1700H, a resupply CH-47 received automatic weapons fire from WT945587 resulting in fuel line damage and an emergency landing near elements of Company C. The company secured the helicopter during the night. No crewmen were wounded.

1st Squadron

The squadron executed search and destroy operations in sector between Phase Line FINTO, and the Cambodian border.

Troop A, found a wall used trail along a stream at WT907788 as well as fishing poles in the stream at 0900H. At 1030H, the troop found a hut filled with an estimated 360 cubic feet of unpolished rice at WT907792.

Troop B, found lines tied to trees, wood for constructing bunkers, and campfires with sticks to hold cooking pot. The camp was discovered at 0915H, in the vicinity of WT91001.
Troop C found a small base camp consisting of seven huts with bunkers. A sick slip was also found for a 15 year old boy suffering from malaria, in the base camp at WT935041. The camp was found at 0900H. The troop discovered what appeared to be an aid station containing documents, and medical supplies and unit identification as C105, at 1030H, in the same area as the base camp found at 0900H. At 1130H, the troop was engaged by the VC using an unknown type of explosive at WT 918800. Fire was returned, resulting in one VC KIA (50), one VC WIA, and eight VC KIA (POSS). A search of the area resulted in the capture of a bundle of booby trapped clothing and two weapons of unknown type.

Company D found two cows at WT937879 at 1130H. The animals were evacuated. At 1300H, the company discovered two bunkers, a blackboard and two pounds of documents at WT938055. At 1335H, an AH-1W was hit by an RPG or rifle grenade, and the vehicle was destroyed by burning. Five US were WIA in the incident at WT943882. The company found a base camp at WT939885 at 1330H. A search of the area disclosed assorted medical supplies, 10 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, four hand grenades, 250 rounds of small arms ammunition, one bag of rice and bloodstained propaganda papers.

3rd Squadron

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in sector between Phase Line PHNO and the Cambodian border.

Troop I destroyed a small base camp of seven small huts, one large hut, one small mess hall, a tailor shop, four bundles of punji sticks and 7 picnic style tables. The camp, discovered at 1115H, was located at WT997887. The troop destroyed fifteen foxholes situation in a defensive position at WT993878.

Company N found a Phillips all transistor radio (portable type) at 1100H, in the vicinity of WT993817.

3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry

The battalion conducted search and destroy operations between Phase Line PHNO and the Cambodian border. In addition the battalion secured the ford site at XT 096165. There was no enemy contact during the day.

9 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment, continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I, conducting night security and search and destroy operations. The night operations being conducted in the Blackhorse AO and the search and destroy operations between the Cambodian border and PL PHNO. Company D, 3rd Battalion, 5th Infantry (M) continued to provide security for the regiment.

At 1300H, an Air Cavalry Troop HHC-1C engaged one VC at WT943833 resulting in 1 VC KIA (RO).

At 1100H, an armored personnel carrier from Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M), hit a mine XT037999 with no casualties and light vehicle damage resulting.

3rd Squadron

The squadron continued search and destroy operations in their assigned sector.

Troop A, received sniper fire at 0900H, from WT930880 and returned the fire with 1 105 WBA as a result of the action. At 1130H, a recovery vehicle with Troop A was hit by a rifle grenade, vicinity WT931793. The grenade penetrated the front and hit an air filter, but the vehicle was still operational and there were no US casualties. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 1500H, Troop A discovered 1 VC KIA (50) with documents, file, and a letter from a US individual in Company C, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry. At 1700H, Troop A received small arms fire and 1 rifle grenade from a ditch on the west side of the road, vicinity WT07797. As fire was returned, a light fire team was called in for support. The results of the engagement were 5 US WIA, 1 VC KIA (50), 1 VC KIA (POSS). A followup of the contact at 1130H, meted 2 VC KIA (POSS).
At 1030H, Troop B discovered a VC hooch containing 55 gallons of gasoline and three 'bags' of cement at K9276L2. The hut and contents were destroyed.

At 0945H, Company D received automatic weapons fire from WY93872. Fire was returned with negative results and there were three US WIA. At 2045H, a Company D tank attached to Troop C saw movement to his front, vicinity WY907797. The tank opened up with canister and automatic weapons fire with unknown results.

3rd Squadron

The squadron continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I and conducted search and destroy operations in their assigned sector. At 0230H, Troop I received small arms fire from an unknown VC force, vicinity WY05872. Fire was returned with automatic weapons and claymores and resulted in one VC KIA (K) and one GRENCH type 56 carbine captured.

At 1915H, Troop L found and destroyed seven foxholes at vicinity WY950666.

At 1100H, Company M found a 12X16 foot shelter and one fish trap at WY957877. The structure and material were destroyed.

3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry

The battalion continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I under GPCC9 to the regiment. They conducted search and destroy operations with no significant incidents reported.

Task Force Artillery

Continued to provide fire support for the regiment.

Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery

Continued to provide direct support to 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry under control of Task Force Artillery.

10 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I, conducting night security operations in the Blackhorse AO. Search and destroy operations continued between the Cambodian border and PL PINTO.

1st Squadron

The squadron continued to conduct search and destroy operations in their assigned sectors while participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY I.

At 0915H, Troop A in the vicinity WY905798 found a hut and three foxholes with a blue wire leading north from the positions toward the river. At 1935H, an ACAV was hit by an anti-tank grenade in the gas tank resulting in two US WIA and one ACAV destroyed. Fire was returned with automatic weapons and an immediate air strike with unknown results. At 1130H, an anti-tank mine was discovered and destroyed on a trail vicinity WY907797. At 1140H, a tunnel and trail were found by Troop A running north-west from vicinity WY907797. At 1600H, vicinity WY92508, Troop A found a classroom 20X15 feet containing documents and fresh flowers on a table. In the same area, a three room hut (one VIP room, one film room) an extensive trench system, and 30 huts were found. Documents were found identifying the unit as CO7.

