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REVIEW AND ANALYSIS SYSTEM

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RVNAF PROGRESS

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12 March 1968

SUBJECT: Program Review and Analysis System for RVNAP Progress

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The Program Review and Analysis System for RVNAP Progress is designed to measure the effectiveness of MACV plans and procedures (programs) developed to assist JGS in improving the effectiveness of RVNAP.

2. The results of the review and analysis are presented orally and in a published report on a semiannual basis. The oral report is limited to areas of exceptional or deficient performance and other significant matters warranting the attention of COMUSMACV and Chief, JGS. The written report contains full details of all programs.

3. This is the second report and covers the period 1 July through 31 December 1967.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

J. J. Ayward, Jr.
Major, USA
Asst AG

1 Incl
Rpt, Prog Review and Anal Sys, RVNAP Progress

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SECTION I - GENERAL

1. (U) INTRODUCTION: The Program Review and Analysis System for RVNAF progress was established on 24 May 1967. As originally published, there were 44 sub-programs submitted by the 14 major activity directors. Subsequent review and study have resulted in two sub-programs being consolidated with others and one being deleted, thus reducing the number of sub-programs to 41. These sub-programs provide the means to evaluate the status and conduct of MACV activities designed to improve or assist RVNAF. The results of the second semiannual Review and Analysis are contained in the sub-program statements in Section II of this document.

2. (U) ORAL PRESENTATION: Under the management by exception technique, 17 of the sub-programs were considered to contain items of exceptional or deficient performance, or significant matters warranting the attention of COMUSMACV and the Chief, JGS. These were presented to COMUSMACV on 11 Feb 68 and are awaiting presentation to Chief, JGS. The titles of the 17 sub-programs, together with page references to the detailed statements in Section II, are as follows:

a. Equipment Shortages - 13
b. RVNAF Force Structure and Organization - 20
c. RVNAF Inspector General Procedures - 23
d. RVNAF Command Leadership and Personnel Effectiveness - 26
e. Maintenance Improvement - 32
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m. Inspection RF/PF Activities - 134
n. Facilities - VNMC - 142
OVERALL EVALUATION AND AREAS OF EMPHASIS: The review and analysis of the last half of CY67 indicated progress in almost all areas, particularly in those reported as having difficulty at the August briefing. All indications point generally towards continued progress during the first half of CY68. There are, however, certain programs which require special attention.

a. Leadership: Continued emphasis must be placed on developing leadership within RVNAF. This is especially significant in view of the programmed expansion and the requirement to provide effective leadership to newly formed units. Units rated unsatisfactory or marginal in leadership of either officers or NCOs must be improved. The newly developed criteria for selection of officers to attend command and staff courses, the recent implementation of leadership programs at officer and NCO schools and the implementation of the proposed pay increase will significantly benefit the leadership program. Promotion policies must be reviewed continually to assure efficiency in this vital program.

b. Strength: Every effort must be exerted to make the most efficient use of the limited manpower available for the armed forces. Operational strength must be kept at optimum level especially in the ranger battalions where their substantial continuing understrength must be eliminated. Units which are newly allocated must be recruited as quickly as possible and understrength units brought up to strength. The Partial Mobilization Decree, if implemented as written, should insure attainment of the strength objectives for RVNAF in 1968. The dissipation of personnel to unauthorized units or in excessive overhead is a matter of continuing concern. Although the number of unauthorized units has decreased since the last report, maximum effort is needed to eliminate those remaining.

c. Desertion Control: Desertions in RVNAF leveled off at too high a rate during 1967. They amounted to 70 percent of the total manpower loss. RVNAF must emphasize the serviceman indoctrination and welfare programs which were recently adopted, in order to control and reduce desertions during 1968.

d. MP Training: The MP units are highly fragmented and over-committed. This adversely affects small unit training programs. Commanders must establish their unit training as a priority matter in 1968.

e. In-Place Training: The in-place training of ARVN units needs command emphasis from the JGS level to insure that units receive their training.
f. Railroad System: Maximum effort must be continued to exploit and expand the rail system.

g. Supply Shortages: Continued emphasis is required on: training of supply specialists; publication of a consolidated supply procedures manual; and decentralizing the authority and responsibility for issuing supplies.

h. Maintenance: Maximum effort is required on organizational maintenance functions in the combat units, particularly in the maintenance of engineer equipment. The ARVN Engineers' inspection system needs expanding to be commensurate with the operations of a Command Maintenance Management Inspection Team. Also, commanders must take full advantage of the various maintenance courses available within RVNAF.

i. Status of Equipment: Reports on the status of major items deadline for maintenance in many cases are inaccurate or have not been submitted. Command emphasis is required on this matter in order to insure timely and accurate status reports. One of the largest deficiencies noted is the failure of RVNAF supply personnel to first review their inventory for specific parts required before requesting MACV assistance.

j. Inspector General: To be totally effective, the Inspector General System must be centralized at the JGS level. The JGS long range plans provide for this, and maximum emphasis must be placed on insuring that these plans are satisfied.

k. Utilization of RAGs: The under-utilization of the River Assault Group in their primary mission of Amphibious Assault should be corrected.

l. Navy Civilian Pay: The pay scales of the Navy shipyard civilian employees should be revised to be competitive with wages paid by the US Government and by private enterprises for similar skills.

m. Marine Training: The Marine battalion retraining program is still adversely affected by operational commitments. A more equitable balance between operational commitments and training is essential. Emphasis is also required at the JGS level on the Marine Corps Medical Program.

n. RF/PF Effectiveness: The statistical review and analysis indicates a need for emphasis on the overall improvement of RF and PF combat effectiveness. The quality and quantity of leaders and combat proficiency training are the most significant areas that require emphasis. This is particularly important in view of the planned 50,000 increase in strength.
SECTION II

FORMAT

The format used in this Section is as follows:

Statement of Objective: Statement of quantity to be accomplished for the period covered, and/or the quality of performance programmed for the period.

a. Review of Progress: Statement of actual accomplishments achieved toward the objective in terms of quantity and/or quality.

b. Analysis of Progress: Statements of evaluation of performance in terms of efficiency or accomplishments in terms of quantity, timeliness and quality.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Comparison with previous data and indications for the remainder of the calendar year.

d. Corrective Actions: Analysis of corrective actions taken or to be taken and results obtained or to be obtained.

e. Projection: Analysis of projection or future trend.

NOTE: (Items not applicable are omitted).
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Assistance

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: English Language Improvement Program

Sub-Program Elements and Objectives:

A. Element - Formal English Language Training

1. Statement of Objective: Develop an overall plan to relocate and improve the RVNAF Armed Forces Language School (AFLS). Target Date - 1 Sep 67.

   a. Review of Progress: On 29 April 1967 COMUSMACV appointed a board of officers to study the AFLS. The initial meeting of the board was held 8 May 1967. The board determined that the AFLS facilities were inadequate (long range problem), and that an unprecedented requirement to train interpreters would cause the student load during second half of CY67 to exceed the annual capacity of the school (short range problem).

   (1) Short Range Solution: Double shifting of classes (two shifts per day) was initiated at the AFLS to train the additional interpreters. To support this double shifting, the board recommended that: (1) an additional 27 US enlisted advisors be assigned to the school as language instructors, (2) $12,375 be programmed for additional Army Language Course material, (3) $30,800 be made available immediately for rehabilitation of the school, and (4) three additional Defense Language Institute (DLI) Civilian Education Specialists be assigned to the school. All of these recommendations were approved by COMUSMACV on 5 July 1967.

   (2) Long Range Solution: The AFLS must be expanded to provide adequate classrooms, library, mess hall and student housing. There is no room for expansion in the present location of the school. The relocation of the school was proposed to RVNAF JGS on 22 Nov 67 by COMUSMACV.

   b. Analysis of Progress: Three additional DLI Civilian Language Specialists were assigned to the school during September, October and November 1967 bringing the total assigned to four. Twenty-seven additional US enlisted advisors have been assigned to the school. All of these instructors have undergone instructor training and have been teaching classes since Aug 67. The contract to rehabilitate the AFLS was awarded on 4 Jan 68 and construction work should begin during the month of January. This construction will enable the school to function properly until such time as the school is relocated. Work includes lighting, sound proofing and air conditioning of the language laboratories and classrooms.

   c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The double shift class schedule is working efficiently and will enable the school to handle the projected inputs. The implementation of the program was slow initially, due to the shortage of
adequately trained supervisory personnel. The arrival of the three educational specialists and assignment of the 27 US enlisted instructors greatly improved efficiency and operation of the school.

d. Corrective Actions: Average training time per student has been reduced and quality of instruction has improved with the adoption of a flexible POI. All students are now given an English language proficiency test when they enter the school. They begin their studies at a level commensurate with their proficiency and are graduated as soon as the prerequisite proficiency is obtained.

e. Projection: The quality of instruction at the AFLS will continue to improve with the assistance of the 4 DLI and 27 US enlisted instructors. The rehabilitation of the present facilities will begin in Jan 68. The relocation and expansion of the school is dependent on the efforts of the RVNAF Central Training Agency to locate a site for the school. No prediction can be made at this time on how this project will progress.

2. Statement of Objective: To acquire two 25-position language laboratories to be installed at the Vietnamese National Military Academy at Dalat. Target date - 30 Dec 67.

a. Review of Progress: Two 30-position laboratories were requested through MASF channels on 1 Jun 67. Two 30-position laboratories were requested because 25-position laboratories are not available. This request was approved by CINCUSARPAC on 7 Jun 67. The equipment was to have arrived during Nov 67, however, as of 12 Jan 68 the shipment had not arrived. Tracer action was initiated but no word has been received from DLI.

b. Analysis of Progress: Performance of initial programming action was outstanding. Final analysis will depend upon receipt of the equipment.

c. Projection: The installation of the laboratory equipment will be completed by a DLI MTT soon after its arrival.

3. Statement of Objective: Install 30 replacement language laboratory positions at the VNAF Air Training Center - Target date 30 Jun 67.

a. Review of Progress: The 30-position language laboratory arrived in country on 19 Jul and installation was completed in Oct. A DLI MTT was programmed and installed the equipment.

b. Analysis of Progress: Only problem encountered was movement of the equipment from the Bien Hoa Depot to Nha Trang and the delayed arrival of the DLI MTT.

c. Conclusions: The laboratory equipment was installed in a very short time once it arrived at the school site and the DLI MTT arrived in-country. The equipment is now installed and operating in support of language training.
d. Projection: An additional laboratory is scheduled in the FY68 program.


   a. Review of Progress: Programming for an ELT Specialist was made in the FY68 MASF Navy program and recruiting action was taken during Jul 67. The DLI Specialist arrived in-country in Nov and assigned to the VNN Training Center in Nha Trang.

   b. Conclusion: This objective was reached in an acceptable manner and no problems were encountered.

5. Statement of Objective: Introduce new American Language Course materials at the VNN Naval Training Center and Naval Advanced Training Center. Target date - 31 Dec 67.

   a. Review of Progress: New American Language Course materials were programmed and approved for introduction in FY68. Shipment was received and instruction using the new text material began in Nov 67.

   b. Analysis of Progress: There were no difficulties encountered in the accomplishment of this objective and the objective was reached during anticipated time frame.

   c. Projection: The use of the American Language Course materials will standardize text books at all English Language Schools in RVN as recommended by DLI.

B. Element: Informal English Language Training


   a. Review of Progress: Through arrangements with JUSPAO, 10,680 textbooks (Conversational American English Series) arrived in-country on 7 Jun 67. Over 1,000 Instruction Kits were prepared consisting of 15 textbooks, lesson plans, and teacher's guides in each. These kits were distributed to all Corps Tactical Zones and field advisors to RVNAF.

   b. Analysis of Progress: Field personnel were enthusiastic about receipt of the teaching kits. All textbooks were delivered by the end of Aug 67. A follow up evaluation of the use of these books was made in Oct 67 and as a result additional textbooks will be ordered in CY68.
c. Conclusion: Use of these textbooks proved to be very useful to the field advisors conducting informal English classes. Without these books their efforts would have been seriously hampered.
Statement of Objective: Equalize the Distribution of Equipment within RVNAF.

a. Element - Improve Equipment Status Reporting.
   Goal - Continued command emphasis on the necessity for accurate and timely equipment status reports.

b. Element - Redistribution of existing assets based on authorizations.
   1. Some units have overages of equipment while shortages exist in others.
   2. Unauthorized units are in existence with equipment on hand that should be in authorized units.
   Goal - Command emphasis on the proper distribution of equipment in accordance with MACV approved TOE authorizations. Identification of and withdrawal of equipment assets from unauthorized units.

c. Element - Initiate and implement an effective TOE/TA review program.
   Goal - Ensure that equipment authorizations are consistent with mission requirements.

d. Element - Timely allocation of available assets particularly equipment on hand in depots.
   Goal - Timely allocation of assets in accordance with TOE.
   (This will be a function of the security of LOCs and improved coordination between tactical and logistical unit commanders.)

Analysis: 1. The equipment status reports have improved during FY67 with regard to the reporting of TO&E and TA shortages and overages. The status reports of maintenance float major items are also quite accurate at the present time. Emphasis still must be placed, however, on the reporting of the status of major items deadlined for maintenance reasons and therefore temporarily lost to the using unit. It has been noticed that reports of this type are in many cases inaccurate or altogether lacking. It is believed that renewed command emphasis through ARVN channels would do much to remedy this situation. Command emphasis on the operating level is currently being stressed by ALC personnel, but command interest and emphasis originating at JGS is urgently required in order to generate the required operating level command interest to insure timely, accurate, status reports. ALC commanders have emphasized reporting by mass media such as the ALC Bulletin and by direct letters to non-complying
units. The improvement is noticeable but varies by degree between technical services. For example, signal equipment reporting improved through the first two quarters to a numerical saturation point of 59 out of 63 units. Ordnance requirements are of necessity more demanding in content and frequency. Communications media prohibits a satisfactory ordnance reporting system although it did improve during the year. Field Medical Depots submit a quarterly stock status report to the Medical Base Depots. The Medical Base Depots consolidate listings and direct redistribution of assets as needed.

2. Redistribution of assets will require continued emphasis as this remains a significant weakness. Some redistribution of assets was made, but there is still much room for improvement. A small manifestation of progress in solving this problem this past year was the authority given to technical services by JGS to redistribute assets where required within units. This authority plus command interest at JGS level should result in a marked improvement in this area. The progress made in shifting assets from ARVN to RF/PP is particularly noteworthy. Monthly reporting has shown a gradual but steady improvement in the area of redistribution. In the area of modernization of equipment, the Signal Directorate has taken positive steps to identify and withdraw excesses from ARVN regular force units as new items are issued. These assets, together with the output of the rebuild lines of the 60th Signal Base Depot, are being issued to RF/PP units on a priority basis. This topic has been one of continuing interest on Signal liaison visits. The Signal Directorate has also taken many steps to speed-up the processing of issue orders so as to expedite allocation.

a. In II ALC satisfactory progress is being made in this area with respect to ordnance material. The lateral transfer of major items presents no problem, as items excess to a unit's TOE and float major items are controlled by the II ALC Commander. Lateral transfer of repair parts between the ALC's is not presently being effected. This is an area which will be investigated by the II ALC supply advisor during the coming months. The requirement for redistribution of equipment continues, though in CT 67 improvements have been noted. Redistribution of generators is taking place. Also improved accountability of generators will result from transferring responsibility from the Area Construction Offices to the Engineer Direct Support Units. In general, however, maldistribution of engineer equipment is a serious problem, for despite excesses in several line items, many units report the same items as shortages.

b. In V ALC command emphasis on proper distribution has increased significantly during the last four months of CT 67. This problem has been diminished considerably by redistribution of 192 major signal items and selected engineer equipment. Training Centers and some province headquarters are holding SB-22/PT pending JGS approval of increased authorizations or improved civilian systems. A lack of transportation has slowed actual redistribution of identified items such as QM items being withdrawn from closed out units and activities and being issued. Increased use of TA's would alleviate this problem to a great degree.
3. In II ALC the allocation of assets to the units needing them most urgently is controlled by the II ALC Commander in an effective manner. A current list of shortages is maintained at II ALC and assets are issued to the proper unit as soon as these assets become available. One of the weaknesses in the present TOE/TA review program is the failure to obtain comments from advisors to the units concerned. Certainly the inclusion of another review level will add delay to the overall processing time, but it is considered that the quality of review obtained will more than compensate for this disadvantage. Technical Services are familiar with broad aspects of unit missions; however, nothing can substitute for the experience and knowledge gained from daily contact with a unit. A document exists for the implementation of this review at the unit level - the quarterly Unit Evaluation Report. Provision could be made in the format for this report for the inclusion of advisor comments on recommended additions/deletions to the units TOE.

4. In V ALC the ALC controlled items ceased to be a problem in the last quarter with a closer coordination between staff action officers and advisors. Allocation authority vested above the ALC still presents a problem however. For example, new 5 ton tractors required by ALC transportation units waited at the OSC for 2½ months for issue instructions. An exception to this standard is the allocations of signal items wherein 35 distribution orders are in the V ALC Signal Depot awaiting the physical arrival of 396 items of equipment.

Projection: With the development of a new equipment status reporting system, and the utilization of transceiver equipment, the RVNAF equipment status reporting system will materially improve during CY 68.
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief, VN Advisory Division, Office of Comptroller

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Financial Management

1. (U) Statement of Objective: To insure effective and efficient fund utilization in all chapters of the RVN Defense Budget by monitoring obligation and expenditure reports, and recommending appropriate action to VN counterparts.

   a. Review of Progress: CY 1967 expenditures were originally projected at $2 billion piasters. During the last six months of the year, the projection was revised to $9.6 billion piasters. Overall expenditures of $3.5 billion piasters as of 30 November 1967 indicate that budget execution is being accomplished satisfactorily. Performance in the logistics area was poor at the beginning of the year but improved starting in May 1967. Pay and allowance expenditures were projected at $4 billion piasters and were $5.5 billion piasters as of 30 November 1967.

   b. Analysis of Progress: Total expenditures exceeded the original projection because of unprogrammed requirements that developed during the year for MILCAP claims, new construction and pay and allowances. The reason for the poor performance in the logistics area was the slow procurement start at the beginning of the year. With the improvement demonstrated in this area, the program is nearly on target. Projected pay and allowance expenditures are based on programmed average monthly strength. The difference between actual and projected was caused by the following unprogrammed actions: TLT bonus, PF pay raise, PF longevity pay, rice allowance, and revised regulations for high cost of living allowance.

   c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The expenditure rate in 1967 improved over previous years. This indicates an awareness on the part of the RVNAF of the importance of establishing valid budget programs followed by a vigorous and timely execution phase. Performance in the logistics area is usually slow at the first of the year because of the time required to negotiate contracts. As the procurement system is refined the initial lag should be reduced. Pay and allowance expenditures are influenced by establishing new entitlements for which funds have not been budgeted.

   d. Corrective Action: A meeting was held on 11 April 1967 by the Director General for Finance and Audit to stress the need for RVNAF logistics agencies to expedite contract action. This was responsible for the acceleration of procurement performance during the remainder of the year. The procurement cycle was aided by the establishment of a Ministry of National Defense Disbursing Center on 1 April 1967 which resulted in
defense contractors being paid promptly after completion of a contract. Reprogramming partially covered the shortfall in pay and allowances. The balance will be financed from the RVN National Budget.

e. **Projection**: Expenditure rates will continue to improve as the RVNAF refines program and budget procedures. Logistic fund utilization will improve with a refinement of procurement programs and contract procedures.

2. **(U) Statement of Objective**: To meet the pilot-test goal of mechanizing 20,000 RVNAF military pay accounts.

a. **Review of Progress**: As of 31 December 1967, 16,000 pay accounts were mechanized.

b. **Analysis of Progress**: Conversion of additional accounts to meet the goal was precluded because of the non-availability of ADP equipment and trained personnel. The Director General for Finance and Audit has ordered key punch and key verifier equipment and is training personnel at the IBM corporation. Presently ADP services are provided by the Director General for Budget and Foreign Aid as their workload permits.

c. **Conclusions and/or Trends**: Mechanisation of military pay accounts can be accomplished when adequate machine and trained personnel resources are available.

d. **Corrective Action**: VN Advisory Division is monitoring the equipment purchase program and training of operator personnel as well as providing an ADP-qualified advisor to work with the Director General for Finance and Audit.

e. **Projection**: Additional accounts will be mechanised as additional ADP equipment becomes available, trained personnel are assigned and lines of communication allow the transmission of input data.

3. **(U) Statement of Objectives**: To better qualify RVNAF personnel in finance positions by improving the curriculum of the RVNAF Administration and Finance School, developing standard student texts for 6 courses, publishing a monthly Finance Newsletter, and expanding off-shore technical training.

a. **Review of Progress**: (1) RVNAF Admin and Finance School: Two new Programs of Instruction (POI) were completed and forwarded to the Central Training Agency during 1967. POI for Basic EM Course was approved and 2 classes enrolled by year-end. Approval of the POI for the Officer Advanced Course is expected in the near future and the first advanced class is scheduled for August 1968. Student output was programmed at 800 students. As of 31 December 1967, 758 students had completed training.
(2) Development of Texts: The project to provide printed texts for 6 courses was completed at mid-year.

(3) Finance Newsletter: First issue was published January 1967. The distribution of 6,500 copies of the monthly Finance Newsletter to RVNAF finance elements was the goal for the year. Actually 8,340 copies were distributed.

(4) Offshore Training Program: Eight officers participated in this program in 1967. Personnel attended the U.S. Army Finance School, Fort Harrison, and were enrolled in the following courses: Finance Officer Advanced Course (3 officers), Military Comptrollership (2 officers), and Techniques of Review and Analysis (3 officers).

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) RVNAF Admin and Finance School: New courses provide a broader and more comprehensive training base for officers and enlisted men within the lower grades. Shortfall of 42 students was due to failure of personnel to report as scheduled, illness which precluded completion of training, and failure of some students to successfully pass examinations.

(2) Development of Texts: Project was completed.

(3) Finance Newsletter: Distribution and utilization of the monthly newsletter was significantly higher than expected. This communication medium is extremely valuable to finance personnel in the field.

(4) Offshore Training Program: This program is small, but effective, in training the more advanced finance officers for key positions within the RVNAF financial network.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Accomplishments in this area reflect the importance placed on training of finance personnel by the RVNAF. Corruption and inefficient operations are being reduced significantly.

d. Corrective Action: None required.

e. Projection: Program will continue to receive emphasis by the RVNAF and U.S. Advisors.

4. (U) Statement of Objective: To improve the quality, scope and depth of audits conducted by the office of the Director General for Finance and Audit, Ministry of National Defense, by more joint US/VN field audits, increasing the number of trained auditors, insuring compliance with regulations and decrees, and reducing corruption and misuse of public funds.

compared to the 350 audits projected. Comptroller advisors completed 1,458 field advisory hours with audit teams in 1967. The number of cases of corruption and misuse of funds discovered was 187.

b. **Analysis of Progress**: Although the Audit Division had a shortage of qualified auditors the projected number of audits was exceeded. Audits reveal malpractice, fraud or misuse of government funds and normal accounting errors and deficiencies. The misuse of 42.4 million piasters was identified through these audits. Disciplinary action was taken against 173 offenders. Of this total 14 received no disciplinary action other than relief from disbursing duty. Comptroller advisors accompanied Audit Division personnel whenever it was possible as part of the advisory effort to develop a more comprehensive audit capability on the part of the Director General for Finance and Audit.

c. **Conclusions and/or Trends**: Audits have proven effective in detecting and preventing corruption, fraud and misuse of government funds.

d. **Corrective Action**: Every effort is being made to increase the number of trained auditors. Twenty RVNAF finance officers will attend a special audit course at the U.S. Army Finance School, Fort Harrison in April 1968.

e. **Projection**: This element will receive increased emphasis and the audit capability will increase with proper training and the availability of personnel.
1. (S) **Statement of Objective:** To time phase activation/inactivation of RVNAF units (including RF/PF) consistent with the jointly approved Unit Authorization List (UAL).

   a. **Review of Progress:**

      (1) As of 31 December 1967, 993 RF companies and 4,463 PF Platoons were authorized for activation. Of that number, 931 companies and 4,237 Platoons were activated as of 15 December 1967 for a shortfall of 62 companies and 226 platoons.

      (2) Of the 62 companies not yet activated, 15 are scheduled to be activated through the conversion of CIDG camps during the 1st Qtr of CY68.

      (3) 60 RF companies and 135 PF Platoons remain to be allocated to the JGS.

      (4) All other unit activations were on schedule. However, the bulk of the activations were scheduled for on or after 1 Jan 68.

   b. **Analysis of Progress:**

      (1) The apparent reasons for the shortfall in RF/PF activations are as follows:

         (a) 22 RF companies and 150 PF Platoons were allocated to the JGS on 26 November 1967. There has not been sufficient time to recruit these units.

         (b) Recruiting difficulties continue in areas of low population.

      (2) While ARVN unit activations are generally on schedule, the entire FY68 schedule was deferred more than a full quarter due to the delay in OSD approval of the FY68 force structure increase.

   c. **Conclusion and/or trends:**

      Since approximately 90 days are required from the time a unit is authorized until it can be activated, the bulk of the FY68 force increase will be activated during the first and second quarters of CY68. Some equipment shortages will exist but should not be a limiting factor. The questionable status of the GV1I mobilization laws could have a serious effect on the RVNAF capability to fill all of the units scheduled for activation during the period 1 Jan 68 - 30 Jun 68. If the mobilization laws are not retained with the elements contained in the earlier decree, the RVNAF will not be able to implement the projected activations during the last half of CY68. In the RF/PF, a projection of activations, based
on the activation rates during the last six months, indicates a shortfall in the activations of authorised companies and platoons of 16 and 122 respectively at the end of FY68.

d. Corrective Actions:

(1) A concerted effort has been made to obtain a combined MACV/JGS approved force structure plan for FY69-70 for presentation to CINCPAC/JCS by mid January. This should allow sufficient time for the JCS and OSD to consider the revised FY69 plan and the projected FY70 plan and to render a decision prior to June 1968. Early OSD approval of the revised FY69 plan will permit the orderly preparation and implementation of an activation schedule for FY69.

(2) The activation schedule for the FY68 force increase will be monitored continuously and a combined MACV/JGS staff review conducted quarterly.

e. Projection:

The FY68 activation schedule review should insure an orderly implementation. The final FY68 review will combine the final reprogramming actions for FY68 and dovetail with the initial scheduling of the FY69 activations if OSD approval of the revised FY69 plan has been received by May 1968.

2. (S) Statement of Objective: To eliminate 50% of the identified unauthorised RVNAF units by reprogramming or inactivation by the end of CY67.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The MACV staff identified 72 unauthorised units* as of 30 June 1967; as of 30 September 1967, 95 unauthorized units were identified with a strength of 6,648 spaces. This increase is the result of a continuous effort to identify these units rather than an actual increase of unauthorized units.**

(2) In a recent revision of the FY68 RVNAF force structure, 24 unauthorized units were legalized by incorporation into the force structure. Inactivation of 14 unauthorized units has been directed by the JGS.

*References made to unauthorized units does not necessarily indicate company or battalion size elements. In many instances the term, unauthorized units, refers to sections, caretaker headquarters, offices or agencies.

**Information as to the existence of unauthorized units is derived from joint MACV/JGS evaluations and research.
SECRET

b. Analysis of Progress: The legalisation and elimination of these units represent a major effort by both the MACV and JGS to adjust available manpower to complement the needs.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends: Steady progress is being made in identifying unauthorised units. The second half of FY68 will provide further progress but certain units will require top level direction before being inactivated. Efforts will continue to be concentrated on units where progress can be expected in the near future.

d. Corrective Action: To inactivate or authorise existing units either by outright elimination or through reprogramming action.

