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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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[Signature]

C. A. STANFIELD
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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I Field Force Vietnam
11th Infantry Brigade (Sep)
CO, US Army Aviation Test Activity

2

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## OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
A.O. 96350

AVFA-GG-OT 15 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, ROF, CSFOR - 65, UIC WDDL AA (U)

TO: See Distribution

SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (S) General:
   a. In August, September and October 1967, United States and Free World Military Forces (FMWF) with 44 maneuver battalions, 26 US and 18 ROK, supported by 24 artillery battalions, and Army Vietnam (ARVN) with 26 maneuver battalions supported by six artillery battalions continued operations in II Corps Tactical Zone (II CTZ) in the west along the Cambodian/Laotian/Public of Vietnam (RVN) border in Dakar, Pleiku and Kontum Provinces; and along the east coast in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanc Hoa and Binh Thuan Provinces. Along the Cambodian/Laotian/RVN border, combat operations were primarily oriented toward interdiction of enemy infiltration routes and surveillance of the western border. On the east coast operations were oriented on search and destroy and cordon and search operations to destroy enemy forces, protect the rice harvests and support revolutionary development.

   b. Enemy losses for the period were 3736 KIA (BC), 954 captured, 1436 individual and 137 crew served weapons captured. Additionally, II CTZ accounted for 778 Hoi Chanhs.

2. (C) Intelligence:
   a. General: During the past quarter there were no major changes in the organisation or staff activities of the ACofS, G2. A series of monthly intelligence staff conferences designed to improve the production and dissemination of intelligence has proven highly beneficial to the intelligence community in the II CTZ. The last such conference was held at HQ, I FFORCEV, Nha Trang, on 24 October 1967. Conferees included G2, I FFORCEV; Dep J2, ROKFORCEV; G2, II ARVN Corp; and the SIA, II Corps. Subjects discussed were: the general enemy situation in II CTZ; the rapid exchange of PW and Hoi Chanh information; Preliminary Interrogation Reports (PIRs) and Interrogation Reports (IRs); distribution of INTSUHs between ARVN, ROK, and US units; and the use of night visual reconnaissance.

   b. Significant Sources, Agencies, and Techniques:
      (1) There were no major changes in sources, agencies, or techniques noted during the reporting period.
      (2) The shortage of linguists continued to detract from the overall intelligence effort at this headquarters.
      (3) Detachment, 1st MI Bn (ARS)

(a) The detachment has continued its assigned mission of imagery interpretation, reproduction, and delivery to field units of tactical imagery taken by the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing in the II CTZ. The detachment has produced a Supplemental Imagery Folder.
Subject: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, RCS, CP FOR — 65, UIC WDDL AA (U)

Interpretation Report on every mission flown in the Corps area. In addition, detachment personnel continued training and advising US and F4NAF personnel in the use of the 35mm hand-held camera as well as in the development of film and printing of photography generated by this program. Detachment personnel also conducted 35mm photo missions for HQ, I FFORCEN, 9th ROK Infantry Division; and the II Corps Advisory Group. Detachment D provided a two man tactical exploitation team to US Special Forces Det B-50 for field operations. The team performs imagery interpretation and photography observer functions. Personnel of the detachment also prepared studies in vegetation typing and agricultural delineation in Binh Dinh Province.

4) 22 Air

(a) During the quarter, notification was received that the 203d Reconnaissance Airplane Company is scheduled to be operational in country on or about 1 December 1967. The company with its 24 O-1 aircraft will be stationed at Phu Hiep in Phu Yen Province.

(b) The following is a summary of relative reconnaissance tasking of the Mohawk (OV1) Company and the Air Force from 1 August 1967 through 31 October 1967:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mohawk</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHOTO</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>66.6%</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLAR</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5) Collection — (55th MID)

During the period 167 individual weapons, 82 crew-served weapons and 35 pounds of uniforms, equipment and medical supplies were evacuated to MACV J2 for technical intelligence examination. IPW teams screened 651 detainees and interrogated 237 POWs. Based on these interrogations, 221 PBs and IBs were prepared and distributed. Captured documents were screened and 58.5 feet of documents were forwarded to CDEC for further exploitation. In addition, nine feet of Korean documents were screened and forwarded to CDEC. The IPW team also translated 15 interrogation reports from Korean to English.

6) The 64th Engineer Detachment (TOPO) (CORPS) processed and distributed 58,800 copies of Tactical Data Overprint maps and 28,305 terrain analysis maps.

c. Deviation from Current Intelligence Doctrine: No change from previous quarter.

d. Significant Changes from Previous Reports: None.

e. Enemy Order of Battle:

(1) Disposition of NVA, VC Main Forces, and VC Local Forces is at Inclosure 1.

(2) NVA and VC regular and irregular forces suffered moderate casualties throughout the II CTZ during the reporting period. Enemy activity declined in the Western Highlands as the southwest monsoon ended, but activity was increased by the 3d and 5th NVA Divisions in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces. There were no new units confirmed in II CTZ during the period. Current intelligence indicates at least 2,500 personnel infiltrated into II CTZ since 1 August 1967. Of these
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, RCS, CSFOR - 65, UIC MDEL AA (U)

accepted gains, 1,400 went to the 3d NVA Division, 600 to the 5th NVA Division, and 500 to the B3 Front. An additional 600 infiltrators are considered as possible gains for the 3d NVA Division.

(3) Enemy Losses During the Period.

**August**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>DISABLED</th>
<th>VC/NVA</th>
<th>INDIV WPNS</th>
<th>C/S WPNS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMNAP</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,487</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>476</td>
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**September**

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<td>539</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMNAP</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,432</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>27</td>
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**October**

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<th>C/S WPNS</th>
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<td>624</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMNAP</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
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*Based on MACV estimate that for every 100 enemy killed by body count, an additional 35 die of wounds or are permanently disabled.

(4) Enemy Strength within II CTZ as of 31 October 1967.

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>21,311</td>
<td>NVA Troops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,612</td>
<td>VC Regulars</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,612</td>
<td>Administration Service</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16,895</td>
<td>Military (VC Irregulars)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11,815</td>
<td>Political Cadre</td>
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<tr>
<td>60,245</td>
<td>Total</td>
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f. LONG RANGE PATROL (LRP) COMPANY:

(1) ORGANIZATION:

(a) The organic I FORCEN Long Range Patrol unit - Co E (LRP), 20th Inf - was activated 25 September 1967 by authority of USARV GO 4916, 26 September 1967. Organized under Modified Tables of

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Organisation and Equipment (MTOE) 7-157E (Infantry Long Range Patrol Company - Field Force), the unit is authorized one officer and 21 enlisted men in addition to the eight officers and 200 enlisted men authorized by TOE 7-157E.

(b) Co E (LRP), 20th Inf, is organized to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition missions in the II CTZ; it has a limited capability for executing small scale combat raids.

(c) Based on USARV guidance, I FFORCEV LOI 2-67 dated 23 September 1967, directed the commander of Co E (LRP), 20th Inf, to organize his unit from selected personnel of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, and pipeline personnel of the 18th MP Bde. Selection of personnel was to be accomplished by 15 October 1967; an additional 15-day period was authorized for personnel screening and replacement. On 31 October 1967 the unit was at 92% of authorized strength.

(d) Originally based at Phan Rang, Ninh Thuan Province, RVN, Co E (LRP), 20th Inf, moved to Camp Enari, Pleiku Province, RVN, closing on 22 October 1967. USARV GO 5271, 14 October 1967, attached the unit to HQ, 4th Inf Div, for administration and logistics, effective 15 October 1967.

(2) TRAINING:

(a) Organic: Upon assignment to the I FFORCEV LRP Co, all personnel immediately entered a vigorous program of physical conditioning and instruction on subjects appropriate to combat operations in RVN. Since the unit's personnel are airborne qualified, and 38% have had combat experience, only refresher training on basic skills was required. Special emphasis was placed on sharpening individual qualification in map reading and jungle navigation. This one week training period was administered by platoon at the company base camp (originally at Phan Rang, and later, at Camp Enari).

(b) Recondo: After the initial conditioning and training period, the 1st Patrol Platoon personnel attended the MACV Recondo School at Nha Trang, Khanh Hoa Province, RVN, for a period of two weeks. Here concentrated instruction was provided on ground patrol techniques, escape and evasion, mines and booby traps, sniping, tracking, small unit tactics, communications and aircraft entry and exit techniques. This platoon, consisting of one officer and 43 enlisted men, completed the Recondo School LRP course on 22 October 1967. On that date, the identically organised 4th Patrol Platoon arrived at the school for training.

(c) Advanced: LRP unit personnel completing the MACV Recondo School then began a specialized training program at the base camp or with active LRP units in II CTZ. Individual skills were refined to meet the high standards required in long range patrolling. This phase of training will continue until 1 December 1967, when the 1st Patrol Platoon becomes operational. As each successive platoon completes Recondo training, it will undergo the advanced training. The final company training objective is fully operational status for the four patrol platoons and supporting elements by 31 December 1967.

(3) TECHNIQUES OF TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT:

(a) The fact that Co E (LRP), 20th Inf, is not yet operational makes difficult any comprehensive discussion of tactical techniques. However, sufficient experience has been gained from major units under operational control (OPCON) of I FFORCEV to arrive at cer-
OPERATIONAL REPORT-LESSONS LEARNED FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1967, RES, CSFOR-65, UIC WDDL AA (U)

The many versions of employment possible for the I FFORCEV LRP Company can be reduced to a fundamental three, as follows:

1. The company could be deployed anywhere within the II CTZ under OPCON of this headquarters.
2. The company might be placed OPCON to a major I FFORCEV subordinate unit.
3. Variable-size operational elements of the company could be placed OPCON to one or more major subordinate unit(s) to augment their assigned LRP resources.

Undoubtedly, the existing tactical situation on 1 January 1968 will determine the nature and location(s) of I FFORCEV LRP Co tactical commitment(s).

Weather:

(1) Interior: Typical southwest monsoonal weather prevailed until 10 September with exceptionally heavy rainfall occurring in the Western Highlands during August. Generally ceilings of less than 500 feet and visibilities below three miles prevailed from near midnight until 1200 to 1400H. During the afternoon and evening, ceilings generally improved to 1000-1500 feet and visibilities improved to seven miles; however, scattered rainshowers and a few thunderstorms occurred reducing conditions occasionally to 500 foot ceilings and visibility one mile. From 10 to 30 September conditions improved slightly with the low fog and stratus occurring less frequently and the afternoon ceilings increasing to 1500 to 2000 feet. A few rainshowers still occurred during the afternoon causing brief 800 foot ceilings and two to three mile visibility. The weather improved greatly during early October with fog occurring on some mornings but generally dissipating by 0900H. The northeast monsoon was in full effect by mid-October which brought partly cloudy skies with just patchy early morning ground fog, mainly in the valleys.

(2) Coast: The southwest monsoon continued in full effect until the end of September, causing partly cloudy skies with a few afternoon and early evening rainshowers and thunderstorms. Precipitation was generally light. Ceilings were generally above 8000 feet except in showers where they lowered briefly to 2000-3000 feet. Visibilities were above 10 miles except in showers. Gusty surface winds, occasionally 40 to 45 knots, occurred in the Tuy Hoa area and 30 to 35 knots in the Qui Nhon - Phu Cat area during the first half of August. On 24 September the Intertropical Convergence Zone moved into southern II Corps causing low ceilings and locally heavy rainshowers. The northeast monsoon set in on 2 October throughout the entire II Corps area which increased rainshower activity along the coastal area especially north of Tuy Hoa. Qui Nhon received over 18 inches of rain during the first week of October with almost 10 inches of that occurring in one day. Clouds were generally scattered to broken at 2000-3000 feet except along the coast from Nha Trang south, where generally fair to partly cloudy skies prevailed with isolated night and early morning rainshowers. This area had considerably less than normal precipitation amounts expected for the month. Unusually good weather for October prevailed all along the coast during the last three weeks in October.

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3) Effects on Operations: There were numerous operations and movements that were delayed due to weather during this period. The insertion and extraction of several Omega Teams was delayed due to weather. Two bridges were washed out and several others threatened on Highway 1 by heavy rain during the first week in October. Several roads were closed in the Western Highlands during August due to heavy rains. There were a total of 352 TAC sorties and 54 Trailblast missions cancelled during this period due to weather.

4) Detachment 31, 5th Weather Squadron, has the mission of supporting I PFCRFCEV and USAV tactical units in II CTZ. This support is being provided in the following manner:

(a) I PFCRFCEV:
1. Staff Weather Officer.
2. Forecast Center for II CTZ.

(b) 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile):
1. Forecast support at base camp.
2. Forecaster support at the Division Forward CP.
3. Observations at An Khe airfield.
4. Observation at Brigade Tactical CPs and Division Forward CP.
5. Climatological Support.

(c) 4th Infantry Division:
1. Forecaster support at base camp.
2. Observation at base camp.
3. Observations at Brigade Tactical CPs.
4. Climatological support.

3. (3) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES:

a. (3) Plans: Based on guidance, intelligence, and the overall concept of strategy for conducting operations, the G3 Plans Division formulated and published two OPLANS and seven frag orders for tactical operations during the reporting period. In addition, the Combined Campaign Quarterly Review for 3rd Quarter was published and the Monthly Assessments for July, August and September were submitted to MACV.

(1) OPLANS and FRAG ORDERS:

(a) OPLAN 214-67 (ROSE): OPLAN ROSE was published on 26 October 1967. It provides for a search and destroy operation involving the 3d Bn, 506th Inf (Abn). The operation is primarily a shakedown operation for 3d Bn, 506th Inf (Abn) which arrived in-country on 26 October. The 32 day operation commences on 11 November, and is oriented against...
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period ending 30 October 1967, RCS, CSFOR-65, UIC MEDL AA (U)

Base 35 in southern Ninh Thuan and northeastern Binh Thuan Provinces. The operation will be under the OPCON of Hq, I FFORC&V.

(b) OPLAN 136-67 (PATTON) published on 20 October 1967 is a contingency plan which deploys the 173d Abn Bde to the PERSHING AO in the event the 1st Cav Div (AN) is committed elsewhere.

(c) Frag Order 50-67 (PATCH) was published 14 August 1967. This operation initiated land clearing operations throughout II CTZ and is expected to last seven months.

(d) Frag Order 56-67 (SILL) was a mobile guerrilla operation in the Con River Valley in the western portion of the PERSHING AO. The operation utilizing a Mobile Strike Force (MSF) from Co B, 5th SPG began on 15 September and terminated 10 October 1967.

(e) Frag Order 58-67 (ROLLING). Op ROLLING began on 19 September 1967. Initially scheduled for 15 days, the operation was extended for an indefinite period due to increased enemy activity in Phu Yen Province. Two battalions of the 173d Abn Bde and one battalion of the 1st Cav Div (AN) began Operation ROLLING; however, at the end of this reporting period three battalions of the 173d Abn Bde were being employed.

