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LESSONS LEARNED, Headquarters,
FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

OPERATIONAL REPORT ON
for quarterly period ending 31 Jul 66.

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MAR 20 1968

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LESSON LEARNED

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## OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1966

### SECTION I - Significant Activities

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<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by II Field Force Vietnam for the reporting period ending 31 July 1966 is forwarded herewith.

2. (U) This headquarters concurs with the basic report as modified by the comment in Paragraph 3 below.

3. (C) Reference Paragraph 5e(5), Section I: 18th Engineer Brigade reconnaissance reports classify that portion of National Highway 15 from Phuoc Li to Vun Tau as class 12, not 20 as reported. This information has been forwarded to II Field Force Vietnam.

FOR THE COMMANDER

R. J. THORNTON
Chief of Staff

INCL

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
700 Polk Street, San Francisco 96006

AVFSM-H

15 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for quarterly period ending 31 July 1966

(RCS CSSM-05)

TO: SEC DISTRIBUTION

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) CONTINUED

a. Since the last reporting period, the assigned and attached strengths of II Field Force Vietnam have steadily increased. On 20 May 1966, the 217th Military Intelligence Detachment was attached by General Order number 56, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, dated 20 May 1966 with an effective date of 10 May 1966. This was followed by the 7th Military History Detachment, attached by USAG 66-391, effective 1 June 1966. Early in June the 33rd Signal Battalion (Corps), plus the 16th Public Information Detachment (Field Service) and the 16th Signal Detachment (Information Assignment) arrived in-country and were attached per USAG 66-3526 effective 4 June 1966. The 517th Engineer Detachment (Terrain) was also attached effective 4 June 1966 on the same General Order. A comparison of the assigned/attached strength for Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam at the end of the last two reporting periods is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>WARRANT OFFICER</th>
<th>ENLISTED MAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr 66</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul 66</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1024</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Major subordinate units are shown at inclosure 1. Locations are shown at inclosure 2.

c. Distinguished visitors received by this headquarters for the months of May, June, and July are shown at inclosure 3, 4, and 5.

2. (C) PERSONNEL, HOUSE AND DISCIPLINE

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SUBJ:  Operational report for quarterly period ending 31 July 1966,
       (DOC: CPA-009)

   a. The health of the command remains excellent. No unusual
diseases or significant outbreaks of disease have been noted. The
gen-oral sanitation of men is constantly improving. The improvement is a
reflection of duration of time in-country allowing for increased effort
on sanitation. There were seventy-six (76) cases of malaria diagnosed in
units under operational control of II Field Force Vietnam during the
quarter. The late onset of the monsoon season appears to have delayed
the expected increase in malaria cases, July being the only month that
reflected a significant increase.

   b. To increase the proficiency of administrative personnel
assigned to the headquarters, the Adjutant General organized and conduc-
ted a clerical school.

   c. In the area of Civilian Personnel, a requirement for a labor
officer developed due to the large number of local nationals employed by
this headquarters and attached units. This function is being performed
jointly by the Provost Marshal and the headquarters Commandant. A recommend-
ation was made to add a labor section to the Headquarters Commandant Sec-
tion by augmentation in order to centralize control in this area.

   d. The deletion of the Provost Marshal from the G1 section and
the addition of a Provost Marshal section to function in the areas of in-
stallation security, control of local nationals, prisoner control, plus
law enforcement and discipline is felt to be justified.

   e. Maintenance of discipline, law and order, has been excellent
during the reporting period. There were no serious incidents or accidents
reported through 31 July 1966.

   f. The 17th Radio Research Unit was attached to Headquarters,
II Field Force Vietnam for Military Justice effective 8 June 1966, per
GO 10, Headquarters, 509th Radio Relay Group, dated 8 June 1966.

   g. Plans were initiated to begin Annual General Inspections of
assigned and attached units beginning in October 1966. Preliminary in-
spections will begin in September to assist units under Operational Con-
trol of this headquarters to prepare for Annual General Inspections by
the USAV Inspector General. As pertains to morale and discipline, no
problems were encountered in this area during the reporting period.

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

   a. The G2 Section expanded its operations due to the arrival
of the 219th Military Intelligence Detachment. The 219th MI Det (Corps) arrived in-country on 9 May 1966 and became operational on 9 June 1966. Selected personnel from the detachment were integrated into the G2 Operations and G2 Air Divisions, and the remainder of the unit established the II FFORCEV Intelligence Center. The nucleus of the center, the Order of Battle Section, works in close coordination with the Imagery Interpretation, Interrogation, Counterintelligence and Document and Material Exploitation Sections. The activities of the center have greatly assisted the G2 Section in the production, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence information.

b. Presently the Interrogation Teams from the 219th MI Det are being used to supplement teams of the units under operational control of Headquarters, II FFORCEV. Arrangements have been made to attach ARVN interrogators to the Interrogation Teams of the 219th MI Det to provide a capability for interrogation of prisoners at Hq II FFORCEV.

c. For a description and recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle see inclosure 6.

4. (C) OPERATIONS, PLANS AND TRAINING:

a. Since the southwest monsoon season begins in May, a campaign plan was developed by COMUSMACV defining the strategy to be used in combating the VC/NVA forces during this period. In order to aid II FFORCEV's development of a plan of action based upon the MACV plan, a study group was formed in late April 1966 to war game likely VC courses of action. A plan was developed that envisioned employment of forces to hold the national priority areas; to clear those areas of local VC; and to protect the rice harvest. In addition, a plan providing for the defense and security of the LONG BINH sub area was formulated during this period.

b. Other major operations initiated by direction of this headquarters were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tr>
<td>Birmingham I &amp; II</td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
<td>24 Apr-16 May</td>
<td>Tay Ninh &amp; Binh Duong Province</td>
<td>S&amp;D, clearing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hardihood</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>16 May-8 Jun</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy Province</td>
<td>S&amp;D, clearing</td>
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<td>Hollandia</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>8 Jun-16 Jun</td>
<td>Long Khan Province</td>
<td>S&amp;D, clearing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yorktown</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>23 Jun-8 Jul</td>
<td>Long Khan Province</td>
<td>Spoiling attacks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aurora I &amp; II</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>9 Jul-31 Jul</td>
<td>Long Khan Province</td>
<td>Spoiling attacks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kahana I &amp; II</td>
<td>25th Inf Div</td>
<td>6 Jul-31 Jul</td>
<td>Bien Tuy</td>
<td>Spoiling attacks</td>
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o. Plans were made for the reception, staging and movement to base areas for the following units scheduled to arrive during the period August - November 1966.

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
196th Infantry Brigade (Sep)
Philippine Civil Action Group, Vietnam
2d Battalion, 34th Armor
2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (155mm towed)

d. The 1st Australian Task Force arrived in-country and moved into an area via Ba Ria (YS 4557) during the period 20 April - 12 June 66. In the same period the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment ceased to be under OPCON of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) and returned to Australia. The 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry arrived in RVN and was assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) in July 1966. The 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery (155mm SP) also arrived and joined II FFORCEN Artillery.

e. As part of a continuing program to counter VC tax collection activities and to further road security within III CTZ, II FFORCEN developed plans requiring subordinate units to conduct ground and airmobile operations in assigned areas to destroy VC engaged in tax collection and traffic disruption activities.

f. Profiting from experience gained by in-country operations, a draft MTOE for Headquarters, II FFORCEN (TCE 52-10) was prepared. The draft MTOE is presently being staffed within the headquarters.

g. During the past quarter, staff studies were completed on the following subjects:

(1) Requirement for Armored Personnel Carriers for Infantry Divisions.

(2) Requirement for M548 Cargo Carrier.

(3) Requirement for XM551.

(4) Requirement for 4th Infantry Rifle Company for Infantry Battalions.

(5) Requirement for Aviation Support for Combat Support and Combat Service Support units.
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(6) Requirement for Night Observation Binoculars.
(7) Requirement for Xenon Searchlight.
(8) Requirement for Kit, Armor Plate.
(9) Requirement for Long Range Patrols.
(10) Augmentation of Infantry Division Air Cavalry.
(11) Requirement for Tactical Carrier Companies for II FFORCEV.
(12) Requirement for Weapon Mix and Sniper Scopes.
(14) Determine Ammunition Requirement for II FFORCEV.
(15) Operations in the Mekong Delta.
(17) RVNAF Manpower and Force Structure.

h. Experience indicated that the coordination for allocation of air resources was not sufficiently refined nor responsive to meet and satisfy the immediate requirements for airlift support. As a result, all air activity was grouped under the G3 Air Branch. This expanded the scope of responsibility normally associated with the G3 Air, but it allowed these activities to be consolidated under one head. An organizational sketch of this reorganization is shown below:

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G3 Air Br

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AAE</th>
<th>TAC Air</th>
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<tr>
<td>allocation and priorities of Army Avn</td>
<td>TAC Air Spt</td>
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<tr>
<td>coord w/FW Air</td>
<td>(Plans &amp; Op)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TACP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(USAF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advise and assist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC &amp; FW Air</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FW Air</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(asgd to G4)</td>
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</table>