At 1500H, Troop B found a dispensary, vicinity WY92508. At 1725H, Troop A found a sixteen inch red star pennant and medical supplies in a stucco building, vicinity WY903797. The building was heavily boobytrapped and contained a sound proof room with double thickness glass on the windows, a place for a truck engine generator, a heavy coaxial power cable, places where antennas had been mounted, and a multiple machine with stencils.
3rd Squadron

The squadron continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I conducting search and destroy operations in their assigned sector.

At 2210H, elements of Troop I fired on three to five VC at XT000666, resulting in one CHICOM type 53 rifle captured and one VC KIA (BC).

At 2210H, Troop L received eight rounds of small arms, vicinity WT990877 (1000 meters from squadron command post). Fire was returned with unknown results.

At 2210H, Company H received five rounds of small arms fire, small arms fire, and recoilless rifle fire vicinity WT973582. Fire was returned with automatic weapons, a light fire team, and artillery with unknown results.

A subsequent sweep of the area following the break of contact, revealed a regimental sized base camp containing the following: Numerous concrete reinforced bunkers, a thirty foot deep tunnel type air raid shelter, extensive trench systems, two mass halls, a volleyball court, dispensary, a 100 foot lookout tower, underground rooms used as shelters for pigs and chickens, an underground cement magazine, a telephone, 300 feet of wire, a bicycle repair shop, three Russian 7.62mm Norin-Bagert rifles, one US M1 rifle, three US M3 submachineguns, two French MG 44 sub-machineguns, two CHICOM grenades, thirteen German Mauser rifles, four French MAS rifles, twelve bicycles, one 12 gauge Remington shotgun, one CHICOM type 21 heavy machinegun with anti-aircraft mount, and documents from North Vietnam. The bunkers and fortifications were destroyed and the telephone and weapons were evacuated.

3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry

The battalion remained OCON to the Blackhorse Regiment while participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY I. There were no significant incidents reported.

Task Force Artillery

Continued to provide fire support for the regiment from a fire support base, vicinity XT031788. Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery continued to provide fire support to the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry under control of Task Force Artillery.

11 and 12 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment continued to conduct night security and search and destroy operations in AO Blackhorse and in the area between Phase Line PINTO and the Cambodian border. Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M) continued to secure the regimental command post and Task Force Artillery. At 0600H, an airborne I.C. observed fifty meters of trench and four square shaped bunkers at XT001630. At 0730H, an Air Cavalry Troop helicopter observed two automatic weapons positions at WT995775. Fire was returned from the position. The helicopter received one hit in the engine mount. There were no casualties. At 1518H, another armed helicopter received fire from WT 995775. The aircraft received 1 hit, but there were no casualties. At 1522H, an Air Cavalry Troop engaged three VC at WT925785, resulting in three VC KIA (BC).

On 12 March the area in which the regiment operated was expanded to include the area between Phase Line PINTO and the boundary with the 3rd Brigade, 8th Infantry Division.

1st Squadron

The squadron continued to operate in sector, in search and destroy operations between Phase Line PINTO and the Cambodian border. Throughout the morning there was light but almost steady contact with the enemy. At 0830H, Troop B discovered a base camp consisting of ten huts, ten bunkers built into ant hills and one 55 gallon drum of polished rice near a river at WT925785. At 1101H, an ACAV was hit by RPG-2 or recoilless rifle round resulting in light vehicle damage and two US WIA, in the same general area.

At 1223H, Troop C received fire from WT925785. Fire was returned with unknown results.
At 1350H, Troop B, contacted a company sized force initiating the heaviest engagement with the enemy during Operation JUNCTION CITY I. The battle was fought in the area of WT921785.

The enemy was well entrenched in fortified positions and was equipped with HK2 recceless rifles, small arms and automatic weapons. Artillery, automatic weapons and TAC Air were employed against the fortified position until 111915H, when the position was sealed and major elements of the squadron withdrew to larger positions while keeping the enemy base area sealed off. Air Force flares and minigun fire was employed over the area throughout the night and the enemy area was illuminated continuously. Artillery and minigun fire was placed in the area throughout the night and the enemy area was illuminated continuously. Artillery and minigun fire was placed in the area throughout the night and the enemy area was illuminated continuously. Artillery and minigun fire was placed in the area throughout the night. One pod of air delivered CS was dropped at 111815H and two pods of air delivered CS were dropped at 120715H. A total of ten air strikes were placed on the target from 111200H to 121000H. A total of six Air Force Flare/Gunships flew in support of the 1st Squadron during the night. At 111845H, a light fire team flying in support of the squadron spotted and took under fire five Viet Cong along the river bank at WT925785. VC losses were unknown. Troop A, at 111215H, received automatic fire at WT925785 and returned the fire with unknown results. At 111850H, Troop B received recceless rifle fire of unknown type at WT925785. Fire was returned with unknown results. Troop C, at 111855H, received automatic weapons fire during the employed small arms were unknown. Troop A, at 111850H, received automatic fire at WT925785 and returned the fire with unknown results. At 111850H, Troop A engaged V0 snipers in trees with M79's inflicting unknown casualties on the enemy. At 112000H, Troop A reported that the most recent air strike had resulted in eight VC KIA (POSS) at WT925785. As of 112300H, the body count for the fight was as follows: twenty-four VC KIA (POSS), three VC KIA (POSS), nine VC KIA (POSS), and eight VC KIA (POSS). At 120715H, a light fire team flying in support of the 1st squadron delivered fire from WT925785 and returned the fire with artillery. At 120815H, location WT925785, an additional two VC KIA (POSS) were found by Troop A. At 120915H an AC130 from Troop A was hit by unknown type antitank fire at WT925785 resulting in one US WIA. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 121035H, Troop A found a GDM2 type 53 bolt action rifle at WT925785. A light fire team, flying in support of the 1st Squadron spotted two VC running into the jungle at WT925785. Troop C investigated. The light fire team received fire from the jungle (WT925785) at 121100H and called artillery fire on the area. At 121200H, Troop A discovered a water cooled heavy machine gun in a concrete bunker at WT925785. Inside the 15 foot bunker was a 105mm fort printing press complete with type. A second press was found in another concrete bunker vicinity WT925785. Artillery, automatic weapons and TAC Air were employed against the pressed area throughout the night and the enemy area was illuminated continuously. Artillery and minigun fire was placed in the area throughout the night and the enemy area was illuminated continuously. Artillery and minigun fire was placed in the area throughout the night and the enemy area was illuminated continuously. Artillery and minigun fire was placed in the area throughout the night. At 122515H, Troop B found one VC KIA (POSS) and Troop C found one VC KIA (POSS) at WT925785. At 123015H, Troop A found an AC130 in a bunker at WT925785. At 123515H, Troop C found one VC KIA (POSS) at WT925785.