(f) Frag Order 59-67 (HICKEY) employed a Mobile Strike Force in a mobile guerrilla role in southern Phu Yen Province. The force was inserted as a stay behind force upon withdrawal of the 2d Bn, 8th Cav with the mission of destroying enemy forces and installations. The operation commenced on 6 October and terminated on 30 October 1967.

(g) Frag Order 60-67 (Relocation of Base Camp). This order provided guidance for the relocation of the rear base element of the 173d Abn Bde from Bien Hoa to An Khe.

(h) Frag Order 61-67 (Op MAC ARTHUR) combined the FRANCIS MARION and GREELEY AOs into a single 4th Inf Div AO. The order was precipitated by the movement of the 173d Abn Bde from Kontum. MAC ARTHUR commenced on 12 October 1967.

(i) Frag Order 62-67 (Op BOUDINOT) is a mobile guerrilla operation which began on 15 October 1967 in northwestern Daklac Province. The operation employs a Mobile Strike Force from Co B, 3rd SPG. Op BOUDINOT is scheduled to terminate on 13 November 1967.

b. (C) Operational Activities:


(a) Op BIRD, which began on 25 August 1966 continued in Binh Thuan Province with TF 2d Bn, 7th Cav conducting search and destroy operations in support of revolutionary development under OPCOM Hq, I FFORC&V. The 3d and 4th Bn, 44th Inf Regt (ARVN) continued to operate in the BIRD AO (Incl 2) and participated in combined company-size operations with US forces.

(b) During August there was very little action in Op BIRD. The enemy avoided contact with the exception of sniper activity and several instances of mining along Hwy 1 and 8.

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(c) Contact continued to be light during September.
During the hours of darkness on 6 September, an unknown size enemy force attacked a hamlet at AM8516. A reaction force from the 4th Bn, 44th Bn (ARVN), supported by ARA and gunships from 2d Bn, 7th Cav made contact. Results of this action were 5 RD cadre KIA, 6 ARVN WIA, 2 SA and 1 25mm gun weapon lost; Enemy: 6 KIA and 1 SA captured.

(d) On 19 September scout helicopters from Troop A, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav located an estimated VC platoon at AM7419. ARA and gunships engaged the enemy and a rifle platoon from Co A, 2d Bn, 7th Cav and one from Co B, 2d Bn, 7th Cav air assaulted into the area. One US soldier was wounded in this action which resulted in 19 VC KIA, and 11 SA captured.
On the same day 20/9, 2d Bn, 7th Cav located and destroyed 50 enemy bunkers, some of which were still under construction, at HN6535.

(e) There were no significant contacts with enemy forces during October. The Task Force concentrated its efforts in the area northwest of the heavily populated Phan Thiet-Huong Lam-Dinh Dac triangle and in the Le Hong Phong base area east of Phan Thiet ( "WOT")

(f) Results of Op ETHER to date:

US               ENEMY
23 KIA            751 KIA
276 WIA           101 WIA
0 WIA             273 SA
10 US             10 US

(2) Operation PERSHING (Frag 0 13-67, dtg 110315 Feb 67)

(a) Op PERSHING, which began on 12 February 1967, continued during the quarter, with the 1st Cav Div (AM) (-) operating in northern Binh Dinh and southern Quang Ngai Provinces. (Inc I). There was a marked decrease in battalion-sized actions during the period, as the enemy appeared reluctant to commit major units in sustained combat. The 40th and 41st Inf Regt, 22d Inf Div (ARVN) and a two battalion Marine TF (FWM) continued operations in the PERSHING AO.

(b) During August the 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) continued to operate in the Bong Son coastal plains. In addition to conducting search and destroy operations, elements of the brigade conducted cordon and search operations working with the National Police Field Forces. Contact was generally light. On 22 August, two companies of the 1st Bn, 8th Cav killed 25 enemy without friendly losses in repulsing pre-dawn probes of their positions.

(c) The 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM), continued operations in the southern portion of the PERSHING AO. On 21 August, Co C, 2d Bn, 12th Cav encountered a dug-in force from the 2d VC Regt east of the Suoi Ca Valley (SR6453). There were 6 US KIA and 16 WIA in this action. A sweep of the area on the following day resulted in a body count of 5 enemy KIA. On 23 August, 2d Bn, 5th Cav engaged an enemy force vicinity CB0178. The enemy withdrew into a boulder and cave complex. Subsequent actions resulted in 33 enemy dead and 41 captured. One US was WIA in the initial contact. On 25 August, two early morning mortar attacks on LZ UPLIFT (SR9375) resulted in 2 US KIA, and 24 WIA. Seven helicopters
(d) During the period 1-19 August, the 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) was employed in the Song Be Valley and surrounding high ground in Quang Ngai Province. On 9 August the 2d Bn, 8th Cav was engaged by an estimated two NVA companies, while conducting an air assault vicinity BS7115. Four US helicopters were downed by enemy ground fire. Results of this action were 11 US KIA, 22 WIA; Enemy: 8 KIA. On 20 August the brigade returned to Binh Dinh Province and resumed operations in the northern An Lao Valley.

(e) In September the 1st Bde continued operations in the northeast portion of the AO. On 3 September, Co A, 1st Bn, 8th Cav made contact with an estimated enemy company at BS7715. Supported by artillery and air, the company killed 11 enemy and captured 3 weapons, while sustaining 1 KIA and 5 WIA. On 17 September, Co B, 1st Bn, 8th Cav killed 31 enemy and captured 1 FM in an action on the Bong Son Plains (BS7108). There were no US casualties in this action.

(f) In response to intelligence that the 2d VC Regt was located in the Cay Giep Mountains, the 2d Bde conducted Op JOIN HANDS, working with the VM Marine TF from 6-15 September. Following a B-52 strike, brigade elements conducted company size assaults into the target area while marine units screened to the south. There was, however, no significant contact made during the operation. On 29 September, the 1st Bn, 50th Inf (Mech) became OPCON to the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM), after arriving at An Khe on 20 September.

(g) In the 3d Bde AO, Co C, 5th Bn, 7th Cav engaged 40 NVA east of the An Lao Valley (BS7617) on 7 September. Thirteen enemy were killed in this action at a loss of 1 US KIA and 4 WIA. Operations continued in this area throughout the month. On 23 and 25th of the month, elements of the 1st Bn, 7th Cav found a cave and bunker complex at BS7519. This area was subsequently determined to have been the CP for the 22d NVA Regt. Eighteen SA and 17 C/S weapons were captured from a nearby supply cache.

(h) On 2 October, the 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM), made up of three battalions: 1st Bn, 7th Cav; 5th Bn, 7th Cav; and 2d Bn, 12th Cav, was moved to the I CTZ under OPCON of III MAF. The 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) expanded its operating area to include the An Lao Valley. The brigade experienced only light contact during the month.

(i) On 11 October, Co D, 1st Bn, 5th Cav conducted a ground follow-up of an airstrike at BS8775 in the 2d Bde AO. Thirty-seven NVA bodies, 23 small arms, and 11 crew served weapons were found; as well as 2 wounded NVA soldiers who were captured. Fifteen additional enemy dead, 11 small arms, and 3 crew served weapons were found in the next three days in this area.

(j) On 31 October Co C, 1st Bn, 50th Inf (Mech), while searching in the Cay Giep Mountains (BS8288), made contact with an unknown number of enemy from the 95th Bn, 2d VC Regt. Artillery and ARA supported the contact and three US companies moved to support. Fifteen enemy were KIA and 3 weapons captured. US losses were 3 KIA and 10 WIA.

(k) Results of Op PERSHING to date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>498 KIA</td>
<td>3907 KIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2361 WIA</td>
<td>2111 FM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 WIA</td>
<td>1065 SA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94 CS</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
(3) Operation FRANCIS MARION (Frag 0 33-67, dtg 060950 Apr 67).

(a) The 4th Inf Div (-) continued Op FRANCIS MARION, which began on 6 April 1967, until 12 October 1967. During the period search and destroy ops in Pleiku, Darlac and western Binh Dinh Provinces resulted in only minor contact (Incl 4). Throughout the period the 4th Inf Div employed its 1st Bde in the vicinity of Plei Djereng - Duc Co to cover the Cambodian border. The 2d Bde conducted search and destroy operations against suspected enemy concentrations and known base areas throughout the AO.

(b) There was no significant ground contact in August. On 23 August the 1st Bde CP at Jackson Hole (XA8731) received 26 rounds of 122mm rocket fire resulting in 1 US WIA. Lack of contact during the month is reflected in the casualty totals which were: 2 US KIA, 47 WIA; Enemy: 27 KIA and 3 PWS captured.

(c) The 2d Sqdn, 1st Armd Cav closed at 'Camp Enari on 1 September, becoming OPCOK to the 4th Inf Div. On 11 September this unit began reconnaissance operations to the east of Pleiku, and on 16 September relieved the 1st Bn, 69th Armor of the security responsibility for Hwy 19 between Pleiku and Mang Yang Pass. (BR2549)

(d) On 23 September the 2d Bde, 4th Inf began operations in the Dak Payau Valley (BR2335). Three battalions, the 1st Bn, 12th Inf, 3d Bn, 12th Inf and 1st Bn, 22d Inf were employed. No significant contact was made during September.

(e) On 2 October 1967 at 0950 hours, an aerial observer saw an estimated two squads of enemy moving along a trail vicinity AR9711. Six sorties of tactical air were employed and Co B, 1st Bn, 12th Inf was airlifted into the area. A search resulted in finding 49 enemy KIA, 26 small arms and 5 crew served weapons.

(f) On 10 October the 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div commenced operations in the Chu Dua Ta area, south of Cheo Reo. There was no significant contact in this area prior to the termination of Op FRANCIS MARION on 12 October 1967.

(g) Final results of Op FRANCIS MARION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>183 KIA</td>
<td>1203 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>843 WIA</td>
<td>122 PW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 KIA</td>
<td>297 SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66 GS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Operation GRESLEY (Frag 0 45-67, dtg 151225 Jun 67).

(a) The 173d Abn Bde continued Op GRESLEY, which began on 17 June 1967, under the OPCON of the 4th Inf Div. (Incl 4). Despite extensive search operations conducted by the brigade in Kontum Province, particularly in the vicinity of Dak To, there was no significant contact made with enemy forces from 1 August until GRESLEY ended on 12 October 1967.

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(b) ARVN forces operating in the AO had one major action during the period. On 6-7 August a two battalion task force, made up of the 5th and 8th Abn Bn (ARVN), and the 1st Bn, 42d Inf (Arvn) engaged the 174th NVA Regt west of Dak Seang (YB8439). Heavy fighting resulted in 14 ARVN KIA and 63 WIA. The enemy lost 181 KIA. Additionally, he was driven from a large base camp, from which he was apparently preparing to attack the Dak Seang Civilian Irregular Defence Group (CIDG) Camp.

(c) On 19 September the 1st and 4th Bn, 503d Inf (Abn) were withdrawn from Op GREELEY to begin Op BOLLING in Phu Yen Province under brigade control. The 2d Bn, 503d Inf (Abn) continued operations in the area around Dak To until 12 October when GREELEY ended. The battalion then rejoined its parent brigade in Op BOLLING.

(d) Final results of Op GREELEY:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>210</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>88 SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16 CS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Operation BOLLING (Frag 0 58-67, dtg 131110 Sep 67).

(a) The 173d Abn Bde began Op BOLLING on 19 September 1967, employing its own 1st and 4th Bn, 503d Inf (Abn), and the 2d Bn, 8th Cav. The operation is designed to locate and destroy the 95th NVA Regt in the high ground west of Tuy Hoa. (Incl 5). Subsequently the 173d Abn Bde has assumed the mission of protecting the rice harvest from the Tuy Hoa basin. The brigade is also exercising OPCON of the mobile strike force company conducting Op HICKET within the BOLLING AO.

(b) Op BOLLING began with a three battalion air assault into the high ground vicinity BQ9650. There was little contact initially and on 29 September, the brigade shifted its efforts to the Suoi Nuoc Nong Valley and adjacent high ground (BQ9930). Light contact was made in this area.

(c) During October the 173d Abn Bde continued to experience light contact in the BOLLING AO without encountering major enemy units. Viet Cong activity was particularly noticeable in Phu Sen District (BQ9937) and a resettlement program was conducted. As its troops became more familiar with their area of operations, the brigade's small unit ambushes and patrols became more effective and began to take a steady toll of isolated enemy groups.

(d) With the termination of Op GREELEY on 12 October 1967, the 2d Bn, 503d Inf (Abn) rejoined the brigade at Phu Kiep. On 14 October the 2d Bn, 8th Cav was released to rejoin the 1st Cav Div (AM) in Op FERSHING.
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for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1967, RGS, CSPQR-65, UIC WOOL AA (U)

(a) Results of Op ROLLING to date:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>ENEMY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 KIA</td>
<td>132 KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>50 MIA</td>
<td>37 PW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 MIA</td>
<td>94 SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 CS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Operation MACARTHUR (Frag O 61-67, dtg 072315 Oct 67).

(a) Op MACARTHUR began on 12 October 1967 as a continuation of the 4th Inf Division's border protection mission in the western highlands. The extensive AO includes Kontum, Pleiku and portions of Daklak and Binh Dinh Provinces. (Incl 6).

(b) There has been virtually no contact in Op MACARTHUR to date. The 4th Inf Div has deployed one brigade of two battalions to Dak To in Kontum; one two battalion brigade in Daklak Province, north of Ban Me Thout; and a two battalion task force in the vicinity of Duc Co CIDG Camp in western Pleiku. Two cavalry squadrons and a tank battalion are employed in security missions along the major routes within the AO.

(c) Results of Op MACARTHUR to date:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>ENEMY</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 MIA</td>
<td>0 PW</td>
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<tr>
<td>0 MIA</td>
<td>32 SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 CS</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(7) Special Operations. The following USSF-led operations were conducted in the II CTZ during the quarter at the direction of HQ I FFORCBV.

(a) Operation MARCH (Frag O 39-67, dtg 290645 Jun 67). This operation, which began on 5 July 1967, continued throughout the quarter. From 1 August to 2 September Det B-50, 5th SFG conducted long range reconnaissance operations in the northern Plei Trap Valley. (Incl 6). Numerous small contacts and enemy sightings indicate that this area is an enemy north-south infiltration route. Op MARCH was suspended from 3-20 September to permit rest and refit of the OMEGA Force. On 21 September operations resumed with primary emphasis on the southern Plei Trap Valley and the area northwest of the Se San River (71/7854). On 30 October 1967, Op MARCH ended.

