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<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; NOV 1967. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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<td>AUTHORITY</td>
<td>AGO ltr 23 Apr 1980; AGO ltr 23 Apr 1980</td>
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Best Available Copy
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Task Force OREGON (America! Division), Period Ending 31 July 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCOMARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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This report received at Hqs, Department of the Army without indorsements. To preclude further delay in benefits gained from the lessons learned herein, this report is published without complete indorsements.
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T.F. FORCÉ OREGON

OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

FOR PERIOD
1 May 1967 - 31 July 1967

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HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAL DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-CC

5 November 1967

(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION AND UNIT ACTIVITIES

A. Command.

1. (S) DELETED

2. (S) DELETED

3. (S) DELETED

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Downgraded at 3 year Interval
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.19
4. (S) DELETED

5. (S) DELETED

6. (S) DELETED

7. (U) On 15 July 1967, the CG, Task Force Oregon, was designated an additional duty as Sub-Zone Coordinator, Southern Sector, 1 CTZ, and was provided with an augmentation of Marine personnel to assist in the accomplishment of this mission.

8. (U) Command Changes:
   c. COL George E. Wear assumed command of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div vice COL James G. Shanahan on 24 June 1967.
B. Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline.

1. (U) Procedures were established to supervise and control replacement for personnel in a TDY status to the provisional headquarters. These consisted of furnishing the USARV AG with monthly updated rosters of officer and enlisted personnel and the preparation and weekly dispatch of messages to the USARV AG indicating known losses thirty days in advance of the incumbents DEROS. Headquarters USARV in turn furnishes information copies of all messages to Army Commands directing replacements. Additionally, all Army Commands are directed to furnish this headquarters an information copy of their reply to Hq USARV. Workability of this system is marginal but continues to improve.

2. (U) Utilization of AIK Daily Hire personnel continued throughout the quarter. An average of 900 local nationals were employed on a daily basis during the quarter. Allocations were requested from and approved by Hq USARV. Additional allocations were approved, upon request, for special projects.

3. (U) All units of the Task Force were requested to present their requirements for permanent hire. These requests were consolidated and the total requirement forwarded to Hq USARV for evaluation.

4. (U) On 11 July 1967 a request for an increase in the MTEL Appendix 2, Annex X, OPLAN OREGON I-67 was prepared and forwarded to Hq USARV. Additional requirements were based on experience factors gained from the first 3 months operation. Recommended increase is for 15 officers, 0 Warrants and 58 enlisted men, or a total increase in authorized strength of 73 personnel.

5. (U) When it became evident that the Task Force would continue operations for an indefinite period, a need for many additional personnel services developed.

a. One such service was educational testing facilities. Initial planning for an education program began in late May 1967. With the appointment of a TFO Education Officer (CPT Cecil B. Harris) in early July 1967, full plans for the development of the program were initiated. On 22 July 1967, following the establishment of the TFO Education Center and completion of all the requirements in AR 621-5, a formal request for authority to conduct the program was submitted to Hq USARV. On 30 July 1967, USARV approved the request and the center began full operations on 1 August 1967. The center offers over 200 correspondence courses from USAFI and over 6,000 more from

(BE-S-CSFOR-65) (U)

participating colleges on the high school, college and technical level. Other services available are General Educational Development and Comprehensive College Testing, guidance on educational benefits under the GI Bill and information concerning colleges, universities and schools across the U.S. Plans have also been approved for providing in-residence University of Maryland undergraduate courses in the fall.

b. The Task Force Safety Program was reorganized and expanded during early July. The accident rates associated with the first few months of operations within the TAOR have shown a downward trend.

c. Beginning 15 June 1967, Task Force Oregon received in-country B&II allocations to China Beach. Allocations of 65 spaces, received twice a week, were sub-allocated to subordinate headquarters on a pro-rated basis.

6. (U) On 22 June 1967, the 258th Personnel Services Company was attached to HQ Task Force Oregon to provide personnel and administrative support to the headquarters and attached units, less separate brigades.

7. (U) On 27 June 1967, Hq USOHV published General Order 3209 which attached all Task Force Oregon units, except separate brigades, for administration, less promotion authority.

8. (U) On 1 July 1967, the awards and Decorations Branch was augmented by personnel remaining from the headquarters Personnel Section and personnel of the 258th Personnel Services Company to a strength of 12 men.

9. (U) On 9 July 1967, Hq USOHV published a letter of instructions outlining the administrative responsibilities of CI, Task Force Oregon. This letter of instructions gives HQ Task Force Oregon complete administrative responsibility for Task Force Oregon units (less separate brigades) in all areas except promotion authority and the requisitioning of senior enlisted personnel (E7-E9) and officers. Promotion authority and requisitioning of senior enlisted and officer personnel remains the responsibility of parent organizations.

10. (U) On 17 July 1967, personnel records of the 15th Support Brigade and units attached thereto were transferred to the 258th Personnel Services Company.

11. (U) On 23 July 1967, a meeting was held with the Adjutants of units attached to this headquarters for administration, to discuss
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transition of administrative procedures from parent organizations
to this headquarters. It was determined that the areas most diff-
cult to transfer responsibility would be: personnel requisitions,
receipt of assignment instructions, replacement personnel and
promotions. These problem areas would be discussed with USARV.

12. (U) During the period 1 May through 31 July 1967, there
has been a continuous increase in all facets of finance operations.
The following selected data demonstrate this increase:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Payrolls Prepared</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Monthly Vouchers</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>6900</td>
<td>8500</td>
<td>8900</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCS Travel Vouchers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>647</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDY Travel Vouchers</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter Payments</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>1503</td>
<td>1159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allotments Processed</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>894</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The increase in workload beyond the staffed capability
of this office was accomplished by re-allocation of personnel
resources. For example: during the payroll processing cycle, per-
sonnel from special actions and disbursing were reassigned to the
payroll section. In some instances to insure maximum utilization
of equipment on hand, night shifts were utilized.

b. On 26 June 1967, the finance records section of the
258th Personnel Services Company was placed under the operational
control of the Finance Officer, Task Force Oregon. This augment-
ation of one Warrant Officer and seventeen enlisted men has trem-
endously contributed to alleviate the personnel shortage and pro-
vide better finance service. Due to the increase, additional
responsibilities have been undertaken. The pay records for the
Task Force Oregon Support Command are now maintained at Finance
under the modified pay system in accordance with DA Circular 37-22
and USAHR Circular 37-9. A total of 1583 pay records are being
maintained at present with a projected increase.

c. CG USAHR directed the conversion of all Finance Off-
ces in Vietnam to the modified pay system. A request for post-
ponement was initiated based on the lack of adequate physical
facilities and pending a more firm organizational structure for the
Task Force. The request was approved on 28 July 1967.

d. The following procedures have been implemented to
provide better finance service and improved operations:

(1) Procedures to enable Class "A" Agents to collect monies from individuals for the purchase of U.S. Treasury checks at no cost. This has eliminated time spent at APO's while transacting money order purchases.

(2) Periodic letters on instruction distributed to personnel connected with military pay administration have been published. These letters bring into focus new changes in procedures and problem areas.

(3) Program of indoctrination to appraise individuals as to pay options available has been undertaken. The purpose of the drive has been to reduce the payroll cash requirements by emphasizing maximum allotment of pay on the part of individual payees. Results have been outstanding, for although there has been an increase in the number of individuals paid, a decrease in the amount of $300,000.00 in payroll cash was experienced on July's payday.

13. (U) Operation of EM, NOO and Officer's Clubs came under Army control, under the staff supervision of the Task Force Oregon 31, on 26 April 1967. The Marine Club Warehouse was the initial source of beverage supplies. The Exchange sub-depot took over the operation of the Marine Warehouse, and at the time of transfer, stocks were low and became critical in all clubs. It took two weeks before the clubs could be adequately restocked. During this reporting period no significant problems have occurred in supplying the clubs. During three months of operation, the clubs have operated smoothly and profitably, with new club buildings being planned for the EM Club and remodeling in both the NOO and Officer's clubs.

14. (U) The Chu Lai Main Exchange (1008) of Task Force Oregon has been in operation since 11 May 1967. During this period the exchange has undergone many improvements. Security construction has been accomplished for more expensive and rationed items and smoother internal operations have been initiated. Since 11 May 1967, average monthly sales have increased from $350,000.00 to an expected new high of $650,000.00. Because of command support, more military personnel will staff important supervisory positions within the Exchange. Exchange personnel in the near future should generally stabilize at approximately 15 military and 45 Vietnamese civilians.

15. (U) The Chu Lai office of the American Red Cross provides services to all military units assigned in the area. As of 1 May 1967, there was a Field Director and five assistant Field Directors assigned. One sub-station is established with the 196th
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(RCS-CSFOR-65; (U)

Light Infantry Brigade. On 7 May 1967, Mr. Harold A. Brett, Assistant Field Director, arrived from Pleiku and established a sub-station with the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. On 9 May 1967, Miss Ruth Walk, Hospital Field Director, arrived with the 2d Surgical Hospital to provide services for the staff and patients. On 17 May 1967, Mr. Herbert L. Redd, Assistant Field Director, arrived to provide services for the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Mr. Redd remains under the operational control of the Phan Rang Red Cross office. On 11 June 1967, Mr. John Papp, Assistant Field Director, arrived, making a total of one Field Director and seven Assistant Field Directors assigned to the Chu Lai office. On 1 July 1967, a sub-station was established at HAG-13, providing coverage for all Army, Navy, and Marine units in that area. On 14 July 1967, the Supplemental Recreation Activities Overseas Program was established at Task Force Oregon with Miss Anita Von Walkehaim, Unit Director, and three assistants. Initial reception of the program has been outstanding. Scheduling is on a weekly basis with one hour allocated to each company-sized unit. All units in the Chu Lai area, to include Navy and Marine units, and most of those at Duc Pho, have this service available. At the end of the reporting period, one Field Director and eight Assistant Field Directors were assigned to the Chu Lai Red Cross Office. During the period 1 May-31 July 1967, the following Red Cross services were provided Armed Forces and civilian personnel in the Chu Lai/Duc Pho area:

a. 3243 messages sent and received.
b. 4009 cases serviced.
c. 889 cases resulted in personnel being granted emergency leave.
d. 46 cases resulted in discharges or receipt of government benefits.
e. 2424 cases involved breakdowns in communications between servicemen and their families.
f. 402 cases involved personal problems.
g. 292 cases involved family problems - non support or lack of support.

16. (U) In the area of population and resources control, Task Force Oregon Military Police conducted 24 checkpoint operations...
and 17 raids. These operations were all in conjunction with National Policemen who conducted identification checks and searches while Military Police provided area control and security. These raids and checkpoints were conducted in villages along Highway 1 throughout the Chu Lai TAOR.

a. Checkpoint results were as follows:

- Personal Identity checked: 11,626
- Vehicles checked: 879
- Persons detained: 74

Items confiscated:
- Military Payment Certificates: $83.50
- American cigarettes: 94 cartons
- American beer: 5 cases
- C Rations: 804 cases
- Misc US food products: 280 pounds
- Radios: 1
- Cameras: 1
- Knives, switchblade: 17

b. Raid results were as follows:

- Personal Identity checked: 1,030
- Buildings searched: 203
- Persons detained: 65

Items confiscated:
- Military Payment Certificates: $1,983.75
- US Currency: $200.00
- Whiskey: 227 quarts
- US Cigarettes: 194 cartons
- Flashlight batteries: 197
- Pornographic books: 57
- Pornographic pictures: 366
- Misc US food: 100 pounds
- 35 mm film: 22 rolls
- Radios: 12
- Cameras: 3
- Tape recorders: 3
- Numerous miscellaneous items of government property.

(17) Three Prisoner of War collecting points were operated by Task Force Oregon during the reporting period; one at Chu
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(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

Lai and two Brigade collecting points at Duc Pho. There were no significant incidents involving Prisoners of War, and activities were as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Detainees Processed</th>
<th>PW Civil Defendant</th>
<th>Inn. cont Civilian</th>
<th>Chieu Hoi</th>
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<td>4,689</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>4,145</td>
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</table>

18. (U) In order to reduce impact of the US Military on the local economy and to reduce exposure of the military to marihuana, prostitution and black-market activities, the Ly Tin district, Chu Lai TAO was placed off-limits except during the hours of 0800 to 1100 on weekdays.

19. (U) The Staff Judge Advocate Section continued its organizational and shakedown activities into May 1967. All units of battalion size and larger were visited, commanders were advised of the legal services available, and courts and board clerks were instructed on Military Justice administrative procedures.

a. To assist the subordinate commands on certain legal matters, directives were published on the following subject areas: Solatium (Condolement) Payments, Classification of Detainees (conjunction with G2), and Right to Counsel.

b. Military Justice matters comprised the largest area of activity. During the reporting period this command tried 3 general courts-martial and received 39 special courts-martial and 18 summary courts-martial for supervisory review. The inferior court-martial rates (average number of cases per month per thousand average strength) computed as of the end of June 1967 were 1.03 (Sp CM) and 0.54 (Sum CM). These rates are among the lowest in Vietnam. To relieve the Task Force Commander of the burden of convening inferior courts and reviewing appeals from non-judicial punishment involving members of the four units of company size or smaller that come directly under his jurisdiction, those four units (HHC, TFO; 148th MP Plt; 3d MHD; TFO MID) were attached to Task Force Oregon artillery.

c. The number of legal assistance cases and cases involving counseling of personnel on disciplinary matters continued to rise throughout the quarter. A total of 404 cases were seen in this office. The three brigades had their own legal officers and their totals are not included.

d. As a result of an ammunition dump fire, a mortar attack on an Artillery battery and a helicopter crash, a large number of personal property claims (AR 27-29) have arisen. It is
expected that the number will reach 100 by the time all are in. Claims personnel of this section visited the units involved and assisted in preparation of forms and collection of supporting evidence. In addition to these claims, this section has assisted Foreign Claims Commission #323 in investigating incidents and paying foreign claimants.
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C. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

1. (C) Chu Lai

a. Enemy activity in the Chu Lai area during May was characterized by frequent small scale harassing attacks and moderate employment of mines and booby traps. On 3 May an NVA PW located the 21st NVA Regt in the vicinity of BT 1738, however, no contact was reported with the unit during the period. The Chu Lai Naval Base Complex received 18 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on 12 May from a point approximately 1km to the west of the installation. The only main force unit identified during the period was the 70th Sapper Bn which contacted the 1/4 Inf on 17 May on the northwestern edge of the 196th T.O.R. It is significant to note that a company of the 409th Sapper Bn had previously been identified following a mortar/sapper attack on the Chu Lai airfield and it is possible that the same sapper unit launched the mortar attack on the Naval complex. There were no large contacts reported during the period and ground reconnaissance in and around the T.O.R revealed moderate enemy activity.

b. Activity during June revealed a significant increase in enemy employment of mines and booby traps at the northern and southern ends of the T.O.R near Highway #1. The majority of personnel and equipment losses for the month can be attributed to highly effective enemy employment of mines and booby traps. Acts of terrorism were frequent during the period as the enemy concentrated on eliminating GVN officials at village and hamlet level. On 3 June the hamlet chief of LY TR/1, vicinity BT 4015 was assassinated. During the period two combat support battalions of the 2nd NVA Div were identified: the GK-30 Signal Bn and the GK-37 Transportation Bn. These units are reported to be important sources of communications and rear services support for the regiments of the 2nd NVA Div. The 21st Regt, 2nd NVA Div, was also located vic BT 1728 by a PW who stated that he was the S-3 of the 22nd Bn, 21st NVA Regt. The source provided the most detailed information ever received on the regiment. Ground reconnaissance of the TAOR and the area west revealed moderate enemy activity particularly in the vicinity of Base Area 117.

c. The trend of effective enemy employment of mines and booby traps continued during July. The enemy displays considerable resourcefulness by his ability to convert C-Ration cans, soda cans, and wooden containers into lethal weapons with explosives removed from dud bombs and artillery rounds. A captured enemy document outlined the enemy intention to increase his efforts to defeat the Revolutionary Development Program. This document accounts for the frequent harassing attacks conducted against RD hamlets and the RP/FP units which secure these areas. Ground reconnaissance in and around the T.O.R revealed moderate enemy activity although no significant contacts with NVA or Main Forces units were reported.

