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31 May 1979 per Group-4 document marking; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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AGAM-P (M) (27 Apr 67) FOR OT
3 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Operation Farragut Conducted by 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as enclosure is a Combat After Action Report for
Operation Farragut. Operation Farragut was conducted by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division during the period 26 January through 23 March 1967. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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COMBAT OPERATIONS
AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPERATION
FARRAGUT

1st BRIGADE
101st
AIRBORNE DIVISION

DIPLOMATS
AND
WARRIORS

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT (MACV/RCS/33532)

THRU: Commanding General
1st Field Force Vietnam
APO 96350

TO: Commanding General
US Army Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
APO 96222

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation FARRAGUT.


3. (U) Location: KINH THUAN, KINH THUAN and LAM DONG Provinces.


5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General S. H. Matheson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

6. (C) Task Organization:

   a. The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation FARRAGUT was as shown below.

   1-327 Inf
   Engr LZ Clearing Team
   2-327 Inf
   1 pl, 1/326 Engr
   2-502 Inf
   1 pl A-37 Gun
   (returned to parent unit control Det 2)

   b. The task organization was changed during operations against the LE HONG PHONG Secret Base by the addition of two CIDG Companies (LEHONG sown SP Camp) in direct support: one company with the 1-327 Inf and two platoons each in direct support of 1-327 Inf and 2-502 Inf. The 4th Troop, 8th Cavalry (ARVN) operated in direct support of the Brigade during the last three phases of Operation FARRAGUT.

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Incl 1
7. (C) Supporting forces:
   a. 2/320 Arty: Employed in a direct support role.
   b. ML/30 Arty: Provided general support reinforcing fires.
   c. 10th Aviation Battalion: Provided two airmobile companies in general support. These helicopters flew troop lift, combat support and resupply missions. The 10th Aviation Battalion was augmented with one additional airmobile company during Brigade airmobile assaults on 17 February and 9 March.
   d. 177th and 180th Assault Support Helicopter Company: Provided four flyable CH-47 aircraft on a mission support basis for use in displacing and resupplying artillery units.
   e. 181st Aviation Company: Provided four O-1 aircraft for visual reconnaissance, artillery adjustment, and radio relay.
   f. 5th Air Commando Squadron: Provided airlift support for Pay War operations.
   g. 2/5th Pay Ops Co: Provided one loudspeaker and leaflet dissemination team in direct support.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: Headquarters, 1 Field Force Vietnam directed the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to move from vicinity KOWTRM on 21 January 1967 to base camp vicinity PHNAN RANG and, on 25 January to initiate operations to search out and destroy enemy units and installations in the Farrout AO with priority to Secret Bases 7 and 35 in that order. Shortly after the
Initiation of the operation, the Brigade (--) was withdrawn from Operation FARRAGUT and conducted Operations OA1 and II. Upon completion of OA1 and II on 15 February 1967 the FARRAGUT AO was extended and the Brigade's mission modified to include the conduct of search and destroy operations in areas adjacent to National Route 1 between PHAN THIEN and PHAN RANG. Inclosure 2, Operations Schematics.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: Operation FARRAGUT consisted of search and destroy operations conducted in four distinct phases. From 11-16 February Operation FARRAGUT was conducted into Secret Base 7 during the period 26 January - 15 February 1967. Following a halt by elements of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry toward Secret Base 35 on 26 January, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 377th Infantry continued search and destroy operations north of the B-52 strike zone and conducted search and destroy operations to the south, while 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry moved overland and conducted search and destroy operations north into Secret Base 7. Following the departure of the Brigade minus on 30 and 31 January for Operation DATING, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 377th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in and adjacent to Secret Base 7 through 15 February. During the period 17-28 February, Phase II of Operation FARRAGUT was conducted in the 1E-K5-2350 Secret Base, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 377th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted thorough search and destroy operations in exploitation of a B-52 strike while 2d Battalion (Airborne), 377th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry minus blocked to the NE and SW respectively. During the later stages of Phase II, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 377th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations to the north, attempting to drive the enemy against blocking positions manned by elements of 1st Battalion (Airborne), 377th Infantry and 3d Battalion (Airborne), 17th Cavalry. Phase III of Operation FARRAGUT (1-8 March 67) was characterized by Brigade minus search and destroy operations against suspected enemy locations north of SONG MAO while 2d Battalion (Airborne), 377th Infantry conducted cordon and search operations against VC controlled villages and hamlets between PHAN THIEN and SONG MAO. The final phase of Operation FARRAGUT was a three battalion search and destroy operation against Secret Base 15. Two battalions, 3d Battalion (Airborne), 377th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry, conducted air mobile assaults from SONG MAO into Secret Base 35 and conducted search and destroy operations to the south and west. 2d Battalion (Airborne), 377th Infantry moved overland along Rt 1, conducted search and destroy operations to the east and blocked routes of egress out of Secret Base 35 to the west.

11. (C) Execution:

a. Operation FARRAGUT was characterized by small unit actions and sporadic contact with small enemy forces. The search and destroy tactics utilized consisted of saturation patrolling, night movement, night ambushes, raids and the use of small unit stay behind forces. The terrain was characterized which operations were conducted included mountainous jungle, rolling hills, sandy scrub forest, and flat, cultivated lowlands.

b. Operation FARRAGUT was initiated seven days after the termination of Operation PICKET in KOMTUM Province. On 21 January 67, the Brigade began air and overland movement from KOMTUM to PHAN RANG. The Brigade minus closed PHAN RANG on 22 January and on 26 January convoy elements closed PHAN RANG after moving overland a distance of approximately 600 miles. Operation FARRAGUT commenced at 260000Z January 1967.

c. Phase II: The three maneuver battalions of the Brigade were located at the Brigade Base Camp vicinity PHAN RANG. At 260000Z January 1967, Task Force DOERTY, composed of C/2-502 Inf, 1 plat A/326 Eng,
1 platoon A/2-17 Cav, and C Battery, 2-320 Artillery, conducted a tactical road march to an area NE of Secret Base 35. This move was an attempt to deceive the enemy as to the Brigade’s true objective, Secret Base 7, and to position forces for the Brigade assault on DI. To further enhance the deception, 2d Battalion, 11th Regiment (ARMY) commenced operations SS of PHAN RANG in direct support of the Brigade and during the period 26-27 January, a heavy artillery and naval gun fire preparation was placed in Secret Base 35. On 27 January 1967, following a B-52 strike, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airborne assaults into the Secret Base 7 area to exploit the strike and destroy enemy forces and installations in zone. 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an overland move from PHAN RANG into the southern portion of the AO and commenced search and destroy operations on the 27th. (Inclusive 2-27th A). Contact within the AO during the period 27-30 January was relatively light. On 28 January, in two brief contacts, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry produced 1 VC KIA (BC) and 3 individual weapons captured. Documents captured as a result of this encounter indicated that NVA forces were being used as fillers in local VC units. On 28 January, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered a large base area believed to have been the VC Province Headquarters. The area contained 20 huts, two hospitals, a mess hall (75-100 capacity), radio repair area, printing plant, and a large amount of food, livestock, documents, and medical supplies. On 30 January the 2d Battalion, 11th ARVN Regiment terminated operations in direct support of the Brigade and resumed normal defensive posture from three locations south of PHAN RANG. On 30 and 31 January, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry extracted from the PHARRAGT AO to PHAN RANG and prepared to initiate Operation GATING. On 30 January the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry continued Operation PHARRAGT. The movement of 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry from field locations to PHAN RANG deserves comment in that a heliborne extraction of one infantry battalion was accomplished during the hours of darkness. Seven separate PZ's were utilized to extract 1408 troops between 1617 hours and 2115 hours on 30 January 1967. At 0115 on January 31st, while conducting a tactical route reconnaissance south on Highway 1, Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry was engaged by mortar and small arms fire resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA, 1/2 ton trk destroyed, 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 SES's captured. During the period 1-8 February, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry continued Operation PHARRAGT, making light contact and discovering numerous caches and base camp areas. On 2 February 67, Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry, reinforced by a provisional platoon of Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion (Airborne), conducted an overland mission into the AO and commenced search and destroy operations under OPCON of 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. On 7 and 8 February 67, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered large caches of food, documents, and communications equipment. On 7 February Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry terminated search and destroy operations and returned to PHAN RANG. At 0600 on February 8th, a large body of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered several bases of operation and communications, a stand-down. The Battalion was on the alert during the period 26-27 February, 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airborne assaults into Secret Base and overland moves into selected LZ’s and firing positions north of Route 1 and commenced search and destroy operations south to eliminate VC/NVA activity along Route 1 between KHAM (Brisack) and PHAN RANG. The task force was supported by elements of Company B, 11th Engineer Battalion which had the mission of repairing Route 1 to accommodate military convoys. On 15 February Task Force THUNDERBALL
terminated operations S of PHAN RANG and conducted a combined air mobile and overland move to SONG MAO (BN2545) and prepared for future operations in the FARRAGUT AO.