(b) Operation GOSTHALS (Frag O 47-67, dtg 060420 Jul 67). There was no contact during the period in Op GOSTHALS, which began on 15 July 1967, with the insertion of a Mobile Strike Force (MSF) in northwest Kontum Province (Incl 6). On 20 August Op GOSTHALS ended and the Mobile Strike Force was withdrawn.

(c) Operation WINFIELD SCOTT (Frag O 48-67, dtg 191130 Jul 67). Op WINFIELD SCOTT was conducted in northern Kontum Province from 30 Jul - 22 Aug, employing a Mobile Strike Force (Incl 6). There were several contacts with enemy forces, the most significant of which occurred on 7 August 1967. In that action the Mobile Strike Force
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Engaged an unknown number of enemy at (282234). Supported by TAC Air, CIDG personnel killed 12 enemy, while sustaining 4 WIA. On 12 August an enemy base camp was located at (281374) and destroyed.

(d) Operation SILL (Frag 0 56-67, dtg 080330 Sep 67). Op SILL was conducted in western Binh Dinh Province, employing a Mobile Strike Force, from 15 September–10 October. Considerable evidence was found that the Kon River Valley serves as an infiltration route and enemy base area, however, there was no significant contact during this operation.

(e) Operation HICKET (Frag 0 59-67, dtg 031324 Oct 67). Op HICKET a Mobile Strike Force was employed as a stay behind force in the Suoi Nuoc Long Valley, following operations in that area by the 173d Abn Bde (Incl 5). The force entered the AO on 6 October and remained in the area until 30 October. There were several minor contacts made during the operation. One of these on 19 October, resulted in the discovery of a weapons cache containing 29 weapons and assorted repair parts. The force killed 8 enemy and captured 2 prisoners at a loss of 1 WIA.

(f) Operation BOUDHOT (Frag 0 62-67, dtg 100759 Oct 67). Op BOUDHOT began on 15 October 1967, to detect enemy infiltration routes and way stations in northwest Barlac Province (Incl 6). On that date, a Mobile Strike Force began foot movement into the AO from the Trang Phuc CIDG Camp. The force has had several minor contacts and located several way stations since the operation began.

c. (C) G-3 AIR OPERATIONS

(1) The number of Sorties flown daily varied from 49 to 128 with a mean of 73.4 per day for the reported period. The most frequent missions were:

(a) Direct support of friendly forces in contact.

(b) Preparation fires on landing zones and objective areas.

(c) Harassment and interdiction of enemy base areas, assembly areas and infiltration routes.

(d) Night Illumination and Strikes.

(e) Landing zone construction.

(2) During the period approximately 15% of the missions flown for 1 FFORCEN were Combat Skyspot. Twenty-One per cent of sorties flown were in support of immediate missions.

(3) There were 6751 tactical sorties flown in support of major operations during the period as indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>TOTAL STRIKES</th>
<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOLLING</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6 secondary fires, 2 bunkers damaged.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Began on 19 Sep)
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRIKE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>CODE NAME SORTIES</th>
<th>OPER</th>
<th>CM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>022040Z</td>
<td>Kontum 151</td>
<td>K-97  6</td>
<td>GREELEY</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>022100Z</td>
<td>Pleiku 174</td>
<td>L-55  6</td>
<td>FRANCIS MARION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>030100Z</td>
<td></td>
<td>175   5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>052120Z</td>
<td>Kontum 221</td>
<td>L-7   6</td>
<td>MARCH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>070130Z</td>
<td></td>
<td>62    6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>072150Z</td>
<td></td>
<td>223   6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>092310Z</td>
<td></td>
<td>327   6</td>
<td>MARCH</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>102130Z</td>
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<td>M-23  9</td>
<td>PERSHING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11230Z</td>
<td>Flu Yen 204</td>
<td>M-33  9</td>
<td>Hong Kil Dong</td>
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<td></td>
<td>132125Z</td>
<td>Khanh Hoa 21</td>
<td>M-73  9</td>
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<td></td>
<td>152340Z</td>
<td></td>
<td>22    9</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) B-52 Support: There were 169 B-52 Sorties flown during the quarter, compared to 549 B-52 Sorties last quarter, in support of ground operations and on suspected enemy concentrations. The large reduction of B-52 Sorties flown during the quarter was caused by the high priority of B-52 strikes outside of the II Corps Tactical Zone.

DATE | NAME | CODE NAME SORTIES | OPER  | CM  |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>022040Z</td>
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<tr>
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<td>FRANCIS MARION</td>
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<tr>
<td>030100Z</td>
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<td>175   5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>MARCH</td>
<td></td>
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<td>070130Z</td>
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<td>62    6</td>
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<td>MARCH</td>
<td></td>
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<td>M-23  9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>152340Z</td>
<td></td>
<td>22    9</td>
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</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, ECS, CSPUR-65, UIC WEML AA (U)

162305Z Ang Binh Dinh 69 M-27 6 PERSHING
212021Z = = 147 L-82 3 MQ ALT
231020Z = = 168 M-15 9 PERSHING
233040Z = KONTUM 333 M-2 6 FRANCIS MARION
260200Z = Binh Dinh 202 M-21 9 PERSHING
022100Z Sep QR 65 M-58 6 FRANCIS MARION
051600Z = Binh Dinh 170 M-36 9 PERSHING
131945Z Oct PLEIKU 182 O-99 9 MACARTHUR
142200Z = = 183 O-12 6 *
142100Z = = 184 P-49 9 *
222305Z = Binh Dinh 172 P-38 3 PERSHING
262300Z = Phu Yen 205 P-63 9 ROLLING

(1) During the reporting period the aviation units listed below became operational on 1 September 1967:

(a) 266th Combat Aviation Battalion.

(b) 185th Reconnaissance Airplane Company.

(2) Personal and equipment of the following aviation units arrived in-country for employment within II CIŽ under OPCOM this headquarters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STATION</th>
<th>ARRIVAL DATE</th>
<th>ESTIMATED OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57th ABC</td>
<td>Kontum</td>
<td>26 Oct 67</td>
<td>26 Nov 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192d ABC</td>
<td>Phu Hiep</td>
<td>29 Oct 67</td>
<td>29 Nov 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243d ASHC</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
<td>30 Oct 67</td>
<td>30 Nov 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Sqdn, 17th Cav Pleiku</td>
<td></td>
<td>28 Oct 67</td>
<td>28 Nov 67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) During this period aviation units under OPCOM this headquarters supported the following tactical operations by US Forces:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>SUPPORTED UNIT</th>
<th>AVN UNIT</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSHING</td>
<td>1st Cav Div (AM)</td>
<td>196th ASHC</td>
<td>1 Aug- 20 Oct (Augmented Div CH47 support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCIS MARION</td>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>119th ANG, 170th ANG, 179th ASHC</td>
<td>1 Aug-1 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACARTHUR</td>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>119th ANG, 170th ANG, 179th ASHC</td>
<td>12 Oct-31 Oct (Continuing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREELEY</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>335th ANG</td>
<td>1 Aug-11 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KING LIL DOG</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>335th ANG</td>
<td>18 Sep-31 Oct (Continuing)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) ROKA forces were allocated (on a daily basis) one ANG and three CH47 aircraft per division. These requirements were supported by the 43th and 129th ANGs and elements of the 180th and 189th ASHCs. Additional support was provided on a mission basis for airborne assaults and other special requirements. Major operations of main forces included:

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<th>DURATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WONG KIL LONG</td>
<td>1-26 Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO KAA RI</td>
<td>3-7 Oct</td>
</tr>
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(5) One assault helicopter company is allocated to support airborne operations by ARVN forces. They received additional support from aviation assets supporting US forces when conducting joint operations within the 4th Inf Div and 1st Cav Div (AM) areas. Support provided on a continuing basis included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>ACTIVITY SUPPORTED</th>
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<tr>
<td>155th ANG</td>
<td>Airmobile Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117th ANG (-)</td>
<td>Advisors (Coastal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189th ANG (-)</td>
<td>Advisors (Highlands)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Throughout the period CH54 support was provided to I and II CTZ, on a mission basis, utilizing aircraft assigned to the 1st Cav Div (AM).

(7) In addition, special operations and requirements of MACV, I FFORCEN and 5th SF4 were supported utilizing the assets of the 221st and elements of the 117th and 189th ANGs. Activities supported included PRAIRIE FIRE, RECONDO, OMEGA, DELTA AND CORDS.
During the period UH-1H helicopters replaced the UH-1Ds in four of the nine AHCs under OPCON this headquarters. UH-1Es were also issued to AHCs organic to the 4th Inf Div and 1st Cav Div (AN). This aircraft provides improved performance under the higher density altitude conditions encountered in Vietnam. UH-1M replacement aircraft are programmed for the other AHCs during the next reporting period.

- Organisation and Training Activities.

(1) All units that are assigned, attached, or under the operational control of this headquarters as of 31 October 1967 are listed at Incl 7.

(2) The command relationship of major US and FMFAF within II Corps Tactical Zone is at Incl 8.

(3) The following units were assigned, attached, or became OPCON to IFFORCEV during the period:

   (a) 8th Bn, 4th Arty (175 SP), assigned by USAV GO 4441, 30 August 1967.
   (b) 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav, assigned, USAV GO to be published.
   (c) 2d Arm Cav Sqdn, 1st Cav (- Air Cav Trp D), assigned by USAV GO 5028, 2 October 1967.
   (d) K Co, 20th Inf (LRP), assigned by USAV GO 4916, 26 September 1967.
   (e) 201st Avn Co (Corps) assigned, USAV GO to be published.
   (f) 1st Bn, 50th Inf (Mech) assigned by USAV GO 5381, 22 October 1967.

(4) Manpower Authorisations: On 23 August 63 O&T and major OPCON unit representatives attended a conference to recommend standard configuration for infantry and artillery battalions. Subsequent to the conference, MTO&E's were prepared and forwarded through channels to Department of the Army. A follow on study to standardise combat support type units for infantry divisions was completed with the submission of MTO&E's on 20 October 1967.

(5) Training:

   (a) Training inspections of all assigned and attached units, less artillery groups and battalions were conducted during the quarter. All were rated satisfactory.
   (b) New Equipment Training Teams were employed in-country for the following items of equipment:

   1. M-36 Radar.
   2. U-21A Aircraft.
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3. AM/ARC-134 Radio.
4. AM/PBC-74 Radio.

(c) IFFORCEV Regulation 350-1 was published 9 September 1967. It outlined seven separate but coordinated programs to provide assistance to Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) in II CTF through training and combined operations. The overall objective was to increase the combat effectiveness of RVNAF. On 20 September 1967 the Commanding General, II Corps approved the seven programs and asked that initially only the programs to improve Regional and Popular Forces (RF/FP) be initiated. Twelve Combined Mobile Improvement Teams (CMIT), composed of US officers and men from the 1st Cav Div (AM), 4th Inf Div, and officers from ARVN II Corps were trained and deployed one to each province. These teams will conduct two weeks on-site training for each RF company. Twelve Combined Mobile Training Teams, composed of officers and men from the OPCON divisions and from the II Corps Advisory group, were trained and deployed to each province. These teams will conduct on-site training for five days with each PF platoon. Both programs will be evaluated in December 1967 before being expanded.

6. Research and Development (R&D) Activities: Requests for information on various R&D items from MACV, USARV, and ACTIN were monitored by this Headquarters as were ENSURE requests from OPCON units.

f. Psychological Operations:

1. General:

(a) From 1 August 1967 to 31 October 1967, Psychological Operations conducted by PMMAF and GVN in the II CTZ were supported by the 245th PSTOP Co, the 9th Air Commando Squadron based at Kha Trang and Pleiku, the 6th PSTOP Bn Saigon, the 7th PS/CP Gp Okinawa, the 2nd US Coastal Zone "junk and Swift" fleet, the 20th FOLAAR Bn (ARVM) and the 114th Liaison Squadron (VMAF).

(b) In II CTZ operations approximately 400 million leaflets were disseminated, 66 million of which were printed by the 245th PSTOP Co. The remaining 350 million leaflets were printed by the 6th PSTOP Bn and 7th PSTOP Gp. In addition, 1,473 hours of aerial loudspeaker time were directed against targets in enemy areas.

(c) Leaflet and loudspeaker support was provided to both tactical and Revolutionary Development (RD) operations in II CTZ.

1. The objectives of PSTOP used prior to tactical and RD support operations were:

a. To foster population control by dissemination of safety instructions and other measures.

b. To persuade the populace to deny supplies and rice to VC/NVA elements.

c. To explain the Chieu Hoi Program to VC/NVA and local populace including specific instructions on how to rally.

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To persuade the populace in VC/NVA controlled areas to expose VC/NVA personnel in contested areas:

- To build popular support for the GVN ranks.
- The objectives of PSIOP during tactical operations were:
  - To demoralise VC and NVA troops.
  - To stimulate defections in VC/NVA of fair treatment.
  - To assure potential Pws and Hoi Chanhs of VC/NVA personnel.
  - To assure control of the population and orient it towards support of the GVN.
  - To exploit recent combat casualties and pressures as a means of stimulating VC/NVA defections.

(d) A sampling of leaflets that were used in tactical operations in II CTZ are found at:

1. Incl 11, quick reaction and special leaflets.
2. Incl 12, demoralization leaflets.
3. Incl 13, pacification leaflets.

(e) Results of psychological operations show 778 returnees (Hoi Chanhs) for the period, a decrease of 651 from the same period last year. The number of returnees for 1967 is 9,935. The II CTZ returnee total since 1 January 1966 is 12,355.

(f) During this period the 4th Inf Div received four ABN-ABS-4 1,000 watt loudspeaker systems. This system is capable of both vehicular and aircraft mounting. The 4th Inf Div tested the system on 2 October 1967 and has since used it operationally. It is a valuable addition to present assets.

(g) The 1st Cav Div (AM) has had 4 ABN-ABS-4 1,000 watt loudspeaker systems since December 1966. These systems have been inoperable due to lack of spare parts since early 1967.
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(a) Plans continued for installation of a 50 kw medium wave PSYOP radio station at Pleiku. After several surveys, a site has been selected which meets the requirements for: security, lack of interference with airspace and existing communication facilities, availability of land and suitability for broadcast antenna positioning. The equipment will be deployed on TDY from Okinawa and will be operated by the 7th Psychological Operations Group Radio Detachment (Prov), RNW. The programming will be the responsibility of the POLMAR Directorate, ARVN.

(1) During this period the military PSYOP function formerly located in the office, ACCS 03 was transferred to the Chieu Hoi Division, I FORECEN/CORDS. This change has facilitated coordination of military and civilian PSYOP with the ED and Civil Affairs agencies without impairment of support of US tactical units.

