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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (1 Nov 67) FOR OT RD-67X059

15 November 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation Junction City, conducted by 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is a report, subject as above.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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101st Airborne Division (-)
11th Infantry Brigade (Sep)
Commanding Officers
5th Battalion, 46th Infantry
5th Battalion, 12th Infantry
6th Battalion, 31st Infantry
31st Engineer Battalion (Cbt)
5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155mm-T)

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HEADQUARTERS
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO San Francisco 96257

1. (U) REFERENCES.
   a. OPORD 05-67 (Operation JUNCTION CITY Alternate) (U), dated 171200H
      February 1967, Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; OPORD 04-67
dated 161200H, same Headquarters.
   b. Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series J70D, Sheets 622 I, II, III, IV, 623 II,
      III; Series J71G, Sheets 611 I, 613 II.
   c. FRAGORDS to OPORD 05-67 (see par 2 above) 1 through 26 dated 20 Febru-
      ary 1967 to 17 March 1967, numbered consecutively.

2. (U) NAME OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION.
   a. The name of the operation was Operation JUNCTION CITY I.
   b. The operation was a search and destroy operation, conducted within a
      large area sealed by friendly troops.

3. (U) DATES OF OPERATION.
   16 February 1967 to 16 March 1967.

4. (U) LOCATION.
   The area in which Operation JUNCTION CITY I was executed is known as "WAR
   ZONE U" and has long been a known stronghold of the Viet Cong. The portion of WAR
   ZONE C in which the Blackhorse Regiment fought and maneuvered is that area bounded
by the I558 grid line on the south, National Highway 1 on the east, and the Cambodian
border on the North and West.

5. (U) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS.
   The 25th Infantry Division was the controlling headquarters for the 11th
Armored Cavalry Regiment. The Reporting officer for this report is Colonel William
W. Cobb, Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

   Subordinate commanders during the operation were as follows:

   1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
   LTC Martin D. Howell

   3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
   LTC Arthur J. Cochran

   Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry
   CPT Marvin L. Doerr

   Air Cavalry Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry
   MAJ Francis R. Martin

   17th Medical Company
   CPT Dennis J. Elie

   519th Engineer Company
   CPT Donald J. Crocker

   159th Radio Research Detachment
   CPT Lee M. Gentry

   1st Military Intelligence Detachment
   MAJ Cornelius L. Gray

   17th Public Information Detachment
   CPT Owen W. Mitchfield

6. (U) GENERAL.
   a. With the exception of attachments and detachments of units on a day to
day basis the task organization was as follows:

   Regimental Controls

   Headquarters Artillery Task Force (11th Arm Cav)
   Air Cavalry Troop (-)
   Troop C, 1st Squadron
   519th Engineer Company (- 1st and 3rd Platoons)
   159th Radio Research Detachment (-)
   1st Military Intelligence Detachment (-)
   17th Medical Company (-)
   158th Maintenance Battalion (-) ES

   GROUP I
   AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
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**TF 3-11:**

1st Squadron (- Troop C and Howitzer Battery)
1st Platoon, 919th Engineer Company
1st Contact Team, 551st Light Maintenance Company (DS)

**TF 3-11:**

3rd Squadron (- Howitzer Battery)
3rd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company
3rd Contact Team, 551st Light Maintenance Company (DS)

b. Artillery

(1) Organisation: Task Force Artillery (Provisional) was comprised of units from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 5th Artillery Group, and 1st Battalion, 83rd Artillery (subordinate to 5th Artillery Group):

1. MAJ - Officer in Charge
2. CPT - S-3 and Asst S-3/LOG
3. IE - Aerial Observer
4. E-8 - Asst Opns/Computers/RTO's

Firing elements for Task Force Artillery were:

- Battery B, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery
- Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 83rd Artillery
- Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 83rd Artillery

Units not under operational control of Task Force Artillery but who rendered supporting fires for Task Force Artillery were:

- Battery D, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery
- Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 83rd Artillery

(b) Execution: In order to present a brief and orderly summary, the operation will be divided into three phases keyed to the occupation of fire support bases as follows:

- **Phase I** 22-27 February 1967 - at FSB Bravo (FSB #2)
- **Phase II** 27 February - 3 March 1967 - at FSB #6
- **Phase III** 3-15 March 1967 - at FSB Blackhorse (Chou)

(a) PHASE I: Prior to 22 February Task Force Artillery was not operational. Howitzer Batteries of the 1st and 3rd Squadrons, 11th Armored Cavalry remained under control of their respective squadrons with Task Force Artillery providing coordination and clearance. On 22 February, Task Force Artillery assumed OPCON of these two batteries when they disengaged from TROOP H/53 of 11TH MEU to FSB Bravo. Elements closed at 1500Z. On 23 February at 0700Z, the 11TH Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) with 1ST Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mechanized) attacked north through War Zone "C". Task Force Artillery fired preparatory fires from 0600Z to 0700Z. As the maneuver elements pushed northward, it became apparent that displacement of Task Force Artillery would be necessary. 1st Infantry Division Artillery (Battery C, 1st Battalion, 83rd Artillery) provided support to ground elements during the move of task force artillery. No significant contacts were reported.

(b) PHASE II - Task Force Artillery with Howitzer Battery 1st Squadron and Howitzer Battery 3rd Squadron disengaged to FSB #6 (adjacent to OP 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division) on 27 February. Battery B, 3rd Artillery
remained at FSB Bravo to support 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mechanized) whose advance along the western edge of the Blackhorse AO was slowed considerably by the dense jungle and underbrush. On or about 28 February, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mechanized) was detached from the Regiment and Battery B, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery reverted to control of its parent battalion. During Phase II the two squadrons encountered moderate contact with platoon-sized VC forces. Several base camps were uncovered and Task Force Artillery fired numerous TOTs and preparatory fires in support. Task Force Artillery also provided reinforcing fires to 1st Infantry Division Artillery and 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery (with 196th Light Infantry Brigade). One one occasion (28 February) Howitzer Batteries of the 1st and 3rd Squadrons, 11th Armored Cavalry were called on to provide reinforcing fire on 2 VC Platoon vicinity X1 272978. Results were 15 VC KIA (SG) with 7 VC KIA (SG) being credited to Task Force Artillery.

PHASE III - Task Force Artillery displaced to FSB Blackhorse (Tahou) on 3 March closing at 1200Z. Due to the displacement, responsibility for direct support of the two squadrons was assumed by 3rd Battalion, 82nd Artillery (105mm Towed). It was not until 6 March that Task Force Artillery received the direct support role of the two squadrons, due to range limitations. During this time there was no lapse in the fire support available to the maneuver elements. Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery and Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery moved from FSB 4th to FSB Blackhorse on 6 March. Control was retained by Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery, with the assignment of 3rd Battalion, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the role of Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery was changed from general support reinforcing (GSR) Task Force Artillery to direct support (DS), 21st Infantry. Here it was realized the disadvantage of 105mm unit as DS to a light infantry unit. Close support fires were not possible during contact missions, whereas the armor protection afforded by the larger caliber weapon to be placed closer to the cavalry troopers. On 11 March, 1st Squadron made contact at an estimated reinforced VC company at 1300Z; contact was broken at 1915Z. Initially Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron and Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron fired in support. Soon it was evident that the entrenched VC units could not be defeated without intensive air and artillery support. Air strikes were integrated with artillery and light/heavy gunship fire teams to seal VC escape routes and maintain unrelenting pressure on the enemy. Additional reinforcing fires were provided by Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery and Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery. By the time contact was broken, Batteries A and B, 2nd Battalion, 7th Artillery (all 105mm Towed) were rendering valuable reinforcing fires. On 13 March, an armored column from 3rd Squadron received RR and/or RPG-2 fire from VC in spider holes as the column was proceeding south on Route 22. Howitzer Battery 3rd Squadron and Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery provided support fires in an effort to ferret out the VC from their entrenchments.

General: Task Force Artillery was disbanded on 15 March when the howitzer batteries reverted to control of their respective squadrons for the road march to the base camp. In general, Task Force Artillery and its firing elements performed commendably during Operation JUNCTION CITY. The organization was a polyglot of elements who had never worked together previously as a team, but through cooperation the Task Force organisation proved successful. The utilization of the FSB has many advantages:

(a) The problem of minimum range when the battery is co-located with squadron CP is eliminated.

(b) Task Force Artillery provided a clearing and coordination station with no significant delays; although there were numerous check fires (did not hinder "contact" missions).

(c) Massing of fire as proved necessary during 1st Squadron's contact is facilitated.

The missions fired by Task Force Artillery included registration, destruction, HkI and contact.

(b) Aerial Observation: Task Force Artillery employed one AGBSR in an Army O-1 daily. In addition to supplementing NSAP TBI's, the observer was able to register firing elements almost on a daily basis. One significant factor was that

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manner鸽元素 were reluctant to utilise the Task Force observer. The C-1 proved to be a superior aircraft to the helicopter for observation and adjustment of artillery due to its endurance between required refueling stops. The observer can be utilised in conjunction with the ground observer to direct supporting artillery. This procedure would allow the commander or the G-3 to concentrate on the direction and control of the ground forces.

(5) Liaison Activities: A liaison team from 25th Infantry Division Artillery was provided Task Force Artillery to assist in its operations and to keep Division Artillery abreast of the tactical situation. This procedure proved invaluable; recommend that such a Liaison team be available on future operations.

(6) Ammunition Expenditures:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>RMT</th>
<th>SUPPORT</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>3525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron</td>
<td>1192</td>
<td>1036</td>
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</table>

Total Rounds Expended: 10,811

- Engineer. Engineer support was provided by the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) (-) and additional support was provided the 919th by the 65th Engineer Battalion. A major responsibility of the 919th was the emplacement of Armored Vehicular Launched Bridges in support of the regiment's maneuver units.

Six crossing fords were constructed at the following locations:

- T1H1515
- T1H2390
- T1H2361
- T0H1565
- T0H0858
- T0H0857

Two water points were established during the operation. They were located at T0H5000 and T0H4002.

During search and destroy missions, elements of the 919th found and destroyed over nine tons of rice. In addition, the company destroyed the following enemy material:

- Three 105mm rounds
- One 155mm round
- One 8 inch round
- One 250 pound bomb

- Chemical.

(1) Indicated are the dates and details of the employment of riot control munitions using KL59 Tactical CS Canister Clusters during Operation JUNCTION CITY I.

(a) 112030H vicinity T08779

- One KL59 CS tactical canister cluster delivered.
- Effect on enemy - unknown.
- Terrain and weather - highland forest; wind 6 knots from the southeast.
- Ground effects - Pilot reported that munition functioned but because of approaching darkness could not determine ground coverage.

(5) The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) had been in contact with a suspected reinforced enemy infantry company. The regiment was unable to neutralise this company which was defending its force from fortifications consisting of trenches and bunkers. After withdrawing and using artillery against the enemy unit,
CS was employed to soften the objective and increase the Viet Cong's vulnerability to fragmentation weapons.

(b) 1207L5K via X927787

1 Two E159 Tactical CS canister clusters were employed by manually firing explosive bolts on the strongback assemblies while flying at an altitude of 600 feet and 80 knots.

2 Terrain and weather - highland forest with a moderate inversion and no measurable surface winds.

3 Ground effect - Pilot reported good ground coverage consisting of two 100 X 200 meter rectangles spaced 50 feet apart at their longest axis.

The clusters were employed against the same troop concentration as in (1) (a) 5, above. Friendly troops did not enter the area until four hours later but this was after artillery and air strikes. Troops on the ground in the target area reported minimal contamination of ground surface with moderate contamination of subsurface structure. Few enemy bodies were found and it was presumed the enemy had withdrawn during the night.

(2) Conclusions and Recommendations.

(a) Agent CS, when employed with the E159 Tactical Canister Cluster will provide sufficient ground concentration to contaminate fortifications when employed during inversion conditions.

(b) Due to the limited availability of the E159 tactical CS canister cluster it should be employed when follow up action will be prompt and provide maximum advantage to friendly forces.

(e) Employment of CS against enemy troops should be followed by artillery and air strikes to take maximum advantage of the characteristic of CS to drive enemy personnel out of fortifications.

* Army Aviation

(1) Army Aviation support was primarily provided by the organic aviation assets of the Air Cavalry Troop, Regimental Aviation Platoon and the Squadron Air Sections. Limited aerial support was required from outside the regiment and this consisted mainly of aerial resupply support.

(2) Regimental Aviation Platoon/Squadron Air Sections.

(a) CH-23

1 Employment:
   a Command and control
   b Reconnaissance
   c Administrative and liaison
   2 Sorties = 1,677
   3 Hours flown = 1095
   4 Passengers moved = 1,647

(b) UH-1D

1 Employment
(c) Timeliness and effectiveness. It was found when the regimental CP and the regimental and squadron trains were at different locations it was necessary to place aircraft at both locations. The OH-23G's were located with the CP while the UH-1D's remained at the trains area. This providing for effective coordination and immediate response to the needs of both areas.

The majority of the observation aircraft missions originated from the command post while the resupply and troop lift missions came from the logistical complex. The arrangement proved to be quite satisfactory and responsive to the needs of the regiment.

(j) Air Cavalry Troop.

(a) Employment.

1. Reconnaissance
2. Reactor force
3. Aerial fire support
4. Artillery adjustment

(b) Statistics on support rendered on Operation JUNCTION CITY I.

1. Sorties flown - 1,789
2. Hours flown - 1,153:30
3. Cargo moved - 64 tons
4. Passengers moved - 1,216

(c) Results.

1. US
   a. WHE - 0
   b. KMA - 1

2. VC
   a. KBA (8C) - 8
   b. KBA (POSS) - 2h
   c. Structures damaged - 16
d. Structures destroyed - 1

S. Sampan destroyed - 1

d. Ammunition Expenditures.