d. Phase II: The second phase of Operation FARRAGUT began on 17 February; two days after the termination of GATLING II by the Brigade minus and one day after Task Force THUNDERBALL moved to SONG MAO. On 17 February the Brigade initiated search and destroy operations in the western portion of the LE HONG PHONG Forest. Air mobile assaults were conducted by all battalions at first light from PHAN THIEU and SONG MAO to selected LZ's in the AO and following a B-52 strike at 0000 hours, all elements initiated search and destruction operations and extensive patrolling to deny enemy egress out of the area. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry with one DS CIDG Co blocked routes of withdrawal to the SS, while 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry each with 2 DS CIDG Platoons conducted search and destroy operations to the SS. 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry minus, supported by 1 DS ARVN Co and 1 DS RF company, screened SW of the Brigade's AO and the Brigade organic cavalry troop screened the road network north of the LE HONG PHONG (Inclosure 2, Tab B). The air mobile assault phase of the operation was conducted prior to and in conjunction with the B-52 strike. All elements of the blocking force and assault elements from 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry were in position prior to the B-52 strike and the air mobile assault continued during the B-52 strike. Concurrent with the assault on the LE HONG PHONG, engineer elements supported by 1st Troop, 6th ARVN Cavalry began repairs and re-opening of Route 1 from PHAN THIEU to SONG MAO. The operation during the period 17-22 February was characterized by numerous, but light contact and frequent encounter with mines, booby traps, antipersonnel and harassing fire. During this period the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry discovered numerous base camps and fortified positions ranging in size from 17-100 bunkers. On 22 February, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry minus, terminated their screening mission SW of the Brigade AO. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry terminated operations in the western portion of the LE HONG PHONG and extracted to SONG MAO and the 1st and 2d Battalions (Airborne), 327th Infantry repositioned forces in order to conduct search and destruction operations against the eastern portion of the LE HONG PHONG. On 23 February the Brigade began operations in the eastern portion of the LE HONG PHONG. 1st the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 1 DS CIDG company blocking routes of withdrawal to the N and W and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry with 1 CIDG company B5 conducting search and destroy operations to the N. Contact during the period 23-27 February consisted of harassing fire and numerous small unit engagements. Several large campsites and food caches were discovered and destroyed or evacuated. The enemy continued attempts without success to interdict convoy traffic on Route 1. On 24 February, in response to a request for assistance from LAM DONG Province, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry and C Battery, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery conducted air mobile assault from SONG MAO to selected LZ's west of DI LINH and began search and destroy operations to locate and destroy an estimated VC battalion which had ambushed local ARVN forces. On 25 February elements of 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry contacted 1 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (8C), 1 VC and 3 individual weapons captured. Acting on intelligence received from the captured VC, one company conducted an airmobile assault to LZ's SW of DI LINH to block enemy routes of withdrawal. The company contacted an estimated 2 company force just prior to dark resulting in 1 US KIA, 8 US WIA, 5 VC KIA (8C) and 3 individual weapons captured. The enemy broke contact at dark and FAC air and artillery were utilized throughout the night in an effort to block enemy routes of egress. On 27 February the Brigade terminated operations in the LE HONG PHONG Forest and DI LINH area and extracted to SONG MAO to conduct maintenance and prepare for future operations in the FARRAGUT AO.
The third phase of Operation FARRAGUT was characterized by the Brigade's continued use of fixed LOCs, the conduct of several cordon and search operations in the SONG MAO - TUY PHONG area, and the conduct of search and destroy operations in the area north of SONG MAO. An FSP was established at SONG MAO by elements of the 1st Logistic Command and the Brigade provided security for the beach unloading site vicinity HOI TAN (BN5737). On 1 March, reacting to intelligence indicating from one to two VC companies near hamlets south of TUY PHONG, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, on two hours notice, executed an air mobile assault into LZ's vicinity TUY THAN and TUY THAN VIEZ (BN468). Elements of two companies, assisted by the Sector Reconnaissance and Surveillance Platoon and 2 FF companies, completed a cordon and search of the hamlets. Results of the operation were 6 VC KIA and 4 SA captured. The battalion was extracted to SONG MAO on 2 March. On 3 March, the 25th RF company replaced Brigade elements securing the beach unloading site vicinity HOI TAN. At 030500H Mar 67, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an air mobile raid under flare illumination to cordon and search the village of VIUH HOA (BN5521). The village had been a center of VC tax collection on Route 1 between PHAN THIET and PHAN RANG. The raid achieved complete surprise as evidenced by the effective sealing of the hamlet prior to detection by the local population. No enemy contacts were made as a result of the operation, significant results were achieved in the fields of intelligence and civic action. As a direct result of this operation, the entire populace of VIUH HOA (over 500) elected to leave the hamlet and return to RVN control by relocating to TUY PHONG. At 030730H March 67, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted air mobile assaults from SONG MAO to four LZ's in the northern portion of Secret Base 35 and began search and destroy operations to the south and north respectively. No significant enemy contact was made, and on 6 March both battalions were extracted to SONG MAO. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry continued to secure National Route 1 while Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry, supported by 1st Troop, 8th Cavalry (ARVN) provided convoy security and escort for logistic convoys between PHAN RANG and SONG MAO.

The fourth phase of Operation FARRAGUT was directed into Secret Base 35 and was initiated on 8 March with the clandestine overland infiltration of four Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Teams into the NW portion of the objective area to conduct ambush and surveillance operations along enemy LOC's between Secret Base 7 and Secret Base 35. At 090000H March 67 the Brigade initiated search and destroy operations against Secret Base 35. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry executed an early morning air mobile raid with one company and the reconnaissance platoon to cordon and search the hamlet of SONG HAI (BN8282). National Police assisted in the search, segregation and screening of inhabitants upon completion of the cordon. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted air mobile assaults from SONG MAO to four LZ's in the northern portion of Secret Base 35 and began search and destroy operations south on multiple axes. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry moved overland from TUY PHONG into the western portion of the objective area and conducted search and destroy operations to the east with two companies. One company continued to secure National Route 1. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry moved to the southeast portion of Secret Base 35 and began search and destroy operations to the west. At 091200H March 67 the brigade launched a major operation to clear the entire Secret Base 35 area by elements of the 2d Battalion, 44th Regiment (ARVN) which moved overland on Provincial Route L07, (Inclosure 2, Tab C). These elements rejoined the battalion minus in the AO and by 1300 hours the air mobile rode was complete. On 10 March the Brigade Main Command Post and trains began movement overland from SONG MAO to PHAN RANG. Operations in the Secret Base 35 area were characterized by light and scattered contacts.
and attempts by the VC to harass traffic on Routes 1 and 107 through the use of mines. On 13 March 67 the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry reinforced with one battery of artillery and one platoon of engineers terminated operations in Secret Base 35 and commenced overland movement to TUY HOA. The battalion closed TUY HOA and became OCPON to Task Force IV at 121800H March 67. On 13 March the 4th Troop, 8th Cavalry (ARVN), terminated operations in support of the Brigade. This unit was responsible for the Brigade's successful utilization of land LOC's during the final stages of Operation FARRAGUT. VC contact was established by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry on 13 and 14 March in a series of caves in the northern portion of the AO and resulted in 9 VC KIA (BC) and 8 SA captured. On 15 March, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry minus, conducted an airmobile and overland move to an area just south of Secret Base 7 and began search and destroy operations. One company of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry continued operations in the NE portion of Secret Base 35 until 18 March when it rejoined the battalion. On 16 March the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry discovered a large campsite and contacted an estimated 6 VC resulting in 1 US WIA, 3 VC KIA (BC), 1 WO and 1 SA captured. The 2d Battalion, 11th Regiment (ARVN) terminated operations north of Secret Base 35 in support of the Brigade on 16 March. During the conduct of operations in Secret Base 35, Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry, reinforced by the Brigade Security Platoon established and maintained TFS's on Route 1 to monitor movement of civilian traffic and gather intelligence on VC tax collection efforts. The troop conducted daily road clearing and screening operations on Routes 1 and 107. On 22 March the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry terminated operations in Secret Base 35 and conducted an overland move to PHAN RANG to begin preparation for future combat operations. At 221200H March 67 elements of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an airmobile raid against the deserted hamlet of VTH HOA resulting in the capture of 2 ARVN deserters and 4 detainees. On 23 March the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry terminated operations in the FARRAGUT AO and conducted an airmobile and overland move to the Brigade base camp at PHAN RANG. Operation FARRAGUT terminated 232400H March 1967.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission of conducting search and destroy operations to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces in the FARRAGUT AO.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the operation: 135 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 10 VC/NVA KIA (EST), 2 M-60, 15 WOs, 1 artillery, 139 detainees (28 classified civil defendants), 80 individual weapons, 80.4 tons of rice, 6.6 tons of corn, 17 radios, 2 generators, and miscellaneous ammunition, medical and administrative supplies.

