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
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

# II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

## OPERATIONAL REPORT ON

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### LESSON LEARNED

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c. Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles, Chief of Staff designee, established a planning group on 15 January 1966, with headquarters in Saigon, to coordinate the deployment and establishment of Headquarters, II Field Force, in Vietnam. He was assigned as Chief of Staff, effective 20 February 1966. Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, became operational on 15 March 1966 under the command of Major General Jonathan O. Seaman.

d. Major subordinate units are shown at Inclosure 4. Locations are shown at Inclosure 5.

e. There were 41 distinguished visitors during the reporting period. They are shown at Inclosure 6.

## 2. (C) PERSONNEL, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE:

a. The headquarters was formed insofar as possible from units stationed at Fort Hood, Texas. It was necessary to requisition some officers and enlisted personnel from outside the command, as the post had previously provided the majority of the personnel for I Field Force Vietnam approximately six months earlier.

b. A program has been established to eliminate the "DEROS Hump" by infusion of personnel with in-country experience and by subsequent transfer of other personnel out of the command. Plans have also been made for the requisitioning of replacement personnel.

c. The health of personnel in this headquarters has generally been excellent. Each unit has had a temporary brisk increase in diarrheal type diseases upon arrival in country. During the reporting period there were one hundred and two cases of malaria in troops under the operational command of II Field Force Vietnam. The 1st Infantry Division suffered a significant increase in the number of heat casualties during the month of April 1966.

d. The three chaplains assigned to Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam conducted ninety-eight religious services during the months of March and April. A total of 2,480 persons attended the services. The Catholic chaplain heard 120 confessions. The Sacrament of Holy Communion was offered 29 times and was received by 264 persons. The chaplains counseled 46 persons. Fifty-three visits were made to troop areas and 31 informal staff visits to units under operational command of II Field Force Vietnam. The chaplains also made 10 civic action visits to local Vietnamese institutions and 15 visits to the 93d Evacuation Hospital. Five religious films were shown to the officers and enlisted men of the command.

e. Maintenance of discipline, law and order has been excellent. No courts-martial were processed during the reporting period, nor were

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there any serious incidents or accidents reported through 30 April 1966.

f. A request for general courts-martial jurisdiction was forwarded to the Secretary of the Army on 17 March 1966 under provisions of Article 22 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The request was necessary because this headquarters, even though organized and functioning as an Army Corps, did not fulfill the statutory requirements to convene a general court. The Secretary of the Army granted the Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam the authority to convene general courts-martial by DA message 760108, dated 14 April 1966, effective 15 April 1966. This was later confirmed by General Order 16, Headquarters, Department of the Army, dated 15 April 1966.

g. On 15 March 1966 a Legal Assistance Office for II Field Force Vietnam was established in the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, thus fulfilling the requirements of AR 608-50.

h. The 23d Field Artillery Group was attached to II Field Force Vietnam for Article 15 jurisdiction effective 24 March 1966 per General Order 1955, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, dated 30 March 1966. The 23d Field Artillery Group was further attached for general courts-martial jurisdiction effective 15 April 1966 by General Order 2345, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, dated 19 April 1966.

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to departure from Fort Hood personnel within the headquarters attended mandatory lectures on Vietnam which were conducted during the period 21 through 26 January 1966. The lectures were general in nature but did include information on the overall intelligence situation in the Republic of Vietnam, on medical problems, and on mines and booby traps. Lieutenant Colonel Coleman, Deputy G2, presented a briefing at the morning staff conference on 27 January on the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) Provinces which included a short discussion on the VC infrastructure.

b. Personnel from the G2 Section did not receive specific intelligence training prior to departing Fort Hood because the majority of the personnel transferred to the G2 Section from III Corps G2 Section were school trained and had participated in Exercise MAP STRIKE III at Amarillo Air Force Base in December 1965. Also, many had attended an excellent Vietnam area study briefing presented in November by the 529th Military Intelligence Detachment (Corps). Newly assigned personnel were briefed on their TOE assignment within the section.

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c. The following counterintelligence operations were completed prior to departing Fort Hood:

(1) Security clearances for personnel assigned to II Field Force were processed.

(2) Security inspections emphasizing the removal of patches and other identifying items (drivers license, organization membership cards, etc.) which could relate the unit to Fort Hood were supervised by the CI Division, G2 Section, Headquarters, III Corps and Fort Hood.

(3) All personnel received a security orientation.

d. Soon after arrival in Vietnam it was discovered that the organization of the G2 Section TOE 52-1T was unsatisfactory for 24 hour operation in non-nuclear, counter guerrilla operations. The problem was compounded by the absence of the supporting MI Detachment. A recommended change to the TOE is presently under consideration.

e. For a discussion of terrain and climatology for III Corps Tactical Zone see Incl7.

f. Under the present organizational concept the bulk of the personnel who work in the G2 Section must come from the attached Military Intelligence Detachment. II Field Force Vietnam did not have this type unit during the reporting period. A newly organized unit, the 219th MI Detachment (Corps), has been designated to provide the necessary support to the headquarters. The unit was scheduled for unit training prior to departing CONUS. However, since this headquarters was without MI support, a request was submitted through Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam to waive the unit training requirement and to make the unit available for shipment no later than 1 May 1966. The request was approved and the unit was ordered to be shipped. An advance party arrived in country on 24 April 1966. The unit's equipment departed Charleston, South Carolina by cargo ship on 25 April 1966. A cargo plane was scheduled to depart 4 May 1966 with air transportable equipment. The main body departed 7 May 1966 by C-141 aircraft.

g. Estimated III Corps Tactical Zone Order of Battle (CTZ OB). Since Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam did not become operational until 15 March, there has been no requirement or basis to determine changes which should be made of MACV estimates of Order of Battle in III Corps Tactical Zone. OB activity has been limited because the 219th MI Detachment is not yet in country. To date, OB activity has consisted of analysis to assist in determining the probable location of confirmed, probable, possible, and newly reported units.

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h. Summary of Major Viet Cong Activities. Enemy activity during the period consisted of five battalion or larger scale attacks and sporadic small scale attacks and mortarings. On 16 March elements of the 271st Regiment attacked the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade at YTL45437 during operation SILVER CITY. Elements of the PHU LOI and C61 Battalions attacked the complex of ARVN compounds and outposts near PHU CUONG (XT8114) on 23 March. At VO XU (YT8238) on 21 March the 275th Regiment attacked the 1/52 ARVN Battalion. On 5 April the 1st Battalion, 165A Regiment attacked the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry in the HO BO Woods area Vicinity XT608288. The D800 Battalion, DONG NAI Regiment attacked Company C, 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry at YS535845 on 14 April. Significant Viet Cong losses resulted from these major attacks. After 15 April the Viet Cong avoided contact, moved to secret zones, conducted infiltration and resupply, and engaged in harassments, mortar- ing and small scale attacks against friendly outposts.

i. Enemy Losses 15 March - 30 April 66

<u>KIA(BC)</u>	<u>KIA(Poss)</u>	<u>VCC</u>	<u>VCS</u>	<u>Small Arms</u>	<u>Hvy Wpns</u>	<u>Rds Ammo</u>	<u>Mines Demo</u>	<u>Eldgs Dest</u>	<u>Grain (Tons)</u>
439	695	76	456	314	17	31,451	849	1267	2717

j. Viet Cong Weapons and Tactics.

(1) The Viet Cong continue to have a multiplicity of makes and models of small arms and crew served weapons. However, the trend in Viet Cong Main Force units is to 7.62mm rifles, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and machine guns of Communist bloc manufacture, which will not chamber the 7.62mm ammunition used by ARVN/US/FWMAF units. The Viet Cong apparently have a plentiful supply of crew served weapons. The most common are 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles; 60mm, 81mm and 82mm mortars; cal .30, 7.62mm, cal .50, and 12.7mm machine guns; rocket launchers and flame throwers. There have been one confirmed and two probable incidents of 75mm pack howitzer fires in III CTZ, indicating at least one such weapon. The Viet Cong are expert in using all types of ammunition and explosives for booby traps and mines.

(2) Viet Cong tactics are designed to conserve Main Force strength for the most remunerative targets, an attack which causes the least VC casualties. They avoid large units, such as brigades, and regiments, but seek to attack isolated battalions and companies using great numerical superiority. In these attacks, they use a hugging tactic as a means of protecting themselves against artillery fire and air strikes. Subsequent withdrawal is by small elements (squad size) over multiple routes. To defeat or defend against surveillance, artillery, tactical air, and B-52 strikes, the enemy disperses in small units in the jungle, moves

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frequently, and takes maximum advantage of darkness and periods of low visibility. Dispersion and concealment are his main defenses for base areas and storage facilities.

k. A discussion of further intelligence requirements and of intelligence collection activities is contained in Inclosure 8.

#### 4. (C) OPERATIONS, PLANS AND TRAINING:

a. The G3 section was involved in very limited activities while at Fort Hood. The majority of the principal personnel of the section were assigned from units located at Fort Hood. Immediately upon assignment to the section, new personnel were further assigned tentative duties within the section.

b. In coordination with G3, US Army Garrison, Fort Hood, all personnel were oriented on the Republic of Vietnam. The following specific subjects were presented:

- (1) General subjects (Survival, "Know the Enemy", Intelligence).
- (2) Individual Training (Duties of Sentries, Perimeter Defense, Field Military Sanitation, Ambush, Communications).
- (3) G2 (Hostile Order of Battle)
- (4) Medical treatment of malaria and malarial control.
- (5) "Vietnam - Questions and Answers" DOD Gen-8 (handout).
- (6) "Pocket Guide to Vietnam" DOD PG-21 (handout).

c. Specific training of individual members of the section was deemed impractical while at Fort Hood since there was a strong possibility that the duty assignments were not permanent. In addition, most of the key personnel of the section were members of either the advance party or the planning group.

d. Upon arrival in Vietnam, the section was reorganized. It soon became apparent that the section, as organized under the TOE, was incapable of conducting 24 hour operations for an extended period. The section was therefore reorganized to more readily conform to the requirements of Vietnam. A TOE revision is presently under consideration which embodies most of the following recommended changes. In the meantime, the section is presently organized in the following manner:

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(1) Administrative Division. The tactical and administrative work load is such as to justify an expanded administrative division with the sole function of routing documents to the various divisions within the section. This division is presently organized with the section sergeant major, one administrative supervisor, three clerk typists, and a general clerk.

(2) Operations Division. An operations division has been established to insure a 24 hour operational capability within the section. The operations division is presently organized with an operations chief - Lt Col, an operations sergeant - Master Sergeant, and three operating teams. Each team is organized with a team chief - Major, an assistant operations officer - Captain, an assistant operations sergeant - Staff Sergeant, and a clerk typist - SP/4.

(3) G3 Air Division. Soon after becoming operational, it became readily apparent that the G3 Air Division would be incapable of conducting sustained 24 hour operations. In addition to operating within the G3 section, the division was required to provide a representative at III ARVN Corps DASC. The G3 Air Division was expanded to its present organization of an operations chief - Lt Col, four operations officers - 3 Majors and 1 Captain, an operations sergeant - Staff Sergeant and a clerk typist - SP/4.

(4) Plans Division. The plans division was developed to facilitate planning operations at this headquarters. This division formulates plans, makes recommendations for employment of units, and coordinates the planning efforts of subordinate units. The plans division is organized with a plans officer - Lt Col, an assistant plans officer - Major, an operations sergeant - Sergeant First Class, and a clerk typist - SP/4.

(5) Doctrine and Training Division. The Doctrine and Training Division was developed to conduct the administrative functions pertaining to Army tactical doctrine, training, research and development and military history. In addition, the division prepares all operational reports which the headquarters must submit to higher headquarters. The division is organized with a lieutenant colonel - chief, a major - assistant chief and a clerk typist - SP/5.

(6) Analysis and Organization Division. The Analysis and Organization Division was developed to study tactical operations, after action reports of subordinate units and other documents to derive lessons learned and to check for proper utilization of forces in an operation. The division is organized with a lieutenant colonel - chief, and a major - assistant chief.

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e. This headquarters planned 12 operations during the reporting period. Six of the planned operations were not carried out for the following reasons: Two were canceled, one is a contingency plan, one contains a "be prepared" mission, and two are scheduled to be conducted during the next quarter. Of the remaining six plans three developed into significant operations.

(1) Operation CIRCLE PINES was a brigade level operation conducted by the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division during the period 29 March - 5 April 1966. The operation was conducted in the HO BC Woods and the HINHOL Plantation north of CU CHI, areas formerly considered privileged sanctuaries of the Viet Cong. This operation was the first in Vietnam in which a US armor battalion was employed en masse. The effectiveness of the major armored unit operating in conjunction with infantry units is readily demonstrated by the casualty figures for the operation: 157 VC KIA (BC), 323 KIA (Poss), 52 small arms captured and 72 tons of rice evacuated. US casualties were light by comparison with 30 KIA and 195 MIA.

(2) Operation ABILENE was a division size operation conducted by the 1st Infantry Division during the period 30 March - 15 April 1966. The division deployed two US brigades, 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment and 161st Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery. The operation was conducted in the rubber plantations and dense jungle of LONG KHANH and PHUOC TUY Provinces. The general plan for ABILENE called for the location and destruction of elements of the 5th and 9th Viet Cong Regiments, their base camps and the HAY TAO Secret Zone. Although neither regiment was in the area during the operation, major supply caches were destroyed. Significant contact occurred on 11 April when Company C, 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry became heavily engaged with the D800 Viet Cong Main Force Battalion in the heavy jungle region vicinity YN535855. The engagement resulted in 41 Viet Cong KIA (DC). Total material losses inflicted on the Viet Cong during operation ABILENE included 1,241 tons of rice, 59 tons of salt, 54 base camps and 5,500 gallons of kerosene.

(3) Operation BIRMINGHAM presently being conducted is a large scale operation conducted by the 1st Infantry Division in WAR ZONE "C" in northern TAY BINH Province near the Cambodian border. The operation was launched on 24 April and is continuing after the end of the reporting period. During the operation US forces cut major east-west Viet Cong infiltration and communications routes. Initial contact with Viet Cong forces was limited to meeting engagements with small isolated groups of Viet Cong who quickly sought sanctuary in the dense jungle when engaged by approaching US forces. On 30 April as the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry and the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry swept north along the east bank of the RACH CAI BAC River, they began receiving automatic

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weapons and mortar fire from the west, or Cambodian side of the river. A heavy volume of artillery was placed on the Viet Cong positions effectively silencing the enemy fire. As the two battalions approached the village of LO GO (WT9775) they were engaged by an estimated Viet Cong battalion. Contact was maintained for six hours before the Viet Cong succeeded in dispersing into the jungle. Viet Cong losses resulting from the battle of LO GO included 54 KIA (BC), and 100 KIA (Poss). US losses were 6 KIA and 9 MIA. Losses inflicted on the Viet Cong as of the end of the reporting period included 82 KIA (BC), 113 KIA (Poss), 7 VCC, 84 VCS; 24 weapons captured; 24 base camps destroyed, 1359 tons of rice destroyed, 184 tons of salt destroyed and a large hospital complex containing laboratory and surgical facilities destroyed.

f. For a discussion of the tactical air sorties and Arc Light missions see Inclosure 9.

g. For a discussion of psychological warfare activities see Inclosure 10.

## 5. (U) LOGISTICS:

a. The G4 portion of the advance party consisted of 1 officer and 2 enlisted men who departed Fort Hood by air on 15 February 1966. The planning group was composed of 5 officers and 7 enlisted men and departed on 23 February 1966. These groups either took with them or shipped on accompanying cargo aircraft sufficient equipment and supplies to last the advance detachments 90 days. There was some delay in the arrival of the cargo aircraft for the planning group. These aircraft arrived three to seven days after the personnel aircraft. The balance of the G4 Section, with the exception of the Transportation Officer who accompanied the sea cargo, arrived by air at Bien Hoa Airbase on 8 and 9 March 1966.

b. The unit shipped the balance of its full TOE plus authorized station property, some Class IV and other special items to Oakland Army Terminal from Fort Hood on 15 February 1966. To assure arrival of the equipment at the COMUS terminal and to coordinate the sea movement of supplies and equipment, the G4 Transportation Officer accompanied the equipment to port and sailed on the same vessel with the cargo.

c. USARV placed one officer and three enlisted men from in country units TDY with the G4 Section, II Field Force Vietnam on 26 January 1966. Based upon guidance provided by the II FFORCEV Command Group, TDY personnel established a property account and proceeded to request and draw essential items of station property. These items included office furniture, cots, bedding, vehicles and essential expendable supplies. This made it possible for arriving unit personnel to move in and immediately perform required duties.

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d. The supplies and equipment shipped from CONUS arrived in country as follows:

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TONS (approx)</u>
Muhlenberg Victory	29 Mar 66	500
Magnolia State	30 Mar 66	12

To insure that all supplies and equipment were received from the ship, the Transportation Officer and one NCO with 10 enlisted men as guards remained at the port until the ship was unloaded and equipment moved to the site. To accomplish this expeditiously, stake and platform trailers were loaded on the pier and moved directly to the site area. No cargo was lost by utilizing this procedure.

e. After becoming operational, the G4 conducted coordination visits to supported and supporting units to familiarize personnel of this headquarters with locations and facilities of subject units. Conferences were held with supported units concerning possible problem areas wherein this headquarters could be of assistance. Subsequent liaison visits were made to all units under operational control of this headquarters for the purpose of providing assistance in critical areas of mechanical maintenance and supply.

f. The G4 Section initiated action to request and coordinate airlift requirements for units under OPCON of this headquarters. This function had previously been performed by the Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division.

g. Status of primary land LOC as of 30 April 1966 is as follows:

(1) National Highway 13. GIA DINH to LAI KHE. This route in its present condition is trafficable in its entirety only during the dry season because four demolished bridges (XT803165, XT802167, XT782238, XT772286) were filled in only with laterite as a dry season expedient. Traffic is limited to Class 30. During the wet season it is expected that this route will become impassable unless the bridges are repaired.

(2) Interprovincial Highway 16 from XT005050 to intersection with Interprovincial Highway 1A and then north on Highway 1A to PHUOC VINH. This route in its present condition is trafficable in its entirety only during the dry season because four demolished bridges (XT935144, XT933165, XT958224, and XT912296) were replaced by laterite fill as a dry season expedient. During the wet season it is expected that this route will become impassable unless the bridges are repaired. Traffic is limited to Class 20.