3. (S) Statement of Objective: To have 85% of all jointly approved TOEs/TAs current and published by the end of CY67.

a. Review of Progress: As of 31 December 1967, 69% of all authorization documents were current as compared to 56% as of 30 June 1967. Review of Progress is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOEs/TAs</th>
<th>30 Jun 67</th>
<th>31 Dec 67</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved by MACV/JGS, awaiting publication</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACV channels for review</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pending action</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Analysis of Progress: The difference between the percentage of TOEs/TAs now current and the goals stated above is attributed to the relatively large number of changes in unit strengths as published in the revised FY68 Unit Authorization List (UAL).

c. Conclusion and/or Trends: There is noticeable improvement between the last reporting period and this in the number of TOEs and TAs that have been made current. MAP equipment is based primarily on jointly approved RVNAF authorization documents which include TOEs and TAs of ARVN, RF/FP, VNR, VNMC and the UMD/UAL of the VNAF. For proper programming to take place, it is necessary that these authorization documents be maintained in a current status.

d. Corrective Actions: A concerted effort is being made to accelerate the revision of all outdated authorization documents and reduce the time required to print those documents.

e. Projection: The goal for CY68 is to have 85% of all authorization documents in a current status.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J3

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SECRET
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Deputy Inspector General

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Inspector General System

1. Statement of Objective: To select highly qualified and motivated officers for assignment to the Office of the RVNAF Inspector General.

   a. Review of Progress: This element of the program is proceeding satisfactorily and on schedule, with the exception of the JGS level.

   b. Analysis of Progress: By the end of 1967, the RVNAF Inspector General assigned strengths were as follows:

      JGS IG - 45 of 60 authorized (75%).
      Corps IG's - 12 of 12 authorized (100%).
      Div IG's - 31 of 20 authorized (155%) Increases in division Inspectors General were recommended to JGS in August 1967 by the JGS IG.

   c. Conclusions: Emphasis will be needed in CY 1968 to reach the desired personnel level at JGS. This will include the assignment of inspectors to the Air Force and Navy offices at JGS Inspector General Directorate.

   d. Corrective Action: None.

   e. Projection: Continued progress in this area is anticipated.

2. Statement of Objective: To provide thorough orientation training for officers assigned or considered for assignment to RVNAF as inspectors general.

   a. Review of Progress: Orientation courses were conducted by the RVNAF JGS IG Directorate as required to train personnel. These courses continued to produce excellent results and trained inspectors in other directorates as well as the IG Directorate.

   b. Analysis of Progress: As of 31 December 1967, 74 percent of the assigned inspectors general had been trained. This was considered acceptable in view of significant factors affecting the assignment and training of officer personnel, retention of selected individuals and re-assignment of trained personnel by subordinate commanders.
c. Conclusions: The training requirements and goals were being attained and the results and quality of instructor were excellent.

d. Corrective Action: Continued emphasis will be needed to establish procedures to preclude the assignment of trained inspectors general to other positions prior to the completion of the detailed assignment.

e. Projection: A special orientation course will be presented by DA OTIG in March/April 1968. Approximately 50 individuals are scheduled to attend this course and upon satisfactory completion will be detailed as inspectors general. Included in this number will be those officers presently functioning as inspectors in the Air Force. Continued satisfactory progress in this element is anticipated.


a. Review of Progress: At the close of 1967, progress in this element of the program was acceptable despite short-falls during the year.

b. Analysis of Progress: At the close of 1967, 12 of the 17 programmed IG advisors had been assigned. Two were at JGS and one had been assigned to each of the four Corps. The remaining advisors were undergoing an orientation program with MACIG. Assignments of advisors had not progressed as originally programmed and as of 31 December, the program was three months behind schedule with a short-fall of five advisors.

c. Conclusion: The objective of assigning advisors to the RVNAF Inspector General has been carried into FY 1968.

d. Projection: Continued progress is anticipated in this element with the result of increased effectiveness in the RVNAF IG system.

4. Statement of Objective: To publish RVNAF Inspector General regulations governing investigations, individual complaints and inspections.

a. Review of Progress: This element of the program progressed satisfactorily.

b. Analysis of Progress: Draft IG regulations had been prepared and were awaiting signature and promulgation. Under the provisions of existing regulations prescribing the conduct of types of inspections the IG had accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Inspections:</th>
<th>Unilateral</th>
<th>382</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combined w/MACV IG</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>435</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) Investigations:

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unilateral*</td>
<td>507</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined w/MACV IG</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>513</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes investigation of complaints.

c. **Conclusions**: This element of the program proved to be very effective and progressed satisfactorily.

d. **Corrective Action**: None.

e. **Projection**: Improved inspection and investigation techniques should evolve as experience is gained.
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief, Advisory Division, JL

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Command Leadership and Personnel Effectiveness.

1. (U) Statement of Objective: To continue the momentum established during CY66 through refinement of existing programs and development of additional programs impacting on leadership and combat effectiveness.

   a. Review of Progress: Leadership received considerable attention in RVNAF, thus reflecting their growing awareness of this important ingredient. This emphasis by RVNAF is evidenced by articles in their Monthly Personnel Newsletters, Directives, and Memoranda. These programs were continued or developed further during 2d Half CY67:

   (1) Career Development: The Infantry is the only branch in ARVN with an officer career program now, but signal's program is awaiting approval by the Chief, JGS. JGS has directed all branches to formulate programs patterned after the Infantry.

   (2) Promotion Procedures: The CY67 annual officer promotions incorporated, for the first time, the efficiency reports in the selection process. Additionally, full disclosure of the promotion board findings was made to the field. Essentially, the same procedures were used for CY66 selections. The directive for annual promotion procedures for Regular Force NCOs and EM was announced by Chief, JGS on 8 Sep 67. It continues to provide for central selection of NCOs for promotion through the review of efficiency reports and the establishment of a point system.

   (3) Command & Staff School Selection: New selection criteria for attendance at Command and Staff School courses were established in February 1967. Selections became centralized at JGS and were based upon the individual's promotion potential as well as his previous record. MACV advisors at the school indicate that the students appear to be much improved as a result of this new selection system.

   (4) Method of Instruction Courses: The Methods of Instruction course is designed to teach proper methods of instruction to faculty personnel of the service schools. Five classes have graduated since July 1967, and nine classes of thirty students each are programmed for 1968.

   (5) Retention of Leaders: In July RVNAF temporarily suspended all discharges. This retained the experience of 1,316 officers and 2,088 NCOs up to four additional months. Also, the partial mobilization decree enacted in October became effective 1 Jan 68, and provides for the selective recall of those discharged. It also extends length of service. Detailed implementing instructions are still pending.
Leadership Training Program: Another recent development was the implementation of leadership programs of instruction for officers and NCOs in ARVN service schools.

PP Pay Proposal: Also, a pay increase has been proposed for the Popular Force to improve its effectiveness. It is designed to assist in developing responsibility and prestige of the leaders by establishing a pay scale based on responsibility and recognized levels of skill.

b. Conclusions: The objective of this subprogram element is difficult to define, and any measurement of progress is subjective. Accordingly, this element has been deleted from the sub-program for CY68; in its place are included elements for which progress can be measured objectively.

2. (U) Statement of Objective: To continue to provide opportunities for qualified and experienced NCOs to be commissioned as Aspirants, through three established programs.

a. Review of Progress:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Direct Appointment</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1967 Goal</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>1967 Goal</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Analysis of Progress: The low number of special battlefield promotions is not considered to be poor performance, since the criteria are stringent and a set of battlefield circumstances must exist before an NCO can be considered.

3. (U) Statement of Objective: To ensure continued, selective identification and annual advancement of deserving personnel with special emphasis on battlefield promotions.

a. Review of Progress: The charts at pages 30 and 31 reflect the Regular Force and Regional Force Promotions, respectively, for CY66 and CY67.

b. Analysis of Progress: The sizeable reduction in annual promotions of Regular Force officers and NCOs during CY67 does not indicate lack of progress, since the large number who were promoted during CY66 were
not eligible for promotion during CT67 due to the time in grade requirement. The increased number of promotions for the Regional Force during CT67 is evidence of progress toward the improvement and motivation of this Force. The disproportionate increase in non-battlefield promotions for the Regular and Regional Forces during 1967 indicates the criteria may be too lenient; JGS is reviewing these criteria.

4. (U) Statement of Objective: To continue to provide competent Reserve officers an opportunity to convert to Regular status.

Review of Progress: A total of 272 officers were integrated to regular status during CT67.

5. (U) Statement of Objective: To continue progress towards full implementation of four large scale programs initiated during CY66 directed at improved procedures for the effective management of personnel.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) Strength accounting - The Popular Force was originally scheduled to be phased into the QD-22 accounting system on 1 Jan 1968, but this has been delayed because the users in the field are not fully educated and trained with the system. The new target date is 1 June 1968.

(2) Casualty Reporting - A notable endeavor to improve casualty reporting was completed recently. A JGS organized team visited all Division Tactical areas and provided an orientation program for individuals involved in casualty reporting from the Regular, Regional, and Popular Forces.

(3) Personnel Service Records - The personnel service record program has shown fine improvement. AG/JGS has completed the project of making an official record for each serviceman, which is filed at AG/JGS. In addition, a new service record has been adopted for use throughout RVNAF which will simplify administrative processing and provide a more comprehensive document.

(4) Personnel Requisitioning Procedures - During CY67, procedures were implemented for the cyclic requisitioning of personnel by grade and MOS. This program has not been fully satisfactory because there was no effective means of validating the requisitions.

b. Corrective Action:

(1) Strength Accounting - The strength accounting of RVNAF will realize further improvements in CT68 when the IBM 360 Model 20 computer is installed in 2d quarter, CT68; this will increase substantially the capability of the data processing center.
(2) Personnel Requisitioning Procedures - In early 1968 simplified personnel requisitioning procedures will be implemented with provisions for validation by the JGS using automatic data processing print-outs of authorized versus assigned strength by grade and MOS.

6. (U) Statement of Objective: To continue recognition of deserving individuals with presentation of awards and decorations. The goal is to increase substantially the number presented during CY66.

Review of Progress: There was a 20% increase in approved awards and decorations during CY67 over CY66. Also, there has been a gradual increase during 1967 in awards and decorations presented RF/PF in comparison with ARVN. The assigned strength of ARVN is about equivalent to RF/PF, and therefore the number of presentations should be similar. This chart depicts the progress being made in this respect.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARDS AND DECORATIONS PRESENTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1ST HALF CY67 ARVN 7% RF/PF 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2ND HALF CY67* 61% 33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Thru NOV 67

7. (U) Statement of Objective: To continue emphasis on improvement of RVNAF discipline and conduct through additional programs and extension of existing programs.

Review of Progress: OPMG/JGS directed a strict enforcement of discipline, law, and order throughout RVNAF in order to improve discipline during 2nd half, CY67. No objective measurement of progress can be made until the records and reports are compiled for the period.
### Regular Force Promotions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Prom</th>
<th>Battle Field Prom</th>
<th>Total Prom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>5908</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>7530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>17027</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>18232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Non Battle Field Prom</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>NCOs</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>9610</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>14035</td>
<td>53924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>3170</td>
<td>3306</td>
<td>54013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PACT 30 of 186 PAGES
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Promotions</th>
<th>Battle Field Promotions</th>
<th>Non-Battle Field Promotions</th>
<th>Total Promotions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3,187</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3,813</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>4,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1,818</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2,371</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>2,4968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>6,161</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,385</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Regional Force Promotions**

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CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACofS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Maintenance Improvement.

Statement of Objective: To increase overall serviceability of RVNAF Material

a. Element - Command Emphasis on PM.

Goal - Continued advisor emphasis at all levels on the necessity for command interest and follow-up of maintenance at the unit level.


Goal - Continued advisor encouragement to establish a formal CMMI system within RVNAF.

c. Element - Availability of repair parts.

Goal - Increase shipments of repair parts from off-shore sources direct to up-country ports. Establishment of maintenance floats. Increased effort on translation, publication and distribution of equipment maintenance manuals.

d. Element - Complete utilization of depot overhaul and rebuild capabilities including additional personnel, the wage problem (civilian), and on the job training (OJT).

Goal - Provision of additional school and on-the-job trained personnel. Initiation and completion of a staff study to identify problem areas involved in hiring skilled civilian personnel and determining possible courses of action.

e. Element - Equipment standardization program for ½ T trucks, 2½ T trucks, and MHE.

Goal - Initiation of a vehicle standardization program.

Analysis: 1. Although the preventive maintenance program has been implemented to varying degrees in RVNAF units, in the majority of units the need for a preventive maintenance program has not been accepted by the commander. Some units have reacted more actively than others with obvious results.

a. Some of the engineer battalion advisors have been successful in getting their counterparts to hold PM classes based on the information provided in USARV Pam 750-25. Still, judging from the condition of engineer equipment that is turned in for support maintenance to the DSU's from engineer units as well as infantry, signal units etc., this area should be continuously stressed by advisors for many years to come. Noticeable improvement, however, has been made.
b. All RVNAF Medical Maintenance Directives have been translated into English and furnished to the maintenance advisors in the field. These directives, published in previous years, have been of great assistance to the advisors in their efforts to get medical units to re-evaluate their preventive maintenance program and to insure that the frequency and quality of maintenance being performed is in accordance with the standards established by the RVNAF Surgeon’s Office with the assistance of U.S. Medical Maintenance advisors.

c. A comprehensive maintenance plan for Quartermaster equipment has been developed in CT 1967 and submitted to the RVNAF Chief Quartermaster for approval and implementation.

d. In I ALC little improvement was accomplished by the command toward FM and organizational maintenance other than that provided by the technical service units who increased the number of its contact visits throughout the year but fell short of an effective technical service program.

e. In II ALC the most critical problem in ARVN maintenance is the lack of proper first and second echelon maintenance in the individual units. In addition to a need for more command interest, more authority must be given to the ALC's and DSU's to enforce proper maintenance standards in the units they support. In part this increase in authority must include a rigid inspection system. Preventive maintenance at the unit level is very poor especially in RF/PF units. This is particularly true of weapons and vehicles to include advisor vehicles. Command emphasis in this area is sorely lacking.

f. In IV ALC a bilingual pamphlet on preventive maintenance for medical equipment has been written and will be distributed during January 1968.

g. Presently the V ALC Commander and his subordinate commanders are actively interested in FM and are beginning to feel the results of a previously poor program (High D/L rate in TC Battalion). FM did improve up to 20 - 25% in supported units from a 0 level. This small improvement is attributed to the ALC units refusing 3rd or 4th echelon support until operator-unit maintenance was completed. This has had some adverse effects and the rules are flexible, but supported unit advisors understand this policy and are responding favorably. The ALC has emphasized FM in their Bulletin which gets wide dissemination. Problems still prevalent are the lack of employment of appropriate management tools by supported units, requisitions not being marked as EDP and poor command emphasis on FM as a whole.

2. The ARVN engineers have no CMII program, however, Office, Chief of Engineers (OCE) has an inspection bureau which conducts IO type inspections of engineer units. During these inspections, the maintenance program of the inspected unit is evaluated. All engineer units receive these inspections at least annually. Units that are marginal may receive up to four visits a year by the inspection team. Technical inspections of the engineer DSU's are also conducted by personnel from Logistics Services, OCE. These inspections are directed toward improving the 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance support provided to the using unit.
a. A directive has been published by the RVNAF Surgeon's Office requiring that the Field Medical Depots inspect all medical units within their area of responsibility annually. A written report of the findings must be forwarded to the Surgeon's Office within 48 hours after completion of the inspection. The directive states that particular emphasis is to be placed on proper utilization of maintenance personnel, effectiveness of the units preventive maintenance program, care and utilization of medical equipment, and maintenance of records. It is planned that beginning in CY 1968, the frequency of these inspections will be semi-annual instead of annual.

b. The ARVN Office Chief of Ordnance Inspection Division now provides two inspection teams which are scheduled to inspect all Ordnance units annually. Based on the observations of inspections being conducted in CY 67 and upon the review of inspection reports and the OCO inspection SOP the ARVN Ordnance Corps inspection system is very satisfactory. An ARVN or RVNAF-wide CMNI system should replace the technical service branch inspection system.

c. The RVNAF Signal Directorate has taken steps to prompt JCS to implement a CMNI system. They have, on field liaison visits, conducted rather extensive surveys of unit maintenance in trip reports.

d. In V ALC, current inspection programs, although intensified in quality and frequency by 30 - 40% over CY66 are ineffective because of a lack of command follow-up action. As a result, only conscientious commanders take action to improve their units when the inspection team points out their deficiencies.

3. Repair parts from off-shore sources are being shipped to the engineer DSU's. The requisitions, if they are passed by the 40th MED, are identified by use of the unit supplementary address code. The parts are then mailed by the off-shore sources to the DSU advisor team through the army postal system. In engineer maintenance activities only small progress has been made in the area of maintenance float. In 1967, ARVN's present maintenance float requirements were established based on current authorizations. Maintenance float graders are now being shipped to the Engineer DSU's. Maintenance float graders have arrived in-country but will not be issued to the DSU's until the required concurrent spare parts have been received. Maintenance float for other items of equipment is negligible; however, maintenance float is being programmed. Attempts to get in-country excesses converted to maintenance float assets have not been successful to date. Some translated engineer manuals were received this year and given to OCE for publication and distribution.

a. A basic load of medical repair parts was requisitioned for direct shipment to the five Field Medical Depots in July 1967. At this time, there has been about 60% fill on the requisitions. Replacement parts for the basic loads are stocked at the 70th MED and maintenance advisors are utilizing the U.S. mail system to expedite the shipping of repair parts to the Field Medical Depots.
b. Total maintenance float authorizations for Ordnance Maintenance activities have not been filled. This has been caused by delayed arrival of equipment from CONUS and the issue of equipment programmed for maintenance floats to newly authorized TOE units. The Ordnance School translation pool has improved somewhat in their translation and publication of maintenance publications, but retention of skilled translation is difficult due to low pay grades. At the end of CT 67, sixty technical publications have been translated for use by Ordnance units.

c. The establishment of a maintenance float for office machines is under study. Technical publications on QM equipment maintenance have been widely distributed with the exception of publications required for office machine maintenance.

d. In Signal Maintenance Activities the maintenance float has been increased to bring levels to the full 5% authorization. The Signal Directorate has taken steps to issue maintenance float down to the lowest supporting echelon consistent with on-hand quantities (i.e. at A&DSL Companies and D.S. Platoons). The basis of issue is 3% to DS and 2% to GS levels.

e. In I ALC the availability of repair parts improved during CT 67; however, lack of standardization, nonavailability of fast moving parts continues to be a logistical burden.

f. In IV ALC a maintenance float has been established for Artillery. A cross reference list for maintenance part numbers, ordnance part numbers, and federal stock numbers is being published locally for units that do not have access to cross reference books. Technical Assistance Teams operate from DSU's out to all supported units on request or on order by higher headquarters.

g. In V ALC direct shipments of repair parts increased at a most significant rate in CT 67. Translation of manuals and distribution has increased at a slow pace. The first maintenance float graders and dosers were received in the 4th Quarter CT 67. Ordnance received no additional float items, and signal still needs nearly half of their authorized items (332 of 719).

4. In September 1967, 10 ARVN officers departed from Ft. Belvoir for the first phase of the "Packet Training Program". During the second phase, which will run from 15 March 1968 to 20 June 1969, these officers will train 200 ARVN students in engineering equipment repair and 60 students in electrical and refrigeration equipment repair. Many of these students will ultimately be assigned to the 40th EED, the remainder will go to the DSU's and troop units. Twenty-six maintenance personnel received on-the-job training at the engineer depot this year. The goal next year and each year thereafter is fifty personnel to receive OJT. ARVN OCE has recognized the personnel problem and has revised the TOE of the 40th EED to increase the authorized military positions. This TOE has been approved by JGS and is pending approval by MACV. In addition, on 9 October 1967 ARVN OCE submitted a request to JGS for authorization to convert 243 civilian spaces to military positions.
a. In 1967, twenty-one medical equipment repairmen were trained by the RVNAF Military Medical School and OJT at the 70th MBD. There still exist vacancies in 25% of the authorized medical maintenance positions in the RVNAF medical system. These should be filled by graduates of the course scheduled for the second half of FY 68. An RVNAF maintenance officers course is tentatively scheduled to be held during CY 68. There are two NGO's attending the CONUS Medical Maintenance Course at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colorado, with two more scheduled to depart during CY 68. These men will be used as instructors and will enable a greater number of in-country maintenance courses to be scheduled.

b. The 80th Ordnance Rebuild Base Depot has been authorized by the ARVN JGS to add 306 military spaces to its T&E. Recruiting of personnel begins in January 1968. On-the-job training of recent hires and both OJT and formal schooling of new military personnel is improving personnel effectiveness. Studies conducted of pay, hiring, and retention problems have not yet led to any remedial actions on the part of JGS. Skilled civilian personnel are difficult to hire and very hard to retain due to RVNAF low pay scales as compared with U.S. contractors and other non-government agencies. A list of all Ordnance critical civilian positions and the problems involved in hiring, promoting, and retaining personnel were submitted to the Central Logistics Command in December 1967. Further study by CIC and working-group meetings on civilian technical service personnel should lead to several proposals for solutions in 1st Quarter CY 68.

c. Maintenance of QM clothing and equipment has been improved by the establishment of QM mobile maintenance teams at each QM Company and field depot. Elimination of QM base depot maintenance has been recommended as QM items in country do not require rebuild or overhaul facilities. Further emphasis on the use of QM mobile maintenance teams is still required to improve the QM maintenance support of all units within ARVN.

d. In I ALC rebuild facilities improved in quantity output but lack of sufficient qualified personnel remains a problem. Equipment standardization programs will alleviate the maintenance problem. The apprentice program, utilizing young boys 12-16 years of age as OJT mechanics and machinists at depot level has helped relieve the personnel shortage somewhat, but the need for more trained men has not abated. The use of more women should be encouraged and a provision for OJT should be initiated where possible.

e. III ALC established three Logistics Inspection Teams, one for each Division Tactical Zone within the corps area. The teams became operational in late October 1967. Technical assistance and liaison visits to supported units have increased in frequency. In addition to non-scheduled visits by technical assistance teams, the DSU Commanders are visiting each supported unit on a quarterly basis to determine effectiveness of supply and maintenance activities. ARVN regulations require a 100% technical inspection of all major items by technical service support personnel at least once annually. In order to fulfill this requirement, mobile contact teams and technical inspection teams combine their efforts.
and visit supported units on a scheduled basis. The use of mobile contact teams for on-site repair has had several beneficial effects.

(1) The repair-time cycle has been shortened since the time for evacuating the equipment to the DSU and returning it to the using unit has been eliminated.

(2) Inspection by 3rd echelon personnel has resulted in early detection of 3rd echelon deficiencies, resulting in improved condition of vehicles in the using units.

(3) The 3rd echelon personnel have assisted in the performance of 2nd echelon maintenance as necessary and have provided technical advice and instruction to 2nd echelon personnel while on site.

(4) On-site repair has increased rapport between the DSU and the using unit.

Training programs offered by 83rd Group, 230th Ordnance Service Center (OSC), and the DSU’s during CT 67 have enhanced the ability of maintenance personnel in the use of maintenance tools and test equipment. Orientation courses for new equipment have been conducted at the 230th OSC. A vehicle test equipment course was offered to both DSU and organizational maintenance personnel. This course of instruction was taught by U.S. Advisory Personnel of the 83rd Ordnance Group, Vietnamese maintenance NCO’s and Philippine contract technicians. Six one-week courses were held at supporting DSU’s. More than 250 students from 181 separate units attended and received certificates of training.

f. In IV ALC teams of ARVN and U.S. advisory personnel visited supported units to inspect equipment, point out errors and instruct in proper procedures. Emphasis was also placed on OJT and in trying to necessitate prompt evacuation of damaged or unserviceable equipment. All of those efforts have been partially successful, but the overall objective of achieving generally satisfactory maintenance has not been reached.

The 141st QM Depot organised a mobile quartermaster contact team composed of a seamstress, shoe repair, furniture repairman and office machine repairman for the purpose of traveling to units in the V ALC area of responsibility to repair QM items. Major repairs are still performed at the 141st QM Depot.

g. In V ALC the higher skill level employees at Nha Trang have not been a critical problem. For example, the 250th OSC is authorised 176 skilled civilian personnel and a total of 185 are employed and working. 40 of the 185 are unskilled and receiving OJT. The Quartermaster Depots have habitually had skilled employee shortages in CT 67 due to proselytizing by U.S. and other employers who need their skills. Employees have been provided OJT when trainable to the skills needed but little effort has been made to get civilian employees to schools to improve skills. V ALC rebuild and overhaul capacities were not exceeded in CT 67.
Although some stated goals were exceeded, many were set too low. Retrograde of items for rebuild and a better flow of parts coupled with increased emphasis on productivity is being stressed.

5. CINCPAC has directed that the vehicle standardization program be accomplished through attrition, and with M standard vehicles programmed for FY 69. In the interim ¼ ton and 2½ ton vehicles are being loaned to ARVN from USARV assets alleviating a portion of the critical vehicle shortages. The receipt of rough terrain forklifts in the ALCs has greatly improved the MRE standardization program.

Projection: Improvement in the maintenance area can be expected as equipment arrives from CONUS to relieve shortages within RVNAF.
1. (C) **Statement of Objectives**: Process 16 tables of organization and equipment scheduled for review during CY 67.

   a. **Review of Progress**: During report period, 11 of the 16 TOE's were submitted by the OTSG, to the JGS for biannual review.

   b. **Analysis of Progress**: Of the 5 TOE's not submitted during the report period, 4 were held in abeyance pending a decision on the reorganization of the RVNAF Medical Service. Permission to withhold action on these TOE's was obtained in writing from JGS. TOE 18-536, Mobile X-Ray Unit, although submitted to JGS for approval, was later cancelled at the request of the OTSG. The decision to cancel activation of 5 Mobile X-Ray Units and eliminate them from the UAL, was based upon the lack of need for this type unit and the progress made in establishing other medical facilities to fulfill X-Ray requirements.

   c. **Conclusions**: Upon reorganization of the RVNAF Medical Service, 20% of all RVNAF Medical Service TOE's will be revised. Due to a major realignment and streamlining of medical units, only those TOE's not affected by the reorganization are being processed at this time.

2. (C) **Statement of Objectives**: To effect RVNAF Medical Service Force Structure Authorizations for 1967.

   a. **Review of Progress**: An increase of 709 spaces in the RVNAF Medical Service Force Structure was approved for CY 67. Personnel have been assigned against 338 of these spaces (48%).

   b. **Analysis of Progress**:

      (1) **Deficiencies in accomplishment**:

      (a) Of the 471 spaces not occupied at the end of the report period, 211 were due to reprogramming of facilities and units. Of the 211 spaces, 181 were authorized to provide staffing for the Bien Hoa Station Hospital. In late 1967, a combined MACV-RVNAAF decision was made to construct this hospital in Cholon, resulting in delayed construction. Plans are being prepared to build this hospital adjacent to the Military Medical School, in Cholon. The remaining 30 spaces of the 211 were originally authorized to the 5 Mobile X-Ray Units previously discussed. Action is underway to assign these spaces to Duy Tan General Hospital.

      (b) Of the 471 spaces not occupied, 260 were authorized
to increase the staffing of 6 convalescent centers from 25 spaces to 90 spaces. Due to a study addressed in the July 67 report, the utilization of convalescent centers will remain as originally planned except that the Vung Tau Convalescent Center has been ordered to deploy to Saigon. This move will be effected during February 1968. This unit will be brought up to its authorized strength as soon as this move is accomplished. The convalescent center at Can Tho is operating in temporary facilities pending construction of a new facility previously scheduled for 1967. Construction of the new facility has not begun due to contractual difficulties. The convalescent centers at Nha Trang and Da Nang are currently limited by lack of adequate space and permanent type facilities. Personnel will however, be assigned to these units as their patient holding capacity is increased. Construction of new facilities is underway at both locations.

(2) Critical Problems: Lack of facilities as described above. The Chief, JGS has interceded to begin construction of the Can Tho facility and construction of the Nha Trang and Da Nang facilities is underway.

(3) Lack of Resources: As described in para (1) and (2) above.

c. Conclusions and/or trends:

(1) Trends: Progress was temporarily halted due primarily to reprogramming actions. All major problems pertaining to the CY 67 Medical Service Force Structure should be resolved by June 1968.