c. Friendly losses during the operation were: 15 US KIA, 11 US WIA, 5ownik WIA (supporting forces); 3 M-151 1/4 ton trks, 1 M-50, 2 M-79 and 1 AN/PRC-25 destroyed, 1 25 ton trk damaged.

13. (U) Administrative Matters:


b. Logistics: See Inclosure 4, Logistics.

c. Civic Action: See Inclosure 6, Civil Affairs.

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. The successful execution of an illuminated airmobile raid by one battalion minus, emphasizes the value of this tactic in achieving surprise as well as the desirability of all aviation units achieving this.
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The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 30th Artillery made extensive use of the organic counter-mortar radar, AN/MPQ-4A, during Operation PARRAGUT. The radar was utilized with varying degrees of success in computing survey coordinates by:

(1) Tracking a low charge, high angle round.

(2) Tracking a balloon floating above the point at which survey coordinates are desired.

(3) Tracking a beer can dropped from an H-l to the point at which surveyed coordinates are desired.

15. (C) Commanders Analysis:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) Inability to fire accurately at fleeting targets that appear in a hasty engagement continues to be a subject for continuous training.

(2) All individuals detained by the brigade should be evacuated through brigade channels. Immediate release of detainees to GVN authorities often precludes the collection and dissemination of intelligence of immediate tactical significance.

(3) In lucrative areas, it is desirable to re-enter the area using varying patterns in order to fully exploit or develop the situation.

(4) Detailed arrangements must be made to insure ARVN and CIDG troops operating in direct support of US troops are properly equipped and supplied to remain in the AO for the duration of an operation.

(5) The conduct of illuminated airmobile operations is tactically feasible and greatly enhances the brigade’s capability to surprise the enemy.

(6) Night airmobile operations require detailed planning and
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Subject: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT (MACV/RCS/3/32)

(7) Civic Action activities, in addition to their contribution to Revolutionary Development Programs, provide an excellent source of intelligence.

b. Commanders Notes:

(1) Operation FARRAGUT was characterized by extensive use of the available road network to position and resupply brigade maneuver elements. The Brigade plans to continue making maximum use of land LOC's whenever feasible.

(2) The 4th Troop, 8th Cavalry (ARVN) supported the Brigade during the overland move from PHN THI to SONO MAO, during operations in the SONO MAO area, and during the overland move from SONO MAO to PHAN RANG. The troop displayed aggressiveness, initiative, and a high degree of professional competence, and contributed materially to the brigade's successful utilization of land LOC's.

(3) The command relationship between the Brigade and USSP/CIDO units in the FARRAGUT AO was not clearly defined at the initiation of operations. This situation led to misunderstanding, created problems in coordination of efforts, and prohibited maximum utilization of all available resources. This problem has since been resolved.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That during the assault phase of operations requiring exploitation of B-52 strikes or when a tactical advantage can be gained by placing maximum troops on the ground as rapidly as possible, the Brigade's normal aviation support of two light airmobile companies be supplemented by at least one additional light airmobile company.

(2) That survival type mirrors and strobe lights (Light Marker, Distress) be issued to units in quantity for use in signalling aircraft and marking LZ's.

9 Inclosures
1. Intelligence
2. Operation Schematics
3. Personnel and Administration
4. Logistics
5. Communications
6. Civil Affairs
7. Fire War
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1. (C) Terrain: The area of operation consisted of flat lowland used for cultivation; sandy bordering on the south China Sea; sandy scrub forests of the LB HONG PHONG; and rugged forested mountains in the northern and western portions of the area of operation. The sparse vegetation in the lowland along Bay #1 provided good observation and fields of fire, but poor cover and concealment. In these areas, the heavy forest offered good cover and concealment, but poor observation and fields of fire. The main avenue of approach was along Bay #1 (N-6). The hydrography of the area had no effect on military operations.

2. (C) Weather: The period of the operation fell into the dry season for Ninh Thuan and Binh Tuan Provinces. Rain occurred on an average of less than one day a month with no effect on air or ground operations. Winds were slightly in excess of predicted speeds, but there were no days that were unfavorable for low-level flying. The lack of rain during this period creates a drastic shortage of water which results in a major resupply problem. Generally, the weather is excellent for the conduct of military operations.

3. (C) Analysis:

a. The entire operation was conducted against local VC forces and a thorough search of the area resulted in no significant contact. Light, scattered contacts, involving no more than squad size enemy forces, occurred almost on a daily basis. The enemy made frequent use of mines and booby traps along roads and trails in the AO, and employed snipers to slow down and harass friendly forces.

b. In SB 3, the VC Provincial Headquarters (LOI), and 274th LF Company sustained sufficient casualties to disrupt and weaken the enemy's influence and control over people. The enemy base in this area was found destroyed; large quantities of documents, training material, medical supplies, rations, and miscellaneous equipment were captured.

c. In SB 35, the 270th LF Company was contacted and its base camp destroyed. The VC District Headquarters and a small PV camp was also found and destroyed. The hamlet of Son Koi has been, and will continue to be stronghold for the VC operating in SB 35. The 270th LF Company has been integrated with NVF up to 50 percent. These NVF soldiers came into SVN in infiltration groups and were used to bolster local force companies in Ninh Thuan Province. This is the first reported incident of NVF being integrated in local VC units.

d. VC tax collection points between Phan Rang and Phan Thiet were frequently disrupted by surprise raids. Several tax collectors were apprehended.

e. A thorough search of the area north of Song Ma failed to produce evidence of any large enemy forces in the area or of any sizable base areas. Contacts made in the area were limited to scattered guerrilla elements.

f. The LB HONG PHONG Forest has in the past been used as a base area for battalion size units. The forest contains a complex of small camps, complete with communication bunkers and trenches, and training areas. During the dry season there is a acute shortage of water in the area with the only water supply being a few local wells. For this reason, it is doubtful that large enemy units will be found in this area during the dry season.

g. The VC are losing control of the civilian population throughout the AO, but to a much greater extent in Ninh Thuan Province than in Ninh Tuan Province. This is substantiated by the significant increase in the number of Ho Chi Min's during the period of US operations in the area.

h. The following CONEMO was provided during Operation FARMOUTH:

GROUP A

DECEMBERED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

1-1

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(1) 8,204 transmissions were monitored on the FM nets during the period 28 Jan - 23 Mar 1967.

(2) 226 transmissions through the "Strike" switchboard were monitored during the period 28 Jan - 23 Mar 1967.

(3) Communications security during all phases of the operations was quite good with only one transmission security violation being found and reported. This violation was the disclosure of classified plans and operations.