USAF FW Trp and equipment lifts coord w/AAE
```
This concept has been in effect for only a short time but the advantages accrued are already manifest. The intra-office coordination between Army Aviation and Air Force airlift has materially reduced the requirement to implement emergency procedures to satisfy immediate requirements for airlift support. For statistics on tactical air sorties and Arc Light missions see enclosure 20.

5. (c) Logistics

a. Operations

(1) The organization of the G4 section underwent one major change followed by one minor change. The final organization (incl 18) resulted in the following functional organization: the ACofS, G4 (and Deputy); an Administrative Branch; a Plans and Operations Division (to include transportation); and a Supply and Service Division. Based upon experience gained from the critical months of operation in this environment, it is believed that this organization will better facilitate the accomplishment of the logistics mission in the present tactical posture.

(2) Logistical support was focused on the following major tactical operations.

(a) Operation DENVER (10-25 May). This operation was supported principally by airlift into the SONG BE airstrip out of Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhat. The 1st Logistical Command assisted in the operation by moving Class V by truck from the Long Binh ASF to the 173d Airborne Brigade Support Battalion area at Bien Hoa, where trained personnel of the Brigade palletized the supplies for air delivery.

(b) Operation BIRMINGHAM (24 April-17 May). This operation was supported from Tay Ninh III airstrip by elements of the 1st Logistical Command, and marked the first instance in the III CTZ in which the Logistical Command supported an operation by means of a forward support area. Resupply was accomplished by both land and air lines of communication (LOC). The land LOC utilized both Routes 1 & 22 and By-Pass 19. Initially the roads would accommodate only 22 ton trucks; however, by 5 May the roads had been improved to a class 60 route. At the conclusion of the operation, approximately 250 tons of Class V were turned over to the 25th Infantry Division and 88 tons of JP-4 fuel had been transferred to Tay Ninh I for "Skybolt" stocks. The 1st Logistical Command back-hauled approximately 80 tons of miscellaneous Class V supplies.

(c) Operations EL PASO I, II, & III (2 June-Present). This series of operations was supplied principally by air LOC out of:
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Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhat; troop and equipment moves were supported from Phuoc Vinh, Lai Khe, Long Thanh North ("Bear Cat") into the areas of Song Be, Loc Ninh, Minh Thanh, Quan Loi and Hon Quan.

(d) Operations AURORA I and II (15 July - 1 August). This series of operations, conducted by the 173d Airborne Brigade, was supported by both land and air LOC. The air LOC operated mainly out of Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhat with 1st Logistical Command coordinating the detailed "marrying-up" of supply and airlift. Coordination by this headquarters consisted of processing airlift request for initial tactical deployment and extraction scheduled for July and processing requests for emergency resupply.

Land LOC support was continuous during the operation, both with regard to movement of supplies and tactical troop movements. The 1st Logistical Command furnished a peak input of 50 trucks during extraction from the operation in addition to providing 18 trucks throughout the operation.

(e) Operation KAHANA (15 July - 1 August). This operation, originally planned as a two battalion operation by the 25th Infantry Division but later reduced to a battalion force, was supported with airlift for the initial tactical deployment and for the extraction phase. Only minimum resupply was programmed and required.

One significant facet of this operation was that both the 173d Airborne Brigade and the 25th Infantry Division elements operated from the same airstrip at Vo Dat.

b. Transportation.

(1) Experience gained over the reporting period indicates that transportation functions of this office will fall into the following categories of activities:

(a) Coordination with the 4th Transportation Command for notification of incoming vessels carrying troops and equipment of units assigned to, or under operational control of, this headquarters.

(b) Processing requests from units for additional vehicles to move troops and supplies.

(c) Processing requests for highway clearance through Saigon.

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SUBJ&CTi

Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
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(d) In coordination with the II FFORCEN Engineer, maintaining data on MSR's and route classification.

(2) Major transportation moves coordinated by this office are outlined below:

(a) Movement of 1/69th Armor. Coordination was made with Transportation Movement Agency (TMA) and the 25th Infantry Division to effect movement of the 1/69th Armor from Da Nang to Pleiku. Movement was by road convoy from Da Nang to Saigon Port on 14, 15, and 16 May. Personnel and equipment were loaded on each of four LST's on 15, 16, 17, and 18 May. Debarkation was made at Qui Nhon with subsequent road convoy move to Pleiku.

(b) Movement of the 53d Signal Battalion. Coordination was made with 1st Logistical Command and the 53d Signal Battalion to move the battalion, arriving on the USS Gordon, from Vung Tau to Bien Hoa on 2 June by air. Cargo and equipment arrived by ocean transport on the USS Ocean Tide, USS Bernie Victory and USS Evergreen State on 11 and 13 June.

(c) Coordination was effected between the 23d Artillery Group, 1st Logistical Command and Hq II FFORCEN Artillery for the movement of the 2d Battalion (155mm SP), 35th Artillery, arriving on the USS Walker, from Vung Tau to Bien Hoa by air on 23 June.

(d) Coordination was effected between the 1st Logistical Command and the 173d Airborne Brigade for movement of the 4th Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry, arriving on the USS Pope 25 June, from Vung Tau to Bien Hoa by air on 26 June.

(3) For a discussion of AIRLIFT see para 5a(1) and Incl 19.

o. Maintenance.

(1) As a step towards insuring a high state of vehicle maintenance, a letter prescribing maintenance policies for this headquarters was published on 25 April. The contents of this letter were further reinforced through means of command emphasis and twice-daily motor stables.

(2) As a result of initial in-country experience and review of reports from other units, this headquarters dispatched a letter on 3 May to units under its control outlining maintenance procedures for generators, proper positioning of equipment, the requirement for back-up generators, and policies pertaining to operator, organizational, and field maintenance.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, (RCS CSFOR-65)

(3) Periodic maintenance assistance visits were made to the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the 23d Artillery Group. As a result of these visits and subsequent coordinated actions, several items of equipment were removed from deadline status. Additionally, back-up support was discussed with representatives from the 1st logistical Command. These discussions resulted in expediting the evacuation of unserviceable items and in establishing a collection and classification point in the Long Binh area.

(4) During the reporting period, Brigadier General W. D. Crittenberger, Commanding General II FFORC EW Artillery, and HQ II FFORC EW Material Readiness Officer, gave further emphasis to the material readiness program initiated during the previous reporting period. This program, in addition to the prescribed monthly material readiness council meetings at which trends, problems and solutions are discussed, now includes these measures: an inspection program designed to inspect 25 percent of each unit’s equipment on a quarterly cycle; solicited visits and advice from USARV material readiness assistance teams; and vigorous and continuous followup on problem areas by unit material readiness officers. It is anticipated that such a systematic program, given adequate impetus by command interest, will appreciably improve the material readiness posture of HQ II FFORC EW assigned and attached units.

(5) In order to apprise the Commanding General and the II FFORC EW Material Readiness Officer of the operational status of certain critical items of equipment (radios, vehicles, generators), a weekly summary, in the form of charted trends, has been utilized by the G4 Section during this period.

(6) Pending arrival of a transportation car company to support Headquarters, II FFORC EW and certain small headquarters-type units, vehicles have been drawn to support requirements. These small units have been satellited on Headquarters Company, II FFORC EW, necessitating an augmentation of mechanics. Overflow maintenance is accomplished by the supporting DS Maintenance Company.

d. Supply.

(1) The rapid build-up in Vietnam has dictated a need for commanders to take a serious look at supply discipline and maintenance in their units in order to prevent an unnecessary strain on the supply system resulting from waste and neglect. To attain this overall objective, COMUSMACV’s letter of November 1965 (incl 21) on this subject was
redistributed to the command in May of this year. The Commanding General, II FFORCEN added command emphasis to this subject by publishing a supplemental command letter in June (incl 22) stressing the importance of conservation of supplies through sound maintenance practices, the establishment of uninflated demands and the exercise of sound command management practices.

(2) During the reporting period, this headquarters participated with 1st Logistical Command and major tactical units in the formation of a provisional air delivery company (organized under TOE 10-407E). The purpose of forming this provisional unit was to cover contingencies pending the arrival of the 109th QM Air Delivery Company in September or October. The capabilities of the provisional unit are:

(a) An initial heavy drop of 250 S/T per day.

(b) A sustained heavy drop of 250 S/T for 12 consecutive days.

e. Status of Primary Land LOC's as of 31 July 1966.

(1) National Highway 13, Gia Dinh to Ben Cat. This route, in its present condition, is trafficable in its entirety. The gaps of four demolished bridges filled with laterite makes wet season trafficability somewhat hazardous. Traffic is limited to class 30. From Ben Cat to Loi Minh, the route requires the use of AVJ13's to cross the gaps of destroyed bridges.

(2) Interprovincial Highway 16 from XT 005050 to intersection with interprovincial Highway 1A, and then north on Highway 1A to Phuoc Vinh. This route is trafficable to class 30 loads limited by the Song Be and Phuoc Vinh bridges which are wide. A triple single Baily Bridge is being repaired to handle class 45 loads at KT 936144.

(3) Provincial Route 2A from XT 706199 to XT 831340. This serves as an alternate MSR from the Phu Quoc area to the Phuoc Vinh area. This route, due to the absence of culverts and bridges, is not susceptible to major interdiction by the VC. A one day clearing operation will open it to class 60 loads.

(4) Provincial Route 7B. When used in connection with Route 2A, this provides a route from Ben Cat to Thuong or Phuoc Vinh. It has no culverts or bridges and a clearing operation will open it to class 60 loads.
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(5) National Highway 15 from Bien Hoa to Phuoc Lo (Serial).
Open to class 24 traffic. From Phuoc Lo to Vung Tau it is a class 20 route. The Ministry of Public Works is involved in a construction program to upgrade the bridges to class 50. Work is progressing rapidly on the portion of the route between Bien Hoa and Phuoc Lo.

(6) National Highway 1 and 22 from Saigon to Tay Ninh. This highway will accept class 60 traffic on Highway 1 from Saigon to Go Dau Ha and is limited to class 20 traffic from Go Dau Ha to Tay Ninh. Using AVLB's and a limited amount of upgrading on the longer bridges, this route can be made class 60 in its entirety.

(7) Interprovincial Highway 2 from Xuan Loc to Phuoc Lo.
Open during dry weather if by-passes around the collapsed bridges are used.

(8) National Highway 1 from Bien Hoa to Phan Thiet. Open to class 40 traffic from Bien Hoa to a point 2 kilometers south of Gia Ray. East of Gia Ray the VC have destroyed a number of bridges. Using by-passes, the route is open to the Ham Tan road junction. No definite information is known about the route from the Ham Tan junction to the II-III CTZ boundary.

(9) Construction underway.
(a) National Highway 15 is being repaired and improved.
(b) Interprovincial Highway 16 is being repaired and maintained by the US 1st Infantry Division. An upgrading program to class 50 is being effected.
(c) Road clearing operations are being run on National Highway 13.
(d) Tay Ninh by-pass road from Go Dau Ha (Routes 19 and 26) can be used after clearing operations and repair of 3 bridges.

6. (U) Information.

a. The 16th Public Information Detachment arrived in-country and was assigned to II Field Force Vietnam on 4 June 1966. Activated at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, per General Order Number 4, Headquarters, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, dated 14 January 1966, with an effective date of 24 January 1966, the detachment was organized under 308 45-5603 (2 Apr 63) as a field service forward area Public Information Team with the mission of providing information support for a corps or logistical area command.
The detachment has an authorized strength of four (4) officers (1 Major, 3 Captains) and nine (9) enlisted men.

b. The detachment departed Fort Meade on 15 May 1966, by commercial air to Oakland Army Terminal, California, where it embarked on the troop ship, USNS General W. H. Gordon on 16 May 1966. Upon joining IX FORCV, the detachment merged with the Information Office and became an integral part of its operation.

c. The following fact sheets were published by the Information Office during the reporting period to support the Command Information Program.

1. Fact Sheet #2 "South Vietnam" (15 May 66)
2. Fact Sheet #3 "Knowledge, Control, Cure" (disease and infection) (24 May 66)
3. Fact Sheet #4 "The Enemy in Your Hands" (How to treat POW's) (28 May 66)
4. Fact Sheet #5 "Inflation in Vietnam" (27 May 66)
5. Fact Sheet #6 "Your Special Services Program in Vietnam" (28 May 66)
6. Fact Sheet #7 "USMACV, History and Organization" (6 Jun 66)
7. Fact Sheet #8 "Excerpts from Sun Tzu's, The Art of War" (8 Jun 66)
8. Fact Sheet #9 "Religions in Vietnam" (8 Jun 66)
9. Fact Sheet #10 "The Inspector General Redress of Complaints" (30 Jul 66)
10. Fact Sheet #11 "Legal Assistance and Personal Affairs Information for the Serviceman" (30 Jul 66)

d. Required orientations, films and directives have been conducted, shown and prepared in addition to daily pick-up in Saigon and