(2) Need for revision of program: None.

d. Corrective Action: Corrective actions already taken should prove adequate.

e. Projection: Approval of the reorganization of the RVNAF Medical Service will eliminate many problems associated with the medical service force structure, by eliminating fragmentation of medical units and providing channels for effective command and control.
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief, Operations Advisory Branch

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Designation of Facilities

1. (U) Statement of Objectives: To establish a 20-bed dispensary in each of 14 sub-sectors during CY 67 using medical personnel and equipment from each of 14 ADSL companies to staff and operate these facilities.

   a. Review of Progress: Completed. Incl 1

   b. Analysis of Progress:

      (1) Deficiencies: None

      (2) Critical Problems: Sub-sector dispensaries are fixed facilities operated by field medical units using TOE field equipment. Since these dispensaries do not appear on the RVNAF Unit Authorization List, no official TOE exists against which permanently installed medical equipment can be requisitioned. Spaces to provide staffing for these dispensaries are currently programmed for the FY 69 and FY 70 Force Structure. When authorized on the Force structure, permanently installed equipment will be requisitioned.

      (3) Lack of Resources: Same as 1b(2)

   c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

      (1) Trends: No experience indicators exist for comparison.

      (2) Need for revision of program: None

   d. Corrective Action: None required.

   e. Projection: Phase 1 of dispensary program for RVNAF progressed as planned. Phase 2 extends through CY 68 and CY 69 and is dependent upon approval of the FY 69 and FY 70 Force Structure.

2. (U) Statement of Objectives: To establish a 100-bed hospital in 26 sectors not now having military hospitals. During CY 67, elements of existing medical units were to deploy to 26 designated locations to establish the nucleus around which a hospital would be built. Using TOE personnel and equipment they will provide medical care within their capability until such time as service can be improved by the construction of the hospital as planned.

   a. Review of Progress: Incl 2

   b. Analysis of Progress:
(1) Deficiencies: Of the 26 hospitals programmed locations for 25 were established. Sections of clearing companies, separate medical companies, field hospitals and division medical companies were deployed to designated areas to provide medical care in accordance with Phase 1 of the plan. The 1 hospital location not established was at Dalat. It is expected that a site will be selected in Dalat by June 1968.

(2) Critical Problems: The 26 hospitals are not on the approved RVNAF UAI; therefore, an approved TOE is nonexistent resulting in the same problem as for the sub-sector dispensaries. Corrective action is described in paragraph 2d, below.

(3) Lack of Resources: The fragmentation of authorized medical units to provide equipment and staffing at sector hospitals has jeopardized the ability of authorized units to accomplish their basic missions. The action taken to correct this situation is discussed in paragraph 2d, below.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) Conclusions: Upon approval of the reorganization of the RVNAF Medical Service as described in paragraph d below, adequate personnel and equipment will be provided for the operation of sector hospitals.

(2) Need for Revision of Program: None

d. Corrective Action: In August 1967, the OTSG, RVNAF proposed a major reorganization of the RVNAF Medical Service. Inherent to this proposal, the OTSG will control more directly the majority of RVNAF medical resources. Medical groups will be established in each CTZ to which all non-divisional medical units will be either assigned or attached. The medical group will be commanded by the corps surgeon and assigned to the OTSG. A medical battalion, commanded by the division surgeon, will be organized in each division. The reorganization, if approved, will make available 1708 spaces from the current medical troop ceiling for staffing other medical facilities, and provide for the submission of TOE's for all desired units.

# REVIEW OF PROGRESS

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## REVIEW OF PROGRESS
### SECTOR HOSPITALS

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SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief, Operations Advisory Branch

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Designation of Facilities

Statement of Objectives: (U) To establish a class I and a class II system of hospitalization within the RVNAF Medical Service.

Review of Progress: This goal was postponed pending a decision on the reorganization of RVNAF Medical Service. If the reorganization is approved, all hospitals will be under the direct command and control of the OTSG and the need for specialized training programs at these hospitals will be determined at that time.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Command Surgeon
Statement of Objectives: To develop an Inter Hospital Aeromedical Evacuation System for the RVNAF.

a. Review of Progress: Uniform procedures for processing of aeromedical evacuation requests have been adopted in each Corps Tactical Zone. Requests for intra-corps evacuations are placed with the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) through the Corps Tactical Operations Center. Requests for inter-corps aeromedical evacuations are processed through the OTSG. Each Area Logistics Command has a Medical Regulating capability.

b. Analysis of Progress:

   (1) Deficiencies in accomplishments: Although a medical regulating capability has been developed two major problems exist: the lack of communications and the lack of aircraft. To overcome the communications problem, the OTSG, RVNAF is installing a teletype system and has installed 2 class A telephones. Increased coordination with the Chief Surgeon, VNAF, has resulted in greater utilization of VNAF aircraft for use in the inter-corps transfer of patients.

   (2) Critical Problems: Center around deficient communications and lack of aircraft or a high priority to existing aircraft.

   (3) Lack of Resources: Same as b(1) and (2) above.

c. Conclusions and/or trends:

   (1) Trends: During the first 6 months of 1967, the trend was toward greater reliance on the US to handle both tactical and inter-hospital aeromedical evacuation requests. This trend gradually reversed itself during the last half of 1967, to where the VNAF is now flying over 80% of all aeromedical evacuation requests.

   (2) Need for revision of program objectives: None.

d. Corrective Action: Action taken to correct deficiencies remain inadequate. It is anticipated that through the reorganization of the Medical Service during the first half of CY68, significant improvement will be made in developing communications as one focal point for all medical operations will be established in each Corps. It is further anticipated that continued reliance upon the US for aeromedical evacuation will be required through CY69.

e. Projection: Continued improvement in RVNAF aeromedical evacuation will continue through 1968.
1. (U) Statement of Objective: Review and evaluate all programs of instruction (POI) and lesson plans developed in 1967.

   a. Review of Progress:

      (1) The school advisor and appropriate officers on the staff of the Command Surgeon MACV reviewed every program of instruction developed during 1967. The POI's are of high quality and should satisfy future requirements for the RVNAF medical service.

      (2) Lesson plans were deficient or incomplete in most instances. Additional effort to correct these deficiencies are being applied.

   b. Analysis of Progress: A complete program of instruction has been developed for every course taught at the Military Medical School. They have been developed with adequate lead time for each course and are thorough and comprehensive. Lesson plans are being completed.

   c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

      (1) Development of POI's is adequate and no future changes are anticipated at this time.

      (2) Lesson plans are being improved.

   d. Corrective Actions: Actions taken appear to be adequate and no further corrective actions are anticipated at this time.

   e. Projection: The POI's as developed will improve training at the Military Medical School.

2. (U) Statement of Objectives: Encourage greater use of training aids, audio-visual aids and practical exercises in various courses of instruction.

   a. Review of Progress: Throughout 1967 considerable emphasis has been placed on the use of training aids, audio-visual aids and practical exercises. Records in the training section show an increase in the use of training and audio-visual aids. Practical exercises appeared to be increasing but a numerical record is not available.

   b. Analysis of Progress: Progress is slow as traditional instruction in Vietnam has centered around the lecture method with minimum use
of audio-visual aids or practical exercises.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Based on past experience future progress will be extremely slow in this area. Because of the importance of improved teaching techniques the program must be continued.

d. Corrective Actions: A Method of Instruction course was conducted for the purpose of improving teaching techniques. The School Advisor has discussed this problem on numerous occasions with the Director of Training and the School Commandant. These corrective actions appear adequate.

e. Projection: There will be little change in teaching methods for a number of years to come.

3. (U) Statement of Objective: Obtain required items currently authorized in the Vietnamese Army Supply and Equipment List (VAMSEL) to support training (Demonstration equipment, medical texts and desks).

a. Review of Progress:

   (1) All medical texts have been requisitioned and new texts have been authorized for the school VAMSEL.

   (2) Invoices are beginning to arrive on training aids shown to be on order in the last review and analysis.

   (3) Desks mentioned in the last report have been constructed; but construction deficiencies were discovered resulting in at least a one month delay in delivering.

   (4) Requisitioned laboratory equipment is now on hand.

b. Analysis of Progress: Considerable progress has been made since the last report. All the major difficulties have been overcome.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The most substantial gains in the entire advisory effort at the Military Medical School have been in this area. It should be maintained with no difficulty.

d. Corrective Action: No change in corrective actions is contemplated.

e. Projection: More effort will have to be expended, follow-up on the actions that have been initiated.

4. (U) Statement of Objective: Search for new and improved ways of developing leadership among the students, staff and faculty.
a. **Review of Progress:**

   (1) The pilot project aimed at improving leadership which was mentioned in the last review and analysis is still in effect.

   (2) The school commandant has assumed a stronger leadership role in his relationship with subordinates.

   (3) NCO's in the Enlisted Student Battalion are beginning to function more effectively in their positions.

b. **Analysis of Progress:**

   (1) The pilot project has proved very successful and will continue indefinitely.

   (2) Comments noted in last review and analysis are still applicable to the present situation.

c. **Conclusions and/or Trends:** Progress has been made and a genuine awareness and concern has been created. Even though there is considerable room for improvement, top leadership has begun to tackle the problem and more improvement should be visible.

d. **Corrective Actions:** Frequent discussions with the School Commandant and key staff officers has been reasonably successful. The pilot project has also produced significant results. A new program is presently being formulated for officers in the Medical College Program.

e. **Projection:** Progress will be slow but effort must be continued in order to develop more capable leadership.

f. **(U) Statement of Objective:** Work for the improvement of the entire physical plant so that training may be adequately supported at all times.

a. **Review of Progress:** In addition to those items mentioned in the last review and analysis the following improvements have been noted.

   (1) Broken windows repaired.

   (2) Several water faucets replaced.

   (3) Painting has been accomplished in several classrooms and barracks.

   (4) Light bulbs have been made available.
(5) Roofing for motor pool has been procured.

b. Analysis of Progress: A program for preventive maintenance is beginning to take shape. Even though many items have been repaired or replaced there is still much room for improvement.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: When compared to past efforts, substantial progress was made during 1967.

d. Corrective Actions. Actions taken during 1967 appear to be appropriate; if continued during 1968 even more significant results should be forthcoming.

e. Projection: To keep the Military Medical Functioning requires constant effort in the area of preventive maintenance. The school staff has finally begun to recognize this fact.
1. (C) Statement of Objective: To attain 90% monthly rate of 100% fill on requisitions.
   a. Review of Progress: RVNAF has attained an 83% month rate of 100% fill on requisitions.
   b. Analysis of Progress: RVNAF has increased its rate of initial fill from 78% in 1966 to 81% in first six months of 1967 and 83% in last six months of 1967. This represents a continual improvement in system. Reason percent of fill is not higher is that RVNAF depot administrative staffs have little sense of urgency in processing receipts, i.e., receipt of stock within depot; therefore, stock record accounts are not always up-to-date and in turn show all assets available at each depot.
   c. Conclusions and/or Trends: RVNAF depot percent of fill will continue to improve from 81% to 83% in the first six months of 1968.
   d. Corrective Action: US advisor personnel are monitoring receipts closely and urging counterpart to expedite posting of receipts.
   e. Projection: The percent of initial fill will continue to improve with each review period.

2. (C) Statement of Objective: To reduce due-out lines at end of each month to less than 10% of requisition lines processed.
   a. Review of Progress: Due-out lines at end of each month average 31% of requisition lines processed, a drop of 2%.
   b. Analysis of Progress: The steady decrease in percent of due-outs is directly related to the improving rate of initial fill. Prompt processing of receipts into stock record accounts reduces, accordingly, the number of due-outs established.
   c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The due-out picture will continue to improve.
   d. Corrective Action: As stated in initial fill problem, US advisory personnel are monitoring receipts closely and urging counterparts to expedite posting of receipts.

3. (C) Statement of Objective: Process requisitions within ten days from receipt of transportation requests (TR).
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a. Review of Progress: Approximately 10% of tonnage available for shipment continues to be on hand over ten days, awaiting sea and air transportation.

b. Analysis of Progress: The sea and air transportation backlog continues to be a country wide problem in all technical services.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Transportation will continue to be a country wide problem with the current heavy work load placed on available transportation assets.

d. Corrective Action: Stress is being placed on coordination of unit loads, avoiding piece meal shipments.

e. Projection: A minimal backlog of shipments will continue to exist for some time, depending on trends of war, availability of transportation, and traffic-ability and security of highways in-country.

h. (C) Statement of Objective: Reduce sea and air transportation requests (TR) backlog over 15 day to zero (0) tons.

a. Review of Progress: An average TR backlog over 15 days of 20,000 s/t exists with RVNAF each month for all types of supplies. Medical supplies continues to average 100 s/t or 1% of the total backlog.

b. Analysis of Progress: This is a Vietnamese country wide problem, medical being only a small portion. The transportation command is continually striving to improve this situation.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends: The sea and air transportation backlog will be reduced with greater coordination of assets and introduction of additional modes of transportation into the command.

d. Corrective Action: See analysis of program above.

e. Projection: See conclusions and/or trends above.

5. (C) Statement of Objective: Completely integrate MEDCAP and operational supply requisitioning to include establishment of due-outs.

a. Review of Progress: Per decision of Chief Surgeon, RVNAF, the Vietnamese military will not integrate the MEDCAP and operational supply systems.

b. Conclusion and/or Trends: Until Chief Surgeon, RVNAF reverses his decision, no progress can be expected in this area.

c. Corrective Action: See 5b above.

d. Projection: See 5b above.
1. (C) Statement of Objective: Establish supply operations reporting system for hospitals and major field medical units.

   a. Review of Progress: The objective was accomplished with the introduction of RVNAF monthly report BC 001.

   b. Analysis of Progress: See 1a above.

   c. Conclusions and/or Trends: See 1a above.

   d. Corrective Actions: No corrective action applicable in this area.

   e. Projection: The reporting system will be adequate for its intended use.

2. (C) Statement of Objective: Establish area supply support missions for hospital and other large medical units in order to reduce number of depot requisitions.

   a. Review of Progress: All action on this project has been suspended pending reorganization of RVNAF medical structure within the military.

   b. Analysis of Progress: See 2a above.

   c. Conclusions and/or Trends: See 2a above.

   d. Corrective Actions: See 2a above.

   e. Projection: Upon completion of change in RVNAF medical organizational structure and resumption of this program, the consolidation program will effect a marked reduction of requisitions being submitted to ARVN medical depots.

3. (C) Statement of Objectives: Establish field medical supply procedures.

   a. Review of Progress: The objective was accomplished with the publication and issue of a field medical supply procedure called Instruction Book No. 4311.

   b. Analysis of Progress: See 3a above.

   c. Conclusions and/or Trends: See 3a above.
d. **Corrective Action:** See 3a above.

e. **Projection:** The published field medical supply procedure, Instruction Book No. 43, will suffice for its intended use within RVNAF.


SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief, Provost Marshal Division, J-1

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Military Police

1(c) Statement of Objectives. To effect 100% of the assignments of personnel in the RVNAF Military Police Corps in accordance with the strength authorizations.

a. Review of Progress. The actual strength of the MP Corps was 5319 at end of 2nd Quarter FY 68. This is 70 below the authorized strength of 5419.

b. Analysis of Progress. This shortage is due primarily to the lack of recruits qualified to perform MP or Criminal Investigative duties. It is considered preferable to accept a shortage than to accept less than fully qualified personnel.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends. While the RVNAF MP personnel picture is in tune with programmed objectives, it is still a long way from being able to meet its mission requirements fully. The slow process of orderly growth, coupled with an insufficient number of qualified personnel, primarily junior leaders, is the current limiting factor.

d. Corrective Actions. A vigorous recruiting program has been initiated and there are no major problems anticipated in relation to achieving programmed goals.

2.(c) Statement of Objective. To achieve at Battalion level and lower units, 100% of the mandatory unit training requirements.

a. Review of Progress. 79.8% of RVNAF Military Police units were engaged in unit training during the first half FY 68.

b. Analysis of Progress. The MP Battalion unit training programs are inadequate due to elements being highly fragmented coupled with extremely heavy commitments and a lack of usable training guides.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends. Unit training has and will continue to be a problem within the RVNAF Military Police Corps. Units will remain fragmented and understrength while missions continue to increase, precluding adequate training participation.

d. Corrective Actions. Lesson plans will be prepared by OPMG and distributed by OPMG to the MP Battalions who will be responsible for conducting formal instruction to subordinate units. OPMG has planned for the consolidation of refresher training which will be conducted at battalion level. There will also be an increased emphasis on training by OPMG during field inspections, to include training tests.

34(c) Statement of Objective: To develop a TOE and SOP intended to establish uniformity of organization and standardization of operations of the MP Stations.

PAGE 55 OF 186 PAGES
a. Review of Progress. Presently no approved TOE exists for MP stations nor is there an SOP to standardize their activities.

b. Analysis of Progress. The fragmentation of MP units has resulted in MP stations being both understrength and lacking in equipment. An MP station is provided by the MP Battalion, which is limited to its TOE and, therefore, does not provide the types and quantities of equipment needed by MP stations. An approved MP Station TOE would eliminate the vast shortage of personnel, equipment and vehicles presently experienced.

c. Corrective Actions. An MP Station TOE has been drafted by OPMG/JOS and submitted to RVNAF/JOS for approval. An SOP applicable to all MP Stations has been completed and presently is being published.

1. (C) Statement of Objective. To achieve at the Military Police School 100% of the training requirements.

a. Statement of Progress. The school achieved 0% of the training requirements the first two quarters of FY 68.

b. Analysis of Progress. The added increase in the strength of the MP Corps has had a great impact on the MP School. It was anticipated that the school would meet only 66% of the training requirements during the last two quarters of FY 68.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends. A major problem of the MP School was the failure to program an equal training load for the last two quarters of FY 68.

d. Corrective Actions. OPMG/JOS has revised its school program to make maximum use of its facilities. The school has programmed an equal training load for the last two quarters FY 69, and the first two quarters FY 69. This reprogramming will achieve 100% of training requirements for CY 68.

5. (C) Statement of Objective. To effect the transfer of 2/2 CI personnel to the National Police as well as train the replacements necessary to fill the vacancies created by this transfer.

a. Review of Progress. This transfer is in compliance with the agreement that all members of the MPCI who were formerly members of the gendarmerie would be phased back to the National Police.

b. Analysis of Progress. The 2/2 ex-gendarmerie personnel will be phased back to the National Police in groups of 30 over a two year period beginning in CY 69.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends. It is necessary to recruit from qualified NCOs within the RVNAF Military Police Corps 2/2 replacements who will be trained to fill the vacancies created by this transfer.
d. Corrective Action. All 2h2 CI replacements have been recruited and will begin schooling in February 68.

6.4) Statement of Objective. To improve the effectiveness of the operations and security of the Prisoner of War Camps.

a. Review of Progress. The Military Police School is unable to provide training pertinent to PW Camp activities.

b. Analysis of Progress. The rapid expansion of the Prisoner of War program has necessitated an increased number of Military Police qualified in PW Activities.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends. Two Military Police Battalions are scheduled to be activated prior to the end of CY 68.

d. Corrective Actions. The PW Camp at Pleiku will conduct PW training for the PW Camps at Da Nang, Pleiku and Oui Nhon. The PW Camp at Bien Hoa will conduct PW training for Can Tho, Phu Quoc and Bien Hoa.

7.4) Statement of Objective. To prepare and submit for approval a TOE for the Central PW Camp at Phu Quoc.

a. Review of Progress. There is no approved TOE for the Central PW Command.

b. Analysis of Progress. Prior to CY 68 there existed no need for a PW Command. All PW installations were confined to an enclosure consisting of 2 compounds with the exception of Oui Nhon which has only one.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends. Current programs call for the expansion of Phu Quoc PW Camp to 7 enclosures. A PW Command TOE is necessary to provide control, security, logistical support and administration for the Military Police forces.

d. Corrective Action. A PW Command TOE is presently being drafted by OPAG for approval by J-3/JGS.

8.4) Statement of Objective: To maintain minimum levels of sickness, injury or death of Prisoners of War which do not exceed RVNAF norms.

a. Review of Progress. The total number of PW that have died in PW Camps is 16 out of a grand total of 9,713 PW.

b. Analysis of Progress. These deaths occurred due to poor physical health of the PW prior to internment.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends. While the sickness, injury and deaths in RVNAF PW camps are consistent with the programmed objective, it is anticipated that the number of injuries, illnesses and deaths will increase in direct proportion to the increased population in the camps.
d. Corrective Actions. Dispensaries are periodically inspected by medical personnel and advisors to insure that adequate medications and equipment are on hand. A program of early identification of those PW that are sick or injured prior to internment has been initiated.

9.(c) Statement of Objective. To expand the Central PW Camp on Phu Quoc Island to provide sufficient PW facilities and guard personnel to maintain a proper population balance in the utilization of all PW facilities.

a. Review of Progress. Two of the seven enclosures at Phu Quoc have been completed. The third enclosure is 70% completed.

b. Analysis of Progress. The present PW capacity under normal conditions at Phu Quoc is 4000 PW and under modified conditions 5000 PW. With the completion of the third enclosure the normal capacity will be 6000 PW and 7500 under modified conditions.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends. The RVNAF Central PW Camp construction is following programmed objectives, and enclosure 3 is 70% completed. The insufficient number of qualified personnel, primarily junior leaders, is the current limiting factor to the accomplishment of this mission.

d. Corrective Actions. A program of vigorous recruiting and training has been initiated and there is no major problem anticipated in relation to programmed goals.

10.(c) Statement of Objective. To inspect 100% of the PW records during CY 68 for maintenance in accordance with PW records management.

a. Review of Progress. 90% of the PW records have been reviewed while being updated and transferred to automation.

b. Analysis of Progress. The remaining 10% of the PW records will be reviewed as they are updated and transferred to the automated system.

c. Corrective Actions. A major problem with the manual system of maintaining PW records and forms was increasing volume. By use of Automatic Data Processing, reviews and updates can be accomplished monthly rather than quarterly. No major problem is anticipated in achieving the programmed goal.

11.(c) Statement of Objective. To develop and maintain a vigorous and energetic work program for PW and ensure that all able-bodied PW are engaged in work or purposeful vocational training.

a. Review of Progress. Work programs at the ARVN PW camps are still in the developmental stage.

b. Analysis of Progress. The work program with appropriate compensation for PW participation has just received official approval of GVN. Pay scales, policies and procedures are being coordinated with the Ministry of Finance with the assistance of the MACV Comptroller.
c. Conclusions and/or Trends. While the work programs are moving forward at the various camps, the policies and procedures needed to implement the PW pay for labor is currently the limiting factor.

d. Corrective Actions. Preparation of pay scales for various types of labor is underway.

12(c) Statement of the Objective. To continue full compliance with all aspects of the Geneva Conventions, relative to the treatment of PW.

a. Review of Progress. US, F:MAF and RVNAF are complying with the Geneva Conventions relative to the treatment of PW, and, with the exception of Thailand Forces, have signed an agreement attesting to their willingness to comply with the Geneva Conventions.

b. Analysis of Progress. Thailand forces have not yet drawn up an agreement because of their recent arrival in country.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends. It can be expected that all nations in Vietnam will continue to observe the Geneva Conventions and that Thailand will execute an agreement to that effect in the very near future.

d. Corrective Actions. Preparation of a working agreement has been initiated by Thailand Forces relative to the treatment of PW and attesting to adherence to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.
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SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Assistant Chief of Staff, J2

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Training and Equipment Assistance to HVN, Military Security Service (MSS)

(C) Statement of Objective: To provide technical equipment and specialized training to the Military Security Service (MSS) to assist them in becoming an effective, proficient counterintelligence organization.

a. Review of Progress: MSS has been issued about 99% of the programmed equipment. The Operational Assistance Team (OAT), 525th MI Group, presented an average of 17 hours per month of formal training during the period October-December 1967 to MSS personnel. OAT conducted an average of 130 hours per month of "on the job training" for the period July-December 1967 to MSS personnel.

b. Analysis of Progress: The equipment and training presented to MSS has greatly increased MSS capabilities and performance in the areas of: use of technical equipment, surveillance, VIP security, sabotage and countersabotage, and investigative photography. During the months of July, August, and September 1967, all formal training was suspended at the request of MSS because of other commitments related to the September elections. Formal training was reinstated on 4 October 1967.

c. Conclusions and Trends: The programmed equipment which has been issued to MSS in addition to the training which has been provided to them has measurably increased their effectiveness and professionalism in the field of counterintelligence. Both formal training and informal OJT instruction will be continued by OAT personnel.

d. Corrective Actions: None required.

e. Projection: Balance of equipment will be issued as needed and refresher training in courses already presented will be offered to MSS.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J2
Statement of Objectives: The Military Telecommunications Network, Vietnam was established to upgrade and expand existing RVNAF communications facilities and in later phases to provide an interconnected area communications system. This expansion covers some 200 NAF funded Class IV Signal Development Projects in the areas of manual and toll switchboards, dial exchanges, outside cable and pole line construction, twelve channel VHF radio relay systems and 24 and 46 channel microwave radio systems, SSB rehabilitation, improvement of existing commcenters and construction of new commcenters, Dial Central Offices and radio relay structures.

Review of Progress: The actual accomplishments achieved during the period 1 July 1967 to 31 December 1967 are:
(1) Manual switchboards installed - 12
(2) Poles set - approximately - 500
(3) Kilometers of cable installed - 40
(4) Twelve channel systems installed - 2
(5) Class IV Projects initiated - 4
(6) Training: Vung Tau Sig School graduates - 60 off, 962 EM off shore graduates - 18 off, 12 EM

Analysis of Progress:
(1) Initial slippage was encountered in the receipt of materials for MTN-V. Since the Spring of 1967, however, material has arrived and installation is progressing. Slippage of funds for construction of 41 structures occurred but necessary fund approval was obtained in 4th quarter of FY67. The late arrival of communications equipment to be installed in these buildings has resulted in an altered schedule which is now progressing according to revised plans.

(2) At this time resources of men and material are being closely monitored. Personnel are being trained in the new equipment of MTN-V, and numerous TO&E's are being revised to meet expanded traffic/maintenance requirements which the new equipment will create.

(3) A complete review of all MTN-V projects was accomplished during this period. Projects were reengineered and reprogrammed as required to conform to current needs. The revision of power and air conditioning equipment requirements produced dollar savings in the amount of $230,000.
(4) According to DA, Multiplexer, AN/TCC-13, used with microwave radio equipment AN/TRC-29, cannot be procured to fulfill MTN-V requirements. Action has been taken to program a commercial multiplexer as a suitable replacement for the AN/TCC-13. This will incur a slippage of the installation and operation of the radio relay system by approximately 12-18 months to CY69.

d. Conclusions and Trends: MTN-V progress is continuing at an acceptable pace. Equipment is being completely installed by ARVN Signal Corps soldiers with only minor installation wiring problems. Systems already in operation have proved to be reliable, efficient and adequate.

e. Corrective Actions: Corrective actions have been taken to speed up certain construction programs after initial delays and to accelerate the arrival or procurement of materiel in-country. These actions will be monitored continually.

f. Projection: Upon completion of all MTN-V projects, local RVNAF communications facilities will be tied into a well integrated and efficient telecommunications system serving RVNAF needs and will provide for an RVNAF owned, operated and controlled system by the end of CY70.
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Psychological Operations Directorate.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Improvement of RVNAF General Political Warfare Department (GPWD).