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<th>TYPE</th>
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<td>2.75&quot; rocket</td>
<td>2,289</td>
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<td>HE90 CS Clusters</td>
<td>6,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE30</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>

(e) Timeliness and effectiveness. The aerial support provided proved to be highly effective particularly when a specific target was uncovered or identified. However, its overall effectiveness could have been greatly enhanced if specific rules of engagement had been established. Additionally, the positioning of fire teams cut with the squadron CP's reduced the overall coverage capability of the troops. The battle area was of such a size that it presented no limitations as to appreciable time gaps between the ground commanders request and the time the aircraft were overhead. The average time was from 5 to 10 minutes.

f. Air Force. The Regiment was OCON to the 25th Infantry Division for the operation, close coordination and planning was required by the ALO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the ALO 25th Infantry Division. The 25th Division required all planned air requests to be submitted through the Division C-3 Air planning section so that the air support effort could be effectively coordinated for all operating units. Immediate requests would be sent in as usual through the Direct Air Request Net (DARN); however, prior to submitting an immediate request the airborne FAC would check with Issue Control (TACP, 25th Infantry Division) for possible diversion of an airborne flight. This diversion of airborne aircraft from a lower priority preplanned target to a high priority immediate target is standard practice in large operations and is highly desirable for it cuts reaction time considerably, thereby greatly enhancing the overall effectiveness of close air support. On several occasions during the operation, tactical fighter aircraft were over a target delivering ordnance less than ten minutes from the time of the request.

The Blackhorse Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) deployed with the TOC and was operational at both of the forward CP's used for the operation. The FAC aircraft and fighter aircraft used to support the Regiment were coordinated and controlled by this facility. FAC 0-1 aircraft escorted all Blackhorse convoys out of and from the operational area and provided full daylight hour coverage over the area with night coverage available on request throughout the operation. Full FAC coverage was also provided for the 2nd Squadron which had remained at LONG QIAO as the base camp security element. Giving full FAC coverage at two widely separated locations taxed the limited resources of the TACP; however, through tight scheduling control and the maximum use of resources all requirements were met.

Due to the distance of the operational area from the normal operating location of the TACP, 0-1 aircraft, the aircraft and pilots deployed to DAU TIBHD and operated from that location throughout the operation.

The FAC and Tactical Air coverage provided during the operation were of the highest quality and provided a major contribution toward the success of the mission.

FAC and tactical fighter/bomber sorties flown in support of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment operations.

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<th>(c) Total 0-1 sorties - 127 (386.05 hours)</th>
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<tr>
<td>(a) Forward Air Control - 51 (155.15 hours)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Convoy Escort - 13 (340.05 hours)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Visual Reconnaissance - 61 (166.30 hours)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(d) Artillery Adjustment - 2 (160.00 hours)</td>
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</table>
(2) Fighter/Bomber Support
   (a) Total strike aircraft missions - 92
   (b) Total strike aircraft sorties - 231
   (c) Immediate missions - 49 (111 sorties)
   (d) Preplanned missions - 123 (120 sorties)

(3) Size and Composition of forces:
   (a) Immediate missions - by flight

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<th>MK-750 NAP / 20mm</th>
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<td>MK-117 / 76 2.75&quot; RX / 2100 20mm</td>
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<td>MK-82 / 1600 20mm</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>MK-82 / 6 750 NAP / 1100 20mm</td>
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* Preplanned missions diverted to immediate targets of higher priority.

(b) Preplanned missions by flight:

- 4 F-100
  6 MK-117 / 6 750 HAP / 2100 20mm
- 2 B-57
  5 MK-82 / 3 MK-82 / 6 750 HAP / 38 2.75" RX / 2000 20mm
- 2 F-100
  14 MK-82 / 76 2.75" RX / 1200 20mm
- 3 F-100
  6 MK-82 / 6 750 HAP / 2100 20mm
- 2 B-57
  14 MK-82 / 2000 20mm
- 2 F-100
  14 MK-82 / 1 750 HAP / 1600 20mm
- 3 F-100
  6 MK-82 / 6 750 HAP / 2100 20mm
- 2 F-4
  6 MK-82 / 1 750 HAP / 2000 20mm
- 2 F-100
  6 MK-82 / 6 750 HAP / 1600 20mm
- 2 F-5
  14 MK-82 / 1 750 HAP / 1000 20mm
- 2 F-100
  14 MK-82 / 1 750 HAP / 1500 20mm
- 2 F-5
  14 MK-82 / 1 750 HAP / 1500 20mm
- 2 F-100
  14 MK-82 / 76 2.75" RX / 1600 20mm
- 1 AC-47
  85 FLARES / 15,000 7.62mm
- 1 AC-47
  52 FLARES / 12,000 7.62mm
- 1 AC-47
  60 FLARES / 13,500 7.62mm
- 1 AC-47
  60 FLARES / 13,500 7.62mm
- 1 AC-47
  12 FLARES / 15,000 7.62mm
- 3 P-100
  6 MK-82 / 6 750 HAP / 1000 20mm
- 2 F-5
  14 MK-82 / 1 750 HAP / 1000 20mm
- 3 F-5
  6 MK-82 / 6 750 HAP / 1500 20mm
- 2 F-5
  14 MK-82 / 1 750 HAP / 1000 20mm

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Cliffs, 100

3 R-100.  12 MK-117 / 1 750 NAP
3 R-100.  12 MK-117

2 B-57.  6 MK-117 / 8 750 NAP
3 R-100.  6 MK-117 / 1 750 NAP
3 R-5.  8 MK-117 / 1 750 NAP
3 R-100.  12 MK-117

2 F-100.  6 MK-82 / 3 750 NAP

2 B-57.  22 MK-81 / 8 750 NAP / 800 20mm / 1000 GALL
3 R-100.  8 MK-117 / 6 750 NAP / 2100 20mm
3 R-5.  6 MK-82 / 6 750 NAP

2.6 F-100.  24 MK-117 / 3600 20mm
3 R-100.  8 MK-117 / 4 750 NAP
3 R-100.  6 MK-117 / 6 750 NAP / 1800 20mm
3 R-100.  6 MK-117 / 6 750 NAP / 2100 20mm
3 R-5.  12 MK-117 / 1 750 NAP / 3000 20mm
3 F-100.  12 MK-117 / 5 MK-82
3 F-100.  12 MK-117 / 4 750 NAP
3 F-200.  6 MK-117 / 6 750 NAP / 2300 20mm
3 F-200.  6 MK-117 / 6 750 NAP / 2000 20mm

F-5.  12 MK-117 / 8 750 NAP / 1800 20mm
F-5.  12 MK-117 / 8 750 NAP / 2100 20mm
F-5.  12 MK-117 / 8 750 NAP / 1200 20mm

1 F-100.  12 MK-82 / 3 750 NAP
1 F-100.  6 MK-82 / 6 750 NAP / 2000 20mm
2 F-100.  6 MK-82 / 6 750 NAP / 2100 20mm
2 F-100.  12 MK-82 / 1 750 NAP
2 F-100.  4 MK-82 / 38 2.75" RX

2 F-100.  4 MK-82 / 6 750 NAP / 1500 20mm

(1) Deployment and results: All missions, both preplanned and imme- diate, were flown against targets selected by the regiment. Though the specific Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) is rather poor, particularly when compared to the large amount of heavy ordnance delivered, it does not reflect the inability of aircrews to hit and destroy targets; instead it reflects on the general ineffectiveness of the intelligence gathering system. On many occasions different locations were targeted as confirmed base camps or supply storage areas yet post-strike BDA and even

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ground follow-up action revealed nothing in the vicinity. Many of the immediate type, close support of ground troop targets had the tactical fighter/bomber crews delivering ordnance within 100 meters of the friendly troops with excellent results. This truly is close support, and attests to the high skill level of the FAC’s and strike pilots.

(a) Recap of ordnance delivered:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mk-117 750# Bombs</td>
<td></td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mk-82 500# Bombs</td>
<td></td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mk-28 250# Bombs</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLU-3 or BLU-27 500# Incendiary Bombs</td>
<td></td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-3 KE FOGS (19 KE/POD)</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLARES</td>
<td></td>
<td>136</td>
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<tr>
<td>20mm RDS</td>
<td></td>
<td>94,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGL RDS</td>
<td></td>
<td>1600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm RDS</td>
<td></td>
<td>67,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Bomb damage assessment (post-strike mission reports):

- KBA - confirmed - 15 / possible - 29
- Bunkers or foxholes destroyed, damaged or uncovered - 92
- Trenches destroyed, damaged or uncovered (meters) - 835
- Secondary explosions - 7
- Secondary fires - 1
- Supply or storage structures destroyed - 4

(c) Civil Action/Psychological Warfare

(1) Psychological warfare support was provided by the 10th Mobile Field Propaganda Team. Daily coverage of the Regiment’s AO was made throughout the operation. In addition to leaflet drops by the team, coordination was affected with other units participating in the operation. Thus insuring complete leaflet coverage.

(2) During Operation JUNCTION CITY I, a total of 29 psychological warfare missions were conducted. Twenty-two missions were made utilizing tape recordings for broadcast and seven combination (leaflet and broadcast) missions were accomplished. During the operation 160,000 leaflets were dropped and approximately 30 hours of broadcast time expended.

(2) Civil Action activities were somewhat limited in nature. This was caused principally by the lack of civilian populace in the areas of operation. However, 60 tons of rice were saved and evacuated back to LONG QUAO, the Regiment’s permanent base camp for later use in civic action projects in LONG KHANH Province.

7. (C) INTELLIGENCE

a. Anticipated enemy situation.
(1) The area of operations (AO) for JUNCTION CITY I has long been considered a Viet Cong safe haven, containing numerous base camps, hospital facilities, training sites, and supply facilities. Except for CIDQ operations and Operation ATTILBECRO, the area has been relatively untouched by FWMAF. COSVN, controlling headquarters for all political and military activities in South Vietnam, is known to have agencies within the AO. The major headquarters of COSVN is believed to be operating from within Cambodian territory, with important subordinate elements operating along the border.

(2) Most Viet Cong facilities in the AO are believed to contain extensive underground complexes. Reliable reports indicate the Viet Cong have made a concerted effort to improve their defenses since Operation ATTILBECRO. All avenues of approach are expected to be heavily mined. The Viet Cong, if they are surprised or desire to fight, are expected to defend from well fortified bunker systems. The Viet Cong will probably not engage large friendly forces with direct confrontation. Harassing probes and mortar/rocket rounds against forward bases can be expected.

(3) Order of Battle.

(a) Composition and Disposition: The following list indicates the last reported location of enemy units in and adjacent to the area of operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVAL</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th VC Div</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>XT 210850</td>
<td>4 Feb</td>
<td>A2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271st Regt</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>XT 776785</td>
<td>4 Feb</td>
<td>A2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272nd Regt</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>XT 526809</td>
<td>4 Feb</td>
<td>A2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273rd Regt</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>XT 290580</td>
<td>10 Feb</td>
<td>B2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-272nd</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>XT 9627</td>
<td>28 Jan</td>
<td>B2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op 69 Arty Regt</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>XT 203960</td>
<td>17 Dec</td>
<td>A2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273rd Regt</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>XT 250718</td>
<td>5 Jan</td>
<td>F3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-37th Pack How Bn</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>XT 357140</td>
<td>7 Dec</td>
<td>C3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Mtr Bn</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>XT 700590</td>
<td>1 Dec</td>
<td>C3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th QD Regt</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>XT 215589</td>
<td>13 Jan</td>
<td>C3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th Gu Regt</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>XT 203960</td>
<td>7 Jan</td>
<td>B2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-1/70</td>
<td>(120)</td>
<td>XT 260750</td>
<td>21 Dec</td>
<td>C3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-1/70</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>XT 260750</td>
<td>21 Dec</td>
<td>C3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>660th Tmm Regt</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>XT 095590</td>
<td>9 Jan</td>
<td>C3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82nd Rear Svc (Sp</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>YT 9661</td>
<td>8 Feb</td>
<td>A2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Within the AO, the 70th Gu Regt and elements of the 69th Arty Regt must be considered immediately available for commit. The regiments of the 9th VC Div, (the 271, 272, and 101 IWA) can be committed within 24-48 hours. The 273rd Regt and other regiments throughout the XII CTZ would take 72 hours or more to reinforce. Status of units available for commitment from locations in Cambodge is unknown, however, it does not seem probable that trained combat units in any measurable force would be held in Cambodia in preference to Vietnam where employment could be much more quickly accomplished with no threat of political overtones.

(c) It can be assumed that the VC will make extensive use of mines and booby traps to slow and canalise the FWMAF operating in the area. The VC can also be expected to defend his supply areas, base camps, and headquarters areas from heavily fortified positions. Recent information from all sources indicated increased activity in the building of fortifications in War Zone '0' Area.
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(d) Major Units:

1. COSVN Headquarters and its many subordinates, although present within War Zone "C" for approximately four years, have maintained extremely high security control, consequently little hard intelligence is known on the exact location and disposition of the headquarters and its subordinate elements. It is believed that the entire northern portion of War Zone "C" along the Cambodian border is utilised by COSVN, with a majority of the installations being underground and heavily fortified. Analysis of all available information indicates that COSVN has a headquarters complex within a 3000 meter radius of XT 2193. Additionally, a map captured by Project Sigma and a railler who had been to COSVN HQ indicates that elements of the headquarters are located vicinity XT 1687.

2. Information on the 9th VC Division, though fairly new (early 1966) to War Zone "C", is more prevalent. Prisoners of War, raillers, and documents captured during engagements with elements of the division have provided fairly accurate hard intelligence data on the division and its current locations and structure. The division can be expected to defend the base camp areas in War Zone "C" and PHNAP can expect attacks by division elements as they close on these base areas.

3. Additional units that operate within War Zone "C" are the 70th Guard Regiment, Group 69 Artillery Regiment, and 680th Training Regiment.
   a. The 70th Guard Regiment generally provides security within the War Zone "C" area, and elements of it can be expected to be found guarding important base and headquarters areas.
   b. Group 69 Artillery Regiment performs a mission similar to a US type Corps Artillery in that it provides artillery battalions as required to support the main force infantry units. Any encounter with main force units of the 9th VC Division would probably turn up elements of one of the Group 69 Artillery Battalions in support.
   c. The 680th Training Regiment is believed to be located in the western portion of War Zone "C" area running the training areas and facilities utilized by the VC in their training program. Normally those areas and facilities are located near water (as are most VC supply installations) and established infiltration routes for ease of access and resupply. The 30,000 VC uniforms located northwest of TRAI BI on 6 Dec 66 are thought to have been part of the 680th supply for new VC trainers.

b. Actual enemy situation:

The intelligence estimate proved to be quite accurate. Sophisticated fortifications, extensive base camps and training facilities were encountered during the operation. Small unit actions (platoon and troop sized) characterised the contacts. For the most part only security and delaying forces were experienced. The anticipated mines, booby traps, sniper fire and harassing mortar fire materialised. The majority of the mines encountered by the Blackhorse was the US M1A1 AT mine or a VC/CHICOM version of it.