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(C) Duc Pho

2. (C) Due Pho

a. Activity in the Duc Pho area during May was dominated by small to moderate contacts with NVA and Main Force units. On 19 May the 97th BN, 2nd VC Regt was contacted resulting in 71 VC KIA (BC) and 21 weapons CIA. PWs and documents also located the 93rd BN and the 2nd VC Regt Hqs. On 28 May PWs and documents taken from a contact resulting in 87 VC KIA (BC) and 19 weapons CIA, identified the 60th BN, 1st VC Regt. A document taken during the above contact provided a detailed enemy appraisal of our employment of heliborne operations and outlined the measures which the enemy would employ to counter operations of this type. Emphasis was placed on surprise attacks and preplanning to ambush reinforcements drawn into a suitable area by small but deceptive attacks. Mine and booby trap incidents were frequent as Army Engineers worked to open Highway #1 and RF/PF outpost near RD areas continued to be harassed by the enemy.

b. Contacts with NVA and Main Force units continued to be frequent during June although on a smaller scale than the previous month. Several medical installations were located and destroyed during the period and a 5th Capt identified as a Doctor from a hospital supporting 4th BN was apprehended. The source provided information on enemy medical practices and was evacuated to US for detailed interrogation. Prisoners captured during the period reported that their respective units were suffering heavy casualties. A PW captured on 28 June near Quang Ngai City stated that the 60th BN, 1st VC Regt was reorganized into a reinforced company of approximately 140 men due to heavy losses in the Duc Pho area. Acts of terrorism and assassinations were frequent during the month reflecting a desperate effort on the part of the enemy to maintain his weakening control of the population resources in the Duc Pho-No Duc area.

c. In early July one returnee, 6 PWs and documents identified a newly infiltrated NVA AA Battalion. The unit (the 107th NVA BN) left NVN in Jan 67 and arrived in Quang Ngai on 26 May. The sources indicated the unit strength was approximately 300 and that weapons included 9x12.7mm AA BMGs. Food was a serious problem for the unit as all the PWs were captured while searching for food. A steel-hulled trailer containing several thousand weapons and tons of ammunition and explosive was apprehended off the Cape Batangan coast on 14 July. Loss of this shipment of ordnance will have a serious impact on the enemy's ability to conduct operations in the future. In addition to weapons and ammunition shortages, the return of a 14 yr old NVA soldier during July indicated that the enemy faces personnel shortages in NVN. The youth stated that several boys of his age in his village were inducted into the army as all of the eligible men between 20 and 30 had already departed for SVN. Search and destroy operations continued to locate enemy logistical installations, training areas and PW camps. On 19 July a PW camp containing 22 friendly PWs was located. The PWs were diseased and suffering from malnutrition.

Page 2.

and 12 individuals were found in shackles. Reconnaissance of the area in and around the T.O.R indicated that enemy density is high although he faces serious shortages in all classes of supply.

3. (C) TFO Military Intelligence Detachment

a. The detachment was engaged in providing intelligence and counterintelligence support to Task Force Oregon during the entire reporting period. Since the Detachment was activated on 12 April 1967 and deployed to Chu Lai on 18 April 1967, organizational and operational problems remained at the start of the reporting period. Significant progress was made in solving these problems and in improving the activities of the Detachment.

b. On 6 May 1967 Maj Charles D. Barney, MI, 078217 assumed command of the Detachment. Personnel remained assigned to their parent unit and were TDY to the Detachment during the entire reporting period. The responsibility for personnel administration, to include R&R allocations and promotion authority, remained with the individuals parent unit. This has created administrative and morale problems. Two (2) recommendations have been made for promotion of personnel in the Detachment and have been submitted to Parent units. No persons have been promoted as a result of the recommendations. Officer promotions have been made however, notification has been as much as two months late.

c. Supply and Maintenance personnel were not authorized for the Detachment and it is totally dependent on outside activities for these functions. Maintenance support is received from Headquarters Company (Provisional), Task Force Oregon. Personnel living in the Task Force Headquarters area mess with Headquarters Company (Provisional) and personnel living at the Task Force Collecting Point mess with the 2d Light Anti Aircraft Missile Battalion, a Marine unit. Expendable supplies are drawn directly from the self service store on a weekly basis. Individual clothing and equipment are issued by Headquarters Company (Provisional). Line items authorized by USARV General Order 1746 are currently on hand receipt from the 525th Military Intelligence Group. The method of obtaining replacements for these items, authorized items which have never been issued and accessories such as tools and equipment for authorized items has not been determined. This problem is currently being studied by the ACofS, G4, Task Force Oregon.

4. (C) Order of Battle Section

a. During the early part of the reporting period, the Order of Battle Section was concerned with establishing procedures for receiving and recording intelligence information so that adequate evaluation and timely dissemination of intelligence could be made. The Section was also responsible for the preparation of estimates and studies on enemy units and activities in the Task Force area of interest (all of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin province). By the end of July, the

Data bank was extensive enough to permit the section to evaluate indicators of enemy activity and provide elements of the Task Force with meaningful estimates of the enemy opposing them.

b. Significant projects completed by the Order of Battle Section during the reporting period were the following:

1. Preparation of intelligence estimates for Operations Matheu I and II.

2. Recommendations for operations to be conducted in Base areas 117 and 121.

3. Briefings for numerous visiting General Officers and other VIPs.

4. Complete order of battle studies on all confirmed enemy units of interest to Task Force Oregon.

5. Special studies on such topics as unit strengths and enemy mine warfare tactics.

5. Imagery Interpretation Section

a. The Imagery Interpretation Section was not authorized much of the equipment organic to Imagery Interpretation Sections. Expansible vans were not provided and the section was assigned working space in buildings in the Detachment area. Much time was devoted to organizing a working area and building necessary tables and shelving to read out photography, store photography, maps, files, and reference materials. The section also established a Master Cover Trac of all imagery available to the Task Force and a photo library of all missions read out by the section.

b. Training of imagery interpreters was conducted because most of them were inexperienced in imagery interpretation in Vietnam. Training has been accomplished through OJT and by sending personnel to the US. RV In-Country Imagery Interpretation School conducted by the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance). Visual reconnaissance training flights were conducted to better prepare imagery interpreters to perform as aerial observers and to familiarize them with the area. This has resulted in six members of the Imagery Interpretation Section being placed on flight status as observers; thereby improving visual reconnaissance coverage of the Task Force Oregon TAOR.

c. During the reporting period the section produced 25 Imagery Interpretation Reports containing information extracted from the immediate read out of tactical imagery and assembled 75 mosaics for use in planning tactical operations.

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In July 1967, a Targeting Branch was established within the section. This branch extracts targeting information from all available sources, maintains targeting files and recommends hard targets on a daily basis for artillery and tactical air.

6. (C) Interrogation Section

a. During the reporting period the Interrogation Section interrogated and classified 331 detainees at the Task Force Collecting Point. Detainees were classified as follows:

1. Prisoners of War: 207
2. Civil Defendants: 10
3. Returnees: 11
4. Doubtful cases: 0
5. Innocent civilians: 103

b. In addition to interrogating detainees sent by brigades of the Task Force, the Interrogation Section furnished interrogation support to other Army and Marine units, the 2d Surgical Hospital in Chu Lai, the Quang Ngai Chieu Hoi Center, and the Special Forces Camps. The section also participated in Market Time operations by sending interrogation teams on patrol with Navy Swift Boats; and augmented the brigade interrogation sections when required.

c. The Interrogation Section screened and forwarded to the Combined Document Exploitation Center approximately two tons of captured documents. Documents of immediate tactical value were translated. Captured documents provided much valuable intelligence information on unit identifications and on the status of enemy units.

d. Classification of detainees was a serious problem during the early part of the reporting period for two reasons:

1. Southern Quang Ngai Province had been dominated by the Viet Cong for a long time and a large percentage of the people assisted the Viet Cong or belonged to Viet Cong associations. In many cases the individuals had been forced to assist the Viet Cong or had given only limited assistance out of fear for themselves or their families. Brigades had a tendency to treat all of these people as Viet Cong and classify them as prisoners of war.

2. Units conducting operations in villages and hamlets evacuated large numbers of personnel to the brigade collecting point. Interrogation teams at the collecting point interrogated and classified all the detainees.
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a. This created additional work for interrogation at brigade and Task Force levels and overtaxed confinement facilities. The publication of additional classification guidance and the increased use of interrogation teams with tactical units has resulted in more selective evacuation of detainees and in information obtained from detainees being passed to the tactical commander more rapidly.

f. Several of the interrogators were inexperienced at the start of the reporting period but the quality of interrogations continually improved. Although detainees had been interrogated at brigade level, much more information of immediate tactical value was being obtained at Task Force level towards the end of the reporting period. Many unit locations were obtained by map tracking techniques. In many cases detainees were willing to lead US forces to unit locations, supply caches, tunnel complexes and known Viet Cong. The number of detainees willing to do this increased significantly towards the end of the reporting period.

g. The Interrogation Section was responsible for the evacuation of captured materiel during the reporting period and 313 captured weapons were evacuated to III Marine Amphibious Force.

h. Detainees of particular interest interrogated during the reporting period were as follows:

(1) 2LT Nguyen Trong Hung, Assistant S-3, 22nd Bn, 21st NVA Regiment, 2nd NVA Division, was interrogated on 13 July 1967. He furnished significant information on the location, organization, and status of the 21st NVA Regiment.

(2) CPT Nguyen, Nguyen Dinh aka Thong, Head Surgeon and Chief Director, 250th Medical Hospital, Military Region 5, was interrogated on 25 June 1967. He furnished significant information on the location, organization, and capabilities of his hospital.

(3) CPL Pang Sheng De aka Bang Thanh Duc, 3d Company, 107th Antiaircraft Battalion, Military Region 5, was interrogated on 10 July 1967. He furnished significant information on the infiltration, location, training and tactics of his unit.

(4) PVT Pham Van Tinh, 72d Company, 231st Battalion was interrogated on 24 July 1967. He furnished significant information on the infiltration of this unit into South Vietnam. Tinh, now 14 years of age, was drafted into the NVA at the age of 13. He was shown on national television while at the Task Force Oregon Collecting Point and was turned over to the Joint United States Public Affairs Office for exploitation.

7. (C) Counterintelligence Section.

a. During May, the Counterintelligence Section continued to concentrate on establishing security procedures for the Task Force.
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Headquarters and establish liaison with allied units and agencies in the Task Force Oregon TAOR. Initially, one problem encountered was the large number of Task Force personnel requiring access to classified information who did not have security clearances or whose clearance could not be verified because their personnel records remained with their parent unit. This problem was solved by liaison with the Task Force Adjutant General and parent units to obtain personnel records; by wide use of the emergency access provisions of paragraph 11, USA RV Regulation 604-5; and by establishing procedures for requesting the necessary investigations and granting interim security clearances pending completion of the investigation.

b. Counterintelligence teams were deployed to Due Pho in early May in support of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. These teams assisted the brigades by conducting liaison with local US and GVN agencies; by providing blacklist and other counterintelligence information to the brigades; by assisting in securing the temporary release of Hoa Chanhs to lead US units on operations; and by accompanying the brigades on tactical operations to exploit counterintelligence targets.

c. In May, 1967 a counterintelligence agent was stationed in Quang Ngai City, the capital of Quang Ngai Province, to act as the representative of the ACofS, G2, Task Force Oregon. His primary mission was to maintain liaison with all of the allied intelligence agencies in Quang Ngai and to expedite the forwarding of intelligence information to Task Force Oregon. He also levies Task Force Oregon intelligence requirements on allied intelligence agencies and assists in coordinating other matters such as the interrogation of selected returnees and spotting prospective Kit Carson Scouts. Because of the proven value of this liaison representative, a counterintelligence representative was stationed in Tam Ky, the capital of Quang Tin Province, in July 1967.

d. In early June 1967, the Counterintelligence Section, in coordination with the Marine 7th Counterintelligence Team and the Counterintelligence Section, 569th Military Intelligence Detachment, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, started to compile a comprehensive Black List of VC personalities in the provinces of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin. The list, including more than 5000 names, was published in July 1967 and disseminated to all Task Force Oregon units and other allied intelligence agencies in the area. Efforts are currently underway to expand and update the list to make it more useful in conducting operations designed to eliminate the VC infrastructure.

e. Task Force Oregon Regulation 380-5, Safeguarding Defense Information was prepared by the Counterintelligence Section and published in July 1967. A program of inspections to insure compliance with this regulation will commence in August 1967.

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Task Force Oregon Circular 381-10, Use of Chieu Hoi Returnees as "Kit Carson Scouts" was prepared by the Counterintelligence Section and published in June 1967. This circular contains instructions on the recruiting, training, and utilization of returnees as scouts for US units, on tactical operations. This program was originated by the III Marine Amphibious Force and has been found to be very successful by Marine units. The Counterintelligence Section has provided assistance to units by maintaining liaison with Chieu Hoi Centers to spot prospective Kit Carson Scouts and offering assistance in obtaining their services. Although no Kit Carson Scouts have been hired by Task Force Oregon units to date, the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division plans to train and utilize eight prospects currently at the Quang Ngai Chieu Hoi Center. It is expected that successful use of these scouts will encourage other Task Force Oregon units to recruit and utilize Kit Carson Scouts.
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D. Plans, Operations and Training.

1. G3 Section

   a. (C) The advance party of the 1st Bn, 327th Inf (Abn) of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div closed their base camp in the vicinity of DUC PHO at 011300H May 67. Btry C, 3d Bn, 18th Arty and the 2d Bn, 11th Arty, minus; closed LZ Montezuma at DUC FHO on the same day. The artillery units deployed to the DUC PHO area to provide general support artillery fires to the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div and the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. One platoon, Co B, 3d AMTRAC Bn (U&RC) became OPCON to the 196th Inf Bde.

   b. (C) On 2 May Task Force Oregon OPCRD IV-67 (Operation MALHEUR) was published. This order tasked the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div to conduct assaults into the mountains west of DUC PHO to locate and destroy NVA/VC forces and to neutralize enemy base camps in the area.

   c. (C) At 031700H May the main body of the 1st Bn, 327th Inf (Abn) closed DUC PHO and was placed OPCON to the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div. Btry A, 3d Bn, 320th Arty, also closed DUC PHO at this time.

   d. (C) Task Force Oregon assumed OPCON of Co C, 2d Bn, 34th Armor, 25th Inf Div on 4 May. OPCON was passed to the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div.

   e. (C) On 5 May CUSMACV, along with LTG Walt, LTG Krulak and LTG Cushman visited Task Force Oregon and was briefed on the current situation.

   f. (C) Task Force Oregon assumed OPCON of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div effective 071200H May; 2d Bn, 502d Inf (Abn) effective 081400H May; and the 176th Avn Co effective 091200H May.

   g. (C) On 10 May Task Force Oregon established a small Forward Command Post which was collocated with the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div Command Post. The purpose of the Forward CP was to enable the Commanding General to be kept thoroughly informed on the status of operations in the DUC PHO TAOR and adjoining AO's of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. On 11 May Operation MALHEUR commenced.