Statement of Objective: The objective of this sub-program is an overall improvement in the performance of the General Political Warfare Department, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

a. Review of Progress: Under the direction of the Chief GPWD considerable progress has been made in the past six months in an overall improvement of resource management required for efficient operation of the Department. Expendable supplies for the Political Warfare Battalions and the Psychological Warfare Department are at a sufficient level for near maximum use of existing reproduction equipment. An annual forecast for expendables plus regular requisition submission have enabled the normal supply system to meet the demand. The common user RTT circuits available to the Psychological Warfare Department have been expanded to cover all four Corps Tactical Zones. Funds have been budgeted in the calendar year 1968 VN budget to provide, on a trial basis, periodic maintenance inspection and repair of reproduction equipment. This will be accomplished by a local maintenance contract. If successful it can be continued or expanded as necessary in 1969. A five headed Wehendorfer roll fed newspaper press was received from Japan in December 1967 and will be fully operational in February 1968. This press will vastly increase the reproduction capability of the Psychological Warfare Department. A substantial TOE change for the Psychological Warfare Department was completed and submitted to the Joint General Staff for approval. Additionally the design for a new printing facility for the Psychological Warfare Department was proposed to COMUSMACV. The construction of this facility will be programmed in the FY 70 construction program with the possibility of reprogramming for FY 69. The "scope of work" study for the expansion of Channel B, RVNAF Radio has been completed and contract negotiations will begin early in 1968.

b. Analysis of Progress: Improvement throughout GPWD at all levels are a direct result of increased command emphasis and the increasing awareness of the roll of Political Warfare. As additional personnel are trained in various aspects of Political Warfare and the experience level has increased the quality in all areas have shown improvement. Although RTT circuits now reach all four Corps Tactical Zones the need exists for newer equipment and sole user circuits. These circuits only reach the Corps Headquarters at this time and should eventually be extended to the divisions as well as the Political Warfare Battalions. The acquisition of the Wehendorfer press will increase the reproduction capability of the Psychological Warfare Department,
however, it will still fall far short of that required. The expeditious approval of the TOE and procurement of the additional equipment proposed therein is needed to meet existing and projected requirements. The “scope of work” study for the expansion of Channel B, RVNAF Radio, although complete, will require additional conferences with interested agencies. These will be held in the near future and will be concerned primarily with total cost of the project.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Indications for 1968 are that continuing improvement can be expected.

d. Corrective Action: The system of an annual forecast for expendable supplies has brought about a great deal of improvement in the receipt of supplies. However, this forecast system should only be considered an intermediate step toward the goal of a smooth running system of timely receipt of those items required for efficient operation. The process of submitting a forecast for all expendable items for the coming year is valid only when used as a planning aid. Under the present system the forecast is so strictly adhered to that an item excess to that of the forecast takes weeks and even months to procure, even if it exists in the supply system. Steps are being taken to bring about the timely submission and follow-up action on all requisitions, thus allowing the demand on the system to determine requirements rather than completely relying on an annual forecast.

e. Projection: The capability of the RVNAF General Political Warfare Department should continue to improve. As programmed equipment continues to arrive and the training and experience of the personnel increase there will continue to be improvement in the quantity and quality of the efforts throughout GFWD.
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER:  ACoFS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE:  RVNAF Procurement.

Statement of Objective:  To improve the responsiveness of the RVNAF Procurement System.


b. Element - Development of Specifications Program.
   Goal - Establishment of adequate and proper contract specifications.

c. Element - Inspection Procedures.
   Goal - Development of inspection and acceptance procedures. Action to reduce the time frame for contract award procedures. Establishment of small-business procurement procedures.

Analysis:  Significant progress in modernizing and standardizing RVNAF procurement procedures was accomplished during CY 67. Regulations covering contract administration were approved and implemented which established reasonable time limitations for the accomplishment of payment of monies due the contractors for completed contracts. These regulations also established procedures for the receipt of supplies and the processing of related receiving reports and inspections.

A program for the standardization and publication of specifications covering items procured was established. To date a total of five specifications have been approved and published, fifty specifications are presently in final draft form being staffed prior to submission for approval and forty-four specifications are currently being prepared.

Projection:  RVNAF has developed a more responsive procurement system, which can be expected to improve as experience is gained.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR:  ACoFS, J4
Statement of objectives: To advise and assist the RVNAF in the conduct of RDT&E and to train RVNAF R&D officers in project definition, experimental design, data acquisition and analysis, technical research report writing, and R&D management.

a. Review of progress:

(1) During the period covered by this report, great progress was made in getting CDTC-V officers into field operations on significant R&D projects. Captain Duat participated in a field test of a Thai combat ration for adoption by the RVNAF for a period of 21 days during July and August 1967. Also, the director of CDTC-V and his project officer, Captain Duat, accompanied RDFU-V personnel on a visit to Bangkok, Thailand, during December 1967 for purposes of discussions with both Thai military and civilian officials concerning the Thai Combat Ration. LT Buu assisted in the development of propaganda pretesting techniques and the extension of these techniques to prisoners of war, and in the process made field trips to six different locations in Vietnam. Captain Loi participated in data collection of social and economic factors affecting development of Plain of Reeds. Major Truong, then Captain, and Captain Luu assisted in development of pretest questionnaires, research design, and data analysis techniques connected with several projects. On two occasions the director of CDTC-V and the director of RDFU-V made inspection trips of the Plain of Reeds accompanied by personnel from USAID. These trips required extensive liaison with high officials in the Delta region. Captain Loi, LT Hai, and Major Truong assisted in preparation of meaningful poetry for a special psychological warfare project. Major Ho participated for five days in field tests of new seismic intrusion devices with the United States' 1st Cavalry Division. Major Ho also supervised a country-wide communications data collection effort. These data are presently being reduced and analyzed at CDTC-V.

(2) Although in the first half of 1967 CDTC-V made progress in interface with the universities of Can Tho, Hue, and Saigon, this activity was for the most part curtailed in the second half of 1967. One exception to this was a special project with the University of Saigon Chemistry Department where Captain Loi secured the assistance of the staff in analyzing an extremely complicated chemical compound captured from the Viet Cong. This was a particularly important effort since the chemical had immediate operational application with the Australian Forces.

(3) The CDTC-V combined effort with the Thai military establishment on two projects of mutual interest
which started in the first half of 1967 continued with visits by Thai military personnel to Vietnam for purposes of testing, data collection, and discussions. Additionally, CDTC-V personnel visited Thailand for a period of one week to coordinate further testing and data collection on these two projects.

(4) During the first half of 1967, CDTC-V project officers were assigned to each of the RDFU-V projects. During the second half of the year significant progress was made in developing CDTC-V capabilities to contribute significantly to the projects to which they were assigned. In addition, the CDTC-V projects have increased in number and (in some cases) in scope, and an RDFU-V officer has been assigned to each of these projects.

(5) The Vietnamese Vocabulary Study, which was commenced in the first half of 1967, continued to near completion in the second half of the year. This study, when completed, will be the first such study conducted entirely by the Vietnamese social science community, and the work should have significant impact on Psy Ops leaflet design and composition.

(6) The new CDTC-V TO&E, which was being formulated with the assistance of RDFU-V in the first half of 1967, was completed and has been submitted to the JGS for approval. A significant addition to this organization is the provision for a behavioral sciences division.

b. Analysis of progress: The progress toward active completion of the program goals appears to be generally satisfactory.

(1) Field trips in which CDTC-V participated increased during the reporting period by a factor of 2.34.

(2) Although the CDTC-V scope of work has broadened considerably, it must be noted that positive working relationships between the unit and the civilian scientific community have diminished. This diminution is at least partially a function of the change in priorities resulting from greater attention to social, economic, and psychological problems of the Republic.

(3) Progress toward the formation of a multinational research community has been extremely slow, and it is now believed that the previously reported idea of assigning Thai, ROK, and ROC liaison officers to CDTC-V was too ambitious. It has now been decided that a pilot program should first be undertaken involving Korean, Vietnamese, and American social scientists. If this program proves successful, additional efforts toward expansion will be made.

(4) Coordination and cooperation between CDTC-V and RDFU-V has increased beyond our highest expectations.
(a) Co-location of U.S. program managers with their counterparts has been increased by a factor of 4.

(b) Mutual participation in all projects has resulted in a greater responsiveness to the needs of the GVN and U.S. effort.

(c) CDTC-V provided quick reaction logistics support for a U.S. field test of a large motorized balloon. Without this close cooperation of the CDTC-V in air lifting helium and supplies to the test site, the field test time would have doubled with significant increase in cost.

(d) A significant indicator of the close coordination and development of mutual understanding has been the successful combined social functions of the two groups. These have included children's parties, celebrations of RVN and U.S. holy days and holidays, and combined religious services.

(5) It is believed that a great step forward in development of the CDTC-V management capability has been accomplished during this period by the initiation of a combined monthly management review of all programs. This review is conducted completely in English with, in most cases, each CDTC-V project officer actively participating.

(6) The combined RDFU-V and CDTC-V study for reorganization of the functions of CDTC-V has resulted in an increasing awareness in the scope of problems confronting the research community in Vietnam.

c. Conclusions and/or trends:

(1) The trend of RVNAF progress in CDTC-V is toward a steady increase of their activities toward the accomplishment of all stated objectives. CDTC-V is becoming more effective in the field of R&D management. The unit is also becoming more responsive to the needs of the operational units of both countries. They are broadening their R&D base by increasing their capability in the new disciplines of behavioral science.

d. Corrective actions: To encourage JGS/MOD to identify and assign qualified personnel resources for R&D work in CDTC-V.

e. Projection:

(1) An increase in the number of officers assigned to CDTC-V has been noted in 1967. This trend is expected to continue.
The training of CDTC-V personnel to a high level of operations research and systems analysis capability has commenced. This training will include courses in design of research instruments for data-collection, data analysis collation, cost effectiveness studies, and management of research resources. The training will consist of a classroom curriculum directly related to current projects as determined by GVN priorities. It is hoped that the training program can provide university credit for each student who completes the course.

The trend toward increased RDT&E capability within CDTC-V will continue by the institution of a program whereby CDTC-V personnel are sent to CONUS under ARPA sponsorship for specialized training related to specific projects. This portion of the program is designed to provide CONUS-based training and/or OJT to specific project officers so that (a) the requirements of the project may be met and (b) this additional education can be relayed to all project officers within CDTC-V upon return from CONUS of the individual project officer.
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SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief, Advisory Division, JI

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Strength

1. (c) Statement of Objective: To maintain the assigned strength of the RVNAF at the allocated or authorized strength level by component.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>GOAL (AUTHORIZED STRENGTH)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>295,878</td>
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<tr>
<td>VNN</td>
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<td>VNMC</td>
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<td>VNAF</td>
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<td>RF</td>
<td>175,067</td>
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<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>196,205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Review of Progress:

1. The actual strength of the Regular Forces as of 31 December 1967 was 342,951 or 7,301 greater than the authorized strength of 335,650. A breakout by components is shown at page 73. VNN and VNAF were slightly understrength.

2. As of 15 December 1967, 931 of the 993 allocated companies had been activated. There was a shortfall of 62 RF companies and 23,691 in strength. The chart on page 74 portrays the number of companies allocated and activated from January 1967 and projected into 1968.

3. As of 15 December 1967, 4,237 of the 4,463 allocated platoons had been activated. There was a shortfall of 226 PF platoons and 7,416 in strength. The chart on page 75 portrays the number of platoons allocated and activated from January 1967 and projected into 1968.

b. Analysis of Progress: The fact that allocated unit and strength goals have not been met indicates unsatisfactory progress in this sub-program. However, cognizance must be taken of the fact that 22 RF companies and 150 PF platoons were allocated for activation in late November. By the very nature of the localized procurement situation, the fill of these new units will always lag the allocation date by several months.

2. (c) Statement of Objective: To maintain the WAFC assigned strength at the programmed strength level.

GOAL (CY67 PROGRAM) - 3,387
a. Review of Progress: The chart at page 76 shows the actual strength of WAPC at the beginning and end of CY67. There was an overall increase of 704 in the strength of the Women’s Armed Forces Corps during CY67. However, the strength is 686 below the CY67 programmed strength of 3,387.

b. Analysis of Progress: This shortage of strength is essentially a recruiting problem, and greater emphasis from JGS would improve this program.

3. (C) Statement of Objective: To maintain the average maneuver battalion assigned strength at the authorized strength level, and average present for duty and present for operations strengths at 90% and 80%, respectively, of the authorized strength.

Review of Progress:

(1) The status of the ARVN divisions and the two separate Regiments, as of 13 Dec 67, is shown on the chart at page 77. The present for duty and assigned strengths are shown as a percentage of authorized strength. The significant shortage in the 1st Division reflects the authorization of the additional Regiment which has not been filled. The other organizations reporting assigned strength below 90% of the authorized are 21st Division with 88%, Airborne Division with 85%, and the 51st Regiment with 86%.

(2) The average assigned strength for the maneuver battalions of the Infantry and Airborne Divisions, Ranger and the Marines as of 31 Dec 67 is shown on the chart at page 78. The strength of each is shown as a percentage of the authorized. The chart also reflects the average present for duty and present for operations strengths of the maneuver battalions as a percentage of the authorized. The Marine battalions are higher in every category than the other maneuver battalions, while the Rangers and the Airborne are still reporting unsatisfactory strengths. However, their recruiting during the last quarter of CY67 showed improvement. The Rangers recruited a total of 2,173 during October, November, and December and the Airborne 1,688.

4. (C) Statement of Objective: To reduce the number of RVNAF desertions to a manageable level.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) A comparison of CY66 and CY67 average monthly desertions and desertion rates per 1000 assigned strength is shown on the chart at page 79. Although there has been a 32% reduction in RVNAF desertions for 1967 as compared with CY66, desertions have leveled off at too high a rate. Desertions comprised approximately 70% of the total manpower loss from RVNAF during 1967.
(2) The chart on page 80 shows the number of deserters apprehended, the number tried in military field courts, number convicted and assigned to battlefield labor units. These figures are cumulative as of each of the dates shown. The number of deserters apprehended has slowed down during the latter period; the number apprehended was less than one-half of those apprehended during the former period.

(3) The chart at page 81 shows the strength status of deserter-laborers as of three dates during CY67. The column heading of miscellaneous includes sick, killed, and rehabilitated. Both MACV and JGS are concerned about the inordinate number of deserter-laborer escapes.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) MACV conducted a comprehensive desertion control study and made necessary recommendations to JGS in December 1967 to reduce the number of deserters. These measures emphasized the need for improvement of leadership throughout RVNAF, the day to day living environment of the RVNAF servicemen and their dependents, and the motivation and indoctrination of the citizens.

(2) Although battlefield labor units do serve as a deterrent to desertion, reports indicate that there is reluctance on the part of some units to thrust deserter-laborers into the fore of operations to perform hard duty details. IG/JGS has been inspecting this matter and recommending corrective action.

(3) JGS published a directive in September 1967 which authorizes grace measures for the reformed laborers. These provisions are resulting in a sizeable number being rehabilitated and returned to military service.

c. Corrective Action:

(1) JGS has recently organized a delegation to visit all Divisions. This delegation will conduct on-the-spot inspections of the administration, employment and procedures to rehabilitate deserving deserter-laborers.

(2) JGS has directed increased activity to round-up deserters.

(3) Specific RVNAF command attention is needed to ensure a steady reduction in the desertion rate.
CONFIDENTIAL

REGULAR FORCE

31 DEC 1967

ARVN

AUTH 295,878

ASG 302,837

DIFF 6,959

ASG 342,951

AUTH 335,650

DIFF 7,301

VNN

AUTH 16,003

ASG 15,968

VNMC

AUTH 7,321

ASG 7,985

664

VNAF

AUTH 16,448

ASG 16,161

287
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>31 DEC 66 STR</th>
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<th>DIFF</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,997</td>
<td>2,701</td>
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**WAFC STRENGTH**

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

ARVN DIVISION STRENGTH
31 DEC 1967

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<th>PERCENT</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>70</th>
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<td>5th</td>
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</table>

PRESENT FOR DUTY
ASSIGNED

CONFIDENTIAL
MANEUVER BATTALIONS - 31 DEC 67

AVERAGE ASSIGNED STRENGTH
AVERAGE PRESENT FOR DUTY STRENGTH
AVERAGE PRESENT FOR OPERATION STRENGTH

CONFIDENTIAL
RVNAF DESERTION CONTROL
AVERAGE NUMBER OF DESERTIONS PER MONTH
AND
RATE PER 1000 ASSIGNED

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Type</th>
<th>CY 1966</th>
<th>JAN-JUN 1967</th>
<th>CY 1967*</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>5,314/16.8</td>
<td>3,437/10.7</td>
<td>3,426/10.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>REGIONAL FORCE</td>
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<td>1,499/10.6</td>
<td>1,391/9.8</td>
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<td>POPULAR FORCE</td>
<td>3,097/22.3</td>
<td>1,967/13.6</td>
<td>1,975/13.5</td>
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* DATA AS OF 30 NOV 1967
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<tr>
<th>RVNAF Deserter Control</th>
<th>Assigned to Battlefield Labor Units</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1,630</td>
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<td>Convicted</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tried</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Apprehended</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>11,639</td>
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<td>12,696</td>
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<td>15,814</td>
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<td>30 Nov 67</td>
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**Dates:** 1 Feb 67, 31 Jul 67, 30 Nov 67
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<td>24 Jun 67</td>
<td></td>
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SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACoFS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Improvement of Status of the RVNAF Soldier.

Statement of Objective: To improve the subsistence of the RVNAF Soldier.

a. Element - Operational Rations: Programming and procurement of adequate operational rations to fill requirements.

Goal - Provide a free operational ration to all personnel engaged in tactical operations.

b. Element - Garrison Rations:
   1. Establish unit mess halls.
   2. Increase the garrison ration allowance.

Goal - Establish approximately 2,000 unit mess halls. Establishment of a unit farm/garden program.

c. Element - Commissary: Increase the capability to provide an adequate number of food items for sale to dependents.

Goal - Establishment of an operational self-supporting Commissary System.

Analysis: Operational rations are in plentiful supply and available on a free issue basis. There are sufficient funds included in the GVN Defense Budget to procure enough rations to meet projected CY 68 needs. Over 700 new mess halls were established in CY 67, providing a total of 1,494, however, a requirement remains for approximately 1,000 additional messes. The garrison ration allowance has been increased by $10 per man per day, however, the continued inflation of food prices requires annual review of this allowance. With the U.S. donation of approximately $42 million worth of food to the RVNAF Commissary System, a major step in assisting the commissary system to become self-supporting was achieved. Additional retail outlets have been established throughout the country to provide improved service to more RVNAF servicemen and their families. As of 31 December 1967 a total of 194 commissary stores were in operation.

Projection: The goal of 220 commissary outlets can be expected to be met by 1 March 1968. The establishment of unit messes are proceeding at an acceptable rate.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: ACoFS, J4
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SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACoFS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Supply Shortages

Statement of Objective: To improve the responsiveness of the RVNAF supply system in reacting to operating level shortages.

a. Element - Priority of Transportation - Insufficient transportation to fill all requirements.

Goal - Increase of direct shipments of supplies from off-shore sources to up-country ports. Activation and equipping of transportation units to provide greater movement and handling capability.

b. Element - Order - Ship time unrealistic.

Goal - Continued advisor emphasis to JGS on establishment of procedures to analyse and readjust in-country order - ship times on a recurring basis.

c. Element - Local procurement problems.

Goal - Continued monitoring of an increased emphasis on proper requisitioning and follow-up procedures by advisors at all levels. The assignment of additional advisors now authorized for A&L Cos will materially assist in the support of Regional and Popular Forces.

d. Element - Improper requisitioning procedures, including timely followup and timely allocation of controlled items of supply.

Goal - Command emphasis on the proper distribution of supplies and equipment in accordance with approved TOE authorizations.

Analysis: 1. U.S. assistance in the movement of supplies continues to be a necessity. Improvement in the backlog of supplies awaiting shipment in Saigon has been achieved to some degree by direct shipments, thus providing additional transportation for in-country movement.

a. Maximum use is being made of direct shipments of engineer supplies to all DSU's. At present these shipments consist mainly of fortification materials.

b. A total of 314 medical lines are now being direct shipped to Field Medical Depots. This constitutes a 9% line item increase during 1967. In addition, all non-expendable items of medical equipment are considered for direct shipment on an individual basis. Approximately 85% of all medical supplies and equipment are being direct shipped from the supply source to field Medical Depots.
c. For Ordnance items the volume of direct shipment requisitions has increased in CY67 to the extent that currently 40% of all critical repair parts requisitions are direct shipped to I, II, and V ALCs. Recently direct shipments of 4,000 ea 750X20 truck tires to the I, II, and V ALCs were made. Priority 02 requisitions for critically needed items and requisitions for items below the established safety level will continue to receive maximum direct shipment action.

d. Direct shipments of selected dry batteries to up-country ports from CONUS has been extremely effective in reducing transportation backlogs of bulky battery shipments.

e. In I ALC improvement in the backlog of supplies awaiting shipment in Da Nang has been achieved by trans-shipping cargo to out-posts without delivery to I ALC depots in the Da Nang area. Through-put shipments from I ALC depots to out-posts bypassing A&D6L companies has improved the flow of supplies to out-posts and released sector transportation assets for other use.

f. In V ALC direct shipments of critical items to Nha Trang has improved the total supply status significantly during CY67. Notable items reflecting this fact are listed below:

1. Receipt of Ordnance repair parts by this mode increased from 30% to 85%.
2. 90% of all barrier material came by direct shipment.
3. Critical medical line items dropped from 35 to 8 during the last two quarters.
4. More than adequate BA-279 and BA-30 batteries, previously in short supply, are on hand.

2. JGS has not changed its position that RVNMAF transportation can meet a 45-day order-ship time (OST) goal. During Aug-Oct 67 in most areas in RVN the 45 day OST was closely approached; however, in Nov - Dec 67 the average OST was about 60 days. About 15 days of the 45 day OST is consumed in transmitting requisitions to the base depot, processing them for fill, preparing the transportation request, and moving the items from the servicing port to the OSC. Transportation resources in RVN cannot meet a 30 day average shipment time, and special attention is not given to transportation requests until they are over 45 days old.

a. The engineer items current order-ship time for routine shipments is felt to be adequate based upon experience at the 40th Engineer Base Depot. A 45 day order-ship time is also established as a CLIP goal. Although it is obvious that a reduction of the order-ship time would provide better customer satisfaction, it is doubtful that this time can be significantly reduced without a change to the normal processing methods currently employed by ARVN.
b. No reduction in order-ship time for medical supplies has been realised during 1967. Order-ship time from the 70th Medical Base Depot to Field Medical Depots varies from a low of 15 days to a high of 85 days.

c. For selected signal items the use of the KBC postal system for the distribution of repair parts and small items has reduced delays caused by time required to consolidate shipments.

d. In I ALC improvement in shipping of repair parts was realized due to direct shipments from CONUS and Japan. Order and shipping time (OST) in country, however, remains relatively unchanged. Actual average OST is consistently 60-70 days, well above the 45 days specified.

e. In II ALC the order and ship time used in determining RO quantities has recently been adjusted to agree with the actual order and ship time required to move supplies from Saigon to the 220th OSC. This is a step in the right direction; updating the order and ship time periodically should be continued.

f. In V ALC the 45 day order - ship time is still considered unrealistic. This is a variable factor at best, but shipments from base depots to Nha Trang is not much better than direct shipment OST's. An OST of 60 to 90 days should be established for items.

3. The cause of many routine supply problems has been identified as a lack of training at all levels, with minimum familiarity with basic supply procedures at the lower echelons. The training of both ARVN and US personnel by ALC advisors has been given strong emphasis. Informal training is being given on specific supply problem areas in ALC units. The ALC commanders have also emphasised joint ARVN-Advisor supply assistance visits to supported units to educate supply personnel on proper procedures. However, a continuing problem that affects all logistics personnel is the lack of a consolidated clear, coherent, current document that defines the procedures for all supply actions and that is available to all units.

a. Local procurement procedures result in slow obligation and expenditure of funds by RVNAF. The requisitioning and allocation of many items is too centralized. The control of assets is often vested in CIC, the Chief of Technical Service, the CTZ commander and the ALC commander. If issue orders could be prepared without such centralized control, items could be offered for shipment and issue much faster.

b. The RVNAF Signal Directorate has taken the initiative and requested issue instructions from JGS for modernization items. This is a step forward in an attempt to get the allocation authority delegated to Chiefs of Technical Services.

c. Certain items of supply would be more readily available to the Engineer Direct Support Units if they could procure them locally, rather than rely on Base Depot for supply. Frequently the Base Depot must also procure locally in Saigon. The lengthy order-ship time would be reduced, and the DSU would be more responsive to requirements placed on them.

CONFIDENTIAL
d. JGS approved the purchase of rice on the local economy for use by Vietnamese troops. This has resulted in providing the troops in IV CTZ with more acceptable food and has required less transportation.

4. Progress in the implementation of correct requisitioning procedures varies from one unit to another. Following are comments regarding progress during CY 67:

a. In engineer supply activities improper requisitioning practices on the whole have been decreasing. Each DSU is required to send both a Vietnamese and U.S. representative to the Depot once a month to follow-up all outstanding requisitions. At the same time those requisitions improperly submitted are re-submitted, thereby reducing administrative delays to the minimum. To further improve requisitioning procedures, classes on the use of TH's to obtain requisition data and classes on editing of requisitions have been presented to DSU supply personnel.

b. Marked improvement in the knowledge of proper requisitioning procedures by QM NICP personnel has been noted. Timely follow-up action on requisitions is being made and a reconciliation program between the field depots and the NICP has been initiated.

c. The Major Items Management Agency, Office Chief of Ordnance is currently reporting expected receipts of controlled major items of equipment to the RVNAF JGS to effect more timely allocation to using units. Delays in distribution experienced in the past are being reduced by this system. Continued emphasis in this area is needed to obtain distribution plans for major items of equipment prior to receipt.

d. In Signal Units reconciliations of requisition status have been accomplished between field depots and the 60th Signal Base Depot. This has improved the responsiveness of the system considerably and is planned to be continued on a quarterly basis.

e. In I ALC units, the lack of improvement in unit level requisitioning procedures and supply management is also responsible for inadequate responsiveness at depot level. More contact teams, command interest, better schooling and a firm system of reconciliation of outstanding requisitions is necessary. Local procurement procedures are not responsive to adequate fund expenditures and acquisition of material. Decentralisation of fund management is required in order to increase supply effectiveness.

f. Generally follow-up action showed minor improvement in CY67 from V ALC supported units and marked improvement by V ALC units to supporting base depots. Employment of proper requisitioning procedures improved to the point of becoming insignificant with a few exceptions, the most noticeable being the Vietnamese Military Academy. Allocation of items controlled by command elements above the ALC vary by technical service. Signal items are designated for issue before they are physically received while Ordnance items wait from one week to two months after receipt. Corps controlled allocations vastly improved that last quarter by improved communications between both the advisor elements and ARVN Elements at II Corps and V ALC.
Projection: Increased emphasis at the lower echelons of command on follow up supply actions will be required to improve the responsiveness of the supply system.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: NTMAF Training; Less Training Responsibilities of MAG and AVOC.


Statement of Objective; To complete renovation of facilities in the amount of $45,200 by the end of CY 67; to establish the faculty and compile the curriculum by the end of CY 67.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The major renovation projects at the college are nearing completion. Although all renovation was not completed by the end of CY 67, it is expected to be complete in time for the first class in Feb 68.

(2) The draft college TOAE has been submitted through CTC but has not been approved. The faculty, as required for the CY 66 projected student load, has been established. The anticipated student input of 15 military and 5 civilians are being selected by a high level committee of the Vietnamese Government. The programmed course starting date is 19 Feb 68. The curriculum for the initial course has been compiled and approved by the Commandant.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Major renovation projects are progressing and will not be a problem. The anticipated completion date is satisfactory to fulfill the needs of the college.

(2) A great deal of effort has gone into the proposed curriculum. It is broad, focuses on national problems, and will adequately meet the objectives of the college. The Faculty, as proposed by the draft TOAE, has been assembled and is prepared to begin courses as scheduled.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends:

(1) The renovation has progressed satisfactorily.

(2) The faculty is adequate to fulfill the present needs of the first course at the college.

(3) The curriculum will meet the objectives of the college.

d. Corrective Action: N/A

e. Projection: The National Defense College will prove a valuable addition to the Vietnamese military educational system in CY 68.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RNWAF Training; Less Training Responsibilities of NAG and AFAG.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Vietnamese Military Academy.

Statement of Objectives: To train 555 cadets during CY 67 and graduate 175 as junior officers; to complete construction of expanded facilities in the amount of $9,668,700 by the end of CY 68; to complete transition to a 4 year curriculum by the end of CY 69.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) A total of 836 cadets participated in training during CY 67. Of these, 260 began their studies in Dec 67. The VNMA graduated 173 officers during this same period. No students were eliminated for academic reasons, although 13 were removed from the 4 year course and installed in the 2 year program.