distribution of the Stars and Stripes for this headquarters.

e. The arrival in June of the 16th Photographic Detachment and
its attachment to the 53d Signal Battalion has provided the required
augmented photographic capability the Information Office must have to
accomplish the mission. Although the 16th Photographic Detachment does
not have a processing and reproduction capability, they are well supported
by the 53d Signal Battalion's photo processing laboratory. The cameramen
of the 16th Photographic Detachment provide excellent photographs and the
processed prints provided by the 53d Signal Battalion are done in a highly
professional manner. At the present time, in coordination with the 53d
Signal Battalion, the 16th Photographic Detachment has as its primary
mission the photographic support of the Information Office.

f. The concept of this office is to give full publicity support
to all units under the operational control of this headquarters. There-
fore, several information teams (press and audio) have been sent to sup-
port various units, tactical operations and civic action activities.

7. (U) Inspector General.

During the reporting period, the Inspector General received one
complaint (unjustified), nine requests for assistance and conducted two
investigations. No trends were indicated as a result of these actions.

8. (U) Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations.

a. Civil Affairs.

(1) The Revolutionary Development Program was supported by
all units throughout III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). Projects implemented
include construction and repair of roads, classrooms, wells, latrines,
dispensaries, fences, dikes, canals and dams.

(2) The US Agency for International Development (USAID) is
working closely with III Corps units and advisors to assist the Revolu-
tionary Development Programs. USAID has provided cement, reinforcing
bars and roofing tin to be used in the construction of schools, dispens-
aries and other structures in villages and hamlets throughout III CTZ.
Large quantities of Bulgar wheat and cooking oil have been distributed
as well as items from CARE, Catholic Relief Services and other in-country
relief organizations. Over 600 metric tons of commodities were air lifted
by USAID to Phuoc Long Province during the month of June to support the
populace because road convoys could not get into the area safely.
Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
(RCS GFOR-65)

(3) Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) activities included support for Operations Birmingham, Hardihood, Lam Son II and El Paso II and III to wit; 350,000 copies of one-page newspapers that contained articles comparing life under communism with a free society plus the reasons for US involvement in Vietnam; one million leaflets explaining US and GVN policy for building a free Vietnamese society; 220,000 JUSPAO publications including How we, A Nation's Progress and Building a New Society; 150 assorted street banners heralding the accomplishments of the GVN; 1½ million "victory print" rice bags; Civic Action School signs; 1,000 posters; GVN national flags; plus PSYOF guidance on appropriate use of themes and information media. During the period, at the request of the Brigade Chief of Staff, JUSPAO II FORCEN representatives lectured to new replacements of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) on the history and culture of the Vietnamese people and emphasized how US troops can promote, by personal example, US National objectives. JUSPAO also responded to a 1st Infantry Division request to evaluate the methods used to encourage Vietnamese to rally from VC main force units.

(4) Vietnamese acceptance of the presence of P4MAF troops was advanced appreciably through the HEDCAP II program. During the reporting period, over 76,600 patients were treated within III CTZ. About one fourth of the patients were ARVN or RF/PF dependents. Typical civic action projects currently in progress by brigade size units are shown in a weekly Civic Action Report (24-30 July) of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) at inclosure 13.

(5) Installation Coordinators conducted monthly community relations meetings with representatives of local units to discuss problems within their areas of concern. The minutes of the Bien Hoa Community Relations Meetings for May, June, and July are shown in inclosure 14, 15, and 16.

b. Psychological Operations.

(1) During the quarter, a total of 2 7/8 leaflet and loudspeaker missions were flown in support of US Tactical Units in III CTZ. The availability of U-10 and AC-47 aircraft during the period was not sufficient to meet the demand. This shortage of aircraft was caused mainly by maintenance problems.

(2) The 12th Aviation Group supported US units in PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS when aircraft of the 5th Air Commando Squadron were not available.
AVF3C-H 15 August 1966


(3) A total of 15,650,000 leaflets were dropped in support of US ground operations. An additional 11,335,000 leaflets were dropped to support combined ARVN-US operations during this period (examples at incl 17). In addition, approximately 900 hours of loudspeaker time were logged.

(4) On 21 June, the 1st Infantry Division received a 1250W multilith printing press on a trial basis. During the remainder of June and the month of July, this press printed 2,570,000 leaflets which were distributed by the 1st Division in support of tactical operations. The evaluation of this press and method of utilization is continuing.

(5) From 1 May - 31 July 1966, a total of 746 Viet Cong rallied to GVN-US/FM/AF units. Especially notable were the 47 ralliers in Hau Nghia Province and the 34 in Binh Dung Province. The increase in ralliers in these provinces can be attributed in part to increased tactical operations conducted by US Forces.

(6) The 246th PSYOP Company supported US/FM/AF units under operational control of II FFORCEN with seven mobile loudspeaker teams. These teams, attached at brigade level prior to and during operations, furnished assistance in selecting target audiences, developing themes for leaflets and tapes, and distributing preplanned leaflets and tapes in the area of operations.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
(RCS CSFOR-65)

SECTION II: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Item: Visual Aerial Reconnaissance.

Discussion: Prior to the publication of II FFORCEV Regulation 301-1,
Military Intelligence, Visual Aerial Reconnaissance, in June 1966 policies
had not been established nor specific responsibilities fixed for the
conduct of an organized and effective visual aerial reconnaissance program
by units under operational control of this headquarters.

Observation: This regulation has accomplished these goals by instituting
such a program. A central agency must coordinate all VR assets to allow a
more complete coverage of the CTZ daily. Additionally this allows emphasis
to be placed on certain aspects of the program, i.e. night VR.


Discussion: The value of SLAR can only be realized when you know what is
moving and what direction it is moving. It is of little value to fly SLAR
over areas where normal movement would be expected up to a certain hour.
Due to the timeliness of the information gained, SLAR targets must be
exploited immediately.

Observation: In determining what is moving and exploiting this movement
rapidly, the use of SLAR aircraft followed by "light ships" and "gun
ships" to illuminate and eliminate a target has proven extremely effective.
The SLAR will locate the movement after dark, the "light ship" allows
proper identification of the target and the "gun ship" is on call to act
if necessary. This procedure allows the user to gain maximum benefit from
his SLAR program. Identification of convoys is meaningless unless direction
of movement can be determined. To gain maximum benefit from such identifi-
cation, two passes of the SLAR ship over the target must be made. This will
allow ground or air interdiction to be made at the appropriate location.

Item: Sensors. Infrared Activities.

Discussion: The significance of infrared operations is directly proportional
to the information derived from the readout. With the continual change of
areas of operation, recipients of infrared information have difficulty in
establishing a data base for their particular area with which to evaluate
results. The identification of friendly and enemy emissions is exceedingly
difficult in this type of environment and the problem is further compli-
cated by flying infrared missions over populated areas prior to curfew.
Operations Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,

Observation: To properly evaluate an infrared readout, one must know the area and the time over target. Also there must be a database of infrared activities for the area. In a rapidly moving situation where areas of operation change frequently, the best way to evaluate infrared information is to reconnoiter the target area visually and continually. One must look for objects that yield hot returns (e.g., charcoal ovens throughout the area) and be aware of their existence. Early morning visual reconnaissance over areas that appear to be significant can often provide the actual basis for the emissions.

Item: Inability to determine if a particular report was supplied by an agent who had furnished reliable information in the past.

Discussion: In the past, reports were received with the source of the information being listed as a coded source, or an informant. This system provided no way to establish the source's reliability as no two reports could be credited to the same individual. Action was taken to have each agency identify these sources by a code number. While this system is not completely in operation, over 70 per cent of the sources are now identified by a code number.

With the establishment of code numbers, the II FFORGEV Intelligence Center has established a dossier on each source. Further, as each report is received, the agent's code number is plotted on a map in the area where the information was obtained. Through the constant review of INSTUNS, Spot Reports, Aerial Reconnaissance Reports, agent reports and personal contact with tactical troops, the source's information is checked and crosschecked to determine if the information reported is accurate, thereby establishing the degree of reliability of each individual source. By the end of the reporting period, due to the newness of the program and the lack of sufficient numbers of agent reports from any particular agent, the actual reliability of any one source has not yet been established. However, in several instances trends are starting to develop.

Observation: As the reliability of these sources is established, the Intelligence Center will be able to assist commanders by being able to supply a record of the past performance of the particular agent and to what degree his information was accurate. As the program develops, the Center will be able to receive requests for specific ERI from a commander, make a review of the sources available who could fulfill the requirement, and then levy the ERI.

Item: Inability of agents to read maps.

Discussion: The agents have given coordinates and state that what they
observed was on a hill; however, upon checking, it was found that the coordinates were in a valley between two hills. In other cases, agents will give coordinates of a particular village, and in many cases the coordinates are as such as 1000 meters in error.

Observation: Agents need additional training in map reading, and their reports should be checked for accuracy by their American counterparts.

OPERATIONS/TRANSPORTATION

Item: Reception of new units (planning and implementation of plans).

Discussion: The arrival of new units "in-country" and their effective integration into the force structure can become an activity of critical proportion.

Observation: Upon the arrival of advance parties of incoming units, a planning conference attended by the advance party, the II FFORCIV Engineer, II FFORCIV 04, 1st Logistic Command representatives and representatives of the host unit should be held in order to clarify logistics problems and to find solutions to the problems presented. These early conferences are a necessity in achieving a favorable logistical posture for the incoming unit.

Item: Dependence on air line of communication (LOC) during monsoon season.

Discussion: Tactical operations based solely, or primarily, on air LOC can become difficult to support owing to poor flying conditions or deterioration of the laterite airstrips.

Observation: Ideally, select a forward support area (FSA) that can be reached by both air and land LOC.

Item: Airlift coordination meetings.

Discussion: Airlift of troops, equipment and supplies often becomes a critical factor during the conduct of an overall tactical operation (e.g., EL PASO II).

Observation: Coordination meetings held during the planning stages of an operation between the ground tactical unit, II FFORCIV, USAF and support elements (e.g., 1st Logistic Command) help to reduce the number of emergency airlift requests submitted during a tactical operation.

Item: Identification and protection of cargo of new units.
15 August 1966

SUJCT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
(Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65)

Discussion: Experience acquired by monitoring and assisting the arrival of
new units from CUS indicates that the initial identification and subse-
quent protection of ocean cargo is one of the most troublesome phases of
their integration into the force structure.

Observation: The following three measures, taken by the unit prior to
departure from CUS, will reduce to a minimum the problem area discussed
above:

a. Staff officers, advance party members, unit commanders and
supply personnel should learn in detail the names of vessels their cargo
is on, the ports and dates of embarkation and debarkation and the unit
"project code".

b. At least one member of the unit should sail on the vessel
moving the unit cargo.

c. Project codes should be marked prominently on all containers.

Item: USAF Air Movement Control teams (proposed).

Discussion: A requirement exists to add further flexibility to the nature
of control presently exercised by Airlift Command Center (ALCC) over USAF
airlift missions so that the senior ground force commander (e.g., division
commander) can get a rapid diversion of allocated aircraft from one off-load
field to a different one. An operation against a guerrilla force is often a
case of "reaction" to a specific contact as opposed to preplanned airlift. This
causes troops and supplies to be moved on an emergency basis. The time
required to divert aircraft from planned or programmed airlift to emergency
requirements now averages about three hours, due in part to existing request
channels and encoding requirements (see incl 19).