A total of 106 facilities of all types were found with 69 being discovered in the first area of operations and 35 in the second. A comparison of each of these locations with all previously reported intelligence information, principally the Viet Cong Installation List, indicated that 29 of 69 and 21 of 35 fell within 500 meters of a reported installation or 12.0% and 6.1% respectively. Overall the average was 50 out of 120 or 41.6% with the average error 133 meters (N-S) by 176 meters (E-W) or a 223 meter radial error. The correlation between reported and discovered installations was not nearly as apparent as during Operation CEDAR FALLS x - 85.1% of these facilities found fall within 500 meters of a reported installation. Much of this can be attributed to the lack of sufficient detailed reports on War Zone "C", as well as the nature of the terrain which undoubtedly prevented units from readily uncovering installations without a thorough, time consuming search. The correlation is still high enough to warrant detailed consideration of the Viet Cong Installation list when targeting for or searching during operations.
Various intelligence sources were utilized before and during Operation JUNCTION CITY I. Preliminary intelligence estimates were gleaned from Viet Cong Installation lists (1st Infantry Division), SPAR and agent reports, Periodic Intelligence Reports (II Field Force SVN), terrain studies and reports received through Vietnamese Intelligence channels. Daily intelligence was obtained from FV interrogation reports and ground (ambush and sniper patrols) and aerial reconnaissance activities. Reconnaissance operations were also supplemented by night vision devices. Only one Red River mission was flown in support of the regiment during the operation. Captured enemy documents also provided information particularly concerning the Viet Cong's organization and order of battle.

d. Terrain analysis.

(1) General.

The area of interest for Operation JUNCTION CITY I, known as War Zone C*, is located north of the city of TAY NINH in TAY NINH Province. It is bordered on the north and west by the Cambodian border and Highway 13 to the east.

(2) Observation.

Observation throughout the area is largely dependent upon vegetation. In those areas where rice is grown the observation is good during this period. Areas of dry crops and grasslands are to be found scattered throughout the area and in these regions observation may range from good to poor. In the remainder of the area the observation is poor both ground and aerial, due to dense undergrowth and forests.

(3) Fields of Fire.

Fields of fire are extremely limited in areas of dense forest and heavy undergrowth. The rice growing and dry crop areas offer the best fields of fire. The dikes in the rice growing regions limit fields of fire somewhat for flat trajectory weapons. Weapons positioned on Nui Ba Den control the approaches to this feature very effectively. The only limitations to fields of fire for high trajectory weapons are the reverse slopes of Nui Ba Den.

(4) Cover.

Individuals and small units may obtain cover from flat trajectory weapons by utilizing the rice paddy dikes, shell craters, and ravines. The principal cover afforded from high angle fire weapons are caves in Nui Ba Den and extensive bunker and trench systems located throughout the area.

(5) Concealment.

All forested areas offer good concealment from both ground and air observation. Concealment in bamboo areas is considered good, from ground observation. The small villages located within the area offer good concealment for small foot mobile units.

(6) Obstacles.

Dense forests and bamboo in the central and eastern portions of the area are formidable obstacles to both foot and vehicle movement. The small streams in the eastern portion are fordable for foot troops. Rice growing areas do not present obstacles to either foot troops or armor and the mountain can be used as a weapons base to interdict any routes within range.

(7) Movement.

The area as a whole provided only poor to unsuitable terrain for cross-country movement. During the period November thru April, cross-country movement for tracked vehicles is locally good. Dense undergrowth is normally the only limiting factor. From May to October, cross-country movement for tracked vehicles is primarily limited to roads and well drained trails.
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(6) Terrain Features.

Hai Ba Den is the dominating geographical feature in the surrounding lowland area. The roads, airstrips and cleared areas (potential LZ’s, fire support bases, forward supply areas) in the area are considered essential terrain features in as much as they are critical to any operations conducted in the area.

(9) Avenues of Approach.

(a) General. Possible vehicular approaches into the area from the north (Cambodia) are limited to Highway 22 and Routes 1 and TL-3. Principal foot avenues of approach limited to jungle trails and stream beds traversing the area.

(b) Roads in the area.

1. Highway 22 ranges from a single lane, laterite surfaced, all weather road in good condition near TAT NINH (XT115707) to an overgrown route not usable in its present condition. It is a fair all weather route up to within 5 kilometers of the Cambodian border. The one bridge (XT097763) along the route has been destroyed, leaving a water gap of 12 meters. The superstructure is still in place.

2. Route TL-3 is a single lane, laterite surfaced all weather road in fair condition from TAY NINH to XT280583. From that point to the Cambodian border it deteriorates to a fair weather road. During the dry season (November through April) the route is normally trafficable to both wheeled and tracked vehicles. Three bridges are located along the route and are generally in need of repair and strengthening prior to sustained use.

3. Route TL-13 as a single lane, laterite surfaced road in very poor condition. Approximately 300 hasty or deliberate road cuts exist that would require major engineer effort to repair. All the bridges along the route have either been destroyed or damaged. An on the ground reconnaissance must be made to determine the capacity of each bridge.

8. (C) MISSION.

The mission assigned to the Blackhorse Regiment was to move to a forward position and then attack in one to destroy CSSVN facilities and VC/WA forces and then to conduct search and destroy operations in assigned Areas of Operation (AO’s).

9. (C) CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION. The operation was planned in three phases:

a. Phase I was to be executed from D-1 to D-Day. At D-1 the 1st Inf (M) and B Battery, 3rd Arty, 13th Artillery became OPCON to Regiment and moved from TAY NINH to secure a Forward Support Area (FSA) in the vicinity of XT2766 and to establish a temporary Fire Support Base (FSB) at the same location. The Regimental Headquarters and maneuver elements was to displace on D-1 to forward assembly areas south of Phase Line BASE and to establish FSB BRAVO (see Phase I overlay).

b. Phase II began on D+1. The Regiment was to attack in one to destroy CSSVN facilities and VC/WA forces and to seize Objectives BLUE, GREEN, and RED. (see Phase II overlay).

c. Phase III was to begin, at the earliest, on D+2. The Regiment, in order, was to conduct search and destroy operations in assigned AO’s to destroy CSSVN facilities and VC/WA forces.

10. (C) EXECUTION.

18 and 19 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

The Regimental Headquarters with normal attachments, the 1st Squadron and the 3rd Squadron departed the Blackhorse Base Camp beginning 1800HR. The 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M) became OPCON to Regiment 1900HR.

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1st Squadron.

Commencing at 182200H, the Squadron, assorting the regimental headquarters and normal attachments, departed the Blackhorse Base Camp and conducted a night tactical road march to a forward assembly area, in the vicinity of XT363 (near TAT NINH, NVA). There were no incidents during the march and the squadron and its escorted elements closed at 191030H.

2nd Squadron.

During the morning and early afternoon hours the squadron prepared to move forward to the area of operations. The squadron (escorting elements of the 159th Maintenance Battalion) departed the Blackhorse home station at 192300H and conducted a night tactical road march, closing at a forward assembly area (in the vicinity of XT039) at 201200 without incident.

20 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

The 3rd Squadron continued its move to its assembly area (closing at 201000H). The 4th Battalion conducted search operations in Area JOHN (center of mass XT3413) under OPORD 06-57. Elements of Troop G, 1st Squadron provided security for the regimental command post at XT3534.3.

1st Squadron.

Troops A and B conducted area reconnaissance and route clearing in Area JOHN. Troop C (-) conducted a cordon and search operation of a village at XT331425, and conducted convoy escort from the regimental combat base and for a water point in the vicinity of XT171620.

At 0600H, Troop A discovered one 105mm artillery round at XT333437 and one 81mm defused round. Both projectiles were destroyed in place. At 1205H, the troop encountered a large log road block. A 81mm round was fired at the barricade resulting in a large secondary explosion (at XT123007). Elements of the 1st Platoon, 92nd Engineers, attached to the troop detonated a large booby trap in a cut in the road at XT123007, and a large secondary explosion resulted from the detonation. At 1330H, near XT3317410, Troop A destroyed one 81mm round and uncovered a hole 3 by 2 feet, and a large secondary explosion resulted when a grenade was thrown into the hole. At 1500H, two detainees were apprehended at XT332032 and evacuated to the Regimental combat base.

Troop B found an unused trench line one hundred meters long at XT328410.

Troop C apprehended two detainees at 0915H. The individuals were discovered at XT371225 without ID cards.

3rd Squadron.

The squadron continued its tactical road march from the Blackhorse Base Camp closing its destination at XT039, at 1100H.

4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (MI)

Commencing at 200700H, the battalion began to move from TAT NINH Base Camp to a forward support area at XT2665, arriving at 1115H, after clearing the route. At 0945H, at XT266419 elements of the battalion discovered one hundred graves, of which about 25 appeared to be fresh. Approaches to the grave site were booby trapped with a claymore mine. The mine was neutralised.

21 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

The regiment continued combat operations in accordance with OPORD 06-57 with reconnaissance, and search and destroy operations in AO BONAI southwest of TAT NINH. Much of the day was utilised by elements of the regiment to position themselves for Operation JUNCTION CITY.
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1st Squadron

The squadron conducted reconnaissance, and search and destroy missions in the northern sector of AO BOBCAT, area PATH with Troops A and B. Troop C remained UNOON to regiment and provided security for the regimental headquarters/trains location, and escorted convoys to and from support base locations. Company D continued to secure the water point at XT337468 and acted as a blocking force for the search and destroy mission assigned to Troop B. Howitzer Battery continued to provide fires in direct support of the squadron.

At 0900H, Troop C found two homemade AT mines, while on a convoy escort mission, at XT400251. The mines consisted of ten pounds of TNT each and were encased in bamboo. The mines were neutralized and removed.

2nd Squadron

Troops I, K, and L, and Company N conducted patrolling in the southern sector of AO BOBCAT (area PAT). At 1200H, elements of Troop K discovered an anti-personnel mine in the road at XT337467 and destroyed the mine in place.

4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M)

The Battalion prepared for Operation JUNCTION CITY I at a FSA at XT2869. At 0900H, a reconnaissance vehicle truck a mine fifty meters east of the road in the vicinity of XT2862. The incident resulted in one US WIA and damaged the front suspension system.

22 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

At 0700H, the Blackhorse Regiment initiated Operation JUNCTION CITY I (in accordance with OPCRD 05-67 Operation JUNCTION CITY Alternate). At 0800H, the 1st and 3rd Squadrons Howitzer Batteries became UNOON to the 11th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M). The regimental headquarters and regimental logistical elements moved to a forward location at XT277686 known as the "French Fort", while Task Force Artillery, a part of the 11th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M), moved to Fire Support Base Bravo. The 1st and 3rd Squadrons and the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry, moved to forward assembly areas. At 1200H, an Air Cavalry Troop truck hit a pressure type mine at XT21678 resulting in moderate vehicle damage but no casualties.

1st Squadron

The squadron moved to a forward assembly area at XT2573 beginning at 1100H, Company D escorted regimental headquarters to its forward location, and upon completion of that move, became UNOON to the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M).

3rd Squadron

The squadron moved to a forward assembly area at XT2378, commencing the move at 1025H.

At 1115H, a tank from Company K hit a mine at XT260701 with damage resulting to the right track and road wheels. One US WIA.

4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M)

The battalion moved to a forward assembly area at XT2705. At 1045H, an ACAV from Company B hit a mine at XT266597 resulting in three US WIA and heavy damage in the vehicle's suspension system and hull. The mine left a crater twelve feet wide and four feet deep. Three rounds of small arms fire were received immediately after the mine was detonated and was returned with unknown results.

23 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
At 0700H, the regiment jumped off in the attack, moving north in some to seize objectives in the northern portion of AO TIGER. The 1st Squadron was the right flank unit, the 3rd Squadron was in the center and the 3/23rd Infantry (M) was on the left.

1st Squadron

The squadron attacked at 0700H and reached Objective RED by dark.

At 0955H, Troop B destroyed four foxholes with overhead cover at XT279087. At 1017H, the troop destroyed seventeen two-man foxholes at XT2783939. An A/C/V from the troop hit a pressure type mine damaging six road wheels with negative casualties. At 1055H, Troop B destroyed thirty spider holes that were camouflaged at XT 278399. The troop found and destroyed six rows of four punji stakes that were emplaced as to be six inches above the ground. A freshly dug grave was found at XT 278999 at the same time. At 1600H, elements of the troop had discovered a trail in a ravine. The trail led to two camouflaged bunkers (XT278999) with firing ports. The bunkers were destroyed at 1655H. At 1800H, an A/C/V hit a mine at XT235299, resulting in light vehicle damage and three US WIA. At 2315H, an A/C/V from the troop hit a mine which resulted in three US WIA. At 1800H, Troop C found two covered foxholes connected by trenches at XT219445. At 1200H, an A/C/V from the troop detonated a pressure type mine at XT215399 damaging 1 road wheel and unseating the 50 Caliber Cupola.

Troop C received fire from a claymore at 0756H. Fire was returned with unknown results. While searching the immediate area an 81mm mortar round and one claymore mine were found at XT236298. At 1030H, elements of the troop found a platoon sized base camp in the same general area. At 2300H, an A/C/V from the troop received one 75mm recoilless rifle round resulting in minor damage and no casualties.

2nd Squadron

At 0700H, the squadron moved to attack north in the center of the regimental sector.

A Troop K A/C/V hit a mine at 0805H. The mine blast caused suspension system damage and four US WIA. The troop found two bunkers and six foxholes at 1130H at XT221753. At 1200H, the troop received two rounds of sniper fire at XT220379. Fire was returned with unknown results. There were no casualties resulting from the incident.

Troop L found a Viet Cong Base Camp at XT227811 which contained a table and several 7.62mm AKIs. At 1300H, the troop, at 1050H, destroyed a 250 pound bomb that had apparently been carried to XT27783 by hand.

At 1100H Company K destroyed two bunkers that showed signs of recent use at XT23080. Fifteen minutes later the company received fire from claymores and automatic weapons from XT237909. Fire was returned resulting in one VC KIA (BC). One KIA was captured in the battle. There were no friendly casualties. At 1700H the company spotted two Viet Cong snipers in the woods at XT237853. One of the terrorists was mortally wounded and the Russian rifle he was carrying was captured. An armored sweep of the area resulted in four bunkers, two C-480 grenades and two home constructed mines. The bunkers and mines were destroyed.

3/23rd Infantry (M)

The battalion crossed the line of departure and attacked slowly towards the north commencing at 0700H.