4. Lessons Learned:

a. Red Haze: It has become apparent that during the dry season when the local inhabitants are burning their fields, the effectiveness of Red Haze is further decreased. Rather than attaching importance to large sitings which are indicative of brush fires, the small sitings of less than ten fires are of greater significance. All reported fires must be checked by visual reconnaissance.

b. Photography: Aerial photography was readily available and trail, LZ and DZ studies prepared of those areas which covered in the original planning. However, when the Brigade began moving out of preplanned areas, aerial photographic support was not able to keep up. Experience shows that it requires a lead time of approximately seven days to obtain the photography, and the intelligence derived from the photography, for any sizable area. The problem seems to be the availability of Air Force photographic support. Future plans call for an aerial surveillance and target acquisition flight note with Mohawk aircraft, to be stationed out of Nha Trang under IFV control. The small ability of this unit should alleviate the problem by reducing the time following submission of requests.

c. Interrogating Detained Individuals:

It should be re-emphasized that due to the complicated classification system of detainees, the low intelligence level of detainees, and large areas of operations, all possible capture data should be placed on capture tags to include coordinates of capture, date-time group, unit of capture, circumstances surrounding capture, and a description of all weapons and documents captured with the individual.

d. All individuals detained by the brigade should be evacuated through channels. The recent experience of evacuation detainees through local channels points out that local Vietnamese do not use the same classification system as we do, do not have the same intelligence interests, and do not have a system for the expeditious dissemination of tactical information. It is also necessary that in operations with the Vietnamese a great deal of specific coordination is necessary. It must be determined beforehand where detainees are to be kept and interrogated, where pick-up points, screening points, and LZ's are to be located, and exactly what physical sets are to be followed by all detained personnel.

e. The VC have a definite radio monitoring capability and have, on several occasions, attempted to enter our FM nets. This makes it mandatory for radio operators to be familiar with the use of authentication tables and be able to challenge suspect stations.

f. When entering a new operational area, all possible intelligence agencies must be screened for information, and personnel who are familiar with the AC. In the past, sources of information (PW's, Ho Chi Minh) have not come to light until the operation had started. Although these sources were available and could have provided invaluable information prior to the commencement of the operation.

g. When operating against local force VC, the longer a unit remains in the area the better the chances are of finding the enemy. Although search must be made to detect hiding places, caches, and base areas. Eventually the VC will leave their hiding places to gain food and water, or due to general restlessness.
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Inosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT (cont'd)

b. Intelligence leads must be reacted on immediately to obtain the best result when fighting guerrillas. Delays in reacting to intelligence will find the enemy gone from the area and the target no longer lucrative. It must be anticipated that many reports and sightings of enemy activity will not pan out; however, some are bound to bring results.

1. During the dry season the enemy will not occupy the highest ground, but will move his camps to areas more accessible to a water supply. Ambushes can be very successful in and around potential sources of water.

5. (U) The following is a breakout of the enemy weapons and materiel losses during Operation FARRAGUT:

a. Weapons Captured:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mauser Rifle</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 Carbine</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M7 30-06</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Shotgun</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.25 Cal Pistol</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springfield .30-06</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson SMG</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosin Nagant</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPSH</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAR</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French SMG</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 Rifle</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 80

b. Ammunition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ammunition</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3A</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60cm Mortars</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claymore, RD 10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claymore, RD 3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP Mines</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79 Rounds</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Grenades</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blasting Caps</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Other:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transistor Radios</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volt Meter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohm Meter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio/Receiver</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW Key</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS-5 Generator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 3/4 H.P. Generator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC-10 Hand Set</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing Machines</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microscope</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micromorph Machine</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typewriters</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typewriter Ribbon</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tab At: Order of Battle

1-3

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1. Initial Order of Battle

a. NVA Units

   (1) At the beginning of Operation PAVNOUT the 324th Co, 714th NVA Bn (possibly of the 7th MT NVA Div) was believed to be located in Ninh Thuan Province. Numerous reports indicated its location as in vicinity of BN 6574, operating close to SECRET BASE 7 (BN 5974). One report indicated its operational area as being in the northern position of Ninh Thuan Province and probably using SECRET BASE 22 (BF 8005) as its center of activity. Its mission was believed to include preparation for and conduct of a mortar assault on the Phan Rang Air Force Base complex in early 67.

   (2) No other NVA units were believed to be located within the area of operation. Some of the local VC units (specifically the 270th VC INF Co) was believed to have an undetermined amount of NVA personnel as cadre.

b. VC Units

   (1) Ninh Thuan Province

      (a) The following VC INF units were confirmed as operating in the Ninh Thuan Province area with the most recent center of operations as indicated:

              UNIT      LOCATION
              270th VC INF Co  BN 7568
              112 VC INF Co  BN 8567
              446th VC Co  BN 4974
              451st VC Co  BN 9785
              452nd VC Co  BN 5974
              453rd VC Co  BN 6574
              454th VC Co  BN 8574
              455th VC Co  BN 9799
              456th VC Co  BN 4585
              457th VC Co  BN 8585

      (b) The following VC INF units were believed to be located in the Ninh Thuan Province area with operational areas undetermined:

              1. 450 VC INF Co
              2. 453 VC INF Co
              3. 497 VC INF Co
              4. 485 VC INF Co

      (c) Secret Base Areas were believed to be established in the following vicinities with the most protracted activities reported in Secret Base 7 and 35:

              SECRET BASE    LOCATION
              7              BN 6574
              19             BN 9799
              22             BN 8505
              25             BN 4685
              35             BN 7559

(b) Binh Thuan Province

      (a) The following VC INF units were believed to be operating...
in Binh Thuan Province with possible locations indicated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>640 VC Bn</td>
<td>Unlocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602 VC Bn</td>
<td>VN 7305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>489 VC Bn</td>
<td>VN 5625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>490 VC Co</td>
<td>VN 7420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>430 VC Co</td>
<td>VN 7429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>420 VC Bn</td>
<td>VN 5530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450 VC Co</td>
<td>VN 9414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>460 VC Co</td>
<td>Unlocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>480 VC Co</td>
<td>Unlocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>440 VC Co</td>
<td>Unlocated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) A VC Mobile force Bn, identification unknown, was reported numerous times operating in the vicinity of BN 9421. The unit was reported to have a strength of 600 to 700 personnel and an assortment of weapons to include 60mm Mortars.

2. (C) Order of Battle Findings and Summary in the Operation Area.

a. Binh Thuan Province

(1) In late Jan 67 elements of the Brigade searched and destroyed the area described as Secret Base 7. Only small, isolated contact was made and as a result an insignificant amount of intelligence was gathered. The presence of small installations and facilities as well as agricultural and built up areas confirmed the assumption that the enemy (most probably Provincial VC Bn) extensively used the area as a staging area, Rest Area, and control center. It was not established that contact with the enemy units listed in 1b (1) (a) and (b) was made; however, the VC Bn were most probably members of the ZLQI VC Provincial Hqs and/or its subordinate units. As a result of captured material, which included typewriters, a reproduction machine, printed propaganda leaflets, directives, posters, etc., it was established that the ZLQI Provincial Hqs was located and operating within the immediate vicinity of BN 5574.

(2) The deployment of elements of the brigade in SB 35 (BN 7559) on 9 March 67 initially did not produce a significant amount of contact. The search and screening of Ban Hai (BN 8352) resulted in approximately 30 detainees, believed to be local VC infrastructure, which established the fact that the hamlet was controlled by VC units in SB 35. During the search mission, contact with these elements was extremely light indicating that the enemy was successfully conducting concealment and escape and evasion tactics. The possibility of exfiltration into SB 7 (BN 5574), however, appeared remote in light friendly deployment of troops in the operational area west of Ban #1. The discovery of numerous small base camps, some fortification, individuals with various caches, and well used trails indicated that SB 35 was extensively used by small VC forces.

b. Binh Thuan Province

The Brigade deployment into Binh Thuan Province produced an insignificant amount of intelligence primarily due to lack of contact with enemy combat forces. All available evidence pointed to a possible enemy exfiltration from the operational area approximately 72 hours prior to friendly insertion.

c. Conclusion

(1) The enemy forces in Binh Thuan Province, particularly the 840th WLP Co and the 490th WLP Co, appear to have been well trained and organized as evidenced by their successful conduction of concealment and escape and evasion tactics in the area of operation during Feb 67.