   (1) The first B52 strikes in support of Task Force Oregon elements were conducted on 13 May. The strike was based on current and timely intelligence information in the Operation MALHEUR AO and was followed up with ground exploitation.

   h. (C) On 15 May the newly constructed airstrip at DUC PHO, constructed by the 39th Fgr En, was certified by USAF inspectors. The completion of the airstrip marked the accomplishment of one of the initial missions assigned the Task Force by CUSMACV. CUSMACV visited DUC PHO on 17 May.

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1. (C) From 18 through 23 May elements of the 196th Lt Inf Bde and 2d Sqdn, 11th Arm Cav Regt participated in a joint operation with the 2d Republic of Korea Marine Brigade in Operation THUNDERDRAGON.

2. (C) On 23 May operations in the Task Force TAOR's were limited to surveillance and defensive operations during the cease-fire in honor of Buddha's birthday. From 2300 to 2324 May was one of the most active days and night since Task Force Oregon units commenced operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

3. (C) OPERATION 196-67 was published on 23 May. This plan tasked the 39th Engr Bn to upgrade National Highway 1 to Class 31 from DUC to DUC PHO. The 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div was given the mission to clear and secure the route in the same area.

4. (C) From 28 May to 10 June a liaison team from the newly organized 196th Lt Inf Bde, Fort Hood, Texas, visited the staff and brigades of Task Force Oregon. Personnel comprising the team included COL James R. Valic, LTC Frank P. Clarke, MAJ Walter Sanders and MAJ Lillie T. White.

5. (C) The 196th Lt Inf Bde base camp elements closed CHU LAI on 9 June. All elements of the 196th are now at CHU LIT.

6. (C) On 15 June a convoy consisting of military and civilian vehicles traveled in convoy from CHU LAI to DUC PHO marking the first time in over two and a half years that vehicles have been able to use National Highway 1 between DUC and DUC PHO. In addition, another of the initial missions assigned Task Force Oregon by COMUSMACV was accomplished.

7. (C) The Forward CP at DUC PHO terminated operations on 16 June and all elements returned to the Task Force main CP.

8. (C) Task Force Oregon was visited by a CDC schools liaison team from 171700 Jun through 191500 Jun 67. The team desired primarily to discuss areas affecting individual and unit training in their respective fields. Team members and activities represented were:
   a. COL Howard E. Hamilton, HQ USMACV
   b. COL Tony F. Ferpich, USA Artillery and Missile School
   c. COL Erwin M. Graham, USA Missile and Munitions Center
d. LTC Oscar E. Hufnagel, USA, Adjutant School
  e. Maj Bernard L. Stewart, USA, Southeastern Signal School

Team personnel visited with various staff offices and subordinate units.

r. (C) On the 20th of June a fire at the Guadalcanal ammunition dump virtually destroyed the entire dump.

s. (U) COL George H. Wallace, Task Force G3, departed for reassignment on 27 June. LTC Louis B. Harris assumed duties of Acting ACofS, G3.

t. (U) The Psycops section of the G3 was transferred to the G5 Section on 28 June.

u. (C) OPLAN VIII-67 (Operation L'KE) was published on 3 July. The mission of this plan was to open, clear and secure National Highway 1 between DUC FHO and SA HUYNH. The 39th Fnger Bn was given the mission to open the road and reconstruct or construct necessary bridging while one battalion of the 1st Bde, 101st Avn Div was tasked to conduct search and destroy operations in the vicinity of the engineer work parties. Operation L'KE commenced on 6 July. On 11 July National Highway 1 was opened between DUC FHO and the I Corps-II Corps Tactical Zone boundary, thus accomplishing the mission of Operation L'KE.

v. (C) At 101520H July Task Force Oregon assumed OFCCN of the 3d platoon, Btry G, 29th Arty (Searchlight) and was placed OFCCN to the 3d Bn 18th Arty. Each brigade has two searchlights in direct support; the CHU L'J Defense Command has two in direct support; and the 2d Bn, 11th Arty and 3d Bn, 18th Arty each has four which are used in a general support role.

w. (U) On 20 July LTC Clinton E. Greger, Jr., incumbent ACofS, G3, arrived at Task Force Oregon headquarters.

x. (C) Task Force Oregon completed 100 days of operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone on 29 July.

(1) During the entire reporting period, the 196th Lt Inf Bde with attached elements and the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div conducted extensive search and destroy operations in the CHU LAI and DUC PHO FHO TACR's respectively.

(2) The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, at the close of the period, was in the last phases of Operation MALHEUR II and was preparing for future operations in the enemy base area 121.

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2. Artillery.

a. (C) Present organization:

- Headquarters, Task Force OREGON Artillery
  
  2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (155mm How)(Towed)
  
  3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm How)(Towed)

- OPCON: Howitzer Battery, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (155mm How)(SP)

- 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-) (8" How/175mm Gun)(SP)

- OPCON: 5th Provisional Marine Battery consisting of:
  
  3d Platoon, 5th Marine 155mm Gun Battery
  
  1st Platoon, 5th Marine 8" Howitzer Battery
  
  3d Platoon, Battery G (Searchlight), 29th Artillery

b. (C) Headquarters, Task Force OREGON Artillery continued to operate during the reporting period, as an austere manned division artillery headquarters. The headquarters has begun to experience loss of personnel from the original organization due to DERO to CGNUS. Listed below are major activities and events covering the period 1 May - 31 July 1967.

(1) Plans for initial employment of the artillery in Task Force OREGON were based on the commitment of two brigades in the CHU LAI TAOR and one brigade in the DUC PHO TAOR. Subsequent deployment of two brigades to DUC PHO and one brigade to CHU LAI necessitated a redistribution of artillery assets between the two TAOR's. Initially Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery was moved by LST from CHU LAI to DUC PHO to provide medium artillery support for the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. The arrival of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division resulted in a requirement for additional general support artillery at DUC PHO. On 1 May 1967 Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery with one heavy battery from the 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery under its operational control, arrived at DUC PHO from CHU LAI and moved into position at Landing Zone MOUNTZUMA. On 7 May, Battery A, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery closed at DUC PHO and occupied a position adjacent to the headquarters. Concurrent with the decision to move the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery from CHU LAI to DUC PHO, a request was
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initiated through channels for an additional 155mm Howitzer Battalion (Towed) to fill the void left in general support artillery coverage in the CHU LAI TAOR.

(2) At the beginning of the reporting period one platoon of 175mm Guns from Battery B, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery was located outside of the Task Force OREGON TAOR providing long range artillery fires to a U.S. Marine operation north of the CHU LAI TAOR. On 4 May 1967 the platoon returned to its parent battery in the CHU LAI area.

(3) With the bulk of forces and activity of the Task Force concentrated in the DUC PHO area a forward command post was established in DUC PHO. The Commanding General, the G3, and the Artillery Officer moved to DUC PHO. Task Force OREGON Artillery established a Forward Fire Support Element co-located with the Task Force Forward Tactical Operations Center on 10 May 1967. The Forward FSE consisted of two officers and two enlisted men who coordinated artillery matters and artillery aircraft in the DUC PHO area.

(4) By 11 May 1967 the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery, the 105mm howitzer battalion organic to the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division had closed into positions in the DUC PHO TAOR. This battalion is equipped with the lightweight M102 howitzer. Requests have been submitted through channels to equip the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (105mm) and the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery (105mm) with the M102 Howitzer.

(5) The arrival of the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in CHU LAI on 28 April 1967 provided an additional medium artillery capability to the Task Force OREGON Artillery. Since the squadron was fragmented and its troops deployed separately the organic 155mm howitzer battery (M109) was placed under the operational control of Task Force OREGON Artillery. Initially, this battery was under operational control of the 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery. On 23 June 1967, operational control was transferred to the 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery.

(6) The redeployment of the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (-) to DUC PHO created a void in medium artillery coverage in the CHU L AI TAOR. On 24 May the advance party of the 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm How) (Towed) arrived in CHU L AI from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This battalion was diverted in flight from the joining the 54th Artillery Group in XUOC LOC, RVN and joined Task Force OREGON Artillery to provide a third general support battalion. The 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery sponsored the new unit and extensive planning, coordination, and orientation of the advance party was completed prior to arrival.
of the main body on 7 June 1967 at CHU LAI. Equipment for the battalion arrived shortly thereafter and the battalion was in position and fully operational on 17 June 1967. Battery B, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery relieved Battery B, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery in position on 15 June 1967. Battery B, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery moved by convoy to a position at NO DUC in the northeastern portion of the DUC PHO TAOR to provide medium artillery coverage along National Highway 1 between QUANG NGOAI CITY and DUC PHO.

(7) A New Material Introductory Briefing Team for the Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FADAC) visited Headquarters, Task Force OREGON Artillery during the period 9-11 June 1967 and presented briefings to interested personnel of the Task Force OREGON and Task Force OREGON Artillery staffs. Later the same day the briefing team conducted briefings for selected members of all artillery units within Task Force OREGON. The FADAC computer will be delivered to Task Force OREGON Artillery units commencing in late August 1967. A New Equipment Training Team will deliver the computers and conduct instruction for the receiving units. In addition, the team will deliver a complete packet of all pertinent publications and necessary spare parts. Test equipment and spare parts will also be delivered to the 188th Maintenance Battalion which will perform the direct support maintenance of the computers.

(8) Colonel Tony F. Perpich, Director, Tactics and Combined Arms Department, United States Army Artillery and Missile School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, visited Task Force OREGON Artillery during the period 17-19 June 1967. COL Perpich was a member of a CONUS Survey Team sent to Vietnam to determine information to be used in re-aligning CONUS service school programs of instruction to better meet the needs of the U.S. Army in the Republic of Vietnam. COL Perpich visited all artillery battalions within the task force and conducted artillery seminars in the CHU LAI and DUG PHO areas to obtain ideas on the requirements for changes in present training, doctrine, and artillery tactics peculiar to combat operations in Vietnam.

(9) On 23 April 1967 a request was submitted to the III Marine Amphibious Force for a searchlight platoon to be employed in the Task Force OREGON TAOR. The 3d Platoon, Battery G (Searchlight), 29th Artillery arrived in CHU LAI on 6 June 1967 and was placed under the operational control of Task Force OREGON Artillery which delegated operational control of the platoon to the 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery. The platoon was deployed throughout the Task Force TAOR. A breakout of searchlights and supported units is as follows:
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Searchlights</th>
<th>Unit Supported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>196th Light Infantry Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chu Lai Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3d Battalion, 18th Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2d Battalion, 11th Artillery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(10) On 27 July 1967 the 5th Provisional Marine Battery consisting of two 8" self-propelled howitzers (M55) and two 155mm self-propelled guns (M53) arrived from Okinawa and relieved Battery A, 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery which had been attached to the 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery. Task Force OREGON was directed by the III Marine Amphibious Force to release this battery from its attachment and prepare it to move to PHU Bai, RVN to provide long range artillery support for a USMC operation in the A SHAU Valley. The 5th Provisional Marine Battery is unique in Task Force OREGON Artillery in that the battery commander is a major. The battery has two platoons which are capable of operating independently.
3. Aviation.

a. (C) On 1 May 1967, the Task Force Aviation Officer requested that GCA facilities be installed to support the operation of the DUC PHO air-field. Foreseeing probable weather restrictions in the months to come and continuing night operations, a GCA capability for this facility was necessary in the interest of safety and completion of operational commitments. The completion of the project was programmed for not later than the 18 August.

b. (C) On 11 May the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div initiated Operation Malheur I west of the DUC PHO area. In order to move the large number of troops and keep them adequately supplied it was necessary to augment the 176th Aviation Company, in direct support of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, with other aviation assets from Task Force Oregon on a temporary basis. The 14th Combat Aviation Battalion provided the liaison necessary to coordinate the use of assets from other brigades within the Task Force.

c. (U) On the 12th of May, the aviation office changed location from an office building to the Tactical Operations Center. This moved proved beneficial in that the aviation Officer shall stay abreast of the operational requirements and tactical situation. Additional aviation support could be better provided as the situation required.

d. (C) Operation Malheur I was terminated 8 Jun 67 and Operation Malheur II was initiated by the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. During Operation Malheur I it was frequently necessary to adjust Task Force's aviation assets on a daily basis to support mass helilifts in conducting our combat assaults. It has proven advantageous to use the maximum number of helicopters to achieve maximum ground combat power in one lift. Operation Malheur II, initiated on the 8th of June, continued as of the end of the reporting period.

e. (C) On 17 June action was initiated to provide a night vision device demonstration for aviation elements in the Chu Lai area. On the evening of 21 June a team from USAV demonstrated the Low Light Level Television Target Acquisition and Fire Control System, the Night Sighting System for the M-5 Armament System, the 15 kw Xenon Heliborne Searchlight, and Stabilized Night Observation Device. Representatives from G2, G3, and aviation elements were present and agreed that such equipment would prove to be very useful in support of ground operations. The 14th Combat Aviation Battalion is scheduled to receive the Xenon Heliborne Searchlight as organic equipment in early August.

f. (C) Along with the normal aviation commitments of Task Force Oregon during the month of July, the Task Force provided a total of seven UD-1D's and two UH-1C's to support III M.F 03 air requests.
Two armed helicopters used in support of Marine Operation Prairie Fire. This was a continuous commitment throughout the month.
Two UH-1D's were assigned to support Company C, of the 5th Special Forces Group. Five UH-1D's were provided to Delta Operations in the I Corps area on alternating weeks.

(U) On 25 July LTC Baldassare was appointed TFO Aviation Officer. LTC Baldassare was the former company commander of the 161st Assault Helicopter Company, a general aviation support company to Task Force Oregon.
4. Engineer.

a. (C) During May, with the assistance of the 9th Marine Engineer and the 71st Mobile Construction Battalions, the Task Force completed most urgently needed construction to operate through late August. With the announcement, in early June, that the Task Force would remain in being throughout the monsoon season, an entirely new look was required as pertains to both construction completed since late April and new construction requirements. The new requirements were:

1. Upgrading route 1 from the initially planned goal of pioneer dry weather bypasses and roadbed to semi-permanent bridging and a road surface that, with maintenance, could withstand all season divisional loads.
2. Upgrading all ASFs, FSAs, and heliports to a standard commensurate with the rigors presented by the northeast monsoon.
3. Providing minimal standard 2 troop living conditions in preparation for the northeast monsoon.

b. (C) To aid the Task Force, D company, 39th Engineer Battalion was redeployed from attachment to the 45th Engineer Group in Qui Nhon, the company closing in the Chu Lai area on 28 June 67; a 75 ton per hour rock crusher with an eight man crew was placed on TDY to TFO arriving in the Duc Pho area on 9 July 67, and the 19th Engineer Battalion was assigned the responsibility of upgrading route 1 from the southern I Corps boundary to Duc Pho thus relieving TFO engineers of approximately 35% of route 1 upgrading.

c. (C) Additionally, engineer support from both the 30th Naval Construction Regiment and the 9th Engineer Battalion was committed by Hq III MAF to upgrade existing support facilities and construct standard 2 troop hutsments in preparation for the monsoon season. Presently, all these tasks are in the planning and pre-construction development stage. Materials have been requisitioned and construction starts are envisioned by 15 August 67.