At 1100H a Company G tank attached to the battalion hit a mine at XT23590, damaging the road wheels and track on the left side of the vehicle. There were no casualties resulting in moderate damage, but no casualties. Yet another tank struck a mine at XT237895 at 1645H resulting in moderate damage but failed to produce any casualties. At 1000H, the company found and destroyed a Viet Cong Base Camp of four bunkers at XT23090.
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21 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment continued to attack north in zone and to seize Objectives GREEN and BLUE. Objective RED, having been seized the day before, was the scene of search and destroy operations.

1st Squadron

The squadron maneuvered within the general area of Objective RED conducting search and destroy operations.

At 0600, a POL truck from Headquarters Troop hit a mine at XT2695. The truck was damaged and three individuals were WIA.

Troop A, at 0900, received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated two or three Viet Cong at XT2695. The enemy fire returned with unknown results. At 0730, an LCM from the troop was struck by an RPG-2 round at XT2695. The vehicle was damaged and one individual was KIA. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 0930, the troop found an underground VC Base Camp. The fortifications consisted of five huts and five bunkers located at XT2695. At 1015, an ACAV was hit with an RPG-2 round but no casualties or damage resulted. Fire was returned at XT2695 with unknown results. At 1200, dismounted personnel from the troop engaged an unknown number of Viet Cong in a brief but sharp firefight. The troopers were wounded in the skirmish but enemy losses were unknown. At 1600, elements of the troop spotted and engaged two Viet Cong as they ran east in the vicinity XT2695 resulting in two VC KIA (RD). An additional three VC were taken under fire (XT34905) with M-79 and automatic weapons with unknown results.

Troop B discovered twenty freshly dug bunkers at 1315. The structures, located at XT2695, were destroyed. Thirty-five minutes later the troop found a base camp at XT2695. A search of the area was conducted; a base camp containing a bunker with a dispensary inside of it was discovered. Inside were radio parts, ponchos, an oxygen tank and a tunnel which led to the northeast for a distance in excess of one kilometer. Search of the area continued by the troop. At 1730, a claymore mine was detonated against elements of the troop at XT2695 and resulted in two US WIA.

Troop C received automatic weapons fire from a Viet Cong Base Camp at 1730. The fire was returned at XT2695 with unknown results. The troop discovered a large enemy facility with eighty bunkers and twenty-five huts, a dispensary with medical equipment, showers, livestock and weapons parts at XT2695 late in the morning and remained in the area for much of the day.

2nd Squadron

The squadron continued to attack center of sector towards Objective GREEN.

Troop A discovered a pressure type mine which damaged the track but produced no casualties at 0700. The mine was emplaced at XT2695. A tank attached to the troop struck a mine at 0800, which resulted in damaged tracks and roadwheels. The incident occurred at XT2695. At 1100, the troop discovered three 30 pound mines which had been booby trapped. They were blown in place at XT2695. At 1600, the troop received fifty rounds of automatic weapons fire, but suffered no casualties. The fire had come from XT2695.

4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry

The battalion continued to attack north in the western sector of the zone. At 1200, Company D, 1st Squadron (attached) discovered a mine (XT2692) in a small wooden box and it was destroyed in place. The company found an anti-tank mine at XT2696. The mine was blown in place at 1300.

Company C found bomb shelters and trenches at 1200. The fortifications, located at XT2697, were destroyed. At 1300, the company discovered an old platoon sized base camp at XT2697.
At 1900H, Company B located a Viet Cong training center with one hut and a rifle range with silhouette targets. The site, at XT286812, appeared not to have been used for several weeks.

25 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The Blackhorse Regiment continued to conduct search and destroy operations while participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY I.

1st Squadron

Continued search and destroy operations in conjunction with Operation JUNCTION CITY I. At 0030H, elements of the troop came upon a complex which included 15 bunkers and 5 structures with sleeping quarters. A homemade claymore mine and clothing were also found. Two graves containing 2 dead VC (30) were uncovered and one body was marked with the identification number "B369" and contained documents with the number "B360,921" written on them.

At 0530H, Troop B located seven bunkers on the edge of a small clearing vicinity XT290905. The structures were destroyed. At 1130H, the troop found an extensive bunker and tunnel system and forwarded a report to the next 2 nights.

At 1325H, Troop C found a complex of 10 bunkers. The fortifications were destroyed.

3rd Squadron continued search and destroy operations while participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY I. In an effort to determine trafficability and access routes to the northwest of AO TIGER, a reconnaissance mission was conducted to the west. At 1701H, a dozer tank operating with the 3rd Squadron hit a pressure mine, vicinity XT269910, resulting in damage to the track and suspension system and negative casualties.

At 1705H, Troop E was engaged by two VC, vicinity XT265926, who fired 1 or 2 rounds of small arms. Fire was returned and one RPO-2 weapon and one RPG-2 round was captured as was one CHINO type automatic weapon.

At 0930H, Troop L came upon a well traveled trail running in an east-west direction in the vicinity of XT268990. It appeared that it had been heavily used. At 1000H, and again at 1120H, in the vicinities of XT269910 and XT279933 respectively, Troop L found numerous punji stake pits. The stakes were subsequently crushed by the tracked vehicles. At 1300H, Troop L found one bunker at vicinity XT209719 and destroyed it. At 1100H, vicinity XT209719, two ACAV's from Troop L hit a pressure detonated mine. The first incident resulted in four US WFA and damage to a track while the second resulted in damage to the track and suspension system but no US casualties. At 1612H, a task from Troop L hit a pressure mine vicinity XT208993, resulting in damage to the track and suspension system and no US casualties.

4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M)

The battalion continued under operational control of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Company A continued to provide security for the regimental command post and the regimental trains.

At 1900H, Company B located a VC training center vicinity XT288812, with one hut in good condition, rifle range equipment and silhouette targets. The area appeared not to have been used for some weeks. At 1200H, vicinity XT239879, a M113 from Company B hit a mine resulting in 1 US WIA and damage to the track suspension system, final drive and roadwheels.

Task Force Artillery

Continued to support the regiment and the 4th BN, 23rd Infantry while participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY I.
26 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment attacked west through Area L to seize Objective GLOBE, and to conduct search and destroy operations in the vicinity of XT245935 and in Fire Support Base FOCH.

1st Squadron

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in the general area of XT245935.

Troop A

Troop A found two bunkers with overhead cover at 0730H. The bunkers, at XT266926, contained expended .30 Caliber brass, fresh cigarette butts and signs of whittling. Two trails leading north from the area were found. An ACAV from the troop hit a mine, breaking the track, at XT288938. The incident occurred at 1000H and produced no casualties. Sniper fire was received by the troop at XT274932 at 1211H. Fire was returned; there were no friendly casualties. An ACAV hit a mine at XT243932; the incident occurred at 1200H, and no casualties resulted. The track on the vehicle was broken. At 1622H, an ACAV struck a mine at XT288938, but there was no damage to the vehicles and no casualties were incurred. At 1715H, a bunker was hit by 155mm shells. The structure contained a telephone and batteries, wire and ten RPG-2 rounds.

Troop B

Troop B at 1105H, destroyed a mine at XT288932. An hour later the troop found a Viet Cong Base Camp at XT289933 as they maneuvered to apprehend two Viet Cong spotted earlier by an air observer.

Troops A and B, at 0900H, engaged in a sharp firefight with an unknown size Viet Cong force that was estimated to be either a reinforced platoon or company. Small arms, automatic weapons fire and RPG-2 fire was received by the two troops resulting in one US KIA and nine US WIA. A rice cache was found during the engagement. The troops returned fire and artillery and TAC AIR were placed on the enemy’s position with unknown results.

3rd Squadron

The squadron attacked to the west through Area L to seize Objective GLOBE and to link up with the 5th Vietnamese Marine Battalion. The squadron closed on Objective GLOBE at 1530H without incident.

4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M)

The battalion conducted search and destroy operations in FSB FOCH. Company D, 1st Squadron (attached) found and destroyed, at 1100H, five foxholes at XT222895. The Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon destroyed two bunkers and a short trench at XT228937. The structures were found at 1230H.

At 1300H, Company C found numerous foot prints on and around a trail and ox cart tracks made by heavily loaded ox carts.

27 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment continued to conduct search and destroy operations in sector. The 3rd Squadron cooperated with the Vietnamese Marine Task Force MLPH in search and destroy operations in Areas L and F. The 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M) (-) was released from OPCON 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at 1130H for movement to their base camp at Chu Chi. Company A of the battalion remained OPCON to the regiment for regimental command post security. At 1130H, a Chinook helicopter flying in support of the regiment received 200+300 rounds of automatic weapons fire from XT255935. The incident, resulted in no damage to or casualties within the helicopter. The aircraft was hit with unknown results. At 1300H, a FAC aircraft received small arms fire from a bunker at XT289946. The aircraft was not hit, and the FAC retaliated with an air strike on the enemy. At 1735H, an Air Cavalry Troop light fire team

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observed three Viet Cong running west at XT278700. The enemy fired three rounds at the aircraft. The light fire team answered the fire with unknown results.

1st Squadron

The squadron executed search and destroy operations in the vicinity of Objective BLUE in coordination with Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. Company D, which was released from OCON, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry at 0000, remained in PSB POCHE (XT203865) area until relieved by elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M) and closed on the Squadron Command Post at 1200H. At 0000, the squadron evacuated 1500 pounds of polished rice from an enemy base camp at XT205933. At 1015H, the squadron command post received an unknown number of sniper rounds from XT255925. An air strike was called in with unknown results. At 1530H, a light fire team flying in support of the First of the Blackhorse observed nine unattended Viet Cong cattle grazing at XT221920.

At 1300H, Troops and B, Company D, and Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry engaged an unknown size Viet Cong force in trenches and bunkers at XT239942. The ensuing firefight killed one VC KIA (20 and one VC WIA (M)).

Troop A received sniper fire at XT239943 resulting, however, in no US casualties. The fire was received at 0945H. At 1230H, the troop captured a Russian rifle. The weapon, found at XT239943, was a Mosin-Nagant rifle with a scope mounted on it.

Troop B found a base camp at 0955H. The camp, positioned in a heavy jungle at XT239942, contained fifty-five gallon cans of rice and two twenty-five gallon drums of rice. The troop discovered an enemy grave yard at XT229215. The site was found at 1135H and appeared to be six months old. At 1355H, the troop discovered and destroyed, at XT229216, one trench, five uncovered structures, and three bunkers five by twelve feet.

At 1030H, Troop C discovered one can, containing medical supplies and documents at XT259943. The troop engaged three Viet Cong running toward the northeast in a woods vicinity XT259910. The enemy was engaged by small arms, automatic weapons and fire from the light fire team. Results were unknown.

3rd Squadron

During the day the squadron consolidated Objective BLUE in coordination with Task Force ALPHA, executed search and destroy operations in the northern portion of Area L, and conducted reconnaissance operations of crossing sites across the SOK CALOR in the vicinity XT172894. At 1000H, the attached Engineer Platoon found and destroyed several bunkers with a trench system at XT172894. Items found at the location included a bicycle and a claymore. At 1100H, an M577 received two rounds of small arms fire from XT122616. There were no hits on the aircraft.

Troop L, at 1500H, destroyed twelve bunkers with trenches at XT179912. Six bunkers were on the north side of a river in the area, and six covered a crossing site over the river. Six of the bunkers were so emplaced as to be a "second line of defense", and all were oriented to the north. At 2100H, Troop L found a sign which indicated the presence of a minefield on the northern side of a stream near XT179912.

Company M accomplished an enemy base camp consisting of large bunkers. The area, at XT159921 was thoroughly searched.

4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M)

The battalion, released from OCON of the Blackhorse Regiment at 1130H, passed through the regimental area as it conducted a tactical road march to CU CHI. At 1130H, an M577 command post vehicle was struck by an RPG-2 round at XT278700 resulting in four US WIA. Fire was returned with unknown results.

28 February 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
The regiment concentrated its efforts on road clearing and search and clear operations. The search and clear operations were carried out in A0's LIMA, MIKE, and BEAR in coordination with the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division along Route Tilt. At 0600H, an OH-23D helicopter, while flying at 1800 feet, received fire from XT185935. Two rounds pierced the helicopter bubble, but the aircraft continued its mission without difficulty. At 0900H, an AH-1W helicopter (UBH) received intense ground fire in the vicinity of XT125943. The fire was from a VC team, which the OH-23D was element, made two firing passes on the enemy. On the second pass the co-pilot of one ship was wounded and died on 1 March.

Company A, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M) remained OPON to the Blackhorse Regiment.

1st Squadron

The squadron executed search and destroy operations in A0's LIMA and MIKE.

At 1000H, Troop A discovered a VC Base Camp at XT221953. Fifteen minutes later, other elements of the troop discovered an enemy base camp at XT219943. In a firefight with three Viet Cong in a bunker, at XT220933, the troop suffered two WIA. The engagement occurred at 1057H. At 1132H, the troop was fired on by five VC resulting in one VC KIA (BC) and one VC KIA (POSS). At 1200H, the troop found documents in a base camp at XT219943 inscribed CHI/DUAN K??A. Medical supplies were found in bunkers and trenches at XT219943, at 1200H, at 1315H, in the same location the troop found in addition to one GHEDOM garden and one Hummer rifle, a 250 pound bomb marked BON CHIN TRI DOAN 82. The bomb was destroyed in place. On the second pass the co-pilot of one ship was wounded and died on 1 March.

Company A, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M) remained OPON to the Blackhorse Regiment.

2nd Squadron

Troop A, at 1000H, discovered a VC Base Camp at XT221953. Fifteen minutes later, other elements of the troop discovered an enemy base camp at XT219943. In a firefight with three Viet Cong in a bunker, at XT220933, the troop suffered two WIA. The engagement occurred at 1057H. At 1132H, the troop was fired on by five VC resulting in one VC KIA (BC) and one VC KIA (POSS). At 1200H, the troop found documents in a base camp at XT219943 inscribed CHI/DUAN K??A. Medical supplies were found in bunkers and trenches at XT219943, at 1200H, at 1315H, in the same location the troop found in addition to one GHEDOM garden and one Hummer rifle, a 250 pound bomb marked BON CHIN TRI DOAN 82. The bomb was destroyed in place. On the second pass the co-pilot of one ship was wounded and died on 1 March.

Company A, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry (M) remained OPON to the Blackhorse Regiment.

3rd Squadron

Troop A, at 1300H, discovered an M11A mine at XT208965. Company B found bunkers, foxholes, clean clothing, and a women's diary at XT208965. The items were discovered at 1600H. At 1800H, the company found a submachine gun at XT219952. Company D, at 1800H, discovered a clothing factory with sewing machines at XT208950.