3rd Squadron

The squadron continued to execute search and destroy operations in sector on the 11th and 12th. Troop L and Company I worked from Phouc Lien FDSO to the border with the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

Elements of Troop L fired on three or more Viet Cong at XT700666. The incident occurred at 1200H and resulted in one VC KIA (POSS) and one CHICOM type 53 carbine.

Troop L, at 110000H, discovered a well used trail running east to west at XT799859. At 0700H, the troops discovered a well used trail and a basket containing punji stakes at WT934800. At 112000H, elements of the troop discovered a damaged fish trap at WT999066, and all were destroyed.

At 110900H, Troop L discovered a well used trail running east to west at XT799859. The grave marker attacked in the unknown VC under which was killed by Americans. At 1200H, the troops discovered a well used trail and a basket containing punji stakes. At 112000H, elements of the troop discovered a damaged fish trap at WT999066, and all were destroyed.

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Troop I, at 117400H, discovered and destroyed one hut with three open stoves and five bomb shelters with interconnecting trenches at XT022866. At 121030H, the troop found five bunkers connected by a trench system at XT001864.

Troop K, at 121825H, destroyed six foxholes with overhead cover at XT987850. At 121120H, the troop found one large underground bunker at WT984849.

Troop L, at 121025H, found one well constructed building twenty five by thirty feet at WT977852. At 121120H, the troop found ten huts with interconnecting tunnels, one M1 carbine, one mess hall, and several pigs and chickens at WT906850. No casualties resulted and fire was returned with unknown results. A large building, wooden rifle, one M1 rifle, one German sub-machine gun, one wooden hand grenade, twenty-five pounds of documents, a musical instrument (horn), clothes, bicycle parts, one gas mask, two flashlights, and sixteen medical bags at WT977852.

Company M found, at 120855H, the following items in an enemy base camp: Six typewriters (only two operational), fifty pounds of documents, fifteen new bicycle tires, twenty-five new bicycle tubes and hand tools at WT970852.

On 11 March, the PSYOPS team conducted a speaker mission for two and one half hours during period 9715 - 0745 - 1000 - 1500 - 1600, and dropped 40,000 leaflets in the regimental AO.

On 12 March, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment PSYOPS team conducted an airborne speaker mission for three and one half hours in support of the 1st Squadron.

13 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I, and prepared for overland movement to the regimental base camp. Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M) continued under the operational control of the regiment and provided security for the regimental command post and Task Force Artillery.

At 1800H, an Air Cavalry Troop light fire team received automatic weapons fire, vicinity WT999790 resulting in negative casualties or damage. Fire was returned with rockets and automatic weapons fire with unknown results.

1st Squadron

The squadron continued search and destroy operations in their assigned sectors while participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY I. The squadron displaced to the vicinity XT0378 in preparation for overland movement to the regimental base camp.

At 1920H, Troop A reported capture on one CHICOM 1944 type 53 carbine and one 22 cal. bolt action rifle and discovered one VC KIA (KIA) in a bunker vicinity WT947858.

At 1630H, Company D captured two generators, vicinity WT947858. It was later determined that the previously reported generators were one cylinder engines of US manufacture (KUBEL in Wisconsin) and were possibly used in sampans.

3rd Squadron

The squadron continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I, conducting search and destroy operations in their assigned sector. The squadron also secured a crossing site, vicinity XT037864, and a landing zone, vicinity XT0586 for helicopter extraction of the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry. The squadron then displaced to the vicinity of XT0682 in preparation for the overland movement to the regimental base camp.
3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry

The battalion continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I and remained OPCON to the Blackhorse Regiment. The battalion conducted a tactical foot march to the vicinity of X0586 and prepared for heliborne extraction.

Task Force Artillery

Continued to provide fire support for elements of the regiment. Battery I, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery continued to provide direct support for the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry under control of Task Force Artillery.

11 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I. The regiment proceeded with the displacement of its elements in preparation for overland movement to the regimental base camp. The 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry was released from regimental control upon completion of extraction - 1st Platoon, Troop K continued to provide security for the regimental trains and the FSA. Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M) continued under OPCON to the regiment securing the regimental command post and Task Force Artillery.

At 1050H, an airborne FAC observed two VC transporting supplies across a river on a raft, vicinity WT9674131. A FAC again reported observing one VC running towards the Cambodian border at 1625H, vicinity WT937786.