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(3) Provincial Route 2A (unimproved from XT766199 to XT831340. This route serves as an alternate MSR from HQ, 1st Infantry Division complex to the 1st and 3d Brigades of this division. Absence of culverts and bridges on this route makes it less susceptible to interdiction by VC. This route is trafficable to Class 60.

(4) National Highway 15 from BIEN HOA to VUNG TAU. This route in its present condition is trafficable in its entirety. Traffic is limited to Class 12.

(5) National Highways 1 and 22 from SAIGON to TAY NINH. This highway will accept Class 60 traffic on Highway 1 from SAIGON to GO DAU HA and is limited to Class 20 traffic from GO DAU HA to TAY NINH (Route 22).

(6) Interprovincial Highway 2 from XUAN LOC to PHUOC LE (BA RIA). This route has not been classified and is not considered open.

(7) National Highway 1 from BIEN HOA to PHAN THIET. This route to XUAN LOC is now open to Class 30 traffic. From XUAN LOC to PHAN THIET the route is not classified or considered open.

(8) Lateral route CU CHI-PPU CUONG-BIEN HOA (Provincial Route 8A and Military Route 313). This route is not opened or classified at this time. No bridges exist over the Saigon or Dong Nai Rivers.

## h. Construction Underway.

(1) The TAY NINH by-pass road from GO DAU HA (Routes 19 and 26) is now being repaired and improved to Class 60.

(2) Reconnaissance and planning is being conducted to provide for the possible improvement of the road from GO DAU HA to TAY NINH (Route 22) to accept Class 35 or 50 traffic.

## 6. (U) INFORMATION:

a. The Information Office of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam became operational immediately upon arrival in the Republic of Vietnam, and is presently functioning adequately, although a shortage of photographic support exists. Until the signal support unit arrives, the information office has taken steps to construct a photographic facility of its own.

b. The standard Army Issue Recorder-Reproducer was unavailable at Fort Hood; however, a substitute, UHER 4000 REPORT-S tape recorder, has been provided. Specifications of this equipment indicate

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that it is adequate to produce high quality tapes necessary for broadcast by both military and professional facilities. The equipment is also able to withstand local climatic and field conditions and requires little maintenance.

c. Mandatory orientations and films have been conducted or shown and the required regulations are being reproduced and disseminated.

d. Release authority on hard news items has been clearly defined by higher headquarters and is being implemented by this headquarters.

e. Adequate distribution of Stars and Stripes is being provided to troops of this headquarters.

f. The Information Office has conducted liaison visits to higher headquarters for the purpose of effecting coordination with the Information Offices in those headquarters and establishing liaison with press media in the country.

g. The Information Office has generated publicity to support civic action programs sponsored by this headquarters and to amplify newsworthy activities of its subordinate units.

## 7. (J) INSPECTOR GENERAL:

a. Significant activities for the Inspector General Section, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for the period January 1966 through April 1966 are as follows:

(1) The entire TOE section moved from Fort Hood, Texas to the vicinity of BIEN HOA, Vietnam during the period 5 - 9 March 1966.

(2) On 18 March 1966 it was agreed by the Chief of Staff and Inspector General, II FFORCEV that the temporary work load of the section did not warrant the assignment of three officers. Therefore, one lieutenant colonel was transferred from the IG Section to the G3 Section. This reduced work load is considered temporary; therefore, it is not recommended that a change to the TOE be made at this time.

(3) Two special inspections were conducted during the period covering the areas of special interest to COMUSMACV. These areas of special interest are listed in paragraph 4a below.

(4) On 14 April 1966 Colonel J.E. Crowe, MACV IG, and Major Ralph E. Maze, MACV Assistant IG, visited this headquarters and conferred with the Commanding General, the Chief of Staff and the

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Inspector General regarding the importance that COMUSMACV placed on certain areas of special interest. These areas are listed below:

(a) Postal activities, to include in particular receipt and distribution of mail. Determine timeliness and any procedural deficiencies noted.

(b) Unit troop mess activities, to include in particular quality of ration and food preparation.

(c) Implementation of the command information program with emphasis on:

1. Troop orientation.
2. Understanding of MACV mission, unit mission, and their relationship.
3. Conduct and attitude toward Vietnamese citizens.
4. Knowledge of Code of Conduct and Geneva Convention Rules on handling and treatment of prisoners of war.

(d) Command Safety Program, in particular the effectiveness of measures taken to minimize non-combatant battle casualties.

(e) Command compliance with counter-inflation.

(f) Administration of clubs, messes and post exchange facilities with emphasis upon measures in effect to preclude malpractices.

b. This section encountered no problems during the period of this report.

## 8. (U) CIVIC ACTION:

During the period 1 January - 15 March 1966 civil affairs/civic action in the III Corps Tactical Zone was monitored by the CG, 1st Infantry Division. Prior to II FFORCEV's assuming operational control on 15 March, coordination visits were made by the ACofS, G5 to MACV Rural Construction, USAID, JUSPAC, POLWAR Directorate, CARE, Catholic Relief Service and the USARV Civil Affairs Section in Saigon. Coordination visits were also made to US/PWMAF units, USAID, JUSPAC, And MACV advisors in the III CTZ. These visits enabled G5 Officers to get a feel for the operations in III CTZ and enabled them to discuss problem areas and possible solutions.

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVXC-D&T

1 June 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period  
Ending 30 April 1968 (RCS CS670-28 (R1) (U))

(1) A wide range of civic action projects have been implemented or continued during the reporting period. These projects include classroom construction, well digging, latrine construction, MEDCAP II sick calls, distribution of food and clothing, provision of scrap lumber for fire wood, construction of market places, and clearing sites for refugee camps. All projects have been coordinated with GVN officials and their US Advisors. Best results have been obtained with US/FWMAF, ARVN, and local civilians participating jointly.

(2) Civic action programs in the III CTZ are progressing both with enthusiasm and with gratifying results. The III CTZ Civic Action Program must, however, be improved and stimulated by new energies and new ideas.

b. Actions implemented to improve American/Vietnamese relations are covered in some detail in the minutes of the Community Relations Meetings at Inclosure 11.

c. Typical examples of civic action projects within III CTZ are portrayed in Inclosure 12, a Civic Action Report (27 Apr - 3 May) of the 12th Aviation Group.

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AVXC-D&T

1 June 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Reports on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period  
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS USGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

## SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED

### AGRICULTURE ✓

#### Item: Destruction of Rice

Discussion: An extremely useful lesson learned concerns the destruction of rice, which was devised by the G5, 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep). Although every conceivable attempt is made to extract rice from operational areas, military necessities, the size of captured caches and lack of transport, sometimes preclude extraction. As stated by one commander, "Under some situations it would be less expensive and more feasible to ship rice from Louisiana than to extract the same amount from the jungle caches." In such cases the rice must be destroyed to deny it as a ration for the Communist terrorists.

1. The 173d Airborne Brigade destruction method is as follows: Six pound bags of powdered gas, CS-1, are placed among rice bags or within a pile of loose rice. The bags of CS-1 are tied with detonating cord and joined in series with detonating cord. The number of CS-1 bags and amount of extra explosives must be determined by experiment.

2. Eight 110 pound bags were contaminated by the 173d Airborne Brigade using one 6 pound bag of CS-1. The 880 pounds of rice were examined after 6 days, which included two torrential rains. The inspectors could not get close to the rice without suffering severe respiratory irritations. How long this rice will remain contaminated has not been determined at this time. However, residual effects were clearly evident after a period of 10 weeks. Further inspections will be made.

### HUMAN RELATIONS ✓

#### Item: US/Vietnamese Relations

Discussion: Continued emphasis on conduct of US personnel in contact with local citizens, including observance of local customs, traditions, and appearance in public. Avoidance of loud and boisterous behavior, moderation in the use of alcohol, courtesy to females and compliance with common rules of decency.

Observation: Americans who conduct their affairs within the frame work of decency, kindness, integrity and respect for the rights and property of others should have little difficulty in accomplishing the mission of the United States military in the Republic of Vietnam.

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AVXC-D&T

1 June 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Reports on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period  
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

## MEDICAL/ADMINISTRATION ✓

Item: Adequate Interpreters for MEDCAP Programs

### Discussion:

1. The necessity for adequate interpreter service at all MEDCAP programs is essential. The best of American medical aid is near worthless without the presence of skilled interpreters. Valuable medical time has been lost because of failure to have sufficient qualified interpreter personnel present.

2. It would be extremely valuable if MEDCAP programs could be operated through the normal siesta period. When medical personnel travel long distances to perform MEDCAP programs it is disheartening for the medical personnel to have to sit through a 2½ to 3 hour siesta during the heart of the day. It would appear that patients are not adverse to continuing treatment and examination through the siesta but objections are from local assistants.

Observation: Better interpreters are a must. The need for using siesta time for MEDCAP is essential.

Item: Supply and Mess Personnel on Advance Party.

Discussion: Normally, in a move from CONUS the majority of the unit equipment is shipped to port several weeks prior to movement of the main body. This procedure would leave the turn in of station property and clearance of facilities at the home station to the supply personnel of the deploying unit. This function is normally accomplished by a support unit or personnel from the main body. At destination there is a great deal of supply work to be accomplished prior to arrival of the main body. Property accounts must be established, applicable station property drawn, arrangements made for mess facilities and equipment, and plans formulated for the receipt and storage of incoming cargo. The Property Book Officer, key supply and mess personnel are essential to effect proper planning and arrange for required logistical support.

Observation: The Property Book Officer, and sufficient qualified supply and mess personnel should be deployed with the advance party.

Item: Planning factors for Requesting US Air Force Aircraft for Tactical Operations.

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1 June 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Reports on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period  
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

Discussion: The responsibility for requesting Air Force airlift assets requires knowledge of the capabilities of both Air Force and Army airlift assets. It was determined that information should be developed that would reflect what types of aircraft could be utilized to move each type and size unit as well as to indicate the average daily resupply tonnage by class. To accomplish this a series of charts have been prepared reflecting logistic experience factors for two operations. In addition, a chart has been prepared reflecting the capacity of four aircraft (C-130, CV-2, C-123, CH-47) and possible load variations.

Observations: Referenced data will be maintained for all major unit movements depicting the aircraft requirements for a particular type unit, including deployment, and resupply requirements. Experience factors will be invaluable for planning logistical support for future operations.

Item: Vehicle and Generator Maintenance

Discussion: During the initial stages of the arrival of II FFORCEV in Bien Hoa area mechanical personnel were not available to perform vehicle and generator maintenance. This resulted in deadline equipment. Arrangements were made with the 60th Ordnance Group to have all organizational maintenance on vehicles performed by the 185th Ordnance Battalion. Generator maintenance presented a more difficult problem in that maintenance had to be performed in place. Military personnel were trained and assigned full time duty of operating and maintaining unit generators. Additionally, two directives were published; one covering generator maintenance and one pertaining to vehicle maintenance.

Observation: Vehicles and generators without assigned drivers or operators and limited organic organizational maintenance personnel results in poor maintenance. Vehicles to support a headquarters of this type are normally provide by a TC Car company. This car company should arrive in country shortly after the main body. Trained generator mechanics must be immediately available to insure continuous operation of required generators.

Item: CONEX Packing List

Discussion: Upon receipt of CONEX containers at Bien Hoa it was found that packing lists prepared at Fort Hood were inadequate to determine the contents of each CONEX. Therefore, valuable time and manhours were lost unpacking and searching CONEX containers to locate items of immediate needs.

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1 June 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Reports on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period  
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

Observation: A detail packing list should be prepared in sufficient copies to place one in each CONEX container, one retained by the individual section chief concerned and one by the unit supply officer.

Item: Tentage

Discussion: The shortage of general purpose tents in the local supply system presented a problem in obtaining sufficient tentage to billet the main body personnel.

Observation: Tentage for this purpose should be shipped in the Red TAT.

Item: Advance Liaison Party

Discussion: The movement of a headquarters the size of II FFORCEV involves both personnel and equipment requirements not foreseeable in CONUS or reflected in current TOE's. It is felt that a liaison Party in country in advance of even the advance party could provide information as to requirements or problems peculiar to the area involved, thereby, allowing time for the requisition and receipt of personnel and equipment while still in CONUS and prior to the actual movement of the unit.

Observation: Two officers should be assigned and placed in country (or assigned from in country resources) as far in advance of the unit move as possible to act as a direct liaison for the unit.

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AVXC-D&T

1 June 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period  
Ending 30 April 1966 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) (U)

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- 10 - ACofS, G3, II FFORCEV
- 1 - ACofS, G4, II FFORCEV
- 1 - ACofS, G5, II FFORCEV
- 5 - 7th Mil Hist Det

19 19

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INCL # 1

GO 11

HEADQUARTERS  
III CORPS AND FORT HOOD  
FORT HOOD, TEXAS 71344

GENERAL ORDERS  
NUMBER 11

8 January 1966

1. TC 001/002. Following unit ACTIVATED/ORGANIZED.

UNIT LISTED IN INCLOSURE 1

Assigned to: Fourth United States Army

Effective date: 10 January 1966

Authorized strength: See inclosure 1

Equipment: Equipment required and not available from local resources will be requisitioned in accordance with normal supply procedures; equipment rendered excess will be disposed of in accordance with current procedures. Provisions of Fourth United States Army message AKADD-C/R 405566, 26 April 1965, apply

Personnel: Maximum number of personnel required by this action will be assigned from locally available resources without MPA-PCS costs; the remainder will be procured through application of normal personnel procedures. Personnel criteria are in accordance with AR's 220-10 and 612-35, as modified by para 2E, USCONARC message, ATPER-MPD-E 420611, 30 November 1965. Enlisted personnel, all grades, beyond local capability to fill will be reported to Headquarters Fourth United States Army, ATTN: AKAAG-P, not later than close of business 12 January 1966

Files/records: In accordance with AR 345-210

Morning report: In accordance with AR 335-60

Mission: See appropriate TOE

Authority: Department of the Army message, DA 745982, 052009Z January 1966; message, ATUTR-TP 50248, 062027Z January 1966; and Fourth United States Army message, AKADC-E 400250, 062211Z January 1966

Fund obligation: In accordance with current fiscal procedures

UNIT	APC
HQ II Field Force	3L7 (Property Book Number)
	13L70 (Activation/Organization)

Utilization of these codes and others will be in accordance with Circular 37-3, this headquarters, 15 July 1965

Special instructions: Attached to Headquarters Company, United States Army Garrison, Fort Hood, Texas, for all purposes (AKPHO/G3)

FOR THE COMMANDER:



VERNON R. RIDER  
Colonel, AGC  
Adjutant General

EPHRAIM F. GRAHAM, JR.  
Brigadier General, GS  
Chief of Staff

1 Incl  
as

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15 - USARMYFOUR, ATTN: AKADC-E, Ft Sam Houston, Tex. 78234  
10 - USARPAC, APO San Francisco, Calif. 96558  
2 - XVIII Abn Corps, Ft Bragg, N.C. 28307  
12 - USAMC, ATTN: AMCOR-P, Washington, D.C. 20315  
2 - COs, USAAGPC, 2000 Eastern Blvd, Baltimore, Md. 21220  
2 - USAAGPC, 1655 Woodson Rd, St Louis, Mo. 63114  
2 - Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Tex. 75500  
2 - USAMIDA, ATTN: AMEMI-CO, Chambersburg, Pa. 17201  
2 - Lexington Army Depot, Lexington, Ky. 40501  
2 - Pueblo Army Depot, Pueblo, Colo. 81001  
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ACTIVATION

<u>TPSN</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>IOE</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>ACC</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>PRIORITY STATUS</u>
20035	II Field Force	52-IT, 65	101	5	178	284	Ft Hood Texas	Fourth US Army	D-1 (2.09)

Headquarters (SRC 5200IT 5101)  
 UMI: FACZA  
 Proj Code: VZW

Plus: Para 26 (SRC 5200IT 5121)

Less: BR MOS GRADE PARA  
 GO 0002 Gen 26  
 EN 2030 Lt 26

Plus: For Para 09

	<u>LINE</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
	1	1	Corps Engineer
	7	1	Aide

AG	2200	Capt	1	Mil Pers Off
AG	711A	WO	1	Asst Mil Pers Off
	71H4	E-7	1	Pers Sgt
	71H4	E-6	1	Pay Sp
	71H4	E-6	1	Pers Mgmt Sp
	71H4	E-6	1	Pers Rec Sp
	71K2	E-5	1	Pers Act Clk
	71K2	E-4	2	Pers Mgmt Sp
	71H2	E-4	6	Pers Rec Sp
	71H2	E-4	2	Pers Act Sp
	71J2	E-4	6	Pay Sp
	71B2	E-4	1	Clk Typ

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY, PACIFIC  
APO San Francisco 96358

GENERAL ORDERS  
NUMBER 56

11 March 1966

REDESIGNATION

1. TC 010. Following Organizations/Units REDESIGNATED.

Effective date: 15 March 1966  
Authority: AR 220-5

Fund obligation: Obligate to the extent necessary the appropriate allotments in accordance with current fiscal procedures.

<u>Present Designation</u>	<u>New Designation</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>UIC</u>
Headquarters, Field Force Vietnam	Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam	96240	WDDL AA
30th Headquarters Company	Headquarters Company, I Field Force Vietnam	96240	WC83 AA
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 30th Corps Artillery	Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery	96240	WFFH AA
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, II Field Force	Headquarters and Headquarters Company, II Field Force Vietnam	96227	WRMK TO
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, II Field Force Artillery	Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery	96227	WRMK

Assigned to: United States Army, Vietnam.


Files/records: Will be maintained in accordance with AR 345-210 or AR 345-215 as applicable.