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An ACAV from Troop L hit a mine at XT169928 resulting in track damage and three US WHA. This incident took place at 0910H.

A tank from Company M hit a pressure mine at XT169928 resulting in vehicle damage, but no US casualties. The mine was struck at 0814H. The company discovered a base camp/training area at XT159916. The camp was located at 0945H, and contained thirty-five 60mm mortar rounds, three Russian 7.62mm rifles, one RFO-2 round, 10,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, a wooden model of an O-1 aircraft, blackboard, paper, and small arms targets. The area also included an extensive fortification system.

1 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Their segment continued to execute missions initiated on 28 February.

1st Squadron

The squadron continued operations as initiated on 28 February.

Troop L, at 1600H, found thirty huts, a sewing machine, a stock of cigarettes, fifteen cases (five gallon size) of medical supplies. At 2200H, members of the troop found a set of dogtags inscribed: "Vanneman, Robert G., 098987, Episcopalian," at XT255912.

Troop H, at 1040H, received heavy automatic weapons fire from what proved to be an enemy base camp at XT215913. During the fight, an ACAV was struck by an RPG-2 rocket on the .50 Caliber hatch armor, injuring two crewmen. Suspected enemy location engaged with 105mm AET and automatic weapons with unknown results. At 1005H, elements of the troop discovered an enemy hospital at XT121936. At 2110H, a diary was found in the area. The diary contained an entry to the effect that all personnel were to cease work and prepare for US operations in the area. The item was dated 27 February.

At 1120H, an ACAV from the troop struck a mine at XT22393U. Though the track was damaged there were no casualties. Within minutes another ACAV struck a mine in the immediate area as the first mining incident. As with the first incident, the track was damaged, but there were no casualties among the crewmen.

Company D received automatic weapons fire from XT20993U at 1150H, resulting in two US WHA. Fire was returned with unknown results.

Three support squads from the squadron moved under the escort of the 2nd Platoon, Troop I, to the regimental command post, closing their destination at 1317H, at which time they became OPCON to regimental headquarters troop. The 3rd Platoon, Troop A, relieved the 2nd Platoon, Troop I, of its security mission at Fire Support Base "7 at 0935H.

3rd Squadron

The squadron continued to operate in coordination and cooperation with the Vietnamese Marine Task Force ALPHA, in AO's LIMA and BSR.

At 0925H, Headquarters Troop, observed an individual outside their perimeter at XT170928, the individual was engaged with automatic weapons fire and was soon to fall. The area was checked at first light, with negative result.

Troop E, at 1145H, destroyed a recently occupied bunker at XT142915. At 11,000H, the troop destroyed two bunkers about four feet square, four "V" type trenches, three feet long, and one foxhole. The fortifications, all at XT142915, appeared to have recently been used.

At 1200H, Troop J found two bunkers and a trail running along a stream at XT159914.

Company M, at 1312H, destroyed four protective shelters made of logs at XT 155928. At 1500H, Company M found an unused company sized base camp at XT152928.

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11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment continued search and destroy operations in AO's BEAK, LIMA, and MIKE. In addition, the regiment continued road clearing operations in coordination with the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division along Route TLU. Troop I and Company A, 4th Battalion, 4th Infantry (M) remained OPON to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during the day as they protected the regimental command post and logistical base. The regimental headquarters prepared to move from the position it had occupied since D+1 (the "French Fort") to a new location in AO Blackhorse (See Annex A). The regimental trains and squadron trains dropped off at THAI III (XVII705) at the 25th Division logistical support base.

At 1030H, a UH-1C from Air Cavalry Troop received four rounds of fire but no hits were received. The incident took place near XT2922.

1st Squadron

The squadron executed search and destroy operations in AO MIKE. Troop A (-) conducted road clearing and mine sweeping operations along route TLU in coordination with the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.

Troop A discovered an enemy base camp containing 250 pounds of medical supplies at XT1992H. The camp, found at 0845H, contained four cases of condensed milk and four CSN41 grenades.

Troop B, at the same time and in the same general area, found fifty pounds of medical supplies, eleven grenades and one typewriter. Troop B, at 1200H, discovered a possible hospital complex consisting of trenches and bunkers and patient recovery rooms. The hospital was located at XT1739H. At 1227H, the troop found seven kits, five pounds of rice and old medical supplies at XT1926H. A small Viet Cong Base Camp was destroyed at 1300H. The camp had been found at XT1753H. The troop found female clothing and personal items in the same area later in the afternoon.

At 1600H, a Troop C ACAV struck a mine at XT2363H. The vehicle burned but was recovered. There were no casualties.

Company D, found two M-16 rifles and one light anti-tank weapon (LAW), bandages, and fresh blood at XT2074H, at 1140H. Later, in the same area, a ten man bunker and one Russian rifle were found.

3rd Squadron

The squadron continued operations begun on 1 March. The river crossing site previously secured was improved. Landing Zone HED was secured for the helicopter extraction of the Vietnamese Marine Task Force ALPBA. The extraction was completed by 1100H.

Troop I, at 0835H, discovered two bunkers and two foxholes in the vicinity of TL1910H. The fortifications were destroyed. At 0950H, the troop discovered and then destroyed a platoon sized delaying position at XT19917. At XT1726H, three spider holes, seven two man foxholes reinforced with logs, and two trenches were found and destroyed late in the afternoon. A small base camp containing fifteen bunkers was discovered at 1738H. The camp, emplaced in the jungle at XT1697H, was destroyed.

3 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment's maneuver elements conducted search and destroy operations in areas of Operation S and R. Regimental headquarters and supporting elements, and Troop I deployed to move by tactical road march to N040999. Troop I, departed at 0700H to secure the new location (within AO BLACKHORSE) and struck a mine two kilometers south of the old regimental command post, at 0714H.
The tank suffered light track damage but there were no casualties. Company A, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry, was released from OPCON 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at 0700H, and followed Troop I until such time as it could move to TAQ NINH and return to its parent unit. Regimental headquarters and supporting units departed the "Old French Post" at 0800H, and proceeded without incident to move the new command post location in AO Blackhorse. Regimental trains and support elements dropped off at TAQ NINH as the regimental headquarters was moving. Task Force Artillery departed FIRE SUPPORT BASE 7, and escorted by a platoon from Troop A closed in the regimental headquarters area at 1600H.

Within twenty-four hours after occupation at the new location, regimental headquarters was surrounded by a total of nine batteries of artillery firing in support of the 25th Division.

1st Squadron

The squadron conducted a sweep in AO N (See Annex B) and then executed detailed search and destroy operations in the same area.

Troop A, at 1130H, discovered and evacuated a small amount of unknown type medical supplies from XT15300H.

Troop B, at 0950H, had a tank fall into a tank trap turning the vehicle on its side. There was no damage to the vehicle and it was recovered.

Troop C, made the major contact of the day. It engaged an estimated Viet Cong platoon at 1130H. The enemy was well entrenched at XT15795S. Air strikes and artillery were called in to the fire support. By 1600H, the results of the engagement were two VC KIA (BO), one VC KIA (BO), and one VC KIA (BO). There were no friendly casualties.

3rd Squadron

The squadron maneuvered within AO O (See Annex C) in search and destroy operations.

At 1130H, Troop I received two HU-2 rounds fired from XT129913. The rounds caused no damage or casualties and were answered by small arms and mortar fire.

Troop L, at 0815H, found two tons of polished rice and two hundred pounds of salt in several bunkers at XT159911. At 1155H, the troop discovered five gallons of kerosene, three hundred rounds of 7.62mm ammunition and 10 pounds of polished rice at XT179111. All the material was destroyed. The troop made a rare find at XT17911H, when it located an operational QWRCOM AM radio and case. The radio was evacuated at 1130H. At 1250H, thirty-five GIU bombs were found in the area and destroyed.

Company H, was fired on by an unknown type of antitank round at 0800H. The round fired from XT165913 missed the tank, but was US was HUA. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 0911H, the company found two bunkers with overhead cover, one rifle of unknown type, a small amount of flour and an extensive trail system at XT165917. The company then made contact with an estimated VC platoon at 0950H. The engagement resulted in three of the enemy KIA (BO), and one VC KIA (US), and took place at XT165911H. By 1250H, the company had discovered an enemy base camp in the same general area. The camp contained seven rifle positions, numerous foxholes, seven claymores and five M196 Munger Rifles.

March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Maneuver elements of the regiment conducted search and destroy operations in Area of Operation Q, and protected the helicopter extraction of elements of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Division and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. The regiment was given OPCON of the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (M) effective 0700H. The 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry was released from OPCON of the Blackhorse Regiment after the helicopter extraction of the battalion from Position COCON at 1130H. Troop I, and one platoon of Troop A, and three support squads from the 1st Squadron remained OPCON to the Regiment, and provided security for the regimental headquarters and Task Force Artillery.
1st Squadron

The squadron secured the extraction of the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry, at Position COUGAR and the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry from Position PANTHER.

At 1100H, Troop A reported punji stakes lined both sides of a road at XT 1300.

At 1330H, a tank attached to Troop B hit a pressure type mine at XT 0296. Vehicle damage was light and there were no casualties. At 1400H, an ACAV from the troop hit a pressure mine about 500 meters east of the mined tank. The vehicle burned and was destroyed. One US was WIA. At 1500H an ACAV from the troop was hit by an RPG-2 through the right side of the vehicle resulting in two US WIA.

2nd Squadron

The squadron continued the same operations as the day before.

At 0800H, Troop K found three CHICOM grenades, three magazines, five pounds of documents and a shower stall at XT 1392. Punji stakes four to six feet high were employed throughout the area. The shower and grenades were destroyed. Followup action by the troop in the same area (XT 1193) uncovered a battalion sized base camp. Included in the complex were bunkers with connecting trenches, dining room, sleeping quarters with cots, kitchen, a number of pigs and chickens, five pounds of documents, medical supplies and a sampan.

3rd Battalion, 5th Infantry (M)

The battalion moved to Position OL08 where it co-located with the 3rd Squadron.

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Operations in AO O and N continued from the day before. Elements of the regiment protected the helicopter extraction of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Division. The Blackhorse assumed operational control of the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry effective 0700H. They were to be extracted at XT 1193. The regiment also provided security for the extraction of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry from an LZ at XT095915. The regiment’s maneuver and support units prepared to enter the ‘Elephant’s’ sealing the Cambodian border and conducting search and destroy in sector beginning 7 March.

4th Squadron

The squadron displaced to Objective PANTHER and protected the extraction of the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry, and Battery C, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery. Elements of the squadron also secured an LZ at XT095915 for the extraction of the 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry.

3rd Squadron

The squadron established a combat base at XT092863 and prepared for maneuver on 6 March.

Troop L, at 1300H, hit a pressure type mine at XT093850. The incident resulted in no casualties to US personnel and only minor track damage to the vehicles.

At 1310H, Troop L found one butterfly type mine by the side of the road at XT091828 and destroyed it in place.

1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M)

The battalion displaced from Objective OL98 to AO Blackburne at XT097989. At 1100H, an armored personnel carrier from the battalion was struck by a 76mm recoilless rifle round resulting in one US XER and two US WIA.
Company B, found an enemy base camp at XTO8891H and engaged an estimated four Viet Cong engaged therein, resulting in one VC KIA (DC). The VC had one M16G6M rifle, and one RPG-2 weapon with two rounds.

6 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment prepared to maneuver into the "Elephant Ear". At 0700H, the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M) was released from OPCON of the Blackhorse Regiment, loan Company B, who assumed control of perimeter security for the regimental command post and Task Force Artillery. Troop K, was released from OPCON 11th Armored Cavalry at 0700H and returned to its parent unit.

At 0725H, a UH-1D helicopter landing at the regimental command post received fire in the vicinity of XTO689. A light fire team was assembled and returned fire with unknown results. At 0935H, an Air Cavalry Troop gunship was fired at from XTO927 while flying at 1100 feet. Fire was returned but enemy losses were unknown. At 1005H, a FAC reported a small trench system at XTO23855 five to seven meters in length.

1st Squadron

The squadron moved from Objective PANTHER to Objective MUSTANG at XTO95575, and prepared for maneuver on 7 March.

Troop A, at 1125H, observed a Viet Cong running in the vicinity of XTO65857, but could not fire on the VC because of the proximity of friendly troops.

At 1537H, a tank from Company D, hit a mine at XTO5781 resulting in only minor suspension system damage and no casualties. At 1900H, an Air Cavalry Troop gunship was fired at from XTO9597 while flying at 1100 feet. Fire was returned but enemy losses were unknown.

3rd Squadron

The squadron prepared for operations from a combat base at XTO2563.

Troop L, upon release from regimental control moved to secure a stream crossing at XTO20985.

Troop L, at 1720H, discovered a series of ten two man bunkers from XTO85862 to XTO78862. In addition a four man bunker was found. The fortifications were destroyed. At 1520H, a tank attached to the troop received automatic weapons and RPG-2 fire at XTO95862. No hits were sustained and there were no casualties. Fire was returned with unknown results.

1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M)

The battalion remained at its combat base at XTO9789 until released from OPCON, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. From 0235H until 0237H, the battalion was attacked by the VC using 60 and 82mm mortars. Approximately 120 rounds were received and forty-one infantrymen were wounded. Patrols discovered the mortar firing sites at XTO19782. During the attack, counter mortar fire was shot by Task Force Artillery. An Air Force C-17 Gun and Flareship called to the scene could not orient itself and was released by the regiment.

3rd Battalion, 25th Infantry

The unit remained at a combat base at XTO26576 and prepared for operations on 7 March.

7 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
Attached and assigned maneuver elements attacked in zone (See Annex D) and established blocking positions along the Cambodian border. The ID was crossed at 0730H.

At 0805H, an Air Cavalry Troop light fire team engaged two Viet Cong at XT026656 resulting in two VC KIA (Killed in Action). Intense ground fire was received at 1130H from W7953777. The fire came from an extensive bunker system in the area. The aircraft had one rocket pod hit which was forced to jettison. A second gunship was hit at the same time resulting in minor aircraft damage. There were no casualties in either instance. Artillery fires were placed in the area as were the fires of the gunships. The enemy force engaged was estimated to be an enemy platoon.

At 0827H, an armored personnel carrier from Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M), hit a mine at XT027977, disabling the suspension system. There were no casualties.

A CH-47 "Chinook" helicopter received ground fire at 1730H. The aircraft was hit numerous times, but was not forced to land. The fire was returned at WT912801.