1-A-2

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The 840th VCLF Co remains in the northern portion of Binh Thuan Province and can be expected to conduct harassment type operations along Hwy #1 in the Phu Phong Area (BN 5342) in the coming months. The 490th VCLF Co also remains in the Phu Phong Area operating as a stable but flexible VC local force and will continue to intercept Hwy #1 in Vinh Hoa Village with tax collections, terrorism and propaganda.

(2) The Binh Thuan Provincial Forces remain intact and operational within the Province. SB 22, 19 and 25 have been undisturbed by friendly forces. The search and destroy operations in SB 7 and SB 35 have probably preempted the NVA/VC plans to appear, prepare for, and conduct a mortar attack on Phan Rang AFD complex. The 274th and 113th VCLF Co's remain operational in SB 7 area. Due to the destruction of certain installations/facilities and the discovery and confiscation of a great amount of enemy materials in SB 7, the NVA VC Prov Hqs will have to recuperate and reorganize before they can reach maximum operational efficiency. The 270th VCLF Co and the 112th VCLF Co appear to have exfiltrated SB 35 but probably left small scattered groups concealed within the area. Son Hai Hamlet (BN 5362) remains under VC control. With the execution of the NVA personal assigned to the VCLF units, there are no NVA in the southern portion of Binh Thuan Province.
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Enclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation PARAGOUT

1. (c) UNIT STRENGTH:
   a. Beginning of Operation PARAGOUT.
      (1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation PARAGOUT were as follows:

      | Authorized Augmented (WTO) | Assigned | Present for Duty |
      |---------------------------|----------|-----------------|
      |                           | 4490     | 4376            |
      | Base Camp - Phan Rang    | 1094     | 1773            |
      | OATIZAO (vdo Soo Loc (1 Feb - 15 Feb 67)) | 3401 |
      | Not Present for Duty     | 342      |

      (2) The assigned strength was 108% of the augmented authorized strength.
      The present for duty strength was 101% of the augmented authorized strength.

      (3) Of the not present for duty strength; 6 were hospitalized, 108 were on TDY/30 status, 76 on leave, 19 in confinement, and 5 AWOL.

   b. Conclusion of Operation PARAGOUT.
      (1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation PARAGOUT were as follows:

      | Authorized Augmented (WTO) | Assigned | Present for Duty |
      |---------------------------|----------|-----------------|
      |                           | 4390     | 4203            |
      | Base Camp - Phan Rang    | 1501     | 745             |
      | TF IVI AO                |          | 283             |

      (2) The assigned strength was 113% of the augmented authorized strength.
      The present for duty strength was 109% of the augmented authorized strength.

      (3) Of the not present for duty strength; 13 were hospitalized, 11 were in transit, 134 were on TDY/30 status, 104 on leave, 19 in confinement, and 4 AWOL.

      (4) The 15th Army Postal Unit, attached to the Brigade, remained at 9 personal present for duty of 11 authorized throughout the operation.

      *This figure includes the Brigade Headquarters, and the logistical elements of the units that were participating in Operation PARAGOUT but were providing their normal support, in this particular case from the Base Camp.

      (5) The 15th Public Information Detachment with 1 officer and 3 enlisted men assigned of 1 officer and 4 enlisted men authorized were attached to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division during the operation.

   c. Replacements received during the operation were assigned to subordinate units as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>EN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/327</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/330</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/320</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/325</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/320</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (c) CASUALTIES:

   3-1

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a. Casualties for the operation were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/327</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/328</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/329</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/17th Cav</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>326th Engr</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSG, Rce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>114</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total casualties to date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>372</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (c) PERSONNEL PROGRAM:

a. The Red Cross Recreational Unit continued its visits to forward units during the operation.

b. Beer, soda and limited sensitive items were provided to the units in the forward area during the operation.

4. (c) PERSONNEL PLANNING:

a. During the operation, continued emphasis was placed on accuracy of personnel records by affording personnel the opportunity to personally review their Military 201 Files.

b. Classes on Administration and postal operations were held for all units during the operation.

5. (c) MEDICAL:

a. Patients treated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Hostile Injury</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to Duty</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuated to Hospital</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining in Holding</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Patients Treated</strong></td>
<td><strong>882</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Hospitalized personnel categorized by wounds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wound Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chest</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdomen</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Extremities</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Extremities</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Operation PARRAGUT was noteworthy for the extensive road convoy activity, in comparison with other recent operations. Major convoy efforts occurred from Phan Rang to Sore Mao, Phan Thiet to Song Mao, and Song Mao to Phan Rang. In addition smaller convoys operated between Phan Thiet and Luang Son almost daily while the Brigade headquarters was at Phan Thiet. A number of deficiencies in convoy operation became apparent. These included failure to maintain prescribed vehicle interval, speed, and failure to report crossing of check points.

The operation differed also in that it was logistically supported, in large measure, direct from Phan Rang base camp. During the initial and final stages of the operation, the Forward Support Element (FSE) was activated and its functions were assumed by the Support Battalion. This was feasible due to the proximity of the base camp and the area of operations. During such periods, some difficulty was experienced in the duplication of logistical requirements. That is requirements for the same item were placed upon logistical personnel from several sources. This sometimes resulted in confusion and duplicated issues.

b. Support Battalion. When necessary, Support Battalion established an FSE consisting of Company D, 326th Medical Battalion, and administrative, maintenance, ammunition, supply, transportation, and command and control elements. The FSE provided responsive support to committed units from successive locations at Phan Thiet and Song Mao. A Forward Supply Point (FSP) was opened for a short time at Luang Son due to the relatively large size of the area of operations.

c. Supporting Forces:

(1) USASC, Cam Ranh Bay provided overall logistical support. It also established separate forward support areas (FSA) at Phan Thiet and Song Mao. These installations provided the Brigade with the bulk of Class I, III, II, and V supplies and were co-located with the FSE.

(2) Phan Rang Sub Area Command, USASC, Cam Ranh Bay provided transportation assets. Of particular importance the 329th Transportation Company (Lt Trk) provided the bulk of transportation required to execute major convoys.

(3) 10th Combat Aviation Battalion helicopters provided logistical as well as tactical support.

(4) USAF C-130, and C-123 aircraft transported most of the Brigade routine resupply of Class II and IV equipment from Phan Rang base camp.

2. (C) MATERIAL AND SERVICES.

a. Supply.

(1) Class I supplies were received in sufficient quantity, and no major shortages were experienced. Some difficulty was initially encountered with resupply of ice and ice cream. However, the proximity of Phan Rang made it possible to fly in ice and ice cream on a daily basis aboard C-130 aircraft. A total of 90.2 short tons of Class I were issued.

(2) Class II and IV supplies continued to be flown directly to the forward area aboard USAF fixed wing aircraft. A total of 144.2 short tons of Class II and IV supplies were issued during the operation.
Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to After Action Report, Operation PARAGUAY

(3) Class III. The large extent of road convoy activity inflated consumption of NATO and D52 fuel to a level above the average for previous operations. The Brigades organic and attached vehicles consumed 326.2 short tons of Class III products throughout Operation PARAGUAY.

(4) Class V. Although no major engagements occurred during the operation, ammunition issue accounted for 359.8 short tons. This entire amount was not expended, and Brigade units completed the operation with full basic loads.

(5) Water.

The resupply of water provided some difficulty while the Brigade was located in the Phan Thiet area. The dry season prevented units from utilizing the many intermittent streams in the area of operations. As a result water came primarily from a small number of central sources. The plastic, 3 gallon capacity, free drop container again proved its worth. Although this item has attained a high degree of acceptance and use, stocks are limited. Consequently every effort must be made to recover and re-use these containers.

b. Maintenance. The following maintenance problems presented the greatest degree of difficulty during the operation:

(1) The H-138/U handset continues as a source of difficulty in signal maintenance. Pending issue of an improved replacement item, field expedient measure and frequent replacement provided the only solutions.

(2) Vehicle engines, particularly for the 3/4 ton truck, failed at an increasing rate. This was due to excessive heating and advanced engine life.

(3) Generators experienced a high rate of failure due to the excessive heat, humidity and breakdowns in viscosity of the oil used. A running limit of 15 hours was established in order to insure adequate lubrication.

(4) Straps member under the rear 2 1/2 ton truck cab and vehicle had begun to fail. This can be attributed to constant operation over poor roads while carrying heavy loads.