(2) Money has been funded for the design of projected construction; i.e., Academic Building, Heavy Laboratory, Gymnasium, and Auditorium. Bids will be opened for the first design project (Academic Building) in early CY 68.

(3) The class that entered the Academy in Dec 67 is scheduled to graduate in Dec 71. The progress toward the four year curriculum is satisfactory.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The number of students graduated from VNMA during CY 67 was only slightly less than the desired goal.

(2) Detailed plans are being drawn up and money is presently available for the proposed construction projects in CY 68. Currently the program is proceeding slightly behind schedule.

(3) The four year curriculum is progressing according to plan. There does not appear to be any particular problem in this area.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) With a slight increase in student input the desired number of qualified students will be graduated. Selective entrance requirements and academic activities will improve the quality of graduates.

(2) The planning for CY 68 construction is not as far advanced as desired. There was a slight delay because of nonavailability of funds to
allow for design. Further delay has been encountered because of administrative problems in ARVN Chief of Engineer's office in letting a design contract.

   (3) The changeover to the four year curriculum is proceeding satisfactorily.

d. Corrective Action:

   (1) An adequate input of students must be programmed into the academy to allow for attrition.

   (2) Rapid progress must be made on the construction effort if the desired goal is to be reached. Contracts must be promptly awarded and work started with a minimum of delay.

e. Projection:

   (1) Plans for construction are behind schedule at present. If designs can be accepted and contracts given promptly, the construction goal will be achieved.

   (2) The transition to a four year curriculum should continue to make satisfactory progress.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVMAF Training: Less Training Responsibilities of NAS and AFAG,

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Command and Staff College.

Statement of Objective: To train 350 qualified officers in the Advanced and
Intermediate Command and Staff Courses during CY 67.

a. Review of Progress: During CY 67 a total of 245 students attended
the Advanced and Intermediate 66SC courses. Of this number 239 successfully
completed the prescribed courses of instruction. This figure represents 68%
of the desired goal.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Although the attrition rate is minimal, the input of stu-
dents was inadequate.

(2) The improvements to the physical plant and revision of the
curriculum have improved the quality of the graduates.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) To meet the desired goal of training 350 students annually
the programmed input must be met.

(2) Work must continue for the improvement of the physical
plant.

d. Corrective Action: It is imperative that all school student
allocations be filled. Selection at the OTU level must continue in an effort
to provide the best qualified students.

e. Projection: The Command and Staff College will continue to
improve qualitatively in CY 68. An increase in the student load is required
to meet the programmed goal.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J3
CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Training: Less Training Responsibilities of MAG and AFNG.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Non-Commissioned Officer Academy.

Statement of Objective: To train 6,550 students during CY 67.

a. Review of Progress: During CY 67, 4,549 students completed instruction at the NCO Academy. This constituted 69% of the programmed goal.

b. Analysis of Progress: The primary reason for failure to achieve the goal was inadequate student input. The quarterly input goal has not been reached since the 1st quarter of CY 67. Progress is being made toward improving the facilities at this school.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Student load was not provided by JGS/CTC. In part this was caused by a decision to reduce output after the first quarter. When the programmed goal was increased again later, an adequate number of students could not be provided.

d. Corrective Action: JGS/CTC must establish realistic goals and fill the quotas.

e. Projection: The new CY 68 goal is optimistic. It can be attained only if JGS/CTC insists that quotas be filled.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J3.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RWAF Training; Less Training Responsibilities of MAG and AFAO.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: The Infantry School.

Statement of Objective: To train 8,880 students during CY 67.

a. Review of Progress: During CY 67 a total of 10,380 students attended this school. Of this figure 8,355 graduated while 1,960 students are presently undergoing training and will complete the course of instruction in June 1968. The objective of this school was 92% achieved.

b. Analysis of Progress: Although the output of this school fell short of the goal, the percentage achieved was satisfactory. Additional emphasis was placed on quality. Facilities, instructors, and texts are presently adequate to accomplish the desired objectives.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The student input needs to be increased to provide for additional attrition.

d. Corrective Action: N/A

e. Projection: Qualitative improvements will continue to be made at this school. The projected output for CY 68 will require a revision of the Officer Candidate Course so that all Phase I training is given at Quang Trung and Phase II training at the Infantry School. Additional motivation will result from the fact that only selected candidates who complete Phase I will go on to Phase II. This should result in an overall qualitative improvement.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J3.
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Training; Less Training Responsibilities of MAC and AFAC.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Junior Military Academy.

Statement of Objective: To provide academic education for 1,400 students during CY 67.

a. Review of Progress: During CY 67 only 1,216 students were enrolled at the academy. This represented 87% of the goal. Progress was made toward improving the entrance examination, the course of instruction, and the physical plant at the academy.

b. Analysis of Progress: The Jr. Military Academy has shown a qualitative improvement. However, the small number of students who achieve their BAC I degree indicates that academic standards are still not satisfactory.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) Continued emphasis must be placed on entrance qualifications to obtain motivated students.

(2) Additional improvements must be made to the physical plant at the academy.

d. Corrective Action: Current improvement programs will be continued.

e. Projection: It is anticipated that the school will improve qualitatively and quantitatively in CY 68.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J3
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SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER:  Director, Training Directorate.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE:  RVNAF Training; Less Training Responsibilities of MAG and AVFA.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT:  The Armor School.

Statement of Objective:  To train 763 students during CY 67.

a. Review of Progress:  During CY 67 there were 1,072 students graduated from this school.  The output exceeded the projected goal by 40%.

b. Analysis of Progress:  Operation of the Armor School was satisfactory.  Several unprogrammed special courses of instruction were conducted which accounted for exceeding the goal.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:  The Armor School is operating satisfactorily.

d. Corrective Action:  N/A

e. Projection:  Indications are that the projected goal for CY 68 will be achieved.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR:  Assistant Chief of Staff, J3.

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SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Training: Less Training Responsibilities of MAC and APO.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Armed Forces Language School

Statement of Objective: To train 1,843 students in English during CT 67.

a. Review of Progress: A total of 1,996 students were trained in this school during CT 67. This constitutes a total of 108% of the goal. Additional instructors were added and the quality of graduates is improving. The addition of three civilians to the staff from the Defense Language Institute has materially assisted in improving the method of instruction.

b. Analysis of Progress: Although the School is improving much remains to be done to improve the physical plant. The English laboratory is in need of complete rehabilitation. Some equipment is inoperable for lack of parts. The School Commandant has been informed by the Senior Advisor that a Signal Repair Contact Team is urgently needed to inspect and repair within their capabilities. He also advised that the supply system for repair parts needs to be checked and an additional three laboratory technicians are needed to maintain the machines. Contracts for renovation of the language labs and classrooms have been approved and will be let in early January.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The language school has shown improvement over the year and is capable of turning out the desired quality of personnel.

d. Corrective Action: Continued emphasis on actions in sub-paragraph b above.

e. Projection: The school will continue to fulfill the established student output goal.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J3.
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SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Training; Lasa Training Responsibilities of NAG and APAG.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Artillery School

Statement of Objective: To train 2,232 students during CY 67.

a. Review of Progress: The actual number of personnel attending this school during CY 67 was 2,553 individuals. Of these, 2,251 successfully completed the prescribed course of instruction. A total of 243 students are presently enrolled and are programmed to graduate in the 1st Qtr of FY 68.

b. Analysis of Progress: The goal of the Artillery School has been achieved and the attrition rate, although small, is evident. This school is providing the desired numbers of trained artillerymen and is considered to be the most effective branch school at the present time.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Operation of the Artillery School is satisfactory.

d. Corrective Action: N/A

e. Projection: The school will continue to fulfill its goal in CY 68.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J3.

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SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Training; Less Training Responsibilities of NAG and AFAG.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Military Dog Training Center

Statement of Objective: To train 218 dogs and their handlers during CT 67.

a. Review of Progress: 206 dogs and handlers successfully completed the prescribed training, constituting 94% accomplishment of the established goal.

b. Analysis of Progress: An adequate number of dogs and handlers are being trained. There are no critical problem areas.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The school is operating satisfactorily.

d. Corrective Action: N/A

e. Projection: The goal will be achieved in CT 68.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J3.

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SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVMAF Training; Less Training Responsibilities of MAG and APAG.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Military School Of Music

Statement of Objective: To train 265 military band students during CY 67.

a. Review of Progress: The student input for this school was 238 individuals of which 220 completed the prescribed course of instruction. This constitutes 93% achievement of the desired goal. Additional needed instruments are being acquired and sheet music is now being reproduced at the school.

b. Analysis of Progress: Prescribed quotas must be filled in order to produce the desired output. Advances are being made which will improve the efficiency of this institution.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The program of instruction and available equipment are adequate.

d. Corrective Action: N/A

e. Projection: Indications are that if adequate input is provided, the school will meet its programmed goal.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J3.

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SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Training; Less Training Responsibilities of NAG and AFAG.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Training Material Translation

Statement of Objective: To reduce the 15 month backlog of translation of training literature by 20% during CY 67.

a. Review of Progress: The backlog of literature to be translated now stands at 172 items. This is an increase in the amount of material waiting translation compared with the last reporting period. Although the efficiency of the organization and number of translators has increased, the workload is much greater.

b. Analysis of Progress: The Training Aids Division has increased the size of its translation staff by five personnel. The translation department has been reorganized to provide for more efficient operation. Maximum overtime is being worked to effect timely accomplishment of priority projects. The workload has greatly increased, primarily due to the needs of the Navy, Signal, and Engineer Advisory Groups. In most cases these are technical publications and work is detailed and time consuming.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends:

(1) The goal of the Training Aids Division was not achieved.

(2) The backlog of material waiting translation is increasing.

d. Corrective Action:

(1) Efforts will be continued to find and employ additional qualified translators.

(2) Control of material by a priority system will be maintained.

e. Projection: The backlog of material to be translated will increase during CY 68.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J3.
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Directorate, Training Directorate

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Training; Less Training Responsibilities of NAG and AFAG.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Off-Shore Schooling

Statement of Objective: To process 735 RVNAF personnel for offshore schools in CY 67.

a. Review of Progress: During CY 67 a total of 705 personnel were sent to off-shore schools. This constitutes 94% of the assigned goal.

b. Analysis of Progress: The input of students provided by RVNAF was insufficient to achieve the desired results. A standard of proficiency of English has been established for each off-shore school. If this standard cannot be reached by the selected student then he will not be sent to the school. Input to the language school of personnel selected for off-shore schools does not allow for the attrition of these students.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends: Attrition of the selected personnel is not adequately being considered by RVNAF. Prior planning is not being accomplished to program input of selected students. Greater emphasis must be placed on this program if the goal is to be achieved.

d. Corrective Action:

(1) Students must be earmarked as far in advance of the starting date for the off-shore school as possible. A minimum of nine months should be used as a guide.

(2) Attrition of students in the AFS must be provided for by increased enrollment.

(3) Careful selection must be made by the respective commands to obtain motivated and physically qualified personnel.

e. Projection: With all language training now being conducted in country the quotas for off-shore schools should be filled. Active interest must be taken in this area if improvement is to continue to be made.
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SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: NVNAF Training; Less Training Responsibilities of MAG and AFMAG.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: ARVN, Regional Force and Popular Force Training Base.

Statement of Objectives: To maintain a Training Center base adequate for the needs of the Vietnamese ground forces. Currently the base consists of nine (9) Central Training Command (CTC) controlled, ten (10) ARVN division controlled and thirty-seven (37) corps controlled Popular Force centers and is adequate to meet the programmed CY67 needs which are: to train forty-eight (48) battalions, two hundred forty-two (242) RF companies, 115,850 ARVN/RF individual soldiers, 1,442 FF platoons and 24,427 FF recruits. To determine the adequacy of the training base to support the programmed training through the conduct of joint inspections of training and elements included in the training base (CTC controlled training centers, monthly; division training centers, semi annually; and FF training center, annually).

a. Review of Progress:

1. The programmed and actual inputs to the training base during CY67 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Training</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>85.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF Company</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>103.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN/RF Individuals</td>
<td>115,850</td>
<td>99,244</td>
<td>85.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF Platoons</td>
<td>1,442</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>71.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF Recruits</td>
<td>24,427</td>
<td>10,511</td>
<td>43.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The utilization of the training base during CY67 fell below rated capacity primarily in the area of FF training.

3. A FF training center consolidation plan was developed during CY67 and will be implemented during early CY68. The plan will, when implemented, result in better facilities and more standardized training.

b. Analysis of Progress: Most training centers operated at below capacity during CY67. The few cases wherein capacities were exceeded for some periods resulted from unpredictable availability of units for training. The shortfall in FF recruit training is primarily attributed to failure of corps to insure that quotas were met.

c. Conclusion and Trend: Acceptable, but not maximum, use was made of the ARVN, RF and FF training base during CY67.
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d. Corrective Actions:

(1) The CT68 training program was developed with all training centers programmed to operate at near capacity levels.

(2) A PP training center consolidation plan has been developed by CTC. It will eliminate 19 of the 37 training centers now in existence. The plan also calls for an increase in the total rated capacity of the remaining training centers.

e. Projection:

(1) Maximum utilization of the training base has been programmed for CT68.
Statement of Objectives: To review annually, and republish as necessary, in-place training directives for ARVN, Regional Force, and Popular Force units. To determine compliance with directives by conducting frequent training inspections. (As a minimum to inspect each unit appearing in the SEER report as unsatisfactory or marginal in training.) To determine the quality of training and unit combat effectiveness by use of an Army Training Test.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) During 1967 new in-place training directives were published. Central Training Command Memo #/3737, 26 Jun 67, prescribes the in-place training program for ARVN units. In-place training for RF and PF units is governed by Central Training Command Memo #/6393, 19 Mar 67.

(2) Central Training Command (CTC) established a periodic inspection program in August 1967 to insure compliance with in-place training directives and to evaluate in-place training programs being conducted.

b. Analysis of Progress: Beginning in August 1967, 15 inspections were made by JCS/JCV personnel with emphasis on in-place training. Significant strengths and weaknesses revealed by these inspections are:

(1) Significant strengths:

(a) Responsibility for training is placed on the unit commander.

(b) ARVN units are aware of the CTC/ACV training requirements outlined in CTC Memo #/3737.

(c) Some ARVN units have published training programs, indicating an increased interest in training.

(2) Significant weaknesses:

(a) ARVN command emphasis, on in-place training, is inadequate.

(b) Training programs for the most part are "paper programs" with little training actually conducted.
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(c) Many US advisors are unaware of the CINC memos concerning in-place training and the provisions of these memos.

(3) CINC in-place training directives do not provide a system for testing units to evaluate potential combat effectiveness.

e. Conclusions and Trends:

(1) The in-place training program, when properly implemented, is an effective means of increasing unit effectiveness.

(2) With few exceptions, the in-place training program in 1967 was ineffective. The program was poorly implemented and lacked adequate command emphasis at all levels.

(3) Some improvement in RFA and RF in-place training was realized during the latter half of 1967 due to the deployment of various mobile advisory teams (i.e., AAT, CAT, MAT, ASAMC, HUTAC) throughout Vietnam.

d. Corrective Actions:

(1) In-place training directives will be reviewed in 1968. Efforts will be made to introduce a testing device (Army training test) into the in-place training program.

(2) Joint inspections of in-place training will continue in 1968. Special emphasis will be placed on those units rated unsatisfactory in the training related fields of the SSI report.

(3) Efforts of mobile advisory teams would have a significant impact on the in-place training programs of RF and FA units.

e. Projection: There will be some improvement in in-place training programs throughout HCAT.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J3

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CONFIDENTIAL
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Training; Less Training Responsibilities of MAG and AVAC.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Training of ARVN battalions and Regional Force companies in the Military Support of RD.

Statement of Objectives: To train all ARVN battalions by 31 December 1967, all RF companies by 1 March 1968, and to retrain all ARVN battalions by 1 August 1968, in selected subjects appropriate to the Military Support of Revolutionary Development. To determine the effectiveness of the RD training program by conducting frequent joint inspections and by evaluating reports.

a. Review of Progress: As of 31 Dec 67, 242 ARVN battalions and 766 Regional Force companies had been trained in military support of Revolutionary Development. This represents 93% of the ARVN battalion goal and 108% of the RF company goal. The 242 ARVN battalions was 16 battalions short of the programmed goal of 258. Operational commitments prevented training in most cases. Fifteen of the sixteen battalions are combat service support units.

b. Analysis of Progress: Despite a shortfall of 16 battalions in 1967, RD training continued to be the most effective field training program ARVN has attempted to date. The program has resulted in improved understanding of all personnel toward the RD program, improved military - civil relations and improved tactics and techniques. Problem areas, encountered thus far, include insecure training environment, inadequate command and staff supervision at corps, division, and sector and poor practical exercises.

c. Conclusion and Trend: Command emphasis slackened noticeably during the third quarter of C667. Despite this and other problem areas the RD mobile training team (MTT) program has achieved major worthwhile results and will continue to do so in C668.

d. Corrective Actions: To capitalize on the success of the RD program and to increase its momentum, a Revolutionary Development Refresher (RDR) training program began in Nov 67 with a revised and improved program of instruction. A similar refresher program is scheduled to begin in Apr 68 for RF companies.

e. Projection: All ARVN battalions will receive RDR training by November 1968. The RD training of RF companies will be completed on schedule. Approximately 50% of all RF companies will have received RDR training by the end of C669. The RD and RDR training programs will continue to be worthwhile and effective programs.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3

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SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Training; Less Training Responsibilities of MAC and APF.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMT: Utilization of Division Training Centers.

Statement of Objectives: To train the members and units of the division in subjects of a supplemental and advanced nature to include; advanced officer and NCO courses, heavy weapons and mines and booby traps refresher courses, night ambush training, and those additional courses of instruction recommended to and approved by the JGS for inclusion in the division training program.

a. Review of Progress: During CY67, a total of 27,105 personnel received training at division training centers (DTC). Courses of Instruction included ambush and counter-ambush training, squad leader, SCO, Intelligence and interrogation courses, ARVN battalion refresher training and heavy weapons instruction.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) DTC's were programmed to train 17,290 recruits during CY67. On 14 Jun 67, Central Training Command published CTC memo 3473, subject: New Recruit Training. This memo terminated recruit training at DTC's effective 1 Jul. 67. As a result only 6,691 recruits actually entered DTC's for training in CY67. This memo also tasked the DTC's to conduct specialized training exclusively.

(2) Utilization of the DTC's ranged from excellent to poor during CY67 and none operated close to maximum capacity. 9,496 personnel entered the DTC's during the first half of CY67 and 17,607 entered during the last half of CY67. Although the number of personnel in the last half of CY67 was almost double that of the first half the overall utilization of the DTC's decreased. This was because the specialized training was of shorter duration and caused a more rapid turnover in personnel.

(3) Utilization of DTC's is largely determined by the command emphasis of the division commanders. Those divisions where there is an aggressive training program in effect, normally make good utilization of the facilities available at the DTC's.

c. Conclusions:

(1) Utilization of the DTC's ranged from excellent to poor. Utilization is in large part determined by the division commanders.

(2) DTC's, when properly utilized, provide excellent training facilities for presenting supplemental and specialized courses of instruction.

d. Corrective Actions: Training Directorate proposed and the CTC CT68 training program utilizes DTC's to retrain Regional Force companies.
The retraining of RF companies and the provision of quotas for RF Officers and NCO’s at DTC Schools should help to improve the relationship between the Divisions and RF.

e. Projection: DTC’s utilization will be improved by the requirement to conduct Regional Force company refresher training during CY68.
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SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF Training; Less Training Responsibilities of NAG and AFAG.


Statement of Objectives: To produce, as programmed, militarily proficient individuals, including platoon and squad leaders, and combat effective units; and to evaluate FF training by the use of monthly reports of facility and training inspections made by CTZ.

a. Review of Progress: With the exception of the PP Squad Leader Course, PPTC actual accomplishment fell considerably below its programmed goals. A breakout by course follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Programmed</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PF Platoon BT</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>89.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF Platoon Refresher</td>
<td>1,385</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF Recruit</td>
<td>26,455</td>
<td>10,511</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF Platoon Leader</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>1,641</td>
<td>76.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF Squad Leader</td>
<td>2,467</td>
<td>4,187</td>
<td>169.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The primary factor in the significant shortfall of the PF training accomplishment was a failure on the part of corps and sectors to insure that available training quotas were filled. Transportation difficulties further hindered the training accomplishment.

(2) The Popular Force soldier has not achieved desired levels of training proficiency. Substandard living conditions, poor pay, inadequate command support and inappropriate training programs have contributed to this condition. There is little standardization in the training product because of the large number (37) of PF training centers with varied facilities and training conditions.

c. Conclusions and Trends:

(1) The utilization of PF training facilities was poor.

(2) Command support of PF training centers was inadequate.

d. Corrective Actions:

(1) Letter, MACV, 13 Sep 67, subject: Popular Force Training Centers, addressed the problem to corps and sector advisory teams of unfilled quotas and lack of command support of the PF training system.
(2) A consolidation of FF training centers from 37 to 18 is planned by CTC. Twelve of the eighteen centers to be retained will be expanded in capacity to compensate for those centers being closed.

(3) Programs of Instruction (POIs) for the FF training courses have been revised and there is a substantial increase in POLMAR and Revolutionary Development subjects.

e. Projection: A considerable qualitative and quantitative improvement in the Popular Force training should be realized during CY68 if the GNC/JGS consolidation plan is implemented.
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SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: NVHAF Training; Less Training Responsibilities of NAG and AFAG.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Battalion Retraining Program.

Statement of Objectives: To retrain 48 battalions programmed for CY67, to produce combat effective units upon completion of training and to determine the effectiveness of this training through the conduct of graded Army Training Tests and End of Training Reports.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) Quantitative goal - 87.5% of the quantitative goal was attained by retraining 41 of the 48 battalions programmed for CY67.

(2) An Army Training Test (ATT) was written, evaluated and implemented during CY67. The test is now administered to all maneuver battalions that train at Central Training Command (CTC) controlled training centers.

(3) The program of instruction (POI) for battalion retraining has been refined to insure that instruction is applicable to the insurgency environment in Vietnam.

(4) Battalion refurbishing, with personnel and equipment, is now an integral part of the battalion retraining program.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The original battalion retraining program called for 62 battalions to be retrained during CY67. During the first four months of CY67 several battalions programmed for retraining were cancelled due to operational requirements or to Revolutionary Development missions. On 28 Apr battalion training was re-programmed to provide for retraining of a total of 48 battalions.

(2) During the last half of CY67, 19 battalions were programmed and 21 battalions actually trained. The success of the program during the last half of CY67 was due to the firmer stand taken by CTC on battalion retraining and to a commitment made by J3/JOS to keep seven battalions in training at all times.

(3) CTC has accepted the ATT as a valuable aid in determining the potential combat effectiveness of the tested battalions. Only one battalion has been rated not combat ready even though all show deficiencies which indicate the need for additional training.

(4) The battalions are rated on leadership, tactics, night operations, and small arms weapons qualifications. These areas present a comprehensive appraisal of the combat potential of the unit.

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(5) Effective May 1967 all national training centers implemented a new six weeks FOI for battalion retraining. This FOI was later increased to eight weeks to provide for refurbishing, for additional POLWAR instruction, and for an end of training inspection by a combined CRC/JGS inspection team.

c. Conclusions and Trends:

(1) The battalion retraining program during CY67 achieved a marked degree of success after the program was adjusted to coincide with the capability of ARVN to support it.

(2) The retraining program is effective in raising the potential combat effectiveness of retrained battalions.

(3) The refurbishing of battalions at the training centers improves the combat readiness of these units.

(4) The FOI presently in use provides for a comprehensive training period geared to the insurgency environment in Vietnam.

d. Corrective Action:

(1) Training Directorate will continue to emphasize the need for meeting programmed training.

(2) Emphasis will be placed on leadership training, battle drill, small unit tactics, and improved marksmanship training.

(3) Battalion end of training reports are forwarded to parent divisions for their use in determining what instruction should be included in the division in-place training programs.

e. Projection: There will be a steady improvement in the combat effectiveness of retrained battalions.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAG.: Director, Training Directorate

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVMAF Training; Less Training Responsibilities of MAC and AFAC.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: RF Company Training.

Statement of Objectives: To train 77 new companies and retrain 165 old RF companies programmed for CT67, to produce combat effective units upon completion of training and to determine the effectiveness of this training through the conduct of graded Army Training Tests and End of Training Reports.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) New RF Companies - 103 new RF companies were trained during CT67. This exceeded the projected goal by 33.77%.

(2) Old RF Companies - 147 RF companies were retrained during CT67. This represents 89.09% of the projected goal.

(3) A company level Army Training Test (ATT) was evaluated during late CT67. An approved ATT will be distributed during early CT68 for use at all training centers conducting RF company training.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Successful recruiting and activation of new RF companies during CT67 resulted in the new RF company training exceeding its programmed goal. This success is also attributable to the responsiveness of the corps in getting newly activated companies to training centers for training.

(2) The shortfall in old RF company retraining resulted from corps not providing the companies for retraining as programmed.

(3) Qualitative effects of the company ATT cannot yet be evaluated.

c. Conclusion or Trend:

(1) There was improvement in quantity and quality of training and this trend should continue during CT68.

(2) The company ATT should provide a useful tool for commanders in evaluating companies and developing future in-place training programs.

d. Corrective Action: The company ATT will be implemented during early CT68.
e. Projection: The training of RF companies will continue to improve during CY69.
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director, Training Directorate

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVMAF Training; Less Training Responsibilities of MAG and AFAQ.

SUB-PROGRAM ELEMENT: Recruit Training.

Statement of Objectives: To train 99,550 recruits programmed for CT67 (94,750 ARVH/RF and 4,800 Ranger), to produce combat effective trainees as replacements for ARVH, Ranger and RF units and to determine the effectiveness of this training through the conduct of BOI/ALT proficiency tests, the evaluation of weapons qualification scores, training inspections and Training Activity Reports.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The recruit training for CT67 attained 87.58% of its goal by training 87,190 of the projected 99,550. The ARVH/RF recruit training attained 84.13% of its goal with 79,712 of the projected 94,750 recruits entering a training center. The Ranger recruit training attained 155.79% of its goal with 7,478 of the projected 4,800 recruits entering a training center.

(2) BCT/ALT proficiency tests are now used at all training centers conducting BCT/ALT recruit training.

(3) All ARVH/RF recruit training is conducted using a standardized 12 week POI.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The short fall in the ARVH/RF recruit training was due to the recruiting system's failure to provide the number of recruits anticipated.

(2) BCT/ALT proficiency testing was initiated in May 1967. Of the 31,953 recruits tested on BOI 24,745 (77.4%) achieved passing grades. Of the 23,500 recruits tested on ALT 15,906 (71.9%) achieved passing grades. The use of BCT/ALT proficiency tests provides a tool for evaluating recruit proficiency and for identifying weaknesses in the training programs.

(3) ARVH/RF recruit training is conducted using a standardized 12 week BCT/ALT POI. This POI was reviewed by both Central Training Command and Training Directorate and was published and distributed to national training centers in March 1967.

c. Conclusions and Trends:

(1) The recruit training program made significant progress during 1967 through standardization and refinement of the POI.
(2) The use of BCT/AIT proficiency tests provides a means for evaluating training programs and recruit proficiency.

d. Corrective Actions:

(1) Training Directorate will emphasize the need for continued refinement of the BCT/AIT proficiency test procedures and that the latest accepted techniques are taught during recruit training.

(2) Battle drill and improved marksmanship will be encouraged.

e. Projection: The quantity and quality of the recruit training program can meet the needs of RVNAP.
SOB-PROORiUl K/UMflER
Director, Training Directorate
8DB-raOGBiU< TIKJ
RVIAT Training; Lets Training Respoiuilbliltes of HAG
and AFAO.
BDB-'HKXimt IMMBP
Other Individual Training.

Statement of Objectives: To train selected individuals in ARVN Reserve
NOO Preparatory Courses; Certificate of Technical Proficiency Course (CCL);
Jungle, Mountain, Swamp (JMS) Courses; and Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
(LRRP) Courses in accordance with CT67 quotas.

a. Review of Progress: With the exception of the ARVN Reserve
NOO program the other individual training fell below the programmed goals.
A breakout by course follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Programmed</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARVN Reserve NOO</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>5,698</td>
<td>109.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCL</td>
<td>7,100</td>
<td>1,632</td>
<td>22.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMS</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>27.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRRP</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>95.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The ARVN Reserve NOO Preparatory Course received adequate
command emphasis through ARVN channels and the input of 5,698 exceeded the
program goal by 498 in CT67.

