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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period Ending 31 July 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257
31 July 1967
This Operational Report — Lessons Learned is the fourth submitted by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment since its arrival in the Republic of Vietnam.

It has been prepared in accordance with AR 1-19 and covers the quarter 1 May 1967 thru 31 July 1967. Pertinent facts concerning the regiment's combat operations, civic action activities and base camp development during the quarter are included in this report.

Col. R. W. Farley
Colonel, Armor
Commanding.
SECTION I

Significant Organization Activities

1. General
2. Personnel and Administration
3. Intelligence
4. Combat Operations
5. Training
6. Aviation
7. Logistics
8. Psychological Operations and Civic Action
9. Personnel Requirements for Base Camp Operation

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2. Recommendations

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2. Map - 1/250,000, 3 Corps Tactical Zone, Cpt Squadron
3. Map - 1/250,000, 3 Corps Tactical Zone, Regimental Tactical Area of Interest
4. 11th Armored Cavalry Organizational Structure
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6. Biographies of Key Officers Personnel
7. Switchboard Diagrams
8. Operation Manhattan - Combat Operation After Action Report (Omitted)
11. 21 Nov 1967 Ambush After Action Report
12. Roster of Personnel Receiving Awards and Decorations - 1 May 67 to 31 July 67

*13. FDACS Instructors
   * Withdrawn, Hqs, DA
**Operation: Dallas, Withdrawn, Hqs, DA; Combat After Action Report 57X179
**Operation Akron, Withdrawn, Hqs, DA; Combat After Action Report 57X179
OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1967.

SECTION I

1. (U) GENERAL. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued operations against the Viet Cong in the Third Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ) with the 2nd Squadron of the Blackhorse Regiment continuing to provide cavalry support for Task Force GREN in the First Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ).

The areas of operation during this reporting period were concentrated primarily in the regiment's Tactical Area of Responsibility (TACO), and Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI). Initially, however, the regiment participated in Operation HANDEYTO, a multi-divisional thrust into the LONG BIENH Secret Zone, long the suspected headquarters of the IV Military Region. This operation, with the regiment under operational control of the 1st Infantry Division, terminated on 23 May.

On the 26th of May, the 9th Infantry Division assumed operational control (OPCON) of the Blackhorse Regiment. The OPCON status was changed to attachment on 1 June. During the month of June, the regiment conducted counter-insurgency operations in the LONG BIENH, BIEN HOI, and PHUOC TUY Provinces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). It participated in Operation GRENCH under control of the 9th Infantry Division, and in operation QUICKSILVER, in support of the 18th ARVN Division, which continued into the month of July.

After a short period of rest and maintenance following the termination of QUICKSILVER on 2 July, the 1st Squadron of the Blackhorse Regiment participated in Operation HANDEYTO under the control of the 1st Australian Task Force. The regiment augmented by the ARVN 52nd Ranger Battalion, commenced Operation HAMSTEIN on 21 July. At 210930H July the 3rd Squadron, while moving to the area of operations (AO), was ambushed by a reinforced battalion of the 275th VC Regiment.

The development of the Blackhorse Base Camp continued on schedule. The perimeter defenses were completed, as were the Post Exchange and Army Post Office facilities. Some progress was made in construction of permanent living quarters and administrative buildings by self-help programs. The ice plant became functional on a full time basis. The Tactical Command bunker was 95% finished and became operational on 31 July. Improvement of perimeter positions continued, and revetments for regimental aircraft were under construction. The airfield was approved for use by USAF C-130s, thus providing fixed-wing transportation and support for the base camp. Construction was initiated on a finance center; the base camp amphitheater was 80% completed.

Units of the 11th Armored Cavalry were continuously engaged in combat operations against the Viet Cong. Operations varied from troop to regimental size during the quarter.

A regimental change of command ceremony was conducted at the forward command post on 8 May 1967. Colonel Roy W. Farley assumed command of the Blackhorse Regiment from Colonel William W. Cobb, while the 11th Armored Cavalry was participating in Operation HAMSTEIN.

In July there were changes in command of both the 1st and 3rd Squadrons. Lieutenant Colonel Hillman Dickinson assumed command of the 3rd Squadron from Lieutenant Colonel Arthur F. Cochran on 2 July 1967. Lieutenant Colonel Marvin B. Howell relinquished command of the 1st Squadron to Lieutenant Colonel James H. Holt on 12 July 1967. In addition Captain William J. Scharrett assumed command of the 919th Engineer Company on 20 July 1967.

2. (U) Personnel and Administration.

a. General. During the quarter, the overall strength of the regiment remained relatively constant. While overall an adequate number of replacements were received, a critical shortage of officers existed during June and the first half of July.
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b. Personnel.

(1) Strength.

(a) Strength figures by month are as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Auth</th>
<th>Aprd</th>
<th>PDY</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1112</td>
<td>1379</td>
<td>1356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1112</td>
<td>1304</td>
<td>1315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>1112</td>
<td>1267</td>
<td>1379</td>
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(b) Hospital Returnees. During the quarter, 153 personnel were returned to duty after being hospitalized. This figure does not include 2nd Squadron returnees, who were processed through Task Force Oregon.

(c) Casualties.

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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>HU</th>
<th>HMA</th>
<th>NH</th>
<th>NEC</th>
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<tr>
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<td>98</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
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d. MOS Shortages. During the last part of June and all of July, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment underwent a massive MSO lift and thus experienced particularly high density MOS short-gaps. Particularly significant was the shortage of MOSs in the grades of E-5 and E-6.

e. Replacements. Quality of replacement personnel remained high. Training level of all persons was acceptable.

f. Services.

(1) Religious. A total of ninety-four Protestant services were held with 1092 attendees. Thirteen of the services were weekly services. One hundred fourteen Catholic services were performed, 76 of them on weekdays, with a total attendance of 3388. These figures do not include 2nd Squadron.

(2) Red Cross. During May, June and July, a total of 81 cases were handled. Fifty-one loans were processed, resulting in $97.55 in cash being loaned to members of the regiment. Thirty-six emergency leaves were granted.

(3) Special Services. During this period, first-run movies were scheduled on the Vietnam circuit and were shown in troop areas and clubs. A covered stage for USO and soldier talent shows was erected, and a loudspeaker system provided. A lending library service was provided with outstanding results.

(4) Postal. Postal operations during the period improved and service was provided to field locations. Binary order clerks were transferred to field locations on a rotating basis and provided service for all personnel.

(5) Red Cross Clubmobile. Clubmobile service was provided to all units on Blackhorse Base Camp, and daily runs were established. Clubmobile service was also provided to other units using the base camp as a staging area as well as units in Khe Sanh and Con Na. The efforts of the unit continued to make significant contributions to the morale of the Blackhorse.

g. Post Exchange. The PX facility had the following dollar volume by months: May = $16,979.59, June = $174,566.68, July = $230,575.24. Increases were due to expanded building facilities, an aggressive procurement program, and more purchasing power due to excellent turnover in inventory. A permanent building was erected to increase greatly available display space.
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9. Morale. Morale continued to be high. New PX facilities and increased Special Services activities contributed to this situation.

h. Information activities. Throughout the period, information coverage for the regiment increased, and a total of 1211 editorial, pictorial, and radio releases were made during the quarter. The number of media representatives visiting the regiment increased, totaling thirty-six arrivals during the three month period.

1. Awards and Decorations. The following awards and decorations were presented during the quarter (most of those approved had been initiated prior to 1 May 67):

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<td>149</td>
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3. Prisoners of War. During the period, a detachment of 1 officer and 18 enlisted men from the 720th Military Police Battalion, was located at the Blackhorse Base Camp which greatly enhanced the security and transport of POW. The detachment worked with the 51st MI and provided prisoner security in forward locations and in the base camp. A POW compound was constructed on the base camp to give further security.

k. Maintenance of discipline, law and order.

(1) Courts-Martial. During the quarter, the regiment processed the following Courts-Martial, by type:

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<th>General</th>
<th>Special</th>
<th>Summary</th>
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<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
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(2) Serious Incidents. There was one serious incident reported, involving a traffic accident between a US military vehicle and a Vietnamese.

(3) A general increase in Military-Police Reports was noted, due to establishment of formal MP patrols on the base camp. Many of the discrepancies had previously been handled by tenant and lodger units and had not forwarded through this headquarters. No noticeable upward trend in incidents or violations was discovered.