Morning report: Initial and subsequent morning reports will be submitted in accordance with AR 335-60.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:


EDGAR C. DOLEMAN  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Chief of Staff

  
JOHN S. TYLER  
Colonel, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

(GO 56, EQ USARPAC, 1966)

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23 - 23



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27  
2-1

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM  
APO US Forces 96227

GENERAL ORDERS  
NUMBER 3

15 March 1966

1. TC 355. The undersigned assumes command.  
Organization/unit: Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
Authority: Para 12b AR 600-20  
Eff date: 17 February 1966

*Jonathan O. Seaman*  
JONATHAN O. SEAMAN  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

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2-CG, 1st Inf Div  
2-CG, 25th Inf Div  
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Units Attached or Assigned to or under OPCON of II FFORCEV during quarter

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>GAIN</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
HQ & HQ CO II FFORCEV (Assigned)	10 Jan 66	Ft Hood, Tex Enroute to RVN LONG BINH	10 Jan - 5 Mar 6 Mar - 9 Mar 9 Mar - 30 Apr
HQ & HQ Btry II FFORCEV Arty (Assigned)	17 Jan 66	Ft Sill, Okla Enroute to RVN TAN SON NHUT LONG BINH	17 Jan - 7 Mar 7 Mar - 10 Mar 10 Mar - 14 Mar 14 Mar - 30 Apr
1st Inf Div (OPCON)	15 Mar	DI AN	15 Mar - 30 Apr
25th Inf Div (-) (OPCON)	22 Mar 66	CU CHI	22 Mar - 30 Apr
173d Abn Bde (Sep) (OPCON)	22 Mar 66	BIEN HOA	22 Mar - 30 Apr
12th Avn Gp (OPCON)	15 Mar 66	TAN SON NHUT	15 Mar - 30 Apr
29th Chem Det (Attached)	10 Mar 66	LONG BINH	10 Mar - 30 Apr
23d Arty Gp (OPCON)	15 Mar 66	PHU LOI	15 Mar - 30 Apr

INCL #

26  
26



DISTINGUISHED VISITORS

<u>NAME and RANK</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
General William C. Westmoreland	11 Mar 66	COMUSMACV
Brig Gen Hal C. Pattison	19 Mar 66	
Lt Gen William F. Cassidy	21 Mar 66	Chief of Engr DA
Maj Gen Harry H. Critz	23 - 24 Mar 66	CG, USAAMC
Brig Gen Robert R. Ploger	24 Mar 66	18th Engr Bde
Maj Gen Harry W. O. Kinnard	24 Mar 66	CG, 1st Air Cav Div
Maj Gen John C. F. Tillson, III	27 Mar 66	J3, MACV
Brig Gen Frank Miller	29 Mar 66	USARV Plans Opns
Lt Gen Dang Van Quang	30 Mar 66	IV ARVN Corps
Brig Gen John R. Deane, Jr	31 Mar 66	CofS, I FFORCEV
Senator John G. Tower	6 - 7 Apr 66	Senate Armed Services Committee
Brig Gen Phillip Davidson	6 Apr 66	G2, USARPAC
General William C. Westmoreland	7 Apr 66	COMUSMACV
Mr. Erle Cocke	8 - 9 Apr 66	
Col William O Quirey	14 Apr 66	COC, MACV
Brig Gen James Collins, Jr.	15 Apr 66	Sp Asst COMUSMACV
Mr. V. J. Scerra	22 Apr 66	Vice Commander, VFW
General Harold K. Johnson	19 - 20 Apr 66	CofS, USA
Mr. Harold Holt	23 Apr 66	Prime Minister of Australia
Brig Gen Alvin J. Cowan	25 Apr 66	JRATA
Brig Gen John D Boles, Jr.	25 Apr 66	JRATA

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28

## Distinguished Visitors (cont)

<u>NAME and RANK</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
Brig Gen Donald H. McGovern	25 Apr 66	MACV, J1
Maj Gen Charles E. Long	26 Apr 66	Dep Chairman, Australian GS
Brig Gen O. D. Jackson	26 Apr 66	Australia
Col Willis B. Scudder	28-29 Apr 66	MACV Protocol
Brig Gen William K. Jones	27 Apr 66	MACV, J3
Col William Ackerly	27 Apr 66	Comdr, 3d Tac Ftr Wing
Gen William C. Westmoreland	29 Apr 66	COMUSMACV
Lt Gen Jean E. Engler	29 Apr 66	DC G, USARV
Lt Gen Co Van Vien	29 Apr 66	Ch of GS, ARVN
Maj Gen Nguyen Tri	29 Apr 66	CG, III ARVN Corps
Brig Gen P. E. Smith	29 Apr 66	CG, 173d Abn Bde (Sep)
Col James H. Dyson	29 Apr 66	CO, 23d Artillery Group
Col Arndt Mueller	29 Apr 66	DSA, III ARVN Corps
Mr. Le Van Kwoai	29 Apr 66	III ARVN Corps Admin Asst

## WEATHER AND TERRAIN ANALYSIS

### 1. (U) Nature of Terrain.

Geographically, Vietnam is divided into four different regions: the ANNAITE Mountains and plateaus of Central Vietnam, the PIEDMONT, the narrow coastal lowlands, and the MEKONG-BASSAC Delta. The III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) extends from the northern portion of the Delta in LONG AN and HAU NGHIA Provinces through the PIEDMONT region and into the foothills of the ANNAITE mountain chain in the three eastern provinces of the III CTZ; BINH LONG, LONG KHANH, and BINH TUY. The PIEDMONT region, covering BINH DUONG, BINH HOA, BINH LONG, and TAY BINH provinces, is characterized by gently rolling hills with moderate slopes, and plains extending from the vicinity of SAIGON to approximately 100 km north to the foothills. Elevations vary from several meters below sealevel to three or four hundred meters with the average elevation for the area being less than 100 meters. The highest elevation in the III CTZ, 1643 meters, is located in northeastern BINH TUY Province. Rivers are generally wide and slow moving, flowing south or southeasterly to the South China Sea. Most of the rivers are navigable for sampans and other small craft. Vegetation varies from dense mangrove or palmetto swamps to open savannah grassland plains, secondary scrub jungle growth, open broadleaf forest, and evergreen double canopy forest. There are numerous rubber plantations within the area. Rice is grown wherever water can be diverted into paddies. Generally the subsurface is sedimentary, lateritic strata with few outcroppings of basalt or granitic rocks in the area. The PIEDMONT region has the best conditioned road network in South Vietnam. The main arteries are Routes 1, 1A, 13, 14, 15, 20 and 22. ALL are in usable condition although many bridges have been destroyed. Average bridge capacity is 15 tons. Secondary roads are usable during the dry season.

### 2. (U) Weather.

a. BINH HOA Climatology for March 1966. The observed weather was close to the climatological averages. Where deviations occurred they could be explained by the different methods of recording weather which the French, Vietnamese, and U.S. Air Force meteorological services used to take and record their observations. The observed mean maximum temperature of 94 compared closely to the climatological mean of 94 degrees. The observed mean minimum temperature was 75 degrees compared to the climatological minimum of 74 degrees. Flying weather was suitable for low level aircraft operations on more than 20 days as expected; however, fog occurred on 20 days instead of 10 days as the records would indicate. Five thunderstorm days were recorded at BINH HOA instead of one day as indicated by past records. The eleven days with precipitations and 1.36 inches of precipitation both exceeded the average values.

b. BINH HOA Climatology for April 1966. The observed mean maximum temperature was 95 compared to the climatological average of 94

INCL 27

degrees. The observed mean minimum temperature of 78 was also one degree above average. Flying weather was suitable for low level aircraft operations except for a few hours during the month. Nine thunderstorm days far exceeded the two or three days which the record would indicate. The 15 days with some rain and the 4.06 inches of precipitation recorded at BIEN HOA again far exceeded the average values of four days and 1.80 inches. Fog occurred on 11 days and was close to the recorded average.

c. Effects of Weather on Friendly Forces. Although no confirmed instances of heat prostration are known, extreme temperatures in late April probably had a noticeable fatiguing effect on ground forces. Forces in the BIN CAT and TAY BINH areas would be most likely to have been exposed to heat fatigue. Known adverse weather effects were limited to isolated instances usually affecting aircraft operations. However, lightning caused 25th Inf Div Non-battle casualties of two killed and 15 injured on 25 Mar 66.

d. Effects of Weather on Enemy Forces. Unknown, but probably negligible.

e. Air Weather Service (AWS) Support and Organization. On 1 March 1966, 30th Weather Squadron (30 WS) detachments at BIEN HOA, VANG TAU, and TAY BINH supported both the Army and US Air Force with observations and forecast service. (See subparagraph 2i, below for AWS organization within III Corps Tactical Zone at the start of the period.) In order to become more functionally aligned with the supported Army command, the 30 WS is working toward the organization shown in subparagraph 2j, below. The reorganization will separate Army and Air Force support without disturbing the integrated AWS technical organization. More specialized support to the Army should result from the reorganization. In addition, the command structure within the squadron supporting the Army will more closely approach the Army's vertical command structure.

(1) Support to the 25th Inf Div (25th Div). The 30th Weather Squadron has provided the 25th Inf Div with weather support since the division arrived in Vietnam. An observing and forecasting detachment at CU CHI needed only teletype communications to become fully operational on 30 April 1966. The division weather station located at the division airfield has the capability to provide 24-hour observing and forecasting service. In addition, combat weather teams composed of three observers are ready to deploy forward with brigades.

(2) Support to the 1st Inf Div. The 30th Weather Squadron has provided the 1st Inf Div with weather support since the division arrived in Vietnam. The AWS observing and forecasting detachment at the PHU LOI airfield was operational on 18 April 1966. As with the 25th Div, combat weather teams will provide weather service to brigades forward as appropriate. The SVO and a combat weather team accompanied division elements forward on Operation BIRMGHAM.

(3) Support to Headquarters, II FFORCEV. The SWO was assigned on 18 Mar 66. In addition to providing staff weather support to the Commanding General and his staff, the SWO monitors and coordinates all AWS support to the Army in the CTZ. With the reorganization of the 30th Weather Squadron, the SWO would also command all AWS units providing direct support to the Army in the CTZ. The responsibility of the corps weather station would be transferred from the detachment at BIEN HOA Airbase to the corps weather station located at HQ, II FFORCEV. The corps weather station would be manned by an additional four officers and two airmen.

f. SWO Services Performed. The SWO prepares the weather briefing board for the daily command briefing. He provides daily forecasts and light data to the Air Force Artillery Metro Officer, and on 29 April initiated daily forecasts service to the 159th Engineer Group. In addition, the SWO prepares weather summaries for the daily INTSUM and the weekly PERINTREP. The G2 and G3 TOC journals are used to evaluate the effect of weather on friendly and enemy forces. He also provides daily upper wind and temperature data to the Force CRE. The SWO monitors weather warnings issued by the corps weather station. In addition, the SWO prepared special climatological summaries and light, tide, and moon data for II FFORCEV operations such as ABILENE and BIRMINGHAM.

g. Projects.

(1) Working in cooperation with the corps weather station, the SWO is monitoring the placement of additional rain gauges at Army installations, base camps, and artillery metro section locations. A significant contribution to more complete and accurate rainfall records is expected from this project by putting ten to fifteen additional rain gauges in the corps tactical zone. The gauges are made from Air Force practice bomb cases. Progress is slow because the gauges are handmade and individually calibrated by the Chief Observer at the corps weather station on a time available basis.


(2) The Commander of 30 WS, the SWO, the Force Artillery Metro Officer, and Commander, Det 3, 30 WS at BIEN HOA agreed on the advantages which would occur if an artillery metro section was collocated with the corps weather station at BIEN HOA. On 8 April 1966, the Force Artillery Metro Officer recommended that the metro section at PHU LOI be moved. 1st Div has not concurred with the recommendation to date. Target date for completing this project is 1 July 1966.

(3) By the end of the period the SWO had completed the preliminary investigation and coordination required to publish both a general weather warning plan for the corps tactical zone and a specific warning directive for HQ, II FFORCEV. The weather warning project was started on 2 April 1966. The target date for completing the weather warning directives is 15 May 1966.

h. Problem Area. Communications presented the only problem area. The absence of rapid and reliable telephone communications hindered timely and effective coordination and passing of weather information among the SWO's and the corps weather station. Although weather and poor communication did not drastically affect operations during the period, both the weather and weather communications will become more significant during the southwest monsoon season which is about to start. A request for a single-user direct line telephone connecting the SWO II FFORCEV with the corps weather station was disapproved. On 30 April 1966, the SWO submitted a request for a single-user direct line telephone conference net linking all SWO's to the corps weather station. As an interim measure, during the last week in April, the Commander, 30 WS provided five RT - 671/PRC - 47 single sideband high frequency radios. The radios were positioned with the three SWO's and at the corps weather station. The additional radio was positioned with the 1st Div forward elements near the end of April. On 30 April 1966, the radios were used to transmit weather warnings, current observations, forecasts, and supporting meteorological information to the SWO's and forward division elements. A single-user telephone net will continue to be an urgent requirement.


(i) Initial Air Weather Service Organization in Support

of Army Operations.



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(j) Future Air Weather Service Organization in Support of Army Operations.



# CONFIDENTIAL

## Inclosure 8 to Operational Report on Lessons Learned

### 1. (C) Intelligence Collection Activities

#### a. G2 Air

(1) Pre-operational. Following arrival in country on 24 February, liaison visits were made to subordinate units and to selected elements of MACV J2, to the TACC III DASC, G2 Air Advisor to III Corps, and 13th Technical Reconnaissance Squadron. MACV directives pertinent to aerial reconnaissance and surveillance were obtained and a G2 contribution was written for inclusion in the II FFORCEV TAC SOP. Air request forms were procured, request numbers allocated to subordinate units, and necessary forms reproduced and stocked. Maps were assembled and section prepared to become operational by 151200H March.

#### (2) Operational Activities

(a) Aerial visual reconnaissance. The visual reconnaissance effort involving use of O1 aircraft was largely directed by III DASC at the time II FFORCEV became operational. Significant sightings made by observers in Army aircraft were reported to the local ground commander but were seldom reported to Headquarters II FFORCEV and III Corps although the Army aircraft were used to augment VR being performed by Air Force FAC Pilots. Reporting increased of significant sightings made during VR performed by Army aircraft as emphasis was placed on this during staff visits to subordinate units. On 27 April a draft regulation dealing with visual reconnaissance was circulated to II FFORCEV Arty, units under OPCON of Headquarters II FFORCEV, G3, III DASC, and Deputy Senior Advisor III Corps for comments. This regulation will provide:

1. That responsibility for visual reconnaissance will be placed on the ground commander (or appropriate advisor) of the unit which has tactical responsibility for that area.

2. A systematic reporting system.

3. Policies for conduct of visual reconnaissance aimed at achieving maximum effective coverage with the limited resources available to II FFORCEV.

(b) Other sources. Arrangements were made with the G2 Air Advisor, III ARVN Corps, to receive all SLAR and RED HAZE read-outs as well as copies of all imagery interpretation reports. II FFORCEV G2 Air disseminates this to II FFORCEV units and likewise passes read-outs and II Reports to ARVN Corps for dissemination to ARVN units.

(c) Problem areas.

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Inclosure 8 to Operational Report on Lessons Learned

1. There are severe working handicaps because only common user telephones and "hot lines" are the sole source of communications between user field units and higher headquarters. This method of communication has proven to be an ineffective method of transmitting air requests and information. In addition to the time consumed encoding and decoding messages for use over unsecure lines, needless hours are spent dictating and receiving request and information. In addition, such time has been lost because of overcrowded and sometime inoperative common user circuits. An Air Request Net (RATT type) would ameliorate this and provide for a more efficient and productive operation.

2. All requests are passed through III DASC which has only one reconnaissance officer assigned. Preplanned requests are often delayed in submission because the one officer is present at the DASC only during normal working hours.

b. 29th Chemical Detachment. After arrival at VUNG TAU on 10 March 1966, the detachment was attached to Headquarters, II FFORCEV by USARV GO Nr 1955, dated 10 March 1966. Because of the nature of the conflict, characterized by the absence of the use of nuclear and toxic chemical weapons, the requirements for a CBR Element of the TOC were found to be very limited. The need for a CBR Center Detachment to augment the TOE CBR Element was even less justified in the present situation. For that reason, personnel of the organic CBR Element, along with 3 members of the 29th Chemical Detachment, were absorbed into the operating divisions of the G2 Section. The NCOIC and one computer were left for duty with the 29th Cal. Det to perform routine unit administration and to assist the G3 Chemical Officer as required in planning defoliation operations.

c. Liaison Officer from 17th RRU arrived in country with the advance party from Hq II FFORCEV and has been making preparations for the arrival of the unit on 3 May 1966.

d. SSO support has been provided to this headquarters since early April 1966.

e. Other. Intelligence collection activities were limited during the period because of the lack of the normally attached intelligence agencies. Actions have been taken to provide the necessary agencies during the next quarter.

2. (C) Intelligence Requirements.

a. Imagery

(1) Platforms. Until II FFORCEV became operational, the ASTA platoon of the 1st Inf Div, consisting of 2-OVIB and 2-OVIC aircraft,

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Inclosure 8 to Operational Report on Lessons Learned

was supporting the 1st Div, the 173d Abn Bde, and the 2d Bde, 25 Inf Div. SLAR and RED HAZE coverage beyond the capability of the 1st ASTA Platoon was flown by USAF aircraft and Army Mohawks requested through MACV J2 Air. When II FFORCEV became operational, the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div and the 173d Airborne Brigade were no longer under the operational control of the 1st Inf Div and therefore were no longer supported by the 1st ASTA Platoon. This deprived these units of the immediate response and flexibility inherent in organic Mohawk aircraft. A letter requesting that Mohawk aircraft be placed in direct support of units having no organic Mohawk was proposed and forwarded to MACV J2 on 30 April.

(2) Photographic. Extensive use has been made of aerial photography produced by USAF. In addition, II FFORCEV has requested and obtained negatives of USN photography in III CTZ. These negatives are stored at Det A, 1st MI Bn (ARS) located at BINH HOA. Some difficulties have been experienced in obtaining aerial photography in sufficient time prior to operations. If a priority two could be assigned for photo request up to seven days prior to the start of an operation photography would reach the unit in time to be of greater value. As yet II FFORCEV has no image interpreters so maximum exploitation of photography is not yet being accomplished.

(3) SLAR. SLAR has proven and continues to prove its worth in use along inland waterways, canals, open trails, and roads. It has been effective in detecting enemy movement at night and the Mohawk in-flight readout capability has proven its worth in immediate target acquisition.

(4) RED HAZE. RED HAZE is currently being employed to the fullest extent. Some difficulty has been encountered in meeting specific TOT's requested by units. RED HAZE imagery has not yet obtained its full potential. Image interpreters are able to count the emissions recorded on the imagery. A comprehensive key should be developed for interpreting RED HAZE imagery produced in RVN.

b. Interpreters and translators.