(5) Starlight scopes are failing at an increasing rate. The primary difficulties are caused by the damage to knobs and rubber covers. Each scope must be evacuated to Sacramento for repair at an estimated cost of approximately $2500.00.

(6) Small arms revealed signs of extensive wear and some corrosion. This is natural since these weapons have been in almost constant use.

(7) Lack of repair parts for signal and engineer equipment created unnecessary deadline periods. Primary examples included handset cables and generator engines.

(8) The following is a summary of maintenance activities and job orders during the operation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Incomplete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to After Action Report, Operation PARAcuts

b. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration, quartermaster laundry and bath services were provided in the PAVN Support at Pham Thai and Song Hao with personnel and equipment drawn from US-SCC, Gia Binh Base. During the periods when the Brigade operated directly from base camp, the Pham Rang Sub Area Command provided these services.

3. (D) SUMMARY. Operation PARAcuts presented no major logistical problems. The logistical system remained fully capable of supporting tactical operations. Some shortcomings were noted in the operation of vehicle convoys, however these remain relatively minor in scope.

l. (D) CONCLUSIONS.

a. The present logistical system and support concepts have proven valid and should be continued.

b. Some efforts are required to raise the Brigade's proficiency in the conduct of road convoys.
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Incloure 5 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Report, Operation PARRAGUT

1. (U) MISSION: The 1st FASP, 501st Signal and the Communications Platoon, 8HC 1st Brigade 101st Abn Div had the joint mission of providing signal support for the Brigade.

2. (C) OPERATIONS

a. GENERAL: The 1st FASP, 501st Signal and the Communication Platoon, 8HC 1st Brigade 101st Abn Div provided signal support during Operation PARRAGUT by establishing the Brigade Command Post and Communications Systems at Song Mao and Phan Rang.

b. VHF Section provided circuits at Phan Rang from the Bde CP to MACV, 101st Avn Section and 10th Avn Rx.

c. Communication Center Section terminated two secure teletype circuits at Song Mao. At Phan Rang the 278th Signal Company Communication Center terminated three secure teletype circuits. Brigade Communication Center personnel augmented the 278th Signal Company Communication Center in support of the Brigade.

d. Switchboard/Wire Section established the Brigade CP at Song Mao terminating 96 circuits and installed approximately 50 miles of wire. At Phan Rang the 278th Signal Co operated the switchboard and terminated the circuits for the brigade. The switchboard/wire section augmented the 278th Signal Co personnel.

e. FM Radio Section provided FM radio stations at Song Mao and Phan Rang. Automatic retransmission and relay stations were employed at RN 677567. The MARS Station was established to provide phone patch service to USA.

f. AM Radio Section operated secure radio teletype circuits between Song Mao and Phan Rang. A secure teletype circuit between Phan Rang and Tay Hoa was established in support of the 2/327 with TF Ivy.

g. Maintenance Section continued to provide maintenance support for the Brigade 8HC and attachments.

h. Field Forces Signal Support; Det H, 56th Signal Bn continued to provide circuits into the in-country system, secure radio teletype between TF FORGER, Brigade Forward and Brigade Rear and a single sideband phone patch net paralleling the radio teletype net.
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Inclusions 5 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operation After Action Report
Operation PINLIGHT

1. During Operation FARRAGUT, civil affairs activities were conducted in Phan Thiet and Song Mao of Binh Thuan Province and at Phan Rang in Kinh Thuan Province. In all areas liaison was immediately affected with the GVN officials, their US counterparts and representatives of the civilian agencies. In conjunction with local officials price lists were established and distributed, fair wages were determined and labor was procured for the Brigade. In less populated, more remote areas there is a tendency for laborers to demand higher wages as was the case in the Song Mao area. Initially a daily wage of 120,000VN per day was demanded even though a wage of 90,000VN per day was fair and adequate for the area. However, as soon as it was learned the Brigade would not exceed 90,000VN, the local labor force agreed to work at that price. The Song Mao area was also unique in that it contained three different ethnic groups living in close proximity to one another, Vietnamese, Hume of Chinese descent and Montagnards. Although the Brigade drew labor from all of these groups on a daily basis, no problems were encountered. Although Phan Rang is a relatively prosperous area and the US Government employs hundreds of local workers on a permanent basis, the Brigade had no trouble obtaining daily hires for 90,000VN per day. The practice of allowing the units to procure their own labor rather than operating a central hire point continued to prove more efficient when operating in the Phan Rang area. During Operation FARRAGUT over 200 Montagnards were resettled in secure areas, 30 innocent civilians were returned to their homes and the VC village of Vinh Hoa in Kinh Thuan Province, (approximately 500 people) was resettled in a GVN controlled area. At the conclusion of the operation 60 families from the VC village of Song Hai in Kinh Thuan had moved back to GVN control in the Phan Rang area. The Brigade provided 3 tons of food stuffs and 2 tons of captured rice to help feed the refugees from Vinh Hoa and 5 tons of captured rice for the families from Song Hai.

2. As the Brigade operated in three different areas during Operation FARRAGUT, civic action efforts were aimed at high impact short duration activities to integrate GVN officials and forces wherever possible. Significant activities during the operation were as follows:
   a. Joint US/VN sick calls were conducted in all 3 areas treating more than 2,000 patients.
   b. Extensive work was conducted on Highway One between Phan Thiet and Song Mao resulting in the repair of 2 culverts, 2 bypasses and 27 ditches.
   c. A running water system was installed in the Notre Dame Orphanage at Phan Thiet. The Brigade provided the materials and the local Public Works Dept installed the system. Prior to installing the system, water had to be drawn from a well and carried to the orphanage. With the new system water can now be drawn from any of 13 taps located throughout the orphanage.
   d. Two captured VC sewing machines were repaired and presented to the Girls Club at the An Phuoc District high school in Kinh Thuan.
   e. More than 100 students in the Phan Rang area were given scholarships for at least one year by troopers of the Brigade stationed at Phan Rang.
   f. Large quantities of food, clothing, soap, scrap lumber and various other commodities were distributed to refugees and needy hamlets.

3. Lessons Learned:
   a. Several packages of gifts were sent by an organization in the States to a member of the Brigade for distribution to needy Vietnamese children. Most of the items were gift wrapped and an attempt was made to distribute them in this form. This proved extremely difficult as many of the items were not suitable for the age of the children receiving them. Regardless of fancy gift wrapping all packages must be opened and examined prior to distribution.
   b. When the Brigade enters a new area the local labor force...
will often demand wages much higher than the normal scale. These high wage demands must not be met and when the labor force learns that they won't be met, they will work for the normal scale.

c. While in the Song Lao area it was learned that USAID had provided the means and advised local farmers to grow an onion crop. This was done and an ample crop was grown. However there was no local market for that amount of onions and no means to get the crop to a distant market. Production of a cash crop of this nature should not be encouraged unless there is a market readily available to turn the produce into cash.

d. As a result of inadequate storage facilities in Phan Rang for SS supplies, food items stored there spoiled and had to be disposed of. Steps are being taken to provide a permanent SS storage facility in Phan Rang.

e. Until recently new tags for daily hire laborers were made on a daily basis. This method proved difficult and time consuming. Laminated tags were procured and are now used. These tags are issued and taken up daily and can be used in any area the brigade operates in.
Enclosure 7 (Psychological Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARAGUT

1. Psychological Objective:
   a. To induce VC, VC sympathizers and GVN supporters living in VC controlled areas to avail themselves of the GVN Chieu Hoi Program.
   b. To encourage the populace "on the fence" to join the GVN as opposed to the VC.
   c. To strengthen the will to resist the VC and increase the morale of the pro-GVN populace.

2. Concept of Operations
   a. Phase I: During this phase of the operation emphasis was placed on conducting Psychological Warfare. The majority of leaflet and loudspeaker missions were conducted in the AO. After all target areas in the AO had been covered missions were conducted over populated areas outside the AO. These missions concentrated on target areas immediately adjacent to the AO which were known to be VC or have strong VC sympathies. All mission during this phase were daylight missions conducted from USAF U-10 aircraft.
   b. Phase II and III: During this phase of the operation emphasis was shifted from Psychological Warfare to Psychological Operations. The priority targets were the populated areas. Emphasis was placed on missions over VC controlled and contested villages. Three leaflets and three tapes were secured from the Province Chief, reproduced, and distributed throughout the Province. Two O-47 loudspeaker missions, each 2 hours in duration, were conducted over the populated areas each night. Daily U-10 leaflet missions covered the populated areas also. Operations within the AO included a mass leaflet drop designed to saturate the entire area at the outset of the Combat Operation. Loudspeaker and leaflet missions were conducted in the AO as the tactical operation uncovered likely targets.
   c. Phase IV: During the last phase of the operation emphasis was again placed on conducting missions in the populated areas. Two leaflets and three tapes from the Province Chief were obtained, reproduced and disseminated. A mass leaflet drop designed to saturate the AO (SB-35) and daily leaflet and loudspeaker missions were conducted against likely targets discovered as a result of tactical operations.