(2) Senior province advisors have established working committees which include US Army PSYOP advisors, CORDS civilian PSYOP representatives Chieu Hoi advisors and their ARVN counterparts. These committees coordinate the PSYOP effort in their sectors with varying degrees of success. Wherever a spirit of cooperation exists, the committee is quite successful. This committee concept will continue to receive emphasis.

(2) Support:

(a) Leaflets disseminated in II CTZ during the reporting period were provided by:

1. 6th PSYOP Br, Saigon: 100,000,000
2. 7th PSYOP Gp, Okinawa: 200,000,000
3. 245th PSYOP Co, Nha Trang/Pleiku: 45,666,000

(b) Six, two man loudspeaker teams (RS) and three radio-visual teams (RS) from the 245th PSYOP Company were attached to US OPCOM units and ARVN forces for major operations in II CTZ. The use of loudspeaker teams in direct support of search and clear operations proved an effective means of assisting population control and promoting the Chieu Hoi Program

(c) Aerial loudspeaker missions were flown in conjunction with and in support of separate operations down to and including platoon sized units. A total of 2,623 aerial loudspeaker sorties were flown by US Air Force aircraft and 167 loudspeaker sorties were flown by Army aircraft in II CTZ.

(d) The 9th ACS flew a total of 2,507 PSYOP missions, disseminating 331,101,000 leaflets and provided 1,302 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts. The 9th ACS is compiling data on missions which could not be flown due to the unavailability of aircraft.

(e) Boats of the "Junk and Swift" Fleet fitted with loudspeakers completed 33 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts and disseminated 3,507,000 leaflets to select target audiences in operations along the II CTZ coastal areas. These activities have shown a marked increase over the preceding quarter.
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(3) Enemy Propaganda: Enemy propaganda is directed mainly toward countering Vietnamese political initiatives and American propaganda rather than creating new themes for their own use. The enemy sought unsuccessfully to discourage participation in Vietnamese national and lower house elections.

g. Chemical:

(1) General:

(a) During this reporting period, continuing emphasis was placed on increasing the responsiveness of the herbicide program. Ten provinces have submitted large area coverage plans which in turn have been forwarded to MACV for approval (Incl 9). On 29 September 1967, this headquarters received a letter from MACV stating that 200 gallon capacity AGAVENCO Spray Systems should be available in 90 days. Two of the spray systems will be issued to II Corps Advisory Area. The AGAVENCO systems would be extremely responsive to small area herbicide requests submitted by Province Chiefs and/or military units operating in the area.

(b) MIC Report NO. 629/67, 28 June 1967, subject: NVA Reaction to Defoliation, states that although the source never witnessed an actual spraying operation, he did pass through areas which had been sprayed within Phu Yen Province. Movement through defoliated areas was difficult. The open areas that were created by the defoliants made it almost impossible to move during daytime hours because of the fear of detection from the air. The increased area coverage by defoliants resulted on several occasions in unplanned moves because the defoliant would affect the protective tree foliage within six hours. Unit food supply was complicated after an area had been sprayed. Existing food supply areas were destroyed and new food sources had to be found. Food transport was difficult because the task could be performed only at night. The information in this report is for the period July 1966 to January 1967; however, the report was not received until this reporting period.

(c) CMIC Report NO. US6245-67, 17 July 1967, subject: Effects of One Defoliation Operation in Minh Hoa District, Khanh Hoa Province states that the trees began to die within a day of the defoliation. It was a month, however, before all the trees were dead. Source was not there continuously to note the progressive effects of the defoliation, but passed through the area many times later. He did not see any trees which were resistant to the spray. In all cases, leaves shriveled and turned color before falling off the trees. A corn field in the vicinity of the defoliated area was completely destroyed within ten days of the attack. Source was told by cadre that in Phu Yen Province, the VC considered themselves economically defeated since 80% of their important crops had been destroyed. The information in this report is for October 1966; however, the report was not received until this reporting period.

(d) CMIC Report NO. USU75-67, 9 September 1967, subject: Defoliation Operations states that on 27 February 1967 and 7 March 1967 defoliation aircraft sprayed along trails which were used as VC ambush sites. The leaves on all the trees, except one type, dried up within three days. In both instances, the defoliation operations disrupted VC ambushes. They moved out of the area soon as it had been sprayed.

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(a) CMIC Report No. US1106-67, 17 September 1967, Subject: Effectiveness of Defoliation Operations states that source witnessed a defoliation operation on 10 June 1967 at Nhuan Phu hamlet, Hoai Hoa Village, Hoai Hien District, Binh Dinh Province. He had also seen the effects of numerous defoliation missions prior to this time, but he had not been in the area during the spraying on these occasions. A base camp sprayed by defoliant would only be moved if it was located in an area of sparse vegetation with very little canopy. The spray was felt to be injurious to health if it was injected in drinking water or food. In August 1966 a man in source’s unit drank water that had defoliant in it. He developed severe stomach cramps and diarrhea two hours later. He was sick for three days as a result. Source also saw a man who had eaten a coconut with defoliant on it. He died after being in the hospital for two days. The VC used nylon cloth to protect their food from defoliant. The men would also cover their mouths with a wet towel or rag to filter out the spray. Spraying of crops in local villages caused the greatest problems as far as operations were concerned. Destruction of crops in the area eliminated an important source of food and forced the unit to find a new supply. Thus spraying of food sources restricted the areas of operation open to the unit. Often the men would have to subsist on greatly decreased rations until a new village could be found. This also caused a drop in the morale of the men, which had a proportional effect on operations.

(b) CMIC Report No. US1079-67, 11 September 1967, Subject: Effects of Two Defoliation Operations in An Loc District, Binh Dinh Province states that the area sprayed consisted of a small valley about four kilometers wide. Rice paddies dominated the terrain and the whole area was used as farmland. The day following the spraying, leaves fell off bananas and coconut trees. In a few days mangos, grapefruits and tea plants were drying. The rice was ready for harvest and did not show any effects of the spraying. To minimize what efforts there might have been to the rice, the villagers began to harvest the rice crop immediately.

(c) Field Information Report, 12 September 1967, Subject: Viet Cong (VC) Food Shortages in Binh Thuan Province states that people living in the VC controlled areas of Tien Bau, Bau Tang and Bau De, VC Hong Phong District, Binh Thuan Province, have been emigrating because of chemical defoliant operations that destroyed 95% of all crops in these areas. In order to stop this flow of people, the VC Binh Thuan Province Committee has distributed VN $4,000 to VN $5,000 (U.S. $50 to $62.00) to area residents, depending on their family status, so that they could support themselves for six or seven months. In early July, residents of these areas often shopped at the Luong Son and Phan Ri markets for food, some of it destined for the VC in the Le Hong Phong secret base area.

(2) Crop Destruction Projects — (Incl 10).

(a) Project 2/2/1/67 in Binh Dinh Province. A total of 30 UC-123B spray aircraft sorties were flown resulting in an estimated 4,360 short tons of crops destroyed.

(b) Project 2/2/1/66 in Kontum Province. A total of 6 UC-123B spray aircraft sorties were flown resulting in an estimated 431 short tons of crops destroyed and 750 acres defoliated.
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(c) Project 2/2/2/67 in Binh Thuan Province. A total of 36 UC-123B spray aircraft sorties were flown resulting in an estimated 1,005 short tons of crops destroyed and 7,920 acres defoliated.

(d) Project 2/2/3/67 in Phu Yen Province. A total of 34 UC-123B spray aircraft sorties were flown resulting in an estimated 3,801 short tons of crops destroyed. An important cave complex found by the 173d Abn Bde was defoliated.

(e) Projects 2/2/5/67 and 2/2/6/66 in Minh Thuan Province. A total of 20 UC-123B spray aircraft sorties were flown resulting in an estimated 2,462 short tons of crops destroyed.

(f) Project 2/2/8/67 in Khanh Ho Province. A total of 31 UC-123B spray aircraft sorties were flown resulting in an estimated 1,642 short tons of crops destroyed and 1,658 acres defoliated.

(g) Project 2/2/6/67 in Phu Bon Province. A total of six UC-123B spray aircraft sorties were flown resulting in an estimated 690 short tons of crops destroyed.

(h) Projects 2/2/10/67 and 2/2/13/67 in Quang Duc Province. A total of 20 UC-123B spray aircraft sorties were flown resulting in an estimated 2,866 short tons of crops destroyed.

(i) Project 4/2/11/67 in Darlac Province. A total of five UC-123B spray aircraft sorties were flown resulting in an estimated 615 short tons of crops destroyed.

(j) Project 2/2/12/67 in Lam Don Province. A total of 13 UC-123B spray aircraft sorties were flown resulting in an estimated 1,725 short tons of crops destroyed.

(3) Defoliation Projects - - Incl 10.

(a) Project 2/20/1/67 in Binh Dinh Province. A total of 22 UC-123B spray aircraft sorties were flown resulting in an estimated 6,165 acres defoliated. This included 13 sorties flown to increase security along highway 19.

(b) Project 2/20/1/66 in Khanh Hoa Province. A total of 12 UC-123B spray aircraft sorties were flown resulting in an estimated 1,657 acres defoliated.

(c) Project 2/20/4/67 in Pleiku Province. A total of 15 UC-123B spray aircraft sorties were flown resulting in 3,700 acres defoliated.

(d) Project 2/20/3/67 in Phu Yen Province. A total of three UC-123B spray aircraft sorties were flown resulting in an estimated 720 acres defoliated.

(e) Project 2/20/6/67 in Quang Duc Province. A total of eight UC-123B spray aircraft sorties were flown resulting in an estimated 2,000 acres defoliated.

(a) Herbicide Operations Conducted by Units under OPCON of this headquarters.

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(a) The 1st Cav Div (AM) flew one CH-47 sortie and
11 UH-1 sorties to defoliate around the Camp Radcliff perimeter. An
additional 12 UH-1 sorties were flown as crop destruction missions in
the An Lao Valley. Approximately 17 short tons of rice were destroyed.
In addition, between 14 September 1967 and 27 September 1967, 16
Montagnard and 10 VC surrendered as a result of the crop destruction.
Enemy forces were reported without food in the An Lao Valley.
The defoliation program was a major contribution to the discovery of
over 100 active bunkers in the An Lao Valley.

(b) The 4th Inf Div flew 13 CH-47 defoliation sorties
around the perimeter of Camp Enari and two CH-47 defoliation sorties
around the perimeter of Camp Holloway. An additional 20 UH-1 defoliation
sorties were flown around fire support base areas. In addition 21
UH-1 sorties were flown as crop destruction missions in the Dak Payau
Valley resulting in approximately 50 short tons of crops destroyed.

(5) Riot Control Agent (RCA) Operations.

(a) M7A3 CS Grenades:
1. The 1st Cav Div (AM) flew 12 XM3 grenade
launcher missions with an expenditure of approximately 7,000 M7A3
CS grenades.
2. The 4th Inf Div employed 2,000 M7A3 CS grenades
with unknown results.
3. These grenades are employed against suspected
enemy troop locations in hardened areas. The CS is also used to break
contact.

(b) The XM54 CS Grenade is similar to the M7A3 but
has an 8-12 second delay fuse. This enables the grenades, used in the
same manner as the M7A3, to be employed from higher altitude and to allow
the grenade to penetrate protective canopy before igniting.

(c) E-8 Tactical CS Launchers have been employed by
the 1st Cav Div (AM) in cave-clearing operations. Two enemy have been
captured after being forced from caves by use of this CS munition. The
E-8 has demonstrated the capability of thoroughly penetrating natural
caves. Overall performance of this munition has been satisfactory but
its weight limits the value as an offensive weapon except when it can
be airlifted to support the operations.

(d) The E-158 CS Canister Cluster has been used extensively
by the 4th Inf Div. The munition is used on suspected enemy locations,
particularly bunker complexes with immediate follow up by artillery
or Tactical Air strikes. Area coverage with the E-158 is approximately
300 square meters per cluster.

(e) XM651, 40mm CS Cartridge.
1. The 1st Cav Div (AM) fired approximately
1,000 XM651 CS Cartridge. They have been used principally for recon by
fire and marking enemy positions for gunships. On 27 August 1967 they
were employed against a cave complex resulting in one VC being flushed
out of the cave.

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2. The 173d Abn Bde fired approximately 200 XM651 CS Cartridges. They are fired from an H-13 at exposed enemy. Then the eagle flight following the H-13 lands and engages the enemy. The CS Cartridges have also been employed by ground forces to flush the enemy from fortified positions and villages where innocent civilians are involved. The range of the CS Cartridge enables targets to be engaged without friendly forces donning protective masks.

(c) Bulk CS-1:

1. The 4th Inf Div employed approximately 20,000 lbs (250 drums) of bulk CS-1 on suspected enemy locations and to restrict the use of large areas and cave and tunnel complexes.

2. The 1st Cav Div (AM) employed approximately 32,000 lbs (400 drums) of bulk CS-1. Eojo was almost entirely destroyed in the H-13. Fifty drums were dropped from CH-47 helicopters in order to contaminate suspected infiltration routes and to restrict the use of large areas of terrain. On 19 August 1967 and again during the period 21-27 September 1967 mighty mite missions were conducted against tunnel complexes resulting in live NVA being flushed from the tunnels. The use of N5 dispensers as a means of harassing the enemy accounted for the remaining CS-1 used.

2. The 173d Abn Bde employed approximately 2,800 lbs (35 drums) of bulk CS-1 to restrict and harass the enemy.

(6) Summary:

(a) Herbicide Operations.

1. Ten provinces have submitted their large area coverage plans in an effort to make the herbicide program more responsive.

2. Defoliation missions continued to cause the enemy to move base camps and avoid defoliated areas for fear of detection. There were 114 defoliation sorties flown, accounting for an estimated 24,570 acres defoliated in II CTZ.

2. Crop destruction missions have caused the VC/NVA in many provinces to continually look for new sources of food supply. Their logistical burden has been greatly increased due to the necessity to carry food long distances. There were 147 crop destruction sorties flown, accounting for an estimated 19,619 short tons of enemy crops destroyed.

(b) Riot Control Agent (RCA) Operations - CS is continuing to be a welcome addition to combat power available to commanders. Bulk CS-1 employed in large scales by drum drops or used to flush tunnels with the mighty mite is proving effective for restricting the enemy and harassing him. The addition of experimental CS munitions allows employment of CS by units on the ground at ranges not requiring the users to wear protective masks. The E-158 CS Canister Cluster allows CS to be delivered from aircraft flying out of range of small arms fire.
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)

a. General:

(1) During the reporting period the CORDS activities were focused on 1968 pacification planning. For the first time an attempt is being made to correlate the Combined Campaign Plan, the Revolutionary Development Guidelines, the Country Assistance Program and Project TAKEOFF. It is considered that the correlation of these plans will greatly benefit the overall pacification program.