5. Chemical

a. (C) On 10 May 1967, this section requested USAW to allocate the following controlled U.S. Army Riot Control Agent (RCA) munitions to Task Force Oregon:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>RECOMMENDED ALLOCATION</th>
<th>STOCK OBJECTIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-8 Launcher</td>
<td>1/Bn/day</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-158 Cluster</td>
<td>1/Bn/day</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-159 Cluster</td>
<td>1/Bde/day</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-24 Hand-Held Launcher</td>
<td>7/Bn/day</td>
<td>1750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2&quot; CS Round</td>
<td>2 rds/tube/day</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 CS Round</td>
<td>2 rds/tube/day</td>
<td>1440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 CS Round</td>
<td>2 rds/tube/day</td>
<td>1080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 mm CS Round</td>
<td>7/Bn/day</td>
<td>1750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Employment of the above munitions provides a means of minimizing casualties and property damage while permitting achievement of the objective.

(1) In addition to the above munitions, the devices indicated below were requested to provide other means of RCA dissemination.

(2) Fourteen (14) each M106, Mighty Mite Dispersers and eight (8) XM-3 Troop Landing Smoke Dispersers.

(3) The CG, USAW informed this headquarters on 19 May that experimental munitions, such as mentioned above, were allocated on a fair share basis as items become available. The experimental ammunition is not stocked at depot/ASL level, but allocated and issued upon arrival in RWN. This usually results in an allocation once a month. To date, the only munitions requested to be allocated to Task Force Oregon, that have been received are forty seven (47) E-8 Launchers.

(4) Information was received from the CG, U.S. Army Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency (USAAPSA), Joliet, Ill. on 25 May, that sufficient assets of M-106 dispersers were on-hand in

RVN. Units that have requirements for the use of this item have been requested to submit their requisitions. There has not been any information received on the availability of the XM-3 Troop Landing Smoke Disperser.

b. (C) On 17 May 1967, the CG, 1st Logistical Command, requested that our requirements for protective hoods be submitted. Protective hoods are not currently required in RVN since the enemy has not employed sophisticated CBR agents. The M-17 and M-24 masks, and the buttoned collars and rolled-down sleeves of the fatigue jacket provide sufficient protection against agents presently used. A contingency requirement for the hoods would exist if more sophisticated CBR agents were employed. Standard hood requirements for Task Force Oregon would then be 20,000 each. Pilot hood requirements would be approximately 440 each. This information was provided CG, 1st Logistical Command on 13 June 1967.

c. (U) Major Sumner J. Denmark, Jr. reported in on 16 June 1967 as the replacement for the Task Force Oregon Chemical Officer, LTC John A. Callahan. LTC Callahan departed 19 June 1967 on a PCS to the United States.

d. (S) DELETED

e. (S) DELETED

f. (C) The CG, III MAF notified this headquarters on
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23 June 1967 (MSG LRN 178-1388) that there had been three (3) incidents of the enemy's use of irritant gas agents since March 1967. The possibility that the enemy could employ gas more frequently and in larger quantities in the future is not to be overlooked. Therefore, all necessary protective measures must be taken under the circumstances. Message containing the above information was retransmitted to Task Force Oregon units on 29 June 1967.

g. (C) In a USARV message dated 28 June 1967, Task Force Oregon was allocated fifteen (15) each Manpack Personnel Detectors (MPD) modified in the airborne mode (a modification which permits operation from a UH-1 helicopter utilizing electrical current from the helicopter). The modification and subsequent allocation was based upon recent successful employment of the MPD in the airborne mode by other units in RVN. On 8 July 1967, USARV was requested to inform this headquarters of the availability date and location of the issue point where TFO could draw their allocation of modified MPD's. To date, there has not been any information received on the above request.

h. (U) 1LT Ralph D. McCloud reported in on 1 July 1967 as the replacement for CPT James E. Leonard, the Assistant Chemical Officer. CPT Leonard departed 6 July 1967 on a PCS to the United States.

i. (S) DELETED

j. (C) On 5 July 1967, the infantry brigades of Task Force Oregon were requested to comment on a CS munition proposed by the 1st Cavalry Division (AML) under the ENSURE program. The proposed munition was to be capable of burning for one hour and cover approximately one square kilometer. Based upon the requirements and comments provided by the brigades of Task Force Oregon,
AVDP-CG  5 November 1967

the above requirements were not considered essential. However, it was agreed that a CS munition with a longer burning time and a potential for greater area coverage than is presently available is needed. Such a munition should have a burning time of not less than ten (10) minutes and weight not more than thirty (30) pounds; it also should be capable of air delivery by helicopter or firing from a ground position. These requirements were forwarded to USA&W on 22 July 1967 for consideration in establishing the requirements for the proposed CS munition.

k. (C) The XM-166 Series Smoke Signals being produced by the Picatelly Arsenal are expected to arrive in RVN in the near future and will be allocated by USA&W. These smoke signals come in the same color as the standard smoke grenades with a burning time of six (6) seconds and are about the same size as a 35 mm film can. On 7 July 1967, USA&W was requested to include Task Force Oregon in all allocations of these items.

1. (C) A survey was conducted on 17 July 1967 of the infantry brigades to determine their use of flame field expedients in planned unit defensive fires. One brigade (3d Bde, 25th Inf Div) had these items emplaced in their planned defensive fires. Intentions of other Task Force Oregon units to emplace flame field expedients are not known at this time.
AVDF-CG


6. Signal

a. (U) During this reporting period, the coordination and logistical problems concerning the SSI, SOI and Crypto Distribution Authority previously reported have been resolved. There has also been a complete change of staff personnel due to the fact that the original DSO staff left for CONUS within a few days of each other.

b. (U) The distribution and coordination of FM radio frequencies between the US Army and Marine Corps units in this area has been effective. The only major frequency problems arise when multi-battalion Task Force elements moved north and Marine elements moved south on Operation Benton. This caused an overlap of assigned frequencies and resulted in mutual interference.

c. (U) The quality and reliability of long haul (DCS) circuits has improved to the point where outages are, for the most part, of very short duration and in most cases are due to user terminal equipment rather than system equipment. This is a marked improvement over circuit reliability experienced during initial stages. Tactical systems and circuits, although greatly extended in some areas have shown increased reliability and quality.
E. Logistics.

1. (U) The primary problems facing the G4 at this time were establishing locations for units, building stockage levels, improving the maintenance, repair parts, and supply posture of the Task Force, obtaining additional equipment for which requirements had been identified, and planning for logistic support for the Northeast monsoon period.

2. (U) When the Marines began leaving Chu Lai, they took with them their generators and water pumping and filtration units. As a result, it was necessary to ration water for a few weeks. It was also determined that the existing wells could not support an activity of Task Force Oregon's size. To alleviate this problem, a new well was drilled. After repeated efforts on the part of all concerned, sufficient pumps and filtration units were received and, by 20 May 67, water was no longer rationed.

3. (U) Initially, numerous problems were encountered in the areas of basic sanitation and personal hygiene. These problems were due to moving into a new area and becoming operational; an initial lack of supplies; and a lack of adequate facilities for the number of personnel housed in the contumax and bivouac areas. After 3 May 67, many of these shortcomings were eliminated through close supervision and operation of field sanitation teams in each company, battery, or similar sized units. Other measures taken to improve the health of the command were periodic testing of all water and ice supplies in the TACs; insect and rodent control; surveying for mosquitoes; and monthly command sanitation inspections covering mess halls, latrines, shower facilities, recreational areas, clubs, and the sanitary fill area.

4. (U) Shortage of generators presented a problem at this time. Those generators on hand presented a maintenance problem. After much exchange of correspondence and numerous discussions with the Navy and 1st Log Cmd, the 80th General Support Group was tasked with furnishing R & U support to the Task Force Headquarters as an interim measure. This included furnishing generators to the TF Oregon R & U section. Since this time, R & U support for the Task Force Headquarters has been better, but many deficiencies still exist. The lack of a Post Engineer to coordinate and furnish base requirements is still an unresolved problem. Action continues towards an acceptable solution.

5. (U) There were many requests from units in the field for an increase in the amount of ice being issued. To help those units who had sufficient water and electricity, low capacity ice machines
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

were ordered and most were in the hands of the units by 30 May. Within a few weeks, however, most of the machines needed repair. Since the Task Force has insufficient organic refrigeration repair capability, a request has been submitted requesting an augmentation to the R & U section. A limited amount of ice was being furnished by the Marine Corps and a smaller amount was being bought on the economy. In order to provide more ice for the Task Force, construction of a 15 ton capacity ice plant was started in May 1967 and was completed on 15 July 67. It is presently operating at full capacity. This has alleviated, but not eliminated, the ice shortage.

6. (U) A Veterinary Section was established on 16 May 67. It's primary missions are food inspection and the care and treatment of all scout and sentry dogs in the area.

7. (U) Headquarters Company took over the operation of the former USMC Consolidated Mess on 10 May 1967. Most of the equipment and furnishings were removed by the Marines. Much of the remaining equipment was in poor repair requiring an intensive maintenance program to include obtaining the PLL required for the equipment being used.

8. (U) On 30 June 67, TF Oregon initiated a new revetment program for each aircraft in the Task Force. This action was based on a USArmy program of the same type in which two approved designs for revetments were furnished. The revetments are being constructed at this time.

9. (U) On 15 June, the Task Force received word that we would remain in the Chu Lai area during the monsoon season. This produced requirements to obtain adequate housing for all personnel in the Task Force. A strongback program was initiated to construct, through self-help, wooden tent frames with raised wood floors. Further, an urgent requirement existed to develop and improve storage and maintenance facilities. An aggressive program was established to acquire necessary materials and engineer support; however, with the exception of the tent frame materials, little of the construction material was on hand by 31 July.

10. (U) Adequate clothing was another requirement. Units were requested to submit their requirements for clothing and cold/wet weather gear. As of 31 July, some of this clothing and equipment has arrived.

11. (U) Until the middle of June, TF Oregon was having difficulty shipping less-than-LST-loads of cargo via water on a
timely basis between Chu Lai and Duc Pho. This problem has been resolved by Headquarters III MAF Transportation/Embarkation Section in making the Osage (a modified LCU) available to Task Force Oregon upon request.

12. (U) On 20 June, the ammunition Supply Point in Duc Pho caught fire causing the destruction of nearly all the ammunition in storage there. Attempts were made immediately to re-stock the ASP. Within 4 days, the stockage had reached an acceptable level to support the operation in the Duc Pho area.

13. (U) By mid-June lack of repair parts support for engineer items became a major problem. CPT Schaeffer and KSO Martin made liaison visits to units and discovered that many of the requisitions were no longer valid. Others were valid but insufficient time had elapsed to fill the supply pipeline to the Chu Lai Duc Pho area. All requisitions were subsequently checked and those no longer valid were resubmitted. HQ USARV and USMC Qui Nhon instituted a crash program to supply these parts. By 5 July, engineer repair parts support had become marginally adequate.

14. (U) On 6 June 67, a USARV Readiness Assistance Team came to Task Force Oregon to provide technical support and make a survey of procedures being used. Project Counter teams began coming into the TFO area on or about the same time. Both teams helped the FLL and AFL posture of TF Oregon.

15. (U) On or about 24 June, it was decided that, upon approval from USARV, two 175 mm howitzers should be converted to 8" howitzers. The conversion was completed 1 July 67.

16. (U) On or about 13 July, USARV requested that all equipment authorized by TOE, yet not required in the present area of operations, be turned in for storage or for issue to other units. The units of TF Oregon are presently in the process of turning this equipment in.

17. (U) Lt. Petty, Marine Corps, reported for duty with G4 on 28 July 67 to assist with the Sub Area Coordinator Functions of CG Task Force Oregon.

18. (U) On 31 July, Sgt Harrington, Marine Corps, reported in for duty with G4 to assist with the Sub Area Coordinator Functions of CG Task Force Oregon.

19. (U) Upon the initial move of Task Force Oregon to Chu Lai and Duc Pho, airlift to areas south of Chu Lai to Qui Nhon
and Cam Ranh was adequate. During the month of July, many flights were discontinued resulting in no scheduled flights for passengers between the Chu Lai/Duc Pho area and the Qui Nhon/Cam Ranh area. Cargo service also suffered between the two locations. It is anticipated that this situation will be remedied in the near future by action initiated by the Transportation Office through the District Traffic Office, Traffic Management Agency, Chu Lai. Airlift is adequate to other major ports to and from which Task Force Oregon moves cargo and passengers.
AVDF-CG

(RCS-GSFC-45) (U)

F. Civil Affairs/Civic Action

1. (U) Organization.

a. The section is organized as a Task Infantry Division G5 Section with:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst G5</td>
<td>L. J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin Supv</td>
<td>SPC E7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk/Typist</td>
<td>SPC E4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>FPC E3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The section is full strength. However, the Asst G5 is a Captain, who will be promoted to Major about October 1967, and the Driver is a SP4 E4.

c. The G5 Section is augmented by having operational control of two Civil Affairs Platoons, 2 Officers, and Enlisted each, of the 29th Civil Affairs Company (US Army). The Civil Affairs Company is under the operational control of Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force. The Platoons are deployed in an area support role, one in the CHU Lai T.O.R., one in the PHO T.O.R. The Platoons coordinate the overall Civic Action Program of the military units in the respective T.O.R.s and act as liaison agents between units and province level COOs Advisors.

d. Each of the Task Force brigades and their battalions have an S5 and appropriate staff. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, each have a Civil Affairs Displaced Persons Team, 2 Officers, and Enlisted each, assigned to the brigade. These teams act as Civic Action/Civil Affairs Generalists and do not confine their activities to displaced persons and refugees. These teams are assigned to the 1st Civil Affairs Company, 1 FFV, under the operational control of the brigades, and accompanied the brigades when the brigades came under Task Force control.

e. Two Civil Affairs Displaced Persons Teams of the 29th Civil Affairs Company are performing an area support refugee relief role in the Task Force area of interest, one team is in QUANG TIN Province and one team is in QUANG NGAI Province. Both teams are under the operational control of the province COOs Advisor Teams. The teams monitor the provincial refugee programs by maintaining records on the location, and coordinating movement of food and building materials from COOs warehouses to refugee camps.
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(RCS-CSR-65) (U)

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On 15 July 1967, the USMC Chu Lai Installation Coordinator Headquarters was deactivated. The Task Force 05 is now coordinating the programs and projects of the eleven USMC/USN units remaining in the CHU LAI area.