1st Squadron

The squadron attacked west in sector following the Cambodian border west and then south to the boundary with the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division establishing blocking positions.

At 0815H, Troop A, engaged one VC at XT025555, with unknown results.

3rd Squadron

The squadron attacked west along the Cambodian border after initially securing an LZ, and a ford site at XT020863 until the site security mission was assumed by the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry.

Troop K, destroyed a box mine at 0759H at XT090857. At 1025H, the troop destroyed two 60mm mortars found along a trail near XT078136 and XT083086.

Troop H, found a small storage bin, recently used pots and pans, and a four by five meter garden plot at WT976899, along with fishtraps in a river at 1150H.

3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry

The battalion conducted an air mobile assault at XT0866 to secure a ford site at XT076863, and establish blocking positions along the Cambodian border. The assault began at 0720H, and was completed by 0930H without incident.

6 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment continued operations initiated on 7 March by conducting search and destroy operations along the Cambodian border.

At 1700H, a resupply CH-47 received automatic weapons fire from WT956957 resulting in fuel line damage and an emergency landing near elements of Company D. The company secured the helicopter during the night. No crewmen were wounded.

1st Squadron

The squadron executed search and destroy operations in sector between Phase Line FUBAR and the Cambodian border.

Troop A, found a well used trail along a stream at W950788 as well as fishing poisons in the stream at 0900H. At 1730H, the troop found a hut filled with an estimated 360 cubic feet of unpolished rice at WT979792.

Troop B, found lines tied to trees, wood for constructing bunkers, and campfires with sticks to hold cooking pots. The camp was discovered at 0945H, in the vicinity of WT979802.
Troop C found a small base camp consisting of seven huts with bunkers. A sick slip was also found for a 15 year old boy suffering from malaria, in the base camp at WT935086. The camp was found at 0900H. The troop discovered what appeared to be an aid station containing documents, medical supplies and unit identification as C10& at 1030H, in the same area as the base camp found at 0900H. At 1150H, the troop was engaged by the VC using an unknown type of explosive at WT918800. Fire was returned, resulting in one VC KIA (BC), one VC W WIA, and eight VC KIA (POSS). A search of the area resulted in the capture of a bundle of booby trapped clothing and two weapons of unknown type.

Company D found two cows at WT937879 at 1130H. The animals were evacuated. At 1200H, the company discovered two bunkers, a blackboard and two pounds of documents at WT991855. At 1230H, an AGW was hit by an RPG-2 or rifle grenade, and the vehicle was destroyed by burning. 5 US were WIA in the incident at WT943809. The company found a base camp at XT939855 at 1300H. A search of the area disclosed assorted medical supplies, 10 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, four hand grenades, 250 rounds of small arms ammunition, one bag of rice and bloodstained propaganda papers.

3rd Squadron

The squadron conducted search and destroy operations in sector between Phase Line PHNO and the Cambodian border. Troop I destroyed a small base camp of seven small huts, one large hut, one small mess hall, a tailor shop, four bundles of punjii stakes and 7 picnic style tables. The camp, discovered at 1155H, was located at WT997887. The troop destroyed fifteen foxholes in a defensive position at WT991836.

Company H found a Philips all transistor radio (portable type) at 1100H, in the vicinity of WT997817.

3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry

The battalion conducted search and destroy operations between Phase Line PHNO and the Cambodian border. In addition the battalion secured the ford site at XT998665. There was no enemy contact during the day.

9 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I, conducting night security and search and destroy operations. The night operations being conducted in the Blackhorse AO and the search and destroy operations between the Cambodian border and Phase Line PHNO. Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mech) continued to provide security for the regiment.

At 1130H, an Air Cavalry Troop OH-1C engaged one VC at WT946833 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).

At 1700H, an armored personnel carrier from Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mech), hit a mine XT930799 with no casualties and light vehicle damage resulting.

1st Squadron

The squadron continued search and destroy operations in their assigned sector.

Troop A, received sniper fire at 0900H from WT930800 and returned the fire with 1 US WIA as a result of the action. At 1150H, a recovery vehicle with Troop A was hit by a rifle grenade, vicinity WT973793. The grenade penetrated the front and hit an air filter, but the vehicle was still operational and there were no US casualties. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 1500H, Troop A discovered 1 VC KIA (BC) with documents, files, and a letter from a US individual in Company C, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry. At 1700H, Troop A received small arms fire and 1 rifle grenade from a ditch on the east side of the road, vicinity WT971797. As fire was returned, a light fire team was called in for support. The result of the engagement were 5 US WIA, 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KIA (POSS). A followup of the contact at 1110H, netted 2 VC KIA (POSS).
At 1030H, Troop D discovered a VC hootch containing 55 gallons of gasoline and three bags of cement at K297812. The hut and contents were destroyed.

At 0940H, Company D received automatic weapons fire from WT998812. Fire was returned with negative results and there were three US WIA. At 2045H, a Company D tank attached to Troop C saw movement to his front, vicinity WT97797. The tank opened-up with canister and automatic weapons fire with unknown results.

3rd Squadron

The squadron continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I and conducted search and destroy operations in their assigned sector. At 0940H, Troop D received small arms fire from an unknown VC force, vicinity Z005872. Fire was returned with automatic weapons and claymores and resulted in one VC KIA (25) and one GRENCH type 56 carbine captured.

At 1145H, Troop I found and destroyed seven foxholes at vicinity WT950866.

At 1215H, Company M found a 12X16 foot shelter and one fish trap at WT957877. The structure and material were destroyed.

3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry

The battalion continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I under control of the regiment. They conducted search and destroy operations with no significant incidents reported.

Task Force Artillery

Continued to provide fire support for the regiment.

Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery

Continued to provide direct support to 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry under control of Task Force Artillery.

10 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I, conducting night security operations in the Blackhorse AO. Search and destroy operations continued between the Cambodian border and PL PINTO.

1st Squadron

The squadron continued to conduct search and destroy operations in their assigned sectors while participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY I.

At 0945H, Troop A in the vicinity WT906798 found a hut and three foxholes with a blue wire leading north from the positions toward the river. At 1235H, an AIV was hit by an anti-tank grenade in the gas tank resulting in two US WIA and one AIV destroyed. Fire was returned with automatic weapons and an immediate air strike with unknown results. At 1138H, an anti-tank mine was discovered and destroyed on a trail vicinity WT90797. At 1145H, a tunnel and trail were found by Troop A running northwest from vicinity WT906797. At 1608H, vicinity WT925808, Troop A found a classroom 20X15 feet containing documents and fresh flowers on a table. In the same area, a three room hut (one VIP room, one film room) an extensive trench system, and 30 huts were found. Documents were found identifying the unit as G07.

At 1500H, Troop E found a dispensary, vicinity WT925905. At 1725H, Troop E found a sixteen inch red star pennant and medical supplies in a stucco building, vicinity WT903797. The building was highly boobytrapped and contained a sound proof room with double thickness glass on the windows, a place for a truck engine generator, a heavy coaxial power cable, places where antennas had been mounted, and a mine machine with stencils.
3rd Squadron

The squadron continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I conducting search and destroy operations in their assigned sector.

At 2210H, elements of Troop I fired on three to five VC at XT000366, resulting in one CHICOM type 53 rifle captured and one VC KIA (RO).

At 0800H, Troop L received eight rounds of small arms, vicinity WT990877 (1000 meters from squadron command post). Fire was returned with unknown results.

At 1200H, Company M received five rounds of mortar fire, small arms fire, and recoilless rifle fire vicinity WT973862. Fire was returned with automatic weapon, a light fire team, and artillery with unknown results.

A subsequent sweep of the area following the break of contact, revealed a regimental sized base camp containing the following: Numerous concrete reinforced bunkers, a thirty foot deep tunnel type air raid shelter, extensive trench systems, two mass halls, a volleyball court, dispensary, a 100 foot lookout tower, underground rooms used as stables for pigs and chickens, an undetermined amount of small arms ammunition, a telephone, 500 feet of wire, a bicycle repair shop, three Russian 7.62mm Norinco Nagant rifles, one US K-1 rifle, three US M3 sub-machineguns, two French FIAT SPB sub-machineguns, two CHICOM grenades, thirteen German Gasser rifles, four French MAS rifles, twelve bicycles, one 12 gauge Remington shotgun, one CHICOM type 21 heavy machine gun with anti-aircraft mount, and documents from North Vietnam. The bunkers and fortifications were destroyed and the telephone and weapons were evacuated.

3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry

The battalion remained OIFCON to the Blackhorse Regiment while participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY I. There were no significant incidents reported.

Task Force Artillery

Continued to provide fire support for the regiment from a fire support base, vicinity XT037368. Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 15th Artillery continued to provide ES to 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry under control of Task Force Artillery.

11 and 12 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment continued to conduct night security and search and destroy operations in AO Blackhorse and in the area between Phase Line PINO and the Cambodian border. Company E, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M) continued to secure the regimental command post and Task Force Artillery. At 0950H, an airborne L.0 observed fifty meters of trench and four square shaped bunkers at XT000696. At 1100H, an Air Cavalry Troop helicopter observed two automatic weapons positions at WT990775. Fire was received from the position. The helicopter received one hit in the engine mount. There were no casualties. At 1615H, another armed helicopter observed fire from WT 990775. The aircraft received one hit, but there were no casualties. At 1621H, an Air Cavalry Troop engaged three VC at WT925785, resulting in three VC KIA (RO).

On 12 March the area in which the regiment operated was expanded to include the area between Phase Line PINO and the boundary with the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.

1st Squadron

The squadron continued to operate in sector, in search and destroy operations between Phase Line PINO and the Cambodian border. Throughout the morning there was light but almost steady contact with the enemy. At 0900H, Troop B discovered a base camp consisting of ten huts, ten bunkers built into ant hills and one 55 gallon drum of polished rice near a river at WT925785. At 1107H, another L.0 observed fire from WT925785. The aircraft received one hit, but there were no casualties. At 1231H, an L.0 observed fire from WT957785. Fire was returned with unknown results.
At 1350H, Troop B, contacted a company sized force initiating the heaviest engagement with the enemy during Operation JUNCTION CITY I. The battle was fought in the area of WT92785.

The enemy was well entrenched in fortified positions and was equipped with RK12 recoilless rifles, small arms and automatic weapons. Artillery, automatic weapons and TAC Air were employed against the fortified position until 111915H, when the position was sealed. Before the enemy withdrew to laager positions, a total of ten air strikes were placed on the target from 111200H to 121000H. At 111915H, two pods of air delivered CS were dropped at WT92785. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 112025H, Troop A reported that the most recent air strike had resulted in eight VC KIA (POSS) at WT92785. As of 112000H, the body count for the night was as follows: twenty-four VC KIA (POSS), three VC KIA (BC), and eight VC KIA (POSS), By 120100H, a light fire team flying in support of the 1st Squadron received fire from WT92785 resulting in one US WIA. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 120200H, Troop A received automatic fire at WT92785. The fire was returned with unknown results. At 120300H, Troop B engaged VC snipers in the jungle at WT92785. The fire was returned with unknown results. At 120400H, Troop A discovered a wooden structure containing a small amount of ammunition.

The squadron continued to execute search and destroy operations in sector, on the 11th and 12th. Troop L and Company M worked from Phase 1 to the border with the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

Elements of Troop L fired on three or more Viet Cong at XT00866. The incident occurred at 111200H and resulted in one VC KIA (BC) and one CHICOM type 53 carbine, 2% Squadrons

At 110905H, Troop L discovered a well used trail running east to west at XT 998669. At 0700H, the troop discovered a well used trail and a basket containing part of a used machine gun at WT99866. At 110600H, elements of the troop discovered a damaged fish trap at WT99866, and all were destroyed.

At 110600H, Troop L discovered a well used trail running east to west at XT 998669. The grave marker stating a body buried under-math was killed by Americans. At 110905H, the troop discovered a small arms fire, but no casualties resulted. At WT99866, the troop found and destroyed a weapon at 111600H.
Troop I, at 121030H, discovered and destroyed one hut with three open stoves and five bomb shelters with interconnecting trenches at XT028566. At 121030H, the troop found five bunkers connected by a trench system at XT001846.

Troop K, at 121120H, destroyed six foxholes with overhead cover at XT987850. At 121120H, the troop found one large underground bunker at WT985849.

Troop L, at 121225H, found one well constructed building twenty five by thirty feet at WT977852. At 121225H, the troop found ten huts with interconnecting tunnels, one M1 carbine, one mess hall, and several pigs and chickens at WT908850. No casualties resulted and fire was returned with unknown results. A large building, wooden rifles, one M1 rifle, one German sub-machine gun, one wooden hand grenade, twenty-five pounds of documents, a musical instrument (horn), clothes, bicycle parts, one gas mask, two flashlights, and sixteen medical bags at WT77852.

Company M, at 120855H, the following items in an enemy base camp: Six typewriters (only two operational), fifty pounds of documents, fifteen new bicycle tires, twenty-five new bicycle tubes and hand tools at WT979852.

On 11 March, the PSYOPS team conducted a speaker mission for two and one half hours during period 0915 - 0745 - 1000 - 1500 - 1600, and dropped 40,000 leaflets in the regimental AO.

On 12 March, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment PSYOPS team conducted an airborne speaker mission for three and one half hours in support of the 1st Squadron.

13 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I, and prepared for over land movement to the regimental base camp. Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M) continued under the operational control of the regiment and provided security for the regimental command post and Task Force Artillery.

At 1800H, an Air Cavalry Troop light fire team received automatic weapons fire, vicinity WT997850 resulting in negative casualties or damage. Fire was returned with rockets and automatic weapons fire with unknown results.

1st Squadron

The squadron continued search and destroy operations in their assigned sectors while participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY I. The squadron displaced to the vicinity XT0378 in preparation for overland movement to the regimental base camp.

At 1920H, Troop A reported capture on one CHICOM 1944 type 53 carbine and one 22 cal. b2T action rifle and discovered one VC KIA (BC) in a bunker vicinity WT947855.

At 1600H, Company D captured two generators, vicinity WT945785. It was later determined that the previously reported generators were one cylinder engines of US manufacture (Kubler in Wisconsin) and were possibly used in sampans.

3rd Squadron

The squadron continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I, conducting search and destroy operations in their assigned sector. The squadron also secured a crossing site, vicinity XT017856, and a landing zone, vicinity XT068846 for helicopter extraction of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Infantry. The squadron then displaced to the vicinity of XT0682 in preparation for the overland movement to the regimental base camp.
3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry

The battalion continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I and remained OPCON to the Blackhorse Regiment. The battalion conducted a tactical foot march to the vicinity of XZ0536 and prepared for heliborne extraction.