(2) At the direction of Ambassador Komer Project TAKEOFF was initiated during the period. The intent of this program is to focus attention on eight areas of pacification and act as an impetus to the pacification program. The eight areas are:

(a) 1968 pacification planning
(b) RVNAF Support for Revolutionary Development
(c) Refugees
(d) Chieu Hoi
(e) Attack on the VC Infrastructure
(f) Detention Centers
(g) Revolutionary Development Cadre
(h) Revamp National Police and PFF

While it is too soon to evaluate the effect of Project TAKEOFF on the overall pacification program it is focusing attention on these vital areas and is giving direction to the myriad of small tasks that make up the program.

(3) One of the important innovations that has come about with Project TAKEOFF is the Infrastructure Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX) concept as part of the attack on the VC Infrastructure action program. The concept aims for improved coordination of infrastructure intelligence collection and collation, more selective targeting and timely exploitation of operational intelligence, and more effective coordination of infrastructure intelligence and action operations with other military and civil programs and operations. This is to be accomplished by the establishment of Provincial Intelligence Centers (PIC) and District Operations and Intelligence Coordinating Centers (DOICCS). Thus far nine PICs and 14 DOICCS have been established in I I CTZ. While the concept is not fully implemented throughout the Corps, field reports indicate that this program greatly enhances the flow of intelligence information and will be a valuable contribution to the attack on the infrastructure.

(4) During the period CORDS has seen some internal reorganization. The Operational Analysis and Evaluation Division and the Plans, Programs and Reports Division were consolidated into the Plans,
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Reports and Evaluation Division. The Public Health Section of the New Life Development Division was taken out of NLD and made a separate Division. (Incl 14 Organizational INFOCEV/CORDS)

(5) RD Mobile Training Teams (RD/TT) instruction continued to be monitored during the period. All ARVN Battalions except one Ranger Battalion have completed the training and a two-week refresher course has been instituted and is on-going. Out of 227 RF companies 167 have completed RD/TT and seven are currently in training. The PF/MIP Training has shown improvement and 443 Platoons out of 1035 have received the instruction.

(6) The Civil/Military RD team innovation referred to in last quarter's report has been redesignated Military Administrative RD Groups (LARD) and has been included in the National RD program. The organization of such groups has been standardized and will consist of 40 RF/PF soldiers, 16 hamlet, village, district or provincial administrative or technical cadre and six Vung Tau trained RD cadres. This concept appears to be well suited for its purpose and is being instituted throughout South Vietnam.

(7) The Quarter Zone RD Team innovation in Binh Thuan Province has been extended until 31 December 1967. During a three-month period, over 50 of the 98 point criteria has been accomplished in Xuan Phong Hamlet, the hamlet in which one of the two teams operates. In comparison, in neighboring hamlets, where RD Groups are working, less than 50% of the 98 point criteria was completed. Progress in the hamlet worked by the second Quarter Zone Team has been steady but not spectacular. Further evaluation will be made concerning the future of this concept in the next quarterly report.

b. Civil Affairs Operations:

(1) During the period August - 31 October the Civil Affairs/Refugee Division of CORDS had staff responsibility for civil affairs operations in II Corps. On 1 October the Civil Affairs/Refugee Division was redesignated Refugee/Civil Affairs Division but the change had no effect on the civil affairs functions of the office. Staff responsibilities include monitorship of all civil affairs activities and specifically the civic action programs of all OPCON units, Advisory Teams, and Installation Coordinators in II Corps. The Civil Affairs Branch also maintains a civic action fund to support the civic action advisory effort.

(2) RVNAF participation in military civic action continues to be a matter of special advisory emphasis. A noticeable increase in RVNAF participation is evident in Ninh Thuan Province with special emphasis on Popular Force units engaging in civic action. A competitive program has been established and an awards system instituted whereby PF Platoons that make a significant contribution to the province military civic action program are recognized officially and publicly.

(3) Staff emphasis from INFOCEV has been to encourage US units to conduct their civic action programs through a Vietnamese agency or military unit rather than to go directly to the institution receiving the assistance.

(4) 41st Civil Affairs Company.
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(a) Significant operations during the period included
the return of two civil affairs teams from I Corps and the submission of
a recommended change to the unit TOE.

(b) The unit has three teams in a command support
role. Two teams are attached to the 4th Infantry Division and one to
the 1st Cav Div (AM). Four teams are attached to III MAF and are not
available for use in II Corps. The nine remaining teams are in an area
support role in the following provinces: Binh Dinh (3), Binh Thuan (3),
Pleiku (1), Dalac (1), and Phu Yen (1). The area support role has proven
to be the best utilization of the Civil Affairs Teams and the four teams
in I Corps are urgently needed in II Corps.

(c) The recommended change to the unit TOE provides
for 16 teams, the same as the current organization, but the teams
will be generalist teams rather that VA refugee oriented teams. Two
teams will be in command support roles with one attached to the 4th Inf
Div and one attached to the 1st Cav Div (AM). The bulk of the unit,
14 teams, will be in an area support role attached to the provincial advisory
teams and under the direction of the Senior Province Advisor.

(d) One problem area in the 41st CA Co is the
lack of adequate equipment for the civil affairs teams. The teams are
authorized two 1/4-ton trucks. The 3/4-ton vehicle would give the team
a capability of transporting building materials and laborers. The
recommended changes to the TOE include this equipment change.

C: Coordination of civic action activities,

(1) The merger of USAID and MACV personnel into a single
advisory team at province and district level (CORDS) has had a favorable
effect on the coordination of civic action programs. Increased staff
emphasis at this headquarters has been given to the importance of coor-
dinating all civic action programs with the local advisors and the Com-

munity Relations Committee.

(2) The coordination of civic action programs in the Cam
Ranh Bay area has been streamlined by the establishment of a civic action
coordinating committee with representatives of the Cam Ranh Air Force Base,
Cam Ranh Support Command, 18th Engineer Brigade (Dong Ba Tien), the local
advisory team, and the ROK forces. This small committee has a rotating
chairmanship and can coordinate the great impact of civic action on the
local community better than the two Community Relation Committees in the
area.

d. Refugee Operations.

(1) During the period 1 August – 30 October, the Refugee
Branch of the Refugee/Civil Affairs Division underwent several changes in
assigned personnel. During the month of October an exerted effort was
made to increase the refugee staff both at I FFORCIV and within the prov-
inces. As a result of these efforts six refugee officers were placed on
TDY to II CTZ and began an extensive survey of the refugee situation within
each province. Upon completion of the survey in November a final deter-
mination will be made as to the permanent assignment of the TDY personnel.
(2) During the past quarter special emphasis had been placed on assisting the GVN in the implementation of SCW directives. There has been noticeable progress toward this end in Phu Yen, Cam Ranh, Khanh Hoa and Minh Thanh Provinces.

(3) The entire operation for refugees is undergoing a revamping and streamlining to improve output, communications and reporting. The results of this will be reported in the next quarterly report.

5. (C) Logistical activities:

a. General:

(1) There were no major logistical problems encountered during this period with continued improvement noted in logistical support to combat operations within II CTZ. Primary logistical effort was devoted to operations PERSHING, FRANCIS MARION, MACARTHUR, BULLING, GREELEY and BYRD.

(2) Forward Support Areas (FSAs) supporting above-mentioned operations are located as follows:

(a) English
(b) Dak To
(c) Phan Thiet

(3) ACoS, G4 continues to monitor the daily status of stocks on-hand at all FSAs; also material, maintenance, and the medical posture of units assigned, attached and OPCOM to I FFORCovy.

(b) There was an increase in intensity of logistical assistance in ARVN, RF/PP, ROKFV and CORDS areas. Included were detailed, temporary assistance efforts, as well as long range planning and organisational effectiveness studies. Examples include:

(a) Logistical expediting to provide CORDS with appropriate advice and material for completion of priority projects.

(b) Assistance to ROKFV units requesting real estate in the Nha Trang area.

(c) Identifying specific GVN actions which can improve effectiveness of ARVN and RF/PP.

(d) Arranging for temporary loan of equipment improve effectiveness of FMWAF, especially in combat operations.

b. Supply:

(1) There are no existing shortage impairing the operational capability of this command.

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(2) Class I, III, IIIa and V supplies are adequate to support all operations.

(3) Changes that occurred to the ASR during the period are as follows:

(a) Additions:
   1. 105mm HR, C 444, 444, 445.
   2. 175mm HR, D 572.
   3. Signal, ground, MP, LI44.

(b) Deletions:
   1. Signal, ground, MP, LI41.
   2. 60mm WP, B690.

(c) End of period ASR:
   1. 60mm Illum, B627.
   2. 105mm HR, C 444, 444, 445.
   3. 175mm HR, D 572.
   4. Signal, ground, MP, LI41.

(4) Long Range Patrol Company. To date, approximately 39% of TOAE equipment is on-hand. Approximately 60% of mission essential equipment has been received. Signal equipment and tool kits are critical items as they are peculiar to this organization and in some cases are not in theater stocks.

c. Maintenance:

(1) During the reporting period the M109 Technical Assistance Team from COMUS visited I FFPORCEN units equipped with the M109 howitzer (155mm). Significant improvement in user and support maintenance resulted from this visit.

(2) Units within I FFPORCEN have received the following items during the period as part of the closed loop program.

(a) 31 ea M113A3 tanks.

(b) 71 ea M113A1 APC.

(3) Assigned and attached units exchanged 5% signal components as part of the signal closed loop program during the period.

(4) Maintenance of advisor and CORDS vehicles in II CTZ has been an item of command interest. Problems exist due to the condition and shortage of advisor vehicles and the lack of adequate maintenance support at operator and organizational level. Additionally the maintenance program and supply system at the province level is in need of overhaul. A study of the CORDS/Advisor vehicle problem has been completed and is presently being staffed at this headquarters.

(5) The OH-6 will be introduced into I FFPORCEN with the arrival of some of the equipment of the 7/17 Air Cavalry Squadron in

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early November 1967. Uh-1H helicopters continue to arrive in quantity with:

(a) 144 0/H 1st Cav Div.
(b) 34 0/H 4th Inf Div.
(c) 63 0/H 17th CAU.

(6) Operational readiness of the air mobile engineer equipment in the 1st Cav Div (AM) has become a serious problem. High maintenance requirements and lack of repair parts for this non-standard equipment are increasing factors in a steadily decreasing OR. The basic problem is that this lightweight, air mobile engineer equipment is unsuitable when subjected to continued daily usage as a standard engineer item.

(7) The G-4 SOP for maintenance training of HVAF units was published during the reporting period. This SOP implements I FORCEN Regulation No. 350-1 and was coordinated with and distributed to major OCPOM tactical units and 1st Log area commands.

d. Medical:

(1) In general, the health of the US combat soldier in II CTZ continues to be good. During the period 1 August 1967 through 31 October 1967 no significant trends were noted. The number of cases of malaria increased slightly over the previous quarter, due in most part to the shift in the rains and the movement of some tactical units within II CTZ toward the coastal areas.

(2) The 71st Evacuation Hospital, Pleiku which became operational 29 May 1967 with 160 beds has now completed its expansion program and has 360 operating beds.

(3) The arrival of three (3) medical detachments (HA) has bolstered the II CTZ "Dustoff" capability with an additional 16 aircraft. Units and their locations:

254th Med Det—Nha Trang
283d Med Det—Pleiku
50th Med Det—Tuy Hoa

(4) Air evacuation continues to be the principle means of evacuation for the sick and wounded from the battlefield. During the report period, "Dustoff" units evacuated 10,388 casualties and 1st Cav Div (AM) medivac helicopters evacuated 2,999 patients.

e. Transportation:

(1) Highway 21 was opened from 10 to 20 October 1967 for the resupply of Ban Me Thuot by US convoys from Can Ranh Bay and ARVN convoys from Nha Trang. This action points up the fact that allied forces are capable of opening a road and, given priority of combat troop effort, keeping it open for any period desired. US tonnage hauled during the period was 1,010.8 short tons.

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The rising tempo of operations throughout II CTZ has resulted in increased daily airlift requirements. The daily averages of emergency airlift for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 compared with the daily averages of the quarterly period ending 31 July 1967 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Short Tons</th>
<th>PAX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May - July</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Oct</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Movement procedures within I FFORCEN were clarified and refined. A revised regulation establishes responsibilities and procedures to be followed by all I FFORCEN assigned, attached, and OPCON units when requesting transportation support for tactical and administrative movements.

During the past quarter daily scheduled C-7A service was inaugurated. These daily flights to and from the principle locations within II CTZ permit staff divisions to make liaison visits on a scheduled basis with minimal time devoted to traveling. Two aircraft originate each morning at Nha Trang and travel in opposite directions around the same circle route. A passenger transported to a point in the morning by one aircraft can be returned to Nha Trang in the afternoon by the other.

Several incidents occurred which pointed out the need for positive airfield control during major airlift operations. Briefings for commanders and staffs are being prepared which stress proper airfield operating procedures and effective means of conducting major airlift operations. This orientation will be offered to commanders and staffs of all brigade and larger units operating in II CTZ.

Personnel and Administrative Action

a. Maintenance of Unit Strengths:

(2) Authorised and assigned strengths of assigned and attached units have been generally satisfactory throughout the reporting period. The 54th Signal Battalion is experiencing shortages in certain key MOS, particularly MOS 31M (Radio Relay and Carrier attendant) and 52B (Generator Repairman). Headquarters USARV submitted emergency requisitions to DA to cover the shortage in MOS 31M and established priority of fill to the 54th Signal Battalion to eliminate this shortage. Improvements in the strength posture for both MOS 31M and 52B are being made and the situation should be corrected by mid December 1967. Assigned strength has also declined in the artillery groups during the reporting period; particularly hard hit is the 52d Artillery Group. This drastic drop in strength in artillery was caused by a USARV-wide shortage in MOS 13A (Basic artilleryman). Action has been taken by HQ I FFORCEN and USARV to correct this shortage. Improvement is slow but all units should be at authorized strength by end of CT 67. The present for duty strengths of OPCON units have generally exceeded the 100% of authorized during the period. The two major OPCON units (1st Cav Div (AM) and 4th Inf Div) moved through their hump rotation period of July and August. The hump rotation of major OPCON units is an annual process which presents serious personnel management problems impacting directly on (1)
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combat effectiveness of the units concerned, (2) transportation requirements and (3) cyclical needs in CONUS recruiting and training programs. To overcome the hump rotation in units, USARY has instituted a stringent infusion program which requires that a unit rotate no more than 25% per month during the 1st year in country and 15% per month during the second and succeeding years in WM.

(3) Manpower strengths and future projections are being closely monitored to comply with manpower callings imposed by HQ USARY. Unit strengths should be stabilised at 100% (auth/asg) by 31 December 1967. During the period a redistribution of area material officer positions was accomplished fer HQ I FORCEN, and assigned and attached units based upon DA guidance. Requisitions and requirement forecasts were adjusted accordingly. The requisition base was stabilised during the period when USARY approved MFQRE 51-17 for requisitioning purposes.