3. (c) INTELLIGENCE:

a. VC Activity: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued throughout the quarter to operate at will within VC controlled areas and base camps. There were four major operations which took the Blackhorse Regiment into the heart of the VC dominated areas in War Zone "C", the HAT DICH Secret Zone, HAT TAO Secret Zone, and for the first time into War Zone "D". During these and other operations, the VC reacted with sporadic defense and harassment. In addition there were two major ambushes, one on National Highway 1 on 210820H May, vicinity VTJ2003 to.

Page 2
Despite the increased number of VM initiated incidents, the regiment suffered only light personal casualties and vehicle damage.

(1) During Operation NAMAHATTA, which terminated on 120230H May, enemy contact was light and sporadic, primarily characterized by mining and RRO-2 incidents. Mines were employed most frequently in areas which, because of vegetation or relief, hindered mechanized movement. The increasing frequency with which mines and RRO-2 weapons were encountered indicates an enhanced capability to counterarmored units by delaying movement and inflicting casualties. During the operation, numerous lightly defended base camps and supply caches were found, of which two in particular noted the regiment a wealth of VM ammunition. On 5 May, the regimental command post and training area received a mortar attack of sixty rounds. There were several instances of contact, all with small sized elements primarily from the 81st Base Service Group protecting the base camps and supply caches in the area. Enemy personnel losses for the operation were fifty-two VM KIA (11C), fifteen KIA (POSS) and eleven俘虏. Enemy arms and equipment captured included twelve small arms, 286 grenades, fifty-five RRO-2 launchers, 133,683 rounds of small arms, 128 mortar rounds, eleven RRO-2 rounds, thirty antitank mines and 101 time bombs (explosive charges with clocks wired into the electrical detonating system). There were 960 fortifications and 167 small structures destroyed and there were three rounds of grain, 137.7 tons of rice, and seventy-five tons of salt located.

(2) Operation KITT HAWK was resumed 121200H May, with only one major enemy contact. On 21 May, a platoon sized element (seven ACAVs, one tank, one 28 ton howitzer, one ten ton truck) from the 3rd Squadron was ambushed by an estimated reinforced VM Battalion (believed to be but not confirmed from the 27th VM Regiment) vicinity 1357263 to 1359063, VM losses were twenty-eight KIA (11C), two KIA (BD), five KIA (POSS). On 20 May, Troop K, 3rd Squadron, at GIA A7 Rock Quarry received fifteen rounds of mortar fire (estimated 82trm). All of the rounds landed outside of the perimeter, and there were no casualties or damage.

(3) The 1st Squadron, attached to the 1st Infantry Division, participated in Operation DALLS from 11 May to 22 May, marking the first time elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment entered War Zone D. During the operation, one significant contact was made with elements of the 273rd VM Regiment resulting in eleven VM KIA (11C). Mechanized movement in the area of operation was good to excellent except in the eastern sector where dense forest and numerous streams caused movement. Total enemy personnel losses were: nineteen VM KIA (11C), three KIA (POSS). Equipment captured included four small arms, two automatic weapons, thirty-one grenades, the RRO-2 launcher, 35.3 tons of rice and .75 tons of salt.

(4) Operation KONG found the normally well occupied VM HAT DOD Secret Zone very lightly defended. On 19 June, the VM once again displayed their ability to attack lightly defended bases by conducting a counterstorm action consisting of a ground, mortar, and recoilless rifle attack by elements of the 1st Battalion, 27th VM Regiment reinforced with heavy weapons. The attack was made against the 3rd Squadron Command Post and fire support base and resulted in fifty-six VM KIA (30). Generally, mechanized movement varied from fair to good, being restricted primarily by streams which canalized movement, and areas of dense jungle. Enemy personnel losses for the operation were sixty-five KIA (30) and three VM KIA (11C). Equipment captured was: thirty-three small arms, fire RRO-2, 100 grenades, 22,315 rounds of small arms, five recoilless rifle rounds, ten RRO-2 rounds, and thirteen antitank mines. There were 660 fortifications, and forty-four small structures destroyed. There were: 18.3 tons of rice and .8 tons of salt located.

(5) Operation EMPATH took the Mocchboro Regiment north along National Highway 20 to the Corps boundary on a road clearing mission. On 200907 July, L Troop, 3rd Squadron moving north on Highway 20 on a road clearing operation was ambushed by elements of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 27th VM Regiment and the DOO Provincial Main Force Battalion from vicinity Y1133317 to Y1133037. L Troop received
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Recoilless rifle and small arms and automatic weapons fire from both sides of the road. Contact was broken at 1230, with ninety-six 81mm. and one 105mm. (HE).  

b. VC Losses:

(1) Personnel: 263 KIA (30), ten KIA (60), thirty-two WIA (POS), seven KM (POS), eighty-two dead/killed; twelve PVA; four GHEU KIA, twenty-one civil defendants, forty-five innocent civilians.

(2) Weapons and Ammunition: 784 recoilless rifle rounds; two 105mm. mortars; one 57mm. mortars, one 250 lbs. bomb; two 105mm. artillery rounds; sixteen 81mm. mortors; seventeen .50 cal. machine guns; twenty-two 82mm. mortors; one 120mm. howitzer; two 60mm. mortors; two 122mm. howitzers; two 155mm. howitzers; two 81mm. mortors; two 75mm. guns; two 60mm. mortors; one 106mm. rocket launcher; one 155mm. howitzer; one 122mm. howitzer; one 105mm. howitzer.

(3) Foodstuffs: Forty-three tons rice, 8,5 tons salt, 100 lbs. potatoes, 7,200 lbs. beans, 10 lbs. meat, 100 lbs. potatoes.

(4) Miscellaneous: Six ax, six cless, 114 lbs. documents, 67 lbs. clothing, twenty rooms, twenty mattresses, 37 lbs. wire, one sand table, three trucks, one bulldozer, one ending machine, nineteen lbs. medical supplies, fourteen bicycles, bicycle parts, one barber cut, 1200 lbs. cement, one gas mask, two foot-bridges, one rice mill, thirty-two sheets roofing tin, one outboard motor, eight clock, fifteen matches, ten large bolts of canvas cloth, seventy-seven small boats, 20,000 lbs. military equipment, one radios, thirty-two batteries, one typewriter, seven sweetmeats, thirty-five pine pails, three medical kits, seventeen tunnels, 1025 bunkers, 152 footmiles, 115 structures, and six mortar positions.

c. Intelligence Sources:

(1) A targeting study was conducted of Viet Cong facilities found during Operation MINI in the "WIN RED" Secret Zone. There were forty installations provided in the intelligence bulletin and of these, twenty-four were found to fall within 500 meters of the suspected location. These facilities included: fortifications, base areas, training areas, fox holes, and miscellaneous ordnance, signal and medical installations. A comparison of each of these locations with previously reported intelligence information shows that 66% of the suspected location fell within a 180 to 200 meter average distance from the suspected given location. A similar study was conducted comparing suspected enemy locations with the actual locations found on Operation MINI. Of the 120 given locations, forty-two (35%) were found to fall within 500 meters of the actual location. The average distance of radial error (100 to 150 meters) was significantly less than compared with the 150 to 200 meter radial error found on Operation MINI. The correlation is still high enough to warrant detailed consideration of the VC Installation list when targeting for or searching during an operation.

(2) RED HAZE: Red Haze still proves useful in detecting VC units, bases and rest areas. There has been a noticeable lack of significant returns in the Blackhorse Unit and areas of operation during the quarter, partly due to the number of missions aborted because of bad weather and the possibility that the VC may have altered their cooking hours to counter Red Haze detection. A change in mission times will be tried in the future to determine if better results can be obtained.

(3) BLINDS: During the quarter numerous BLIND Missions were flown but again bad weather caused some missions to be aborted. Readings received provided possible locations for BLIND fires.

(4) PHOTOGRAPHS: Utilization of the hand held camera with telephoto lens, equipped with four lenses, has proven to be a valuable asset to the regiment throughout the quarter, providing spot photography on a more timely basis than before. The 9th Infantry Division organic aerial photographs capability provided rapid response to operational and intelligence gathering processes for the regiment during Operation HUNTER, KITTY HAWK, and EXPRESS.
5. During the latter part of this quarter an additional intelligence gathering source was made available to the regiment. This was a "People Sniffer", a device which detects personnel concentrations by measuring the amount of ammonia in the air. This additional source has been used almost daily with outstanding results. Because of its high reliability, future plans call for its extensive use, particularly in covering convoys in remote areas, along known VC lines of communications, suspected base camp areas, and rallying points.