1st Squadron

The squadron continued search and destroy operations in their assigned sector and displaced to vicinity X0376 in preparation for overland movement to the regimental base camp.

At 1020H, Troop A observed two VC running. One VC was carrying a paper, the other a weapon and were fleeing to the southwest, vicinity WT945782. At 1110H, the troop received one rifle grenade and small arms fire from across the river in the vicinity WT945789 resulting in one US KIA. Automatic weapons fire was returned with unknown results. Troop A destroyed three 55 gallon drums filled with fuel at 1115H, vicinity WT945785. The fuel was thought to be fougasse.

At 1230H, Troop B found fifty, one pound sticks of dynamite with US markings, one case of C3 explosive, twelve 100 pound bags of salt, several documents, a small quantity of grenades, and a trench, vicinity WT932788. At 1300H, the troop engaged five VC, vicinity WT928785, resulting in one VC KIA (BC), capture of one Thompson sub-machinegun and a document indicating the VC was a squad leader of unit 85-271. There were no US casualties. At 1650H, one HPG-2 round and small arms fire were received from an estimated three VC vicinity WT926788. Fire was returned with automatic weapons, TAC Air, and artillery with unknown results.

3rd Squadron

The squadron continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I, conducting search and destroy operations in their assigned sector. The squadron displaced to X0582 in preparation for overland movement. 1st Platoon, Troop K, continued security for regimental trains.

At 0900H, a Troop K tank hit an AT mine, and an AAV hit another AT mine, vicinity YTM889.

At 0930H, Troop I located an oxcart trail running north-south, vicinity WT 955881. At 1115H, automatic weapons and recoilless rifle fire was returned from west of WT955880 resulting in two US WIA. Fire was returned with unknown results.

3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry

The battalion was extracted to THAI III in eight lifts commencing at 1302H. The battalion was released from regimental control upon completion of extraction at 1358H.

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Task Force Artillery

Continued fire support for elements of the regiment from vicinity XT 916. Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery reverted from direct support 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry at 1300H to 08 (Reinforcing) under control of Task Force Artillery.

The PsyOp team conducted an airborne operation mission for two hours and dropped 150,000 leaflets in the areas: WT906 - WT9976 - WT9149 - WT9566.

15 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment terminated search and destroy operations and the squadrons moved to night laager positions in preparation for the road march to the regimental base camp. Regimental command post and trains escorted by Troop K departed AO Blackhorse at 1100H, making a day and night tactical road march. The regimental command post and trains closed the regimental base camp at 0300H on the 16th.

1st Squadron

The squadron terminated search and destroy operations and moved to night laager positions vicinity XT0787. Squadron elements departed AO Blackhorse for the regimental base camp at 1600H, and conducted a day and night tactical road march closing the base camp at 1800H on the 16th without incident.

3rd Squadron

The squadron terminated search and destroy operations in assigned sector, and moved to night laager positions vicinity XT0682. Squadron elements departed AO Blackhorse for the regimental base camp at 1300H, conducting a day and night tactical march closing the base camp at 1600H, on the 16th. There were no incidents reported.

11. (C) RESULTS

a. Personnel:

77 VC KIA (DS), 7 VC KIA (DC), 46 VC KIA (POSS) and 27 VC KIA (POSS). Eight individuals were detained and 3 Viet Cong were captured. There were no CHINH HOI's during JUNCTION CITY I.

b. Fortifications and Buildings:

216 structures, 655 fortifications, three water wells, one water dam and one footbridge were destroyed.

c. Material:

(1) Captured: 1 US M4 rifle, 1 AK-47 w/casegan, 5 M3 SMG, 7 Russian Mosin Nagant rifles, 3b Mauser rifles, 17 CHICOM type 53 carbines, 17 French MAS 36 rifles, 6 CHICOM type 55 carbines, 3 French MAS-49 SN9, 2 M-16 rifles, 1 Remington shotgun, 1 CHICOM type 24 Hvy MG w/4A mount, 1 CHICOM type 24 Hvy MG, 3 LAW, 1 Schmeisser MP-38 SMG, 1 M1 carbine, 1 Thompson SMG, 1 .22 Cal bolt action rifle, 91 wooden rifles, 3 VQ claymores, 1 magazines, 1 R-62mm TC barrel, 1 rifle scope, 1 RGO-2 rd, 61 60mm mortar rds, 1 case Composition C3, 50 1 lb sticks of TNT, 1 IED wood mod, 1 blackcoll, 1 CHICOM radio receiver, and 3 CHICOM protective masks.

(2) Destroyed: 1 CHICOM type 24 Hvy MG, 16276 rds of small arms, 163 artillery rds, 39 mines, 1 US claymore, 10 110 rds, 2 RGO-2 launchers, 22 RGO-2 rds, 161 grenades, 1 Hvy MG, 2 250 lb bombs, 150 50 lb bomb, 15 VQ claymores, 3 60mm mortar rds, and 3 82mm fuses.

d. Miscellaneous Items and Foodstuffs:

(1) Captured: 1850 lbs salt, 1 switchboard line, 150 tons of polished rice, 350 lbs clothing, 50 1 gal cans cooking oil, 1 cases condensed milk, 7 typewriters,
A mimeograph machine w/stencils, 2 medical kits and assorted medical supplies, 16 medical bags, 1 helicopter radio, 1 antenna, assorted radio and generator spare parts, 1 generator, 2 US VONDER engines, 2 printing presses, 251 lb documents, assorted hand tools, 2 flashlight, 10 batteries, 1 musical instrument (horn), 3 sewing machines, 1 snapshot, 16" roll of 16mm film, 2 microphone stands, wooden map board, unknown type container round, 3 bags cement, 2 telephones, 300 ft wire, 17 bicycles, 15 bicycle tire tubes, 15" stack of photos.