(2) CCL courses fell far below the programmed goals. The
shortfall was due to the failure of the corps to provide the programmed
input to the five training centers conducting CCL instruction.

(3) LRRP courses were conducted for the first time during
CT67. Both the LRRP and JMS courses are taught at Duc My RTC. Due to
lack of sufficient instructors and facilities to conduct both courses at
the same time, the JMS courses were suspended during the conduct of LRRP
courses. This caused the JMS program to fall to 27.94% achievement of
the input projected for CT67. LRRP training was not part of the CT67
Training Calendar when it was published. The introduction of LRRP training
at Duc My RTC in May caused a "trade-off" with JMS. JMS was resumed in
Sep and both courses were conducted during Oct.

c. Conclusions and Trends:

(1) The ARVN NOO Preparatory Course was successful due to
projected inputs being met during CT67.

(2) CCL courses fell below desired levels of input because
the corps failed to provide the required personnel.

(3) There has been a shift from the individual reconnaissance
type qualification to the team concept.
d. **Corrective Actions**: JlS and LkF courses will be taught concurrently during CY66. Experience gained during CY67 indicates that Dc ly ATC can accommodate both courses.

e. **Projection**: There will be steady improvement in the quantity and quality of individual training during CY66.
Statement of Objectives: To implement a long range program which will provide sanitary living conditions for troops and dependents, adequate and safe training facilities and an adequate level of maintenance for buildings, roads and grounds at Quang Trung Training Center, Dong Da, Lam Son, Van Kieu and Chi Lang National Training Centers, Phu Cat and Cao Lanh Regional Force Training Centers and Duc My and Trung Hoa Ranger Training Centers.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) Training Center Senior Advisors, in conjunction with Training Center Commanders, developed a comprehensive five year facilities improvement plan for each Central Training Command (CTC) controlled training center. The intent of the plan is to facilitate and guide the planning, staffing and requesting of major construction projects including self-help programs.

(2) The primary effort at the training centers during CT67 was in the self-help area.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Training Center Commanders, in conjunction with US advisors conducted periodic reviews of the plans and updated them where appropriate.

(2) Some training center commanders have not fully accepted the desirability of implementing the plans.

(3) The types of improvements made through self-help are: construction of obstacle and confidence courses, renovation of ranges, screening of messhalls, construction of drainage ditches, repairing beds and other furniture and construction of dependent quarters. The most outstanding example of what can be accomplished by a joint effort were the improvements made at Phu Cat R TCP. During the period September - December 1967 the following rehabilitation and construction projects were completed: A complete water system was installed; an electrical system was installed; the mess hall was rebuilt and 26 new oven burners were completed; concrete floors were poured in seven barracks; an ammunition storage building was constructed; the parade field was graded; a confidence course was completed; drainage ditches and culverts were installed throughout the training center; defensive trenches were revetted; and the dispensary was 65% rebuilt.
(4) Some training center commanders are not making full use of limited routine maintenance funds for their intended purpose. In many cases, these funds are used for small new construction and modification projects instead of for maintenance and repair of existing facilities.

(5) The AFRN Engineer contract construction and rehabilitation effort is not yet adequately meeting the needs of the training centers.

c. Conclusions or Trends:

(1) The self help facilities improvement portions of the plans were partially successful during CY67 and improvements were accomplished.

(2) Adequate implementation of the plans will continue to be an area requiring extensive advisor emphasis.

(3) Many projects scheduled for completion during CY67 have been carried over to CY68.

d. Corrective Actions:

(1) US Advisory effort will stress the importance of timely and adequate planning.

(2) US advisory effort will monitor closely the utilization of routine maintenance funds available at training centers.

(3) Self help projects such as those done at Phu Cat RFAC will be expanded.

e. Projection: There will be continued improvement of training center facilities during CY68.
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: ACofS, J4

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Transportation Improvement

Statement of Objective: To improve the RVNAF transportation system.

   Goal - Continue advisor emphasis on the necessity for establishment of a Central Movements Control Agency.

b. Element - Proper distribution of transportation equipment.
   Goal - Command Emphasis on the proper distribution of equipment.

c. Element - Improvement of Port Operations.
   1. Increase direct shipments.
   2. Additional pier space.

   Goal - Increase direct shipments of supplies from offshore sources to up-country ports. Continue development of up-country port facilities. Activation and equipping of transportation units to provide increased movement and handling capability. Continue advisory emphasis on the necessity to stabilise contract prices and contract negotiation procedures relative to port operations. Continue advisory emphasis on improvement of the operations of the Saigon Transportation Terminal Command.

d. Element - Secure the lines of communications.
   1. Open available highways.
   2. Open available railroads.

   Goal - Continue tactical operations to open and secure land LOC IAW ABL42.

Analysis: 1. Considerable advisory emphasis was placed upon the establishment of a RVNAF Central Movements Control Agency during CY 67. No Central Agency, however, was created and the RVNAF Transportation System continues to function as a nonintegrated movement system with fragmented control. The ALC Movements Division and Zone Transportation Office continue to function as separate activities both of which engage in movement control. As RVNAF’s transportation capability increases, the requirement for a single agency controlling all movements will become more important.

2. The reduction of the quantity of cargo awaiting shipment from the Saigon Port Area complex to the Area Logistical Commands during CY 67 was
accomplished by proper use and distribution of transportation equipment. The reduction, from 41,050 to 11,602 short tons of cargo, was achieved by increased capability at the RVN ports of discharge and the improved employment of manpower and equipment resources by the Saigon Transportation Terminal Command.

a. In I ALC the receipt of new material handling equipments has improved the capability of the Terminal Service Company to perform port clearance; however, no additional personnel have been added to this company. Additional personnel and MHE are necessary if ARVN is to handle its own cargo. The local Terminal Service Company still remains short MHE equipment necessary to clear cargo at out-ports within I Corps.

b. As the pacification effort expands in the II Corps area, it will be accompanied by an increase in troop strength and an expansion of logistical installations. This results in a corresponding increase in the transportation effort to keep pace with this build-up. Port facilities and port capacity have improved to the extent where these are no longer limiting factors. The limiting factors now deserving attention are as follows:

1. The military highway transportation capability does not meet the average cargo and passenger hauling requirements. An additional medium truck company is required.

2. The transportation terminal service capability must be expanded so that it will be capable of handling double the tonnage now moving through the port of Qui Nhon. This projected increase in tonnage is due to the activation of the 55th Ammunition Base Depot in Qui Nhon.

3. II ALC needs an amphibious capability to off-load ships at anchorage and to transport cargo from ship to shore; also to transport cargo from one coastal installation to another within II ALC.

3. As operational requirements increase in RVN the existing limited road net assumes greater importance from a tactical as well as a logistical point of view. Effective traffic control measures have been a matter of considerable advisory emphasis. The percentage of open highway (green and amber) has increased by 8.6 percent in CT 67. The highway system consisted of 2805 Km in CT 67 as compared with 2560 Km in CT 66. The quantity of open road line increased 16.2 Km in CT 67. This increase constitutes a total of 3 percent more open road line at the close of CT 67 than was available in CT 66.

a. In II ALC, during CT 67, efforts to secure the highways running west to Pleiku, north to Bong Son, and south to Tuy Hoa have been successful. Although the enemy still retains the capability of sporadic interdiction of these routes, convoys have operated freely along these routes with a minimum of clearing operations being conducted prior to movement. However, air cover, communications, armament, fire power, and other security
measures are still mandatory. On or about January 1968, ammunition will start arriving at the 55th Ammunition Base Depot. Tonnage will gradually increase until approximately 8000 short tons per month in and out will be handled by this unit. The construction of a rail spur will provide ship-side to depot delivery.

b. In V ALC 138 Km of Highway 1 from Phan Rang to Phan Theit were opened when V ALC conducted its first convoy operation on this highway 18 - 21 December.

Projection: The RVNAF transportation system continues to improve, however, until the shortage of 2½ ton trucks is alleviated, RVNAF cannot be expected to assume an increasing share of the transportation load.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Modernization of Equipment for the Airborne Division.

(C) Statement of Objective: To complete the issue of the M16A1 rifle as the standard shoulder weapon of the division, and to complete the transition from the old family of radios to the AN/PRC-25 series.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The division has received its full authorization of 5922 M16A1 rifles. This authorization includes all the maneuver elements of the division.

(2) The division is presently authorized 415 AN/PRC-25 radio sets, of which 139 are on hand. The AN/PRC-10 radio set remains issued in lieu of a full issue of the AN/PRC-25 radio set.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Deficiencies: US and RVNAF assets of the AN/PRC-25 radio set have been exhausted. The balance of AN/PRC-25 radios will be issued from the first shipment of 6000 radios due in as part of the FY69 modernization plan.

(2) Critical Problems: None.

(3) Lack of Resources: None.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The increased fire power of the M16A1 rifle and the increased communication capability of the AN/PRC-25 radio set has greatly enhanced the combat effectiveness of the maneuver elements of the Airborne Division.

(2) The division can continue to operate with the AN/PRC-10 radio set until the AN/PRC-25 radio set can be fully issued.

(3) The objective of this sub-program is revised for calendar year 1968 and reflects a continued modernization of equipment.

d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projection: A complete issue of the AN/PRC-25 radio set will optimize the combat effectiveness of the maneuver elements of the division.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J4
CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Airborne Division Training.

Statement of Objective: To provide the Airborne Division with well-trained, highly-motivated airborne volunteers.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The following table summarizes the airborne recruit training program at Quang Trung NTC during the reported period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class #</th>
<th>Beginning Strength</th>
<th>Graduating Strength</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>Compl Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>03Jul67</td>
<td>30Sep67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>17Jul67</td>
<td>14Oct67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>07Aug67</td>
<td>28Oct67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>21Aug67</td>
<td>11Nov67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>04Sep67</td>
<td>25Nov67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>18Sep67</td>
<td>09Dec67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>02Oct67</td>
<td>23Dec67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>16Oct67</td>
<td>06Jan68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>30Oct67</td>
<td>20Jan68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>186 *</td>
<td>27Nov67</td>
<td>17Feb68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>577 *</td>
<td>11Dec67</td>
<td>03Mar68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>125 *</td>
<td>26Dec67</td>
<td>17Mar68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Strength as of 31 December 1967.

(2) The quality of the training received by the recruits is described as outstanding by the commanders and staff officers throughout the division. Additionally, this is reflected in the fact that a high percentage of the recruits, after airborne training, are assigned to elements that are engaged in operational missions without a decline in the units' combat effectiveness.
(3) The Quang Trung NTC is capable of training 1600 airborne recruits simultaneously, with four 200-man and two 400-man classes.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The airborne recruit training program provides the necessary replacement needs of the division.

(2) Deficiencies: None.

(3) Critical Problems: None.

(4) Lack of Resources: None.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The airborne recruit training is being conducted in a highly successful manner and is adequate for the needs of the division.

(2) In comparison to the previous semi-annual report, the number of airborne recruits receiving training was increased by 841 personnel (3057 this report as compared to 2216 for the previous semi-annual report).

(3) No revision of the sub-program is deemed necessary.

d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projection: The airborne recruit training program is expected to continue with the desired results that it has achieved in the past.

Statement of Objective: To provide airborne qualified personnel required by the division's replacement requirements.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) The following table summarizes the airborne training program during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class #</th>
<th>Beginning Strength</th>
<th>Graduating Strength</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>Compl Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>10Jul67</td>
<td>05Aug67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>22Jul67</td>
<td>22Aug67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>21Aug67</td>
<td>09Sep67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>06Sep67</td>
<td>27Sep67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>20Sep67</td>
<td>13Oct67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>04Oct67</td>
<td>24Oct67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) The number of training aids in the Airborne Training Center has not increased during this reporting period.

(3) The Airborne Training Center has the facilities to train three 200-student classes simultaneously. However, as indicated in the graduating strength for Classes 124, 125 and 126, the size of the class can be substantially increased, if necessary.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The airborne training program provides the necessary airborne qualified replacement to meet the needs of the division.

(2) Deficiencies: None.

(3) Critical Problems: None.

(4) Lack of Resources: None.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The airborne training program is being conducted in a highly successful manner and is adequate for the needs of the division.

(2) In comparison to the previous semi-annual report, the number of personnel receiving airborne training has increased by 1075 personnel (2756 this report as compared to 1681 for the previous semi-annual review).

(3) No revision of the sub-program is deemed necessary.
d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projection: The airborne training program is expected to continue with the desired results that it has achieved in the past.

Statement of Objective: To provide retraining for a minimum of one airborne battalion during each quarter of the calendar year 1967.

a. Review of Progress:


b. Analysis of Progress: No deficiencies, critical problems, or lack of resources exist with respect to retraining at the Van Kiep NTC.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The goal of retraining one airborne battalion per quarter was met this reporting period.

(2) No revision is deemed necessary.

d. Corrective Action: None.

e. Projection: The Van Kiep retraining program will continue to be extremely valuable to the airborne battalions.

Statement of Objective: To identify, select, and train candidates whose demonstrated performance indicates that they would benefit from the off-shore schools program.

a. Review of Progress: During this reporting period the division had the following personnel attend off-shore schools: three officers attended the Leadership Training for Junior Officers at Ft. Knox, Kentucky; three officers attended the Basic Infantry Officers and Pathfinder Course at Ft. Benning, Georgia; one officer attended the Adjutant General basic course at Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Indiana; and three officers (doctors) are attending Public Health and Endocrinology Course at Ft. Sam Houston, Texas. In addition, seven officers from the division attended the Jungle Warfare School in Malaysia.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Those personnel who have participated in the off-shore
schools program have benefited themselves and the division from the instruction they received; this is especially true for the leadership training.

(2) Deficiencies: None.

(3) Critical Problems: The division personnel status is not sufficiently stable to permit specific selection of personnel to attend the off-shore schools. Due to the heavy operational commitments of the Airborne Division, individuals cannot be taken out of critical slots to attend the language tests. To alleviate this problem, the advisory detachment is continuing to emphasize the following:

(a) To place qualified personnel in the language training program in a timely fashion.

(b) Not to ask for allocations unless they intend to fill them.

(c) If not capable of filling a requested allocation, to cancel the request in sufficient time to permit another ARVN unit to fill the space.

(4) Lack of Resources: Timely availability of qualified personnel.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) The Airborne Division has made an effort to request and fill allocations for off-shore schooling that will be beneficial to its overall combat effectiveness. However, availability of best qualified personnel continued to be a problem.

(2) No revision of the sub-program is deemed necessary.

d. Projection: The availability of best qualified personnel will continue to be a problem.
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Advisor, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment.

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Revision of Table of Organization and Equipment.

(C) Statement of Objective: To revise the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) of the units of the division and obtain approval of the Joint General Staff (RVNAF) and the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV).

a. Review of Progress: During the reporting period, COMUSMACV authorized an expansion of 1477 personnel in the Airborne Division. In conjunction with the force structure increase the following TOE's of the division were revised or established:

   Engineer Company
   Signal Company
   Division Hq & Hq Company
   Medical Company
   Technical Company
   Military Police Detachment
   Artillery Battalion
   Airborne Training Center
   Support-Supply Company *

* Newly established.

b. Analysis of Progress:

   (1) The revision of the TOE's of the division were completed and approved by the Joint General Staff and MACV.

   (2) Deficiencies: None.

   (3) Critical Problems: None.

   (4) Lack of Resources: None.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

   (1) With the revision of the TOE's and the increase in force structure, the division will become more of a self-sustaining force that is capable of division size operations for long periods of time.
(2) This sub-program was not kept for calendar year 1968 because of the completion of this calendar year's revisions.

d. **Corrective Action:** None.

e. **Projection:** The TOE's of the division will continually be reviewed and updated when appropriate.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Chief, OP&R Division, J32

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Conversion of CIDG Camps to RF

(C) Statement of Objective: To convert CIDG companies to RF companies in those camps located in areas that are pacified or where RF elements can adequately assume the mission of CIDG forces.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) Six CIDG camps were converted to RF during the second half CY67 as follows:

   Lac Thien       II CTZ       1 Oct 67
   Mai Linh        II CTZ       1 Dec 67
   Van Canh        II CTZ       1 Jan 68
   Tanh Linh       III CTZ       1 Nov 67
   Ha Tien         IV CTZ       1 Nov 67
   Tinh Bien       IV CTZ       1 Nov 67

(2) A MACV/JGS Combined Directive was published on 26 December 1967. This directive outlines specific MACV and JGS/RVNAF responsibilities for camp conversions.

b. Analysis of Progress: Conversion progressed satisfactorily in the personnel and administration field. Difficulties were experienced in the withdrawal of US Army Special Force logistic support and the introduction of RVNAF logistic support. It is believed that the publication of the Combined Directive will alleviate these problems in the future.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The conversion of six CIDG camps to RF was accomplished during the last half of CY67. It appears that the CY68 conversions will be more efficient, particularly in the logistics field.

d. Projection: It appears that there will be no need for revision of program objectives.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, J3

CONFIDENTIAL
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Assistant Chief of Staff, J2

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: RVNAF CONSEC Unit (C)

(C) Statement of Objective: Issue to Unit 16 100% of the RVNAF TO&E 22-872 signal equipment by 31 December 1967.

a. Review of Progress: The signal equipment on hand increased from 58% (June 1967) to 89% (December 1967).

b. Analysis of Progress: Since June 1967, a gain of 31% of equipment on hand has been achieved. 11% of this gain can be attributed to cancellation of specific items of equipment which are not required for the successful accomplishment of Unit 16's mission. The remaining 20% can be attributed to normal receipt of requested items through supply channels plus redistribution of some equipment within the RVNA unit.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Satisfactory progress has been made in acquiring signal equipment for Unit 16. However, since 11% of the current TO&E remains to be filled, this sub-program has been renewed for CY 68 under the Program Review and Analysis System for RVNAF Progress.

d. Corrective Actions: Per MACJ2 request, the US Senior Signal Advisor has assisted greatly by requiring the RVNAF Signal Officer to review his resources and issue available equipment to Unit 16. In early December 1967, correspondence was forwarded to CINCPAC requesting that certain Army Security Agency (ASA) peculiar items (Monitor Set, TA-49 and Rack, MT-2345) be released to the Military Assistance Program (MAP) so they can be issued to Unit 16. Further, the Signal Advisor reviewed the TO&E, found 6 more suspected ASA peculiars items, and queried the ASA if they are under ASA control so that proper supply channels can be employed in requisitioning them. As of 31 December 1967, CINCPAC and ASA have not responded to the queries regarding these ASA peculiar items.

e. Projection: The remainder of the equipment listed in the current RVNAF TO&E 22-872 has been projected for delivery in equal increments during the first half of CY 68. Continued follow up on these items should assure their delivery not later than June 1968. However, it should be noted that the US Advisor to Unit 16 has submitted a new TO&E to the RVNAF JCS for coordination and approval. If this new TO&E is approved during CY 68, it will be necessary to realign signal equipment acquisition objectives as related to this review and analysis program. The reason for this realignment is that the new TO&E provides an increase in manpower and equipment for Unit 16.
Statement of Objective: Make general inspections and reinspections of each sector at least annually concerning the status of morale, organization, training, supply, and administration of RF/FF units throughout the country and conduct investigations where warranted.

a. Review of Progress: Total area and units to be inspected included 44 sectors, 44 A&DSL Companies, 291 sub-sectors, 919 RF Rifle Companies and 1,193 FF Platoons. Units inspected were 42 sectors, 42 A&DSL Companies, 118 sub-sectors, 180 RF Companies and 406 FF Platoons. In addition three investigations were conducted concerning pay and distribution of FF food supplements. The quality of inspections showed improvement as teams gained more experience.

b. Analysis of Progress: Objectives were not satisfactorily until 10 November 1967 when the General Directorate for RF and FF Affairs was inactivated. On 11 November 1967 the Office of Vice Chief of Staff, concurrently Commanding General, Regional Forces and Popular Forces, was activated. The inspection capability was doubled by this action since eight inspection teams were created; however, due to this reorganization, joint inspections were not conducted for the remainder of the year.

c. Conclusions and Trends:

(1) Inspections conducted during period 1 July 1967 and 10 November 1967 were more comprehensive and conducted more efficiently since problems involving acceptance of Inspection teams and inadequate TDX funds were eliminated during the second half of CY 1967 and inspection teams were more experienced.

(2) Program objectives have been revised and expanded as indicated below:

To inspect, in conjunction with the RVNAF JOS RF/FF Inspection teams, the RF/FF units to determine the appropriateness of their employment and utilization in support of the GVN Pacification Program. Also to monitor the overall effectiveness of RF/FF units in their missions and to maintain the status of RF/FF upgrading programs.

d. Corrective Action: Corrective action taken in reference to problems presented in Mid Year Review was adequate. Correction of deficiencies noted as result of inspections of RF/FF units through the
RVNAF chain of command is still in progress.

e. 

Provision: The JCS proposed increase to eleven inspection teams will allow more inspection time for each province and provide for bi-monthly inspections. Continued efforts will be made to meet revised goals concurrent with evaluation of goals during next reporting period.
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: 5th Special Forces Group (ABN)

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Conversion of Selected Special Forces Camps to LLDG (VNSF) Control

(S) Statement of Objective: The 5th Special Forces Group is conducting the turnover of selected Special Forces Camps to complete Vietnamese control.

e. Review of Progress: Goals for CY-67 were to prepare the VNSF "A" detachments for the assumption of unilateral control of selected camps and to complete turnover of these camps to VNSF control to include responsibility for supplies, administration, and tactical employment. Target dates for this action were:

- Camp Plei Mrong - 1 May 67 (completed)
- Camp Vinh Gia - 1 Jul 67 (completed)
- Camp Minh Thanh - 15 Jul 67

Camp Minh Thanh was not transferred due to subsequent plans to relocate it closer to the Cambodian border at Bo Tuc. However, another camp in II CTZ, Camp Vinh Thanh, was selected and transferred to VNSF control in CY-67, thus the program goals of turnover of three "A" camps were accomplished in CY-67.

b. Analysis of Progress: The analysis of progress, related problem areas and lessons learned follows:

(1) Personnel: The primary areas evolved from a general lack of capable and qualified VNSF personnel to assume the full responsibilities of the camps. There were exceptions to this; e.g., CPT Nam, CO, VNSF Detachment A-149, Camp Vinh Gia, IV CTZ, and CPT Hang, CO, Camp Vinh Thanh, II CTZ, but these two individuals are exceptions to the norm. Camp Plei Mrong, II CTZ, has had and continues to have personnel problems as evidenced by the replacement of the camp commander several times and the maintenance of a larger than normal "A" detachment on site.

(2) Administration and Logistics: Problems encountered universally throughout the three camps have been lax reporting procedures, some difficulties in administering CIDG funds and personnel accounting procedures, and poor communications due primarily to the language barrier and the lack of emphasis placed on communications at the VNSF "B" and "C" detachment levels. As a result an interpreter must accompany all FAC's and medevacs when operating in support of these camps. Although transfer was effected smoothly in the field of logistics it does require continued emphasis and supervision by the "B" detachments. Slowness in reporting can be eliminated by continuous emphasis and training by the "B" detachments, but the communications problem will be a continuing one and must be considered in all future transfers to VNSF control.

(3) Operational Techniques: Operations from camps under VNSF control have been generally carried on as they were under bilateral control with no serious problems having developed.
(a) Camp Vinh Gia has increased operations and covers its TAOR well, principally utilizing platoon-size operations. There has been a decrease in the number of contacts that can be attributed to the fact that there are no enemy base camps within the TAOR. Two examples of the effectiveness of their operations are ones that occurred on 29 Nov 67 when a sampan convoy was ambushed resulting in two VC KIA, a sizable number of B-40 and B-41 rockets, 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, and assorted documents being captured and on 23 Dec 67 when a canal clearing operation made contact with two companies of VC resulting in 20 VC KIA and numerous weapons, ammo, and documents captured.

(b) Camp Plei Mrong continues its operations at approximately the same level as before turnover. There was a problem at the outset in that the operations were of short duration resulting in failure to cover the TAOR completely. Recently a new VNSF commander was assigned to Plei Mrong and subsequently the effectiveness of the operations has increased. This increased effectiveness was demonstrated on 1 Jan 68 during a search and destroy operation consisting of one company of Camp Strike Force (CSF). The operation ambushed an estimated NVA battalion resulting in 47 NVA KIA, two NVA captured, and numerous weapons and equipment captured while losing only three CSF KIA and four CSF WIA.

(c) Camp Vinh Thanh has continued to conduct operations very effectively as evidenced on 30 Dec 67 when a local security outpost was attacked and 48 NVA were killed by the defenders.

(d) Training: Training of VNSF personnel to assume unilateral control of the camps requires special study. As evidenced by the problems involved in the transfer of these three camps the shortage of qualified VNSF personnel is the most serious problem area. Indications from senior VNSF commanders are that this shortage will continue to be critical; therefore, an intensive and expanded training program must be carried out.

(a) Administration and Logistics: Training in administration and logistics to include administering the CIDG funds must be conducted as very few VNSF personnel possess more than a superficial knowledge of these subjects. A prerequisite for this is the translation of all administrative publications and pertinent regulations. Training must be conducted on site by USAF detachment members who are engrossed in carrying out the daily operation of the camp and who usually have no previous experience in transferring camps. Further complications develop as a result of the language barrier which requires the use of interpreters who many times are, at best, mediocre. For these reasons the training process is a lengthy and difficult task.

(b) Technical Training: Technical training to develop proficiency in FO and FDG procedures, training in the operation of USAF communications equipment, and training in the operation and maintenance of equipment such as boat motors, generators, etc., must be conducted prior to transfer. Translation of documents, the language barrier, and the lack of experience all contribute to the difficulty of conducting this training. Indicative of the problems involved is an example to be cited at Camp Vinh.
Classes were presented to the VNSF and CIDG in FO and FDC procedures by the USASF; however, something seems to have been lost when the technical data was translated from English to Vietnamese. As a result ARVN artillery personnel were requested to present a one week course in FO and FDC procedures.

(c) Period of Training: The sub-program specified that the final phase of training for the VNSF would begin 30 days prior to the transfer of the camp. From the experience obtained in the transfer of these three camps it appears that this period of time is too short and should be lengthened to at least 60 days.

c. Conclusions and/or Trend:

(1) The transfer of selected camps to VNSF control is an extremely valuable program in improving the quality and training of the VNSF not only at the "A" detachment level but also at the "B" and "C" detachment levels through the experience gained in supporting the "A" detachment.

(2) The selection of VNSF personnel will continue to be a critical feature of the program due to the lack of qualified personnel.

(3) Problems in administration, logistics, and communications will continue to arise but they can be reduced considerably through intensive and continuous training and by the continued emphasis and interest at the USASF "B" and "C" detachment levels on the importance of the above areas and the value of timely reporting.

(4) Operations have been and should continue to be conducted effectively. The only potential problem is the area of incomplete coverage of the TAOR and this can be eliminated by emphasis at the "B" detachment level.

(5) Training of the VNSF personnel will be a continuing problem and one that requires added interest and emphasis. A small, highly skilled and experienced combined USASF/VNSF Mobile Training Team (MTT) would greatly improve this situation on a short term basis by moving on site 60 days prior to the designated transfer date and conducting the training for the VNSF detachment. Inasmuch as the transfer of camps will most likely continue, and perhaps even be accelerated in the future, the training program should be expanded. The expansion should include the development of a training center in-country similar to the JFKSPWRCEN and sending selected VNSF personnel to CONUS training centers to be trained in administration, logistics, communications, and other technical subjects.

(6) The program of transfer of camps to VNSF control should be expanded wherein a pilot area will be selected in which all of the camps under the selected "B" detachment will be transferred, the culmination
being the transfer of the "B" detachment to VNSF control. This would place the entire area under VNSF control; however, the area would continue to remain under USASF logistical support and funding.

d. Projection:

(1) The transfer of selected camps to VNSF control will continue during CY-68 at a rate not to exceed one camp per quarter.