Observation: This problem is presently under study by this headquarters
and USARV J5.

Item: During the period covered, Air Force airlift was utilized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>FLT</th>
<th>TOTAL S/T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4921</td>
<td>2524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>8439</td>
<td>7467.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>6721</td>
<td>8864.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion: The above figures are based, where possible, on actual recorded
tonnage lifted. However, when compiling figures for passengers and vehicles, the tonnage is usually based only on the requested amount due to a lack of available information.

In spite of possible inaccuracies, the figures indicate an increasing utilization of Air Force airlift to achieve "battlefield mobility" for units not organically equipped to be airmobile. This increased utilization carries with it certain inherent problems which will be discussed in "Items", below.

Observation: As the tempo of U. S. offensive action increases, it can be expected that the distances from existing base camps will also increase. Unless the security of existing roads also increases, tactical deployment and resupply activities will become increasingly dependent on Air Force airlift.

Item: Overcommitment of airlift.

Discussion: As noted above, the utilization of Air Force airlift has increased steadily during the period covered. At the same time available Air Force planes have remained relatively unchanged, resulting in an overcommitment of assets.

It has become increasingly apparent that the available assets are approaching saturation. This has been underscored by the increasing number of "postponed" and "carryover" missions which cannot be completed due to a shortage of aircraft. In addition, it is often necessary to upgrade troops movements from "priority 1" to "combat essential" in order to complete the mission within desired time limits.

Observation: A shortage of Air Force planes will be a steadily increasing problem and requests will necessarily be completed as priority demands. Commanders should be aware that the availability of airlift is becoming a major planning consideration. When possible, problem areas should be resolved at planning conferences prior to major operations.

Item: Validity of airlift requests.

Discussion: In recent operations, several cases of invalid airlift requests have come to light, causing either "wasted" aircraft availability or extensive delay in completion of the mission.

The Air Force allocates aircraft based on the type and amount of cargo requested to be moved. In one instance, a mission was estimated as 22 C-130 sorties, but because of unlisted cargo to be moved, 39 sorties...
were required to complete the mission. In another case, a request was made to move a battalion by Air Force airlift. Four aircraft were allocated for this purpose. Concurrently, Army aircraft also were dispatched and had moved about half the cargo. The result was the use of four aircraft to fill a request that could have been fulfilled by two aircraft.

Finally, the use of unnecessarily high priority requests, especially emergency priorities, results in a degradation of the priority system, which in turn results in a reduced utilization of available airlift.

Observation: In order to have a reasonable amount of airlift available for emergencies, commanders and staff officers must exercise restraint in order not to degrade the priority system. Additionally, more accurate estimation of requirements is indicated.

Item: Reduced Capability of Airfields.

Discussion: On several occasions, especially in EL PASO, the inability of a given airfield to handle required traffic has created a critical situation.

The reduction of airfield capability was caused by several items:

a. Airfield congestion due to helicopter traffic in and around the " airlift" origin or destination airfield. This usually combines with minimum air traffic control at forward airfields to create safety hazards, and has resulted in two incidents and one major accident involving "contact" between fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft.

b. Weather: The onset of the monsoon season has turned several airfields, fully suitable for heavy use during dry weather, into "seas of mud", thus causing the airfields to be closed or at least reducing the capability below that necessary to sustain the operation.

Observation: When planning operations from forward airfields, considerable weight should be given to the capability of the airfield under all weather conditions and to the use of adequate air traffic control to reduce airfield congestion.

SUPPLY/MAINTENANCE

Item: Cargo Slings and nets.

Discussion: The requirements to lift external loads such as artillery...
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pieces, ammunition, brass, or other bulk supplies is paramount. Cargo slings and nets have always been in short supply. The bag, cargo, arial delivery, A-22, using appropriate aerial delivery slings, will serve the same purpose as the cargo nets for transporting external loads. The 173d Airborne Brigade has consistently used the A-22 container for this purpose--and other units are now placing them on requisition. It is better to make the sling set OVE to the artillery piece as opposed to the heli- copter.

Observation: Tactical units deploying to Vietnam should ascertain the availability of in-country assets of these two items prior to departing CONUS; insure an adequate supply is available or take necessary action to obtain them prior to departure.

Item: Rapid refueling of helicopters.

Discussion: A rapid refueling capability for helicopters supporting tactical operations is mandatory. A flight of 16 helicopters should be able to land and be refueled simultaneously without shutting down the engines. There are several pumping systems with filter units that can be rigged to meet this requirement. The MINIPORT SERVICING SYSTEM with four outlets and the KENCO pump (100 gal per minute) with two outlets are favored. Of these two systems, the KENCO system is considered more satisfactory for highly mobile operations in that this system can be transported by UH-1 helicopter. Neither of these items have been available in sufficient quantity to satisfy total needs. This shortage has caused considerable difficulty in that it has been necessary to shift available assets from unit to unit to support operations.

Observation: Incoming units that will be involved in conducting airmobile operations should make every effort to obtain these items in sufficient quantity prior to departing CONUS.

Item: 600 gallon water purification set.

Discussion: The 600 gallon set is more desirable than the 1500 gallon set for tactical operations in Vietnam. Most operations are conducted in areas inaccessible to land LOC's and the 1500 gallon set is not air transportable by aircraft capable of using airfields in those areas. Therefore, it has been found that the 600 gallon set is far more suitable for airmobile operations in Vietnam.

Observation: Units should make an effort to obtain at least one 600 gallon water purification set per brigade prior to departing CONUS.

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AVYOC-II

15 August 1966

SOUTH: Operational Report for quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
(Reports Control Symbol OSFOR-65)

Item: Organizational Maintenance.

Discussion: Detachments of units arriving in-country without organic
maintenance capabilities, and assigned to II PFORCSV, have difficulty in
obtaining required organizational maintenance support. Lack of organiza-
tional maintenance support capability has caused an unacceptable deadline
rate.

Observation: Units without organizational maintenance capability must be
satellited on another unit capable of furnishing this support immediately
upon arrival of its equipment. (See item on "Reception of new units",
page 18).

MEDICAL

Item: Surgical Augmentation of Division Medical Service.

Discussion: During two (2) operations (BIRMINGHAM and KL Passo II), the
clearing company providing normal division medical service was augmented
by a surgical detachment (KA). This detachment consists of a general
surgeon, an assistant surgeon, an anesthesiologist, and operating room
nurse (male) and enlisted operating room specialists. This unit is fully
equipped. This addition provided a surgical capability not normally
available at clearing company level.

Observation: Surgical augmentation of the clearing company provides a
forward "small surgical hospital". It is of particular value in distant
operations where resuscitation may be required prior to long air
evacuation to a fixed hospital. It appears that this type augmentation
provides the tactical unit an adequate surgical capability without the
added logistical problems of moving a standard surgical hospital.

LOGISTICS/SUPPLY & MAINTENANCE

Item: Climatological Effects upon Thermo Copy Paper.

Discussion: The high temperatures and humidity unfavourably affect Thermo
Copy paper and greatly reduce the usable time it may be stored. The high
temperatures, in effect, "burn" the paper in the same manner as does a
Thermo Copy machine in a short period of storage time unless the paper is
stored in an air-conditioned area.

Observation: If Thermo Copy paper cannot be stored in an air-conditioned
area, it should be stored in small quantities to prevent deterioration.
caused by high temperatures and humidity.

**Item: Supply and Maintenance of Office Equipment.**

**Discussion:** Missions and functions in the administrative area require the use of complex office equipment. There is, however, no firm program for maintenance or supplies for this equipment.

**Observation:** Support-echelons should consider establishment of supply and maintenance programs for the various types of office equipment.

**Item: Assumption of Post, Camp, and Station Activities at Field Force Level.**

**Discussion:** When a unit of Field Force level is deployed to an overseas area in a tactical environment, there is not always a support activity upon which to rely for Post, Camp and Station functions such as civilian personnel, billeting, protocol, special services and welfare activities. This necessitates an assumption of these activities by the various staff agencies, often with limited personnel, resulting in possible diminishment of effectiveness.

**Observation:** Units of Field Force level should be prepared upon arrival at an overseas location in a tactical environment without a support activity to assume various Post, Camp and Station activities necessary for effective functioning of the headquarters.

### CIVIL AFFAIRS

**Item: Coordination of CA/PSYOP between II FFORCEV and USAID/JUSPAO Military Representatives.**

**Discussion:** Initially coordination between II FFORCEV and USAID/JUSPAO representatives was done by telephone or required considerable travel time between the distant locations of the respective offices. Daily briefings, Staff Planning Conferences, and situations that required immediate coordination were at times difficult to arrange because of the distance between the agencies. Office space and equipment were made available to JUSPAO for collocation of their military representative with II FFORCEV, G5. JUSPAO military representative and G5 are now collocated thus enhancing the coordination and operation under the "Country Team" concept. The possibility of collocation of the USAID military representative is being explored.

**Observation:** Collocation of G5 and JUSPAO military representative materially enhances necessary coordination between these agencies.
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AVPSC-H

15 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
(RCS OSPO-65)

Item: Commander's Recommendations.

NONE.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT L. ALDERMAN
Major, AGC
Asst AG

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<td>4th &amp; HQ Co</td>
<td>10 Jan 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 May - 31 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 FFORCENY (assigned)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>17 Jan 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 May - 31 Jul</td>
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<td>1st Inf Div (OPON)</td>
<td>15 Mar 66</td>
<td>DI AN</td>
<td>1 May - 31 Jul</td>
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<td>22 Mar 66</td>
<td>GU CHI</td>
<td>1 May - 31 Jul</td>
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<td>22 Mar 66</td>
<td>BICH HOA</td>
<td>1 May - 31 Jul</td>
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<td>12th Arm Gp (OPON)</td>
<td>15 Mar 66</td>
<td>TAN SON NHUT</td>
<td>1 May - 30 Jun</td>
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<td>10 Mar 66</td>
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<td>1 May - 31 Jul</td>
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<td>23d Arty Gp (OPON)</td>
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<td>PHU LOT</td>
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<td>1 Jun 66</td>
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<td>1 May - 22 May</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Enroute to RVN</td>
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<td></td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>25 May - 31 Jul</td>
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<td>4 Jun 66</td>
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<td>4 Jun - 31 Jul</td>
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<td>17th BNU (attached)</td>
<td>8 Jun 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>8 Jun - 31 Jul</td>
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<tr>
<td>49th Sig Det (attached)</td>
<td>1 Jun 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>1 Jun - 31 Jul</td>
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<td>53d Sig Bn (OPON)</td>
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<td>4 Jun - 31 Jul</td>
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<td>219th MI Det (attached)</td>
<td>20 May 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>9 May - 31 Jul</td>
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<td>4 Jun 66</td>
<td>LONG BINH</td>
<td>4 Jun - 31 Jul</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL
Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle

1. (c) Description.