(1) Interpreters and translators from US sources do not yet exist in any significant quantity. However, interpreters and translators from GVN sources are available in limited numbers in subordinate units but are not available at this headquarters.

(2) The language barrier will continue to be a problem for at least the next twelve months, even though the problem will slowly decrease on a monthly basis as interpreters and translators become available; primarily from GVN resources.

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I  
STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT  
15 Mar - 30 Apr 1966

	SUB <u>TOTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. Total air sorties during period:		
USAF	2683	
USN	1933	
VNAF	1735	
		<u>6351</u>
2. Number sorties flown by US acft in support of ARVN:	2047	
3. Number sorties flown by VNAF acft in support of ARVN:	1425	
4. Total number sorties flown in support of ARVN:		<u>3472</u>
5. Number sorties flown by US acft in support of US Forces:	2569	
6. Number sorties flown by VNAF acft in support of US Forces:	310	
7. Total number sorties flown in support of US FORCES:		<u>2879</u>
8. Number SKY SPOT missions flown in support of ARVN:		<u>19</u>
9. Number SKY SPOT missions flown in support of US:		
1st Inf Div	5	
25th Inf Div	0	
173d Abn Bde	0	
		<u>5</u>

10. Results of air strikes:

KIA (BC)	<u>294</u>
KIA (EST)	<u>510</u>
Structures destroyed	<u>3676</u>
Structures damaged	<u>1823</u>
Secondary explosions	<u>111</u>

11. Ordnance expended:

Bombs	<u>4101</u>
Rockets	<u>862</u>
CBU	<u>244,000</u>
NAPALM	<u>4112</u>
20 mm	<u>894,800</u>

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Inclosure 10 to Operational Report on Lessons Learned

1. During the period 1 January to 15 March 1966, psychological warfare operations were conducted at Division and Separate Brigade level. When II Field Force Vietnam became operational, G5 became psychological warfare coordinator between US tactical units and the 246th Psyops Company. During this period each Division and the 173d Abn Bde had as an attachment a Mobile loudspeaker team (HB). These teams were utilized by the units during all tactical operations.

2. During Operation BIRMINGHAM, II FFORCEV was requested to evaluate a concept of psyops in which a composite detachment composed of one HC team (printing and processing), one HD team (propaganda) and three HB teams were attached to the 1st Infantry Division. This attachment is still in effect and will continue until the completion of Operation BIRMINGHAM.

3. In mid April each Division and Separate Brigade were issued portable loudspeaker kits on the basis of one per Brigade. This gives each Brigade a loudspeaker delivery capability in addition to that afforded by the attached teams.

4. During the reporting period, a total of 105 air delivery missions were flown in support of US units in the III Corps Tactical Zone. These missions totaled 151 hours of loudspeaker appeals and 14,155,000 leaflets dropped on VC controlled areas.

5. The Cheui Hoi program accounted for 882 ralliers during the first four months of 1966. In a similar period last year there were 505 ralliers under this program.

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## II

### LIMITING FACTORS

1. Shortage of air munitions particularly heavy bombs became a matter of operational concern during late April.
2. Weather throughout period was generally favorable to air operations.

## III

### ARC LIGHT MISSIONS

A total of 16 Arc Light Missions were flown within III CTZ during the reporting period.

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THEME OF MESSAGE: Chiêu Hồi

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: Viet Cong

Các bạn có biết bao nhiêu cán binh Việt Cộng đã ra qui chánh với Chánh Phủ Quốc Gia, phía đang chiến thắng, không? Thừa các bạn, có 2082 anh em đã trở về trong tháng vừa qua, hơn 11,000 trong năm 1965 và tổng số 31,167 cán binh Việt Cộng đã trở về với Chánh Nghĩa Quốc Gia từ khi chánh sách chiêu hồi được đặt ra từ năm 1963. Hiện nay, số Việt Cộng ra Qui chánh với Chánh Nghĩa Quốc Gia ngày càng đông hơn vì họ biết rõ những gì chánh phủ nói ra là sự thật, là Chánh nghĩa. Các bạn sẽ được săn sóc thuốc men, có chỗ để an nghỉ tránh được bệnh hoạn, rừng sâu nước độc, có dịp học nghề, tìm lại nhân phẩm và xum họp với những người thân yêu. Chánh phủ quốc gia biết rằng Việt Cộng bắt đồng bào làm nô lệ cho chánh phủ bù nhìn miền Bắc. Chánh phủ quốc gia cũng biết được sự gian khổ mà các bạn đang phải chịu đựng trong hàng ngũ Việt Cộng. Chánh phủ sẽ tha thứ những lỗi lầm đã qua của các bạn. Hãy đến trình diện với một trong bốn cơ quan chánh quyền địa phương ghi trên bản đồ nơi trang sau, các bạn sẽ được tiếp đón nồng hậu. Hãy ra qui chánh ngay bây giờ và hãy yên tâm về chánh sách chiêu hồi của chánh phủ !!! Các bạn hãy về ngay đi !!!

English Translation

HOW MANY VC DO YOU KNOW WHO HAVE RALLIED TO THE WINNING GOVERNMENT SIDE? 2082 RALLIED LAST MONTH, OVER 11,000 FOR 1965, 31,157 SINCE THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM BEGAN IN 1963. MORE AND MORE VC RALLY DAILY THAN EVER BEFORE BECAUSE THEY KNOW THE GOVERNMENT'S WORD IS JUST AND TRUE. YOU WILL BE GIVEN MEDICAL CARE, A COMFORTABLE PLACE TO SLEEP AWAY FROM THE DISEASE INFESTED JUNGLE. YOU WILL BE GIVEN A CHANCE TO LEARN A TRADE, REGAIN A NEW SELF-RESPECT AND THEN REJOIN YOUR LOVED ONES. THE GOVERNMENT KNOWS THE VC STEAL YOUR FELLOW COUNTRYMEN TO BE SLAVES FOR THE COMMUNIST PUPPETS TO THE NORTH. THE GOVERNMENT KNOWS THE HARDSHIPS YOU ENDURE AS A VC. YOU WILL BE FORGIVEN. GO TO ANY ONE OF THE FOUR PLACES SHOWN ON THE MAP ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THIS LEAFLET AND GVN AUTHORITIES WILL WELCOME YOU. RALLY NOW AND PUT YOUR MIND AT REST WITH THE GOVERNMENT CHIEU HOI PROGRAM.

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THEME OF MESSAGE: Power and Chieu Hoi

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: Viet Cong



CÁN BINH V. C. CÁI CHẾT SẼ ĐẾN VỚI CÁC BẠN:  
CÁC CHIẾN SĨ THIÊN CHIẾN CỦA LỮ ĐOÀN 173 NHẢY  
DÙ HOA KỲ XUẤT HIỆN TỪ TRÊN TRỜI ĐỂ TIÊU DIỆT  
CÁC BẠN. CHÚNG TÔI ĐÃ TIÊU DIỆT HÀNG TRĂM  
ĐỒNG CHÍ CỦA CÁC BẠN BẰNG BOM, HOA LỰC PHÁO.  
BINH, VÀ LỰC LƯỢNG BỘ BINH THIÊN CHIẾN. MUỐN  
SỐNG SỐT, CÁC BẠN HÃY RA QUY CHANH VỚI CHANH.  
NGHĨA QUỐC GIẢ, NẾU KHÔNG, CÁC BẠN SẼ CHẾT  
MỘT CÁCH VÔ ÍCH, THÂN THỂ CÁC BẠN SẼ BỊ VUI-  
LẬP TRONG NẤM MỒ VỖ CHU, MỘT NƠI RỪNG SÂU.  
ĐỪNG ĐỂ TRỄ HƠN NỬA, RY QUY - CHANH NGAY ĐI  
CÁC BẠN !!

English Translation

Side 1: THE FAMOUS SKY SOLDIERS OF THE U.S. 173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE ARE  
HERE TO DESTROY YOU. WE HAVE KILLED HUNDREDS OF YOUR COMRADES WITH OUR POWERFUL  
BOMBS, ARTILLERY AND INVINCIBLE GROUND TROOPS. YOU WILL SURELY DIE UNLESS YOU  
RALLY NOW TO THE WINNING GOVERNMENT CAUSE. YOU WILL DIE A SENSELESS DEATH AND  
BE BURIED IN AN UNMARKED GRAVE IN THE JUNGLE. RALLY NOW BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.

Side 2: DEATH TO ALL VIET CONG  
THE FAMOUS SKY SOLDIERS OF THE US 173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE ARE HERE TO  
DESTROY YOU. WE HAVE KILLED HUNDREDS OF YOUR COMRADES WITH OUR POWERFUL BOMBS,  
ARTILLERY, AND INVINCIBLE GROUND TROOPS. YOU WILL SURELY DIE UNLESS YOU RALLY  
NOW TO THE GOVERNMENT CAUSE. YOUR LOVED ONES ARE CRYING OUT FOR YOUR RETURN.  
RALLY NOW AND BE REUNITED WITH YOUR FAMILIES OR YOU WILL NEVER SEE THEM AGAIN.

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THEME OF MESSAGE: Hunger

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: Viet Cong

SUỐT ĐÊM NAY, CÁC BẠN PHẢI CHỊU ĐÓI VÌ LỰC LƯỢNG CỦA SƯ ĐOÀN  
1 BỘ BINH HOA KỸ, PHÁO BINH VÀ VÔ SỐ MÁY BAY ĐANG SÀN ĐUỔI CÁC  
BẠN.

HÃY TRỞ VỀ NGAY VỚI CHÍNH NGHĨA QUỐC GIA, CÁC BẠN SẼ ĐƯỢC  
TỰ DO VÀ NO ẤM.

ĐỪNG SỢ HÃI GÌ CẢ VÃ HÃY CHỌN: HOẶC TRỞ VỀ VỚI QUỐC GIA, DÂN  
TỘC, HOẶC CHỊU ĐÓI KHÁT CHẾT CHÓC TRONG NAY MAI.

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English Translation

You are hungry tonight through the combat power of the 1st Infantry  
Division and the many airplanes and artillery we use to kill you.

Return to the lawful and correct side of the GVN.

Have rice and freedom.

End your fear of an unmarked grave.

Rally now or be hungry today and dead tomorrow.

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THEME OF MESSAGE: Empty Promises of the Viet Cong

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: Viet Cong

CÁC BẠN ĐÃ CỐ GẮNG RẤT NHIỀU CHU MỘT MỤC ĐÍCH VÔ VỌNG. CẤP CHỈ HUY KHÔNG THỂ CUNG CẤP ĐỒ TIẾP TẾ, VŨ KHÍ VÀ SỰ YẾM TRỢ CẦN THIẾT CHO CÁC BẠN. CÁC BẠN ĐANG TỰ DẪN THÂN TỚI MỘT CÁI CHẾT NHỤC NHÃ. CÓ RẤT NHIỀU ĐỒNG CHÍ CỦA CÁC BẠN RA QUÍ CHÁNH HÀNG NGÀY. TẠI SAO VẬY? VÌ HỌ NHẬN THẤY CỘNG SẢN CHỈ HỨA XUÔNG. HÃY SÁNG SUỐT NHÂN ĐỊNH TÌNH THỂ THUYẾT VỌNG. TRỞ VỀ VỚI CHÁNH NGHĨA QUỐC GIA, CÁC BẠN SẼ ĐƯỢC ĐÓN TIẾP NIỀM NỞ VÀ SẼ ĐƯỢC THẢ THƯ VỀ NHỮNG LỖI LẦM ĐÃ QUA. HÃY RỜI BỎ HÀNG NGŨ VIỆT CỘNG NGAY KHI CÁC BẠN CÓ CƠ HỘI THUẬN TIỆN.

English Translation

You try hard but your cause is hopeless. Your Cadre cannot give you proper supplies, weapons and the support that you need. You are headed for a dishonorable death. Many of your comrades rally each day. Why? Because they realize that the Communist give them only empty promises. Realize your situation. Return to your Government your past will be forgiven and you will be warmly welcomed. Leave your unit as soon as you get a chance.

To All Viet Cong Soldiers: Where are your supplies you need so badly? Where are your good weapons and ammunition you must have? Where is the food you want so badly? Where is your pay? Why don't you get the money you deserve and were promised? Your leaders are giving you empty promises. They promise you things they can't give you. You are fighting for a cause and people who can't support you.

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THEME OF MESSAGE: Leave Viet Cong Territory

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: Vietnamese Civil Population

ĐỒNG BÀO VÙNG THUÊ TỊCH ĐÃ RỜI BỎ NHÀ CỦA LÃNG MẠC ĐỂ TRÁNH  
BỌN VIỆT CỘNG CƯỜNG BÁCH THU THUẾ, BẮT LÍNH VÀ KHUNG BỐ.

ĐỒNG BÀO HÃY RỜI BỎ NGAY NHỮNG VÙNG GÓ VIỆT CỘNG ĐỂ TRỞ VỀ  
SINH SỐNG TRONG VÙNG QUỐC GIA TỰ DO VÀ AN NINH.

CHÍNH PHỦ SẼ TRỞ GIÚP ĐỒNG BÀO THỰC PHẨM, THUỐC MEN VÀ NHÀ  
CỬA.

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English Translation

The people of THUE TICH left their homes because of VC oppression, Taxes, forced draft, forced labor and terrorism. Escape the VC. Go to an area safe from VC Oppression.

Go to an area controlled by the GVN.

The GVN will give you food, medical care and shelter.

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
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THEME OF MESSAGE: School Dedication

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: Vietnamese Civilians

CÔNG BỐ VIỆC KHANH THANH TRƯỜNG HỌC

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English Translation: SCHOOL INAUGURATION ANNOUNCEMENT

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW AP NOI-HOA SCHOOL HAS BEEN COMPLETED. THE VIET CONG FAILED TO STOP THE CONSTRUCTION EVEN THOUGH THEY SHOT SOME OF THE LABORERS. YOUR DISTRICT CHIEF WILL PRESENT THE DEDICATION OF THE SCHOOL AT 0900 HOURS. THIS IS YET ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN FOR YOUR CHILDREN'S EDUCATION AND WELFARE. ALL CHILDREN ARE ENCOURAGED TO ATTEND THE NEW SCHOOL.

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
Advisory Team 98  
APO US Forces 96227

MAGTN-BHEH

4 Mar 66

SUBJECT: Community Relations Council

TO: Senior Advisor  
10th Inf Div  
Advisory Team 87  
APO US Forces 96314

1. A meeting of the Bien Hoa Community Relations Council was held on 3 March 1966 with the following members present:

Lt Col Richard W. Ellison	SA, Bien Hoa Sector
Lt Col Travis L. Higginbotham	G-5 FF II
Lt Col P.J. Greenlaw	Surgeon FF II
Lt Col (Chap) James C. Morrill	Chaplain III Corps
Maj Charles E. Guilford	Dep. Sector Advisor
Maj J. Cornett	DSLE 3rd Air Police Sq
Maj W.W. Brooks	GI Advisor III Corps
Maj L. Sutliff	S5 145th Avn Bn
Capt Harold L. Rodgers	Recorder
Capt O.F. Smith	Ops Off 3rd Air Police Sq.
Capt J.E. Reichel	MP Advisor, III Corps
Capt Jae A. Icenhower	Dep C5 173rd Abn Bde
1st Lt J.E. Maxwell	Info Off USAF
1st Lt D.W. Little	Provost Marshal Office Bien Hoa
2nd Lt Allen K. Long III	Plt Ldr 232 Sig Co.
Luong Quang Khuong	Chief of Nat. Police Bien Hoa
Pham Van Bay	Chief of MSS Bien Hoa

The following unit representatives were absent:

1st Infantry Division  
C-3 Detachment, Special Forces

The council chairman re-iterated the purpose and functions of the council for new members in attendance.

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MAGTN-BHBH  
SUBJECT: Community Relations Council

4 Mar 66

2. Lt Col Ellison stressed the need for tighter security controls resulting from the boom of new bars, shops and restaurants springing up along Highway 15, 1-A and the COGIDO Paper Mill Road. He explained the controls being applied to these areas by the U.S. military in cooperation with the Province authorities.

3. Discussion was then centered on traffic control problems, price controls and civic action.

It was pointed out by Major Guilford that cooperation from troop unit commanders was imperative in overcoming the traffic control, security and price stabilization problems. Also discussed was the necessity for all civic action projects to be coordinated through subsector advisors and the local district chief in order to assist in strengthening the peoples ties with the GVN.

4. The MSS Chief and the National Police Chief were introduced respectively and each in turn outlined their responsibilities and problems concerning the protection of American troops. The National Police Chief proposed that a secure area be established in Bien Hoa City for the pick-up of all soldiers returning from pass by unit vehicles. He volunteered to provide police security of the pick-up point.

5. Lt Little of the Bien Hoa Provost Marshal's office was introduced and discussed new VC tactics of placing taped hand grenades in vehicles gas tanks, speed limits, the raising number of unattended weapons in vehicles and precaution US soldiers should take to guard against the friendly tots that are adept little pickpockets.

6. All representatives in attendance were extended the opportunity to discuss individual problems pertaining to their area of interest. Each unit representative was required to ensure dissemination of all information presented down to each soldier and to work closely with the committee in solving our common community problems.

RICHARD W. ELLISON  
Lt Col Infantry  
Sector Advisor

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
Advisory Team 98  
APO US Forces 96227

MAGTN-BHBH

6 April 1966

SUBJECT: Community Relations Council

TO: Senior Advisor  
10th Inf Div  
Advisory Team 87  
APO US Forces 96314

1. A meeting of the Bien Hoa Community Relations Council was held on 6 April 1966, 1000 hours. The following members were present:

Col Durbin	G-5 FF II
Col Hope	Chaplain FF II
Lt Col Ellison	SA, Bien Hoa Province
Lt Col Story	Bien Hoa Airbase
Lt Col Higginbotham	Asst G-5 FF II
Lt Col Jenkins	Info Officer FF II
Lt Col Merrill	PM FF II
Lt Col Bishop	Surgeon FF II
Maj Guilford	Deputy Adv Bien Hoa Prov
Maj Sutliff	S-5 145th Avn Bn
Capt Smith	PM Bien Hoa Airbase
Lt Little	PM Bien Hoa Province
Mr. Nhon	Deputy for Admin Bien Hoa
Mr. Khuong	Chief National Police
Mr. Phan	Chief VIS
Mr. Huyen	Chief Education Serv
Mr. Anh	Chief Public Works
Mr. Thanh	Chief Social Services

2. Lt Col Ellison welcomed all members to the meeting.

3. Maj Guilford summarized the March minutes and informed the members of the progress attained in the security of the COGIDO area and the improvement in cooperation of US units commanders with the police.