3. Operations conducted:
   a. Missions: 102 missions covering 177 target areas were conducted. Target areas ranged in size from several huts to areas as large as 216 sq. km.
   b. Leaflets: 6 different leaflets were used totalling 11,897,000 dropped. National Safe Conduct Passes were dropped on each leaflet mission. (See Tab A, Leaflet List).
   c. Loudspeakers: A total broadcast time of 154.5 hours was logged. These consisted of:
      (1) Aerial
         (a) Day (live): 8.5 hours,
         (b) Day (tape): 28 hours,
         (c) Night (tape): 101 hours,
      (2) Ground (day, live): 11 hours,
      (3) Sea (night, tape): 3 hours.
Inclusion of Psychological Operations to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT

1. Summary

a. Evaluating the effectiveness of the 6th Psy Ops program continues to be a major problem. However, indirect indicators tend to show the program is effective.

(1) Several Hoi Chanh questioned at the PHAN THIET Chieu Ho1 Center (FARRAGUT IV) indicated they had heard loudspeaker broadcasts both day and night prior to their rallying.

(2) Most Hoi Chanh were in possession of one or more leaflets at the time they rallied.

(3) Chieu Ho1 Center officials at PHAN RANG confirmed that they received Hoi Chanh as a direct result of a loudspeaker appeal conducted by this Brigade. A VC made the appeal from a UH-lD to his friends. His friends heard the appeal and returned to the GVN.

(4) Village of SON HOI commenced evacuation to a GVN secure area several days after a low level leaflet drop had been conducted against the village.

(5) 40 persons rallied to the GVN in a group NW of PHAN THIET. These people's village had been several leaflet and loudspeaker missions conducted against it approximately 1 week prior to their rallying.

b. This operation marked the first use of "Key Communicator" leaflets and taped messages. The results achieved indicated that this method of getting across a message is highly successful. One Hoi Chanh who rallied to the PF TISET Chieu Ho1 Center said he did so because he heard "the Province Chief talking from an airplane" (U-10 using one of the prepared tapes).

c. Several Hoi Chanh stated that of all weapons systems used by the NVA, the one most feared is the helicopter. The VC know its capabilities and are therefore uncertain what any helicopters intentions are when one is sighted. It is interesting to note that the majority of indications pointing to a successful Psy Ops program involved helicopter missions. Whether this is the result of probability or a direct correlation is not known at this time. However, continued efforts will be made to define the relationship between effective Psy Ops missions and the use of helicopters as Psy Ops vehicles. Two reasons why the helicopter may be more successful than other type aircraft in conducting Psy Ops missions are:

(1) The helicopter instills greater fear in the VC initially. After it becomes apparent that the helicopter is conducting a Psy Ops missions a feeling of relief would be manifested. At this time the Psy Ops message might be more meaningful to the VC.

(2) The helicopter normally is used at much lower altitudes in conducting Psy Ops than the USAF Fixed Wing aircraft. This fact allows greater accuracy in leaflet drops and closer range for the loudspeaker broadcasts.

d. Based on the effectiveness indicators received to date, the current program of concentrating on population centers using Key Communicator appeals will be continued and the results evaluated.

5. Lessons Learned:

a. The availability of a proficient interpreter or linguist is essential to conducting effective Psy Ops, particularly in rapid reaction situations.

b. Key communicator appeals approach Face-to-Face communications in that the audience can identify with the speaker.

c. General appeals promising good treatment and encouraging VC to rally to the Brigade are ineffective due to a lack of credibility. Emphasis should be placed instead on encouraging VC to rally to the GVN. Key communicator appeals
coupled with the demoralising effects of combat operations create a high measure of persuasiveness and credibility.

d. The helicopter makes an ideal Psy Ops aircraft. Its use on leaflet missions allows pinpoint accuracy since leaflets can be distributed at very low levels. Loudspeaker broadcasts similarly can be pinpointed and the effects of high winds, on clarity, minimised.
During Operation FARRAGUT the following leaflets were used:

1. NSCP
2. SP-331
3. SP-766
4. SP-769
5. SP-782
6. SP-868
7. SP-941
8. SP-962
9. SP-947
10. SP-951
11. SP-954
12. SP-957
13. SP-958
14. SP-1141
15. SP-1234
16. SP-1389
17. SP-1431
18. SP-1539
19. SP-1619
20. SP-1716
21. SP-1755
22. SP-16-67
23. 245N-63-67
24. 24SN-63-67
25. 24SN-109-67
26. 24SN-113-67
27. 24SN-111-67
28. 24SN-117-67
29. 24SN-118-67
30. 24SN-129-67
31. 24SN-120-67
32. 24SN-122-67

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Inclusion 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation FARAGUT


2. Summary of Operation:
   a. In the conduct of Operation FARAGUT the same techniques of fire support coordination and artillery employment which have proven successful in previous operations were utilized. Favorable terrain and the concept of operation of the maneuver elements allowed extensive employment of radar throughout phases II, III, and IV. Battalion FDC was utilized throughout the operation, centrally located, as the controlling FDC.
   
   b. An additional forward observer requirement was imposed by the attachment of a forward observer party to the 2/44 ARVN during the conduct of Phase IV. This exceeded the organic forward observer capability of the battalion, and was fulfilled by utilizing personnel with associated training and experience from within the battalion.
   
   c. Naval gunfire provided reinforcing fires to the brigade during phases III and IV of FARAGUT. Liaison was maintained at the brigade level as well as periodic radio communications between the supporting ships and battalion FDC.
   
   d. BN/70 was frequently split into two platoons, each platoon collocated with a battery of 105mm howitzers, throughout the operation. Several fire missions were conducted, adjusting with the 105's and massing the fires of both the 105's and 155's in effect. Flexibility was obtained by shifting the fires of one element (usually the 105's) onto possible escape routes while the other maintained suppressing fires on the enemy.
   
   e. The amount of H and I fires was increased during this operation. These fires are effectively utilized to deceive the enemy as to the objective of the maneuver elements and to deny the enemy use of critical terrain, roads, bridges, fords, campsites, etc. Likely H and I targets can be obtained from the maneuver elements relaying through their forward observers.
   
   f. Air warning messages are now being broadcast over the "Guard" UHF frequency by the fire direction center, using an air force survival kit radio. Tests to date have been generally favorable, although the radio's range seems to be extremely limited. Broadcasting air warning messages in this manner is convenient for the pilots since the UHF "Guard" frequency is monitored by them at all times. A search is being made for a more powerful, portable UHF radio.
   
   g. A schedule of fires conducted at the beginning of Phase IV was terminated about halfway through due to the flight paths of helicopters, lifting in the maneuver elements, crossing the gun-target line. Strict adherence to the proposed flight corridor by the pilots would have enabled the schedule of fires to be completed.

3. Execution:

   a. Phase I:
        (1) At 2200 January, A/2-320th displaced to BM5848.2. Unit closed at 1030 hours. Direct Support of 1-327th Infantry.
        
        (2) At 31030 January, A/2-320th displaced to BM74675. Unit closed at 1030 hours. General support of 1st Brigade.