(2) Destroyed: 500 meters puntii stakes, 1 rice mill, 1 poncho, 30 pigs, 12 chickens, 6 tables, 6 fishtraps, 1 bicycle, 65 gallons gas, 5 gallons tar, 1 fish net, 5 meters detonating cord, and 1 sampan.

Friendly losses included nine US KM, 111 US WIA. Material losses were twenty-seven ACAV's one M577, one M578, fifteen M60A3, one 5 ton truck, one 2.5 ton truck, five OH-6C helicopters, and 2 OH-23 helicopters damaged. Seven ACAV's were destroyed.

Reaction to friendly air strikes was not possible in most instances. approximately 25% of the strikes initiated were followed up by ground maneuver elements. The missions assigned to the aircraft were the principal limiting factors on followup action. TAC Air during the operation was employed to engage suspected or known enemy locations and to neutralize objective areas. Because of the inaccessibility of most of the suspected or known Viet Cong positions, movement of ground forces into the areas was not feasible. However, when used on objective areas ground forces closed almost immediately upon termination of the strike.

12. (U) Administrative Matters

a. General. Plans formulated for JUNCTION CITY I proved to be adequate, resupply activities kept pace with consumption rates while replacement personnel continued to fulfill the daily needs of the Blackhorse. During Phase I (18-22 February) support for all classes of supply was provided by the 25th Infantry Division from supply points in their base camp at CU CHI. From 23 February to the termination of JUNCTION CITY I (15 March) logistical support was provided from 1st Logistical Command Forward Supply Areas at XT2867 and later at TAJ IK (XT1270).

Personnel activities were split with the initial processing and transmitting of casualty information from the forward area back to the regimental base camp. The quantity of paperwork dictated the requirement for it to be processed from the forward to high or headquarters. Consequently, all final action personnel and administrative matters were conducted from the base camp.

b. Logistics

(1) Resupply

Both ground transport and aerial delivery were used. Ground transportation was primarily used to move 155mm ammunition over a secured route to the fire support bases. Aerial delivery was used to haul Class I, II and V supplies to the forward elements of the two squadrons, since their locations were normally inaccessible by land lines of communication. All supplies were either drawn from supply points in CU CHI or forward supply areas.

(2) Maintenance

Maintenance support was provided by the 188th Maintenance Battalion with backup support provided by the 610th Maintenance Battalion.

(a) Repair parts. Numerous vehicles received damage to suspension systems from mines. Replacement parts were not readily available, thus limiting the number of tracked vehicles available for combat operations. Items such as left and right road wheel arms, road wheel hubs, seals, torsion bars, and road wheels had to be scavenged by scavenging the maintenance units in the area and by making frequent visits to the classification and salvage point in TAJ IK and the 506th Supply Depot in SAIGON. Experience factors established on Operation GODIN FAILED had not been cranked into the supply system in anticipati of the increased demands for these high mortality repair parts.

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(b) Evacuation. Seven M6A1 tanks and eight ACAV's remained in TNNH for evacuation by the 15th Support Brigade. The apparent lack of a sense of urgency by the supporting unit, resulted in a considerable loss of time. In fact it was some 30 days before the last vehicles were moved. This was necessary since the regiment does not have the organic tank transporters or low bed trailers required to evacuate the disabled vehicles.

(c) Transportation. Only organic transport was utilized.

(d) Supply and support statistics. Daily consumption figures were rendered by the Forward Supply Areas to the 15th Support Brigade.

(3) Treatment and evacuation of Casualties:

Casualties received during JUNCTION CUT I were light and the majority of the individuals sustaining injuries from hostile fire received them from either mines or sniper fire. Of the casualties evacuated, 30% were first sent to the 15th NSW and then transferred to either the 12th, 33rd, 5th and 56th Evacuation Hospitals or the 3rd Field Hospital. The maximum utilization of organic medical facilities in the regiment resulted in the treatment of 25% of the casualties in the battle area and their prompt return to duty.

(e) Communications:

(1) Communications to higher headquarters from regimental headquarters:

(a) FM Nets - The regiment entered the 25th Division Command Net maintaining close contact with higher headquarters.

(b) AM RATT - 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment entered the 25th Infantry Division Command Net Number 2, providing on-line radio teletype communications with higher headquarters (See Appendix h to Annex E).

(c) Telephone - A twelve channel VHF system was provided by the 125th Signal Battalion from the Blackhorse Forward CP to the Lightning Forward CP utilizing half of an AN/WSC-69 which provided the following circuits:

1. Common User:

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment S-3 TOC to 25th Division TOC
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment S-3 TOC to 25th Division Artillery Support Unit (b) to 25th Division Artillery
11th Armored Cavalry Air Cavalry Troop Forward to 11th Armored Cavalry Air Cavalry Troop

2. Common User:

Two 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Forward to 25th Division Forward
One 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Forward to Long Giao Switchboard

The three common user circuits provided access into the Army Telephone System.

(c) Teletypewriters:

A circuit was established through 25th Division Forward into Army teletype system. The AN/MQC-17 (Communications Center) and operating personnel were furnished by the 125th Signal Battalion.

(d) Regimental Train Telephone:

When separated from the regimental command post, the regimental trains were provided access into the Army telephones system by dual routes. Circuits were established into the 25th Division Artillery Forward Switchboard and into the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Forward Switchboard. The latter circuits were established through the use of a second AN/WSC-69 provided by the 125th Signal Battalion by establishing train-to-train telephone connections through a release system, an alternate capability was available in the event the first system became inoperable.
Communications to base camp from regimental field location:

(a) Radio Teletype:

1. AM Command/Intelligence Net established to base camp from regimental field location by using an AN/URJ-20D as the base camp station. This facility was provided by the 52nd Signal Battalion.