On 29 June 1967, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) organization was instituted in the provinces in Task Force OREGON's area of interest. In QUANG TIN Province, LTC Robert O. Lynch, formerly the Sector Advisor, was appointed Senior CORDS Advisor, and Mr. Tom Brierton, formerly Senior Office of Civil Operations (OOC) Advisor, was appointed Deputy CORDS Advisor. In QUANG NGAI Province, Mr. James A. May, formerly Senior OOC Advisor, was appointed Senior CORDS Advisor, and LTC William Quinn, formerly Sector Advisor, was appointed Deputy CORDS Advisor. QUANG TIN Province contains six districts. In the two districts that lie in the Task Force's area of interest, TAM KY and LY TIN, the Sub-Sector Advisors were appointed as Senior CORDS Advisors. QUANG NGAI contains ten districts, six have Sub-Sector Advisors, four have 5th Special Forces "A" Teams. The six Sub-Sector Advisors were appointed Senior CORDS Advisors.

2. (U) Operations,

a. On 2 May, at a staff briefing, the Commanding General, MG Rossen, stated that the primary mission of civic action/civil affairs was to improve security. He stated that every opportunity must be taken to exploit security in the wake of combat operations. Medical (MEDCAP II), construction, and agricultural programs and projects, refugee care and housing activities, are designed to increase hamlet/village security and enhance the influence of the GVN.

b. During the period 5-10 May 1967, three meetings were conducted at Task Force Headquarters to coordinate the movement of sugar mill equipment from BIEN HOA, 12 miles north of SAIGON, to QUANG NGAI City. The meetings were attended by G4 representatives from III MAF and Task Force X-RAY, G5 and Provost Marshal representatives from Task Force OREGON and Task Force X-RAY. The equipment was to be moved by barge from the SAIGON area to the USN docking facility at CHU LAI and transported by commercial truck from the CHU LAI area to QUANG NGAI City. The operation is operating well; approximately 12 barge loads have been moved. It is expected the operation will be completed in early September.

c. QUANG TIN Province Joint Coordinating Council Meetings were held in May and June. BG Frank H. Linnell attended these meetings as the Task Force senior representative. 05/55
representatives of the Task Force and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and the province MCVM and G00 senior advisors attended. The meetings were conducted by the Province Chief, LTC Tho. Principal results of the meeting were:

1. Movement of AN Tan Hamlet residents and business establishments to permit the 9th Engineer Battalion (USMC) to widen and upgrade National Route 1 in the CHU LAI area.

2. Establishment of a provincial GVN curfew of 2000-0500 hours, except in TAN KY City (not in Task Force TAN) and AN Tan, where the curfew is 2200-0500 hours.

3. Province officials will develop a fair price list for Vietnamese items and services most frequently purchased by military personnel.

d. Doctor Hoanh, QUANG NGAI Province Chief, has not favorably considered provincial joint coordinating meetings between Task Force and provincial representatives. Mr. Nay, Senior COMS advisor, is attempting to establish a program of joint monthly meetings.

e. Due to the large influx of refugees generated by combat operations in western QUANG NGAI Province, the G5 has taken a primary interest in the refugees and the facilities and care being provided them. This interest includes frequent trips to the camps by members of the G5 Section and other members of the Task Force staff including the staff Surgeon. At the conclusion of the SONG VE Valley operation, a total of 6000 refugees, 1200 head of livestock and 13 tons of captured rice had been taken to NGHL, HAH District Headquarters in QUANG NGAI Province.

f. On 27 June, the PSYOP Section was placed under the staff supervision of the G5. The PSYOP Section had been under the supervision of the G3.

g. Since the Task Force arrived in the CHU LAI operational area, considerable difficulty has been experienced with the Vietnamese fishermen who fish off the coast of the CHU LAI Base. By agreement between USMC Task Force X-RUY, which occupied the CHU LAI area prior to Task Force OREGON, the local fishermen were permitted to leave their boats on the beach within the base perimeter and by special pass, enter the base at dawn each day to launch their boats and fish in local waters. The fishermen were to leave the base before dusk. By the agreement the small boats (narrow junk-type) were to operate only during the daylight hours and no closer than 200 meters from shore. Fishing junks were permitted to operate all
night but must remain beyond 4000 meters from shore during the hours of darkness. Many meetings were held with the fishermen concerning their violations of the fishing agreement. At the present time, G and US officials are working on a fishing regulation that will both insure the security of military installation and the livelihood of Vietnamese fishermen.

3. (U) Civic Action/Revolutionary Development.

a. On 1 July 1967, the KEDCaP II medical supply system was changed. All units now draw KEDCaP medical supplies through normal medical supply channels. Heretofore they were drawn through SVN channels. The KEDCaP II program was restricted for about 15 days until the increased demands on the US Army supply system were met. No additional difficulty is foreseen.

b. In support of the GVN Program of Revolutionary Development, the TF OREGON, maintained close coordination with the Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) in both QUANG TIN and QUANG NGU Provinces.

c. Since 1 May 1967, Task Force OREGON units have performed the following KEDCaP activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>No. of MEDCaP visits</th>
<th>Patients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TF OREGON Artillery</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF OREGON Surgeon</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Support Brigade</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196th Inf Bde</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>43,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde, 25th Inf Div</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>17,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde, 101st Abn Div</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2,619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Task Force OREGON elements have assisted in many "self-help" projects during the reporting period. Following is a recap of projects by major elements of the Task Force:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>Projects Completed</th>
<th>In Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, TF OREGON</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF OREGON Artillery</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196th Inf Bde</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde, 25th Inf Div</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde, 101st Abn Div</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. (U) Psychological Operations.

(NGS-OPFOR-65) (U)

a. PSYOP Section is organized as follows:

1. Headquarters Section consists of one officer and two enlisted men.

2. Administrative Section consists of one officer and two enlisted men.

3. Operations Section consists of one officer, two enlisted and four ARVN (interpreters).

4. Detachment from 244th PSYOP Company, Danang, consists of two officers and ten enlisted men, who are all attached to Task Force OREGON.

b. PSYOP Section, Task Force OREGON, The 244th PSYOP Company, Danang, provides personnel and equipment for Task Force OREGON. 244th PSYOP Company has furnished Task Force OREGON an audio-visual (AV) and loudspeaker (HB) detachment consisting of one HB team and one AV team; all are equipped. One HB team is attached to the 3rd BDE, 25th INF DIV, the second team is attached to the 1st BDE, 101st AIR DIV to support their ground tactical operations. The assigned AV team shows films in the Chu Lai area of operation and as requested, in other areas.

c. Each Brigade is authorized a PSYOP Officer who is responsible for selecting targets, requesting PSYOP support from Task Force OREGON PSYOP Section, and coordinating Brigade PSYOP effort. Since 15 June, the 3rd BDE, 25th INF DIV has not had a PSYOP Officer assigned to them.

d. Effective 26 June 1967, Assistant Chief of Staff G5, Task Force OREGON, assumed operational control of PSYOP Section. PSYOP Section has been under OPCOM of ACoS, G3.

e. Statistical Data for the Period 1 May 1967 to 31 July 1967:

1. Leaflets dropped: 56,830,000

2. Loudspeaker hours:
   (a) Waterborne broadcasts: 55 hrs. 25 min.
   (b) Ground broadcasts: 619 hrs. 55 min.
   (c) Aerial broadcasts: 332 hrs.

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(ACS-CSF/05-65) (U)

1. Movies shown: 211 for a total of 110 hrs.

2. Tapes developed by Task Force E.J.S.O.N. PSYOP

Section:

(a) Chieu Hoi Appeals
(b) MIDCO.PS
(c) Fishing Regulations
(d) VC atrocities
(e) Pre-Strike Warning
(f) Curfew Restrictions
(g) Support SVN
(h) Population Control
(i) Rewards
(j) Allied Victories
(k) VC Taxes

3. Posters developed: 1, Enclosure 2.

4. Leaflets developed: 18 with same basic themes as tapes. Enclosure 2.

5. PSYOP in support of major operations:

(a) MI.LHEUR I:

(1) Leaflets dropped: 4,352,000
(2) Aerial broadcasts: 15 hrs.
(3) Ground broadcasts: 85 hrs.

(b) MI.LHEUR II:

(1) Leaflets dropped: 6,183,000
(2) Aerial broadcasts: 105 hrs.
(RCS-CFR: F-65) (U)

(2) Ground broadcasts: 99 hrs.

(c) MULTIMOD:

(1) Leaflets dropped: 850,000

(2) Aerial broadcasts: 45 min.

(8) Hoi Chanh Status: The following are the number of Hoi Chanh that have turned themselves in to U.S. units and GVN agencies in Task Force OREGON's area of interest in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces as shown in column (1). Figures shown in column (2) are of the Hoi Chanhs for the same period last year. Records are not available showing where Hoi Chanhs turned themselves in to, either U.S. forces or GVN agencies.

(a) Quang Tin: (b) Quang Tin:

(1) U.S. Forces: 4  (1) Total: 132

(2) GVN agencies: 45

(3) Total: 49

(a) Quang Ngai: (b) Quang Ngai:

(1) U.S. Forces: 23  (1) Total: 72

(2) GVN agencies: 254

(3) Total: 277

Activities:

(1) The Task Force OREGON PSYOP program has consisted of a variety of activities designed to win the hearts and minds of the local populace, demoralize local and main force units, cause defection from enemy units and assist in establishing the Government of Vietnam as the true government of the people of the Republic of South Vietnam.

(2) PSYOP Section has portrayed the American fighting man as an individual who is here to help the people, an individual who will protect them and will aid them in building better homes, schools, and in general, lead a better way of life.
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(3) In the PSYOP campaign against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units, PSYOP Section has disseminated leaflets and broadcasted appeals using the following major themes: Rally or Die, Chieu Hoi, Allied Power, and the Inevitable Defeat of the VC. The principle theme stressed was Rally or Die, used in support of tactical operations conducted throughout our area of operation.

(4) PSYOP Section has prepared a study on inducing families that have relatives among the VC to write letters to their relatives asking them to return home. MACV advisors in Quang Ngai Province have been informed of program and have been requested to implement it in their areas of operation. This program has not been in operation long enough to evaluate its effectiveness.

(5) Following the opening of Highway 1 from Nha Trang to 15 June 1967, 9th AOS dropped over 800,000 leaflets along Highway 1 announcing the opening of the road by the GVN and allied forces.

(6) 14 members of Task Force OREGON have attended a three day PSYOP Orientation and Training Course at III MAF, Danang. Individuals received instruction on operation and employment of loudspeakers and other PSYOP equipment in addition to learning PSYOP techniques. These individuals will be able to operate Brigade PSYOP equipment when personnel from Task Force OREGON Headquarters are not available.

(7) Combat loudspeaker teams have been effectively employed on boats, during ground operations, in support of NEDCAPS, and to broadcast from unit perimeters. On several occasions teams accompanying Task Force OREGON units have broadcasted appeals to enemy units during actual ground operations and have induced personnel to rally. The casualties among combat loudspeaker personnel have been high, of eleven individuals who participate in field operations one has been killed and three others have been wounded by hostile fire.

(8) On the 19th of July 1967 the 1st BDE, 101st ABN liberated 22 Vietnamese who had been held captive by the Viet Cong, some for as long as 29 months. Photos showing the decimated bodies of the Vietnamese were taken for dissemination in leaflet form in Quang Ngai Province. The purpose of the leaflet was to show the people the criminal acts being committed by the VC.
(9) In conjunction with Navy Swift Boats 10 hours of loudspeaker messages were broadcasted along the coast of Quang Ngai announcing the capture of a trawler carrying arms and ammunition for the VC and warning civilians not to let the VC use their boats.

(10) A leaflet is being developed to show Task Force OREGON's achievements in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces during its first 100 days of operation. The leaflet will be printed in sufficient quantities to cover the populated areas of both provinces.

(11) 5 Members of Task Force OREGON have attended a special 2 day PSYOP course on leaflet dissemination given at III M.F, Danang. Individuals received instruction on computations required to disseminate leaflets at low, medium and high altitudes.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RG-6523-67 (U))

G. Inspector General.

1. (U) Inspector General activities during the last quarter included the conduct of courtesy annual general inspections, several inquiries as a result of routine complaints and requests for assistance, one formal investigation as the result of allegations made at Department of Defense level, and publication of IG guidance material, for use by this headquarters and subordinate units.

2. (U) At the request of the Commanding General, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, this office conducted a courtesy inspection of the brigade down to and including company level. The purpose of the inspection was to assist the brigade in preparing for the Annual General Inspection recently conducted by the USARV Inspector General. Several major problem areas were identified during the courtesy inspection and appropriate corrective action was taken prior to the arrival of the USARV inspection team.

3. (U) The complaints and requests for assistance processed by this office averaged 35 per month. Seven out of a total of eight actual complaints received were considered to be justified. The remainder of the actions were requests for assistance. The bulk of the requests and complaints were in the categories of reassignment/transfer, excess duty, and actions of superiors.

4. (U) This office published guidance for the command in the form of TFO Reg 20-1, Inspector General Activities, and an SOP for operation of the Office of the Inspector General, Task Force Oregon, with sections pertaining to duties of Acting Inspector General at major subordinate commands.

5. (U) Because of normal rotation, the Chief Clerk, Office of the Inspector General has been replaced. No major problems were encountered since the replacement was present for duty two weeks prior to the departure of the old Chief Clerk.

6. (U) Future plans include courtesy inspections of several artillery units at the request of the Task Force Artillery Commander preparatory to USARV AGI's.

H. Information.

1. (U) During the period 1 May through 31 July 1967, the Task Force Oregon Information Office served as a clearing agency for news releases from brigade Information Offices, as well as a news-generating office. Support was provided to the news media, both military and civilian, as indicated:

- Number of printed releases: 500
- Number of pictorial releases: 384
- Number of Home Town News Releases: 5647
- Number of formal press interviews or briefings: 110
- Number of correspondents provided support: 183

2. (U) Significant events and activities were as follows:

a. Expediting News Releases: An arrangement was made whereby copy cleared for release by the MACV-IO representative in Da Nang would be hand-carried to in-country news media (i.e., Stars and Stripes, the wire services) in Saigon. Brigade Information Officers provided pre-addressed envelopes with stories they submitted for clearance. Once the story was cleared for release, a Task Force Oregon Information Office courier mails the release from Da Nang to out-of-country news media whose addresses are provided by the Brigade Information Officers. This saves a minimum of two mailing days for the Brigade Information Offices.

b. On 15 May 1967, the Information Office, USARV, began publishing an Army Daily Summary from that office. Each major Army command in Vietnam provides the data for this summary. The USA RV IO reaction to the Task Force Oregon Information Office's system for transmitting the summary has been favorable. (See attached Inclosure 2.)

(1) Each brigade Information Officer calls in a general summary of his unit's tactical operations, civic action achievements, or feature stories at the end of the day. A Task Force Oregon Information Office representative compiles the brigade summaries into a cover story. A Task Force Oregon Information Office representative verifies, or updates the statistics at the Task Force Oregon Command Operations Center the following morning.

(2) The cover story is transmitted telephonically
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(RES-GSR-65) (U)

To III M&F Combat Information Bureau for the daily SITREP (IO),
and to the USAFRV Information Office, where it is included in the
Army Daily Summary.

c. On 18 June 1967, the Information Office increased
distribution of the OREGON NEWS SHEET to 1,000 copies per day. The
increased distribution was designed to tell the Task Force Oregon
daily combat story to the troops of the command, and also to fill
the news gap when Stars and Stripes and APRTS are not available.

d. APRTS - TV Survey: A television transmitter station
survey was completed for the Task Force in the Chu Lai-Duc Pho area
on 22 July 1967 by Mr. Sanu Geise, contract engineer for APRTS
Saigon.