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Inclosure 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAOUT

(3) At 27h00 January, B/2-320th displaced to BN512768. Unit closed at 1600 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(4) At 31h15 January, B/2-320th displaced to BN615695. Unit closed at 1600 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(5) At 05h30 February, B/2-320th displaced to BN665960. Unit closed at 1300 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(6) At 10h45 February, B/2-320th displaced to BN696965. Unit closed at 1130 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(7) At 19h31 January, B/2-320th displaced to BN692757. Unit closed at 1700 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(8) At 27h1000 January, C/2-320th displaced to BN702598. Unit closed at 1700 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(9) At 28h1000 January, C/2-320th displaced to BN667688. Unit closed at 1430 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(10) At 30h830 January, C/2-320th displaced to BN874687. Unit closed at 31h0200 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(11) At 31h3000 January, B/2-320th displaced to BN926768. Unit closed at 1900 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(12) At 27h00 February, A/2-320th displaced to BN666105. Unit closed at 1600 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

b. Phase II:

(1) At 17h05h5 February, A/2-320th displaced to BN116052. Unit closed at 1005 hours. Direct support of 1-327th Infantry.

(2) At 22h700 January, A/2-320th displaced to BN647688. Unit closed at 1600 hours. Direct support of 1-327th Infantry.

(3) At 28h7100 February, A/2-320th displaced to BN666465. Unit closed at 1800 hours. Direct support of 1-327th Infantry.

(4) At 27h0500 February, B/2-320th displaced to BN122513. Unit closed at 0630 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(5) At 23h0600 February, B/2-320th displaced to BN235274. Unit closed at 1100 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(6) At 25h0600 February, B/2-320th displaced to BN215274. Unit closed at 0900 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(7) At 20h3600 February, B/2-320th displaced to BN660660. Unit closed at 1220 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(8) At 17h0730 February, C/2-320th displaced to AP962116. Unit closed at 1730 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(9) At 15h0600 February, C/2-320th displaced to BN212606. Unit closed at 1800 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(10) At 15h0700 February, C/2-320th displaced to BN215401. Unit closed at 1630 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(11) At 25h3200 February, C/2-320th displaced to BN666456. Unit closed at 2000 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.
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Enclosure 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT

(12) At 170715 February, B/1-30th displaced to BN76636. Unit closed at 1730 hours. General support reinforcing the fires of C/2-320th.

(13) At 281210 February, B/1-30th displaced to BN66156. Unit closed at 2020 hours. General support of the 1st Brigade.

c. Phase III:

(1) At 030700 March, A/2-320th displaced to BN97666. Unit closed at 1000 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(2) At 060515 March, A/2-320th displaced to BN26656. Unit closed at 1035 hours. Direct support of 1/327th Infantry.

(3) At 060530 March, B/2-320th displaced to BN92339. Unit closed at 1120 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(4) At 020730 March, B/2-320th displaced to BN53820. Unit closed at 1500 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(5) At 030700 March, B/2-320th displaced to BN951621. Unit closed at 1615 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(6) At 050500 March, C/2-320th displaced to BN25525. Unit closed at 0930 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

(7) At 060630 March, C/2-320th displaced to BN66856. Unit closed at 1600 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(8) At 030600 March, C/1-30th displaced to BN59521. Unit closed at 1645 hours. General support reinforcing the fires of B/2-320th.

d. Phase IV:

(1) At 090600 March, A/2-320th displaced to BN78667. Unit closed at 1500 hours. Direct support of 1-327th Infantry.

(2) At 220700 March, A/2-320th displaced to BN76869. Unit closed at 1745 hours. General support 1st Brigade.

(3) At 090500 March, B/2-320th displaced to BN70557. Unit closed at 1745 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(4) At 150700 March, C/2-320th displaced to BN68668. Unit closed at 1152 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

(5) At 230700 March, B/2-320th displaced to BN77869. Unit closed at 1250 hours. General support of 1st Brigade.

(6) At 080600 March, C/2-30th displaced to BN55219. Unit closed at 1250 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

(7) At 121300 March, B/2-320th displaced to BN74869. Unit closed at 2130 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(8) At 220700 March, B/1-30th displaced to BN63426. Unit closed at 1000 hours. General support reinforcing the fires of B/2-320th.

(9) At 230900 March, B/2-30th displaced to BN74469. Unit closed at 1205 hours. General support of 1st Brigade.

4. Results:

a. 12 VC (KIA Army).

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Inclosure 8 (Artillery) to Contact Operations After Action Report, Operation FAIUCOT

b. HQ VC (RB Army) (EST).

5. Administrative matters: N/A

6. Special equipment and techniques: The radar was extensively employed during phases II, III and IV of FAIUCOT in the following manners:

a. Registrations were conducted, both center of impact and high burst.

b. Survey coordinates were computed for C battery by the tracking of a low charge high angle round fired by C battery, by radar.

c. Further tests in computing survey coordinates for a given location were conducted by the radar section as follows:

(1) Tracking a balloon floating above the point at which surveyed coordinates were desired.

(2) Tracking an H-13 hovering above the point at which surveyed coordinates are desired.

(3) Tracking a beer can dropped from an H-13 onto the point at which surveyed coordinates are desired.

7. Commander's Analysis: That the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery, Battery "EF", 1st Battalion 30th Artillery, and tactical air continue to provide adequate fire support.

Tests conducted with the portable UHF radio in broadcasting air warning messages have been more satisfactory than methods employed in past operations. A more powerful portable UHF radio, once obtained, should eliminate the problem of adequate aircraft warning during the conduct of fire missions. Tests conducted with the radio have indicated many areas of possible employment in a counterinsurgency environment.

8. Recommendations: That four (4) C-147's be provided this brigade at all times and that the aviation company assigned to support continue to provide a liaison officer.
Inclosure 9 (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT

1. The most significant Engineer activity in Operation FARRAGUT was the opening and use of land lines of communication. During the initial phase of the operation, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry moved into the Secret Base 7 area using Rt 1 and Rt 606. The later stages of the operations were characterized by daily usage of Rt 1 in the area in which the Brigade was operating. The displacement of the Brigade base from PHAN THIET to SONO MAO and from SONO MAO to PHAN RANG was accomplished by road.

2. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division received general Engineer support from elements of the 35th Engineer Group. Company A, 11th Engineer Battalion provided support in the PHAN RANG area, specifically repairing 8 kilometers of Rt 606 in late January, assisting in the opening of Lt 1 from PHAN RANG to SONO MAO on 15 and 16 February, and in opening Lt 107 to SONO MAO in mid March. 2d Platoon, Company A, 11th Engineer Battalion provided support in preparing the Brigade base area at PHAN THIET and in opening Lt 1 from PHAN THIET to SONO MAO on 17 and 18 February. Company B, 326th Engineer Battalion constructed the airfield at SONO MAO, prepared the Brigade base area at SONO MAO, provided bulldozers for construction of access roads into the LE HONG PHONG Forest, and installed a bypass on Lt 1 on 1 March. The support rendered by each of these units was responsive and timely in every incident.

3. Throughout the operation Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion provided LZ clearing and demolition teams to the committed Infantry Battalions. Mine sweeping teams working with A Troop, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry and with the 97 Platoon conducted daily sweeps on Lt 1 from 10 February through the end of the operation. The company provided a provisional platoon, reorganized as Infantry, to secure Battery B, 1-30 Artillery, from 3 through 11 February. With equipment support from the 35th Engineer Group, Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion opened Lt 1 from PHAN THIET to SONO MAO, repairing 27 cuts and installing 3 bypasses. Elements of the company constructed approximately 25 kilometers of access roads into the LE HONG PHONG Forest and destroyed two bunker complexes totalling more than 100 bunkers.

4. The types of mines encountered in Operation FARRAGUT were the CNH booby trap placed on trails and along Lt 1 between PHAN THIET and SONO MAO, a command detonated Claymore type mine used on Lt 1 north of TUT PHONG, and electrically detonated road mines placed on Lt 1 north of PHAN THIET. Claymore type mines used a firing mechanism made of two flattened sections of tin cans held approximately 1/2 inch apart by split wooden poles. These metal sections were wired into the firing system and pressing the sections together completed the circuit and fired the mine. This simple but effective mechanism was used as a pressure device or for command detonation.

5. Drinking water was a distinct problem in the coastal regions around and north of PHAN THIET. The only water source found near PHAN THIET that would support the Brigade water point was the city reservoir. During the dry months of February and March this water has a strong, musty taste that is extremely unpleasant and even affects foods prepared with water. Salt was used to contaminate wells used by the VC on the edge of the LE HONG PHONG Forest.

6. There were no unusual Engineer problems encountered in Operation FARRAGUT. The requirement for careful road sweeping and the efficiency of roads as a means for moving supplies were again demonstrated.