(2) A pilot program should be initiated in CY-69 in which a "B" detachment and all subordinate "A" detachments will be transferred to VNSF control.

(3) The 5th SFGA has begun expanding the training program as stated to prepare the VNSF for these eventualities.
SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Self-Help Shelter Program for Dependents of ARVN Troops

(C) Statement of Objective: To provide materials, technical supervision and training to ARVN troops in III CTZ for the purpose of self-help construction of ARVN dependent housing to improve morale.

a. Review of Progress.

(1) On 19 December 1966, the SECAF approved in principal the proposed trial program to provide 9130 family housing units in the III CTZ on a trial basis; further expansion of the program would be deferred until an evaluation of the trial program was made. JCS authorized the use of O&M funds, and a fund allocation of $2.83 million was made. Inflation and a revision in the design reduced the scope to 4040 units. It is now felt that at least 4400 units can be obtained within the $2.83 million.

(2) In July 1967, construction was started on the first 10-family model unit at Bien Hoa. Construction of this unit was completed in November 1967. On 31 December two 10-family units had been completed, vertical construction was underway on eight 10-family units and site preparation was completed or underway at the majority of the remaining sites.

(3) The first quarterly evaluation report was made as of 1 October 1967 with the following results:

(a) ARVN Participation.

1. Staff Interest - variable, no observable trend.
2. Quality - variable, too few units under construction.
3. Speed - initial slow start, expected to improve but operational commitments cause disruption.
4. Diversion of Materials - no deliberate diversions, small loss due to theft.

(b) Advisory - more than expected because of pilot model problems.

(c) Engineer and Logistical - generally as expected for special attention required on small items because of command emphasis.

(d) Effect on morale - not yet measurable.
b. Analysis of Progress.

(1) The established goal of initiating vertical construction at all housing sites except two by 31 December 1967 was not achieved. The delay is attributed to nonavailability of engineering equipment to support site preparation, commitment of construction teams from recipient units to combat operations, and relocation of recipient units. Lack of security and enemy action has also caused some slippage in the program.

(2) It was estimated that the housing program would have progressed sufficiently by March 1968 so that an evaluation could be made for a determination of future programs. It is now estimated that the evaluation cannot be made until 1 July 1968 due to unattained goals.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends. The program has not progressed at the rate anticipated and its effect on ARVN morale cannot be determined.

d. Corrective Action. The III Corps Advisor is preparing an assessment of progress report to the CG III CTZ to facilitate acceleration of the program.
(C) Statement of Objective: To construct a new Vietnamese Marine Corps Training Center.

a. Review of Progress: The construction of this training center has an original target date for completion of December 1967. The FY 1967 Military Construction Program approved funds for this project but the funds were diverted for higher priority needs. The 1967 Supplemental Fund provided $52,000 which was utilized for purchase of construction materials for 21 barracks, 2 messhalls, 4 classrooms, 4 latrines and an administration building. The construction of the 21 barracks has been completed, and the construction of the remaining assets is in progress. Thus far, all construction has been a combined services effort. United States and Vietnamese sources provide the materials and the VNO provides the actual labor. All construction is integrated into the Self-Help Program except specialized construction i.e., water treatment, storage and distribution system, electrical generation and distribution system and sewage disposal and road building.

b. Analysis of Progress: During the latter part of December 1967, COON.WACNAV reallocated sufficient funds to complete the training center. The training center is now forty-five percent completed.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: None

d. Corrective Action: None

e. Projection: Target date for completion of the new training center is June 1968.
(C) Statement of Objective: The construction of facilities for the purpose of training the VNMC battalions in amphibious techniques commensurate with the mission of the VNMC.

a. Review of Progress: To construct an amphibious training center at VUNG TAU. Existing buildings will be rehabilitated and/or finished to be utilized as classrooms. In addition, a dry net disembarkation platform and a helicopter mock-up will be constructed. This will be a self-help project.

b. Analysis of Progress: Materials have been assembled for construction of the Amphibious Training Center.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: None

d. Corrective Action: None

e. Projection: Target date for completion of this project is December 1968.
(C) Statement of Objective: To provide new replacement for major items of equipment in order to modernize/improve the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

a. Review of Progress:

(1) Modernization and improvement of current Vietnamese Marine Corps communication equipment. This modernization program will replace all outmoded F1 equipment, replace all HF/AM equipment with Single Side Band (SSB) as well make all communications systems helicopter transportable.

(2) Replacement of the present eight guns in the 75mm Pack Howitzer Battery with six 105mm howitzers.

(3) Modernization and improvement of current Vietnamese Marine Corps motor transport equipment.

(4) Modernization and improvement of current Vietnamese Marine Corps crew served weapons.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The modernization and improvement of all communications equipment is currently in the planning stage and is approximately fifty percent complete. It is planned to program the new equipment for delivery in Fiscal Year 1970.

(2) To phase out the 75mm Pack Howitzers due to the fact that based on anticipated usage rate, only one year's supply of ammunition is available in Vietnam and further this type ammunition is no longer manufactured. The six replacement 105mm Howitzers are currently programmed for delivery during the second quarter of CY 1968.

(3) To replace all old non-standard Overseas Procured Japan (OSPJ) and M600 series vehicles with the new M standard series vehicles. These new M series vehicles are currently programmed for delivery in FY 1969.

(4) To replace all caliber .30 machine guns with the M-60 machine gun. Currently programmed for third quarter of FY 1968. To replace all 81mm M1 mortars with the 91mm M-29 mortars. Currently programmed for the third quarter FY 1968. To replace all 57mm recoilless rifles with the 90mm recoilless rifle. Tentatively programmed for the fourth quarter FY 1968.
c. Conclusions and/or Trends: None

d. Corrective Action: None

e. Projection: Completion of improvement and/or modernization of equipment is scheduled as discussed in paragraph b above.
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Institute a Viable Leadership Program for the Vietnamese Navy

Sub-Program Elements:

1. **Element: Develop a leadership plan.**

   a. **Statement of Objectives:** Define the purpose, scope and goals of the Vietnamese Navy leadership program (Target date: December 1967). Assign specific tasks to appropriate staffs and commands (Target date: December 1967). Promulgate detailed coordinating instructions required to carry out the plan (Target date: January 1968).

   b. **Review of Progress:** The Headquarters Staff, Vietnamese Navy has developed a comprehensive leadership plan for Navy-wide implementation. This plan was submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, Vietnamese Navy for review early in December 1967 and was returned to the Chief of Staff, Vietnamese Navy for minor revision during the latter part of that month. Approval of the leadership plan by the Chief of Naval Operations, Vietnamese Navy is anticipated early in Calendar Year 1968, followed by early implementation.

   c. **Analysis of Progress:**

      (1) A detailed Naval Advisory Group proposal was submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, Vietnamese Navy, early in November 1967 delineating a method of approach for developing and implementing a Vietnamese Navy Leadership Plan. As a result of this proposal, a Leadership Board, headed by the Chief of Staff, Vietnamese Navy was created to coordinate the preparation of such a plan. This board, in conjunction with the Psychological Warfare Section of the Vietnamese Navy Headquarters, prepared a plan which establishes a training program providing for leadership training encompassing examples of good leadership practice, standards of military conduct, appearance, performance, discipline and smartness.

      (2) The plan requires the implementation of this program by all Vietnamese Navy units, provides for periodic inspections by Chief of Naval Operations or his representatives and establishes monthly, quarterly and annual evaluation reporting requirements to determine the effectiveness of the program. In addition, the plan establishes an awards system to recognize outstanding individual and unit performance. Many of the concepts of the US Navy leadership program are incorporated in the Vietnamese Navy Plan.

   d. **Conclusions and/or Trends:** The quality of leadership in the Vietnamese Navy has continued to improve during the latter half of Calendar Year 1967. The strong personal leadership of the Chief of Naval Operations and his continuing efforts to raise standards of performance
throughout the Navy are readily in evidence. A policy of public recognition of outstanding performance such as presentation of personal and unit awards and promotions at public ceremonies has been established. These policies are formalized in the Vietnamese Navy Leadership Plan to be promulgated. Routine inspections of ships and facilities have been instituted to upgrade the material and ship keeping standards.

(1) The effects of improved leadership throughout the Navy are reflected in increased effectiveness of Vietnamese Navy units in carrying out assigned missions as well as the assumption of increased responsibilities for naval operations in the Republic of Vietnam.

(2) The trend toward improved leadership is continuing and will be greatly enhanced when the Leadership Plan is fully implemented.

e. Corrective Action: A high level of advisory attention will be given to monitoring the implementation and follow-through action on the leadership plan throughout Calendar Year 1968.


2. Element: Improve Formal Leadership Training.

a. Statement of Objectives: Review the quality and suitability of the leadership programs in use at the various training centers and at the Naval Academy, Nha Trang (Target date: July 1967). Develop new leadership courses for officers and non-commissioned officers as required (Target date: August 1967). Commence revised and updated formal courses of leadership instruction at the Naval Advanced Training Center, Saigon, and Naval Academy, Nha Trang (Target date: September 1967).

b. Review of Progress: The revised curriculum for the Vietnamese Naval Academy containing 89 hours of formal leadership instruction was introduced into the curriculum of Class A and Class B schools in September 1967. The leadership plan developed by the Vietnamese Navy and to be implemented in Calendar Year 1968 provides for unit instruction for junior officers and petty officers in leadership and related subjects.

c. Analysis of Progress: The number of students who received formal leadership instruction during the second half of Calendar Year 1967 is as follows:

(1) Naval Academy, Nha Trang: 234 midshipmen, training period is two years. Curriculum contains 89 hours formal leadership instruction.
The leadership instruction conducted at the Recruit Training Center and the leadership instruction presented in the curricula of the Reserve Officer Training and Class A Schools represent a gain in leadership instruction for the Vietnamese Navy of approximately 16,000 classroom hours compared to the leadership training conducted in the first half of calendar year 1967.

d. Conclusions and/or Trends: Formal leadership instruction is now an integral part of the curriculum of all regularly conducted schools operated by the Vietnamese Navy. Additionally, all new personnel inputs into the Vietnamese Navy, officer and enlisted, will have received some leadership instruction prior to their first operational assignment.

(1) Quality of instruction. The quality of instruction is evaluated to be satisfactory or better in all cases. Leadership instruction is taught by experienced commissioned officers. The leadership portion of the Reserve Officer Training Course conducted in Saigon was taught by the Chief, Vietnamese Bureau of Training. It is the usual practice that the leadership portion of a curriculum is taught by the Commanding Officer of the particular school.

(2) Further expansion of the volume of leadership training is anticipated in 1968 with the introduction of the Vietnamese Navy Leadership Plan and the implementation of unit leadership training provided for in that plan.

E. Corrective Action: Advisory effort will continue to press for improvements in and expansion of leadership instruction. This effort will be especially critical in the implementation of the Vietnamese Navy Leadership Plan in 1968.
f. Projection: Adequate formal leadership instruction now exists in the Vietnamese Navy Schools. Increased training will be accomplished when unit leadership training programs are inaugurated. Review of leadership training presently contained in formal schools will be required upon promulgation of the Vietnamese Navy Leadership Plan to ensure standardisation and conformity with that plan.


a. Statement of Objectives: Vietnamese Navy complete a review of present sea to shore rotation policies and make recommendations to Chief of Naval Operations, Vietnamese Navy for revision to present policies (Target date: October 1967). Chief of Naval Operations, Vietnamese Navy promulgate revised sea to shore rotation policies (Target date: December 1967). Prepare and promulgate to all personnel a "Career Planning Guide" (Target date: 1968). Establish a Career Counselling Team to advise personnel on the advantages of a career in the Vietnamese Navy. This team will concurrently study and evaluate problem areas aired during counselling interviews (Target date: 1968). Career Counselling Team conduct a review of the significant problem areas uncovered during counselling interviews and submit a report of findings and recommendations to Chief of Naval Operations, Vietnamese Navy (Target date: 1968).

b. Review of Progress: Continuing progress is being made in the area of validation of personnel assignments and introduction of machine accounting of officer personnel assignment. The concepts of development of a Career Planning Guide and establishment of a Career Counselling Team have been incorporated in the Vietnamese Navy Leadership Plan in a modified form.

c. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The review of personnel assignments revealed an imbalance in distribution of Vietnamese Navy petty officer assets. Recommendations for reassignment of personnel were made to and acted on by the Adjutant General section which resulted in reassignment of approximately 120 non-commissioned officers. Review of reassignment policies was completed and it was determined that, if adhered to, the existing system is adequate. Increased resources of qualified personnel will make it possible for the Vietnamese Navy to adhere to established rotation policies in the future. Progress in the implementation of machine accounting of personnel system has been made through the validation of two ADP listings of all Vietnamese Navy officer personnel.

(2) The modification of the Career Planning Guide and Career Counselling Team concept to better meet the needs of the Vietnamese Navy and incorporation of these concepts into the Vietnamese Navy Leadership Plan are considered to be effective means of accomplishing the desired goals.
d. Conclusions and/or Trends: Continued improvement in distribution and accounting of personnel is possible. Manpower resources can be better monitored and rotation policies adhered to through the implementation of more efficient and reliable accounting procedures. Implementation of the Vietnamese Navy Leadership Plan will result in improved distribution and dissemination of information on career planning and career incentives. This plan provides a means of making known to higher authority problems generated by improper personnel policies or distribution actions that affect morale, motivation and effectiveness. The plan further establishes the machinery for generating corrections to these problems.

a. Projection: Some modifications of personnel policies will follow implementation of the Vietnamese Navy Leadership Plan resulting in improved career incentives and a better informed personnel situation.
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Improvement in the Effectiveness of Logistics Support in the Vietnamese Navy

Sub-Program Element:

(C) Element: Increase Effectiveness of Logistics Support in the Vietnamese Navy.

a. Statement of Objectives: To provide increased effectiveness and efficiency to the Vietnamese Navy through improved logistics support by:

1. Organizing a Vietnamese Navy Headquarters Logistics Group.
2. Reorganizing Coastal Zone and Riverine Area logistics organizations.
3. Establishing field operational supply activities to support the logistic mission of the Vietnamese Navy.
4. Revising, formulating and promulgating systems and procedures pertaining to logistical functions.
5. Determining personnel requirements, including skills and qualifications, for logistical functions and operations.
6. Training personnel in logistical systems and procedures.

b. Review of Progress:

1. On 20 October 1967, the Chief of Naval Operations, Vietnamese Navy, prescribed the organization and functions of the Navy Logistics Group. The Headquarters Staff has been organized and is currently functioning. In November 1967, instructions were issued for organizing and operating eight decentralized supply depots. It is anticipated that the depots will be operational by 30 June 1968.

2. The Naval Supply Center has organized a three week training program in supply methods and procedures and to date has graduated three classes.

3. Little has been done with the logistics group to formulate position descriptions or identify skill requirements for various positions.
c. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The original organization for the Logistics Command proposed to the Chief of Naval Operations, Vietnamese Navy on 10 June 1967, would have granted the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics wide authority to control and direct the logistic system. The organization and functions as outlined in the instruction dated 20 October 1967, provide that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics will coordinate the work of the various Bureaus comprising the Logistics Group, prescribe the fleet repair program and equipment maintenance program, prepare the Navy Budget, establish plans for the logistic support of the Navy, and prepare and carry out construction projects at all naval installations.

(2) The establishment of a depot system and supply operating instructions is a significant improvement in the logistic distribution system. The supply depots will be under the military command of the Coastal Zone or Riverine Area Commander but technical control of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

(3) Phase I, the planning and reorganizing stage, is partially completed. A logistics organization has been established at Vietnamese Navy Headquarters under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. The logistic organization at the Coastal Zone and Riverine Areas has not been promulgated although there is a functioning unit at each of these commands. The authority relationship of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to certain field activities is yet to be defined.

(4) Phase II is a series of studies to formulate systems and procedures to carry out the functions assigned the Logistics Group. This has been partially accomplished with the publication of a series of instructions outlining the procedures for operation of the supply depots and other instructions relating to requisitioning procedures. A comprehensive series of logistic instructions to cover organic distribution procedures, preparation of the Navy Budget, and naval construction procedures still remain to be prepared and published.

(5) Phase III of the program, staffing and training of the organization, is proceeding at a good pace. A training program has been organized at the Naval Supply Center offering a three week course in Naval Logistics for both officers and enlisted.

d. Conclusions and/or Trends: Progress is being made toward achievement of program goals. This area of ambiguity in command relationships will be resolved when the Chief of Naval Operations promulgates the Coastal Zone and Riverine Area logistic organizations and defines the authority relationship between the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and field activities.
e. Corrective Action: To continue to press for a better definition of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics authority over the field activities and, at the same time, urge the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to take full advantage of the authority presently vested in his office. Frequent inspection and assistance from field supply advisors are necessary to ensure that the auxiliary supply depots plan is implemented on schedule.

f. Projection: The Vietnamese Navy Logistic Group, as presently organized, is capable of formulating a comprehensive logistic plan for the Vietnamese Navy and of ensuring that this plan is carried out.
(C) Statement of Objective: Facilities necessary to provide definitive and comprehensive medical care to sick or injured VNMC personnel and their dependents as well as to operate an autonomous medical support capability for the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

a. Review of Progress: To upgrade existing facilities at CUU LONG to provide complete medical support to the VNMC in existing facilities. This includes the expansion of those facilities to accommodate the 30 additional beds authorized by the Joint General Staff on 1 December 1967. This temporary measure includes the acquisition of the necessary support equipment attendant thereto. Further, included in this upgrading effort is the installation of a water distribution system for the CUU LONG facilities. Installation of the water distribution system should have the highest priority.

b. Analysis of Progress: Approximately 600,000 Piasters were authorized in December 1967 to renovate the existing facilities to include installation of water, sewer systems and structural repairs. Construction is to commence 8 January 1968 with a completion target date of May 1968.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: None

d. Corrective Action: None

e. Projection: Completion target date is May 1968.
Statement of Objective: To acquire more modern equipment with greater performance capacity to support the additional patient load and variety of medical care rendered to VNMC personnel and their dependents. The present VNMC Medical Company is working with the barest essentials.

a. Review of Progress: All items of equipment required have been programmed for delivery in June 1968.

b. Analysis of Progress: All items of equipment required have been programmed for delivery in June 1968.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: With receipt of the programmed equipment and the training program provided for on page 156 the Medical Support Program of the VNMC will be able to provide autonomous medical support to the VNMC.

d. Corrective Action: None

e. Projection: Delivery of required items of equipment is now programmed for June 1968.
Statement of Objective: To establish training programs designed to improve the capability of all VNMC personnel of the Medical Company to improve and specialize competence in the many fields in and allied to medicine and toward achieving complete autonomy in support of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

a. Review of Progress: This includes residency and off-shore training for physicians, dentists and pharmacists as well as in service programs for general service corpsmen. In-country and off-shore training programs which exist will be utilized more fully.

b. Analysis of Progress: A continuing two week on-the-job-training course for physicians at USNH GUAM is in process of being established. A ten day course of Preventative Medicine Techniques at the Station Hospital, DA NANG for corpsmen has been established.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: None

d. Corrective Action: None

e. Projection: The first doctor to attend the OJT Course at USNH GUAM is scheduled for April 1968. The first two corpsmen for the Preventive Medicine Course at Station Hospital, DA NANG are scheduled for February 1969.
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Naval Advisor, Vietnamese Navy

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Management Improvement in the Vietnamese Naval Shipyard and Making Shipyard Careers Attractive to Civilian Personnel

Sub-Program Element:

(C) Element: Improve shipyard management techniques and make shipyard careers attractive to civilian personnel.

a. Statement of Objectives: Raise the output of the Vietnamese Naval Shipyard to the level necessary to support the ships and craft of the Vietnamese Navy by effecting improvements in management techniques and by attracting and holding skilled workmen in the employ of the shipyard.

b. Review of Progress:

(1) Qualitative: During the past six months the quality of shipyard work and the number in the work force have remained relatively constant. Many of the newly hired personnel are of a low skill level. The small number of skilled workers who were hired was more than offset by the number of skilled workers who left the shipyard for the more remunerative civilian sector. In October, the first graduating class of the apprentice school entered shop employment. These personnel are performing with enthusiasm. If they can be retained in the shipyard, they will eventually add significantly to the skill level. A decree, establishing the yard as an autonomous activity, is currently being prepared at the Ministry of Defense level. If the shipyard is given such status it will have the prerogatives of setting wage scales at a level that will make it competitive in the labor market. Rumors of a pending pay raise have contributed to slowing down the loss of the skilled work force, however, unless a sizable pay adjustment is forthcoming in the near future a substantial further decline in skilled personnel can be expected. In order to improve the qualitative aspects of the yard, the US Navy supplied Mobile Training Teams in welding, gyro repair and refrigeration repair to train shop personnel during November and December.

(2) Quantitative: Mainly due to increased emphasis on supervision by the shipyard and advisory unit personnel, and management improvements which have recently been effected, there has been a marked improvement in the number of ship and boat overhauls completed during the period covered by this review. Nine ships have completed overhaul since 1 July and two more are nearing completion. Fifty-four small crafts completed overhaul during this same period, and twelve additional junks have been launched. Because of the dearth of skilled and supervisory personnel, however, faulty yard repairs are still being reported at too great a frequency by forces afloat.
(3) Timeliness: Although the yard has been unable to complete the assigned work within programmed availability periods, recent improvements have been noted in this regard. A considerable advisory effort is being made to ensure adherence to schedules wherever possible and to provide the necessary training and assistance to the shipyard personnel in the pre-planning phase of overhauls. Through such efforts, the available personnel and facilities may be more effectively utilized.

(4) Economy: With the improvement which has been achieved in the timeliness of work, there has been an accompanying decrease in the cost of performing work. Real savings, however, must await the influx of skilled and supervisory personnel which is expected once a pay raise is approved.

c. Analysis of Progress:

(1) Management:

(a) The shipyard Commander now has the authority to accept or decline additional work for the yard. This has enhanced the planning and production capabilities of the shipyard.

(b) A more aggressive program of monitoring and progressing work has been initiated. Analysis of work requirements is still a weak area in the overall management of the yard, but advisory focus on this deficiency has generated some improvement to date.

(2) Personnel:

(a) Personnel strength leveled off. It showed a slight rise in September and October. A decline in the total number of on-board personnel was registered in November and December. It must be borne in mind, however, that inflow is essentially unskilled while outflow is essentially skilled.

(b) The Shipyard Advisory Unit has been assisting the shipyard administration in developing a pay system based on position rather than on education, and one that will be competitive in the present manpower market. It is planned to arrange for a personnel classification mobile training team in order to assist in formalising the pay and classification system.

(3) Resources: Both the physical plant and the material support of the shipyard do not significantly limit the productive capacity of the shipyard. Minor improvements continue to be made in these areas. Basic techniques in procurement, follow up and accountability of material are being stressed by advisory unit personnel in order to ensure the effectiveness of supply support.

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d. Conclusions and/or Trends: Employment and productivity have improved during the past six months. A significant improvement is expected soon after implementation of the pay raise. Some management improvements have been made and others are in the final stages of being implemented. Facilities improvements are scheduled to keep pace with personnel and management improvements.

e. Corrective Actions:

(1) The shipyard advisors will continue to stress training both the formal training for the apprentices, and the upgrading of skill level of the present work force through on the job training; the latter, through the utilization of US supplied mobile training teams and instructors supplied through the auspices of USAID.

(2) Emphasis will continue on employee benefits, employee welfare and industrial safety.

(3) Improvements in the physical plant will be programmed as required.

f. Projection: It is anticipated that the decree, which will give the shipyard an autonomous status, will be promulgated in early March 1968. The revised pay rates have been established for shipyard workers and are essentially equivalent to the wages paid by US Forces to local national employees. The long range trend, providing these vitally needed impending actions are implemented, is for growing effectiveness in the shipyard and eventual self-sufficiency of the repair capability of the Vietnamese Navy.
I. Element: Off-Shore Training

a. Statement of Objective: To improve the English Language capability of the Vietnamese Navy personnel selected for off-shore training. (Target date: continuing).

b. Review of Progress: The English Language Screening Test for evaluation of the English language capability of prospective off-shore trainees was utilized extensively during the second half of Calendar Year 1967. The two English language training facilities operated by the Vietnamese Navy (a 20 booth laboratory at Naval Training Center, Nha Trang and a 10 booth laboratory at Naval Advanced Training Center, Saigon) operated at near optimum student load during the period. A Defense Language Institute English language training specialist reported in October 1967 to advise the English Language School at Naval Training Center, Nha Trang.

c. Analysis of Progress: Upgrading of the quality of English language instruction has been accomplished by converting all courses of English language instruction to the American Language Course developed by the Defense Language Institute. During the 2d half of Calendar Year 1967, the 10 booth language laboratory located at Naval Advanced Training Center, Saigon was utilized exclusively for intensive English language training for prospective off-shore trainees. Utilization figures for this facility were improved during the period. Average student load was 15 students. Forty-five students completed an intensive eight week training program during 2d half of Calendar Year 1967 as opposed to 30 students completing the course during the 1st half of Calendar Year 1967. The 20 booth laboratory at Naval Training Center, Nha Trang operated at maximum student load during the period. Averages for the period were:

30 students in intensive 16 week course
230 midshipmen receiving four hours per week instruction

During the 2d half of Calendar Year 1967, 79 departures for off-shore training were scheduled. During this period there were four cancellations due to candidate not being properly qualified in the English language. Total cancellations in the FY67 off-shore training program for lack of an English language qualified candidate was four.

d. Conclusions and/or Trends: Improved utilization of English language training facilities accomplished during 1967 will continue. Quality of instruction will be upgraded with adoption of Defense Language Institute course materials that was accomplished, and the advisory effort of the English Language Training Specialist now assigned to the primary English language training facility.
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e. Corrective Actions:

(1) The language training facility at Naval Training Center, Nha Trang will be expanded to 60 booths by the addition of 40 booths during the 4th quarter FY68.

(2) Commencing with the FY69 off-shore training program all off-shore trainees will be required to have received 16 weeks intensive English language training in-country.

(3) The Vietnamese Armed Forces Language School will not accredit the 10 booth language laboratory at Naval Advanced Training Center, Saigon or provide instructors at this time. It is anticipated, however, that the facility will continue to be used, utilizing Vietnamese civilian instructors.

f. Projection: The expansion of the language laboratory facilities at Naval Training Center, Nha Trang and improvement in the quality of instruction will result in better English language training for off-shore training candidates.

2. Element: In-country Training.

a. First sub-element:

(1) Statement of Objectives: Edit and adapt US Navy technical publications to the needs of the Vietnamese Navy, translate into Vietnamese and distribute. (Target date: December 1967).

(2) Review of Progress: During the period of this report, 12 special technical manuals associated with new equipments to be introduced into the Vietnamese Navy were submitted to the MACV Training Aids Division of the Training Directorate for priority translation. Because of the priority of this translation requirement, no progress was made in routine translation of training publications. The translation pool available to work on training publications continues to have a backlog of work amounting to 18 months to two years work. The progress of this translation is hampered by the necessity to preempt work on this material to complete priority projects.

(3) Analysis of Progress: The project awaits translation and printing of the publications.

(4) Corrective Action: A thorough review of translation requirements and capabilities is required. Adequate translators to handle the necessary training documents as well as operational materials should be drawn from the Vietnamese Armed Forces. In many cases translation work presently being done is unsatisfactory because the personnel doing the translation do not have the technical or military knowledge required to make a meaningful translation.

(5) Projection: Advisory effort is being expended to establish a limited translation capability within Vietnamese Navy Headquarters Training
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Bureau in order that the technical and language skills of Vietnamese Navy personnel may be utilized.

b. Second sub-element:

(1) Statement of Objective: Review and update the curriculum of all courses offered in the Vietnamese Navy's training establishment. (Target date: December 1967).

(2) Review of Progress: Percentage of completion of reviews of courses are as follows:

- Naval Academy: 100%
- Short Courses: 50%
- Class A Schools: 40%
- Recruit Training: 20%

(3) Analysis of Progress: Progress in review of courses is hampered by the necessity to have all course materials translated so that course content can be adequately reviewed by advisory personnel. The reviews that have been accomplished were in the priority areas of electronics and engineering and the entire Naval Academy's curriculum.