a. The III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) includes all or part of four Viet Cong major military/political subdivisions known as military regions (MR). The military regions concerned have been designated MR 6, 7, and 8 and the Salayon Cholen Gia Binh Special Zone (SCGDSZ) which is of equal status with the military regions. Two provinces of the VC MR 6, Phuoc Long and Khanh Tay, are included in III CTZ. All of the VC MR 7 and the SCGDSZ lie within the III CTZ. Long an and part of Ha' Giang provinces belong to VC MR 6 and are included within III Corps boundaries. The SCGDSZ includes the Gia Dinh Capital Military District (Gia Dinh province) plus an extension running to the northwest along National Highway 1 which is 20 km long and about 50 km wide. Military Regions 7, 8 and 9 and the SCGDSZ have recently been redesignated by the VC as MR 1 through 4 respectively. MR 6 remaining unchanged. For the sake of simplicity, the old more familiar MR designations will be used below.

b. The VC control two important base areas within the III CTZ. The first is the Quang Thi Chau, or war zone "C", in northern Tay Ninh province and the site of the headquarters of the communist insurgent effort designated the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). The second major base area is war zone "D" which lies mostly within northwestern Long Khanh province and where the headquarters of MR 7 is located.

c. The VC provinces of Military Region 7 and those portions of Military Regions 6 & 6 located in the III CTZ have organized 5% Local Force Companies and 25 LF Platoons that operate in III CTZ.

d. Five VC provinces have six confirmed Local Force Battalions. These Battalions are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Force Battalions</th>
<th>VC Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huu Lai Sn</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Independent Sn</td>
<td>Long An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506th Sn</td>
<td>Long An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>320th Sn</td>
<td>Tay Vinh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166th Sn</td>
<td>Binh Tay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th Sn</td>
<td>Phuoc Tay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. There are eight Viet Cong Main Force infantry regiments, three NVA regiments and one artillery regiment normally operating within the III CTZ. The SCGDSZ (G14) controls the 736A Regiment. Ht 6 directs 6-1
The three NVA regiments, the 101st Regiment/325 Div, the 141st Regiment/512 Div and the 250th Regiment were infiltrated into the III Corps Area during the reporting period. The 141st Regiment was engaged by the 101st Airborne Brigade during the first part of May in the vicinity of Bu Vinh Map (YU 3835) on Operation AUSTIN VII. Captured documents and a PAVN indicated the 101st Regiment was moving through Phuoc Long Province in May. It is now located in northeastern Tay Ninh Province. The 250th Regiment evidently moved into War Zone "B" from Quang Duc Province with a reported six battalions. Reports indicate several of the battalions have been used to replace and fill out main force VC regiments. The remainder of the regiment is currently unlocated.

2. (C) Summary of Recent Activities.

a. May marked the opening of the VU Monsoon Campaign. The 9th VC Division had two regiments, the 271st and 273rd, in War Zone "D" and the 274th in War Zone "C" in April. Possibly to counter the threat to War Zone "D" posed by the US 1st Division on Operation Birmingham, the 9th VC Division Headquarters moved into eastern Tay Ninh Province following the 271st and 273rd Regiments. These units closed into their new locations the first week in May. The first two or three weeks were a period of relative inactivity until it was determined that the 1st Infantry Division was ending its operations in Tay Ninh and was beginning a series of search and destroy operations in northeastern Binh Duong Province.

b. On 18 May, a CIDG force made contact with at least one battalion of the 273rd Regiment west of Loc Ninh. The 1st Infantry Division moved a brigade force north to Loc Ninh. The 9th VC Division avoided further contact, possibly awaiting reinforcements or assistance from the NVA regiments reportedly moving in Phuoc Long Province.

c. On 6 June the 272nd Regiment began the first of six significant contacts with the 1st Infantry Division and CIDG units in Binh Long Province. Dates of contact and VC losses are summarized below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>COORDINATES</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA (BC)</th>
<th>KIA (POSS)</th>
<th>VCC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 June</td>
<td>XT 771745</td>
<td>272 Regt</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6-2.
d. It is notable that each regiment was contacted twice during the period. After only one month recuperation period from its bloody losses of 6 June, the 272d Regiment attacked for the second time. NVA captives from the 9 July action indicated they were recently assigned to the 272d Regiment. The availability of trained replacements was credited with enabling the VC units to shorten their recovery time after heavy battle losses.

e. Regiments of the 5th VC Division located in Phuoc Tuy Province avoided direct contact with the US 175th Airborne Brigade during Operations Hardly and Hollandia in May and June, choosing to attack twice during Operation Yorktown. On 29 June, the 175th made contact with a company from the 303th Bn, 274th VC Regiment at XT 580000. The following day, 30 June, the RVN 4/52 Regiment and 3/43d Regiment encountered elements from the 274th Regiment on Highway 1 south of Tia Ray. Since this action, it appears that the 5th VC Division has shifted its attention to the 1st VC north of Phuoc Lo in Phuoc Tuy Province.

f. The Dong Thap II Regiment (-) (the 271st Bn normally operates in the northern portion of IV CTZ) avoided direct confrontation by moving west into the "Plain of Reeds", probably as a result of several operations along the Han River in Hau Nghia Province. The 267 and 365 Bns participated in the attack on Tan Hoa on 27 May. Both battalions and the regimental headquarters are now carried in the vicinity of the Cambodian border of Hau Nghia.

g. The seven battalions of the 1654 Regiment continued harassment of the Capital Military District, the Cu Chi area, and the Binh area throughout the period. The Seventh Battalion was accepted as "confirmed" in the first part of July. The 4th and 5th battalions have been increasing their activity in the latter part of July, primarily in the western and southern portions of the Gia Dinh District. The US 25th Division made contact with the 3d Company of the 1st Bn in the Ho Ho woods area on 16 July.
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b. The 2/25th Battalion, formerly used as a security guard for COVNQ, was absorbed when the VC formed the 70th Security Regiment of three battalions. This regiment was accepted as "confirmed" in the middle of June. A battalion from the 70th Regiment is believed to have attacked the (J). Command Trunit Bi (XT 1270) on 23 July using 70mm Chicom 120mm howitzers.

1. The local force battalions have generally avoided decisive contact throughout the period. The US 25th Infantry Division had contact with company size of the 75th Long An unit and the 320th Tay Ninh Battalion during the first part of May. The 10th ARVN Division had a short contact with a company of the 50th BN (Huoc Tay) in June. The US 173d Airborne Brigade discovered a bunker used by a weapons platoon of the 50th during Operation Yorktown. The Thu Loi Battalion may have participated in an ambush of a company of the 1/8 ARVN Regiment on Highway 13 in July.

2. (c) Actions.

a. The VC are apparently using battalions and regiments for individual operations, being wary of engaging and attacking in multi-regimental strength. They are still attempting to use "hugging" tactics by staying close to the enemy in an effort to reduce the effects of close air and artillery support. When not engaged, the VC appear to be dispersing their units over larger areas and digging bunkers for supply and command installations to lessen the effects of 3-52 strikes and Sky Spot bombings.

b. The VC have also increased their use of small arms and machine guns in antiaircraft defense. On several occasions, the VC have used weapons emplaced in groups around an open area.

c. Two plans for ambushes of relieving forces have been captured, demonstrating the VC doctrine that planning for an attack of a force is not complete until measures have been taken to counter any attempts at relief. These measures may include using a portion of the VC force in ambush positions along the most likely route of approach or helicopter landing zone, or using a coordinated mortar attack on garrisons and headquarters in the vicinity which would most likely dispatch relief forces. Usually the principal objective of an attack is to ambush the relief force.

d. The captured plans also show the importance of the "preparation of the battlefield" which includes stockpiling of supplies, extensive planning, and detailed reconnaissance. This contributes to the apparent short reaction time of one or two days before a force is moved into position for an ambush or an attack.

e. In Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces and the Capital Military

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District, the VC have increased the number of small unit attacks on Regional/Popular Forces outposts and ARVN garrisons. Harassing fire, to include mortars, has been used in simultaneous attacks on several outposts. These minor attacks are an effort to challenge GVN control and appear also to be a part of the VC plan to intimidate the civilian population, thus influencing the forthcoming elections.

For trends in certain enemy tactics and techniques, see ind. 9 thru 12.

4. (C) VC Battle Losses.

VC battle losses inflicted by U.S. units between 1 May 1966 and 31 July 1966 are tabulated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA (U1)</th>
<th>KIA ( Poss)</th>
<th>WOC</th>
<th>VCO</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>Hvy Wpn</th>
<th>Mines &amp; Demo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2632</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>1435</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1083</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VC battle losses are tabulated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA (U1)</th>
<th>KIA (Poss)</th>
<th>WOC</th>
<th>VCO</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>Hvy Wpn</th>
<th>Mines &amp; Demo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74,526</td>
<td>1434</td>
<td>2466.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (C) Enemy Capabilities and Vulnerabilities.

a. Enemy Capabilities.

(1) Despite suffering heavy losses of personnel and material during May, June and July, the Viet Cong retains significant attack capabilities in III CLR.

(a) The presence of the 271st, 272d, and 273d Regiments give the VC the capability of attacking target areas in Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Binh Duong Provinces. Likely specific targets are Loc Ninh, Tri Tu, and Trai Bi CIDG/SP Camp; in addition, the VC will take advantage of targets of opportunity.

(b) Elements of the 141st NVA Regiment were last identified in Phuoc Long Province on 11 May. "There have been four reports of elements of the 141st possibly moving into War Zone "D". The possible location of the 141st furnishes the VC an attack capability in Phuoc Long and Northern Long Khanh Provinces.

(d) The location of the 274th and 275th Regiments, 5th VC Division, in Phuoc Tuy Province gives the VC the capability to attack selected targets in Phuoc Tuy and southern Long Khanh Province. Enhancing this capability is the possible location of the 250th NVA Regiment in southern War Zone "D".

(c) The 165A and Dong Thap II Regiments are capable of...
attacking targets in Binh Dinh and Long An Provinces and in the Capital Military District. Based on past actions involving these units, attacks will probably be battalion size operations.

(2) Possible infiltration of additional NVA units from Cambodia must be considered in the VC reinforcement capability. These units could be both unit and individual replacements.

(3) The VC can defend their bases and so-called safe areas with all or part of the forces listed in paragraphs 4(a)(1) and (2) above.

(4) The VC can withdraw or continue to avoid contact within or outside of III Corps after exercising any one of the above capabilities.

b. Discussion and Analysis of Enemy Capabilities.

(1) Attack Capability.

(a) Binh Long Province. Elements of the 9th VC Division were last contacted on 9 July in Binh Long Province. The lack of reports on the movement of these units would tend to indicate that they are still in Binh Long Province near the Cambodian border. Considering the recuperative capability previously demonstrated by the Viet Cong, the 9th Division, with the possible exception of the 272d Regiment, is ready for further combat operations. The 9th Division, together with the possible presence of the 101st NVA Regiment, presents a definite threat to northern Binh Long Province. A document captured on 14 July indicated that GVN had ordered the Chau Thanh District (Binh Duong Province) Forward Supply Council and Military Committee to dispatch a second group of laborers and one-third of the district's guerrilla force to southern Binh Long Province for a two-month period (apparently July and August). This second group of laborers were replacements for a group that had finished its service on 27 June. The new group was to report to the Chau Thanh District Communications and Liaison Committee no later than 7 July. The addition of local guerrillas to the labor force indicates a possible need for local security to guard laborers, a shortage of civilian laborers, or a requirement of additional guerrilla forces for combat support of main forces operations. This document, together with present 9th Division troop dispositions, indicates that the VC have not abandoned their plans for conducting offensive operations against troops and installations in the Dak Lao - Lao Binh area.

(b) Binh Dinh, Long Khanh and Lam Dong Provinces. A report indicated the possibility that large VC units were located in Lam Dong Province; however, the 173d Airborne Brigade, operating along route 20 and into Lam Dong Province, had only scattered and sporadic contact with small groups of VC. Likewise, the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, operating in the vicinity of Vo Dat and Gia Ray, has had no significant contact. On 22 July, an agent reported that an estimated two VC
battalions had recently conducted training exercises in the area of May Tao Mountain (Y3 785855). Another report indicated that a number of civilian laborers had been transporting rice from May Tao Mountain to the vicinity of Hien Son (Y3 880839). Agents dispatched to investigate and report on the area have not returned. May Tao is confirmed to be a base area for NVA units.