6. F. and Documents: Rapid interrogation and dissemination of F. information aided in the identification and location of enemy units and facilities. Sniffers, when used within areas with which they are familiar, proved useful and profitable in locating VC installations and facilities.

7. Agent reports: These reports constituted the bulk of intelligence reports received by the regiment. The majority of these reports were of doubtful value unless corroborated by other intelligence sources.

4. Combat Operations

a. General

1. Background: On 22 April, the 2nd Squadron moved to join Task Force 61-32G, per Operation Plan (LGEN 1-17, M. Memo to Task Force 61-32G, dated 19 March 1967 (See chap. Section III, inclosure 2). See Camp security, provided primarily by the 4th Squadron and the Regimental Support Group, was assumed by the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, 9th Infantry Division. Operation Highball commenced on 23 April 1967 (See Operation Plan (LGEN 1-17, 5th Cavalry, 9th Infantry Division). The regiment's general planning guidance was provided by II Field Force, Vietnam, Letter of Instruction (LFI 7-26) for the 1967-1968 campaign plan for 1967.

2. Key: At the beginning of the reporting period, the regiment (--) continued Operation HARDWALK (See map, Section III, inclosure 3), a search and destroy operation, in the LRGN Notch Secret Zone. The 1st and 3rd Squadrons led the multi-divisional force, again proving the versatility of the Blackhorse Regiment by the penetration of jungle terrain hitherto accessible only to infantry troops. Because the enemy was continually pursued, he was not able to concentrate his forces for a major assault upon the armor columns. In fact, the armored cavalry forces were able, in many instances, to seize and destroy enemy base camps, food and ammunition caches with few casualties because of the haste of the Viet Cong (VC) departure. The employment of saturation schemes as well as stay behind and sniper patrols proved to be very successful in surprising the enemy when he returned to a base area after the sweep was completed. (See combat after action report, Section III, inclosure 8)

Upon termination of HARDWALK on 12 May, the regiment (--) rendezvoused back to Blackhorse under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. On reaching base camp on 12 May, the regiment, now minus both the 1st and 2nd Squadrons, resumed Operation KITTY HAWK, a continuing operation within the regiment's Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) (See map, Section III, inclosures 1 and 3). Operation KITTY HAWK was initiated 15 February 1967 under guidance provided by II Field Force, Vietnam, Letter of Instruction (LFI 7-26) for the 1967-1968 campaign plan for 1967.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Squadron, now under operational control of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, was preparing for Operation DALLAS which began on 17 May. This was a search and destroy operation and was the first Blackhorse venture into War Zone "D". The 3rd Squadron participated in Operation DALLAS until 20 May and returned to regimental control on 27 May. (See combat after action report, Section III, inclosure 9)

On 21 May, the 1st Platoon, Team K, was ambushed by a reinforced Viet Cong battalion approximately one kilometer west of SVN 38C (175906). Team K was providing security for an element of the 939th Engineer Company at the Gia Rat Rock Quarry (175909), as part of Operation KITTY HAWK. The 1st Platoon, at the time of the ambush, was conducting a resupply run along National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 2. (See Section III, inclosure 11; Ambush Action Report)
I was stricken

Provinces of the Republic of Vietnem Operation領域 was initiated on 9 June by the 9th Infantry with the 11th Armored Cavalry attached to seek out and destroy Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Forces in the "RED ZONE" Special Zone. Participating forces under operational control or direct support to the Blackburn were 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry (-), 35th Ranger Battalion (RNZ), 32d Ranger Battalion (RNA), and elements of the 9th Division Artillery. Contact throughout the operation was sporadic with a major contact with elements of the 29th VC Regiment on 15 June. This engagement, called the BATTLE OF SLOPE 3, began at 130215 (19) June, when elements of the 1st Battalion, 27th VC Regiment, reinforced with heavy weapons, initiated a mortar, recoiless rifle and ground attack against the 3rd Squadron Command Post (GP) and Fire Support Patrol Base secured by Troop E (See Section III, Annex A to Enclosure 10, Table of Slope 30). The regiment terminated participation in Operation ALAMO on 27 June (See combat after action report, Section III, enclosure 10).

On the same day, the 1st Squadron was committed to reinforce elements of the 16th Armored Division in Operation QUICKSILVER. The 27th Division had launched an attack earlier in the day in order to disrupt the advance of two battalions of the 217th VC Regiment which had crossed the RED ZONE River from War Zone S (1730352). Forces under the operational control of the regiment (-) were 2nd Battalion, 159th Infantry; 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery (-); 3 Battery, 2nd Battalion) 5th Artillery; and Troop J, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry. During the operation; the 1st Squadron secured the air landing and extraction of elements of the 2nd Battalion, 159th Infantry and conducted aggressive search and destroy operations. The 1st Australian Task Force reinforced two Fire Support bases (FSB) during the operation. The entire operation was performed in conjunction with the 16th Armored Division. The close coordination between the US and SVN units resulted in extensive and profitable use of FOM and GREN zone as guides to enemy positions.

The Blackhorse Regiment (-) continued Operation QUICKSILVER periodically throughout the month of June. This consisted of road clearing (RECONNAISSANCE) operations along National Highways 1 and 20, Interprovincial Route 2, and search and destroy operations in the Blackhorse Tactical Area of Interest (2024). Major emphasis was placed on the Revolutionary Development Program, cordon and search operations in hamlets and villages, the Medical Civic Program (RECON) and other civic action projects.

(4) July: The regiment (-) continued direct support of the 16th Armored Division in Operation QUICKSILVER until it was terminated on 2 July. The 1st Squadron closed Blackhorse Base Camp at 021501 (4) July.

Following a short period for rest and maintenance, the 1st Squadron moved, under the operational control of the 1st Australian Task Force, on 8 July to participate in Operation PARKINGTON. This operation, of multi-brigade size, was conducted by the 9th Infantry Division in conjunction with the 1st Australian Task Force and 6th Forces. Initially, the 1st Squadron conducted a tactical march from ICBM 0110 (19 4977) to NINIBAT (10 2977). On 10 July, they made the main attack up route 320 (via 20 0777) while two battalions of the 1st Bn, 9th Infantry Division, occupied blocking positions south of Route 320, and the units of the 1st Australian Task Force occupied blocking positions east of the attacking 1st Squadron. On 13 July after securing their objective, the 1st Battalion linked up with the RVN Marines. They continued to support the Marines and conduct clearing and securing missions along Route 320 until 15 July.

On 15 July, the 1st Squadron terminated participation in Operation PARKINGTON and reverted to regimental control.

Operation EXPATRIA was initiated 210706 (5) July with the 3rd Squadron conducting a road march along National Highway 20 to secure engineer route clearing operations. At 210708 (5) July the Squadron was ambushed by elements of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 279th VC Regiment, reinforced by elements of the ICBM 0110 (19 4977) to NINIBAT (10 2977). On 10 July, they made the main attack up route 320 (via 20 0777) while two battalions of the 1st Bn, 9th Infantry Division, occupied blocking positions south of Route 320, and the units of the 1st Australian Task Force occupied blocking positions east of the attacking 1st Squadron. On 13 July after securing their objective, the 1st Battalion linked up with the RVN Marines. They continued to support the Marines and conduct clearing and securing missions along Route 320 until 15 July.

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(5) Miscellaneous: Plans were initiated to improve the defensive posture of Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces (RVF) facilities within the ICBM by providing barrier materials, communications and ready reaction forces. Operation
b. Engineer Activities.

(1) Combat Support. Combat engineer support for the regiment was provided principally by the 919th Engineer Company (directed) with the limited assistance provided by the 27th Engineer Battalion (6).

During the first week in May, elements of the 919th Engineer Company were still engaged in Operation KANGAYAM. The 1st and 3rd Platoons were supporting the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, which was attached to the 1st Infantry Division. The 2nd Platoon was supporting the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry of the 1st Infantry Division. These search and destroy operations were centered around Tan Son Nhut and Long Xuyen.

The platoons found one mine of undetermined origin and a 250 pound bomb and 155mm round which had been recovered by the enemy and used as mines.

The 1st Platoon destroyed 155 fortified positions, which consisted of two and four man foxholes, Upon termination of Operation KANGAYAM, on 11 May 1967, the company moved back to Blackhorse Base Camp.