(4) Personnel strengths of assigned, attached, and units under operational control are at Incl 16. Present for duty percentages of assigned strengths of maneuver battalions are at Incl 17.

b. Personnel Management:

(1) MOS imbalances, both officer and enlisted, have presented assignment problems during the period. This has been particularly noticeable with officers having highly technical skills such as MI officers, MOS 9666. This problem has been overcome to a degree by redistribution throughout USARY, and should be completed by end of CT (7). The 8th TAB, 26th Artillery has experienced a total overstrength yet has critical shortages in MOS 17B (Radio Crewman) and 93F (meteorologist). The unit has valid requisitions to bring the strength to 100% of authorized by 31 Dec 67.

(2) The receipt of timely assignment instructions for personnel nearing rotation continued to be a problem during this period. Such delays cause personal hardship and moral problems among those individuals leaving the command. This area should be investigated and continued follow-up action be taken by all headquarters to insure prompt and timely action with regard to reassignment instructions.

c. Civilian Personnel Management:

Civilian personnel management during the period was satisfactory in both administration and pay. During this quarter actions were taken at all levels of command to control the initiation and termination of Local National employment thru the local civilian personnel officer servicing that area. In addition, controls were established and guidance furnished non-appropriated activities to convert their employees records to conform with the wage scales and grade standards presently used in established job descriptions governing direct hire positions. The action to convert and align non-appropriated wage scales and job description was coordinated with the Civilian Personnel Officer in the area of employment. Controls and guidance on overtime payments were emphasised. The use of overtime for non-essential work was discouraged. Subordinate commands were directed to examine the adequacy of controls and conformance with these requirements. Inspections conducted by the Inspector General and during Command Inspections will inquire into and examine the units concerned for compliance with guidance furnished.

(1) Direct Hire Employees Auth: 51

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Moral services within the command continued to improve. Special services activities showed improvement by the opening of a new library in the Kha Trang, Camp McDermott area. Also an athletic program is under development for off duty recreation.

Utilisation of RAR quotas for assigned and attached units distributed and utilised as shown at inclosures 19 and 19A. There were no significant difficulties experienced during the quarter. Those units assigned in the III MAF area are receiving sufficient transportation allocations from Da Nang.

Awards and decorations approved during the period are at inclosure 20.

Chaplain Activities:

(a) There were no significant personnel changes.

(b) II CTZ has 153 US Military Chaplains:

1. 132 US Army: 98 Protestant; 33 Catholic and 1 Jewish.


(c) Religious Services:

1. Protestant services in OPCON units and in combat support and service support units is adequate. Services for Advisory Teams on a regular basis is a practical impossibility. Chaplains assigned to Advisory Teams do the best they can and depend on neighboring units to render services.

2. Catholic services in OPCON units are adequate.

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2. Jewish services are adequate. Services are conducted by the Jewish Chaplain in seven locations once a month in Nha Trang every week on the Sabbath. Lay leaders conduct weekly Jewish services at the seven locations. Coordination is no problem. One Jewish Chaplain assigned to this headquarters has responsibility for II CTZ. High Holy Day Services were conducted in Nha Trang for all II CTZ Jewish personnel during this period.

A. In Nha Trang the following services are scheduled:

a. Sunday, 18 Protestant, 12 Catholic.

b. Friday evening: Jewish Sabbath Services.

c. Daily three Catholic services.

f. Safety and Accident Prevention:

The number of traffic fatalities and accidental gunshot wounds increased during the quarter. I FFORCEV Regulation 385-1 was published to revitalize the Safety Program. Unit Safety SOs were reviewed by this headquarters to determine adequacy and compliance with the regulation. A system was established for compiling injury and motor vehicle accident rates for announcement to units for comparison on a quarterly basis. Injury rates, motor vehicle accident rates and accidental gunshot wounds experienced are at incl 21. (OPCOM units report safety statistics directly to USARV.)

g. Nonappropriate Fund Activities:

MACV and USARV prescribed standards to attain uniform wage practices among US military elements and directed specific procedures and actions to seek out job misclassification and wage malpractices. All nonappropriate fund activities of assigned/attached units were required to provide uniform wages, benefits and conditions of employment to all their VN employees by transferring responsibility to Area Civilian Personnel Officers.

h. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order:

(1) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) Off Limit actions:

The Installation Coordinator, Nha Trang Sub Area Command in coordination with Zone Coordinator, placed the city of Nha Trang and civilian establishments off limits to all US Forces personnel during the Vietnamese elections. This action was necessitated by the increased terrorist activities directed against polling places, Vietnamese officials and US Forces personnel. During the Presidential elections, the off limits was in effect from 182100H August thru 090400H September 1967. The city was again placed off limits 212100H October thru 240400H October 1967, during the lower house elections.

(b) Law and Order:

1. The Chief of Staff, I FFORCEV, directed an inquiry to determine the cause of the losses suffered by the PXs located

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in the Nha Trang area and to make recommendations which, when implemented, could reduce future losses. The inquiry revealed that the losses, which ranged from 53 to 93.59% of the gross sales for the period 10 May to 10 September 1967 were attributed primarily to improper management, collusion between employees and customers and lack of internal merchandise control. To alleviate the excessive losses, the following recommendations were made: a. That exchange managers comply with the established procedures for controlling merchandise, b. That military checkers be used at exchanges selling high priced or controlled merchandise, c. That the Provost Marshal, I FFORCIV, coordinate with the local CID in expediting crime prevention surveys of the exchanges, d. That a follow up inquiry be made at a later date to determine if the above recommendations are being complied with. There are four PAs involved in the inquiry.

2. A study of incidents in the Nha Trang area during the 1st quarter of FY 68 revealed a 42% decrease in known offenders from the previous quarter. However, increases were noted in the number of personnel apprehended for larcenies and off limits offenses. The overall decrease can, in part, be attributed to the city of Nha Trang being off limits for a nineteen day period during the Vietnamese elections.

(2) VIP Security:

(a) Commander Conferences held on 25 August and 19 September 1967 at the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) conference room, were attended by COMQSMACY, Deputy COMDSMACY, CG, I FFORCIV and other senior commanders. Security arrangements were coordinated by the Provost Marshal, I FFORCIV and provided by the 5th Special Forces Group, Security Police, Long Van Air Base, US Navy, GVN National Police, Provost Marshal, HNSAC and the 272d Military Police Company.

(b) During the reporting period, security was provided by the agencies listed in (a) above for all VPs visiting the Nha Trang area. These included statesmen, political leaders, and General Officers.

(c) On 30 August 1967, the Provost Marshal, I FFORCIV, in coordination with Deputy CORDS, I FFORCIV, was given the responsibility of providing security for the US Election Observer Group to the Vietnamese Presidential Elections, visiting II CTZ. The visit took place between 31 August and 4 September 1967, with elements of the group visiting various provinces. Coordination effected between the Provost Marshal, I FFORCIV, the 16th Military Police Group, Province Senior Advisers, GVN NCP, the ARVN Military Security Service and Headquarters, I FFORCIV staff elements, resulted in the efficient accomplishment of the mission without incident: however problems did arise, the first being dissemination of information: to action addresses. CORDS furnished a courier and aircraft to deliver the necessary security instructions to each province. Planning was hurried due to the short lead time given to this headquarters and Province Senior Advisers. Although the planning for security was considered adequate, additional lead time is needed when possible. The prepared itineraries were constantly changing. This caused security elements to stand by in areas not visited by observers, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the overall mission. In the interest of safety the PM, I FFORCIV, assigned CID investigators as personal security for observers. Due to the short lead time and limitations on transportation, it was often not possible for CID investigators to meet the party they were securing prior to arrival at the destination or permit advance reconnaissance of the route to be traveled and areas to be visited.

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The monthly Khanh Hoa Police Officers Conferences were held on 30 August, 27 September and 24 October 1967. Attendees included representatives from the Vietnamese military and civilian police agencies, ROE Military Police, CORPS Public Safety Division, US Air Force Security and Law Enforcement, 16th Military Police Group, 27th Military Police Company and the Provost Marshal, I PPORCE. The following items were topics of discussion: security during the period of Vietnamese National Elections, the increased terrorist activity in Nha Trang, larcenies from villas occupied by US Forces personnel, traffic safety within the city of Nha Trang, narcotic traffic and suppression of blackmarket activities. These monthly meetings continue to be beneficial in maintaining liaison with other police agencies.

I PPORCE Regulation 210-5, "Custody and Control of Firearms and Dangerous Weapons" was approved for publication. This regulation implements USAF Regulation 210-5 and establishes criteria for carrying and possession of government owned weapons to government leased quarters outside cantonment areas. This authority was granted to those personnel in areas subject to hostile fire or terrorist activities. Safeguards required in carrying weapons to quarters include permission of commander or supervisor; carrying weapons openly; appropriate procedures for protection of weapons and ammunition; limitation on carrying weapons to any public place or club and weapons used only when person is under direct attack. Safety in using weapons is stressed.

Evacuation: I PPORCE

1. Evacuation of PWs from hospitals to the Phu Tai PW Camp presented a problem on several occasions when the Camp Commander refused to accept PWs who had open wounds or were wearing bandages or casts. This refusal was based on the non-availability of an ARVN doctor at the camp to treat wounded PWs. On 21 August 1967, the Asst PN and Surgeon, I PPORCE, visited the Phu Tai PW Camp regarding the acceptance of PWs at the camp from US Medical facilities. The Camp Commander described the conditions under which wounded or ill PWs would be admitted and he required only that they be ambulatory, able to assume a squatting position and able to conduct routine activities without assistance of others. There have been no problems since this visit.

2. During an update briefing at Headquarters, I PPORCE on 28 July 1967, COMSHAEV commented that the population of the Pleiku PW Camp was too high and that action should be taken to move PWs to other locations. The population of the Pleiku camp at the time was 1,771 PWs. Concern was expressed over the vulnerability of the camp to attack, and the camp was closed for receipt of PWs on 29 July 1967. It was decided that the camp population be reduced to less than 1,200 PWs to lessen its attraction as a target. Permission was granted by JGS to move 500 PWs to Phu Quoc Island and the movement took place on 2 August 1967. This action reduced the Pleiku camp population to 1,220 PWs, but filled the Phu Quoc Island PW Camp to the maximum for existing facilities and that camp was closed after receipt of PWs by JGS. As a means to further reduce the Pleiku camp population, an action was initiated to move 331 PWs that had been reclassified as civil defendants by a MACV/JGS screening.
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Tea on 21-23 June 1967.  Permission was granted by JCS on 14 August 1967 to move the 331 civil defendants to province jails. Between 22 August and 6 September the movement was accomplished, which reduced the Pleiku PW Camp population below the desired level. The Pleiku camp remains closed for receipt of PWs.

(t) Population:

The population of the II Corps Combat Captive (PW) Camp Pleiku fluctuated during the period as a result of input from II Corps G2, the shipment of 518 PWs to the Phu Quoc Island camp and the movement of 331 reclassified PWs to the province jails. The present Pleiku PW Camp population is 855 PWs. During the reporting period, 654 PWs were received at the Phu Tai PW Camp from US, ROK and ARVN collecting points, hospitals and province jails. Two hundred PWs were shipped to the Phu Quoc Island Camp: 100 on 11 October and 100 on 20 October 1967. The present Phu Tai PW Camp population is still 926 PWs.

(6) Civilian Detention Facilities:

A message from MACV on 31 August 1967 expressed concern over the release by the VC of over 1400 prisoners from the Quang Ngai city jail and requested commanders and advisors at all levels to re-evaluate the security of civilian jails. Provost Marshal, I FFORCEV, in coordination with Public Safety Division CORDS, is visiting the nine province jails and two detention facilities in II CTZ to determine adequacy of security. As of the end of this reporting period seven jails and one detention facility have been inspected.

7. (c) Arty:

a. (U) During the period 1 August 1967 thru 31 October 1967, I FFORCEV Artillery continued to support US, ARVN and FWMAF in I and II CTZ.

b. (C) I FFORCEV Artillery units, totaling two artillery groups, ten battalions, five separate batteries and two detachments, supported all major operations in II CTZ to include operations PERSHING, FRANCIS MARION, GBEZUET, MACARTHUR, BOLLING, BIRD and HCHG LII DONG.

c. (C) Four battalions, five separate batteries and two detachments under I FFORCEV Artillery (Forward) Dong Ha and under operational control of III Marine Amphibious Force continued to support Marine operations in I CTZ.

d. (C) The 8th Bn, 4th Arty (175mm gun self-propelled) arrived in country in mid-August 1967 and was placed under I FFORCEV Artillery (Forward) with operational control to III Marine Amphibious Force. The battalion was assigned the mission of General Support Reinforcing the 12th Marine Regiment. Battalion base camp was established at Dong Ha.

e. (U) To facilitate more efficient operations, the physical location of the entire FFORCE was moved to a room adjoining the I FFORCE TOC on 20 August 1967.

f. (U) A profitable MACV working conference for I FFORCEV divisional and non-divisional artillery units was conducted on 23-24 August 1967 at HQ USARV. The purpose of the conference was to tailor
the artillery units to accomplish the mission in RVN. The conference agreed on standardized MTO&Es for the divisional light and medium battalions and the Force artillery light, medium and heavy battalions, both towed and self-propelled.

g. (C) In September, Battery C, 6th Bn, 12th Arty, was relieved of its operational mission in I CTZ and redeployed in III CTZ.

h. (C) In mid-September 1967, Battery B, 6th Bn, 27th Arty, was relieved of its operational mission in I CTZ and redeployed in III CTZ.