Task Force Artillery

Continued to provide fire support for elements of the regiment. Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 30th Artillery continued to provide direct support for the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry under control of Task Force Artillery.

11 March 1967

11th Armored Cavallry Regiment

The regiment continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I. The regiment proceeded with the displacement of its elements in preparation for overland movement to the regimental base camp. The 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry was released from regimental control upon completion of extraction. 1st Platoon, Troop K continued to provide security for the regimental trains and the FSA. Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M) continued under OPCON to the regiment securing the regimental command post and Task Force Artillery.

At 1050H, an airborne FAC observed two VC transporting supplies across a river on a raft, vicinity WT966743. A FAC again reported observing one VC running towards the Cambodian border at 1625H, vicinity WT937785.

1st Squadron

The squadron continued search and destroy operations in their assigned sector and displaced to vicinity XM0378 in preparation for overland movement to the regimental base camp.

At 1020H, Troop A observed two VC running. One VC was carrying a paper, the other a weapon and were fleeing to the southwest, vicinity WT964782. At 1110H, the troop received one rifle grenade and small arms fire from across the river in the vicinity WT962789 resulting in one US KIA. Automatic weapons fire was returned with unknown results. Troop A destroyed three 55 gallon drums filled with fuel at 1130H, vicinity WT944786. The fuel was thought to be fougasse.

At 1230H, Troop B found fifty, one pound sticks of dynamite with US markings, one case of C3 explosive, twelve 100 pound bags of salt, several documents, a small quantity of grenades, and a trench, vicinity WT927785. At 1405H, the Troop B command post engaged five VC, vicinity WT928785, resulting in one VC KIA (KG). Capture of one Thompson sub-machinegun and a document indicating the VC was a squad leader of unit 6-271. There were no US casualties. At 1530H, one 81mm round and small arms fire were received from an estimated three VC vicinity WT926788. Fire was returned with automatic weapons, TAC Air, and artillery with unknown results.

3rd Squadron

The squadron continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY I, conducting search and destroy operations in their assigned sector. The squadron displaced to XM0382 in preparation for overland movement. 1st Platoon, Troop K, continued security for regimental trains.

At 0900H, a Troop K tank hit an AT mine, and an ACAV hit another AT mine, vicinity XM006853.

At 0930H, Troop I located an oxcart trail running north-south, vicinity WT 955801. At 1135H, automatic weapons and recoilless rifle fire was received from west of WT955801 resulting in two US WIA. Fire was returned with unknown results.

3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry

The battalion was extracted to TRAI III in eight lifts commencing at 1309H. The battalion was released from regimental control upon completion of extraction at 1358H.
Task Force Artillery

Continued to provide support for elements of the regiment from vicinity XT-0687, Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery, reverted from direct support 3rd Battalion, 25th Infantry to OR (Reinforcing) under control of Task Force Artillery.

The PsyOP team conducted an at home operation mission for two hours and dropped 150,000 leaflets in the area: WT9060 - WT9876 - WT9489 - XT0586.

15 March 1967

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The regiment terminated search and destroy operations and the squadrons moved to night laager positions in preparation for the road march to the regimental camp. Regimental command post and trains escorted by Troop K departed AO Blackhorse at 1130H, making a day and night tactical road march. The regimental command post and trains closed the regimental camp at 0330H on the 16th.

1st Squadron

The squadron terminated search and destroy operations and moved to night laager positions vicinity XT0278. Squadron elements departed AO Blackhorse for the regimental camp at 1000H, and conducted a day and night tactical road march closing the camp at 1530H on the 16th without incident.

3rd Squadron

The squadron terminated search and destroy operations and moved to night laager positions vicinity XT0682. Squadron elements departed AO Blackhorse for the regimental camp at 1500H, conducting a day and night tactical march closing the camp 1600H, on the 16th. There were no incidents reported.

11. (C) RESULTS

a. Personnel:

77 VC KIA (BC), 7 VC KIA (BC), 60 VC KIA (POSS) and 27 VC KIA (POSS). Eight individuals were detained and 3 Viet Cong were captured. There were no CHIEU NOI's during JUNCTION CITY I.

b. Fortifications and Buildings:

216 structures, 856 fortifications, three water wells, one water dam and one footbridge were destroyed.

c. Material:

(1) Captured: 1 US M1 rifle, 1 AK-47 w/magazine, 5 M1 SMGs, 7 Russian Mosin Nagant rifles, 3b Mauser rifles, 17 CHICOM type 53 carbines, 17 French MAS 36 rifles, 6 CHICOM type 55 carbines, 3 French MAS-49 SMGs, 2 M1 Garand rifles, 1 Remington shotgun, 1 CHICOM type 26 Hvy MG w/cal mount, 1 CHICOM type 26 Hvy MG, 3 LAW, 1 Schmeisser MP-38 SMG, 1 M1 carbine, 1 Thompson SMG, 1 .22 Cal bolt action rifle, 91 wooden rifles, 3 VG claymores, 4 magazines, 1 7.62mm .55 barrel, 1 rifle scope, 1 RPO-2 rd, 61 60mm mortar rds, 1 case Composition C3, 50 1 lb sticks of TNT, 1 119 wood model, 1 blackbox, 1 CHICOM radio receiver, and 3 CHICOM protective masks.

(2) Destroyed: 1 CHICOM type 26 Hvy MG, 15276 rds of small arms, 163 artillery rds, 39 mines, 1 US claymore, 10 RPO rds, 2 RPG-2 launchers, 23 RPG-2 rds, 181 grenades, 1 Hvy MG, 2 250 lb bombs, one 500 lb bomb, 13 CHICOM claymores, 3 82mm mortar rds, and 3 82mm fuses.

d. Miscellaneous Items and Foodstuffs:

(1) Captured: 125 lbs salt, 1 switchboard line, 150 tons of polished rice, 350 lbs clothing, 50 gallons of cooking oil, 1 cases condensed milk, 7 typewriters,
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1 mimeograph machine w/stencils, 2 medical kits and assorted medical supplies, 16 medical bags, 1 4-channel radio, 1 antenna, assorted radio and generator spare parts, 1 generator, 2 US WINDER engines, 2 printing presses, 500 lb. documents, assorted hand tools, 12 flashlights, 10 batteries, 1 musical instrument (horn), 3 sewing machines, 1 spool, 1 roll of 16mm film, 2 microphones, wooden map board, unknown type canister round, 3 bags cement, 1 bicycle, 145 bicycle tire tubes, 16" stack of photos.

(2) Destroyed: 500 meters punji stakes, 1 rice mill, 1 poncho, 10 pigeons, 12 chickens, 6 tables, 6 fishtraps, 1 bicycle, 65 gallons gas, 5 gallons tar, 1 flash mat, 5 meters detonating cord, and 1 empty.

a. Friendly Losses:

Friendly losses included nine US KM, 11 L11 US WHA. Material losses were twenty-seven ACAV's, one M577, one M578, three M60s, one 5 ton truck, one 2 1/2 ton truck, five OH-23 helicopters, and 2 OH-23 helicopters damaged. Seven ACAV's were destroyed.

x. Reaction to friendly air strikes was not possible in most instances. Approximately 25% of the strikes initiated were followed up by ground maneuver elements. The missions assigned to the aircraft were the principal limiting factors on followup action. TAC Air during the operation was employed to engage suspected or known enemy locations and to neutralize objective areas. Because of the inaccessibility of most of the suspected or known Viet Cong positions, movement of ground forces into the areas was not feasible. However, when used on objective areas ground forces closed almost immediately upon termination of the strike.

12. (U) Administrative Matters.

a. General. Plans formulated for JUNCTION CITY proved to be adequate, resupply activities kept pace with consumption rates while replacement personnel continued to fulfill the daily needs of the Blackhorse. During Phase I (18-22 February) support for all classes of supply was provided by the 25th Infantry Division from supply points in their base camp at CU CHI. From 23 February to the termination of JUNCTION CITY (15 March) logistical support was provided from 1st Logistical Command Forward Supply Areas at XT2667 and later at THU M (XT279).

Personnel activities were split with the initial processing and transmitting of casualty information from the forward area back to the regimental base camp. The quantity of paperwork dictated the requirement for it to be processed from the base camp to higher headquarters. Consequently, all final action personnel and administrative matters were conducted from the base camp.

b. Logistics.

(1) Resupply

Both ground transport and aerial delivery were used. Ground transportation was primarily used to move 155mm ammunition over a secured route to the fire support bases. Aerial delivery was used to haul Class I, II and IV supplies to the forward elements of the two squadrons, since their locations were normally inaccessible by land lines of communication. All supplies were either drawn from supply points in CU CHI or forward supply areas.

(2) Maintenance

Maintenance support was provided by the 168th Maintenance Battalion with backup support provided by the 610th Maintenance Battalion.

(a) Repair Parts. Numerous vehicles received damage to suspension systems from mines. Replacement parts were not readily available, thus limiting the number of tracked vehicles available for combat operations. Items such as left and right road wheel arms, road wheel hubs, seals, torsion bars, and road wheels had to be scavenged by scavenging the maintenance units in the area and by making frequent visits to the classification and salvage point in XT2667 and the 504th Supply Depot in SAIGON. Experience factors established on Operation CEDAR FALLS had not been integrated into the supply system in anticipation of the increased demands for those high mortality repair parts.
(b) Evacuation. Seven M60A3 tanks and eight ACAVs remained in TAF KHH for evacuation by the 15th Support Brigade. The apparent lack of a sense of urgency by the supporting unit, resulted in a considerable loss of time. In fact it was some 30 days before the last vehicles were moved. This was necessary since the regiment does not have the organic tank transporters or low bed trailers required to evacuate the disabled vehicles.

(c) Transportation. Only organic transport was utilised.

(d) Supply and support statistics. Daily consumption figures were rendered by the Forward Supply Areas to the 15th Support Brigade.

(3) Treatment and evacuation of Casualties:

Casualties received during JUNCTION CUT I were light and the majority of the individuals sustaining injuries from hostile fire received them from either mines or sniper fire. Of the casualties evacuated, 50% were first sent to the 15th DMPH and then transferred to either the 12th, 93rd, 25th and 35th Evacuation Hospitals or the 3rd Field Hospital. The maximum utilisation of organic medical facilities in the regiment resulted in the treatment of 25% of the casualties in the battle area and their prompt return to duty.

(e) Communications:

(1) Communications to higher headquarters from regimental headquarters:

(a) FM Nets - The regiment entered the 25th Division Command Net maintaining close contact with higher headquarters.

(b) AM RATT - 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment entered the 25th Infantry Division Command Net Number 2, providing on-line radio teletype communications with higher headquarters (See Appendix I to Annex B).

(c) Telephone - A twelve channel VHF system was provided by the 129th Signal Battalion from the Blackhorse Forward CP to the Lightning Forward CP utilizing half of an AN/MRC-69 which provided the following circuits:

1. Common User:
   11th Armored Cavalry Regiment 5-3 TOC to 25th Division TOC.
   11th Armored Cavalry Regiment 5-3 Air to 25th Division 0-3 Air Forward FSS to Forward FSS to 25th Division FSE.
   11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Trains 5-1 to 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment 5-1 Rear Artillery Support Unit (h) to 25th Division Artillery (h).
   11th Armored Cavalry Air Cavalry Troop Forward to 11th Armored Cavalry Air Cavalry Troop.

2. Common User:
   Two 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Forward to 25th Division Forward.
   One 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Forward to Long Giao Switchboard.

   The three common user circuits provided access into the Army Telephone System.

(e) Teletypewriters:

   A circuit was established through 25th Division Forward into Army teletype system. The AN/MQG-47 (Telegraph Center) and operating personnel were furnished by the 3rd Signal Battalion.

(d) Regimental Train Telephone:

   When separated from the regimental command post, the regimental trains were provided access into the Army telephone system by dual routes. Circuits were established into the 25th Division Artillery Forward Switchboard and into the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Forward Switchboard. The latter circuits were established through the use of a second AN/MRC-69 provided by the 129th Signal Battalion by establishing into a second VHF channel system, an alternate capability was available in event the first system became inoperative.
(2) Communications to base camp from regimental field location:

(a) Radio Teletype:

1. AM Command/Intelligence Net established to base camp from regimental field location by using an AN/GMR-25D as the base camp station. This facility was provided by the 53rd Signal Battalion.

2. AN Admin/Log Net established to LONQ DINH and to base camp from regimental trains in cooperation with the 186th Maintenance Battalion, who provided one operator at LONQ DINH, two at base camp and the equipment at base camp. The remaining operators were provided by the regiment.

(b) Telephone:

1. Dedicated user circuit established from forward location to base camp to provide direct access between Blackhorse Forward Switchboard and LONQ QIAO Switchboard. A second dedicated user circuit was established from the Blackhorse Forward Switchboard to the regimental S-1 at base camp (See Appendix 1 to Annex B).

2. Cannon user circuits (2) were provided from Blackhorse Forward into Lightning Forward thus offering access into the Army telephone system (See Appendix 2 to Annex B).

(c) Teletypewriters:

Circuit to base camp from 11th Armored Cavalry Forward, through 25th Division Forward and II Field Force V.

(d) FM:

Admin/Log Net utilized almost continuously in the last field location due to the separation of the forward command post and the trains areas. It was also utilized in convoy control thus providing continuous communications (See Appendix 3 to Annex B).

(3) Special Equipment:

(a) A P-145L battery charger was obtained to be utilized in converting AC to DC for operation of the radios within the Blackhorse TOC from a central generator power source, thus reducing the number of small generators and the necessity for running the M-77B engines. Due to the added power requirements of the AM equipment the P-145L is not large enough to provide power for all AM and FM equipment. Heavy duty 12 volt batteries are utilized between the battery charger and the equipment to provide a constant voltage.