(o) Phuoc Tuy Province. The probable location of the 274th and 275th Regiments in Phuoc Tuy Province indicates a possible threat to the 1st AFR. There have been reports of VC battalions in the vicinity of the 1st AFR base, and reconnaissance and contacts have partially confirmed these reports. Several recently abandoned company size base camps have been found, however, and on 29 July the 6th RAR engaged an estimated VC company. On 29 July four CH-47's received intense small arms and automatic weapon fire in the vicinity Y3 4069 where an earlier report had indicated a dug-in VC battalion. However, later reconnaissance of the area indicated only small groups of VC. Documents found on a VC body identified the 860th Local Force Battalion. It is likely that small VC reconnaissance and intelligence groups are maintaining surveillance of the 1st AFR while the main force regiments are awaiting a suitable opportunity to attack.

(d) Bien Hoa Province. Small scale attacks and harassments by local force guerrilla units continued during the period. Several reports indicated VC activity south of Route 14 and west of Route 15. An A-10 operation conducted in the area had no contact thus indicating the presence of only local force and guerrilla units. On 29 July a FAC reported the terminus of a track route at a stream vicinity YT 084377. Since there is no trail on the other side of the stream, it is believed the VC unloads supplies from trucks onto sampans, float the sampans to another canal at YT 120360, where they enter War Zone "D."

(e) Phuoc Long Province. There has been no recent contact in Phuoc Long Province. A visual reconnaissance reported locating a cable across a river vicinity YU 173361. Several meters upstream is a camouflage pontoon bridge section on each side of the river. Each section is 50 to 75 feet long and 8 to 12 feet wide and is supported by four pontoons. On the north side of the river is a well-used trail being widened but not presently suitable for vehicular traffic. This trail leads to the Cambodian border where it joins a road leading north. These facts indicate a considerable new emphasis on this VC infiltration route. There have been no airstrikes on the bridge due to its proximity to the Cambodian border.

(f) Binh Duong Province. Several reports indicate VC activity west of Xau Cat (Yt 1528). Recon teams in the area on 9 July reported seeing well-used trails throughout the area. One report located the 3800 VC Battalion, 274th Regiment, in the vicinity. This could be a second 3800 Battalion, but it is not likely to be the one subordinate to
the 247th Regiment. On 24 July, a 1st Infantry Division LRRP reported
killing two VC officers vicinity XT 671451. From the immediate reac-
tion of the nearby "C" force, it is possible that these were two high-ranking
officers. On 26 July, escort traffic was reported moving north and south
from XT 757410. On 29 July, during a ground follow-up of a B-52 strike,
a bag of documents was found vicinity XT 836453. These documents indi-
cated that the target was the comms-liaison or postal transportation
facility of the VC Binh Duong Province. Much of the mail was destined
for Van Zan "C", Eastern Nambro Headquarters and the 272d Regiment.
Earlier reports indicated that the 272d Regiment had moved from the
vicinity of Hinh Thenh and was in the vicinity of the Long Nguyen Secret
Zone (XT 7050) in Binh Duong Province. The captured documents also men-
tioned the Thu Loi Battalion and the 3d Battalion, 165A Regiment. Several
reports indicate that the VC are increasing their efforts to harass and
interdict Highway 13. The addition of the 272d Regiment would enhance
this capability.

(k) Ninh Binh Province. A 5th SF ALO reported 2 1/2 ton
trucks transporting supplies along a hard surface road from XT 386450
to XT 542845 indicating the movement of VC supplies within war zone "D".
The presence of the 70th VC Regiment is a continual threat to the Trnd 31
CIDG/3F Camp. Although this camp was not harassed during last week of
July, it is likely that additional harassing attacks will be made soon
since the location of Trnd 31 disrupts the VC infiltration route into
war zone "D". This camp was established on 22 June 1966, and has been
probed or attacked on nine separate occasions.

(h) Capital Military District. A VC senior captain,
captured by the 1/50th Infantry (AVH) on 28 July, stated that he was the
commander of 32 Battalion, F-100 (C1O) Regiment. This regiment is report-
edly a special mission regiment in Saigon. (The C10 Sapper Battalion is
accepted as a subordinate unit of the 165A regiment. There has been no
previous indication that this unit has been upgraded to a regiment.)
Captured with this officer was a bag of documents which included maps of
Saigon and surrounding area, residences of important VC and Us personal
and a detailed intelli-ence estimate of Tan Son Nhut Airbase. These
documents tend to confirm VC intentions of harassing and destroying key
installations.

(i) Bau Rghia and Long An Provinces. Viet Cong initiated
activity such as harassments, small scale attacks and acts of
terrorism increased during the month of July. The VC continue in their
efforts to strengthen their influence among the people and are using
their methods to make the maximum psychological impact at a minimum cost
in material and personal resources.

(j) Viet Cong ambush and interdiction efforts continued
during the period. Reports indicate that road blocks and tex collection
points along Highway 13 have made it virtually impossible for rubber
plantations to obtain food and supplies necessary for the processing of

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Twenty road blocks were located along Highway 13 at the end of the reporting period.

(4) Reinforce Capability.

Reports during the quarter indicated company, battalion and regimental sized NVA units infiltrating into III Corps. Information obtained from a VC contact on 30 June in the Loc Ninh area revealed that the 271st Regiment had been furnished replacements from the 64th Battalion of the 250th Regiment. Since it is believed that the 250th Regiment infiltrated into South Vietnam with six battalions, it is possible that at least three battalions have been retained intent to constitute the 250th Regiment as a tactical entity while the remaining battalions were used as filler. The VC will likely continue to infiltrate NVA units as replacements and reinforcements.

(5) Defens Capabilities.

NVA initiated incidents during the quarterly period consisted mostly of harassments and small scale attacks. The Viet Cong will likely defend when surprised or when his key bases and command installations are threatened.

(6) Withdraw Capability.

With few exceptions, most of the period's VC incidents were probably conducted by local force and guerrilla units. The Viet Cong will probably continue these tactics until he initiates an offensive at a time and under conditions of his choosing.

o. Relative Probability of Adoption.

(1) Local force and guerrilla units will increase their attacks upon Popular and Regional Force outposts and attempt to weaken GVN influence by harassments and acts of terrorism, particularly in the Capital Military District.

(2) Elements of the 70th Regiment, augmented by local forces, will continue to rob and harass the Trái Bi CID/RF camp. An attack on Trái Bi appears likely.

(3) The 271st and 273d Regiments will continue to harass province and district capitals and GVN camps in Bình Long Province. Attacks against An Lão, Loc Ninh, and Xin Chánh, and Suoi Da are likely if US forces are withdrawn from the area.

(4) The 274th Regiment, the 660th (RF) Battalion, and possibly the 275th Regiment may attack the 1st ATF in Phuoc Tuy Province.
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(1) The primary vulnerability of the VC is his inability to cope adequately with aggressive US tactics backed by a technical superiority in all areas, especially artillery and tactical air, plus the mobility provided by the helicopters.

(2) The VC soldier is increasingly more vulnerable to friendly psychological warfare efforts. His successes against ARVN forces have been encouraging, though limited, but he has had no significant successes against US troops. Mounting losses of manpower and material have frustrated his efforts and lowered his morale.

e. Conclusions. The most likely areas for VC main force attacks in the near future are: Long An Province, and possibly Phuoc Tuy Province. Small scale attacks will continue in Long An, Hai Nghia, Dinh Duc, and Gia Dinh Provinces.
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Enemy Attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1-31 May</th>
<th>1-30 Jun</th>
<th>1-31 Jul</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9-1

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SABOTAGE AND RAILROAD INCIDENTS

1-31 May | 1-30 Jun | 1-31 Jul

| 1 | 2 | 3 |

10-1

CONFIDENTIAL
HAILEY ENTRY AND PROPAGANDA INCIDENTS

![Bar chart showing incidents from 1-31 May to 1-31 Jul. The chart shows two peaks: one at 5 incidents in 1-30 Jun, and another at 10 incidents in 1-31 Jul.]

11-1

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INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM

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1.31 mw

J = 1-31 Jul

12-1

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**CIVIC ACTION REPORT 24 July 1966 thru 20 July 1966**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AREA/DISTRICT</th>
<th>UNIT(S) INVOLVED</th>
<th>DATE 24-JUL</th>
<th>DATE OR % COMPL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td>Phuoc Hai/Duc Tu</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>3 Feb 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td>Binh Lu, Binh Hoa/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>4 Jan 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Health &amp; Sanitation</td>
<td>Binh Lu, Hai An, Thai Hung/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>21 Mar 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Health &amp; Sanitation</td>
<td>Binh Lu, Binh Hoa/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>1 Jul 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Education &amp; Training</td>
<td>Binh Hoa/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>7 Apr 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Binh Lu/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>19 Jun 66</td>
<td>26 Jul 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Binh Lu/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>12 May 66</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Binh Lu/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>17 Jun 66</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Binh Lu/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>12 May 66</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Binh Lu/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>21 May 66</td>
<td>28 Jul 66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SF) CIVIC ACTIVITIES REPORT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AREA/DISTRICT</th>
<th>UNIT(S) INVOLVED</th>
<th>DATE BEGN</th>
<th>DATE OR % COMPL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Commerce &amp; Industry</td>
<td>Binh Luc/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>1 Jan 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Jobs for Vietnamese Lumber distribution</td>
<td>Binh Luc/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>1 Jan 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td>Binh Luc/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>23 May 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Clothing distribution</td>
<td>Binh Luc/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>24 May 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td>Binh Luc/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>28 May 66</td>
<td>29 Jul 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Big Brother program</td>
<td>Binh Luc/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>24 May 66</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Construction Fence</td>
<td>Binh Luc/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>29 Jul 66</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Construction Landscaping</td>
<td>Binh Luc/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>1/503d Inf</td>
<td>29 Jul 66</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXEMPLARY DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS**

Transportation was provided for the Boy Scouts returning from their three day bivouac. Soap, CRSP packages, and school supply kits were distributed. English classes were resumed at the Binh Hoa School. At Binh Luc School, the sidewalk, fence, and gate have been completed; the classroom requires minor work before it is completed. A latrine for the school has been started. The road at Binh Luc was improved by filling in washed-out areas. The 1/503d HSCAP team treated 700 persons this week (300 were ARVN dependents). There were 320 persons treated by the HSCAP team. Two more soldiers have elected to be Big Brothers this week. The 8th continues to employ 82 Vietnamese from the Bien Hoa area.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>UNIT(S) INVOLVED</th>
<th>DATE BEGUN</th>
<th>DATE OR % COMPL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Health &amp; Sanitation</td>
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<td>2/503d Inf</td>
<td>17 Jan 66</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Community Relations Soap distribution</td>
<td>Loc Lea/Duc Tu</td>
<td>2/503d Inf</td>
<td>23 Jun 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Community Relations Milk distribution</td>
<td>Loc Lea, Thanh Hoa/Duc Tu</td>
<td>2/503d Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Community Relations Aid to Th Hospital</td>
<td>Hanoi/Duc Tu</td>
<td>2/503d Inf</td>
<td>3 May 66</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Community Relations Food distribution</td>
<td>Hanoi/Duc Tu</td>
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<td>7 Dec 65</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Education &amp; Training English classes</td>
<td>Poc Binh, Hanoi/Duc Tu</td>
<td>2/503d Inf</td>
<td>3 May 66</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Commerce &amp; Industry Jobs for Vietnamese</td>
<td>Base camp/Duc Tu</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
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<td>23 Jun 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Construction Landscaping</td>
<td>Thanh Hoa/Duc Tu</td>
<td>2/503d Inf</td>
<td>27 Jul 66</td>
<td>26 Jul 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Construction Three classrooms</td>
<td>Poc Binh/Duc Tu</td>
<td>2/503d Inf</td>
<td>13 Jun 66</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Area/District</td>
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<td>Date Begin</td>
<td>Date or % Compl</td>
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<tr>
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<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Construction Playground equipment</td>
<td>Base camp/Duc Tu</td>
<td>2/503d Inf</td>