In June the 919th Engineer Company with elements of the 99th Engineer Company, 27th Engineer Battalion, and the 15th Engineer Battalion was vigorously engaged in a land clearing operation near Gia RY. The combined engineer force cleared approximately 150 acres of heavily forested land.

During Operation PADDINGTON (8-15 July), combat support consisted of bunker destruction, mine sweeping and building of foxholes in support of search and destroy missions. Following PADDINGTON the 919th Engineer Company assisted in the development of Blackhorse Base Camp until the 21st of July when the company (1) moved out on Operation 273410A. While employed along Highway 20 (71698) in support of the Blackhorse Regiment, the headquarters of the 919th Engineer Company supplied material for the Regional and Popular Forces outposts along the highway.

The 1st Platoon, in support of the 1st Squadron, was employed in reinforcing the highway, vicinity T354275. The 3rd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company, supporting the 3rd Squadron, supplied the RF/FF with material and assisted them in constructing positions along Highway 20. Material used consisted of 110 rolls of concertina, 65,000 sandbags, eighty long pickets and twenty short pickets. In addition, the 3rd Platoon stocked 168 rolls of concertina wire, 160 long pickets, sixty short pickets and 20,000 sandbags in the sub-sector advisors headquarters.

During each of these operations, a small detachment from the 919th Engineer Company remained at Blackhorse to assist in the development and betterment of the base camp. This rear detachment completed the Regimental Tactical Operations Center, three semi-permanent buildings for the Air-Cavalry Troop, a Regtional Replacement School and the Headquarters and Headquarters Troop Supply Point.

(2) Base Development: Progress on the base camp continued to move on schedule in spite of the loss of engineer resources during the quarter for tactical missions. The 27th Engineer Battalion, along with elements of the 919th Engineer Company, continued to provide the engineer assets necessary for the development of the base camp.

The Regimental Headquarters, Tactical Operations Center and numerous other administrative buildings, to include the Army Post Office, Post Exchange and a Finance Office, were completed during this quarter. The camp drainage system, of major importance during this monsoon season, was completed. Work continued on the drainage ditches in the form of reshaping and repairing whenever necessary. EQ facilities for the Regimental Headquarters were completed and are occupied. Mess halls have been erected, and a total of thirty-six billets were completed. One more hospital ward was finished. The logistical support element had three
large supply sheds, one vegetable shed, one canteen store and office, two direct exchange and self-service facilities and one repair parts building erected during the quarter. These add greatly to their ability to support the regiment.

An operational ice plant, started last quarter, was completed. Water continues to be provided by a spring fed lake. During this quarter, 3,125,758 gallons of potable water were consumed; of this total, there were 784,796 gallons in May, 970,362 gallons in June and 1,370,600 gallons in July.

c. Chemical Activities.

(1) Defoliation and clearing. The area of National Route 2 along Hill 300 (117403) and the cemetery (117403) about 5 km from the Blackhorse Base Camp have been cleared using HJ-2 Flamethrowers. Both of these areas offered good concealment, and were frequented by snipers and used for mine placement. For a more persistent effect, these two areas are presently being defoliated. The growth around the Gia Ray Rock Quarry was such that the Viet Cong could easily move close to the perimeter undetected. This perimeter has been defoliated. The defoliation of the Blackhorse Base Camp perimeter in order to provide a more effective field of fire is a continuing operation.

(2) CS Drops. The Chemical Section and 33rd Chemical Detachment participated in no ROA drops during the reporting period.

(3) Explosive Ordnance Disposal. Although this is not a primary function of the 33rd Chemical Detachment, the detachment has rendered safe or exploded various munitions as a service to the units on the Blackhorse Base Camp. The list of munitions includes 179 rounds, a 3/4 ton truck load of various unusable armaments, and a damaged Claymore Mine rendered safe. The enemy munitions rendered safe included 12 grenades, 2 rifle grenades, 1 large Claymore mine, 2 parachute type grenades, and 2 RPG-2 Rocket Launcher rounds.

(4) Training Conducted by the 33rd Chemical Detachment. The detachment conducted training for new replacements on CBR operations and equipment that is being used in the Republic of Vietnam. This training includes conducting a gas chamber exercise for replacements as an opportunity to fit and test the operation of their protective masks.

(5) Training Received by the chemical detachment. Personnel of the chemical detachment were trained in the operation and maintenance of the Personnel Detector. The training was conducted by personnel of the 9th Infantry Division Chemical Section. The regiment requested three Personnel Detectors which will be laterally transferred from the 173rd Airborne Brigade. They are expected to arrive in August or early September.

d. Signal Activities.

(1) During the months of May, June and July, signal activities within the regiment were varied in nature. On 12 May, the regiment terminated Operation HANGTAN and returned to the base camp. The remainder of May and part of June and July were spent in installing a security bunker telephone system around the Blackhorse base camp perimeter. In addition, work continued on base camp development to include the rerouting and balancing of the Headquarters power distribution system, the acquisition of two 100 kw generators from PA&E, the wiring of new headquarters buildings and the preparation of the Regimental TOC for occupancy.

(2) During the period 22 July to 31 July, the regiment participated in Operation EXPORA, in which the Regimental CP moved to a forward area. This operation was a good shakedown for the regiment, as many personnel were new. VHF, telephone circuit and Communications Center Support were provided by elements of the 9th Signal Battalion, 9th Infantry Division. These facilities afforded the regiment direct circuits to the Blackhorse Base Camp, 9th Infantry Division, 19th ARVN and 34th Artillery Group.
(3) On returning to the Blackhorse Base Camp the new Regional TAC was occupied. Two sixty-five foot wood poles were obtained on which air RF antennas for the regiment, one VHF antenna and one VHF antenna for the Air Liaison Team (US Air Force) were mounted. Power for all communications equipment is provided through the use of a rectifier, heavy duty batteries and AC power from the Regional Headquarters 100 KW generator. This eliminates the necessity of small size generators which have not been completely reliable for the power levels required.

(b) Permanent base camp communications, provided by the 1st Platoon, 59th Signal Company, continued to improve. The unit is in the process of changing over to permanent telephone cables, moving the switchboard, VHF terminals, switchboard and communications center into a permanent type building.

a. Support

(1) Air Force

(a) General: During this period the entire Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) became established at LGU ZS20. Parking facilities and facilities were completed by self-help. Living quarters were improved and new house all TACP personnel. Many of the operational problems that existed when the FAC's and O-1 aircraft were located at MEM RCA have been eliminated by this move. Reactie time to the 11th Armored Cavalry Tactical Air requests has been improved considerably. The acquisition of a third O-1 in July increased FAC coverage available to the regiment.

(b) Resources:

1. Aircraft: The unit now has three O-1 aircraft assigned. All aircraft are located at LGU ZS20.

2. Personnel: During this period, the TACP has suffered almost a complete changeover of personnel.

a. Officers: The unit maintained an average strength of six officer personnel during this period. However, there were new personnel who had to undergo a checkout prior to replacing the experienced FAC who were leaving.

b. Enlisted: Enlisted personnel manning consists of one NCO and seven radio repairmen/operators and two O-1 aircraft crewchiefs. A temporary shortage existed while new personnel underwent a training program.

(c) Operations: During this period, the TACP supported several major operations. Even though the regiment remained under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division, the FAC and O-1 aircraft, after coordination with ALO of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, staged out of AMF TND. By deploying closer to the regiment, closer coordination and less reaction time were achieved.

(d) Problem Areas: FAC communications problems still existed throughout this period. The suspension date for the new service radios, scheduled to be installed in O-1 aircraft, has been moved to September.

STATISTICAL DATA ON AIR FORCE SUPPORT

May - July 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>SORTIES FLOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visual Reconnaissance</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward Air Control</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy Escort</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Strikes</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Page 10
(2) Artillery

(a) General: Artillery fire support provided during the quarter assumed two principle roles: one, support of ground operations and secondary, the delivery of harassing and interdicting (HI) fires. The organic howitzer batteries continued direct support missions for their squadrons with reinforcing fires being provided by the 54th Artillery Group in the Blackhorse TAOL, TAOI, and areas of operations (AO).

Coordination of artillery fires from the base camp were done by the 54th Artillery Group Liaison section location at the regimental TOC.