(4) Corrective Action: It is considered desirable that curricula receive thorough regular and recurring reviews at a deliberate pace rather than hurried cursory reviews of all courses. Advisory effort is being directed toward adoption of Vietnamese Navy policy to conduct a programmed review of all courses spread over a three year period with 30% to 40% of the curriculum being reviewed each year. This program will be more realistic and within the capabilities of the Vietnamese Navy training center staffs and the US Navy advisory units.

(5) Projection: Continued review and updating of curricula on a programmed basis.

c. Third sub-element:

(1) Statement of Objective: Vietnamese Navy Training Officer promulgate a complete training package to be used in training the crews of PCFs (Patrol Craft Fast) and PBRs (Patrol Boat River). (Target date: October 1967).

(2) Review of Progress: A joint US Naval Advisory/Vietnamese Navy plan for introduction of PCF and PBR type craft into the Vietnamese Navy was promulgated in August 1967. This plan contained the requisite annexes with goals and milestones devoted to crews to man these craft upon arrival in-country.
   a. Statement of Objective: Commander in Chief, Vietnamese Navy, established two complete underway training groups. (Target date: 1968).
   b. Review of Progress: No progress has been made in the establishment of a second Underway Training Group.
   c. Analysis of Progress: The present Underway Training Group is adequate to handle the projected assignment of ships to underway training. This team is well qualified and experienced in conducting intensive periods of training aboard ship. The present operational commitments of the Vietnamese Fleet units prohibit assignment of more than two units per month to underway training. One underway training unit is adequate to conduct this level of underway training.
   d. Conclusions: Delay establishment of a second Underway Training Team until the tempo of fleet operations will present adequate utilisation of a second team.

4. Element: Mobile Technical Training.
   a. Statement of Objective: Vietnamese Navy develop Mobile Technical Training Teams for the Coastal Zone and Riverine Areas. (Target date: July 1967).
   b. Review of Progress: Mobile Technical Training teams are now active in each of the four coastal zones. Mobile training teams for 3d and 4th Riverine Areas have not yet been established, however, training programs, utilising on-the-job training concept at the unit level, are in progress which will enable early establishment of these teams.
   c. Analysis of Progress: The full potential of the Mobile Training Team has not been exploited even in the areas where they have been established. This is primarily due to operational commitments, and poor scheduling by the Coastal Zone Commanders.
d. Conclusion and/or Trends: Upgrading of the quality of the Mobile Training Team personnel and improved scheduling will enhance the effectiveness of the Mobile Training Teams.

e. Corrective Action: Special instructor training for Mobile Training Team personnel will be conducted in early 1968 to improve the quality of the training being conducted. Increased advisory effort will be devoted to proper scheduling and utilization of these teams. Increased effort will be devoted also to implementation of the Mobile Training Team concept in the Riverine Areas.

f. Projection: Increased utilization and effectiveness of the Mobile Training Teams in the future is foreseeable.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Marine Advisor

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Vietnamese Marine Corps Training

(c) Statement of Objective: Conduct a comprehensive and objective study of the present recruit training system to determine if the resulting product meets the minimum acceptable standards of training for subsequent assignment to a VNMC combat unit.

a. Review of Progress: The Joint General Staff, RVN, directed the use of a revised 12 week Program of Instruction for recruit training on 25 March 1967. The program of instruction entails a 6 week Basic Combat Training Course (BCT) and a 6 week Advanced Individual Training Course (AIT).

b. Analysis of Progress: After comparison of the Joint General Staff, RVN, directed twelve week Program of Instruction and the USMC Recruit and Infantry Training Courses it was found that the syllabi are closely paralleled with no differences of any magnitude.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The current twelve week course of instruction for recruit training produces an acceptable Marine for assignment to a combat unit of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

d. Corrective Action: Emphasis is presently being placed on the improvement in quality and quantity of cadre personnel, training aids, classroom facilities and combat training facilities.

e. Projection: With the refinements in personnel, training aids, classroom facilities and combat training facilities, a great improvement in retention of subject matter by the recruits is anticipated.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Senior Marine Advisor

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Vietnamese Marine Corps Training

(C) Statement of Objective: To review and update the present Vietnamese Marine Corps Non-Commissioned Officers Course.

   a. Review of Progress: The revision of this course of instruction commenced in December 1967 and is approximately twenty-five percent complete.

   b. Analysis of Progress: Presently the NCO training course under the purview of the training center contains little more than a brief review of general military subjects. It is planned to totally revise the course of instruction emphasizing combat leadership in addition to teaching the normal military skills.

   c. Conclusions and/or Trends: When the review of the NCO Course is completed it is anticipated that the revised course will produce a greatly improved NCO who will return to his parent unit better prepared to accomplish his duties.

   d. Corrective Action: A complete review and update of the entire NCO Course. Results to be a new course of instruction which will emphasize combat leadership in addition to refresher training in basic military skills.

   e. Projection: Target date for completion of the revised NCO course is June 1968.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Senior Marine Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL
(C) Statement of Objective: To establish a military skills refresher course for company grade officers.

a. Review of Progress: Establishment of this course commenced in December 1967 and at present is approximately five percent complete.

b. Analysis of Progress: Presently in the initial stages of study and construction this course will place emphasis on "lessons learned in combat", aerial observation techniques, use of supporting arms and leadership.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Upon completion of this course the vehicle will be available to conduct a short, comprehensive review course for company grade officers of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

d. Corrective Action: To provide a course to satisfy a critical requirement in the overall training requirements of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

e. Projection: Target date for completion of the course is December 1968.
Statement of Objective: To study and develop a short term program of instruction for Vietnamese Marine Corps Infantry Battalions to be utilized when not actively engaged in combat operations.

a. Review of Progress: Establishment of this course is currently under study.

b. Analysis of Progress:

(1) The release of a VNMC Infantry Battalion from operational status by the Joint General Staff is indeed a rarity. To partly overcome this deficiency of battalion retraining is the major objective of this program.

(2) Infantry Battalions of the VNMC have had no formal retraining for the past eighteen months. Three battalions are scheduled for a six week retraining course at the National Training Center at VAN KEP during CY 1968. Battalions are scheduled for this training in February, June and September.

(3) The resources of the VNMC are available to attend scheduled battalion retraining at the National Training Center provided they are released from operational commitments by JGS.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Based on past experience the indications are that the battalions of the VNMC will not attend retraining during this calendar year.

d. Corrective Action: The action required to alleviate this training problem is release of the battalions for retraining as scheduled.

e. Projection: It is anticipated that for the foreseeable future the battalions of the VNMC will not be available for formal retraining. The proposed course will be designed to conduct short courses of instruction for these battalions while not actively engaged in combat operations and are located in the general area of the VNMC Training Center.
Statement of Objective: To consider and study the establishment of a mobile training team within the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

a. Review of Progress: A mobile training team concept is presently under consideration and study.

b. Analysis of Progress: With the active operational posture of all VNMC Infantry Battalions, it is nearly impossible to have a battalion released from operational commitments by the JGS for normal battalion retraining. The concept of a mobile training team would not alleviate the situation entirely, but could be used when the battalions are not operating for short durations.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: This mobile training team would normally be concerned with basic combat skills and lessons learned, but could also have the capability of teaching specialized subjects as the need arises.

d. Corrective Action: The mobile training team concept will not alleviate the battalion retraining requirement in its entirety. However, when combined with the program of battalion retraining proposed on page 168 will provide some formal retraining where none is now conducted.

e. Projection: Establishment of this team commenced in December 1967 and is approximately five percent complete. Target date is December 1968.
1. (c) Statement of Objective: To man the VNAF Air Request Net in support of ARVN with qualified VNAF ALO personnel.

a. Review of Progress: 133 ALOs have been trained in the VNAF AGCS.

b. Analysis of Progress: VNAF Program Plan 67-02 calls for 131 officers to be trained by 1 July 1968.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Program is proceeding slightly ahead of schedule.

d. Corrective Action: N/A.

e. Projection: Program outlook favorable.

2. (c) Statement of Objective: Positioning of qualified VNAF ALO personnel in the Tactical Air Control System.

a. Review of Progress: Seventy of the 133 VNAF ALOs are currently positioned in the Tactical Air Control System. As the TAGS expands other trained ALOs will be positioned accordingly.

b. Analysis of Progress: The ALO Program is progressing on schedule. Lack of support from some Province Chiefs has prevented the positioning of ALOs in some areas.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: Program will be hampered at some locations, unless the ALOs receive proper support i.e., adequate housing and transportation from the Province Chiefs.
Statement of Objective: Accomplish maximum economical repair in-country commensurate with available personnel, facilities, equipment and availability of parts support.

a. Review of Progress: On 5 Jul 1967, the F-5 component repair capability of the VNAF depot was evaluated and determination was made that 40% of F-5 components could be repaired in-country. F-5 component repair capability was re-evaluated, and an increase in depot component repair capability was noted. Primary emphasis has been on the F-5 modernization program but the depot monthly reparable review has indicated an increase in the Wing capability to affect component repair on all aircraft systems. The VNAF comm/nav reparable program has shown definite improvement at both Wing and Depot levels. An active OJT program to increase the quality of trained technicians has been the primary factor in the improvement.

b. Analysis of Progress: Definite progress has been made at the Depot level, and minor progress at the Wing level. The use of manufacturers technical representatives and AFLC WSLO personnel in both advisory and working capacity have contributed to increased efficiency. Newly arrived test equipment and tools will further increase the depot component repair capability. The increase in the depot capability will provide the basis for continuing evaluation of the Wing reparables programs.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The program is proceeding satisfactorily and will continue to show improvement throughout this calendar year. A basis for evaluation of component repair capability has been established and continued increase in proficiency in this area now depends on improvement in technical qualification of VNAF maintenance personnel.

d. Projection: There is no completion date on this project since 100% self-sufficiency is not required. The program will continue to show improvement and evaluation of trend will be based on continued progress.
SUB-PROGRAM MANAG.-H: Director of Materiel - AFGP

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Increased VNAF Aircraft Maintenance Self-Sufficiency

Statement of Objective: Maintain sufficient quantity of spares on hand to meet maintenance requirements and to preclude priority requisitioning.

a. Review of Progress: Spares requirements for the F-5 aircraft are completed. The C-119G initial spares lay-in is currently over 3/4 complete and will be completed by March 1968. Programming action for initial spare parts for AC-47 aircraft guns and pods has been completed with initial delivery due 15 April 1968. Programming action for UH-1H spares is complete and initial delivery is expected in March 1968. Dollar programming has been completed for A-3B spares, however, the items have not been definitized pending receipt of the Initial Spares Support Listings from AFLC. We expect to receive the ISSL's on 1 March 1968.

b. Analysis of Progress: Progress is satisfactory and actions in support of the VNAF Modernisation will be completed within acceptable time frames.

Critical Deficiencies: None.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends:

(1) Trends: Not Operationally Ready-Supply (NORS) rates have been generally favorable, aside from sporadic deviations caused by random failures. Primary difficulties have been on H-34 aircraft (excessively high main rotor blade consumption, delay in CONUS resupply from repair/return sources), and on U-17 aircraft (random item failures, relatively small number of aircraft).

(a) H-34 In-Country NORS Trend

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(b) U-17 In-Country NORS Trend

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(2) There is no need for revision of program objectives or schedules.

d. Corrective Action: Not applicable.

e. Projection: H-34 NORS for rotor blades should continue to improve with the maximum AFLC command pressure being applied. Some upward trend in C-47, A-1, U-17 and U-6 NORS and EMORS rates may occur as a result of loss of depot stocks.
Statement of Objective: Improve the maintenance data collection system on the F-5 aircraft in accordance with AFM 66-1 and related 00-20 series T.O.'s with a view toward expanding into the other aircraft types.

a. Review of Progress: From 1 Jun 66 to 15 Feb 66 an AFGP-MKE maintenance analyst did a detailed study with the VNAF 23rd Wing and AFAT-2 on the F-5 aircraft maintenance data. An updating of all TCTO and jet engine records on the F-5 aircraft was accomplished. Also VNAF maintenance personnel were trained in the use of the mechanized data forms and techniques of analysis derived from them. The completed study will be used as a basis for a joint maintenance analysis workshop in the later part of March 66.

b. Analysis of Progress: Due to the VNAF Modernization Program, implementation of a mechanized data system has been delayed. Projects are being completed but a slippage of two months is anticipated.

c. Conclusions: Implementation of improved maintenance data analysis will begin as VNAF translates selected AFM 66-1 and 00-20 series T.O.'s.

d. Corrective Action: Not applicable.

e. Projection: Projects will be completed two months after the scheduled date.
SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director of Materiel - AFGP

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Increased VNAF Aircraft Maintenance Self-Sufficiency

Statement of Objective: Plan and program facilities required to carry out increased base maintenance responsibilities.

a. Review of Progress: A central review to insure that the program provided for minimum hangar and shop requirements was completed in March 1967. With the exception of an aircraft general purpose shop at Nha Trang AB, an adequate number of field maintenance facilities is available at all VNAF bases. However, many of the in-place facilities require rehabilitation. A 19,440 SF aircraft maintenance shop has been programmed in the FY68 funded MEP for Nha Trang at an estimated cost of $350,000. Design is underway and construction should be completed by January 1969. In addition, projects to rehabilitate aircraft maintenance facilities at Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Tan Son Nhut were included in the Maintenance, Repair and Minor Construction Program. The Tan Son Nhut project was funded with FY67 monies and has been completed (Project TSN 11-7v). The Da Nang and Nha Trang projects (DNG 4-7v, NHA 4-7v, NHA 11-7v, and NHA 12-7v) have been designed and funded with FY68 monies. Construction should be completed by July 68.

b. Analysis of Progress: Projects are being completed on schedule with no problem areas.

c. Conclusions: Fully adequate aircraft maintenance facilities will be available for VNAF use by January 1969.

d. Corrective Action: Not applicable.

e. Projection: Projects should be completed on schedule.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Chief, Air Force Advisory Group

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Statement of Objective: Plan and program requirements for each VNAF Wing, consistent with economic considerations and availability of skilled personnel to effectively support the current and projected inputs of new types of aircraft.

a. Review of Progress: Equippage for field and depot maintenance of F-5 aircraft was completed in April 1967. Equipment required for F-5 component repair was revalidated and appropriate MOD Control Numbers were cited to AFLC. Equipment requirements for C-119 aircraft were procured by AFLC and are currently being received, with completion expected in March 1968. Programming has been completed for support of the initial increment of UH-1H aircraft, with equipment delivery expected in March 1968. Minor programming has been completed on the AC-47 aircraft and equipment requirements are on order. Dollar programming has been completed for the A-37B aircraft, however, the equipment has not yet been definitized pending receipt of the tentative Table of Allowance from AFLC. The T/A is expected 1 March 1968.

b. Analysis of Progress: Progress is satisfactory and actions are or will be completed within acceptable time frames.

   (1) Critical Deficiencies: None.

   (2) Critical Problems: None.

   (3) Lack of Resources:

   (a) Eight each 463L Forklifts, FSN 3930-856-6897 are programmed for use with the C-119 aircraft to assure maximum effectiveness in utilization of the aircraft and in on-and-off loading. HQ USAF directed a February 1968 delivery date on the lifts and a request for shipping status will be forwarded to Warner Robins Air Material Area. Adequate interim operating arrangements have been made.

   (b) Pallets, nets, conveyors, and palletized trailers for use with C-119 aircraft were definitized to HQ AFLC on 22 Sep 67. The items have not yet been received. Adequate interim operating arrangements have been made.
c. Conclusions:

(1) Trends: Not applicable.

(2) There is no need to revise the program objective or delivery schedules.

d. Corrective Action: Not applicable.

e. Projection: The objective will be achieved for CY68/69 aircraft input.
Statement of Objective: Conduct a continuous training program to maintain a stabilized organizational, field and depot maintenance capability.

a. Review of Progress: F-5 maintenance training was completed in Sep 67 for most support areas. Aircraft mechanic and jet engine maintenance are still undergoing training at present. C-119 maintenance training started on 6 Nov 67 and is estimated to be completed 7 March 68.

b. Analysis of Progress: Projects are being completed on schedule with no major problem areas.

c. Conclusions: Continuous training in all phases of maintenance are being accomplished on the F-5 and C-119 aircraft entering the VNAF fleet.

d. Corrective Action: Not applicable.

e. Projection: Projects should be completed on schedule.
1. (C) Statement of Objective: To realize improved management techniques, emphasizing the need for accurate, up-to-date information as a tool of good management.

a. Review of Progress: Although an implied sub-program element in the past, management improvement has only recently been spelled out by the present Director as a specific element now that a significant amount of communications hardware is possessed by the VNAF. Weekly management meetings between VNAF DCS/C&E and USAF Advisory Group Director/C&E have pointed out management problems concerning equipment, supply, personnel and maintenance. An AC&W quality control team has been established and the number of productive staff visits to subordinate units has increased.

b. Analysis of Progress: Weekly management meetings have been successful in persuading the VNAF to begin an up-date of their basic management document (PCSP) for C&E equipment and facilities by means of a complete physical inventory. VNAF DCS/C&E has also agreed to the need for collecting data on personnel manning levels, authorization and requirements in order to identify mal-assignments and training requirements.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: VNAF initiated a PCSP-type document several years ago but has not kept it current. They have been given advice and briefings on the purpose and need for such a management document. Specific examples of malassignment and lack of control over VNAF personnel in C&E fields have been pointed out in order to reinforce the need for timely reports and information from subordinate communications organizations. A previous goal, to reorganize VNAF communications units into a communications and Electronics group similar to the 1964th Comm Gp (AFCS), has been abandoned since such a structure was interpreted as a lowering of the prestige and status of VNAF DCS/C&E. Accordingly, we have established a lesser goal in which future emphasis is to be placed on advice aimed at establishing accepted authority of VNAF DCS/C&E over communications units in the field.

d. Corrective Action: VNAF must be persuaded to accomplish a complete physical inventory of equipment and facilities at all levels and must continue to up-date the PCSP once it has been reaccomplished. They must be convinced of the necessity for better control of personnel in communications fields to prevent malassignment and inefficient use of trained personnel.
Within the next 12 to 18 months, we expect that the VNAF PCSP will be updated, published and disseminated to the appropriate organizations. In addition, during the same period, personnel training levels, authorizations and training requirements should be identified and, in cooperation with the 1964th Comm Grp and 505th Tactical Control Group, the VNAF should make significant progress in training and upgrading its C&E personnel.

2. (C) Statement of Objective: To provide on-line secure teletype communications between communications centers.

a. Review of Progress: On-line equipment has been installed and is operational at Tan Son Nhu, Nha Trang, Binh Thuy, Pleiku and Bien Hoa.

b. Analysis of Progress: On-line equipment is to be installed at the Da Nang Comm Center, the last to receive the required equipment. It was inspected and approved for on-line equipment in Nov 67. Existing circuit quality must be improved. Presently only the TSN to BHA circuit meets the required tolerances of the on-line equipment.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: VNAF has increased the sophistication of its facilities by progressing from CW radio to teletype communications. On-line encryption will improve the speed and efficiency of their present systems.

d. Corrective Action: MACV has been requested to reroute or re-engineer the present teletype circuits in order to improve their quality for on-line encrypted service.

e. Projection: The VNAF teletype system should be capable of 100% on-line encrypted operation within the next 18 months.

3. (C) Statement of Objective: To modernize VNAF telephone systems.

a. Review of Progress: Installation and cutover of new DCO, have been accomplished at Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhu.

b. Analysis of Progress: Cut-over of present VNAF circuits need to be accomplished at Da Nang, Nha Trang, Binh Thuy and Pleiku. Joint operation must be achieved at Tan Son Nhu and Pleiku.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The VNAF are beginning to integrate their telephone systems with USAF systems. As this is accomplished the VNAF will be able to phase out their old system in favor of the modern and efficient USAF system.
4. (C) Statement of Objective: To provide rapid and reliable secure teletype and clear voice communications between command posts and between command elements and command posts.

a. Review of Progress: Equipment to provide VNAF Command Posts with interfacing and patching capability from telephone lines to air/ground radio and non-tactical radios on the commanders net has been programmed and partially funded.

b. Analysis of Progress: GEEIA has completed the technical input for an Engineering Requirements Plan (ERP) which will be forwarded to CINCPAC for their approval. Following CINCPAC approval the required equipment will be procured.

c. Conclusions and/or Trends: The completion of this system will enable VNAF commanders to maintain contact with and control over their airborne aircraft anywhere in RVN. This will represent a large step toward completing the VNAF command and control system.

d. Corrective Action: A request for additional funds will have to be made since the original estimates and approved funding did not cover the total required cost of the system. GEEIA installation assistance must be requested.

e. Projection: This system should be operational within six months following CINCPAC approval, since required equipments are common USAF items.

5. (C) Statement of Objective: To complete the modernization of existing VNAF Control Towers.

a. Review of Progress: The control towers at Nha Trang, Da Nang, Bien Hoa and Minh Thuy have been equipped with new FAA control consoles. The interior and exterior of the DaNang control tower have been completely refurbished.
b. Due to the recent decrease in VNAF force structure at Pleiku, we are re-evaluating the previous plan to equip the Pleiku tower with a new FAA control console.

c. The installation of FAA control consoles gives the VNAF modern, up-to-date capabilities equal to those of the USAF in their Air Base Control Towers.

d. Corrective Action: N/A

e. Projection: We are querying the Pacific GEEIA Region on the status of the Engineering Requirements Plan for the installation of an FAA console at Pleiku Air Base. When the status is determined we will decide if the FAA console is a valid requirement in view of the present VNAF force structure there and on a commonality and logistic support basis.

6. (C) Statement of Objective: To complete the in-country transfer of TACAN facilities.

a. Review of Progress: At present, the only VNAF owned and maintained TACAN facility is at Ban Me Thuot. TACAN facilities at Tan Son Nhut, Nha Trang, Pleiku, Bien Hoa, Binh Thuy and Da Nang are scheduled for in-country transfer.

b. Analysis of Progress: In-country Transfer must await the availability of trained personnel to maintain the equipment. Thus this element depends on management improvement in both personnel and training areas.

c. Conclusion and/or Trends: Funds for in-country transfer are available, but the transfer should not be accomplished until the maintenance capability exists.

d. Corrective Action: The required maintenance capability should result from actions, in the management improvement area, aimed at training and upgrading of VNAF personnel.

e. Projection: Within 18 months the VNAF should obtain the trained personnel necessary before in-country transfer is accomplished.

7. (C) Statement of Objective: To complete the installation of direction finding equipment and plan for in-country transfer.

a. Review of Progress: AN/GRD-11 Direction Finders have been installed at Bien Hoa and Pleiku. Another is to be installed at Da Nang. The latter should be completed in July, 1968.

b. Analysis of Progress: In-country transfer must await the availability of trained personnel to maintain the equipment. Thus this element depends on management improvement in both personnel and training areas.
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Conclusions and/or Trends: Funds for in-country transfer are available, but the transfer should not be accomplished until the maintenance capability exists.

c. Corrective Action: The required maintenance capability should result from actions in the management improvement area, aimed at training and upgrading of VNAF personnel.

d. Projection: Within the next 18 months the VNAF should obtain the trained personnel necessary before in-country transfer is accomplished.

d. Statement of Objective: To upgrade Pleiku, Ban Me Thuot AC&W sites and complete the installation of AC&W equipment at Binh Thuy.

a. Review of Progress: Modernisation of radars at Tan Son Nhut and Monkey Mountain is complete. The new installation at Binh Thuy should be completed in FY3/68.

b. Analysis of Progress: Both Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot AC&W sites have new search radars (AN/MP-11) installed under project Pacer Dog. These radars are more dependable, give better tracking and longer range. They are easier to maintain and parts are more readily available.

c. This modernisation program will give VNAF a more sophisticated radar system with an increased capability to handle modern jet aircraft.

d. Corrective Action: N/A

e. The modernisation should be complete for all existing sites by FY2/69.
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SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: VNAF Modernization Program

   a. Review of Progress: All plans completed.
   b. Analysis of Progress: All plans were completed within the time frame desired. No critical problems or lack of resources were encountered during formulation of the plans.
   c. Conclusions and/or Trends: All plans proved effective in providing the guidance necessary to update the VNAF air arm.
   d. Corrective Action: N/A.
   e. Projection: N/A.

2. (C) Statement of Objective: Develop operational procedures manuals for the F-5, A-37, C-119G, and UH-1D.
   a. Review of Progress: Manuals completed for the F-5, C-119G, and UH-1D. The A-37 manual will be delayed pending Tactical Air Command/PACAF evaluation of project "Combat Dragon".
   b. Analysis of Progress: All manuals were completed in a timely manner. No major deficiencies were encountered.
   c. Conclusions and/or Trends: N/A.
   d. Corrective Action: N/A.
   e. Projection: N/A

3. (C) Statement of Objective: Convert one A-1 Squadron to F-5 aircraft.
   a. Review of Progress: Conversion completed.
   b. Analysis of Progress: Program proceeded IAW VNAF Plan 67-02A. No critical problems, lack of resources or major deficiencies were encountered.
   c. Conclusions and/or Trends: This conversion of the first VNAF Squadron to jet aircraft was accomplished in an outstanding manner.
   d. Corrective Action: N/A
   e. Projection: N/A.
4. (C) **Statement of Objective**: Convert one C-47 Squadron to C-119G aircraft.

   a. **Review of Progress**: Maintenance training is 75% complete.

   b. **Analysis of Progress**: The basic project is on schedule. Deficiencies have been encountered in USAF personnel augmentation.

   c. **Conclusions and/or Trends**: The program should proceed on schedule.

   d. **Corrective Action**: Follow-up action on the personnel augmentation problem has been taken by the Advisory Group.

   e. **Projection**: No critical problems are anticipated with this program. Outlook favorable.

5. (C) **Statement of Objective**: Convert one C-47 Squadron to AC-47 aircraft.

   a. **Review of Progress**: The first contingent of instructor aircrews and ground instructor personnel (Maintenance) have been trained.

   b. **Analysis of Progress**: Program slippage has been experienced. The 16 modification kits for the aircraft have not been received to date.

   c. **Conclusions and/or Trends**: The program should accelerate to a normal flow schedule upon receipt of modification kits.

   d. **Corrective Action**: APGF has initiated follow-up action to determine the status of the Modification Kits.

   e. **Projection**: The VNAF has many C-47 qualified aircrews, therefore the introduction of the AC-47 should present no major problems. Outlook favorable.

**MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR**: Chief, Air Force Advisory Group

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SUB-PROGRAM MANAGER: Director of Training, AFGP

SUB-PROGRAM TITLE: Expand and Emphasize VNAF Training

1. Statement of Objective: Construction of new barracks, training aids building and an auxiliary air field for the Air Training Center at Nha Trang.

Review of Progress: Construction of our new barracks and the training aids building have been completed and are being used by the students of Air Training Center. The auxiliary air field for the Air Training Center at Nha Trang has a number 2 priority; however the project is to be revalidated after FY67 Military Construction Program funds are received and prior to initial procurement contractual action.


Review of Progress: Goal was to produce minimum of 145 pilots in offshore training to increase the VNAF pilot to aircraft ratio. Actual production for calendar year 1967 totaled 223.

3. Statement of Objective: Establishment of Unit General Military Training programs at three VNAF Wings.

Review of Progress: Each VNAF Wing has a Unit General Military training program in effect. Each flying and non-flying VNAF officer attends a 3 day training course. The number of hours depend on the annual program prescribed by Headquarters VNAF. Semi-annually airmen are scheduled for a three day refresher training course established annually by Headquarters VNAF. The training for officers and airmen is well organized and appears to be effective. The Base Commander of each wing is in charge of training assisted by his Deputy and the Chief of Operations of the Training Director.


Review of Progress: Fourteen Job Training Standards which are used in the OJT programs have been translated into Vietnamese. Also sixteen text books and eighteen Air Force Manuals which directly affect the OJT program have been translated for use in the program.


Review of Progress: Four new aircraft are in process of acquisition for VNAF. Training is progressing satisfactorily in each weapon system. New aircraft are arriving as scheduled.

MAJOR ACTIVITY DIRECTOR: Chief Air Force Advisory Group

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