2. AN Admin/Log Net established to LONQ DINH and to base camp from regimental trains in cooperation with the 186th Maintenance Battalion, who provided one operator at LONQ DINH, two at base camp and the equipment at base camp. The remaining operators were provided by the regiment.

(b) Telephone:

1. Sole user circuit established from forward location to base camp to provide direct access between Blackhorse Forward Switchboard and LONQ QIAO Switchboard. A second sole user circuit was established from the Blackhorse Forward Switchboard to the regimental S-1 at base camp (See Appendix 1 to Annex B).

2. Cannon user circuits (2) were provided from Blackhorse Forward into Lightning Forward thus offering access into the Army telephone system (See Appendix 2 to Annex B).

(c) Teletypewriters:

Circuit to base camp from 11th Armored Cavalry Forward, through 25th Division Forward and II Field Force V.

(d) FM:

Admin/Log Net utilized almost continuously in the last field location due to the separation of the forward command post and the trains areas. It was also utilized in convoy control thus providing continuous communications (See Appendix 3 to Annex B).

3) Special Equipment:

(a) A PA-JUL battery charger was obtained to be utilized in converting AC to DC for operation of the radios within the Blackhorse TOC from a central generator power source, thus reducing the number of small generators and the necessity for running the M-777 engines. Due to the added ampere requirements of the AM equipment the PA-JUL is not large enough to provide power for all AM and FM equipment. Heavy duty 12 volt batteries are utilized between the battery charger and the equipment to provide a constant voltage.

(b) Techniques. It was necessary during one phase of the operation to install and utilize an FM retransmission station to provide communications between the forward maneuvering squadrons and the regimental headquarters. The AN/ARC-121 was utilized to provide this capability.

d. Administration.

1) In concept, the S-1 function during Operation JUNCTION CITY I was to be virtually the same as for CEDAR FALLS. That is to say, courier flights for transportation of personnel to go on R&R, mail for personnel located in the field, replacements for the field and equipment for the field, all were scheduled for movement via C-7A Caribou aircraft. As in CEDAR FALLS, aircraft for these missions were provided by II Field Force, Vietnam, 0-1 Airlift in coordination with the US Air Force. The awards and decoration activity remained virtually unchanged during the operation, as recommendations for decorations resulting from the operation for the most part were not submitted until termination of the operating. Purple Heart orders were cut by the medical facility treating the individual. To handle the limited amount of administration which was processed in the field the S-1 section deployed 6 personnel to the field; additionally, the assistant field director for the American Red Cross team with the regiment went to the field. The balance of the Regiment's administration remained in the base camp.
(2) In conduct of operations the three main problems encountered were as follows:

(a) Limited radio contact via AM voice and RTT relay through LONG BAY necessitated extensive use of land line communication. Heavy daytime traffic virtually precluded establishing contact with the forward S-1 elements, therefore most casualty reports and strength reports were fed to the rear area at night and relayed to higher headquarters. Due to communications difficulties, the majority of these reports were late.

(b) Another problem was the frequent diversion by higher headquarters of the Caribou aircraft scheduled for courier runs. When this aircraft was diverted, it became necessary for tactical aircraft to be pressed into service by the regiment to move personnel, equipment and mail to and from the forward area.

(c) Due to lack of cooperation from medical facilities treating wounded personnel evacuated from the combat area and the reluctance of medical personnel to divulge information over the telephone on the status of wounded personnel, it became necessary to install liaison personnel in the various hospitals that were treating the regiment's casualties. Ideally, two enlisted personnel (medical MGs) should be in each facility to obtain the necessary information regarding casualties and relay it to this headquarters. Two personnel at each hospital are required in order to maintain 24-hour operation. However, the regiment does not have adequate resources of medical personnel to fulfill this need. During Operation JUNCTION CITY I, personnel of the regiment were evacuated to nine different hospitals, including one as far away from the operational area as LONG BAY. If casualties are to be dispersed to such a wide variety of hospitals, it would become necessary to deploy as many as 16 or 20 qualified medics to liaison duty in hospitals. During Operation JUNCTION CITY II, after the initial wave of casualties leveled off, this problem could be handled with a three man team stationed at the evacuation hospital nearest to the operational area. However, if the number of casualties rises to the same high level experienced early in Operation JUNCTION CITY I, this organization would probably have also malfunctioned. There appears to be no feasible solution to the problem, of the lack of return information to the regiment from the medical evacuation system on the status of the regiment's wounded, short of stationing a casualty reporting team in each servicing hospital when a large number of casualties are expected.

(3) With regard to maintenance of morale, daily mail delivery and the periodic transport of beer and soft drinks was made to the forward area by aircraft. Additionally, Red Cross SKAIO girls were transported forward regularly to entertain elements of the command not in immediate contact with hostile forces.

(u) The only unusual activity undertaken during the operation was a daily helicopter liaison flight to the forward area by the regimental adjutant or his representative. Such a flight enabled the adjutant to fully inform the commander and executive officer of S-1 activities, and provided necessary personnel services, advice and information to other members of the regimental and squadron staffs.

13. (U) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES

The only special equipment utilized on JUNCTION CITY I was the employment of riot control agents. See paragraph 6d for evaluation of results and method of employment.

14. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS

Operation JUNCTION CITY I reaffirmed lessons previously learned on Operations ATLANTA and CEDAR FALLS. The unique dual combat capability of the Blackhorn Regiment's Modified T6H - the ability to move fast and the capability to conduct detailed search and destroy operations - was clearly demonstrated during the operation. During Phase II the maneuver squadrons moved north in the attack and cleared the area as they moved. The distance moved by the right flank squadron the first day was over 20 KM.

When Phase III began on D+2, the maneuver squadrons settled down to detailed search and destroy operations. The success achieved by the squadrons in the search and destroy phase of the operation is shown by their discovery of large numbers of enemy base camps, medical facilities and fortified positions.
The value of armor protection of fighting personnel was strikingly shown during the heavy and close-in fighting one squadron experienced as it fought its way into a tenaciously defended VC Base Camp. For an entire afternoon the three troops maneuvering in the area were exposed to intense small arms fire, recoilless rifle fire, and anti-tank rocket fire. During the fight, friendly air strikes and the fire of eight artillery batteries were placed in the area. Had the Blackhorse Troopers not had armor protection they would have taken more casualties than the wounded actually suffered (50 KIA). In addition friendly artillery and air strikes could not have been employed in close support without the protection afforded by armored vehicles.

Much of the area of operation was heavy jungle, yet the tanks and ACAV's of the Blackhorse were able to maneuver virtually at will. The rapid employment of AVLB's enabled the armored vehicles to maintain the momentum of the attack and maneuver in the three areas where stream crossing assistance was required.

During Operation JUNCTION CITY I the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment worked effectively with attached infantry battalions. The armored cavalry squadrons and the mechanized infantry battalions performed well as maneuver elements of the regiment.

The enemy's use of anti-tank weapons was more pronounced than on any previous operation. A total of twenty-nine armored vehicles struck mines during the operation. In addition, recoilless rifles, HEDP-Pockets and anti-tank grenades were used frequently against Blackhorse tanks and ACAV's. Nonetheless, however, in the fact that, despite the heavy concentration of anti-tank weapons, only four armored vehicles were destroyed by enemy anti-tank weapons.

The stubborn defense of their base camp by the VC on 12 March is worthy of comment. The VC enjoyed well planned defenses, and sturdily built fortifications. They were engaged by the equally determined men of the Blackhorse, yet the enemy defense, pounded by air and artillery, did not fail. The VC defenders fought coolly and stubbornly. This engagement was the most prolonged engagement in which the regiment has participated since its arrival in Vietnam, and the quality of the opposing force was above that of either the 27th or 275th Regiments previously engaged by the 11th Armored Cavalry.

15. (0) Lessons learned.
   a. Operations.
      (1) Item: Booby trapped roadblocks.
         Discussion: When a log constructed obstacle was encountered it
              was usually found to be booby trapped with a sizeable explosive charge. 90mm HE
              rounds were utilized to detonate the explosive charge.
         Observation: Log barricades should be checked for booby traps
              before attempting to remove them.
      (2) Item: Trail breaking equipment.
         Discussion: Mined roads and the lack of suitable trails required
              tracked vehicles to create their own trails. The most effective trail breaker was
              the tank mounted dozer. With the blade raised off the ground approximately 12 inches
              it was able to break through an area more efficiently and quickly than a regular tank.
         Observation: Tank dozers are effective in breaking trails through
              heavy jungle foliage.
      (3) Item: FM radio frequency conflicts.
         Discussion: Close coordination between units not familiar with
              each others operations is necessary to avoid FM frequency conflicts.
         Observation: Prior coordination on assignment of FM frequencies
              averts future conflicts.
      (4) Item: Utilization of VHF equipment.

Discussion: When utilizing VHF equipment it is necessary to re-adjust the channels at least four times a day due to temperature changes. This is normally necessary in the morning, at noon, in the late afternoon and at night.

Observation: Frequent temperature changes require periodic daily adjustment of VHF channels.

(5) Item: Commitment of Aviation fire support elements.

Discussion: Once significant contact has been established, the ground commander should assign a mission to the Air Cavalry Troop elements. This precludes the ground commander from having to continually control both ground and air elements. Example: Screen along the river between coordinates WT123456 and WT234567 and north 1500 meters. This area then becomes the responsibility of the Air Cavalry Troop commander while any movement and fire outside the area would require normal boundary coordination. Aircraft could also be diverted to other missions for limited periods.

Observation: Assignment of specific missions and AO’s by the ground commander (in contact) to the Air Cavalry Troop enhances the troop’s capabilities and efficiency.

(6) Item: Employment of gunships.

Discussion: When flying restrictions over the battle field prohibit low level reconnaissance, gunships should not be held waiting overhead. Continuous use increases the hours on the aircraft and maintenance required to keep them operational. Flying time is like money in the bank — once it’s spent it’s gone until the next payday (scheduled maintenance).

Observation: Maintain gunships on an “on call” basis as targets appear in the battle area.

(7) Item: Night landings in field locations.

Discussion: Prior to darkness forward landing areas should be prepared for possible night landings. Pads should be marked at dusk, and M1 utilized as a homing signal broadcast information as to wind and existing dust conditions; keep the area free of antennas.

Observation: Prior planning and preparation of forward landing areas facilitates night landings.

(8) Item: Tank Recovery.

Discussion: When a tank becomes mired in soft ground, it was found that attempts to “rock” the tank out proved futile. In fact all such efforts produced was a more complicated recovery problem.

Observation: Tankers should be instructed not to keep using rocking techniques once it becomes apparent they cannot extract themselves.

(9) Item: Recovery of tanks by ACAV’s.

Discussion: The ACAV has been found to be a very useful item of equipment for recovering tanks. ACAV’s hooked in tandem can perform many recovery missions. A mired tank may require as many as five or as few as two ACAV’s to do the job. Since a single cable is liable to snap, double cables should be used wherever possible. This is especially true between the last ACAV and the mired tank and the first two pulling ACAV’s.