(b) Employment and Combat Operations:

1. Organic artillery was employed dependent on the mission assigned each squadron. General support artillery was provided by elements of the 54th Artillery Group from respective base camp firing positions. Long range fires were provided daily for convoys operating between the base camp and LAMO DIVH, and on all targets of opportunity within the Blackhorse TAOL.

2. During Operation KILWINN, conducted April-May 1967 the batteries received clearance to fire from 8th Battalion, 6th artillery, the general support battalion of the 1st Infantry Division. Due to the lack of a Fire Support Element organic to the regiment, clearance of fires with adjacent units was processed through the Regimental Tactical Operations Center (RTOC) which lacked necessary personnel to handle the additional requests. The howitzer batteries of the respective squadrons coordinated directly with one another for clearance of fires.

3. During Operation AKRON in June, the fires of Howitzer Battery, 3rd Battalion, were cleared through the 54th Artillery Group Liaison Section at the Regimental Tactical Operations Center. Due to the limited size of the liaison section, fires were not expeditiously processed on a twenty-four hour basis. In the latter part of June, 1st Battalion (-) supported by 2nd and 4th Battalions, 39th Infantry, 7th Infantry Division, reacted to support the 10th Infantry Division (AINW) elements in contact with elements of the 275th T&G Regiments. 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery (-) deployed with two batteries and assumed control of artillery fires in the operational area, to include D Battery, 2nd Battalion, 39th Artillery, from the 54th Artillery Group. Liaison sections were also provided to AINW maneuver elements to assure maximum fire support available to participating units.
During Operation BENGU, a Fire Support Element comprised of members of the 9th Division Artillery provided coordination and clearance of fires, as well as establishing an auxiliary Artillery Warning Control Center (AWCC) to 11th LOC Artillery. This arrangement proved to be a most advantageous means of ensuring effective and timely delivery of supporting fires and relieved the Regimental Tactical Operations Center of the additional responsibilities for clearance of fires.

(c) Ordnance Expended

May

Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron 7,515
Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron 6,788

TOTAL 14,303

June

Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron 4,335
Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron 6,276

TOTAL 10,611

July

Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron 3,588
Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron 3,143

TOTAL 7,027

5. (b) Training.

a. Unit Training, maintenance, on the job training, weapons familiarization and proficiency firing were conducted throughout the quarter. During periods of extended tactical operations, maximum utilization of available time enabled small unit leaders to review tactics, techniques, and lessons learned.

b. Replacement Training was continued throughout the quarter on a six day a week basis. Individual attendance for the quarter were as follows: May - 181, June - 355, July - 715. The program of instruction was reviewed to improve replacement training based on lessons learned from combat operations. Logically, the scope of instruction remained unchanged from USMC requirements. Additional emphasis was placed upon individual marksmanship, mines and booby traps, individual actions, patrolling, ambushes and counterambushes. With a high projected turnover of personnel during July and August, action was taken to construct a permanent classroom 20 foot x 60 foot to increase attendance capacity to 120 replacements. The new classroom was completed 21 June with the former classrooms to be utilized as an annex during peak training months. Each squadron, in addition, was allotted a total of three non-commissioned officers to serve as instructors.

c. New Equipment Training was conducted on the AN/GSE-1 anti-intrusion device. In addition, training was conducted on the stellite scope for units of the Provisional Squadron authorized augmentation of equipment for perimeter defense.

d. Specialized Training:

(1) Recondo School. The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) of the Air Cavalry Troop continued to provide individuals for attendance at the HH TRANG NMC Recondo School. Due to a constant turnover rate of personnel in the LRRP, four to six students were sent for schooling. Map reading and jungle navigation continue to be a major weakness in the training. In order to overcome deficiencies, the LRRP conducted training approximately two weeks each month or whenever operational commit Mountain would allow.

(2) Jungle Survival School. A three day course conducted at Clark AFB Philippines was made available to aviation personnel. One individual per month attended the course to become familiar with the techniques of jungle survival.
(3) Aircraft Maintenance. The Army Aviation Maintenance Technical Assistance Program (ATAP) Schools, 70th Transportation Group, VMWO TA, administered in-country training on aircraft maintenance. The courses offered by the ATAP Schools have proven to be invaluable in that there has been a critical shortage of adequately trained aircraft mechanics and maintenance personnel for weapons subsystems.

6. (b) Aviation.

a. General: The Army Aviation elements supported the regiment with 17 OH-23s, 19 UH-1Ds, and 12 OH-13s. The OH-23s continued to prove their value for command and control in moving armor units, convoys and supporting elements by not only increasing the armor's versatility but also lengthening its range of communications.

Aerial fire support and rapid reaction force was provided by the Air Cavalry Troop's OH-6 gunships. These helicopters not only suppressed enemy fires during ambushes and provided a blocking force against retreating enemy during armor assaults, but also silenced enemy mortar fire day or night within minutes after an attack. Insertion and extraction of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, evacuation of wounded and emergency resupply, was accomplished by the OH-1D. Major emphasis was placed on improving the air traffic control system. The air traffic at Evans Army Airfield averaged 250 to 800 operations a day. The regiment realized the urgent need for a traffic advisory in order to assist in the safe flow of traffic. With limited resources of personnel and equipment the tower became operational with both MF and UHF frequencies. It provided aircraft with limited information such as traffic advisory, weather, artillery firing, change of flight plan, and relay of information from ground personnel. An aircraft Control Team (ACT) and airfield control tower (ATC) were requested to resolve the existing limitations. Six electric helicopter landing lights were installed on the runway to reduce the hazards of night helicopter approaches. The taxiway was lengthened, marked, cleared, and made usable as a runway and is presently being used by OH-1Ds daily for transporting replacement and expiring personnel. Pavements are being built for protecting helicopters against mortar attack and are fifty percent complete. Other achievements are listed below:

Sorties Flown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Command &amp; Control</th>
<th>Troop Lift</th>
<th>Cargo Lift</th>
<th>Casualty Evac</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-23</td>
<td>316</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>OH-1D</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>60</td>
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Aerial Fire Support & Reaction Force

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Reconnaissance</th>
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<tr>
<td>OH-23</td>
<td>1253</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-1D</td>
<td>2386</td>
<td>382</td>
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Total:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. Pass</th>
<th>Tons Cargo</th>
<th>Hours Flown</th>
<th>Fuel Consumed (gal.)</th>
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<tr>
<td>OH-23</td>
<td>3047</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>12568</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-1D</td>
<td>2712</td>
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<tr>
<td>OH-1D</td>
<td>7804</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>2114</td>
<td>190350</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

These results were achieved by use of resources organic to the Regimental Aviation Platoon, the Squadron Aviation Sections and the Air Cavalry Troop.

b. Employment: The Observation Helicopters were utilized mainly for command and control, reconnaissance, and fire adjustment at the squadron level. In-country orientation and training of newly arrived aviators was accomplished with a vigorous emphasis on safety.

The OH-1D gunships were employed in aerial fire support as a rapid reaction force and in reconnaissance missions.
Results of Fire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VG killed confirmed</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VG killed estimated</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
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</table>

Results of Fire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structures destroyed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures damaged</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ammunition consumed: 7.62mm 9,430,100 2.75mm 6,682 20MM 17,766

UN-I'd aircraft were principally utilised for LEP insertions and extractions, medical evacuation of the wounded, night command and control, group reconnaissance and emergency resupply.

c. Techniques: The observation and communication capabilities of the OH-2 continued to enhance the versatility of the Cavalry Squadron. Safe procedures were emphasised for flying under adverse conditions such as marginal weather, night and low level. The program of STANDARDS rides for aviators every three months was continued to maintain a high state of proficiency. A program of infusion of aviators was instituted to spread the rotation of aviators as evenly as possible throughout the year.

Training powered UN-I flying hours were closely monitored in order to fly only those tasks necessary for accomplishment of the mission. Conservation of flying time and crew in the use of equipment was emphasised and practised in order to conserve the life of the aircraft. The average number of hours flown is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CH-23</th>
<th>UN-LD</th>
<th>UN-I'd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>69</td>
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The main area of technique development was in providing close fire support during darkness. It was learned that the elements essential for success in this type of operation depend upon detailed reconnaissance during daylight hours of positions and outposts likely to be subject to enemy attacks and close coordination with the ground command and control elements. Experience gained during the quarter in this type of operation indicates that ground elements can expect rapid, effective gunship support during darkness with friendly troops stationary and when the above listed actions are accomplished.