(1) The engineer indicated that a transmitter van
was available in Saigon to provide service in this area. Support
required by Task Force Oregon includes surface preparation and
grading, construction of a concrete pad 15 by 30 feet, mess and
billeting facilities for enlisted personnel assigned to the
facility.

(2) Because of the large number of forces of all
services in the Chu Lai-Duc Pho area, Task Force Oregon request-
ed completion and placement of the transmitter in this area.

e. Six Command Information Fact Sheets and Troop Topics
were prepared and distributed, covering the following subjects:

(1) Proposed Military Pay Raise: Gave figures of
proposed military pay hike effective 1 October 1967, if passed by
Congress.

(2) 12th Interservice Photo Contest: Announced
the Department of Defense Interservice Photo Contest and rules for
entering.

(3) Photographic Security: Discussed the hazards
of compromising classified material and giving the enemy valuable
information through careless personal photography.

(4) In-Country R & R: China Beach: Explained
procedures for Task Force Oregon personnel to apply for in-country
R & R, and described the facilities available at China Beach in Da
Nang.

(5) Your New General Orders: Explained the three
new General Orders for sentry duty, and included a brief history of the General Orders. A wallet-size handout of the General Orders was distributed to each man in Task Force Oregon.

(6) THE PILL. . . and why to use it: explained the causes and effects of malaria and the importance of taking chloroquine-primaquine and dapsone anti-malaria tablets.

These troop topics were designed to supplement information from normal Department of the Army channels, as well as to publicize items of command interest.

f. Arrangements were made for the distribution of the major in-country newspapers to all elements of the Task Force: Stars and Stripes, the Army Reporter, and the Observer.
AVDP-CG
(RCS-CSPOR-65) (U)

I. Headquarters Support.

1. (U) During the reporting period, the Headquarters Commandant Section directed its efforts primarily towards the improvement of the CP area water supply and electrical distribution system, the Task Force Oregon Consolidated Mess, and general improvement of troop billets.

   a. At the beginning of the period, the water supply was so critical as to require rationing. The two wells used by the Task Force furnished a total of 15,000 gallons per day. An additional 20,000 gallons per day were trucked from other water points. This provided approximately 20 gallons of water per day per man for the 1,600 troops being supported. A new well was dug which is furnishing 50,000 gallons per day. Additionally, a new 3,000 gallon-per-hour water purification plant was installed. The supported troop strength was reduced to 1,000 which has resulted in the provision of approximately 50 gallons of water per day per man. Since the dry-season capacity of the well is not known, the water-borne sewage system in the CP area has not been completely activated.

   b. The electrical distribution system which supports the Task Force CP, 509th Signal Battalion, 258th Personnel Services Company, APO 96374, Task Force Oregon Post Exchange, and the Vietnam Regional Exchange Warehouse was completely rebuilt. At the beginning of the period power was furnished by six 60 KW and one 100 KW generators at three generator sites. Two 150 KW and one 100 KW generators were installed at one site, and two 100 KW generators were installed at a second site to replace the former system. One of the 100 KW generators was received in an inoperable condition and parts have not been received, since they are not available in-country. Additionally, all main electrical distribution lines were replaced with heavier wire to reduce line loss. A considerable amount of interior rewiring has also been completed.

   c. At the beginning of the reporting period, the Task Force Consolidated Mess was well below the minimum physical standards for such a facility. During the period, refrigeration has been installed; the entire kitchen work area has been rearranged; and the dining areas have been partitioned and painted. Additional mess equipment has been requisitioned and will further add to the efficiency and appearance of the mess when it is installed.

   d. Overall improvement to the general living conditions

has not progressed much above the maintenance stage. The existing living structures are adequate for current living; however, they will need improvement to face the coming monsoon season. Materials have been ordered, and the work will be accomplished on a self-help basis.

2. (U) The HQ, Task Force Oregon, R & U Section, which is not an organized R & U section as such, but a section organized internally to perform limited R & U functions, has carried a majority of the load of the operations and improvements that have been made. Outside support was received in the installation of the water system, the improvement of the physical plant of the Mess, and some water point and generator operators. Although this section has carried the load since the organization of the Task Force, it is not felt that it can provide the support that will be required over a long period of time. It is felt that some type of permanent R & U facility should be established in the Chu Lai area to support all Army elements in the area.
(RCS-CGFOR-65) (U)

Section 2, Part I, Observations-Lessons Learned.

A. Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline.

ITEM: (U) Replacements for Provisional HHC.

DISCUSSION: (U) Hq USARV policy on replacements for HHC, TFO is to require the parent organization of a given individual to furnish his replacement. Notification of an impending loss is provided USARV AG by message 30 days prior to the individual’s DEROS. Additionally, an updated roster is provided USARV AG monthly.

OBSERVATION: In most cases replacements are received just prior to the departure of an individual or within seven days of his departure. In some cases no replacement is received, which necessitates numerous calls to USARV AG to resolve the problem. In most cases problems arise when a departing individual’s parent unit does not have a qualified individual on hand to replace the departing officer or EM.

ITEM: (U) Promulgation of Policy on Changes in Administrative Procedures.

DISCUSSION: (U) Hq USARV General Order 3209, dated 27 June 1967, implemented changes in the administrative channels of all Tank Force Oregon units, except separate brigades. The general order established this headquarters as a major subordinate command of Hq USARV for administrative matters.

OBSERVATION: (U) The transfer of administrative control (less promotion authority) from parent units of Task Force Oregon units to this headquarters was accomplished with little prior discussion of problems which would occur and means of resolving them prior to effecting the change. This has resulted in confusion in a number of personnel administrative areas in determining when former parent headquarters of units will discontinue performing administrative functions and this headquarters will begin.

ITEM: (U) Requirements for Unit Identification Code for a Provisional Unit.

DISCUSSION: (U) The transfer of administrative responsibility for receipt of reassignment instruction and advanced overseas returnee listings presents problems unless units are identified by the UIC. Consequently, reassignment instructions are forwarded to the headquarters of the member’s former parent organizations.
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OBSERVATION: (U) A unit identification code prefix should be established for provisional units and all units subsequently attached thereto.

ITEM: (U) Authorized Number of Order of Battle Personnel.

DISCUSSION: (U) The four Order of Battle personnel authorized in the G-2 section cannot properly process the large amount of data and records required on NVA/VC Main Force and Local Force and VC Irregular units. This is necessary to properly evaluate and disseminate meaningful intelligence on the enemy. The placement of two personnel from the Interrogation Section into the Order of Battle Section has helped, but has required the request for augmentation interrogation teams from the Combined Military Interrogation Center on several occasions.

OBSERVATION: (U) The authorized strength of the Order of Battle Section in the Division Military Intelligence Detachment should be increased to two Officers and six Enlisted men.

ITEM: (U) Regulations, Blank Forms, and Reference Material.

DISCUSSION: (U) Regulations, blank forms, and other necessary reference material were generally unavailable during the early part of the reporting period. This hampered the accomplishment of unit administrative activities, and it was difficult to establish command policies. The lack of interrogation aids such as foreign weapons and equipment pamphlets and maps made interrogation less effective.

OBSERVATION: (U) Packets of reference materials and blank forms should be provided to provisional units upon activation to allow them to quickly attain effectiveness.

ITEM: (U) Administrative and Logistical Support for ARVN Interpreters.

DISCUSSION: (U) ARVN interpreters attached to the Task Force Military Intelligence Detachment were assigned to III Corps. This was based on their personal preference as the highest ranking members scholastically in their interpreter's class. No field equipment, clothing, or identification cards were issued to them prior to deployment to Chu Lai. When they deployed to Chu Lai with Task Force Oregon, they remained assigned to III Corps and were not informed of the manner in which their pay, leave, and other administrative matters would be handled. This, coupled with the fact that they were involuntarily sent to Chu Lai when normal

(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

ARVN policy would allow them to remain in III Corps, creating serious morale problems among the interpreters. Although these problems were eventually overcome, it initially hampered seriously the efficiency of operations requiring the use of interpreters.

OBSERVATION: (U) Future operations which include the use of ARVN interpreters must include planning for their administrative support and for informing them of measures being taken to provide support.

ITEM: (U) In-Country R & R to China Beach.

DISCUSSION: (U) There has been a steady decline in the fill of quotas for R & R to China Beach.

OBSERVATION: (U) Interviews with personnel returning from China Beach, either on R & R or visits to check areas of unfavorable comments, point up the following factors as causing the declining interest:

1. The city of Da Nang is off-limits during R & R.
2. There is no mess hall; all food must be purchased from a cafeteria.
3. Complaints about crowded billets and defective shower and toilet facilities.
4. Some personnel are subject to pull guard details.
5. Availability of the beach facility at Chu Lai.
6. Negative comments from personnel who have been to China Beach have not provided much of an incentive to others.

ITEM: (U) Specialized Office Equipment for Finance Offices.

DISCUSSION: (U) The operation of a Finance Office requires several types of electrical office machines which are not stockage to the Army supply system due to the lack of demand and high cost.

OBSERVATION: (U) After activation of this office, efforts to obtain procurement data through the army supply system resulted in inadequate information. Outdated Finance TO&E's do not contain this information.

ITEM: (U) Emergency Chaplain Coverage.

DISCUSSION: (U) On 25 May 1967, Chaplain (CFT) Ambrosio S. Grandea, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, was seriously wounded by hostile action and medically evacuated. As a result, Chaplain
coverage for the Battalion had to be obtained from local resources until a replacement arrived.

OBSERVATION: (U) The problem was solved by temporarily assigning the Chaplain from the 509th Signal Battalion to the unit, Chaplain (MAJ) Mace J. Jett. The Signal Battalion is collocated with Headquarters, Task Force Oregon, and chaplain coverage could be provided by the Task Force Oregon Chaplain Section and the Provisional Support Group Chaplains located nearby. Through technical channels, the USARV Chaplain was notified by telephone of the need for a replacement. Within three days, Chaplain Grandea's replacement was in the Battalion, and Chaplain Jett was returned to his parent unit.

ITEM: (U) Monthly Chaplain Conference.

DISCUSSION: (U) A monthly Chaplain Conference was needed to provide an opportunity for the Task Force Chaplains to be given necessary information, guidance, and policy. Also, the conference is necessary to provide an opportunity for the chaplains to discuss problems of mutual concern.

OBSERVATION: (U) The need was met by scheduling a one-day monthly conference of all Task Force Oregon Chaplains. In addition to regular business, guest speakers have included Major General Rosson, Task Force Oregon Commander; Chaplain (COL) Luettgen, 1st Logistical Command Chaplain; Chaplain (COL) Lyons, III MAF Chaplain; Chaplain (COL) Casazza, 1st Marine Division Chaplain; Chaplain (LTC) Ferrera, 1st Marine Air Wing Chaplain; and Chaplain (LTC) Carroll, Deputy USARV Chaplain. Since the Task Force Oregon Chaplains coordinate closely with Marine and Navy Chaplains in the area to provide complete religious coverage for all U.S. Military Personnel, all Marine and Navy Chaplains attend the conference.

ITEM: (U) Joint Police Patrols.

DISCUSSION: (U) The Chu Lai area has a large number of U.S. Marines, a Korean R & R center and supply point, and a large number of Vietnamese workers. In order to solve difficulties in language, customs, and jurisdiction, joint patrols of one U.S. Army MP, one U.S. Marine MP, and either a National Policeman or Korean MP were initiated.

OBSERVATION: (U) Marines understand and better appreciate Marine MPs. If an incident arises involving a Vietnamese or Korean, the appropriate patrol is dispatched, and a policeman
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(RCS-CSPOR-65) (U)

ITEM: (U) Currency Violations.

DISCUSSION: (U) The use of MPC was common among villagers who operated laundries and small shops throughout the area. Their complaint, when caught with MPC, was that most soldiers and Marines did not have piasters. As this is primarily a tactical area, there was neither ample time nor opportunity for proper money conversion.

OBSERVATION: (U) The appointment of piaster-conversion officers at unit level has made piasters readily available to troops. Upon request, the Province and District Chiefs have warned villagers that they must not have MPC in their possession. Joint MF/National Police raids have resulted in confiscation of MPC. There has been a noticeable reduction of MPC in the hands of Vietnamese in the area.

ITEM: (U) Personnel.

DISCUSSION: (U) The TO&E for the Staff Judge Advocate Section provides for Warrant Officer, Legal Administrative Technician. This position is especially important, because of the specialized administrative functions of a legal office. The Warrant Officer position has never been filled.

OBSERVATION: (U) This command has requested USARV to fill the Warrant Officer position, but, to date, it has not been done.

ITEM: (U) GCM Jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION: (U) Two of the brigades in the Task Force were attached for operational control only. GCM jurisdiction was retained by other commands. This placed an undue restriction on the Task Force Commander's disciplinary authority.

OBSERVATION: (U) When an organization is attached to a command for an extended period, the receiving commander should be given those functions of command necessary for him to meet his responsibilities. This includes GCM jurisdiction over the attached unit.

ITEM: (U) Reduction of Enlisted Personnel.

DISCUSSION: (U) The commander of a unit, including a prov-
(RCS-CSF HW-65) (U)

A special unit, to which an EM is attached may appoint to pay grade E-3 only (Para 7-2c, AR 600-200). This limitation also applies to reductions (Para 7-3o, AR 600-200). Thus the personnel in HHC, Task Force Oregon, above grade E-3 may be reduced under Article 15, UCMJ, by their parent unit only. This deprives the commander of the provisional or attached unit of a necessary tool of command, as it is not practicable to return the individual to the parent unit for non-judicial punishment.

OBSERVATION: (U) A change in AR 600-200 would be necessary to give the provisional or receiving unit commander reduction authority over enlisted personnel above pay grade E-3.

ITEM: (U) Personnel.

DISCUSSION: (U) As a result of the uncertainty as to the duration of the Task Force, three of the four officers assigned to the Staff Judge Advocate Section had relatively short periods of service remaining in Vietnam. Two of the officers had previously approved R & R's which came during their tour of duty with the Task Force. They also had prior commitments in court-martial cases in their parent units which necessitated their return to those units on several occasions. These absences, plus the failure of USMC to provide an immediate replacement for officers departing, have resulted in an average of only three officers being available for duty during the crucial formative stages of this section.

OBSERVATION: (U) When staffing a new section, every effort should be made to provide personnel who will be available for full-time duty during the initial phase of operations. This problem is being corrected by assignment of replacements who will have a full tour of duty ahead of them.
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(REQ-CSPR-65) (U)

B. Operations.

ITEM: (U) CBU-19 Tactical CS Cannister Cluster Employment

DISCUSSION: (U) This is an Air Force munition which is normally delivered in support of ground operations by an H-1 type aircraft. This aircraft is capable of carrying twelve (12) each CBU-19. Each munition contains 528, E-49 sub-munitions that will expel non-persistent CS for 7-19 seconds. One CBU-19 will cover an area of approximately 9,000 square meters. In jungle areas, the effective concentration may last from 10 minutes to several hours. Munitions are delivered at altitudes from 700-3,000 feet. Requests for the employment of these munitions are submitted to G-3 Air, 24 hours in advance of the time desired.