I. (C) Battery C, 6th Bn, 16th Arty, was relieved of its mission in the PERSHING area of operation and was employed in Operation ROLLING in support of the 173d Airborne Brigade in late September.

j. (C) The 108th Arty Gp arrived in-country during the first week in October 1967. It will remain attached to Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam but will be under operational control of the III Marine Amphibious Force in I CTZ.

k. (C) In order to influence future operations in II CTZ, the I FFORCEV Artillery officer recommended to the Commanding General I FFORCEV Vietnam that all non-divisional artillery units be attached to I FFORCEV Artillery. On 15 October 1967, 2d Bn, 17th Arty, was removed from attachment to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and attached to I FFORCEV Artillery with further attachment to 1st Artillery Gp. Their mission is to support the 1st Cav Div (AM) in the PERSHING area of operation and base defense of Camp Radcliffe.

l. (C) Effective 19 October 1967, Battery A, 1st Bn, 30th Arty, was placed under operational control of the Americal Division Artillery operating in the southern portion of I CTZ.

m. (C) On 28 October 1967, Battery A, 3d Bn, 18th Arty, was relieved of its mission in the PERSHING to MACARTHUR area of operation to increase heavy artillery support of the 9th Infantry Division. The 52d Arty Gp assumed operational control of this battery.

n. (C) During this quarter more I FFORCEV Artillery was committed to support ARVN units. Batteries A&D, 1st Bn, 92d Arty, have supported recent ARVN operations.

e. (C) Statistics for US Artillery in II CTZ and I FFORCEV Artillery units in DMZ area for the reporting quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions fired:</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45,110</td>
<td>34,441</td>
<td>34,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBSERVED</td>
<td>10,771</td>
<td>9,109</td>
<td>10,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOBSERVED</td>
<td>12,298</td>
<td>8,785</td>
<td>5,436</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(2) Ammunition Expenditures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>HDS EXPENDED</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL</th>
<th>RDS/TUNED/DAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>265,729</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>72,624</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>29,916</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 inch</td>
<td>32,083</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>400,734</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| SEP   | 105mm  | 221,181      | 63%        | 36            |
|       | 155mm  | 68,190       | 20%        | 36            |
|       | 175mm  | 31,932       | 9%         | 33            |
|       | 8 inch  | 27,923       | 8%         | 29            |
| **TOTAL** |       | **344,626**  | **100%**   | **35**        |

| OCT   | 105mm  | 215,042      | 70%        | 39            |
|       | 155mm  | 50,561       | 16%        | 25            |
|       | 175mm  | 22,979       | 7%         | 21            |
|       | 8 inch  | 32,149       | 9%         | 22            |
| **TOTAL** |       | **325,721**  | **100%**   | **34**        |

* Prorated average.

p. (C) Artillery Strength:

(1) The following chart reflects artillery strength by caliber for US, ARVN, and FMAF artillery units in II CTZ at the end of the quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>175mm</th>
<th>8 inch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Divisional</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Divisional</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Force Artillery</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN Artillery</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th SFG (CIDG Camps)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>383</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(2) The strengths for Army Artillery units supporting III MAF in I CTZ at end of reporting quarter were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>8 inch</th>
<th>7.5mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

q. (C) Artillery units attached to I FFORCEN at the end of the reporting period were:

(1) Non-divisional:

1st Artillery Group

7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm T)
Battery A, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (175mm 8)
7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (8 inch SP)
2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (105mm T/155mm T SP)
5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm T)
1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155mm T)
Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm T)
6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (8 inch SP)
4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (175mm)
Battery E, 41st Artillery (ME)
Headquarters Battery, 8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 26th Artillery
Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight)

52d Artillery Group

3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm SP)
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175mm/8 inch SP)
1st Battalion, 52d Artillery (155mm T)
77th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
237th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

I Field Force Vietnam Artillery (Forward), DONO HA
8th Battalion, 4th Artillery (175mm SP)
1st Battalion, 40th Artillery (105mm SP)
235th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)
236th Field Artillery Detachment (Forward)
null
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personnel and equipment which should accommodate internal communication requirements. In the interim, the 173d Abn Bde has been advised to request TRANY for the emergency loan of a communication center (AM/NDC-34) and a switchboard (AM/NDC-10).

d. The radio relay system feasibility test program was continued. A test system was installed between Lang Man Mountain and the Special Forces Camp vicinity of Duc Lap with satisfactory results. Tests of this type provide valuable data for future operations.

e. The I PFORCEV Communications Center experiences difficulty in maintaining a current listing of Theater Routing Indicators. According to instructions contained in the Routing Directory, each communications facility is responsible for reporting changes to each of the six major headquarters in Vietnam. These headquarters in turn are responsible for disseminating the changes to subordinate units. Since distribution of changes is not the responsibility of one authority, changes cannot be sequentially numbered or controlled. As a result, the user is never certain his directory is current. Dissemination of changes should be the responsibility of one authority. A recommendation to change the procedure has been submitted through USARY to MACV-J6.

f. Increased emphasis has been placed on the utilization of the command radio teletype nets. Messages are being passed daily over these nets as a matter of routine. As the primary means of passing classified information to the Senior Liaison Officers to 9th Division and 9th Division, these nets provide a reliable, indispensable, secure communications means for this headquarters. The traffic volume now absorbed by this method indicates the reliability of the system. This program has resulted in reduced backlogs in teletype circuits during peak traffic periods and has provided a positive and realistic vehicle for operator training.

g. The 459th Sig Bn and 1879th Comm Sqdn are jointly responsible for telephone service in the Nha Trang area and operate and maintain the GOLDFINCH and NHA TRAMS local dial central offices respectively. Both have initiated projects for providing subscribers with graded telephone service. This action will limit access to long distance facilities to certain designated subscribers and should result in increased efficiency of the common user long distance service. Concurrent with this program, action has been taken to eliminate non-I PFORCEV subscribers from the TIPRBOX switchboard and to deny access to TIPRBOX tactical trunks by NHA TRAMS local and GOLDFINCH subscribers. This action has resulted in improved service to TIPRBOX subscribers.

9. (C) ENGINEER:

a. The 39th Engr Bn (65th Engr Cp) remained under the operational control of the AMERICAN DIVISION throughout this period. In addition, the 19th Engr Bn's area of responsibility continued to extend into the I Corps Tactical Zone as far as Duc Pho (38 012365).

b. The majority of the effort of the engineer section during the reporting period was devoted to planning, coordination and supervision of the engineer combat support provided by 16th Engr Bde units in support of I PFORCEV, ROK and ARVN operations. The organic engineer units - 6th Engr Bn, 8th Engr Bn, and the 17th Engr Co of major commands under operational control of I PFORCEV were fully committed in support of their parent organizations throughout the period. Their

Activities were monitored by the engineer section as was the base development at Dragon Mountain in preparation for the arrival of the 7th Sqn, 17th Cav. Tactical operations supported during the period were ROLLING, BIRD, DAZZZL, FRANCIS MARION, GREEKLY, MACARTHUR, FERSHING and BUNG KIL DONG. Engineer combat support effort expended by units of the 15th Engr Rde and divisional and brigade engineer units in support of current and future tactical operations included:

(1) An Khe Airfield (BR 477447). This project consisted of constructing a 1365 foot by 72 foot concrete runway with four connecting taxiways next to the bituminous strip at An Khe. The construction was done by the 70th Engr Bn (C) using a slip-form paver. The runway was officially opened for traffic on 27 October 1967; however, work continues on the taxiways, parking apron, and drainage structures.

(2) Bao Loc Airfield (ET 068796). The completion of this project has been delayed several months by heavy rains. The upgrading of the field from T-17 membrane to NBAI matting is being done by the 14th Engr Bn (C). When completed it will be a Type II, C-130 field and has a current EOD of 5 November 1967. Several small road projects are also being done for Lam Dong Province.

(3) Ben Het CIDG Camp and Airfield Complex (IB 865251). This project was started on 23 October 1967 by the 299th Engr Bn (C). It consists of clearing an area with Roe Plows for the construction of a CIDG Camp, building an NBAI surfaced C-7A airfield with sufficient subgrade prepared for future upgrading to a C-130 capability and clearing and leveling an adjacent area for future construction on order.

(4) Operation ROLLING. The 577th Engr Bn (Const) is in general support of this operation. Support to date includes construction of an ammunition supply point, six hali-pads and cantonment facilities and road maintenance. They have also supported the ROK forces in Operation TOPKAP, and ROK operation in conjunction with ROLLING, with float bridging and light tactical rafts. The denial of the Rock Complexes at BQ 8752 and BQ 8854 during operation ROLLING was considered. A detailed reconnaissance was conducted by the 64th Engineer Detachment (Terrain). As a result of this reconnaissance and previous experience with similar formations in Binh Dinh Province it was concluded that destruction with conventional explosives was not feasible. The preferred alternative was to defoliate and observe the area for signs of enemy activity, using air strikes and ground troops where appropriate.

(5) Bong Son Airfield (Two Bits) (BR 816947). The 8th Engr Bn rehabilitated this field by scarifying and reconnecting the subgrade and sealing the surface with a pentene solution. Work was completed on 6 October 1967 on the Type II, C-7A field.

(6) Operation STIR. The 14th Engr Bn (C) has been in general support of this operation with a company at Phan Thiet. The company has been upgrading CL-1 both north and south of Phan Thiet by constructing culvert bypasses and bridges. They have also constructed two Bailey bridges at Song Tao and have assisted ARVN forces in the construction of Fort Hera.

(7) Cung Son Airfield (BQ 806424). The 14th Engr Bn (C) upgraded this Type II, C-123 field by replacing the T-17 membrane with NBAI matting. The work at the field was completed on 13 September 1967;
however, the unit could not be extracted until 24 September since the ROK forces were in contact with an enemy force blocking Route 7B, the access route to Cung Son.

(8) Dalat Cam Ly Airfield (BP 196212). The 11th Engr Bn (C) has had a platoon maintaining this airfield throughout this period using concrete patches on the deteriorating sections. The 18th Engr Bde plans to begin construction of a new parallel field at this location later this year.

(9) Operation DAZZLE and PERSHING. The 45th Engr Gp is in general support of these two operations. Support being rendered includes upgrading and maintenance of roads and airfields and general engineer support.

(10) Dong Tre Airfield (BQ 917706). The 577th Engr fn Const) completed the upgrading from T-17 membrane to an M8A1 surfaced, Type II, C-123 field on 21 August 1967.

(11) English Airfield (BS 075013). The 35th Engr Bn (C) completed the repair of this field on 26 August 1967. The repair operation included pemiprime application to shoulders, welding and straightening of runway matting, subgrade compaction and the replacement of 1400 ft of runway matting which was too badly damaged to be repaired.

(12) Operations FRANCIS MARIO, GREELEY, and MACARTHUR. The 937th Engr Gp was in general support Operations FRANCIS MARIO and GREELEY and is now in general support of Operation MACARTHUR in the same area. Support included bridge construction, maintenance of roads and airfields and general engineer support. These operations coincided with the monsoon season in this area and consequently a considerable amount of effort was necessary to keep the roads in this area open. Route 512 deteriorated to a point where it was impassable for approximately a month during this period.

(13) Ha Tay Airfield (BR 799829). The 8th Engr Bn completed this Type II, C-7A field on 4 September 1967. The construction included grading and compacting of a 1400 foot later it runway and sealing it with pemiprime. This field had previously been known as LZ Pony.

(14) Operation HONG KIL DWG. This operation was supported by the 35th Engr Gp with a D-4 dozer and a water point. The D-4 dozer was lifted by a flying crane into several areas to prepare artillery gun positions.

(15) Land Clearing Operations: The 35th Land Clearing Team, which consists of 30 tractors with Rome Plows, has been placed under operational control of 1 PFORCE. The object of the clearing operations has been to clear a 100 meter section on each side of a roadway to prevent enemy ambush. To date approximately 2800 acres have been cleared along Routes 19, 14, 6C and 11B. Operations are now in progress at Pen Het (TB 865250), Rte 19B and at Edap Enang (ZA 030328).

(16) Paving Operations. Paving and upgrading to MACV standards was completed on QL-1 from Cam Ranh Bay to Ba Nga (BP 975175) and from Qui Nhon to Phu Cat and is now in progress on QL-19 from Qui Nhon to An Khe and on QL-1 from Phu Cat to Bong Son.
17. Phan Thiet Airfield (AN 802071). The 14th Engr Bn (c) completed the upgrading of this field on 25 October 1967. Upgrading consisted of the addition of a turn around and parking apron of M111 matting. Other work accomplished included construction of a POL tank farm and aircraft revetments and panoprim application of perimeter roads.

18. Route Upgrading. The I FFO/W objective has been to upgrade roads first to CL-15 to permit movement of troops and supplies, then improve to CL-31 to permit movement of gasoline tankers and self-propelled artillery and finally to upgrade to HC77 standard, which is an all weather, 24 ft wide roadway with permanent bridges of CL-35, two-way and CL-50, one-way.

(a) QL-1: Phan Thiet (AN 8510) to Song Hoi (AN 2815) upgraded from closed to CL-15, one-way, all weather.

(b) QL-1: Vung Ho (CQ 2622) to Minh Hoi (BF 9081) upgraded from CL-15 to CL-31, one-way, all weather.

(c) QL-1: Qui Chon (CR 0622) to Song Sen (BR 8595) upgraded from CL-31 to CL-35, two-way, all weather.

(d) QL-1: Dong Son (BR 8595) to Doc Pho (BS 8238) upgraded from closed to CL-31, one-way, all weather.

(e) QL-1A: Kontum (AN 7889) to (EB 0723) upgraded from CL-15 to CL-35, one-way, all-weather.

(f) Route 506: An Roi (BR A843) to (BR A8768) upgraded from closed to CL-31, one-way, all-weather.

19. Sa Huynh Port Facility (BS 929224). The 456th Engr Op opened a port facility at Sa Huynh on 15 October 1967 to supply Doc Pho and units in that area during the monsoon season. The work consisted of dredging a channel for LUs and constructing a beach unloading area and access roads.

20. T-17 Membrane Repair. Considerable effort has been expended in the maintenance of T-17 membrane covered fields due principally to the failure of factory vulcanized seams. Platoon sized repair teams were employed on Ben Black, Peleliu Klang, Phu Khon and Phu To for periods in excess of one week during the period. The following fields; Doc Lap, Dan Black, Peleliu Klang and Van Canh are scheduled to be upgraded from a T-17 membrane to M111 surface during the next three month period.

10. (U) Information Office

a. Representatives of the Information Office provided publicity coverage for numerous award and promotion ceremonies as well as for special events during this period, including the departure ceremony for BU Linton S. Bestwright, Chief of Staff, 1 PFMCTV, 19 September.

b. Photographic coverage was provided for the visits of numerous distinguished visitors, including that of General Omar Bradley, 23 August.
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The following media representatives were granted an interview with the commanding general and/or a G2/G3 briefing during the period covered by the report:

1. Mr. Kim Willenson, UPI, 6 September.


3. Mr. Peter Arnett, AP, 6 October.

4. Miss Kelly Smith, AP, 6 October.

5. Mr. Sid White, New York Times, 7 October.


8. Mr. Henry Hansen, Stars and stripes, 28 October.

d. The 5th Public Information Detachment, under the supervision of the IO, IFORCEV, published and distributed its "Morning News" on a daily basis, and published the August, September and October issues of "Typhoon". Major Henderson Garrett reported for duty with the detachment on 15 September and assumed command.

e. The 11th Public Information Detachment continued to provide transportation, escort, billets and other aid to correspondents and visiting information personnel, handling 803 persons during the period covered. A major renovation project on the Press Camp in Kha Trang was begun in September with an expected completion date of November. Work was begun on the Pleiku Press Camp permanent buildings in October with an expected occupancy date of December.