A major area of concern was maintaining the highest possible number of aircraft flyable. Night maintenance and the shuttling of parts to the base camp from general support units assisted in maintaining a good availability rate. The base camp airfield tower provided a flight following service for aircraft and an instant relay to maintenance when recovery of a damaged aircraft was required. It was learned that a back up of tower operators, generators and radios is required for consistency of operation even though they are not authorized by the TOE. The base camp airfield is handling an average of 300 aircraft a day, and when it is used for a staging area for operations, the air traffic count rises to over 800. It is anticipated that the 12th Air Traffic Control Company will provide some assistance toward the meaning of the Air Traffic Advisory Facility.

d. Maintenance: The maintenance posture has been plagued with CH-23 generators shearing drive shafts, performance of the 1200 hour periodic inspection for the UN-LD and the malfunction of armament systems on the UN-I'd. The availability of mission ready aircraft was significantly reduced because of the lack of direct support maintenance at Blackhorse Base Camp for aircraft armament and radios. Helicopters with armament and radio systems requiring direct support maintenance must be flown to Vung Tau for repair which is time-consuming and uses flight time not in support of combat effort. Considering these obstacles, the availability has been excellent compared to other units in Vietnam. The aircraft availability is as follows:
Aircraft availability - (expressed in percent of assigned aircraft)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OH-6D</th>
<th>UH-1D</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>81.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. LOGISTICS

a. General: The regiment was adequately supported in Class I thru V by the 29th Support Group. The primary means of resupply for Classes I, II, III and IV was supply point distribution from the 3rd Forward Battalion at Long Binh. In this quarter, during tactical operations conducted by the regiment, resupply was conducted by both ground convoys and air, Chinook Ch7.

b. Supply and Maintenance:

(1) Class I: Adequate support was provided. The 28-day cyclic norm provides for too many "D" type rations. More fresh meats and vegetables would be appreciated, especially during periods the unit is at base camp.

(2) Class II/IV:

(a) The regiment received the 9 authorized Armor Vehicle Launch Bridges (AVLB) during this period.

(b) The regiment experienced a shortage of handsets (HH61/60) used by track vehicle crew members.

(c) Availability of signal repair parts continues to be a problem.

(3) Maintenance: Direct maintenance support was provided by the 551st Light Maintenance Company during the period. Due to the time lag in receiving needed repair parts, some vehicles experienced long periods of down time. This unit further experienced a shortage of engines for M131 vehicles. Critical shortages still exist in signal repair parts causing excessive down time on equipment turned in for repair.

c. Transportation: Organic transportation was used extensively for the transporting of repair parts and Class II items from supply depots in Saigon and Long Binh. This was due to the non-availability of supporting transportation from 1st Logistical Command on a timely basis. Air re-supply by Chinook Ch7 and UH-1D was used extensively for all classes of supply during tactical operations conducted during this period.

d. Services: Adequate support was provided, however it has been noted the contract laundry service at THU-DUO has deteriorated since this laundry was initially used. Many items are being exchanged at the laundry and the quality of workmanship has decreased.

(e) Medical:

(1) General: Injuries as a result of hostile action are primarily due to fragments. The upper and lower extremities are most commonly affected. Chest and abdominal wounds account for less than 25% of reported injuries. The percentage of injuries as a result of hostile action (EHB) cases accounted for hospitalization was smaller than in the preceding quarter (165 evacuated, 11 treated at regimental facilities).

(2) Non-malaria diseases: Malaria occurred at an average of four cases per month. Four cases of hepatitis were diagnosed. Three hundred sixty-eight cases of diarrhea were reported. Unit medical personnel have been unable to associate food and water sources in any of these cases.

(3) MEDEVAC: The MEDEVAC program during the report period was conducted in a more organized manner. Most of the MEDEVAC missions were conducted by a team of
one physician and several nixies. Skin diseases, upper respiratory tract infections, and suspected malnutrition type disorders and anemia were the most frequently encountered diseases. During the month of July special emphasis was placed on improving basic sanitation, and the handing out of soap to the patients seems to be a promising start in this direction. Attempts are being made to revisit certain villages or hamlets on a regularly scheduled basis. A total of 5277 medical and 226 dental patients were treated. Fifty-two missions were performed.

8. (c) Civic Action and Psychological Operations:

(a) Civic Action during the quarter included an increased number of MEDCAP/DENCAP, English language classes, and distribution of commodities and foodstuffs to the Vietnamese people. In addition, a new building was constructed at the Chieu Hai center. Close coordination with local agencies involved in civic action was made to ensure that these projects support SVN objectives.

(1) In May, considerable progress was made by the Hoi Chanh of the Long Khanh Chieu Hai center toward the completion of a six motor by twelve motor building. Also, during the month of May, scrap lumber and foodstuffs were donated to the Chieu Hai center to improve living standards at the center. A total of 2500 lbs of rice, 1500 lbs of milk, 1350 lbs of cooking oil and 100 bars of soap were distributed to needy Vietnamese throughout the province. A total of 610 patients were treated during the month as part of the MEDCAP program, and 125 were treated during DENCAP. Refugees relief assistance was provided during the final stages of Operation MAJESTY, and 15 tons of captured rice were returned to the GVN.

(2) During the month of June, the continuation of the dormitory at the Chieu Hai center, in Xuan Loc, was completed. In addition, the Hoi Chanh have commenced work on the renovation of existing buildings. This is a self-help program with assistance and advice being provided by the 85th section of the 11th armored cavalry regiment and Civic Operation for Revolutionary Development Support (CORS). In addition to the six motor by twelve motor building at the Chieu Hai center, a class 65 expeditor timber bridge was constructed (GS960658), and 720 cement blocks were distributed to needy Vietnamese throughout the province. A total of 610 patients were treated during the month as part of the MEDCAP program, and 125 were treated during DENCAP. Refugees relief assistance was provided during the final stages of Operation MAJESTY, and 15 tons of captured rice were returned to the GVN.

(3) In July, the 18th ARVN Psychological Operations (PSYOP) team was used in conjunction with regimental activities. The team was used a total of five times during MEDCAP/DENCAP and civic action operations. The ARVN has proven very cooperative and effective in the deployment of their PSYOP team. The Hoi Chanh of the Long Khanh Chieu Hai center are making preparations for construction of another building to house new Hoi Chanh. The 85th section of the 11th armored cavalry and CORS work closely on this project in order to coordinate disposition of material and technical assistance. July also illustrated the continuing involvement of the Blackhorse Regiment in support of Revolutionary Development and civic action. Twenty trucks loads of lumber were delivered to the Chieu Hai center and the 52nd Ranger Battalion for building new housing. Also 1250 lbs of milk, 2000 lbs of rice, 2000 lbs of oil, 1100 lbs of bulgur wheat and 150 lbs of candy were distributed to the needy families of the province. In order to stimulate educational and vocational training in the province, 3300 school kits, 120 sewing kits and 2000 livelihood kits were distributed during the month. The regiment’s emphasis on MEDCAP showed positive results as the number of patients treated increased fourfold. A total of 2297 patients were treated. In addition, 35 patients were treated during DENCAP.

(b) During the quarter, care was taken to achieve a more favorable balance between short term immediate impact projects and long range projects, with the goal of assisting the indigenous population in achieving greater self-sufficiency. Closer liaison was achieved with the 18th ARVN Division; their PSYOP and cultural teams produced rewarding results for the regiment. Close liaison and coordination continued with both US and Vietnamese agencies in the area that are actively involved in civic action. Among these are the sector advisory team, advisory personnel of the 18th ARVN Division, battalion advisory personnel, the District Chief, the 85 of the 5th Artillery Group, the Civic Operations for Revolutionary Development
Support, and the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) representatives. The employment of all available agencies and resources in a fruitful civic action program is a necessary prerequisite to an effective civic action/Revolutionary Development program.

The psychological warfare effort of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment is supported by the 10th Public Field Propaganda Team from the 24th PSYOP, psychological operations Company in Bien Hoa. From 1 May thru 31 July the team conducted a total of 78 psychological warfare missions in which there were 7,449,400 leaflets dropped and 35 hours of loudspeaker broadcast time.

(1) The psychological operations of the past quarter can generally be divided into two types: (1) direct support of squadron and regimental operations at the request of the unit and (2) operations which were originated by the field team based on its intelligence and targeting. During the reporting period, 18 special tapes were prepared by the field team. These consisted of personal messages from recent Binh Chanh to members of their units, messages by district and other local officials, and tapes prepared for quick reaction to tactical situations.