OBSERVATION: (C) Only one (1) request for the CBU-19 has been received by the G-3 Air during the reporting period. In support of the request by the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, CBU-19's were delivered on enemy troop concentrations by two sorties. The overall results are not known. However, the capability of the CBU-19 for placing non-persistent CS on a target is more effective than methods currently available in Task Force Oregon. Chemical Officers in the infantry brigades have been notified of the availability of the munitions and procedures for requesting delivery on targets.

ITEM: (C) Displacement of Towed 155 mm Howitzers by Heavy Helicopter.

DISCUSSION: (C) On various occasions during the reporting period the Army CH-54 (Flying Crane) helicopter and the Marine CH-53 helicopter have been utilized by units of Task Force Oregon Artillery to move towed 155 mm howitzers into otherwise inaccessible fire bases within the TFOR. This capability has greatly enhanced the effectiveness of medium artillery fire support of the Task Force. Tactically, the positioning of 155 mm artillery by air significantly extends the 155 mm artillery coverage in any area of operation.

OBSERVATION: (C) That the capability of moving towed 155 mm howitzers by heavy helicopter has proved beneficial to Task Force Oregon operations and should be exploited during future operations within the Republic of Vietnam.

ITEM: (C) Howitzer Battery, Armored Cavalry Squadron.

DISCUSSION: (C) The Howitzer Battery, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was placed under the operational control of Task Force Oregon Artillery when it was determined that the
squadron would operate as individual troops. Task Force Oregon further placed the battery under the operational control of the 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery and later the 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery.

OBSERVATION: (C) That when and where possible, the howitzer battery of the armored cavalry squadron should be integrated into the local artillery organization to increase the total support to the command, and should be provided technical assistance and guidance through available artillery channels.

ITEM: (C) Use of Faulty Aircraft Sling Equipment.

DISCUSSION: (C) Due to several incidents involving faulty sling equipment in rigging external loads to CH-47 helicopters, an inspection team furnished by the 178th Aviation Company visited the artillery locations to examine the equipment in use.

OBSERVATION: (C) The inspection team reported that approximately 25% of the endless slings and 10% of the other type slings were faulty and needed replacing.

ITEM: (U) Efficient Use of CH-47 Helicopters.

DISCUSSION: (C) Due to the distance between the CH-47 helicopter company area and the southern portion of Task Force Oregon's TLOR, aircraft were assigned directly to the brigades to fly as directed by the respective brigade S-3 Air Offices.

OBSERVATION: (C) The impact of direct assignment of CH-47 helicopters to the brigades was characterized by a decrease in prior planning of helicopter loads. On-the-spot missions caused mis-utilization of aircraft. To remedy the situation, the aviation office was tasked to process all requests for CH-47's and in turn pass the requests down to the 14th Aviation Battalion S-3 in chronological order. There are control advantages to this system. Additional prior planning by the brigade S-3 Air results in more efficient use of aircraft and a lower number of flying hours for the aircraft supporting each brigade.

ITEM: (C) Maximum Number of Helicopters for Combat Assault to Utilize the 1 Lift Per Landing Zone Concept.

DISCUSSION: (C) In the past, combat assaults were conducted by sending two or more lifts of helicopters into the same landing zone with time intervals of 10 to 40 minutes between lifts. This interval enabled any enemy units in the vicinity of the landing zone to muster anti-aircraft fire causing a hazard to subsequent lifts arriving in the same area. Also, it presented a control

problem to the ground commander, because he was more vulnerable after the first lift was unloaded and prior to receiving the rest of his troops. By consolidation of lifts, using additional aircraft, the element of surprise was employed to the maximum and enabled the ground commander maximum ground support and control.

OBSERVATION: The one-lift principle has been successful in eliminating unnecessary hazards and has simplified control problems for the ground commander.

ITEM: Effectiveness of Fire-Fly Mission.

DISCUSSION: It has been known in the past that VC activity increases during the hours of darkness. The 71st Aviation Company conducted several Fire-Fly missions between the hours of 2100 and 0400 with very significant results. On two of the more successful missions, the VC were caught openly shipping supplies up and down inland waterways. The first incident resulted in 146 sampans destroyed and the second incident accounted for 78 sampans destroyed.

OBSERVATION: It has been evident that the VC have been conducting extensive resupply operations after the hours of darkness. Fire-fly operations have denied the enemy complete freedom of movement and disrupted resupply and troop movements. With further development of night-lighting devices, the cover of darkness will no longer be an advantage to the enemy.
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C. Training and Organization.

ITEM: (U) Officer Training.

DISCUSSION: (U) Many junior artillery officers reporting for duty with the artillery battalions have had insufficient training or experience in artillery procedures now being used in the Republic of Vietnam. Consequently, the gaining units train these officers before assigning them to critical positions such as forward observers, fire direction officers, or executive officers.

OBSERVATION: (U) That the program of instruction at the Artillery School be modified to include artillery tactics and techniques peculiar to artillery operations in the Republic of Vietnam. In addition, a 30-day overlap should be programmed for junior officer replacements to provide necessary time for their training by the unit and to facilitate a smooth transition into their jobs.

ITEM: (U) Lack of Published Bunker Overhead Cover Data.

DISCUSSION: (U) Table 25, FM 5-34 & table 39, FM 5-35 do not prescribe overhead thickness required to withstand direct hits from high trajectory missiles. The engineer, designing against direct hits, must resort to a combination of experience, field tests, or substitution of other known data and applying same to this situation.

OBSERVATION: (U) This office has used standard breaching formulae to emulate the effect of a direct hit, contact burst (untamped), in the absence of more definitive data. To date, no confirmation of design is available. A letter is being prepared to the Commandant, U. S. Army Engineer School, requesting available information.

ITEM: (U) Resistance of Wet Sand or Earth to Explosive Force.

DISCUSSION: (U) Tables 25 & 26, FM 5-34 and tables 38 & 39, FM 5-35 direct the user to increase protective thickness requirements when wet earth or sand is contemplated for protective overhead or side wall cover. However, table 6, 5-34, does not address any difference in moisture when calculating required explosives to breach earth embankments. The physical circumstances are different. Nevertheless, as there is no explanation as to why saturated soil provides less protection against enemy rounds, the normal inference would be that it requires more deliberately

Observation: There is a doubt created in the minds of those who use extensively FMs 5-34 and 5-35 as to whether an omission has occurred as regards explosives required to deliberately breach a wet embankment. A letter has been forwarded to the Commandant, U. S. Army Engineer School, requesting clarification.

Item: Dust Suppression; Lack of Palliative Distribution Equipment.

Discussion: Common to all operations in areas where road networks are limited and unsurfaced, the dust problem is very significant. Many pedestrian deaths, injuries, and vehicle accidents have occurred because of impaired visibility of both vehicle operators and pedestrians. Dust palliatives are in adequate supply but distribution equipment is very scarce. Therefore, units have combated the problem by improvising all manner of trailer-mounted, gravity-feed distributors. There have been instances where serviceable water trailers have been diverted to spreading black oil or penceprine after a central water supply has become operative. This has occurred simultaneously with other units, in more underdeveloped areas, seeking potable water trailers to solve water supply problems. With the increase of Army Aviation activities, more area than ever before (helipads & heliports) requires dust control.

Observation: The problem completely overtaxes the equipment authorized to control it. Task Force Oregon is not authorized a single asphalt distributor but is responsible for maintaining over 60 miles of unsurfaced road, over 31,000 square yards of helipads, and over 90,000 square yards of motor park or supply joint area. An MDE is being developed which requests standard asphalt distributors to be assigned on the basis of 2 per Engineer Battalion (Combat), one per Aviation Battalion, and one per separate Infantry Brigade.

Item: Backup Engineer Support for Divisional Size Task Force.

Discussion: Task Force Oregon's original complement of engineers consisted of:

a. One combat battalion (Army) minus one company.

b. An engineer combat company attached to each of the...
three assigned brigades.

c. A 27-man utilities detachment in general support.

In the last forty-five days the following actions have taken place to alleviate a large backlog of urgently needed engineer work which accumulated as a result of change of mission.

a. The fourth letter company of the combat battalion arrived in the TaOR.

b. A 75 TPH rock crusher unit with 7 men has been placed on TDY. No drilling equipment was received.

c. A 41-man utilities detachment has been assigned in a GS role.

d. The 45th Engr Group has been assigned upgrading responsibility for 26 kilometers of Route 1 in the southern I Corps Sector.

e. An equivalent of one battalion of non-army engineers have accepted construction responsibility of 21 base development projects (Standard 2 construction). Design and layout must be provided with requests for construction.

The above-listed "augmentations" reveal the degree of austerity that original planning was based on. The combat engineer force provided by the originally designed engineer force proved to be sufficient, loss the ability to produce rock. However, the more refined, base development requirements, combined with an expanded Route 1 upgrading program, forced the other augmentations listed above. All the activities of the augmented force are monitored, coordinated, and planned by the original staff of the Task Force Engineer Battalion. There are currently 62 projects either in work or in planning which will ultimately be simultaneously constructed by the equivalent of 13 separate engineer companies and self help. Most of these projects must be completed by 15 September in order to provide minimum monsoon readiness. The scope of this program is roughly equivalent to that carried on by an Engineer Group which possesses a minimum of three battalion staffs plus a group staff. These staffs would possess anywhere from one to four complete engineering sections dependent on the type (combat or construction) engineer units assigned.

OBSERVATION: (C) Task Force Oregon has no engineering section. The Task Force Engineer Battalion has a limited design capability and a single survey team. The requirement to plan, monitor,
and coordinate the activities of this urgently required program is far beyond the capability of the Task Force Engineer Staff. Where possible, back-up support should be assigned, or, the Task Force Engineer Staff be augmented as follows:

a. Two survey teams with equipment and vehicles.

b. Two cartographic draftsmen with equipment.

c. One design engineer.

d. Two enlisted construction specialists to perform materials takeoff.

e. Three supply expeditors and material control personnel with two ½ ton trucks.

f. One Engineer Captain to provide overall supervision.

Items a and b above were requested on 23 July 1967 by immediate precedence message. The other requirements are being requested.

Future task force planning groups must carefully analyze the area they will be deployed to with consideration for the non-tactical engineer support requirements that will exist. Proposed troop lists must then be submitted to reflect these requirements.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDF-CG
(RCS-CSRA-65) (U)

D. Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence.

ITEM: (U) Timeliness of Aerial Photography.

DISCUSSION: (C) The Task Force is dependent upon the
Air Force for all aerial photography, infra-red, and side-looking
airborne radar coverage. Aerial photography is not normally
received until at least one week after the request for it is
submitted. This is normally five to six days after the mission
is flown and is not rapid enough to meet most operational re-
quirements.

OBSERVATION: (C) Task Force Oregon requires an ASTA
Platoon in order to provide rapid photographic and other imagery
coverage of areas of intelligence interest.
E. Logistics.

ITEM: (U) Base Development.

DISCUSSION: (U) During the planning phase of Project Oregon, little, if any, attention was paid to the Force's role in Base Development. Under the original concept, Task Force Oregon elements would occupy billets and facilities of departing Marine units. The construction effort, with the exception of combat support, e.g. airfield roads, etc., would be minimal. However, this picture was radically changed when it was decided that Task Force Oregon would have to prepare for the forthcoming monsoon season. This entailed a major construction effort with the emphasis placed on the strong-back buildings for troop billets. In addition, there was a need for maintenance sheds, warehouses, mess halls, bandstands, etc.

When the Task Force's construction requirements were made known to III MAF, it was discovered that such projects had to be integrated into the base development plan in order to obtain the necessary construction priorities for labor and materials. At this point, the Task Force Oregon staff had to enter into a base development program. Such a program primarily concerned the GI and Engineer.

The scope was further enlarged when the Task Force Commander became the Sub-Zone Coordinator in the Southern I Corps Tactical Zone. With this responsibility came the additional requirement of coordinating the overall base development in the Chu Lai-Duc Pho Area.

OBSERVATION: (U) When this headquarters' role in base development became known, contact was immediately established with the COMER-ROWEF-DA NANG base development office. At the local level, contact had already been established with the Base Development office primarily for real estate allocation. New assistance was obtained from this office in the form of area layout, mapping and design. The Task Force Engineer realized that this office was not adequately staffed to perform the additional function connected with Base Development. In order to alleviate this situation, a request for augmentation has been forwarded to Headquarters III MAF.

ITEM: (U) Ammunition Resupply by USAF Aircraft.

DISCUSSION: (C) Recent experience by Task Force Oregon Artillery has shown that ammunition resupply utilizing USAF fixed
(RCS-CSFUR-65) (U)

ITEM: (U) Authorized Equipment for Provisional Units.

DISCUSSION: (U) Equipment for the G-2 was provided on hand receipt from the 525th Military Intelligence Group. However, all authorized items were not issued. Accessories such as tools and other CVM were not issued. Requests for these items and for replacements of items turned in (one truck, utility, 7 ton turned in for salvage) have not been satisfied by the 525th MI Group or by Headquarters, US. HV. Attempts are being made to determine how this equipment may be obtained.

OBSERVATION: (U) Planning for the establishment of provisional units should include provisions for requisitioning and obtaining authorized equipment and supplies.
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(RCS-CSRA-65) (U)

Wing aircraft requires close coordination between the support unit, the Task Force Transportation Officer, the Ammunition supply point, and the local USAF representative. Lift requirements must be defined and forwarded as early as possible and changes must be kept to a minimum to allow for proper planning for timely and adequate airlift support.

OBSERVATION: (U) Close coordination is essential for efficient utilization of USAF for ammunition resupply.

ITEM: (U) Maintenance Support for Artillery Weapons.

DISCUSSION: (C) Task Force Oregon now possesses a heterogeneous mixture of artillery weapons in support of its operations. The inventory includes:

- 105 mm howitzer, towed, M101a1
- 105 mm howitzer, towed, M102
- 155 mm howitzer, towed, M114a1
- 155 mm howitzer, self-propelled, M109
- 155 mm gun, self-propelled, M53
- 8" howitzer, self-propelled, M55
- 8" howitzer, self-propelled, M10
- 175 mm gun, self-propelled, M107

It is obvious that such a mixture of weapons requires maintenance personnel possessing a variety of skills or a variety of maintenance personnel possessing one skill. In order to provide better maintenance support, the 188th Maintenance Battalion has requested 9 additional personnel to augment their capability of performing Direct Support Maintenance on the vast array of artillery weaponry.

OBSERVATION: (U) Direct Support Maintenance units in Vietnam must be able to shift personnel within the maintenance organization to have appropriately trained maintenance personnel in the same location as the weapons.
F. Civil Affairs/Civic Action

ITEM: (U) Inadequate Identification of Civilian Casualties.

DISCUSSION: (U) Units in the TAOR evacuate civilian battle casualties to US military medical facilities. Often these casualties are put in evacuation channels by non-medical personnel and are not identified by name, or location from which they were evacuated. This method of handling civilian casualties makes it extremely difficult to return the persons to their homes when released from the medical facility. The problem becomes even more serious when the evacuate dies in the US medical facility. With no identification as to name, location from which evacuated, unit who evacuated the individual, it is extremely difficult to return the remains to the next of kin.