(b) Techniques. It was necessary during one phase of the operation to install and utilize an FM retransmission station to provide communications between the forward maneuvering squadrons and its regimental headquarters. The AN/ARC-121 was utilized to provide this capability.

d. Administration:

(1) In concept, the S-1 function during Operation JUNCTION CITY I was to be virtually the same as for CEDAR FALLS. That is to say, courier flights for transportation of personnel to go on R&R, mail for personnel located in the field, replacements for the field and equipment for the field, all were scheduled for movement via C-7A Caribou aircraft. As in CEDAR FALLS, aircraft for these missions were provided by II Field Force, Vietnam, O-1 Airlift in coordination with the US Air Force. The awards and decoration activity remained virtually unchanged during the operation, as recommendations for decorations resultant from the operation for the most part were not submitted until termination of the operation; Purple Heart orders were cut by the medical facility treating the individual. To handle the limited amount of administration which was processed in the field the S-1 section deployed 6 personnel to the field; additionally, the assistant field director for the American Red Cross Team with the regiment went to the field. The balance of the Regiment's administration remained in the base camp.
In conduct of operations the three main problems encountered were as follows:

(a) Limited radio contact via AM voice and RTV relay through LONQ necessitated extensive use of land line communication. Heavy daytime traffic virtually precluded establishing contact with the forward S-1 elements, therefore most casualty reports and strength reports were fed to the rear area at night and relayed to higher headquarters. Due to communications difficulties, the majority of these reports were late.

(b) Another problem was the frequent diversion by higher headquarters of the Caribou aircraft scheduled for courier runs. When this aircraft was diverted, it became necessary for tactical aircraft to be pressed into service by the regiment to move personnel, equipment and mail to and from the forward area.

(c) Due to lack of cooperation from medical facilities treating wounded personnel evacuated from the combat area and the reluctance of medical personnel to divulge information over the telephone on the status of wounded personnel, it became necessary to install liaison personnel in the various hospitals that were treating the regiment’s casualties. Ideally, two enlisted personnel (medical MOS) should be in each facility to obtain the necessary information regarding casualties and relay it to this headquarters. Two personnel at each hospital are required in order to maintain 24-hour operation. However, the regiment does not have adequate resources of medical personnel to fulfill this need. During Operation JUNCTION CITY I, personnel of the regiment were evacuated to nine different hospitals, including one as far away from the operational area as VUNG TAU. If casualties are to be dispersed to such a wide variety of hospitals, it would become necessary to deploy as many as 10 or 20 qualified medics to liaison duty in hospitals. During Operation JUNCTION CITY I, after the initial wave of casualties leveled off, this problem could be handled with a three-man team stationed at the evacuation hospital nearest to the operational area. However, if the number of casualties rises to the same high level experienced early in Operation JUNCTION CITY I, this organization would probably have also malfunctioned. There appears to be no viable solution to the problem of the lack of return information to the regiment from the medical evacuation system on the status of the regiment’s wounded, short of stationing a casualty reporting team in each servicing hospital when a large number of casualties are expected.

(3) With regard to maintenance of morale, daily mail delivery and the periodic transport of beer and soft drinks was made to the forward area by aircraft. Additionally, Red Cross SHAO girls were transported forward regularly to entertain elements of the command not in immediate contact with hostile forces.

The only unusual activity undertaken during the operation was a daily helicopter liaison flight to the forward area by the regimental adjutant or his representative. Such a flight enabled the adjutant to fully inform the commander and executive officer of S-1 activities, and provided necessary personal services, advice and information to other members of the regimental and squadron staffs.

13. (U) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES

The only special equipment utilized on JUNCTION CITY I was the employment of riot control agents. See paragraph 6d for evaluation of results and method of employment.

11. (C) COMMANDER’S ANALYSIS

Operation JUNCTION CITY I reaffirmed lessons previously learned on Operations ATLANTA and CEDAR FALLS. The unique dual combat capability of the Blackhorse Regiment’s Modified TOW — the ability to move fast and the capability to conduct detailed search and destroy operations — was clearly demonstrated during the operation. During Phase II the maneuver squadrons moved north in the attack and cleared the area as they moved. The distance moved by the right flank squadron the first day was over 20 KM.

When Phase III began on D+2, the maneuver squadrons settled down to detailed search and destroy operations. The success achieved by the squadrons in the search and destroy phase of the operation is shown by their discovery of large numbers of enemy base camps, medical facilities and fortified positions.
The value of armor protection of fighting personnel was strikingly shown during the heavy and close-in fighting one squadron experienced as it fought its way into a tenaciously defended VC base camp. For an entire afternoon the three troops maneuvering in the area were exposed to intense small arms fire, recoilless rifle fire, and anti-tank rocket fire. During the fight, friendly air strikes and the fire of eight artillery batteries were placed in the area. Had the Blackhorse Troopers not had armor protection they would have taken more casualties than the wounded actually suffered (No KIA). In addition friendly artillery and air strikes could not have been employed in close support without the protection afforded by armored vehicles.

Much of the area of operation was heavy jungle, yet the tanks and ACAV's of the Blackhorse were able to maneuver virtually at will. The rapid employment of AV's enabled the armored vehicles to maintain the momentum of the attack and maneuver in the three areas where stream crossing assistance was required.

During Operation JUNCTION CITY I the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment worked effectively with attached infantry battalions. The armored cavalry squadrons and the mechanized infantry battalions performed well as maneuver elements of the regiment.

The enemy's use of anti-tank weapons was more pronounced than on any previous operation. A total of twenty-nine armored vehicles struck mines during the operation. In addition, recoilless rifles, RRO-2 Rockets and anti-tank grenades were used frequently against Blackhorse tanks and ACAV's. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that, despite the heavy concentration of anti-tank weapons, only four armored vehicles were destroyed by enemy anti-tank weapons.

The stubborn defense of their base camp by the VC on 12 March is worthy of concern. The VC enjoyed well planned defenses, and sturdily built fortifications. They were engaged by the equally determined men of the Blackhorse, yet the enemy defense, pounded by air and artillery, did not fail. The VC defenders fought coolly and stubbornly. This engagement was the most prolonged engagement in which the regiment has participated since its arrival in Vietnam, and the quality of the opposing force was above that of either the 271st or 275th Regiments previously engaged by the 11th Armored Cavalry.

15. (0) Lessons learned.
   a. Operations.
      (1) Item: Booby trapped roadblocks.
         Discussion: When a log constructed obstacle was encountered it was usually found to be booby trapped with a sizable explosive charge. 90mm HE rounds were utilized to detonate the explosive charge.
         Observation: Log barricades should be checked for booby traps before attempting to remove them.
      (2) Item: Trail breaking equipment.
         Discussion: Mined roads and the lack of suitable trails required tracked vehicles to create their own trails. The most effective trail breaker was the tank mounted dozer. With the blade raised off the ground approximately 12 inches it was able to break through an area more efficiently and quickly than a regular tank.
         Observation: Tank dozers are effective in breaking trails through heavy jungle foliage.
      (3) Item: FM radio frequency conflicts.
         Discussion: Close coordination between units not familiar with each other's operations is necessary to avoid FM frequency conflicts.
         Observation: Prior coordination on assignment of FM frequencies averts future conflicts.
      (4) Item: Utilization of VIP equipment.
Discussion: When utilizing VHF equipment it is necessary to re-adjust the channels at least four times a day due to temperature changes. This is normally necessary in the morning, at noon, in the late afternoon and at night.

Observation: Frequent temperature changes require periodic daily adjustment of VHF channels.

(5) Item: Commitment of Aviation fire support elements.

Discussion: Once significant contact has been established, the ground commander should assign a mission to the Air Cavalry Troop elements. This precludes the ground commander from having to continually control both ground and air elements. Example: Screen along the river between coordinates WT12345 and WT32456 and north 1500 meters. This area then becomes the responsibility of the Air Cavalry Troop commander while any movement and fire outside the area would require normal boundary coordination. Aircraft could also be diverted to other missions for limited periods.

Observation: Assignment of specific missions and AO’s by the ground commander (in contact) to the Air Cavalry Troop enhances the troop’s capabilities and efficiency.

(6) Item: Employment of gunsights.

Discussion: When flying restrictions over the battle field prohibit low level reconnaissance, gunsights should not be held sitting overhead. Continuous use increases the hours on the aircraft and maintenance required to keep them operational. Flying time is like money in the bank - once it is spent it’s gone until the next payday (scheduled maintenance).

Observation: Maintain gunsights on an "on call" basis as targets appear in the battle area.

(7) Item: Night landings in field locations.

Discussion: Prior to darkness forward landing areas should be prepared for possible night landings. Pads should be marked at dusk, and NI utilized as a homing signal. Broadcast information as to wind and existing dust conditions; keep the area free of antennas.

Observation: Prior planning and preparation of forward landing areas facilitates night landings.

(8) Item: Tank Recovery.

Discussion: When a tank becomes mired in soft ground, it was found that attempts to "rock" the tank out proved futile. In fact all such efforts produced was a more complicated recovery problem.

Observation: Tankers should be instructed not to keep using rocking techniques once it becomes apparent they cannot extract themselves.

(9) Item: Recovery of tanks by ACAV’s.

Discussion: The ACAV has been found to be a very useful item of equipment for recovering tanks. ACAV’s hooked in tandem can perform many recovery missions. A mired tank may require as many as five or as few as two ACAV’s to do the job. Since a single cable is liable to snap, double cables should be used wherever possible. This is especially true between the last ACAV and the mired tank and the first two pulling ACAV’s.

Observation: If a VTR is not available, tanks can be recovered by ACAV’s hooked in tandem. Imagination and proper recovery techniques can save long delays waiting for a VTR and also free recovery vehicles for more demanding operations.

(10) Item: Contact near VC base camps.
Discussion: On two occasions when search and destroy elements encountered organized contact in the vicinity of a base camp, the VC deployed and withdrew so as to lead the pursuing elements away from their base camp.

Observation: Always conduct a thorough search of the entire area after contact with a withdrawing VC force has been broken.

(11) Item: VC ambushes.

Discussion: The VC ambush tactic when operating away from roads, was the 3 to 5 man ambush. These ambush cells operated on trails units had made through the jungle. The ambush was usually set up in the jungle several meters from the edge of the trail. The ambush force waited for a column to go by and almost invariably fired on the last vehicle or an ACAV towing another ACAV. They were usually armed with at least one anti-tank weapon, either an AT-2 or heat type rifle grenade. AT weapons were fired first then small arms, and then the team rapidly evacuated the area over a preplanned route. Sometimes the last vehicle leaving a clearing might be ambushed.

Observation: The potential threat of small ambushes can be minimized by a vigorous recon by fire any time an existing trail is being used, even if only for the first time. The last vehicle must direct its attention to the rear and should cover the area with fire as the column progresses. Recon by fire prevents the VC from setting up aiming points resulting in many misses.

(12) Item: VC mines.

Discussion: The VC made limited but effective use of mines. They generally were to be found in defiles, or along the edges of woodlines, or at natural stream crossings. They were normally employed in pairs.

Observation: Approaches to areas of restricted movement should be swept for mines prior to passing through.

(13) Item: Location of VC base areas.

Discussion: VC base areas were generally found within 500 meters of clearings and near water. Trails were numerous leading into the base areas and usually were covered by defensive positions along them.

Observation: NBC fires should be placed around the clearings, not in them. Any trail leading out of a clearing should be thoroughly reconed by fire prior to proceeding. Artillery should be adjusted into the area so that fires can be accurately placed in front of the advancing unit.

(14) Item: Vehicle recovery.

Discussion: Vehicle recovery is a difficult task in the jungle, due to the limited number of tow bars available and the lucrative target which a doweled vehicle presents to the enemy.

Observation: Each platoon should have a tow bar readily available. Towed vehicles should never be placed at the end of a column since the last vehicle was the one most frequently hit. The last vehicle must be ready and able to fight and not be encumbered by other requirements.

(15) Item: Employment of tanks.

Discussion: The tank proved to be a valuable asset in the jungles of TAY Ninh Province, not only for its firepower, but also for its ability to crush trails across broad expanses of otherwise impenetrable jungle. However, recovery of tanks was a difficult and complicated task.

Observation: Extreme care must be exercised when moving tanks through jungle terrain, as a disabled or mired tank will result in a major recovery operation. Security will also present a difficult problem.
b. Personnel.

(1) Item: Base camp personnel requirements.

Discussion: Duty personnel are definitely required during hours of darkness when the regiment is located in an area which cannot be reached by radio. Qualified personnel must be on duty 24 hours a day to receive and process reports which can only be submitted through landline facilities. This is due to the heavy daytime traffic.

Observation: When direct radio communications with forward areas are not possible, a 24-hour administrative operations center must be maintained at the base camp.

(2) Item: Medical liaison personnel.

Discussion: During an operation, liaison personnel are necessary in each of the hospitals treating the regiment's casualties to preclude unnecessary delay in reporting or losing track of the casualty's whereabouts. One casualty remained unidentified for a period of 6 days due to improper tagging by the attending medic, unawareness of the man's presence by the hospital, and incorrect description of the man's wounds by higher headquarters when attempting to trace his identity through channels. The entire situation could possibly have been alleviated had one of the regiment's liaison personnel been on hand to report the casualties entry and departure from the hospital and the seriousness of the individual's wounds.

Observation: On major operations, a casualty reporting liaison team must, as a minimum, be located at the nearest medical or evacuation hospital to the operational area.

(3) Item: Supporting courier aircraft (C7-A) service.

Discussion: Since the supporting Caribou is the only scheduled mode of transporting bulk quantities of supplies and relatively large numbers of personnel, the aircraft is invariably swamped by unmanageable large loads. To preclude this, daily manifests were prepared the evening before each flight. Priorities, and their establishment, were made by one central authority based upon input on deadline date and tactical requirements in the field.

Observation: The regimental adjutant must receive reports from all subordinate units on volume and weight of personnel and equipment for movement from base camp to the forward area so that complete manifests can be prepared, based upon tactical commitments and requirements.

(k) Item: Utilisation of organic courier aircraft.

Discussion: A courier helicopter must be placed at the complete disposal of the regimental S-1 to enable him to make his daily liaison flights. Additionally, the basing of such a craft in the rear area would enable the Adjutant to make emergency airlifts of mail and personnel in the event the C7-A courier aircraft is diverted.

Observation: Administrative requirements during combat operations necessitate the assignment of a courier helicopter to the S-1 on a full-time basis.
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Annex A: Initial Operations Order Overlay Phase II
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FLAGORD 12, Operations Overlay - Reference maps, VIETNAM 1:50,000; Series L7014,
Sheets 6231 II, III, IV, 6232 II, III.

Annex B

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Annex C
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ANNEX E

SWITCHBOARD
AND
RADIO NET DIAGRAMS
Appendix 1 to Annex B
Appendix 2 to Annex II
25th Division Command Net
Regimental Command Net
Regimental Intelligence Net
Regimental Administration/Logistical Net
25th Division Logistical Net

Appendix 3 to Annex E
Appendix A to Annex B