(2) A new addition to the PSYOPS effort this quarter was the utilization of the Psychological Warfare (PSW) Team from the 18th ADVN Division. This special team assisted on various occasions in conducting KNGDF as well asordonnance and search operations. This type of operation will be continued.

9. (C) PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR BASE CAMP OPERATIONS. This regiment has a minimum requirement for 15 officers, 41 NCO, and 112 ES for strictly base camp operations. These requirements include Primary Replacement and Club personnel, Logistical Convey Control and Unit Police personnel, Regimental Training School NCOs, water point, ammunition, supply point and baggage procuring personnel, and supply personnel at the Long Binh convey staging area. At the present time these personnel are assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. This requirement should not be counted against the combat strength of the maneuver squadrons and the Air Cavalry Troop. This is an absolute minimum requirement which is necessary for the safety and well-being of all of the units and personnel assigned to Blackhorse Base Camp. This problem is especially critical for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment as it is the only separate brigade or regiment in Vietnam that is not authorized a support battalion.

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CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION II COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

a. Operations:

(1) Item: Enemy employment of automatic weapons along aircraft firing routes during ambushes and attacks.

Discussion: During recent ambushes and night attacks against outposts, hostile automatic weapons have been employed successfully by low flying aircraft to attack the long axis of the enemy target. Weapons are placed in individual shelters and mounted to fire effectively at low flying aircraft.

Observation: Aircraft crews must be extremely vigilant for anti-aircraft weapons around ambush and night attack sites. When discovered these weapons must be given priority in being neutralized so that effective fire can be placed on enemy forces.

(2) Item: Coordination of Air Strikes and Artillery Fire.

Discussion: The lack of common communications frequencies between the ground commander and the Forward Air Controller (FAC) has caused difficulty in coordinating Air Strikes and artillery fire resulting in loss of fire support for ground units during critical moments of engagement with the enemy.

Observation: The ground commanders must operate on a frequency compatible with the Forward Air Controller's radio, thus allowing the FAC to monitor the command net. The FAC could brief the fighters, then notify the ground commander that the fighters are ready. Upon hearing, over the command net, that the last round was on the way or that the artillery had been sighted, the FAC should mark the target and order the fighters in. If this procedure is followed, the fighters can be deployed in a minimum of time. Using this procedure, with the 1st Squadron on Operation JUNCTION CITY I, Phase II, the fighters were on target less than one minute following the last round of artillery. In addition, if the last round of artillery fire is white phosphorus, marking by FAC is not necessary, allowing for a more rapid reaction by the fighters.

(3) Item: Recovery of Damaged Vehicles.

Discussion: It has been found that recovery of M113 is facilitated by having a tractor and 12 ton trailer occupy the recovery section whenever possible. This allows vehicle recovery without dragging the personnel carrier over hard surfaced roads.

Observation: Recovery teams should be accompanied by a tractor-trailer whenever possible.

(4) Item: FAC and observers must keep abreast of the tactical situation.

Discussion: Valuable time is lost when information of the tactical situation must be relayed to FAC.

Observation: The practice of FAC reporting in on the command net to learn the tactical situation should be followed by all observers rather than having information relayed.

(5) Item: Passive Defensive Measures.

Discussion: During the rainy season, digging underground bunkers for permanent protection usually results in water filled trenches.

Observation: Seventy-two inch culvert half-sections can be easily transported to the field for use with sandbags as support for bunkers and overhead cover and produces digging-in, thereby avoiding water filled trenches. (See Diagram, next page.)
Ite: Ambush Indicators

Discussion: An ambush depends primarily on surprise for its success. This surprise can be eliminated or minimized, and the enemy force destroyed or neutralized by observing telltale indicators. These indicators are:

(a) Absence of indigenous population in fields or rubber plantations adjacent to the road or in towns known to be populated.
(b) Absence of civilian traffic on the road.
(c) Unexplained halts in civilian traffic flow; vehicles stopped or parked on the side of the road.
(d) Roadblocks of trees, brush, and dirt.
(e) Combination of one or more of the above in an area lacking room for maneuver or possessing limited trafficability for tracked vehicles.

Observation: Alert ground crews or personnel in command and control aircraft can use these indicators as early warning and initiate proper countermeasures to neutralize or destroy the ambush force.

Item: Jungle Clearing.

Discussion: Units often clear heavily forested or overgrown areas to establish larger positions, LZ's and access roads, or to conduct search and destroy operations. Several steps can be taken to reduce injury to personnel and damage to equipment.

(a) Bulldozers will effectively clear the area when contact is not imminent. In this way, weapons, ordnance, and personnel of the combat vehicle will not be exposed to unnecessarily rough treatment.
(b) Should combat vehicles be used, drivers should be buttoned up; nearby combat vehicles should cover the "clearing" vehicle.
(c) Remove loose equipment from the top or sides of the vehicle. Secure items which cannot be stowed inside the vehicle. Sensitive items, such as radio antennas, should be tied down or removed.
(d) Instruct soldiers not to place their arms on rims of cupolas, or upon potential cutting edges (armor shields) in the event of falling objects such as tree limbs.
(e) Use tents in lieu of ACV whenever possible. Exercise care to prevent damage to weapons and miniguns; weapons such as machine guns should be depressed and kept on line toward the direction of movement.
(f) Instruct vehicle commanders to guide their vehicles along paths of least resistance.
(g) Maintain interval between adjacent vehicles during multiple-axis jungle clearing operations.

Observation: Personnel should be trained to clear heavily jungled areas within the capability of their vehicles and without injury to personnel or sacrifice of equipment.

Item: Suspension Systems.

Discussion: During the rainy season, suspension systems are subjected to continuous strain as a result of the mud and swampy terrain. Accumulation of dried mud on and around the idler arms and road wheel arms causes the track to be forced from the road wheels, resulting in thrown track and ruptured seals.
Observation: Crews must be particularly conscious of before, during and after operations checks on suspension systems. Track tension and road wheel oil levels must be checked continuously. Mud deposits should be chipped off with a shovel or tanker's box.

(9) Item: Aerial Resupply.

Discussion: Overland resupply off main roads during the rainy season is impractical. Wheeled vehicles cannot negotiate the muddy or swampy terrain prevalent in this area. Although aerial resupply alleviates this resupply problem, the following additional factors peculiar to this method must be considered:

(a) Weather: The uncertainty of aerial resupply due to poor weather required full five days basic load at all times be maintained in vehicles during field operations.

(b) Priorities of resupply items must be established, and items prepackaged for efficient use of the aircraft.

(c) Logistics personnel must be thoroughly familiar with rigging techniques, LZ selection, and preparations, aerial resupply communications procedures, and aircraft load capacities.

Observation: Logistics personnel must not allow the speed of aerial resupply to be a substitute for careful planning. Weather and aircraft maintenance introduce variables which drastically affect the aerial resupply effort.

(10) Item: Revolutionary Development Materials/Civil Affairs.

Discussion: Grants to ARVN Forces, local villages, and AVN/PB outposts in the form of construction or barrier materials must be made in quantities commensurate with the locally available manpower. Stockpiling of large quantities of such material may impose a security burden upon responsible persons. In addition such materials may be used improperly or for barter if allowed to accumulate.

Observation: Provide materials in quantities which can be used effectively over a one to two day period.

(11) Item: Civilian Labor and Planning.

Discussion: Civilian labor can be used for the mutual advantage of US Forces and Vietnamese Officials for such tasks as clearing brush, erecting fortifications, and common hard labor. Civilian labor requirements must be planned and coordinated well in advance to allow National Police and village chiefs to screen available personnel. Wages, working conditions, and labor requirements can be analyzed and agreements made from District through village level. Use of civilian labor in Operation Espiora II disclosed that the people were uninform on the labor contract, dissatisfied with their wages, and ignorant of the job to be performed. This problem was caused by insufficient time allowed for coordination of labor requirements.

Observation: Allow 2-3 weeks notification and coordination time to allow GVN officials to exploit their manpower resources and eliminate misunderstandings.

(12) Item: Employment of Vietnamese National Police.

Discussion: Vietnamese National Police are sent to the field unprepared and uninformed. In most cases, they explain that their section chiefs don't tell them where they are going, how long they will be gone, or what they are to do. Police report to the Squadron without sleeping gear, proper change of uniform, etc.