<td>1 Jul 66</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Narrative Description of Projects**

The MEDCAP team treated 630 villagers this week. Soap was distributed at the Orphanage and at the Dispensary. Milk and cup cakes which were baked by the BN were distributed at the Thanh Hoa Orphanage. The students in our English class are progressing very well. The BN continues to employ 25 Vietnamese. A bulldozer from the 173d Engineer Company was taken to the Orphanage to clear away debris. We provided transportation for three medical patients and one dental patient. The School in Hoa Binh will be finished next week. Construction of the playground equipment has stopped due to faulty equipment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<th>Unit(s) Involved</th>
<th>Date Begin</th>
<th>Date or % Compl</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Construction Fence</td>
<td>Tan Phong/Duc Tu</td>
<td>3/319th Arty</td>
<td>25 Jul 66</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Construction Wall</td>
<td>Tan Phong/Duc Tu</td>
<td>3/319th Arty</td>
<td>22 May 66</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Construction Latrine</td>
<td>Tan Phong/Duc Tu</td>
<td>3/319th Arty</td>
<td>1 Jan 66</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Construction Church repair</td>
<td>Thanh Tam/Duc Tu</td>
<td>3/319th Arty</td>
<td>18 Jul 66</td>
<td>26 Jul 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Commerce &amp; Industry Jobs for Vietnamese</td>
<td>Base camp/Duc Tu</td>
<td>3/319th Arty</td>
<td>1 Jan 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

This week our team started building a fence around the School at Tam Phong. Construction on the latrine and wall is progressing steadily. The refurbishing of the Church at Thanh Tam has been completed. The 2/319th Arty continues to employ 15 Vietnamese.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AREA/DISTRICT</th>
<th>UNIT(S) INVOLVED</th>
<th>DATE BEGUN</th>
<th>DATE OR % COMPL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Health &amp; Sanitation NEDCAP</td>
<td>Cay Da, Ong Huong, Thien Tau, Thai Hung/ Cong Thanh</td>
<td>4/503d Inf</td>
<td>7 Jul 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Community Relations Food distribution</td>
<td>Ong Huong/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>4/503d Inf</td>
<td>27 Jul 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
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<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Commerce &amp; Industry Jobs for Vietnamese</td>
<td>Base camp/Duc Tu</td>
<td>4/503d Inf</td>
<td>12 Jul 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Community Relations ACTT Warehouse detail</td>
<td>Base camp/Duc Tu</td>
<td>4/503d Inf</td>
<td>24 Jul 66</td>
<td>29 Jul 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Construction Two classrooms</td>
<td>Ong Huong/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>4/503d Inf</td>
<td>8 Feb 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Construction wall</td>
<td>Ong Huong/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>4/503d Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Construction Latrine</td>
<td>Ong Huong/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>4/503d Inf</td>
<td>29 Jul 66</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

The NEDCAP team treated 431 persons this week (91 were RNLF dependents). The NEDCAP also pulled three teeth. The School at Ong Huong is almost completed. It only lacks painting and the replacement of 4 sheets of tin on the roof. A wall and latrine construction for the school has been started this week. Approximately 100 cases of C rations were distributed in Ong Huong. Our unit assisted in the storage of the American Christmas Trees and Trains project. The 8n is employing 36 Vietnamese.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AREA/DISTRICT</th>
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<th>DUR OR % COMPLETE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Health &amp; Sanitation (EHDCLP)</td>
<td>Than Duc, Long Tan,</td>
<td>173d Spt Bn</td>
<td>15 Mar 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vinh Hiep, Xom Kyong/</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Cong Thanh</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td>Vinh Hiep/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>173d Spt Bn</td>
<td>24 Jan 66</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food distribution</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td>Loi Hoc/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>173d Spt Bn</td>
<td>17 Jan 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Milk distribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Tan Phu/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>173d Spt Bn</td>
<td>26 Apr 66</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refurbishing Dispensary</td>
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<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Loi Hoc/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>173d Spt Bn</td>
<td>9 May 66</td>
<td>28 Jul 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Latrine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Loi Hoc/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>173d Spt Bn</td>
<td>9 May 66</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mall</td>
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<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Bien Hiep/Duc Tu</td>
<td>173d Spt Bn</td>
<td>26 Jul 66</td>
<td>26 Jul 66</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pedevac</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Commerce &amp; Industry</td>
<td>Base camp/Duc Tu</td>
<td>173d Spt Bn</td>
<td>1 Jan 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jobs for Vietnamese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td>Loi Hoc/Cong Thanh</td>
<td>173d Spt Bn</td>
<td>28 Jul 66</td>
<td>28 Jul 66</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>School kit distribution</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS**

The 173d Spt Bn EHDCLP team treated 1159 patients this week (72 were AVNAP dependents). We also provided dental care for 29 patients. We distributed 26 gallons of cooking oil, 400 pounds of flour, 300 pounds of powdered milk, 32 boxes of oatmeal, 3/4 cans of beans, and 200 pounds of clothing to the village of Vinh Hiep. Construction of the dispensary is nearing completion. This week we
173D AIRBORNE EJIGADE (35P) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS (Cont'd)

finished work on the latrine. Two patients were evacuated to the Bien Hoa Hospital for surgery. The 173 Support Battalion employs 105 Vietnamese and provides medical care for them. We distributed 44 school kits to the Lai Hoa School.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AREA/DISTRICT</th>
<th>UNIT(S) INVOLVED</th>
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<th>DATE OR % COMPL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Health &amp; Sanitation</td>
<td>Vinh Cuu, Bau Longe, Ten Hiep, Ten Thanh/ Duc Tu</td>
<td>HHC Bde</td>
<td>9 Nov 65</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
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<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td>Phuoc Hai/Duc Tu</td>
<td>HHC Bde</td>
<td>15 Jan 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Commerce &amp; Industry Jobs for Vietnamese</td>
<td>Base camp/Duc Tu</td>
<td>HHC Bde</td>
<td>1 Jan 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Transportation 3d MASH</td>
<td>Bien Hoa/Duc Tu</td>
<td>HHC Bde</td>
<td>22 Jun 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Construction One room</td>
<td>Tan Hiop/Duc Tu</td>
<td>HHC Bde &amp; III Corp ARVN Ranger Group</td>
<td>22 Jul 66</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Khu V/Duc Tu</td>
<td>HHC Bde &amp; III Corp ARVN Ranger Group</td>
<td>9 Jun 66</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

The 35CP team treated 310 patients this week (60 were ARVN dependents). An additional 826 patients were treated in the forward area of operation. Magazines were given to the Boy Scouts at Phuoc Hai. HHC Bde employs 26 Vietnamese laborers. We plan to finish the school construction at Khu V next week. On Tuesday, we provided transportation for doctors from the 3d MASH to the Bien Hoa Hospital.

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173D AIRMEN'S BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
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<td>Co A (Admin)</td>
<td>30 Nov 65</td>
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<td>56.</td>
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<td>Base camp/Due Tu</td>
<td>Co A (Admin)</td>
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<tr>
<td>59.</td>
<td>Community Relations Boy Scout Troop</td>
<td>Vinh Cuu/Due Tu</td>
<td>Co A (Admin)</td>
<td>26 Jul 66</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EXECUTIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

Attendance dropped off considerably to 6-10 in the adults class and 6-10 in the children's class. Lesson III was finished this week and lesson IV will be studied next week. No employ 17 Vietnamese who came from the Bien Hoa area. Two CP medium tents w/poles were loaned to one member of the adult class for use on a Boy Scout campout.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AREA/DISTRICT</th>
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<th>DATE OR % COMPL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60.</td>
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<td>B/17th Cav</td>
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<td>95%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7th LA/1st BN</td>
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<tr>
<td>61.</td>
<td>Construction Library</td>
<td>Tan Le/Due Tu</td>
<td>B/17th Cav</td>
<td>27 Mar 66</td>
<td>95%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7th LA/1st BN</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>62.</td>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td>Tan Le/Due Tu</td>
<td>B/17th Cav</td>
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<td>Barber distribution</td>
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<td>63.</td>
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<td>Tan Le/Due Tu</td>
<td>B/17th Cav</td>
<td>1 May 66</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Milk distribution</td>
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<td>7th LA/1st BN</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

13-8
173d AIRCRAFT BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

The school construction is moving along rapidly. The latrine is almost completed. We distributed scrap lumber to the villagers this week.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AREA/DISTRICT</th>
<th>UNIT(S) INVOLVED</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Construction Refurbishing School</td>
<td>Dong Hai II/Duc Tu</td>
<td>D/16th Armor &amp; III ARVN Ranger Group</td>
<td>23 May 66</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Health &amp; Sanitation</td>
<td>Dong Hai II/Duc Tu</td>
<td>D/16th Armor</td>
<td>23 May 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Community Relations Scop distribution</td>
<td>Dong Hai II/Duc Tu</td>
<td>D/16th Armor</td>
<td>23 May 66</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Community Relations Lumber distribution</td>
<td>Dong Hai II/Duc Tu</td>
<td>7/16th Armor</td>
<td>23 Jun 66</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Commerce &amp; Industry Jobs for Vietnamese</td>
<td>Base camp/Duc Tu</td>
<td>D/16th Armor</td>
<td>1 Jan 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. PROJECT DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

Construction of the Dong Hai II School has slowed down this week. The furniture is finished and we are planning to start classes next week. Our EDCP team treated 27 patients this week. D/16th Armor distributed two boxes of scop to the villagers. We hauled one truck load of lumber this week. Our unit employs six Vietnamese.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AREA/DISTRICT</th>
<th>UNIT(S) INVOLVED</th>
<th>DATE BEGIN</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Transportation Hauling sand &amp; gravel</td>
<td>Tan Khip, Kha V/ Duc Tu</td>
<td>173d Engr Co</td>
<td>24 Jul 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AREA/DISTRICT</th>
<th>UNIT(S) INVOLVED</th>
<th>DATE BEGUN</th>
<th>DATE OR % COMPL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Construction Landscaping</td>
<td>Phuong Lam</td>
<td>173d Engr Co</td>
<td>24 Jul 66</td>
<td>26 Jul 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Construction Road repair</td>
<td>Da Hoa</td>
<td>173d Engr Co</td>
<td>25 Jul 66</td>
<td>22 Jul 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Commerce &amp; Industry Jobs for Vietnamese</td>
<td>Bien Hoa/Duc Tu</td>
<td>173d Engr Co</td>
<td>1 Mar 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Narrative Description of Projects**

The 173d Engr Co hauled sand and gravel for base material for the construction of the teachers office at the Tan Hiep School. The sand and gravel hauled for the Khu V School ended this week. In the forward area of the brigades T.O., the 173d Engr Co cleared two areas. One was by hand for the Phuong Lam School and the other was by bucket loader for the Phuong Lam Dispensary. Hwy 20 under went road repair operations in four separate locations near the village of Da Hoa. Sand and gravel were hauled for fill material for pot holes and a platoon sized effort made the road passable at each of the four locations. We continue to employ 20 Vietnamese laborers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AREA/DISTRICT</th>
<th>UNIT(S) INVOLVED</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Education &amp; Training English classes</td>
<td>Tan Mai/Duc Tu</td>
<td>172d MI Det</td>
<td>13 Nov 65</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Community Relations Aid to Orphanage</td>
<td>Tan Mai/Duc Tu</td>
<td>172d MI Det</td>
<td>13 Nov 65</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Narrative Description of Projects**

During the previous reporting period three classes were conducted at the Tan Mai Orphanage. There were approximately thirty-five students in each class. The 172d MI Det distributed one bundle of clothing, one box of soap, two boxes of dried milk, two boxes of flour, two boxes of soup, two boxes of pork and beans, two boxes of Quaker Oats, and a large box of toys to the children at the Tan Mai Orphanage.
### 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AREA/DISTRICT</th>
<th>UNIT(S) INVOLVED</th>
<th>DATE BEGIN</th>
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<td>75</td>
<td>Health &amp; Sanitation 12D&amp;GP</td>
<td>Bien Hoa, Tan Mai/</td>