Observation: If a VTR is not available, tanks can be recovered by ACAV’s hooked in tandem. Imagination and proper recovery techniques can save long delays waiting for a VTR and also free recovery vehicles for more demanding operations.

(10) Item: Contact near VC base camps.
Discussion: On two occasions when search and destroy elements encountered organized contact in the vicinity of a base camp, the Viet Cong deployed and withdrew so as to lead the pursuing elements away from their base camp.

Observation: Always conduct a thorough search of the entire area after contact with a withdrawing VC force has been broken.

(11) Item: Viet Cong ambushes.

Discussion: A frequently encountered Viet Cong tactic when operating away from roads, was the 3 to 5 man ambush. These ambush cells consisted of smaller units, usually set up in the jungle, and ambushed the column to go by and almost invariably fired on the last vehicle or an ACAV towing another ACAV. They were usually armed with at least one anti-tank weapon, either an RPG-2 or heat type rifle grenade. All weapons were fired first, then small arms, and then the team rapidly evacuated the area over a preplanned route. Sometimes the last vehicle leaving a clearing might be ambushed.

Observation: The potential threat of small ambushes can be minimized by a vigorous recon by fire any time an existing trail is being used, even for the first time. The last vehicle must direct its attention to the rear and sweep the area with fire as the column progresses. Reconsting by fire prevents the Viet Cong from setting up aiming points resulting in many misses.

(12) Item: Viet Cong mines.

Discussion: The Viet Cong made limited but effective use of mines. They generally were to be found in defiles, or along the edges of woodlines, or at natural stream crossings. They were normally employed in pairs.

Observation: Approaches to areas of restricted movement should be swept for mines prior to passing through.

(13) Item: Location of Viet Cong base areas.

Discussion: Viet Cong base camps were generally found within 500 meters of clearings and near water. Trails were numerous leading into the base areas and usually were covered by defensive positions along them.

Observation: HF1 fires should be placed around the clearings, not in them. Any trail leading out of a clearing should be thoroughly reconed by fire prior to proceeding. Artillery should be adjusted into the area so that fires can be accurately placed in front of the advancing unit.

(14) Item: Vehicle recovery.

Discussion: Vehicle recovery is a difficult task in the jungle, due to the limited number of tow bars available and the lucrative target which a dowen vehicle presents to the enemy.

Observation: Each platoon should have a tow bar readily available. Towed vehicles should never be placed at the end of a column since the last vehicle was the one most frequently hit. The last vehicle must be ready and able to fight and not be incapacitated by other requirements.

(15) Item: Employment of tanks.

Discussion: The tank proved to be a valuable asset in the jungles of Tay Ninh Province, not only for its firepower, but also for its ability to crush trails across broad expanses of otherwise impenetrable jungle. However, recovery of tanks was a difficult and complicated task.

Observation: Extreme care must be exercised when moving tanks through jungle terrain, as a disabled or mired tank will result in a major recovery operation. Security will also present a difficult problem.
b. Personnel.

(1) Item: Base camp personnel requirements.

Discussion: Duty personnel are definitely required during hours of darkness when the regiment is located in an area which cannot be reached by radio. Qualified personnel must be on duty 24 hours a day to receive and process reports which can only be submitted through landline facilities. Night due to the heavy daytime traffic.

Observation: When direct radio communications with forward areas are not possible, a 24-hour administrative operations center must be maintained at the base camp.

(2) Item: Medical liaison personnel.

Discussion: During an operation, liaison personnel are necessary in each of the hospitals treating the regiment's casualties to preclude unnecessary delay in reporting or losing track of the casualty's whereabouts. One casualty remained unidentified for a period of 6 days due to improper tagging by the attending medic, unawareness of the man's presence by the hospital, and incorrect description of the man's wounds by higher headquarters when attempting to trace his identity through channels. The entire situation could possibly have been alleviated had one of the regiment's liaison personnel been on hand to report the casualty's entry and departure from the hospital and the seriousness of the individual's wounds.

Observation: On major operations, a casualty reporting liaison team must, as a minimum, be located at the nearest medical or evacuation hospital to the operational area.

(3) Item: Supporting courier aircraft (C7-A) service.

Discussion: Since the supporting Caribou is the only scheduled mode of transporting bulk quantities of supplies and relatively large numbers of personnel, the aircraft is invariably swamped by unmanageable large loads. To preclude this, daily manifests were prepared the evening before each flight. Priorities and their establishment were made by a central authority based upon input on deadline date and tactical requirements in the field.

Observation: The regimental adjutant must receive reports from all subordinate units on volume and weight of personnel and equipment for movement from base camp to the forward area so that complete manifests can be prepared based upon tactical commitments and requirements.

(h) Item: Utilization of organic courier aircraft.

Discussion: A courier helicopter must be placed at the complete disposal of the regimental S-1 to enable him to make his daily liaison flights. Additionally, the basing of such aircraft in the rear area would enable the Adjutant to make emergency airlifts of mail and personnel in the event the C7-A courier aircraft is diverted.

Observation: Administrative requirements during combat operations necessitate the assignment of a courier helicopter to the S-1 on a full-time basis.
Annex D  Frogord 15  Operations Overlay
ANNEX E

SWITCHBOARD
AND
RADIO NET DIAGRAMS
Appendix 1 to Annex E
Appendix 2 to Annex II
RADIO NETS

Division Command Net
Regimental Command Net
Regimental Intelligence Net
Regimental Administration/Logistical Net
Division Logistical Net

Appendix 3 to Annex E
Appendix 4 to Annex B