MAGTN-BH3H  
SUBJECT: Community Relations Council

6 April 1966

4. The National Police Chief requested that a pick-up point for soldiers returning to their units at night be reconsidered due to the prime target created by groups of GI's. The unit mobile pick-up runs as requested by Bien Hoa PM worked well for about two weeks but then lapsed back into the waiting truck type pick-up. It was also requested that any US personnel with complaints on stolen items etc work through the Bien Hoa PM only and not go direct to the National Police. The Police Chief also indicated that a bottleneck exists in claims settlement. After discussion it was decided to establish a committee composed of the PM Claims Officer III Corps, G-5 FF II and the National Police Chief to get proper claims procedure worked out.

5. The VIS Chief thanked the US elements for their support and requested that all US personnel be indoctrinated as to the way they should conduct their activities in respect to Vietnamese children in that many children are being led astray and taught many bad habits by the GI's. This VIS Chief will work with the Bien Hoa Advisory Team to compile a list of recommended means for the GI's to make proper contacts with Vietnamese children.

6. The Education Chief expressed his gratitude to the US units for their assistance in the school program. Col Durbin requested the Education Chief to inform him through the Advisory Team of other ways US units can be of assistance.

7. The Public Works Chief requested assistance in clearing the right of way along Highway 15 where it passes through US controlled areas. He also requested assistance in supplying water to some of the US Compounds located in the city of Bien Hoa.

8. The Social Services Chief thanked the US units for the many jobs provided refugees and requested all civic action projects, no matter how small, be coordinated through his office at Province on representative at district level.

9. Lt Little, the Bien Hoa PM requested command emphasis be placed on unsafe driving, carrying weapons in unauthorized areas, leaving vehicles unattended, uniform appearance and personal conduct of the US personnel. Lt Col Merrill requested more coordination in the PM coverage of the Tam Hiep area.

MAGTN-BHIDH

6 April 1966

SUBJECT: Community Relations Council

10. Lt Col Ellison requested more command coordination and emphasis be placed on the problems discussed in the meeting and invited all commanders, down to company level, to visit the Advisory Team for a first-hand tour and appraisal of the PM problem in Bien Hoa City.

11. There being no further business the meeting was adjourned at 1130 hours.

RICHARD W. ELLISON  
Lt Col, Infantry  
Sector Advisor

HEADQUARTERS  
12TH AVIATION GROUP  
APO US Forces, 96307

AVAW-IO

6 May 1966

SUBJECT: Civic Action Report

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, US Army, Vietnam, APO US Forces, 96307  
COMMANDING GENERAL, II FFORCEV, APO US Forces, 96227  
COMMANDING GENERAL, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO US Forces, 96307

Forwarded is the Civic Action Report for the week of April 27 to May 3.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

S/ WADE W. LA DUE  
T/ WADE W. LA DUE  
Captain, Artillery  
Asst. Adjutant

INCL # 12

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NO.	DESCRIPTION	AREA/PROVINCE	UNIT (S)	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPLETED
1.	Education	Bui Vinh	HHD - 145 Avn Bn	March 66	Continuous
2.	Construction	Bui Vinh	HHD - 145 Avn Bn	26-28 Apr 66	26-28 Apr 66
3.	Refugee	Bui Vinh	HHD - 145 Avn Bn	March 66	Continuous
4.	Community Relations	Saigon	HHD - 145 Avn Bn	25 Apr 66	25 Apr 66
5.	Transportation	Vo Dat	68th Avn Co	26 Apr 66	26 Apr 66
6.	Transportation	Duc Phong	68th Avn Co	27 Apr 66	27 Apr 66
7.	Transportation	Phu Cuong	74th Avn Co	27 Apr 66	27 Apr 66
8.	Community Relations	Phu Loi	74th Avn Co	26 Apr 66	26 Apr 66
9.	Health & Sanitation	Phu Loi	74th Avn Co	26 Apr 66	26 Apr 66
10.	Refugee Assistance	Song Be	118 Avn Co	24 Apr 66	24 Apr 66
11.	Education & Training	Bien Hoa	118 Avn Co	March 66	Completed
12.	Community Relations	Bien Hoa	118 Avn Co	Oct 64	Continuous
13.	Health & Sanitation	Bien Hoa	118 Avn Co	Oct 64	Continuous
14.	Health & Sanitation	Tan Uyen	118 Avn Co	May 65	Continuous
15.	Community Relations	Bien Hoa	118 Avn Co	5 Apr 66	50% Completed
16.	Refugee Assistance	Duc Hoa	118 Avn Co	27 Apr 66	27 Apr 66
17.	Community Relations	Bien Hoa	118 Avn Co	28 Apr 66	Continuous
18.	Health & Sanitation	Bien Hoa	197 Avn Co	25 Apr 66	25 Apr 66
19.	Community Relations	Saigon	197 Avn Co	Dec 65	Continuous
20.	Health & Sanitation	Saigon	197 Avn Co	Dec 65	Continuous
21.	Transportation	Saigon	197 Avn Co	29 Mar 66	Continuous
22.	Community Relations	Bien Hoa	197 Avn Co	28 Apr 66	Continuous
23.	Transportation	Tay Ninh	A/501st Avn Bn	25 Apr 66	25 Apr 66
24.	Community Relations	Bui Hiep	A/501st Avn Bn	12 Apr 66	Continuous
25.	Construction	Bui Hiep	A/501st Avn Bn	25 Apr 66	25 Apr 66
26.	Education & Training	Bui Hiep	A/501st Avn Bn	25 Apr 66	Continuous
27.	Education & Training	Bui Hiep	A/501st Avn Bn	28 Apr 66	Continuous
28.	Community Relations	Vung Tau	A/501st Avn Bn	March 66	Continuous
29.	Transportation	Long An	57th Avn Co	29 Apr 66	29 Apr 66
30.	Community Relations	Gia Dinh	120 Avn Co	August 65	Continuous

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS (CON'T)

17. Unit donated the following to the Bien Hoa orphanage on 28 April: 400 lbs white rice, 200 lbs powdered milk, 400 lbs rolled wheat, and two cases of jellies and preserves.
18. Sp/5 Geary, unit medic, gave on-the-spot medical attention to include a tetanus shot to a Vietnamese who had stepped on a nail.
19. Unit donated 30 lbs of clothing received from the United States to the An Lac Orphanage.
20. Two cases of soap received from the United States donated to the An Lac orphanage.
21. Unit is providing truck transportation daily for 8 workers until they relocate their families in Bien Hoa.
22. Unit provided a pump and operator to fill the reservoir at the An Lac orphanage farm at Bien Hoa during the critical water shortage period.
23. Unit evacuated 50 refugees from a search and destroy operation near Try Ninh.
24. Civil affairs representatives made their weekly coordination visit with the chief of Bui Hiep which resulted in the expansion of the English classes to 4 nights a week instead of two.
25. A 2½ ton truck was provided to Bui Hiep to transport building materials for the self help school construction project.
26. A two hour conversational English class was held on 25 April at Bui Hiep for 50 residents.
27. A two hour English class was conducted at Bui Hiep on 28 April for 50 residents.
28. Unit donated 6,900\$VN worth of clothing to the Vung Tau old age home.
29. Unit contributed 1000 lbs rice to an outpost in province.
30. The following collected to buy mattresses and beds for the Go Vap orphanage: 46,000\$VN; presentation will be made when all collections are in and will be given PIO coverage.

NOTE: Civic Action Officers, 12th Aviation Group, and 145th Aviation Battalions completed the MACV JUSPAO Advisor orientation course on 22 Apr 66.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
 HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM  
 APO San Francisco 96266

10 March 1966

Personnel Roster

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ASN</u>
<u>GEN</u>		<u>LT COL (Cont'd)</u>	
KNOWLES, Richard T	035418	HENGLEIN, Robert J	01294864
<u>COL</u>		HIGGINBOTHAM, Travis L	078880
DOYLE, George K	044000	ISON, Glen W	072904
DURBIN, Paul J	052110	LILLIE, Truman A	01183114
GAGE, Nathaniel A Jr	047155	McGHEW, James W	01846408
GRACE, Denis B	023760	MERRILL, Clifford R	079927
HOPE, Holland	058795	NOWAK, George A	058539
KRAMPITZ, Charles T	033630	SHARPE, Edward	01845504
MERRITT, Charles A	080459	SMITH, Conor R	0996554
RIDER, Vernon R	059488	STRICKLAND, Rufus K	01113005
SMITH, William C	032572	TEWS, Robert J	01885806
WEAVER, Earl J	080517	WEBB, George S Jr	028015
<u>LT COL</u>		WILLIAMS, Harry R	084442
BISHOP, Raymond H Jr	069592	<u>MAJ</u>	
BROOKE, Stafford R Jr	065955	AHEARN, John F	097948
COLEMAN, James F	058863	ALDERMAN, Robert L	04030864
FITZGERALD, Charles	028593	BAKER, John L Jr	01920196
GILES, Earl F	058899	BOWMAN, Shannon D	095476
GREENLAW, Patrick J	02047672	BROWN, Sam P	066739
HARSTON, Edward B	02014478	CHARLES, William S III	01183035
HAYES, Joseph W	066012	CHEESEBROUGH, Donald	01874958

INCL # 14

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Personnel Roster, dtd 10 Mar 68

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ASN</u>
<u>MAJ (Cont'd)</u>		<u>CAPT (Cont'd)</u>	
CLARK, Richard D	072692	ANDRES, Dudley M	05206455
CLUNE, William C	068088	BAY, Charles H	085869
COKER, James D	01920203	BAGDONAS, Edward	087006
COLANE, Vincent R	01043595	BISHOP, William T	05313623
EWERS, John B	04009557	BREM, Homer L Jr	04024645
FUNDERBURG, James D	0992081	BUTLER, David H	094998
GARNER, Roy L	0964644	CODY, Jack A	05875320
GRANGER, Clinton E Jr	064081	CRISP, Richard A	04071398
GRANT, James R	097123	ECHOLS, Andrew B	05405882
LASHBROOK, Richard	099978	FLECK, Richard D	05307209
MASON, Darsey	0987501	HAGY, William K	0960744
McCASKILL, John L Jr	0103531	HAUPT, Jerome L	05704995
McNEIL, Darrell O	083959	HEAPS, David K	05525635
MITCHELL, John W	067728	HIGHTOWER, Robert W	05703700
MORRISON, Patton H	068648	HITZFELDER, Jerome L	092548
MURRAY, William K	01335564	KONDITCH, Lawrence	02265136
KROGH, Richard V	02263619	KINNEY, Ross R	02315439
PARKS, John E	065890	KOHL, Richard W	02304193
ROPER, Charles A	079447	O'BYRNE, Edward	05005872
ROSE, John W	02034078	FALMER, David W II	05205974
SHELTON, Cyrus Q	065907	RIVERA, William	05004615
THOMAS, Hiram J	085678	SCOTT, Legrand T Jr	05308226
WIESE, Leo J	01186890	SHANK, Edward L	0F103731
<u>CAPT</u>		STRAUSS, Olin B	05416204
ANCKAITIS, William II	094909	SUMMERS, Harry G Jr	076680

Personnel Roster, dtd 10 Mar 68

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ASN</u>
<u>CAPT (Cont'd)</u>	
TALBUTT, William S	05404293
TAYLOR, Robert E	05807822
WHEELER, Eugene C	05010060
WILKINSON, Tary D	085701
WILHITTE, Carl M	01922594
WISDOM, Thomas E	097220
<u>1/LT</u>	
BOLES, Bennie C	05302549
FISHER, John T	05019559
STANTON, James W	05011263
<u>2/LT</u>	
BRIDGES, Larry E	05326368
<u>CWO W4</u>	
POTSIALDO, Leopold A	W2 04383
<u>CWO W2</u>	
CORDTZ, John H	W2141534
MUELLER, Larry A B	W2213063
ROBINSON, Norman C	W3430301
<u>CWO W1</u>	
DILLON, William P	W3152903
BELLAH, Zere E Jr	W3200743
JARVIS, Allen J Jr	W3152909

INCL # 15

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# OFFICER ~~ROSTER~~ ROSTER

Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam

and

attached units

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NAME (HoName)	RANK	SERVICE NUMBER	DOR	DUTY SECTION	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	SCTY CLINC	DUTY PHONE	QTRS PHONE	QTRS NO	DEPOS
SEAMAN, Jonathan O. (Jack)	Maj Gen	019385	15Sep61	Command	Commanding General	TS	206	308	8	Indef
KOWLES, Richard T. (Dick)	Brig Gen (CS)	035418	7Jul64	Command	Chief of Staff	TS	205	309	8	Indef
DOYLE, George K. (Gene)	Col AGC(CS)	044000	14Jun61	G-1	Asst C of S G-1	TS	201	293	10D	4Mar67
DURBIN, Paul J. (Judge)	Col JAGC	052110	1Jan64	SJA/OS	SJA/Actg G-5	TS	217 298	293	10D	4Mar67
GAGE, Nathaniel A. Jr. (Nate)	Col TC(CS)	047155	11Mar58	G-4	Asst C of S G-4	TS	204	293	10D	16Mar67
GRACE, Dennis B. (Gene)	Col CE	023760	13Sep62	Engr	Engineer	TS	215	293	10D	15Feb67
HARDENBERGH, Henry H. (Hank)	Col Inf(CS)	076832	21May62	DCoFS	Deputy C of S	TS	236	293	10D	25Jun66
HOPE, Holland (Gene)	Col ChC	058795	19Nov65	Chap	Chaplain	TS	219	293	10D	4Mar67
KRAMPTZ, Charles T. (Charlie or Chuck)	Col Arm(CS)	033630	27Oct60	G-3	Asst C of S G-3	TS	263	263	10D	15Feb67
MERRITT, Charles A. (Charlie)	Col SigC	080459	23Dec64	Sig	Signal Officer	TS Cypto	210	293	10D	19Feb67
RIDER, Vernon R. (Vern)	Col ACC	059488	25Mar64	AG	Adjutant General	TS	207	293	10D	5Mar67
WEAVER, Earl J. (Buck)	Col Arm(CS)	080517	2Jul64	G-2	Asst C of S G-2	TS	202	259	10D	21Feb67

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NAME (Nickname)	RANK BRANCH	SERVICE NUMBER	DOR	DUTY SECTION	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	SCTY CLINC	DUTY PHONE	QTRS PHONE	QTRS NO	DEPOB
BISHOP, Raymond H. Jr. (Ray)	Lt Col Inf	069592	8Jul65	Medical	Surgeon	TS	216	288	10B	4Mar67
BROOKE, Stafford R. Jr. (Staff)	Lt Col CmlC(GS)	065955	17Nov65	G-3	Asst G-3 Chem Off	TS	223	288	10B	4Mar67
COLEMAN, James F. (Jim)	Lt Col Arm(GS)	058863	18Sep63	G-2	Asst G-2	TS	202	288	10B	15Feb67
FITZGERALD, Charles A. (Chuck)	Lt Col Inf(GS)	028593	10Jan64	G-3	G-3 Air	TS	253	288	10B	4Mar67
GILES, Earl F. (Boss)	Lt Col IG(GS)	056099	28Dec50	G-4	Chief Trans Br	TS	236	293	10D	1Mar67
GREENLAW, Patrick J. (Pat)	Lt Col	03047672	8Dec64	Medical	Medical Opn Off	S	216	288	10B	21Feb67
HARSTON, Edward B. (Ed)	Lt Col Arm	02014478	2Nov65	Hq Cmlt	Hq Commandant	TS	234	288	10B	15Feb67
HAYES, Joseph W. Jr. (Joe)	Lt Col Arty(GS)	066012	20Jul64	G-3	Doctrine & Reports	TS	258	288	10B	21Feb67
HENGLEIK, Robert J. (Bob)	Lt Col Inf(GS)	01294664	5Nov62	G-3	Deputy G-3	TS	203	288	10B	15Feb67
HIGGIBOTHAM, Travis L. (Higg)	Lt Col Arty(GS)	078880	16Jan64	G-5	Asst G-5	TS	238	288	10B	21Feb67
ISON, Glenn W. (Boss)	Lt Col Inf(GS)	072904	2Aug65	G-2	G-2 Air	TS	247	288	10B	21Feb67
JENKINS, Frederick B. (Fred)	Lt Col Inf	02016899	12Oct64	Info	Information Off	TS	237	288	10B	19Sep66

NAME (Surname)	RANK BRANCH	SERVICE NUMBER	DOB	DUTY SECTION	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	SCTY CLNC	DUTY PHONE	QTRS PHONE	QTRS NO	DEBOS
LILLIE, Truman I. (None)	Lt Col Arty	01183114	18Apr62	IG	IG	TS	209	288	10B	5Mar67
MCCREY, James W. (Dan)	Lt Col SigC(GS)	01646408	25Jun63	G-4	Chief Supply Br	TS	221	288	10B	5Mar67
MOMAK, George A. (None)	Lt Col CE	058539	22Nov65	Engr	Plans Officer	TS	215	288	10B	21Feb67
PHILLIPS, Steve F. Jr. (None)	Lt Col Inf(GS)	036624	21Aug61	G-3	Chief Operations	TS Crypto	260	293	10D	18Sep66
ROGERS, Joseph B. (Joe)	Lt Col Inf(GS)	028233	23May63	G-3	Chief Plans Div	TS	254	288	10B	7Jul66
SHARPE, Edward G. (Ed)	Lt Col ACC	01845504	31Dec63	AG	Deputy AG	TS	207	288	10B	21Dec66
SHUFFER, George M. Jr. (None)	Lt Col Inf(GS)	059029	25Sep63	G-2	Chief Opns Div	TS	247	Hurricane 247	HF; Area	18Jun66
SIMPSON, William J. (Bill)	Lt Col CE(GS)	02033336	16Apr64	G-2	Chief Op & Targeting	TS	246	288	10B	19Sep66
SMITH, Connor R. (None)	Lt Col ChC	0996554	1Jul65	Chap	Asst Chaplain	TS	219	288	10B	5Mar67
STRICKLAND, Rufus K. (Strick)	Lt Col CE	01113005	15Feb62	Engr	En Opn Officer	TS	276	288	10B	5Mar67
TAVS, Robert J. (Bob)	Lt Col Inf(GS)	01685606	5May65	G-1	Executive Officer	TS	201	288	10B	15Feb67
TORREY, Clarence (Clara)	Lt Col SigC	082114	19Jun64	Sig	Last Sig Off TOC	TS Crypto	210	288	10B	19Oct66