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<td>7 Nov 65</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>HHC B3</td>
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<td>76</td>
<td>Health &amp; Sanitation Surgery program</td>
<td>Base camp/Duc Tu</td>
<td>3d K.SH</td>
<td>23 May 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Commerce &amp; Industry Jobs for Vietnamese</td>
<td>Base camp/Duc Tu</td>
<td>3d K.SH</td>
<td>1 Jan 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
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<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td>Tan Hai/Duc Tu</td>
<td>3d K.SH</td>
<td>27 Jul 66</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food, soap, and toy distribution</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS**

9 CIDG members received emergency treatment. One Vietnamese child was seen and referred to the Bien Hoa Hospital for plastic surgery. Distribution of food, soap, dietetics, and toys were given to the Tan Mai Orphanage and to the Bien Hoa Hospital. We employ 25 Vietnamese laborers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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<td>79</td>
<td>Construction Three classrooms</td>
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<td>Co A, 62d Avn Bn</td>
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<td>38th Arty Br LIVN</td>
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<td>25th Med Det</td>
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<td>Base camp/Duc Tu</td>
<td>Co A, 62d Avn Bn</td>
<td>1 Feb 66</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS**

The school at Ngu Phuc is almost completed. The 12D&GP team treated 508 persons (92 were PVN/P dependents). We continue to employ 45 Vietnamese.

13-11
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

<table>
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<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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<td>63</td>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td>Phuoc Lam, Trai Lam</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>19 Jul 66</td>
<td>30 Jul 66</td>
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<td>Food distribution</td>
<td>Cay, Phu Lam, Tho Lam/</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Dinh Quan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Health &amp; Sanitation Surgery</td>
<td>Phuoc Lam/Dinh Quan</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>19 Jul 66</td>
<td>30 Jul 66</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>program</td>
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NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

For the period 19 Jul 66 to 30 Jul 66 the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) operated in the AURORA II TDOR. Our MEDCAP team treated 715 persons during this period. We distributed 1000 pounds of clothing, 40 cases of soup, 36 cases of cooking oil, 5100 pounds of flour, 800 pounds of paddy rice, 800 pounds of polished rice, 1010 gallons of kerosene, and CURE sewing kits. A minor surgery program was performed on a regular basis in the Phuoc Lam Special Forces Dispensary.
MESSAGE OF MESSAGE: 1st Infantry Division power

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: VC Units

CÁC BAN KHÔNG Có MỞ HY VỌNG MÃO CHIẾN THẮNG ĐỨC
LỰC LƯỢNG HƯNG HÀU CỦA QUÂN LỰC VIỆT NAM CỘNG HOÀ
VÀ DIONS MINH.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Side I: Illustration of US and GVN flag and soldier.
(You have no hope of winning against our powerful ARVN and Allied Forces.)

Side II: Attention Viet Cong!

Powerful ARVN and Allied Forces are now operating in this area. We have
brought with us combat-hardened 1st Infantry Division soldiers, artillery and
air power. We have also brought with us newer and more powerful weapons
against which you have no defense. We are using every means possible to aid
the GVN in bringing peace and security to the people of South Vietnam. To
achieve this we shall persevere you relentlessly until you and your cadre have
no hiding places left. Your cause is a hopeless cause. Why suffer and die
needlessly? Rally now! Use the National Safe Conduct Pass before it's
too late.

17-1
Kể từ ngày từ ngày 15.7.1966 đồng bào phải rời khỏi vùng oanh kích, vào cácấp an ninh huyện Quận Can Duoc và Can Giuoc, nơi đây chính quyền sẽ tiếp dân và cũng cấp đây đủ vui chia cho dân công đồng bảo.

Sau ngày 15.7.1966 đồng bào nào không rời cụ thể vùng oanh kích chính quyền sẽ không bảo đảm an ninh mạng và tao sẵn các đồng bảo.

CHÁNH QUYỀN TỈNH LONG AN
DIỆT TRÙ CỘNG SẢN LÀ YÊU QUỐC

ENGLISH TRANSLATION: The people of Can Duoc and Can Giouc, the VC is hiding along the Nha Be river to terrorize the innocent people and destroy our economy. The authority of Long An Province decided to bomb along the Nha Be River of Can Giouc and Can Duoc districts, 2000 meters from the riverside toward inland (an area including Hiep Phuoc, Binh Khach, Thoi Pong I Phuoc-vinh-Dong, Tan Yap and An Thoi Dong II village) "Down to the Communist Aggressors".

Side 2: From today to the 15 July 1966, you must move out of the mentioned area and settle in secured hamlets of Can Giouc districts where you will be welcomed and given necessary help.

After 15 July 1966, if you do not move out of the above area, the authorities will not be responsible for your lives and properties.

Long An Province
Kill the Communists is to love ones country.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION: Side 1: (Silhouette of girl, sitting by an open window with a full moon outside and open doorway near the window.)
TEXT: "I do not know where he is now. What is he doing at this time?"

Side 2: (Same as front, except silhouette of man standing in doorway.)
TEXT: Return to your loved ones by rallying to the just cause.

17-3
Side 2: Attention VC!

Why do you continue to struggle and fight, in hardship and misery, for an unjust cause? All your leaders give you are false promises of victory, urging you to risk your life against our awesome power. How can you possibly hope to win against our overwhelming military superiority? Not only do our soldiers have the latest in weapons and equipment, but, they have armor, artillery and planes to support them. One of the most fearsome airplanes at our disposal is the helicopter. The helicopter can search you out anywhere. It can hover over your positions and direct artillery and airstrikes on you. It can fly low and surprise you with deadly machine gun fire or rockets. It can land anywhere and bring troops right into your midst. Why continue the futile struggle against such power when the only reward you will get will be a shameful death and an unmarked grave? Don't waste your youth needlessly. Use the National Safe Conduct Pass, rally now to the just cause and build a new life in peace.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION: ATTENTION VIET CONG!

In support of the GVN the American Forces have recovered another rice cache which you stole from the people. This rice will be returned to its rightful owners, the people who grew it.

Viet Cong, the army you joined or were drafted into has become nothing but a big gang of thieves, murdering and stealing from the people. Those of you who have seen enough of this senseless killing and robbing can return to the protection of the GVN, through the Chieu Hoi Program. You will be welcomed.

For those of you who continue in the ways of terrorism and thievery, we pledge your annihilation.
MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: C-62

ENGLISH TRANSLATION: Side 1: Men of C-62!

One of your comrades, Huy Van Lai, has seen the light. He was tired of no food; eating peanuts and not rice. He was tired of being guarded by weapons that the cadres carried to keep him from going to his loved ones. Huy Van Lai has rallied to the GVN and Allies. Don’t live on the meager diet of the VC. Don’t live under the eye of those who lie to you and take away your freedom. Rally now to the GVN.

Side 2: (Picture of Starving VC) Caption: “No rice again today?”
ENGLISH TRANSLATION: Illustration Caution: The next artillery shell may kill you instead of dropping this leaflet.

Side 2: VC: This leaflet was dropped from an artillery shell which exploded in the air. This artillery shell could easily have contained explosives which would have killed you. The GVN does not want to destroy you. You must leave the Communist murderers and rally to the side of peace and freedom. Use this leaflet as a warning, and rally to the Government at the first opportunity. Do not wait until an explosive shell kills you.
MESSAGE THERE: Futility and Destruction
MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: VC Guerillas

ENGLISH TRANSLATION: Side 1: (Illustration of 2 VC walking thru a destroyed village)

Panel 1: "Look at the harm we bring to our own people. Can this be right?"
Panel 2: "We have been duped by the Communists. Let's rally to the Just Cause."

Side 2: Attention Viet Cong Guerillas!
Every village you enter becomes a target for the GVN and Allied Forces. The innocent suffer because of you. Your aims are futile because you are on the wrong side. The enemy in the war is not the GVN, not the Americans, not the Koreans, not the Australians, not the New Zealanders. You, Viet Cong, are the aggressor. You Viet Cong, are being used by the communists as part of their plan to conquer all the free peoples of Southeast Asia. You, Viet Cong, are the real enemy.

17-17

[Image of two VC walking through a destroyed village with text in English and Vietnamese]
THEME OF MESSAGE: Post Operative

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: Civilians in Operational Area

ENGLISH TRANSLATION: Side 1: The US soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division have been in your area making it safe by clearing the area of the VC. You have only seen a small part of our massive strength. This mighty force, known the world over, stands ready to make your life safe. Side 2: Your friends, the US soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division, are here to help you. We will give you medical assistance when you need it. We can build schools, bridges and roads to make life easier for you. Help us together to defeat the VC forever.

17-18
SUBJECT: Air Force Airlift Capability

1. Recent experience in Operations Birmingham and Idem has pointed up a serious need to improve the responsiveness and flexibility of Air Force airlift capability to meet changing requirements of the tactical situation.

2. The airlift support currently provided by Air Force aircraft (C-123's and C-130's) is programmed by the Airlift Control Center (ALC) of the 315th AFW, based on requests channeled through ROHQ/OC. Directive 557, 11 June 1966, is the basis for this request system. There are no provisions in this directive which permit the diverting of Air Force aircraft already allocated to missions or destinations of a lower but more immediate tactical importance, without going through channels to ROHQ/OC. For example, assume an airlift has been requested to move a battalion from Long Xom to Hien Van for an urgent operation. During the initial stages of this move, a tactical situation develops at Hon Quan which requires the battalion to be deployed at Hau instead of Hien Van. Under the present system, the responsible commander must request the diversion by submitting a new request through existing channels, a time consuming process at best. Similar situations result in resupply airlifts, such as requesting interchange of commitments.

3. Recognizing that ultimate control of Air Force airlifts must remain in Air Force channels, a recommended solution is the establishment of airlift Movement Control Teams (MCT). MCT would consist of a theater commander, located at the major focal point of the operation, and an airlift coordinator at each on-load and off-load airfield. It is essential that these teams be furnished adequate radio communication between the mission commander and (a) LCC and (b) Airlift Coordinator. They would have the authority to divert, through the Mission Commander, currently allocated aircraft as necessary to respond to the tactical requirement.

4. In essence, elements of this organization already exist. Namely, each operation has a Mission Commander and in some cases representation at the major on-load and off-load airfields. What is required is the authorization to establish procedures and obtain the necessary radio equipment.
AVXD 4 July 1966

SUBJECT: Air Force Airlift Capability

equipment and qualified personnel to implement the HQT concept.

5. It is requested that this proposal be implemented during a future selected tactical operation. This headquarters will make personnel available, as desired, to assist in formulating plans and procedures.

/s/Richard T Knowles
/"/RICHARD T. KNOWLES
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

19-2
# I
## STATISTICAL SUMMARY
### TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT
1 May - 31 July 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>6,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>4,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNAF</td>
<td>3,174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Total air sorties during period: 14,224

2. Number of sorties flown by U.S. aircraft in support of ARVN: 6,134

3. Number sorties flown by VNAF in support of ARVN: 2,771

4. Total number sorties flown in support of ARVN: 8,905

5. Number sorties flown by U.S. aircraft in support of U.S. Forces: 4,646

6. Number sorties flown by VNAF aircraft in support of U.S. Forces: 970

7. Total number sorties flown in support of U.S. Forces: 5,616

8. Number VNAF combat missions flown in support of ARVN: 284


10. Results of air strikes: 20-1

11. Ordnance expended:

| KIA (2D) | 411 | Bombs | 8,880 |
| KIA (2<sup>3</sup>) | 1,364 | Rockets | 12,454 |
| Structures destroyed | 4,520 | CBU | 774,800 |
| Structures damaged | 3,243 | KAAA | 5,262 |
| Secondary explosions | 125 | 20 mm | 1,550,400 |

CONFIDENTIAL
II
LIMITING FACTORS

1. Shortage of air munitions, particularly CBU, MK-24 Flares, heavy bombs, long delay fuses and Daisy Qu...er Fuse Extensions, was a matter of concern throughout the period.

2. Fill of requested preplanned missions was less than during the previous reporting period. TASE occasionally would not accept all preplanned requests on the basis that TACC could not allocate sufficient aircraft.

3. Navy flights frequently showed up early for scheduled TOT's.

4. A few aircraft, particularly Navy flights, showed up at the target having ordnance at variance with the TACC Frag Order resulting in reduced effectiveness of the strike.

5. Weather throughout the period was generally favorable to air operations with the exception of July when early morning ground fog and rain were recurring problems.

III
ARC LIGHT MISSIONS

A total of 34 Arc Light Missions were flown within III CTZ during the reporting period utilizing a total of 300 B-52 aircraft.