II. (U) Inspector General Activities:

a. LTC Thomas P. Noble was appointed as Acting Inspector General of this headquarters on 15 August 1967. LTC Noble was previously assigned as Chief of the Security Division, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96307.

b. There were seven complaints and 19 requests for assistance, advice or information received during the period. Two of the complaints were justified and five were unjustified. None of the complaints indicated any evidence of trends, widespread irregularities, or problems detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of this command.

c. The inspector general participated in the command inspection of the following units on the dates indicated:

1. HHB, I IFORCEV Arty, 21 Jul 67

2. 313th RR BN, 28 Jul 67

3. 55th MI Det, 64th Engr Det, and 11th PI Det, 11 Aug 67

4. 41st CA Co and 245th Pay Op Co, 26 Aug 67

5. 279th Trans Co, 1 Sep 67
The results of the Annual General Inspection of this headquarters conducted during the period 17-20 May 1967 were received from USARV on 5 August 1967. The results were distributed to staff sections and units concerned, with instructions to submit a report of corrective action to this office. On 14 September 1967 the reports of corrective action were forwarded to USARV. On 26 October 1967 a letter was received from USARV that stated that the corrective action taken was adequate.

12. (U) Staff Judge Advocate Activities:

a. There were three trials by general court-martial convened by the Commanding General, I FPFRCIT, during the quarter compared to four the previous quarter. The offenses involved in all the cases were military type offenses. Fifty-one special and 32 summary court-martial records of trial were reviewed for legal sufficiency. This reflects decreases of 10 special and 15 summary court-martial cases over the previous quarter.

b. Sixteen claims by Army personnel for loss of, or damage to, personal property incident to service were adjudicated and paid, compared to six the previous quarter. The claims totaling $2061.63 were approved for payment in the total amount of $1852.38.

c. The legal assistance office provided advice and assistance on civil matters to 768 individuals during the quarter compared to 926 the previous quarter.

d. No significant problems were encountered during the quarter, in the judge advocate functional areas of responsibility.

SECTION II (U) - COMMANDERS OBSERVATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned)

a. Item: Classification of Detainees

Discussion: An ACoS, G2 representative attended two MACV Screening Conferences. These conferences were required because detainees were being improperly classified. For example, many civil defendants were originally classified as PIs. As a result of the conferences, in a few cases as innocent civilians.

Observation: In a counterinsurgency campaign, great effort must be exercised by units to properly classify detainees during initial interrogations.

b. Item: Logistic Support for ROK PSTOP unit.

Discussion: The ROKV PSTOP Co has received two light mobile
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Printing sets; however, they are not operational due to lack of expendable supplies. The 1st LOGEST is taking action.

Observation: Timely action should have been taken by both the ROYV Field Command and MACV to insure the availability of these supplies in the ROY logistical system.

b. Item: The 114th Liaison Squadron (VNAF).

Observation: The 114th Liaison Squadron (VNAF) has aircraft for leaflet dissemination operations; however, none of the U-17 aircraft in II CTZ are equipped with aerial loudspeaker equipment. ARVN must rely on USAF support for all loudspeaker missions.

Observation: The VNAF PSYOP aircraft be equipped with loudspeaker units to increase the total PSYOP capability and to allow the ARVN to place greater reliance on their own capability.

c. Item: Availability of repair parts for low density equipment.

Observation: Unless sufficient repair parts, manuals, and expendables are simultaneously procured in quantities to establish unit level PMA's as well as US and CS level back-up stocks, the PSYOP effort will be impaired in proportion to equipment deadlines.

d. Item: Effectiveness of PSYOPS in exploiting intelligence and tactical situations.

Observation: Coordination between PSYOP and intelligence personnel has improved at all levels. There continues to be some difficulties on the availability of Ho Chi Minh under ARVN control. These delays inhibit exploitation by the entire PSYOP/intelligence community. However, substantial progress is being made in this area.

f. Item: Quick reaction audio capabilities.

Observation: A fixed or transportable studio set consisting of three recorder reproducers, one turn-table and the required microphones, amplifiers, mixing panel, etc should be procured for use in II CTZ. When possible this equipment should be procured from items currently listed in Federal Supply Catalogs to prevent unnecessary requisition of non-standard items. Tape systems must be compatible with ground and air reproduction equipment now in use.
g. Item: 35mm Slides.

Discussion: Both the audio-visual projector and the new Modular Audio Visual Unit (MAU) contain 35mm slide projectors. The PSTOP companies are not authorised 35mm cameras and are not permitted to requisition 35mm film. When used in conjunction with the tape capability discussed above, this equipment could be employed effectively to support local CA and ED efforts if the capability to take 35mm slides existed locally; 35mm color and black and white film can be processed in-country.

Observation: Many 35mm cameras exist in the hands of personnel assigned to PSTOP duties. With proper controls, film could be issued to the PSTOP companies which would permit utilization of this media.

h. Item: US staff assistance to allied units.

Discussion: Allied units require US staff assistance in certain situations when normal logistical systems do not respond to tactical requirements.

Observation: Augment the Field Force logistical staff structure with an action division to handle the coordination and implementing directives incident to assistances with FWRAP, and to monitor and assist the logistical advisory function where command interest demands rapid response/improvement of ANWIP/RF/PP.

i. Item: Field Force staff assistance in logistical advisory functions.

Discussion: The logistical advisory functions must be monitored and assisted by the Field Force staff in those instances where command interest demands rapid response/improvement in ANWIP/RF/PP.

Observation: Augment the Field Force logistical staff structure with an action division to handle the coordination and implementing directives incident to assistances with FWRAP, and to monitor and assist the logistical advisory function where command interest demands rapid response/improvement of ANWIP/RF/PP.

j. Item: Incarceration of Civil Defendants:

Discussion: During tactical operations in II CTZ persons listed on the district and province blacklists as VC infrastructure are often captured. Those individuals meeting the criteria listed in MACV Directive 150-3 are classified as civil defendants and released to district or province officials for incarceration. Experience has shown that a few GVW officials are releasing some of these individuals prior to trial. This has resulted in considerable wasted effort by tactical units capturing individuals listed as VC infrastructure and having them released to return to the area of capture.

Observation: Adequately and properly supervised detention facilities are needed to confine persons identified as VC infrastructure pending trial. Sufficient prisons are required to intern them until the sentence is served or hostilities cease. GVW officials at district and province levels must be made aware of the importance of
the apprehension and detention of the VC infrastructure members. Where graft and corruption is detected in releases of these individuals, corrective action must be taken against the officials involved.

k. Item: Movement of PWs

**Discussion:** Based on intelligence of enemy capabilities, the large number of PWS interned in II CTZ PW camps led to concern about their vulnerability. In order to reduce the enemy threat, I FFORCEN has taken measures to ensure that reaction forces are readily available; additionally, this headquarters has requested MACV to expedite transfer of PWS from II CTZ PW Camps to Phu Quoc Island PW Camp.

**Observation:** The vulnerability of II CTZ Camps to the enemy will be considerably reduced as MACV/JGS provides continuous evacuation of excessive numbers of PWS from II CTZ PW Camps to the Phu Quoc Island PW camp. This will reduce the PW population in II CTZ to a more manageable level.

l. Item: Religious Services/Chaplain Area and Denominational Coverage:

**Discussion:** Artillery, Engineer, Special Forces, Army Aviation and Combat Support units are often in isolated locations and move frequently. It is difficult for unit chaplains to give proper coverage. It is the responsibility of the nearest division, battalion or area supervisory chaplain to coordinate chaplain coverage for these isolated units with the appropriate chaplain according to the procedures outlined in I FFORCEN Regulation 10-4.

**Observation:** All chaplains must keep up-to-date on the religious needs of all assigned, attached and neighboring units and be familiar with the procedures for attaining necessary chaplain coverage. Each coordinating chaplain should keep an up-to-date troop list of all units in his area of responsibility. Personal visits to unit commanders in his area and continuous liaison concerning religious coverage should be maintained. Tactful offers to help in religious and morale matters can enhance religious coverage and assure a better and wider use of unit and support chaplains. Unit chaplains should be encouraged to serve as many troops as possible within his own capabilities and the unit's mission.

m. Item: Life of T-17 membrane surfaced airfields.

**Discussion:** Field experience in a tropical climate such as Vietnam indicates that the lifetime of a T-17 membrane field is limited to approximately six months, principally due to failure of the factory vulcanised seams. The failure of seams has been found to be a far greater problem than the expected damage limitations due to inadequate subgrade strength or excessive locked-wheel braking action. After approximately six months the number and length of seam failures requires an inordinate amount of repair, material and effort. Due to these failures the reverse propeller action of a small number of C-130 sorties can all but destroy a T-17 membrane field.

**Observation:** Plans should be made to upgrade a T-17 membrane field to a more permanent surface within six to eight months after the T-17 has been emplaced. A more durable factory vulcanizing process should be developed.
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PART II: Recommendations:

a. That careful examination be made of the ROK logistical system to determine if spare parts and expendable supplies for PSYOP have been properly requisitioned and are in pipeline.

b. That procurement of loudspeaker units for VNAF aircraft be expedited.

c. That greater effort be made to procure military standard equipment for PSYOP and to type classified those commercial items deemed essential. Advanced maintenance arrangements should be established when contract support is required.

d. That US advisors continue to organize committees comprised of sector military and civilian advisors, available US unit PSYOP officers and their ARVN counterparts to improve immediate exploitation of Hoi Chanh.

e. That a fixed or transportable recording studio be made available for use in II CTZ.

f. That 6th PSYOP Battalion be directed to honor reasonable requisitions for 35mm color and black and white film.

g. That positive action be taken at the highest ARVN level to insure continuous logistical support of PSYOP requirements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GEORGE A. BLANCHARD
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558 26 DEC 1967

Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Force Development, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam (DDLA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:
   a. Reference item concerning ROK logistical system, page 48, paragraph b. The ROK PSYOP Company has submitted requisitions for a 30-day supply of expendables. These requisitions have not been forwarded to 1st Logistical Command by ROK 100th Logistical Command. USARV has directed a forced issue of these items. 14th Inventory Control Center (ICC) has taken action to issue all items on hand, and placed an 02 (high priority) requisition for the remainder.
   b. Reference item concerning loudspeakers for VNAF U-17 aircraft, page 49, paragraph c: Concur. This would provide ARVN more responsive support, and free additional 14th Air Commando Wing (ACW) aircraft for use by US Forces.
   c. Reference item concerning repair parts for low density PSYOP equipment, page 49, paragraph d: Concur.

   (1) USARV requested extension of the Quick Reaction Procurement System (QRPS) through 31 December 1967 to permit time to fill the MILSTRIP pipeline. USARPAC recommended approval, but DA disapproved. Eighty-three 02 priority requisitions were submitted by the 6th PSYOP Battalion during October. None have been filled as of 24 November. All contained the special QRP designator code established by Army Materiel Command (AMC) for exception data.

   (2) Recommend QRPS be reestablished as a parallel supply channel until MILSTRIP proves responsive to supply demands.
AVHGC-DST
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, RCS, CSFOR - 65, UIC WDDL AA (U)

d. Reference item concerning quick reaction audio capability, page 49, paragraph f. This requirement would be met by the issue of one MRT-5 sound studio.

(1) The methods of requesting equipment in excess of authorized allowances have been discussed with PSYOP officers of Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam.

(2) One MRT-5 sound studio will be placed at Pleiku as part of the 50KW radio station due in December. This facility will be available for quick reaction tape production.

(3) If part-time use of the studio at Pleiku does not meet the requirements of I Field Force Vietnam, authority for another can be requested.

e. Reference item concerning ARVN logistical support of PSYOP requirements, page 52, section II, part II, paragraph g: Concur with recommendation contained in paragraph g. There is constant attention by US logistical advisors at all levels in assisting and advising ARVN counterparts to provide responsive support to all logistical requirements including those of PSYOPS.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. S. Nakatsukasa
Cpt. AGC
Asst AG

Copies for:
HQ, I FFORCEV
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 from HQ, 1 Fld Force Vn (UIC: WDDLAA) (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558  2 FEB 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

K. F. Osbourn
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

REGRATED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED MATERIAL.

SECRET

59
# CONFIDENTIAL

## HEADQUARTERS I FFORCEV TASK ORGANIZATION

**AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1967**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSIGNED UNITS</th>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
<th>LOG</th>
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<td>USARV 00 56, 11 Mar 66</td>
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<td>IFFORCEV 00 391, 9 May 67</td>
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**NOTE:** *Attached to III MAF for OPCOM, admin and logistical spt, less ARMY peculiar admin and logistical spt. Obtain Army peculiar logistical spt from lst Log Cmd.

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**DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS**

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28 Arm Cav Sqdn, 1st Cav
(Air Cav Troop D)
B Co, 20th Inf (LRP)
201st Avn Co (Corps)
1st BN, 549th Inf
232nd PA Det (Radar)
235th PA Det (Radar)
69th Inf Det (Radar)
54th Inf Det (Eng Serv)
54th Sig Bn (Corps)
272d MP Co
66th Engr Det (Terrain)
66th MI Det
209th Sig Det (KA)
297th TC Co (Car)
43d AFU (APO 96650)

ATTACHED UNITS

184th Chem Plt
26th Chem Det (CBR CTR)
19lst MI Det
13th MI Rct Det
1st CA Co (-)
11th "T" Det
54th MT Det
224th TP BN

AUTHORITY

USARV G0 5028, 2 Oct 67
USARV G0 1916, 26 Sep 67
USARV G0 5937, 27 May 66
USARV G0 5688, 20 Sep 65
USARV G0 668, 20 Sep 65
USARV G0 1599, 13 Jan 66
USARV G0 1220, 27 Oct 65
USARV G0 1590, 15 Nov 65
USARV G0 5933, 6 Oct 66
USARV G0 5933, 6 Oct 66

STATUS

Attached to 4th Inf Div
Attached to 4th Inf Div
Attached to Ist Cav Div
Attached to 4th Inf Div
Attached 54th Sig Bn

AUTHORITY

USARV G0 5028, 2 Oct 67
USARV G0 1916, 26 Sep 67
USARV G0 5937, 27 May 66
USARV G0 5688, 20 Sep 65
USARV G0 668, 20 Sep 65
USARV G0 1599, 13 Jan 66
USARV G0 1220, 27 Oct 65
USARV G0 1590, 15 Nov 65
USARV G0 5933, 6 Oct 66
USARV G0 5933, 6 Oct 66

LOG

Attached 1st Cav Div (AM)
Attached 1st Cav Div (AM)
Attached 1st Cav Div (AM)
Attached 1st Cav Div (AM)
Attached 54th Sig Bn

Attached 1st Cav Div (AM)
Attached 1st Cav Div (AM)
Attached 1st Cav Div (AM)
Attached 1st Cav Div (AM)
Attached 54th Sig Bn

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967

CG, I Field Force Vietnam

15 November 1967

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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