NAME (Nickname)	RANK	SERVICE NUMBER	DOB	DUTY SECTION	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	SCTY CLAS	DUTI PHONE	QTRS PHONE	QTRS NO	DEMOB
WEBB, George S. Jr. (Gene)	Lt Col Arty(GS)	029015	15May63	G-3	Analysis & Org	TS	223	293	10D	21Feb67
WILLIAMS, Harry R. (Gene)	Lt Col QMC(GS)	064442	30Sep60	G-4	Deputy G-4	TS	204	288	10B	21Feb67
ABRAHAM, John F. (Jack)	Maj Arty(GS)	097948	31May65	G-3	Asst G-3	TS Crypto	260	249	69	15Feb67
ALDERMAN, Robert L. (Bob)	Maj AGC	04030664	18Nov65	AG	Ch, Admin Svc	ITS	220	249	69	21Feb67
BAKER, John L. Jr. (Boss)	Maj OrdC(GS)	01920196	26Apr63	G-4	Chief Maint Br	TS	236	249	69	21Feb67
BELFORD, Ross P. (Boss)	Maj Inf(GS)	01893078	28Sep64	G-5	Civil Affairs Off	TS	238	249	69	14Dec66
BOWMAN, Shannon D. (Boss)	Maj Arty	0954756	21Aug64	IG	Asst IG	TS	282	249	69	4Mar67
BROWN, Sam P. (Gene)	Maj OrdC(GS)	066739	31Jan64	G-3	Asst G-3 Air	TS	253	249	69	5Mar67
CHARLES, William S. III (Bill)	Maj Arty(GS)	01183035	28May62	G-2	Asst G-2 Air	TS	249	249	69	21Feb67
CHESTERBROUGH, Donald (Gene)	Maj Cmic(GS)	01874958	30Jan64	G-3	Asst G-3 Air	TS	253	249	69	5Mar67
CLINE, William C. (Bill)	Maj Arty	068088	23Jul63	G-2	Target Officer	TS	254	249	69	21Feb67
COLANE, Vincent R. (Vince)	Maj Arty	01043595	7Jun62	Info	Asst Info Off	TS	237	249	69	5Mar67
CREMER, Robert D. (Gene)	Maj CE	073651	29Mar66	Engr	Base Dev Off	TS	276	249	69	26Feb67

NAME (Nickname)	RANK BRANCH	SERVICE NUMBER	DOR	DUTY SECTION	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	SCTY CLNC	DUTY PHONE	QTRS PHONE	QTRS NO	DEROS
CRISP, Richard A. (Dick)	Maj MFC(GS)	04071398	21Apr66	RM	Asst Provost Marshal	TS	227	249	69	4Mar67
*BLOACH, Jimmy D. (None)	Maj SigC	01885767	31Dec63	AAE	Tn Ch, Army Avn Cont Ctr	TS	251	249	69	17Nov66
*DOAN CONG HAU	Maj	A-50/200006		ARVN LMO	Liaison Officer ARVN		241	None	7 Mai Khol Chi Hoa Saigon	
*ELMORE, Donald J. (None)	Maj Inf	074683	2Jan64	AAE	Tn Ch, Army Avn Cont Ctr	TS	251	249	69	25Jun66
EVANS, John B. (None)	Maj Arty	04009557	5Mar65	Command	Liaison Officer	TS	Army 343	None	Rm 2 21/5 Nguyen Minh Chieu, Saigon	20Sep66
FUNDEBURG, James D. (Jim)	Maj SigC	0992081	21Sep62	Sig	Sig Op Officer	TS Crypto	210	249	69	21Feb67
GARNER, Roy L. (None)	Maj Arty(GS)	0954644	1Aug63	G-2	Asst G-2 TOC	TS	249	222	38	10May66 Train Compound
GRANGER, Clinton E. Jr. (Clint)	Maj Inf(GS)	064081	26Oct62	SGS	Secy Gen Staff	TS	240	308	8	15Feb67
HUNT, John E. Jr. (None)	Maj Arty(GS)	065745	6Sep61	G-3	Asst G-3 TOC	TS	260	249	69	27Jul66
KROGH, Richard V. (Dick)	Maj Arm(GS)	02263619	16May65	G-5	Prq War Officer	TS	238	249	69	4Mar67
MARHAM, Richard L. (Dick)	Maj CE	04026648	14Jun65	Engr	Intel Officer	TS	276	249	69	9Apr67
MASON, Darsey (None)	Maj Arm(GS)	0987501	25Apr62	G-4	Asst Supply Off	TS	264	249	69	21Feb67

\*NOT ASSIGNED TO II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

NAME (Nickname)	RAIK BRANCH	SERVICE NUMBER	DOB	ENTRY DATE	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	SCTY CLING	DUTY PHONE	QTR3 PHONE	QTR3 NO	DEPOS
MCCASKILL, John L. Jr. (Mac)	Maj Inf (GS)	0F103531	18Nov64	1-2	Asst G-2 TOC	TS	249	330	3	9Sep66
MCNEIL, Darrel O. (None)	Maj JAGC	063959	14Nov62	SJA	Asst JA	ITS	217	249	69	5Mar67
MITCHELL, John W. (Jack)	Lt Col Inf	067728	22Apr66	Command	Liaison Off	TS	Tiger 824	None	Pa BC4 Saigon	4Aug66
MORRISON, Patton W. (Pat)	Maj Arty (GS)	068648	18Dec64	G-3	Asst Doctrine & Reports	TS	255	249	69	5Mar67
MURRAY, William K. (Ken)	Maj Arm (GS)	01335564	11Jun62	G-4	Chief of Plans & Operations	TS	264	249	69	15Feb67
PARIS, John E. (Jack)	Maj MPC (GS)	065890	26Feb63	PM	Provost Marshall	TS	227	249	69	21Feb67
*PERCIVAL, Wilson (Bill)	Maj USAF	FB64717	16Feb64	G-2	Staff Weather Off	TS	250	249	59	25Jan67
ROPER, Charles A. (Charlie)	Maj Arm (GS)	079447	18Jan65	G-3	Asst Plans	TS	254	249	69	4Mar67
ROSE, John W. (None)	Maj Arm (GS)	02034078	18Apr63	G-3	Asst Operations Off	TS	260	249	69	20Feb67
*ROUSE, Michael F. (Mike)	Maj Arty	0970531	28Jun62	AAB	Tn Ch, Army Avn Cont Ctr	S	251	249	69	23Mar67
SHELTON, Cyrus O. Jr. (Cy)	Maj Arty (GS)	065907	26Feb63	G-3	Adm Off & Briefer	TS	255	249	69	21Feb67
SMITH, Clark (None)	Maj Arty	062543	2Jun64	G-3	Asst G-3 Air	TS	253	249	69	9Nov66

\*NOT ASSIGNED TO HQ II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

NAME (Sic Name)	RANK BRANCH	SERVICE NUMBER	DOR	DUTY SECTION	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	SCTY CLNC	DUTY PHONE	QTRS PHONE	QTRS NO	DEPOS
THOMAS, Hiram J. (Jack)	Maj Cmlc(GS)	085678	10Feb66	G-2	Asst G-2 CBRE TOC	S	249	249	69	4Mar67
*TOP, John J. (None)	Maj Arty	086980	18Nov65	G-3	Tm Ch, Army Avn Cont Ctr	TS**	251	249	69	22 Jun66
*VINCENT, Samuel (Sam)	Maj Arty	092032	22Apr63	G-3	Ch, Army Avn Cont Ctr	TS**	251	318	10A	21Aug66
WERNER, Robin R. (Rube)	Maj Arty	067493	4Dec63	G-3	G-3 Analysis	TS Crypt	223	249	69	6Mar67
WILES, Leo J. (Joe)	Maj Arty (GS)	01186890	23Jul63	G-2	Asst G-2 TOC	TS	249	249	69	4Mar67
WICKLIFF, William H. (Bill)	Capt Cmlc(GS)	094909	9Jul64	G-2	Asst G-2 CBRE TOC	TS	224	249	69	5Mar67
WILES, Dudley M. (Andy)	Capt Arm(GS)	05206455	22May64	Command	Liaison Off	TS	230	249	69	5Mar67
WATSON, Edward (Ed)	Capt Arm	087006	3Jun63	G-2	Target Officer	S	254	249	69	4Mar67
WATSON, Charles H. (None)	Capt Cmlc(GS)	085869	23Apr62	G-3	Asst G-3 Air	TS	253	249	69	4Mar67
WATSON, William T. (None)	Capt JAGC	05313623	26Jan66	SJA	Claims Off	None	217	249	69	4Mar67
*WATSON, Vernon W. (Bill)	Capt Arty	089419	23Nov63	G-2	RRU, LNO	TS	250	249	69	21Feb67
WATSON, Homer L., Jr. (Junior or Tex)	Capt TC(GS)	04024645	10Apr62	G-4	Asst Plans & Op	TS	236	249	69	5Mar67

\*NOT ASSIGNED TO BQ II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

\*\*Not Validated

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NAME (Nickname)	RANK	SERVICE NUMBER	DOR	DUTY SECTION	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	SCY CLIP	DUTY PHONE	QTRS PHONE	MTS NO	DEPTS
BUTLER, David H. (Dave)	Capt SigC	094996	29Jun64	Sig	Wire Officer	TS Crypto	210	249	69	5Mar67
COYI, Jack A. (None)	Capt AGC	05675320	29Sep65	AG	Asst, Admin Svc	TS	220	249	69	21Feb67
SCHLES, Andrew B. (Andy)	Capt SigC	05405882	14Sep65	Sig	Radio Officer	TS Crypto	210	249	69	21Feb67
FLECK, Richard D. (Dave)	Capt Inf(OS)	05307209	7Oct63	Command	Liaison Officer	TS	224	249	69	4Mar67
HAGT, William K. (Bill)	Capt Arm(OS)	0960744	17Jun65	G-2	Asst G-2 CI	TS	252	249	69	4Mar67
HAUPT, Jerome L. (Jerry)	Capt Arm	05704395	23Jun64	HHC	CO	TS	243	Hurricane HHC 243	69	5Mar67
HEAPS, David K. (Dave)	Capt MC	05525635	27Jun64	Med	Gen Medical Off	S	259	249	69	19Jun66
HIGHTOWER, Robert W. (Bob)	Capt Inf(OS)	05703700	14Oct64	G-1	Asst G-1	TS	218	249	69	21Feb67
HITZFEILER, Jerome L. (Hitz)	Capt AGC	092548	24Nov64	AG	Asst, Admin Svc	ITS	220	249	69	21Feb67
KINSKY, Ross R. (None)	Capt JAGC	0235439	15Apr65	SJA	Ch Mil Affairs	S	285	249	69	5Mar67
KUDSON, Wayne C. (Knute)	Capt Inf	05315230	15Dec65	Flight Det	Detachment Cndr	TS	245	249	69	16Aug66
KOHL, Richard (Dick)	Capt ChC	02304193	19Dec62	Chap	Asst Chaplain	S	219	249	69	4Mar67

NAME (Sicronym)	RANK BRANCH	SERVICE NUMBER	DOR	DUTY SECTION	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	SCY CLNC	DUTY PHONE	QTRS PHONE	QTRS NO	REPOS
MERRITT, William D. (Bill)	Capt Arty	099691	29May62	Command Aide		TS	213	308	8	18Sep66
O'BRYEN, Edward G. (Ed)	Capt JAGC	05005872	26Mar65	SJA	Ch Mil Justice	S	217	249	69	88Sep66
PALMER, David W. II (None)	Capt Arm(GS)	05205974	22Jun64	SGS	Asst SGS	TS	265	249	69	15Feb67
RIVERA, William (Bill)	Capt AGC	05004974	1Jul63	AG	Mil Per Off	TS	271	249	69	4Mar67
SCOTT, Legrand T. Jr. (Scotty)	Capt MC	05308226	11Sep64	Medical	Preventive Medicine Officer	S	216	249	69	3Sep66
SHAW, Edward L. (Ed)	Capt ATS	0F103731	25Sep64	G-2	Intelligence Coord	TS	249	249	69	5Mar67
STRAUSS, Olin B. (None)	Capt JAGC	05416204	28Dec65	SJA	Mil Justice Off	S	285	249	69	5Mar67
SUMMERS, Harry G. (Capt)	Capt Inf(GS)	076680	26Mar62	G-3	Asst Opn Off	TS Crypto	260	249	69	5Mar67
TALBOTT, William S. (Bill)	Capt QMC(GS)	05404293	4Nov63	G-4	Asst Plans & Op	TS	221	249	69	5Mar67
TAYLOR, Robert E. (Bob)	Capt Arty(GS)	05701622	5Aug63	G-3	G-3 TOC	TS	260	249	69	4Mar67
WHEELER, Eugene C. (Bert)	Capt SigC	05010060	26May65	SAg	Com EN Officer	TS Crypto	210	249	69	21Feb67
WILKINS, Carl M. (Will)	Capt QMC	01922594	8Apr58	G-4	Food Advisor	TS	221	249	69	4Mar67

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NAME (Nickname)	RANK	SERVICE NUMBER	DOB	DUTY SECTION	ASSIGNMENT	CLINC	DUTY PHONE	QTRS PHONE	QTRS NO	DEPOS
WINDSON, Thomas Jr. (Tom)	Capt Arm (CS)	05320542	22 June 25	ASST	Asst Cpn Off	S Crypto	260	249	69	21 Feb 67
BOLES, Bennie C. (None)	1st Lt Inf	05320542	18 Jan 25	Hq Cdn	Billeting Off	ITS	249	249	69	5 Mar 67
BOSTWICK, Burdette E. Jr. (Pete)	1st Lt Inf	05318135	29 Sep 04	Command	Aide	TS	205	265	8	19 Aug 66
EVANS, Frederick L. (Fred)	1st Lt Arm	05322073	14 Nov 65	Avn	Maintenance Off	S	245	316	10A	19 Sep 66
FISHER, John T. (None)	1st Lt Arm	05019559	8 Jan 66	HHC	Executive Officer	S	243	243	HHC Hurricane	30 Jun 66
JOHNSON, Adrian J. Jr. (None)	1st Lt Arty	05415818	2 Aug 65	Avn	Flight Op Officer	S	245	318	10A	10 Oct 66
STANTON, James W. (Jim)	1st Lt CS	0F106829	14 Apr 66	Engt	Terrain Intel Off	S	276	249	69	4 Mar 67
BRIDGES, Larry E. (None)	2nd Lt Inf	05326368	22 Jun 65	Hq Cndt	Asst Hq Cndt	S	234	249	69	21 Feb 67
FINLEY, Frederick F. (None)	2nd Lt QMG	0F104068	28 Feb 65	G-1	Asst G-1	S	218	249	69	24 Sep 66
*LE VAN THANH	2nd Lt	52A114670	14 Apr 66	ARMY	IMO		241	None	16/38 In-Gia Street Saigon	
CORDTZ, John H.	CWO W4	W2141534	26 Jun 62	SJA	Legal Adm Asst	TS	286	249	69	4 Mar 67
POTSIADLO, Leopold A. (Leo or Mr. P)	CWO W4	W2004583	20 Jun 63	Command	Gen Staff Tech	TS	240	249	69	5 Mar 67

\*NOT ASSIGNED TO HQ II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

NAME (Nickname)	RANK BRANCH	SERVICE NUMBER	DOB	DUTY SECTION	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	SCTY CLNC	DUTY PHONE	QTRS PHONE	QTRS NO	DEPOS
JACOBS, Allen H. (Jake)	CWO W3	W3150493	18Aug65	Avn	Helicopter Pilot	S	245	249	69	29Aug66
JAMES, Edward L. (Ed)	CWO W3	W908099	11Mar65	Avn	Helicopter Pilot	S	245	249	69	25Jan66
OLSENBERGER, George D. (Ox)	CWO W3	W2205183	11Feb63	Avn	Helicopter Pilot	TS	245	249	69	15Aug66
HORAN, George B. (None)	CWO W2	W3151112	18Dec64	Avn	Helicopter Pilot	S	245	249	69	15Aug66
MUELLER, Larry A. B. (None)	CWO W2	W2213063	30Oct63	HHC S4	Supply Technician	S	248	243 Hurricane	HHC	4Mar67
ROBINSON, Norman C. (Robbie)	CWO W2	W3430501	15Aug65	HHC	Mess Technician	S	308	308	8	4Mar67
BELLAH, Zere E. Jr. (Ed)	WO W1	W3200743	18Feb66	AC	Asst Mil Per Off	S	271	249	69	5Mar67
DILLON, William P. (Bill)	WO W1	W3152903	1Feb66	Avn	Helicopter Pilot	S	245	318	10A	2Mar67
JARVIS, Allen J. Jr. (None)	WO W1	W3152909	1Feb66	Avn	Helicopter Pilot	S	245	318	10A	3Mar67

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NAME (Nickname)	RANK BRANCH	SERVICE NUMBER	JOR	DMTY SECTION	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	SCTY CLNC	DUTY PHONE	QTRS PHONE	QTRS PC	DEPOS
CRUYENBERGER, Willis D Jr. (Crit)	Gen	024893	19Mar66	Command	CC	TS Crypto	222	265	8	Indef
ALLIN, George R. Jr. (None)	Col Arty	024760	26Feb62	Command	DC	TS Crypto	287	281		6Mar67
SAYES, Thomas H. (Tom)	Col Arty	084569	27Jul65	Command	MD	TS Crypto	287	281		21Feb67
MCFARLAND, B. J. (Mac)	Lt Col Arty	085110	4Mar62	S-2	S-2	TS Crypto	290			7Mar67
RISDEN, Edward J. (Ed)	Lt Col Arty	01168052	26Jun61	S-4	S-4	TS Crypto	235			7Mar67
SANDOVAL, Billy B. (Sandy)	Lt Col Arty	02262975	26Jun62	S-3	S-3	TS Crypto	292			6Mar67
BEAL, Charles R. (Charlie)	Maj Arty	072677	15Dec65	S-1	S-1	TS Crypto	289			21Feb67
DOHOVAN, Billy B. (Bill)	Maj Arty	02262975	26Jun62	FSCE	Duty Team Chief	TS Crypto	297			6Mar67
FRILLOU, Louis A. Jr. (Lou)	Maj Arty	04009009	18May65	FSCE	Duty Team Chief	TS Crypto	297			6Mar67
H. RHE, Jasper C. Jr. (J C)	Maj Arty	067018	3Jun64	S-3	Asst Plans Off	TS Crypto	293			6Mar67
HUNTER, Charles M. (None)	Maj Arty	061014	21Nov62	S-3	Asst Opns Off	TS Crypto	292			3Oct66