OBSERVATION: (U) All civilian battle casualties should be tagged at the time of their evacuation with at least the following information:

a. Name (if known)
b. Location from which evacuated
c. Unit which ordered evacuation

Medical facilities should insure that this information is placed on the patients records to facilitate the return of the individual to his family or the remains to the next of kin if the evacuee should die. Unidentified remains are evacuated to a provincial hospital.

ITEM: (U) Extraction of Captured Commodities.

DISCUSSION: (U) From time to time large caches of commodities such as rice and salt are captured in the course of combat operations. Many times these caches are significant, more than 10 tons. In one case 70 tons of rock salt was captured. These commodities are in caves or thatched huts and must be bagged before they can be extracted. This required bags, a tremendous amount of troop labor unless VN personnel (RF/FF/CIDG) are provided by the district and transportation resources beyond the unit's capability.

OBSERVATION: (U) The extraction of captured commodities at times places a great burden on the capturing force often interfering with the tactical mission since they must stay in the area until the material can be removed. The extraction also may place a great burden on limited air transport capabilities. In most cases, the only method of extraction is by air. Salt, for example, must be extracted as an exterior (sling) load due to the damage salt can do to aircraft if it is spilled inside them. Captured commodities, particularly food should be extracted if at all possible, but the value of the commodity must be carefully considered against the manpower and transportation resources requirements and the possible detrimental effect on the overall operation.

ITEM: (U) Inadequate Size of G5 Staff Section.

DISCUSSION: (U) The primary mission of the G5 in a counter-insurgency atmosphere is security and exploiting every opportunity to develop and increase security in pacified areas. The integrated effort of the US/PAK.V and the GVN in Vietnam is called Revolutionary Development (RD). The entire US/PAK.V effort — the pacification effort — has been made a military responsibility. The existing personnel authorization for the G5 Section was developed for a conventional warfare, military government, civil affairs situation. It does not provide for the monitoring and assisting host nation elements, the fusion of US/PAK.V combat operations and traditional civil affairs activities and the close liaison required between village/district level government and Task Force level commanders.

The present Task Force OREGON G5 Section is organized as follows:

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This is an insufficient staff to provide for all the coordination between three brigades, two sector and nine sub-sector teams, two provinces chiefs, 12 district chiefs and approximately forty village chiefs on a "need to" basis. Additionally, the G5 Section must coordinate with CORDS on support of the GVN RD Program since this is now under military control. One third of I Corps RD assets are located in QUANG NAM Province, one tenth of GVN National RD resources are located in I Corps. G5, Task Force OREGON has RD responsibility for QUANG TIN and QUANG NAM provinces, with the exception of the 1st Marine Division TAOR and the ROKMC TAOR. Because of this RD responsibility, coordination must be effected with the GVN 59 man RD Teams, 4 in QUANG TIN Province and 34 in QUANG NAM Province. The addition of RD responsibility requires the formulation of programs and plans in support of the GVN RD Program, the clearing and securing phases of pacification, as well as the follow-up phase of traditional civic action.

OBSERVATION: In this counterinsurgency environment, the G5 Section must of necessity be organized to cover the additional responsibilities incurred. It is felt the G5 Section in this environment should be organized as follows:

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5 November 1967

(RCS-GSPM-69) (U)

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When organized as outlined above the duties of the G5 would be the same as the G5 in any environment. The G5 would be responsible for RD support to GWH. The Civic Action Officer would be responsible for long range, mid range, and short range civic action programs. The Operations Officer would be responsible for the administrative functions of the section. The Interpreter/Translator would assist all personnel in the section in their dealings with the Vietnamese people and government officials. The additional clerk and drivers along with the additional equipment required will give the section the support required to perform the mission.
A


(RCS-CPFOR-65) (U)

Section 2, Part II, Recommendations:

SUBJECT: Unit Identification Code (UIC).

RECOMMENDATION: That a Unit Identification Code prefix be established for provisional units and all units subsequently attached thereto.

SUBJECT: Procurement of Specialized Office Machines.

RECOMMENDATION: That Finance Sections in need of equipment communicate directly with the U.S. Army Finance Center.

SUBJECT: Lack of Published Bunker Protective Criteria.

RECOMMENDATION: Protective criteria should be developed, published, and distributed as addendums to FM 5-34, FM 5-35, and FM 5-15.

SUBJECT: Resistance of Wet Sand or Earth to Explosive Force.

RECOMMENDATION: See discussion of same subject Section 2, Part I.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

RECOMMENDATION: Sufficient explanation be provided in FM 5-34 & 5-35 to resolve the question in the user's mind as to why wet conditions affect defensive considerations but not offensive considerations.

SUBJECT: Backup Engineer Support for Divisions or Divisional Size Task Force.

BACKGROUND: Task Force Oregon was originally planned to operate for only 90-120 days in the III MAF area of operations. Upon the extension of Task Force Oregon, announced in early June, to remain throughout the 1967 monsoon season, an urgent requirement for base camp construction came into being. Although sufficient non-Army engineers were available to perform the necessary construction, the planning design and layout remained the responsibility of the Task Force Engineer who is staffed with only that staff authorized by an Army Combat Engineer Battalion. Normal Army design and planning capability was not available (e.g., Engineer Group and Area Engineers) in the III MAF area, and non-Army design and planning capability was not available. As a result, the Task Force Engineer is faced with planning and coordinating a construction program roughly equal to that carried by an Engineer Group.

RECOMMENDATION: Whenever a divisional-sized Army force relocates outside an Army controlled area, formal arrangements must be made to provide an engineer planning and design staff to cope with whatever construction program is envisioned.

SUBJECT: Issue and Turn-In of Weapons.

BACKGROUND: Issue and turn-in of weapons. Each time a unit goes through a rotational hump, there are more people than weapons. After the rotational hump has subsided, the excess weapons must be turned in. By regulation, a unit is required to have enough weapons for the personnel assigned or as required by the TOE, whichever is greater. In most areas, this regulation is adequate. However, in Vietnam, where a weapon has much greater importance, and where overstrength is a likely situation, the regulation is not an adequate guide. Although the unit may be at the TOE strength personnel-wise and weapon-wise, the addition of one additional person will require initiation of a supply request. Since no weapons are stocked in this area, the one additional person will be without a weapon until one is flown in from outside areas or until a lateral transfer can be effected with another unit.
AVDP-03

5 November 1967


(REC-FSPOR-65) (U)

RECOMMENDATION: (U) It is recommended that each unit in Vietnam be authorized to stock additional weapons for situations such as this. The number can be determined by a percentage factor, as in the case of organizational clothing and equipment, or by an experience factor, such as ordering additional weapons for a month or two in advance of the arrival of in-coming personnel. If another rotational hump is expected shortly, the weapons could be held until the strength of the organization reverts to normal.
AVDF-CG
(RCS-GSR-R-65) (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
ROBERT H. HUGGINS
Colonel, G-3
Chief of Staff

Inclosures:

1. Task Force Oregon Organizational Structure

2. PSOPS Leaflet - (Copy 1-13 and 22-23 only)
DISTRIBUTION:

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      | Washington, D.C. 20315  
      | (Through channels) |
| 2,3  | Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
      | Department of the Army (ACSPOR, DA) |
| 4,5  | Commander in Chief  
      | United States Army Pacific  
      | ATTN: GHQ-OT  
      | APO 96558 |
| 6,7,8, | Commanding General  
         | United States Army, Vietnam  
         | ATTN: NHHC  
         | APO 96375 |
| 9,10,11 | Task Force Oregon Chief of Staff |
| 12   | Task Force Oregon History (Record Copy) |
| 13   | Task Force Oregon History |
| 14   | Task Force Oregon G1 |
| 15   | Task Force Oregon G2 |
| 16   | Task Force Oregon G3 |
| 17   | Task Force Oregon G4 |
| 18   | Task Force Oregon G5 |
| 19   | Task Force Oregon Information Officer |
| 20   | Task Force Oregon Artillery |
| 21   | Task Force Oregon AG |
| 22-30 | Task Force Oregon History (Reference) |
AVHGC-DST (5 Nov 67) 1st Ind
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 13 Dec 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Development, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, Task Force
Oregon (Americal Division) as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:
   a. Reference item concerning replacements for provisional Head-
   quarters and Headquarters Company, page 53, paragraph A: Concur. The
   problem discussed is common when a provisional unit is established. It
   was increased due to Task Force Oregon returning attached personnel to the
   parent unit without authority from this headquarters when EM did not meet
   standards. The problem was eliminated with the activation of Headquarters
   and Headquarters Company, Americal Division and the reassignment thereto
   of attached personnel. Replacements are now assigned to the Americal
   Division against TOE position vacancies.

   b. Reference item concerning Unit Identification Code (UIC), page
   53, paragraph A: Nonconcur. Paragraph 9, AR-220-5 provides for UIC only for
   units established for strength accounting purposes under DA authority, i.e.,
   TOE, TDA, MTOE and MTDA.

   c. Reference item concerning regulations, blank forms, and reference
   material, page 54: Concur. Ten USARV publication packets were provided to
   the AG, Task Force Oregon, upon its activation.

   d. Reference item concerning authorized number of Order of Battle
   Personnel, page 54. Authorization can be increased by justified trade-off
   spaces.

   e. Reference item concerning specialized office equipment, page 55.
   The Americal Division is aware of procedures to obtain equipment excess to
   authorized allowances. Type of equipment required should be identified and
   requests processed in the same manner as for any other additional equipment
   required above authorization.

   f. Reference item concerning in-country R&R to China Beach, page 55:
   Concur. The China Beach facility is operated by the Marines, and Army
   personnel in the I Corps area are permitted to use it on a quota basis.
AVHGC-DST
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Although improvements are planned by the Marines, this facility does not offer much more than the beach facilities presently existing at Chu Lai.

g. Reference item concerning personnel, page 57: Concur. This headquarters has advised DA of the current Warrant Officer, Legal Administrative Technical shortage in the Americal Division. DA advises that the 1968 fill for Warrant Officer, Legal Administrative Technicians is being completed and that the Americal Division should receive relief in the near future.

h. Reference item concerning General Court-Martial jurisdiction and reduction of enlisted personnel, page 57: Concur. Normally when the attachment of units is expected to cover a long period of time, General Court-Martial jurisdiction should be granted in the attachment order. However, the situation in this case required Task Force Oregon to remain operational beyond the initially anticipated 60-90 day period.

i. Reference item concerning personnel, page 58: Concur. Every effort should be made to provide personnel who will be available for full time duty during the initial phase of operations. This problem is being corrected through assignment of officers and enlisted personnel who will have a full tour of duty with newly formed Americal Division.

j. Reference item concerning officer training, page 62: Concur. The CONARC Liaison Team visit devoted considerable effort to evaluating CONUS school programs. The visit resulted in a number of recommended changes in Artillery School training. Approval has been given by the Chief of Staff of the Army to lengthen the Artillery Officer Basic Course by three weeks in order to provide additional gunnery and fire direction training for new artillery officers. Recommendations were made that training be increased in the following areas:

(1) FDC and firing battery operations.

(2) Team drill.

(3) RVN clearance procedures.

(4) Forward observer techniques.

k. Reference item concerning dust suppression, page 63. In addition to the MTOE action, the Americal Division is scheduled to receive four 600-gallon, trailer mounted, asphalt distributors prior to the end of the year, under the ENSURE program.
AVHGC-DST  
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

1. Reference item concerning backup engineer support, page 63.  
Base construction and LOC upgrading in the I CTZ area are assigned responsibilities of COMNAVFORV, under MACV Directive 10-11. It is understood that the Naval Mobile Construction Battalions and the Fleet Marine Force Battalions in the area have accepted and have been discharging requirements placed upon them. In addition to the survey capability of the 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat), the brigade engineer companies each have their own organic survey capability.

m. Reference item concerning authorized equipment for provisional units, page 69. USARV General Orders 1746, dated 16 April 1967 authorizes equipment for the Americal Division Intelligence Detachment (Provisional). Temporary loan is applicable as approved by this headquarters. Headquarters which organize a provisional unit are responsible for logistical support IAW AR 220-5. The cited General Order states equipment will be provided from USARV assets.

3. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

t/C. S. NAKATSUKASA  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

cc:  
Hq, Task Force Oregon (Americal Division)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for quarterly period ending 31 July 1967
(RCS-OSPOR-65) (U)

TASK FORCE OREGON ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
AS OF 31 JULY 1967

TASK FORCE OREGON TROOPS

HHC, Task Force Oregon (Prov)
14th Avn Bn
71st Aslt Hprtr Co
161st Aslt Hprtr Co
174th Aslt Hprtr Co
176th Aslt Hprtr Co
178th Aslt Hprtr Co
39th Engr Bn (Cbt)
509th Sig Bn, HHD (-)
Co C, 459th Sig Bn (Spt Op)
Flt (+), 167th Radio Relay Co
258th AG Frg Svs Co
148th MP Flt
3d Mil Hist Det
Task Force Military Intelligence Detachment (Prov)
Task Force Radio Research Co (Prov)

TASK FORCE OREGON ARTILLERY (PROV)

HHB, Task Force Artillery (Prov)
2d Bn, 11th Arty (155 T)
3d Bn, 16th Arty (155 T)
3d Bn, 18th Arty (8"/175 SP)
Flt, Btry C, 29th Arty (Searchlight)

TASK FORCE OREGON SUPPORT COMMAND (PROV)

HHC (-), 15th Spt Bde (GS)
HHC (-), 94th Sup & Svc Bn (DS)
221st Sup & Svc Co
163d Trans Co (Lt Trk)
3d Flt, 10th Trans Co (Med Trk)
Co C, 25th Med Bn
Hq and Main Spt Co, 188th Maint Bn
335th Trans Co (DS) (Acft Maint)

3D BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

HHC, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
1st Bn, 35th Inf
2d Bn, 35th Inf

Inclosure 1
OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1967

Trp C, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav
Co C, 2d Bn, 34th Armd
2d Bn, 9th Arty (105 T)
Co D, 25th Spt Bn (Frvv)
Co B, 25th Med Bn
Co C, 725th Maint Bn
Det, 25th S & T Bn
40th Inf Flt, Scout Dog
Det, 25th Admn Co
Th C, 41st CA Co
Det, 374th Radio Research Co
Th, 25th MI Det
Co B (-), 125th Sig Bn
Flt, 25th MP Co

196th LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 196th Lt Inf Bde
2d Bn, 1st Inf
3d Bn, 21st Inf
4th Bn, 31st Inf
1st Bn, 116th Inf, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
2d Sqdn, 11th Armd Cav Regt
Trp F, 17th Cav
3d Bn, 82d Arty (105 T)
8th Obh Svc Spt Bn
8th CA Plt, 2d CA Co
10th PI Det
27th Obh Det (CBR)
569th MI Det
508th Radio Research Det
175th Engr Co (Cbt)
156th Sig Flt (Fwd Area)
48th Inf Flt, Scout Dog
54th MP Flt
28th Mil Hist Det
4th Flt (-), Co E, 3d AMTRAC Bn (USMC)

1ST BRIGADE, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION

HHC, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
1st Bn, 327th Inf (Abn)
2d Bn, 327th Inf (Abn)
2d Bn, 502d Inf (Abn)
Trp A, 17th Cav
2d Bn, 320th Arty (105 T)
Co A, 326th Engr Bn (Cbt) (Abn)
Co A (Fwd Spt), 501st Obh Spt Bn
501st Obh Spt Co

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