NAME (Nicknames)	RANK BRANCH	SERVICE NUMBER	DOR	DUTY SECTION	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	SCTY CLNC	DUTY PHONE	QTRS PHONE	QTRS NO	LEADS
TURNER, Grady C. (Kase)	Maj Arty	097554	11Oct65	Commo	Commo Officer	TS Crypto	229			6Mar67
BROADUS, James C. (Jim)	Capt Arty	088342	17Jul62	FSCE	Target Analyst	TS Crypto	297			21Feb67
DISTEL, Francois L. (Frank)	Capt Arty	05511106	30Jun64	LO	v/1st Div Arty	TS Crypto	214			5Mar67
FOOTE, Boyd H. (Kase)	Capt Arty	02014701	1Jul54	FSCE	Arty Intel Off	TS Crypto	297			27Feb67
LIONS, Edward J. (Ed)	Capt Arty	04045225	20Apr61	FSCE	Arty Intel Off	TS Crypto	297			6Mar67
MARGARRO, S. Joseph (Joe)	Capt Arty	096776	3Jun63	S-4	Asst S-4	TS Crypto	235			21Feb67
PERLAN, Arthur J. (Art)	Capt Arty	088875	13Aug62	S-3	Asst S-3 Opns	TS Crypto	292			21Feb67
SMITH, Patrick O. (Smitty)	Capt Arty	04010960	12Oct61	HBB	BC	TS	232			6Mar67
THEVINO, Miguel G. (Mike)	Capt Arty	05306782	8Feb65	S-3	Chem Off	TS Crypto	292			6Mar67
W. JAHN, Harold F. (Hal)	Capt Arty	01924541	12Aug55	S-2	Asst S-2	TS Crypto	291			6Mar67
ELLIOTT, Charles B. III (Forch)	1st Lt Arty	0F100624	2Feb66	Cmd	Asst DC	TS Crypto	222			21Feb67
KONTAK, Thomas H. (Tom)	1st Lt Arty	05406298	1Apr65	Commo	Commo Off	TS Crypto	232			6Mar67

NAME (Nickname)	RANK BRANCH	SERVICE NUMBER	DOR	DUTY SECTION	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	SCTY CLNG	DUTY PHONE	QTRS PHONE	QTRS NO	DEPOS
KOSKA, Robert L. (Bob)	1st Lt Arty	05406559	28Oct65	FSCE	Target Officer	TS Crypto	297			6Mar67
OWERS, Marland L. (Marby)	1st Lt Arty	05406842	15Mar66	Maint	Motor Officer	S	232			7Sep66
STURKARD, Larry E. (None)	1st Lt Arty	0F106838	26May65	III CORPS	ARVN LO	TS	214			7Mar67
WHITE, Charles H. Jr. (Charlie)	1st Lt Arty	05009655	11Sep64	10th ARVN	Liaison Officer	ITS Crypto	214			8Mar67
BRIGHT, Joseph G. Jr. (Joe)	2nd Lt Arty	05419259	6Jul65	S-1	Asst S-1	S Crypto	289			7Mar67
BURRIS, Dewey H. (None)	2nd Lt Arty	05406949	10Nov64	25th Div	Liaison Officer	ITS Crypto	214			2Nov66
PAVULAK, Paul E. (None)	2nd Lt Arty	05418907	12Apr65	S-2	Asst S-2	TS Crypto	292			6Mar67
FARMER, Robert F. (Bob)	CWO W2	W3430389	18Aug64	S-3	Metro Off	TS	292			7Mar67
POTILE, Clarence E. (Skip)	CWO W2	W2213524	8Mar64	S-4	Food Svc	S	235			7Mar67
WOODS, Roy S. Jr. (None)	Capt CmlC	086956	27May63	C-2	00 <u>29th CHEMICAL DET</u>	TS	249/258		69	17Feb67

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219th MI DETACHMENT

NAME (Sicence)	RANK BRANCH	SERVICE NUMBER	DOR	DUTY SECTION	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	SOFT CLNC	DTY PHONE	QTRS PHONE NO	QTRS DEPOS
ESTES, Clifford H.	Lt Col	056987	17Jun64	CO	Commander	TS	252		20Apr67
RANKS, Richard H.	Maj	02096887		CI	Ch, CI Sec				
MOORE, Joseph P.	Capt	05311035		CI	Op Ctl Off				
BEIN, Kenneth I.	1st Lt	05220705		CI	Asst IRO	TS	252		20Apr67
READINCUR, Harry W.	1st Lt	05410884		II Sec	Asst IIO				
CONGER, Paul S.	2nd Lt	05324429		OB Sec	Order of Battle Off				
BOWEN, Winston H.	2nd Lt	05711326		Inter Sec	Asst Inter Off				
DAUGHER, David L.	2nd Lt	05536073		TI Sec	TI Off				
BETKER, Stephen L.	2nd Lt	05710646		EdIt Sec	Intel Editorial Off				
CHAUKAL, David E.	2nd Lt	05225215		Inter Sec	Asst Inter Off				
HARDIN, Coy W.	2nd Lt	05414913		Inter Sec	Asst Inter Off				
HEGRICK, Donald E.	2nd Lt	05022728		EdIt Sec	Asst Intel Editorial Off				
HUMPHREY, Bernard A.	2nd Lt	05229061		II Sec	Asst II Off				
PAGE, Dean G.	2nd Lt	05535215		Inter Sec	Inter Off				
PETERFISH, Charles L.	2nd Lt	05418043		OB Sec	Asst OB Off				
WATSON, William D.	2nd Lt	05327689		II Sec	Asst II Off				
HUTSON, Thomas M.	S/A			CI Sec	Intel Tech				

*[Handwritten signature]*

NAME (Middlename)	RANK		SERVICE NUMBER	DOR	DUTY SECTION	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	SCTY DTY CLNC	QTRS PHONE	QTRS PHONE NO	DEBOS
	BRANCH									
SAMHARTER, Norman J.	S/A				CI Sec	Intel Tech				
DALEY, Daniel J.	WO W1		W2216656		II Sec	Imagery Inter				
GALBREATH, Marela A.	WO W1		V2216625		II Sec	Imagery Inter				

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II FFORCEV S-125-66

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DTG 161200H April 1966  
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FRAG ORDER 9-66 (Operation BIRMINGHAM) (U)

Reference: Maps, Vietnam, 1:250,000, See Annex A - Area of Operation Overlay.

1. (S) SITUATION.
  - a. Enemy Forces. Annex B, Intelligence.
  - b. Friendly Forces.
    - (1) 7th Air Force provides close air support.
    - (2) III ARVN Corps conducts operations in TAY NINH Province in conjunction with II FFORCEV during this operation.
    - (3) I FFORCEV conducts operations in II CTZ, along boundary between II and III CTZ, and within III CTZ in BINH TUY, LONG KHANH and PHUOC LONG Provinces.
    - (4) 246th Payop Co supports II FFORCEV.
2. (S) MISSION: II FFORCEV in conjunction with III ARVN Corps destroys Viet Cong Forces, supplies and installations in TAY NINH Province during the period 24 Apr - 7 May 66.
3. (S) EXECUTION:
  - a. Concept of Operation. 1st Inf Div (-) deploys to TAY NINH City (XT2350) by air and/or surface; establishes division base; in coordination with III ARVN Corps, conducts search and destroy operations in zone (see Annex A, Area of Operation Overlay).
  - b. 1st Inf Div: Locate and destroy VC/NVA Forces, supplies and installations in that priority in assigned AO.
  - c. 25th Inf Div (-): Continue present mission.
  - d. 173d Abn Bde:
    - (1) Continue assigned missions.
    - (2) Provide II FFORCEV Reserve.
  - e. II FFORCEV Arty: Be prepared to support Op BIRMINGHAM by providing additional artillery to the 1st Inf Div upon request.
  - f. 12th Avn Gp (-): Provide support to 1st Inf Div during period of Operation BIRMINGHAM. See coordinating instructions.
  - g. DSA III ARVN Corps assist 1st Inf Div in coordinating Operation BIRMINGHAM with ARVN Units participating in the operation.
  - h. Coordinating Instructions:
    - (1) Submit requests for Army Aviation assets ASAP to this Hq, ATTN: AAE.
    - (2) Priority for tactical air to 1st Inf Div during Op BIRMINGHAM effective 240001H Apr 66. Submit request for tactical air and Air Force transport support ASAP through this Hq, ATTN: G5 Air.
    - (3) Requests for additional artillery support will be submitted ASAP to this Hq, ATTN: Arty.
    - (4) Use of RCA authorized in accordance with existing directives.
    - (5) Submit 16 copies of implementing plans to this Hq.
    - (6) 1st Inf Div effect direct coordination with 25th ARVN Div concerning the use of airfields via TAY NINH, and requests for security of airfields by ARVN units if desired.
    - (7) Direct coordination between 1st US Inf Div and 25th ARVN Div to subdivide the AO into respective operational zones is authorized.

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FRAC ORDER 9-66 (Op BIRMINGHAM) (U) (Cont'd)

- 4. (U) LOGISTICS. See Annex H, Logistics.
  - 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
    - a. Signal. Current SOL/SSI index in effect.
    - b. Command. II FFORCEV CP - no change.
- Acknowledge.

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Maj Gen

- Annexes: A - Operations Overlay  
B - Intelligence  
H - Logistics (TBP)  
L - Medical *(omitted)*  
M - Psyop/Civil Affairs

- Distribution: "S"
- 2 - MACCOG 11
  - 1 - MACV-TMA
  - 1 - MACV-CICV
  - 1 - MACV J2 Air
  - 5 - 1st Inf Div
  - 2 - 25th Inf Div
  - 2 - 173d Abn Bde
  - 2 - 12th Avn Gp
  - 1 - 73d Avn Co
  - 2 - 23d Arty Gp
  - 1 - 7th Air Force
  - 1 - 1st Log Cnd
  - 1 - 430th Tac Recce Wing
  - 1 - 3d RRU
  - 3 - DSA III ARVN Corps
  - 1 - III DASC
  - 4 - II FFORCEV Arty
  - 1 - II FFORCEV Cnd Sec
  - 1 - ACofS, G1
  - 3 - ACofS, G2
  - 7 - ACofS, G3
  - 1 - ACofS, G4
  - 2 - ACofS, G5
  - 1 - Engr Sec
  - 1 - Sig Sec
  - 1 - Surgeon
  - 1 - AG File

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Annex B (Intelligence) to FRAG ORDER 9-66 (Operation BIRMINGHAM) (U).

References: a. Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheets 6144 I, 6145 I, II, 6244 I, IV, 6245 I, II, III, IV, 6246 II, III.

b. USMACV J233, Intelligence Estimate of the Situation in TAY NINH Province, 15 Nov 65.

c. MACV Imagery Interpretation Reports: #597, #635, #637 and #640.

d. Hq USMACV Order of Battle Summary, MACF 236-1, 24 Mar 66.

1. (C) SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

a. War Zone "C" consists generally of the northern half of TAY NINH Province and is bounded on the south by Provincial Highway 13, on the north and west by the Cambodian Border, and on the east by the Saigon River. The VC have relatively free use of the zone and easy access to Cambodia. The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) is frequently reported to be located in the northwest corner of War Zone "C". The area contains many base installations and activities of vital importance to the VC. In addition to military and political headquarters, there are training areas, production bases, storage areas, and other support facilities as reported in the Estimate of the Situation listed above. There have been indications that the VC fear U.S. operations against War Zone "C". It is expected that the VC will initially defend important base areas, using a screen of guerrilla and militia units, before entering into delaying actions designed to permit exfiltration.

b. The C230 and C320 VC Battalions and seven separate companies comprise the confirmed combat units in TAY NINH Province. Recent reports, the validity of which cannot be determined, indicate several regimental sized units have infiltrated from Cambodia. For last reported locations of confirmed and newly reported units, see MACV J236-1, Order of Battle Summary, 24 March 66. Militia forces are believed to number about 2,000 for the entire province. (See Appendix 2 - Confirmed OB Summary)

c. Reports from Special Forces "C" Detachment Agents are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ON DATE</u>	<u>II F FORCEV EVAL</u>
C103	100	XT4243	7 Apr	C/4
C40	95	XT0553	7 Apr	F/3
C33	95	XT3345	7 Apr	F/3
U/I Bn	Unk	XT1158	27 Mar	C/3

d. Reinforcement capability consists of the 272 and 273 Regiments within four days and the 271 Regiment within five to six days, and possibly the 250th NVA Regiment from QUANG DUC Province of II CTZ. Although unconfirmed, the 25th ARVN Div reports a VC Regiment located along the Cambodian Border, 10 km SW with Arty Btry at WT9763, 1 Bn Vic XT2918, 1 Bn Vic XT 1625 and a VC General named DONG VAM CONG reported to be with the regiment (II F FORCEV F/6).

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2. (C) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

a. Essential Elements of Information.

- (1) Where are the VC units in the operational area? What is their strength? What are the unit designations?
- (2) Will the VC defend within the areas of operations? If so, where, in what strength, with what units, in what configuration? What are the unit designations?
- (3) Will the VC reinforce his units? If so, when, where, in what strength, with what units, and by what routes?

b. Other Intelligence Requirements. (In Order of Priority)

- (1) What is the location of the major elements of COSVN (Central Office South Vietnam)?
- (2) Are the VC training and equipping main force battalions or regiments in the operational area?
- (3) Is there significant evidence of infiltration of new or large sized units from NVA through Cambodia into the zone?
- (4) Are there large amounts of supplies stockpiled in the area? If so, where, from what country, in what condition?
- (5) Current SICR's as applicable.

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS.

a. Orders to Attached and Subordinate Units.

- (1) 1st Inf Div. Report periodically as obtained:
  - (a) Information concerning EEI and OIR listed above.
  - (b) Contact and loss of contact with VC units.
  - (c) Any unit identification, size, composition, location, source and date of information.
  - (d) Location of bunkers, caves, supply and bivouac areas or other significant installations.
- (2) II FFORCEV Arty. Report as obtained:
  - (a) VC Mortar and Artillery locations.
  - (b) VC movements or sightings.
  - (c) Significant targets.
- (3) 12th Avn Gp. Report to 1st Inf Div as obtained; (Info to II FFORCEV)
  - (a) Any sightings of VC units moving in and adjacent to the operational area.
  - (b) Hostile activities.

b. Request to higher, adjacent, and cooperating units.

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- (1) MACV-J2 is requested to provide SLAR and RED HAZE reports of significant activity in the operational area.
  - (2) CICV, 1st MI Bn (ARS), 460th TAC Recce Wing, and 73d Avn Co are requested to provide all available image interpretation reports of areas in and adjacent to the operational area.
  - (3) DSA III Corps (ARVN) is requested to provide information, as obtained,
    - (a) Location, size, identification, composition of VC forces in and adjacent to the operational area.
    - (b) Any information concerning movement of VC/NVA forces capable of reinforcing VC units in the operational area. Particular attention to Q762 and Q763 Regiments.
  - (4) DASC III Corps (ARVN) is requested to provide results of visual reconnaissance flights over the operational area.
4. (U) MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIAL.
- a. MACV Directive 381-11, Intelligence Procedures for Processing and exploitation of Captives, Returnees, Suspects, and Documents, 5 Mar 66, (C) applies. Report significant results when obtained.
  - b. Captured documents will be screened for information of immediate tactical value before being processed through channels to DEC.
  - c. Technical Intelligence assistance may be requested through II FFORCEV for major discoveries during operation.
5. (U) WEATHER SUMMARY. It will be cloudy about 75% of the time with the greatest amount of cloud cover occurring during the afternoon. Ceilings and visibilities will not hamper low level air operations except during rain showers and thunderstorms. Only one or two days with early morning fog should be expected. Afternoon and evening thunderstorm activity will increase during the period. Thunderstorms will occur almost every other day by the end of the period. The maximum precipitation for 24 hours is from four to five inches. Winds will be light from the Southeast to South. Maximum temperatures average near 95 degrees. Minimum temperatures average near 75 degrees. The mean relative humidity will be near 80% with highest values occurring near dawn. Soils will be very dry except immediately after the heavier rainshowers.

Acknowledge.

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#### Appendices

- 1 - Light Data
- 2 - Confirmed OB Summary
- 3 - Air Reconnaissance Plan

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Appendix 1 (Light Data) to Annex B (Intelligence) to FRAG ORDER 9-66  
(BIRMINGHAM) (U).

(C) Light Data for 11° 30' N 106° 05' E (Vic TRAI BI XT1170)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>BMNT</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>EENT</u>	<u>MOONRISE</u>	<u>MOONSET</u>	<u>PHASE</u>
23 Apr	0557	0639	1908	1950	----	----	NEW
24 Apr		↓	1909	1951	0915	2219	
25 Apr	0556	0638			1009	2320	
26 Apr	↓	↓			1107	----	
27 Apr					1208	0019	
28 Apr	0555	0637			1309	0117	1st Qtr
29 Apr	↓	↓			1410	0211	
30 Apr	0554	0636			1508	0302	
1 May	↓	↓			1603	0350	
2 May					1658	0435	
3 May	0553	0635			1751	0520	
4 May	↓	↓			1847	0604	
5 May					1943	0650	FULL
6 May	0552	0634	1910	1952	2041	0728	
7 May	↓	↓			2139	0831	
8 May					2236	0925	
9 May	↓	↓			2331	1019	
10 May	0551	0633	1910	1952	----	1114	

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Appendix 2 (Confirmed Order of Battle) to Annex B (Intelligence) To FRAG  
 Order 9 -66 (BIRMINGHAM) (C).

UNIT	CODE NAME	OPERATIONAL AREA	PROB PRES LOC	STR	WPNS	SUB UNITS	REMARKS
COSVN R, ANH TRONG CHIN (9) NAM		XT173938-243973					Headquarters for HQ ops in S VN
C230 BN DOAN 365	C202 DOAN 365	XT045680		250	3-57mm RR 3-60mmMtr 2-81mmMtr indy wpns		Security Bn or R
UBO GF DOAN 563		XT380740 (Dec 65) XT4070				Z39, Z41, Z43 Z45, Z49	Artillery Committee for co- ordination, probably co-locat- w/COSVN
F15 Bn		XT1490800		400	2-75mm RR 6-57mm RR 2-81mmMtr 6-60mmMtr 4-MG 18-AR's 80-SWC	CH421 CH422 JNK ARTY UNIT	Subordinate to R
C320Bn	D14 D320	XT523304	XT150355 (1 Apr)	600	1-75mm RR 2-57mm RR 5-60mmMtr 2-50Cal MG 3-30Cal MG 30-MGs 19-AR's	Co C320 Co C315 Co C325 Co C335	Company also designated C-1, C-2, C-3 and C-4
Z37 Bn		SUOI DAYSTREAM AREA (XT870750)		400	6-75mmRR 3-57mmRR 2-120mmMtr 4-81mmMtr 4-60mmMtr		

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NIT	CODE NAMES	OPERATIONAL AREA/PROB PRES LOC	STR	WPNS	SUB UNITS	REMARKS
31 Co	K618, B18 CSHT, 631	PHUOC TINH	100			
82 Co	K617, A71 6152, C52	BEN CAU	60			
83 Co		TAN BIEN	60			
84 Co	K615, A73 C53, HT643	GO DAU	80			
85 Co	K614, A74 C54, C34	TRANG BANG	70			
86 Co	K613, A75, HT639, C55	PHU KHONG	70			
87 Co	K612, A76, C56	TOA THANH	40			CAO DAI HOLY SEE
88 Co	K611, A77, C57	CITY	60			TAY NINH TOWN (PARTY committed (?)) SAPPER
320 Co						1st Co, C320 Bn (?)
325 Co						3rd Co, C320 Bn (?)
335 Co						Combat support company to C320

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Appendix 3 (Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance) to Annex B (Intelligence)  
to FRAG ORDER 9-66 (Operation BIRMINGHAM)

1. (U) SITUATION.

- a. Enemy. Annex B (Intelligence)
- b. Friendly Forces. 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, 7th Air Force and 12 Aviation Group support II FFORCEV.

2. (C) MISSION.

To insure that adequate RED HAZE, SLAR and photo coverage is provided BIRMINGHAM area during period of operation.

3. (C) EXECUTION.

- a. Concept. Maximum reconnaissance will be performed by aircraft organic to and under operational control of 1st Inf Div. Requirements beyond the capabilities of the 1st Inf Div will be provided by requesting support of other agencies.
- b. Immediate Missions. Request directly from III DASC or TACC as required. Inform II FFORCEV ASAP. Identify requests as being in support of operation BIRMINGHAM.
- c. Preplanned Missions. Preplanned missions will be submitted through II FFORCEV three days prior to request time on target. Identify request as being in support of Operation BIRMINGHAM.
- d. Imagery Interpretation Responsibilities. 1st Inf Div will perform detailed imagery interpretation on all imagery produced by organic aircraft. Two copies of II reports will be furnished to II FFORCEV.
- e. Request to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units.
  - (1) MACV J2-Air is requested to provide 1st Inf Div will all RED HAZE and SLAR readouts of mission flown in or near area of operations.
  - (2) CICV, 1st MI Bn (ARS), 73d Aviation Co, and II Corps are requested to forward all available II reports covering areas in or adjacent to operation area.
  - (3) The III Corps DASC is requested to provide to 1st Inf Div all Visual Reconnaissance sightings in or near area of operation.

4. (C) ADMINISTRATION.

- a. Distribution of Imagery. No Change.
- b. Procedures for submission of mission requests. No Change.
- c. Other Imagery. All readouts of RED HAZE and SLAR missions produced or received by 1st Inf Div will be transmitted to II FFORCEV G-2 Air by telephone.

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5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

- a. Coordinates in requests will be encoded using current TIGER code.
- b. Current SOI in effect.

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Annex M (Psyops/Civil Affairs) to FRAGORD 9-66 (OPERATION BIRMINGHAM) 31 Mar 66

1. (C) SITUATION

- a. Enemy forces. See Annex B. Principal Psyops target audiences in operational area will be civilian cadre from COSVN, VC military support units from COSVN, NVA infiltration groups and neutral civilians. Morale of enemy is expected to be high because of lack of previous significant contact with GVN or US units in the past. VC living conditions in this area have been excellent in the past and there have been very few VC logistical problems. B-52's have conducted numerous airstrikes in this area in the past. The success of these airstrikes and their effect on enemy morale is generally unknown. The following psyop opportunities are expected to develop during the conduct of tactical operations:
- (1) Destruction of base camps, security complexes and logistical caches.
  - (2) Impending danger to civilian cadre in COSVN.
  - (3) US operational victories and resulting loss of VC life.
  - (4) Display of US Force and contact with civilian population.
  - (5) Military contact with NVA personnel.

Neutral civilians in the area have been under complete control of the VC in the past. They have had little, if any, contact with the GVN, and no contact with US Forces. They are completely misinformed concerning US aims and policies in Vietnam.

- b. Friendly Forces - See Basic plan.

2. (S) MISSION

To conduct an aggressive PSYOP program to encourage ralliers and gain information on location of VC; and to conduct Civic Action program as required with emphasis on MEDCAP II.

3. (S) EXECUTION

- a. Concept of operation.
- (1) JUSPAO leaflets directed at NVN personnel will be dropped in known and suspected VC locations prior to the operation.
  - (2) Mobile psyop field teams will follow tactical operations with leaflet and loudspeaker support which will exploit opportunities provided by the current situation.
  - (3) Mobile psyops field teams will provide leaflet and loudspeaker support for the control of the neutral population, and the distribution of relief supplies.
  - (4) The 246th Psyops company will continue to exploit psychological vulnerabilities in the area after the conclusion of the operation.
  - (5) Civic action projects will be limited to short range high impact activities with particular emphasis on MEDCAP II. Civilians will not be forcefully evacuated from area of operation.

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- b. 246th PsyOps Co. attach mobile teams A, B, and C and Teams HC and Hd to 1st Infantry Division effective 090800 April 66.
  - c. 1st Infantry Division
    - (1) Conduct PSOP in accordance with concept of operations.
    - (2) Conduct Civic Action in accordance with concept of operations.
  - d. DSA III ARVN Corps  
Request CG, III Corps to locate refugee collecting points and designate ARVN resources to receive and transport refugees if required.
  - e. Coordinating Instructions:
    - (1) C-47 loudspeaker broadcasts will be scheduled with Air Operations 246 Psyop Company.
    - (2) Leaflet delivery will be coordinated with 246 Psyop Company.
  - f. Divisions report location of Refugee Collection Points.
4. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS  
Required MDCAP supplies and relief supplies will be provided from Division resources.
5. (C) SIGNAL  
246th Psyop Company Targetting SOP will be in effect for the communication of targetting information.

Acknowledge.

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
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


1ST INF DIV OPN BIRMINGHAM  
24 APRIL - 7 MAY 66

NOTE : 1ST INF DIV EFFECT  
DIRECT COORDINATION WITH  
5TH ARVN DIV FOR DIVISION  
OF AC INTO RESPECTIVE

NOTE : 1ST INF DIV EFFECT  
DIRECT COORDINATION WITH  
5TH ARVN DIV FOR DIVISION  
OF AO INTO RESPECTIVE  
ZONES.

5TH ARVN DIV



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A OF OPERATION OVERLAY)  
ORDER 9-65 (OPN BIRMINGHAM) (U)  
TNAM, 1:250,000  
IC 48-3 B NC 48-4.

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SAME AS BASIC PLAN

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
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1ST INF DIV OPN BIRMINGHAM  
24 APRIL - 7 MAY 66

NOTE : 1ST INF DIV EFFECT  
DIRECT COORDINATION WITH  
5TH ARVN DIV FOR DIVISION

NOTE: 1ST INF DIV EFFECT  
DIRECT COORDINATION WITH  
5TH ARVN DIV FOR DIVISION  
OF AO INTO RESPECTIVE  
ZONES.



ANNEX A (AREA OF OPERATION OVERLAY)  
TO BRAC ORDER

ANNEX A (AREA OF OPERATION OVERLAY)  
TO FRAG ORDER 9-66 (OPN BIRMINGHAM) (U)  
REF: MAP, VIETNAM, 1:250,000  
SHEETS NC 48-3 & NC 48-4.

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FRAG ORDER 1-66 (Operation CIRCLE PINES) (U)

References: Maps Vietnam 1:50,000, sheets: 6243I, 6244II, 6343IV  
and 6344III.

1. (S) Situation.
  - a. Enemy Forces: Annex B.
  - b. Friendly Forces:
    - (1) 2d AD provides close air support.
    - (2) 25th ARVN Division conducts operations in assigned TAOR in conjunction with U.S. operations.
2. (S) MISSION: II FFORCEV in conjunction with III ARVN Corps conducts operations in HAU NGHIA Province to locate and destroy VC forces and base camps during the period 28 March - 5 April 1966.
3. (S) EXECUTION:
  - a. Concept of operations: II FFORCEV conducts operations in HAU NGHIA Province to locate and destroy VC forces and base camps between Highway 1 and the SALIGON RIVER in the FILHOL Plantation area. ARVN forces will conduct operations in an adjacent area in conjunction with U.S. operations.
  - b. 25th Inf Div (-):
    - (1) Move to zone REDBOY on 28 March 1966.
    - (2) Locate and destroy VC forces and base camps in zone REDBOY.
    - (3) Return to base camp on order.
    - (4) Submit one copy of implementing plans to this Hq by 26 March 1966.
  - c. 1st Inf Div: Be prepared to release one bde (-) for employment in Operation CIRCLE PINES.
    - (1) Be prepared to release one infantry Battalion on two hours notice.
    - (2) Be prepared to release second infantry battalion on 12 hour notice.
  - d. 23d Artillery Group: Provide fire support from present positions in accordance with currently assigned tactical missions.
  - e. 12th Avn Gp: Assist CG, 25th Inf Div (-) in the planning and conduct of airmobile operations.
  - f. DSA III Corps: Request CG III ARVN Corps to conduct operations in area on east flank of U.S. forces operational area.
  - g. Coordinating instructions.
    - (1) Submit requests for tactical air support through this Hq, ATTN: G3 Air.
    - (2) Submit Army aircraft requirements to this Hq, ATTN: AAE.
    - (3) Use of RCA authorized in accordance with existing directives.
    - (4) Annex A: Area of operation overlay.

Acknowledge.

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Annexes: A - Operation Overlay  
B - Intelligence (TBP)

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FRAG ORDER 1-66 (Cont'd)

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- 4 - 25th Inf Div (-)
- 3 - 1st Inf Div
- 2 - II FFORCEV Arty
- 1 - 12th Avn Op
- 1 - ACofS, G1 (Annex A omitted)
- 2 - ACofS, G2 (Annex A omitted)
- 5 - ACofS, G3 (Annex A omitted)
- 1 - ACofS, G4 (Annex A omitted)
- 1 - ACofS, G5 (Annex A omitted)
- 1 - Sig Section (Annex A omitted)
- 1 - Engr Section (Annex A omitted)
- 1 - FSCC (Annex A omitted)
- 1 - 3d RRU (Annex A omitted)
- 1 - AG File

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Bien Hoa (YT 959115) RVN  
221200H Mar 66

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Annex B (Intelligence) to FRAG Order 1-66 (Operation Circle Pines) (U)

Reference: Maps Vietnam, 1:50,000 Series L-509, Sheets 6243 I, IV, 6244 II, 6344 III.

1. (S) SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

a. FERINTREP #1

b. The 1st and 2nd battalions of the 165A Regiment have been operating in the southern zone of the 25th Inf Div (US) TAOR. Occasionally the 6th battalion of the 165A regiment moves into the area. The 506th Local Force battalion has been operating in the northern part of the area. A 307th Local Force battalion has been reported operating in the area. (Not confirmed by ARVN OB)

c. HO BO woods (IC 6228) shows recent Spar and IR activity. 5th Special Forces reports a new comol-liaison route through the woods from the East to the West. 5th Inf Div (ARVN) reports activity in the area on 21 March.

d. Unidentified units and activity have been reported North of the TAOR in the vicinity of the MICHELIN Plantation (IC 5550) (20 Mar)

2. (S) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. EEI

(1) Will the VC/NVA reinforce units currently operating in the TAOR? If so, when? Where? Unit designations? From what location?

(2) Will the VC/NVA defend in strength? If so, where? When? and in what configuration?

(3) Will the VC/NVA withdraw or evade our forces? If so, where? When? Particular attention to withdrawal routes?

b. Other Intelligence requirements. Current SIGR'S. Particular attention to:

(1) D-IC3-13339 "Smuggling operations into Cambodia" 14 Feb 66 (C)

(2) (S) U-UPA-U0056 "Location and description of POW Detention areas" 6 March 1966

(3) (C) U-UPE-U039 "VC Administrative Support Equipment" 3 Mar 66.

(4) (FOUO) U-UPE-U0236 "Technical Intelligence of VC Tunnel System" 2 Mar 66.

(5) (S) U-UPE U0222 "Names Jobs, Biographic Data on NVA and COSVN Generals"

(6) (C) U-UPE-U0234 "VC Casualties and Deserters" 28 Feb 66

(7) (C) U-UPE-U0217 and 218, "VC Recruiting" 13 Feb 66 (C)

3. (S) INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS.

a. Orders to Attached and Subordinate Units.

(1) 25th Inf Div (US) Report as obtained.

(a) Contact and loss of contact with VC/NVA units.

(b) Any unit identification, size, composition, and location.

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- (c) Location of supply caches, way stations, CP Areas, and bunker complexes.
  - (2) 12 Avn Gp
    - (a) Sightings VC/NVA Movement of Reserves
    - (b) Significant movement in and out of TAOR.
  - (3) II FFV Arty
    - (a) Mortar positions, types of mortars used.
    - (b) Sightings, movements of VC/NVA Units.
    - (c) Significant targets.
  - b. Requests to higher, adjacent, and cooperating units.
    - (1) III Corps DASC is requested to provide as obtained:
      - (a) Red Haze
      - (b) SLAR
      - (c) Imagery Interpretation results.
    - (2) DSA III Corps is requested to provide as obtained:
      - (a) Location, identification, size, composition of VC/NVA units in and adjacent to TAOR, particularly MICHELIN plantation area (XT5550) and Iron Triangle - ANSON area (XT7027)
      - (b) Movement of VC/NVA forces capable of reinforcing VC units in TAOR.
    - (3) 3d RRU. Request information as obtained concerning:
      - (a) Significant sightings.
      - (b) Locations
      - (c) Significant installations.
4. TERRAIN AND VEGETATION.
- a. Terrain. The Terrain relatively flat with few distinguishing features, varying in height from 4 to 17 meters. The TAOR is roughly divided into a northern and southern zone by the RACH SON stream, a tributary of the SAIGON river. Roads and trails in the area will support  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicles during this season. Most bridges have been blown or damaged in the past.
  - b. Vegetation. Primarily rubber plantation with varying degrees of jungle vegetation increasing in density in the northern zone.
  - c. The HO BO woods area in the northern zone has numerous trench systems; bunker complexes, some very sophisticated, consisting of three levels; and has been severely bombed in the past.
5. (C) MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL.
- a. MACV Directive Nr 381-11, 5 Mar 66 applies. Report significant results when obtained.
  - b. Technical intelligence assistance may be requested through II FFV for major discoveries during operation.

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## 6. DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT REQUIRED

- a. Engineer Photomap 1:25,000 "VC Installations in HO BO woods".
- b. Mosaic, 1:7,500 (est) HO BO Woods area.

## 7. (U) REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.

- a. INTSUMS daily by 0600 (electrically transmitted copy) and by 1200 (mimeographed).
- b. RED HAZE reports as available.
- c. SLAR reports as available
- d. VR Reports by 2400 hours daily.
- e. 182 Reports, if appropriate
- f. PRETECHREP'S if appropriate.
- g. Interogation and translation reports as available.
- h. NBC-1 (Chemical) reports, if appropriate.

## 8. WEATHER AND LIGHT DATA FOR TACR

- a. General Weather Summary. The northeast monsoon weakens during late March and early April. Weak and variable winds predominate. Thunderstorms will probably occur on one or two days late in the afternoon. Precipitation will total between 0.5 and 1.0 inch. Flooding is unlikely. Mean tractionability is "very dry". Maximum temperatures will average near 95 degrees. Minimum temperature will average near 75 degrees. Relative humidity will average near 76 percent with the highest values occurring in the early morning hours. Fog will probably form along rivers during pre-dawn hours on two or three days in any ten day period. Fog usually dissipates by 0900 hours. Ceilings of at least 2,000 feet and visibilities of at least three miles permit low level air operations between 0400 and 2000 hours daily with few exceptions. The exceptions occur during heavier rainshowers during late afternoon and when fog forms near dawn along the rivers. The mean frequency of visibility two miles or less at 0700 hours is 7 to 12 percent of the time.

### b. LIGHT DATA (All Times Are Local)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>BLMT</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>EBMT</u>	<u>MOONRISE</u>	<u>NOONSET</u>
28 Mar	0611	0653	1904	1946	1117	
29 Mar	0610	0652	1904	1946	1212	0023
30 Mar	0609	0651	1904	1946	1312	0124
31 Mar	0609	0651	1904	1946	1415*	0223*
1 Apr	0608	0650	1904	1946	1517	0321
2 Apr	0607	0649	1904	1946	1619	0416
3 Apr	0606	0648	1904	1946	1717	0508
4 Apr	0606	0648	1904	1946	1814	0555
5 Apr	0605	0647	1904	1946	1910**	0643**
6 Apr	0605	0647	1904	1946	2006	0727
7 Apr	0604	0646	1904	1946	2102	0814
8 Apr	0603	0645	1904	1946	2159	0901

\* First Quarter Moon

\*\* Full Moon

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