Observation: With this lack of information perhaps aids security, a procedure should be established to insure that policemen report to a unit with the equipment and clothing necessary for extended field operations.
(13) Item: Captured Enemy Material.
Discussion: Captured enemy items are often kept by soldiers as war trophies.
Observation: Captured material should be tagged ASAP as to where, when, and how and who captured the material. If the item is a valid war trophy it should be promptly returned to the trooper who found it. Soldiers should be informed of the valuable intelligence information gained from captured items and assured that legitimate war trophies will be returned to them.

(14) Item: Radio Transmission.
Discussion: Complaints are received concerning garbled radio transmissions, especially during the rainy season.
Observation: Antennas should be unscrewed from their bases and cleaned daily. Mud and dirt accumulate on the base connecting ball, causing weak and distorted transmission.

(15) Item: MEDCAP Teams and Intelligences.
Discussion: MEDCAP Teams are received favorably by the population. People are more willing to talk about VC activities.
Observation: NI or 5-2 personnel should accompany MEDCAP Teams to obtain intelligence information.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Observation: Wheel trafficability is greatly reduced during the monsoon season, whereas tracked vehicles demonstrate versatility in operating over varied terrain. During Operation MAGRA, wheeled vehicles encountered difficulty in maneuvering and keeping up with track vehicles. As a result, many wheeled vehicles needed in the combat trains remained at the base camp, which greatly increased the number of aerial resupply sorties needed.

Recommendation: That the new H54 cargo carrier be authorized in lieu of some of the wheeled vehicles in the squadron support platoon. The H54 can be adapted or modified to transport fuel or water pods, as well as to carry ammunition. Six of the H54s are to be issued to the howitzer batteries of each squadron. Three are to be issued for the S-2 personnel sections of each squadron. Additional H54s should be issued to the support platoon to improve its cross-country mobility.

b. Observation: The regiment has experienced a low availability rate on O-23 aircraft due to failures of: cylinders; exhaust valves; fuel pumps; ignition locks; generators; tail rotors. Problems have been encountered with the flight control system; 25% of those checked had control issues. One which have been grounded, and with aircraft bolts vibrating loose. Also, several engine failures have occurred in aircraft which have habitually carried two passengers and where the engine had in excess of 700 operational hours.

Recommendation:

(1) That several additional checks be initiated during the Intermediate and Periodic Inspections:

(a) Compressors checks.
(b) A more vigorous oil analysis program.
(c) A more thorough check of all systems during the intermediate inspections.

(2) That tail rotors, which have been found to last no more than 400 hours, be dye-penetrated at each F3 and prove cracks from going un...
detected.

(3) That control systems be checked each 100 hours.

(4) That all bolts be retorqued after replacement and checked during all scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.

(5) That a more extensive FLL be maintained to preclude loss of availability due to carburetor, generator and fuel pump failure.

(6) That OH-23 aircraft be restricted to carrying one passenger to reduce load on engine and prevent early engine failures.

c. Observation: The rifle platoon organic to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's Air Cavalry Troop has been used as a long range reconnaissance element. Under the staff supervision of the regimental S-2, long range reconnaissance patrols have provided timely and accurate information concerning areas of operations. However, because of insufficient training in patrolling techniques, land navigation, jungle survival and helicopter insertion and extraction procedures for thick jungle, the regiment has had to send members of the crew-rifle platoon to the RVN Reconnoiter School. The necessity for this schooling and the training of the platoon members not sent to the Reconnoiter School has meant a loss of utilization of the platoon as a reconnaissance element.

Recommendation: That Ranger School trained personnel be provided for utilization in the Air Cavalry Troop's crew-rifle platoon. This specialized training would enable the platoon to be employed as a long range reconnaissance element with a minimum of in-country training.

d. Observation: The TOE for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment does not provide a means for clearing supporting fires. At the regimental level, there is no authorized artillery liaison section to handle artillery matters and the coordination and delivery of fires during operations. The regiment, during Operation CHRYSTAL, occupied four fire support bases and had four artillery battalions supporting three battalion size operations. The 56th Artillery Group, located in Xuan Loc (TV4508) approximately 12 kilometers north of base camp, had 8th and 17th artillery in support of the regiment's operations. In addition to the problem of fire support coordination from the widely separated fire support bases, there was additional fire support coordination required to maintain support of the base camp.

Recommendation: That a fire support element, consisting of one officer, two non-commissioned officers and three radio telephone operators, be authorized. This augmentation would give the regimental tactical operations center an operational fire support element and would allow for a more timely coordination and delivery of fires in support of Blackhorse Base Camp and regimental operations.

e. Observation: The regiment is presently short 34 A and 39 B gun shield kits for the M134. Indications are that these kits will not be available until December 1967 or January 1968.

Recommendations:

(1) That all M134 shipped into RVN that are to be used as AGAV be equipped with the A and B gun shield kits prior to shipment from CONUS.

(2) That USAV take action to expedite the delivery of these kits to replace existing shortages.

f. Observation: All resupply to units at the Blackhorse Base Camp is conducted by daily wheeled vehicle convoys from Long Binh, a distance of approximately 60 kilometers. These daily convoys consist of 50 to 60 vehicles and take three-hours to traverse National Routes 1 and 2 to the base camp at Long Giao (TV1396). Personnel and vehicles require 24 hours for the round trip if they are stationed at the Blackhorse Base Camp. In addition critical combat power is required to escort all wheeled vehicle convoys, which reduces the regiment's oper-
national capabilities and this greatly to the mileage of trained vehicles. A Vietnamese railroad, which is operational, does run between Long Binh and Xuan Loc (T1450), which is 12 kilometers north of the 11th Armored Cavalry’s Blackhorse Base Camp.

Recommendation: That a railroad spur be constructed from the main line of the Long Binh/Xuan Loc railroad to the Blackhorse Base Camp and that the railroad be used for movement of supplies to the base camp.

Observation: The operation of Blackhorse Base Camp requires a minimum of 15 officers, 110 NCO and 142 EN above the TOE strength of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. These personnel are necessary to carry out the responsibilities of installation coordination and for the safety and well-being of all units and personnel assigned to the Blackhorse Base Camp. In addition to the regiment these units include the 27th Engineer Battalion (B), the 7th Surgical Hospital, the 506th Supply and Service Company, the 551st Light Maintenance Company and several smaller units. This problem is especially critical for the 11th armored Cavalry Regiment as it is the only separate brigade or regiment in Vietnam that is not authorized a support battalion.

Recommendation: That sufficient personnel be authorized to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to meet Base Camp needs and to preclude the diversion of combat strength for this purpose.

Observation: The 398th Transportation Detachment (CHIF) is staffed to provide maintenance support for 26 UH-1 type helicopters. The 11th Armored Cavalry has 46 helicopters assigned. At the helicopters of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment become older the amount of direct support maintenance has increased; and, under present conditions, requires evacuation of more and more helicopters to Vung Tau for maintenance. This increases down time of helicopters and causes a lower availability rate. Additionally, no avionics or armaments support is available within the 398th Transportation Detachment.

Recommendation:

1. That a second maintenance detachment be assigned to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment thereby providing the proper level of direct support maintenance in the density of aircraft supported.

2. That an Avionics team and an Armaments team be attached to the 398th Transportation Detachment for direct support of regimental aircraft.

These two teams would enable the maintenance detachment to provide one-stop maintenance service at Blackhorse Base Camp thereby precluding evacuation of aircraft to Vung Tau which normally causes a delay in availability of at least 48 hours.

Observation:

1. The Airfield Traffic Advisory handles between 250 and 800 operations a day.

2. Both FM and VHF radios are required for Air Traffic Control and flight following service.

3. An adequate dependable power source is needed for continuous operation and prevention of surging and blowing of radios.

4. Adequate trained personnel are required. Tower personnel must be well rested and alert to provide a safe flow of traffic over the fire base.

5. Fire crews should have proper wearing apparel to fight aircraft fires.

Recommendation:

1. That the AH/75070, which has been programmed for September 67,
be utilized for air traffic control in the field and backup control at the base camp.

(2) That VHF and FH radios be authorized for the tower, regimental flight operations and maintenance. The tower radios are required for air traffic control and flight following. The flight operations radio is required for monitoring the tower, changing missions and diverting aircraft. An FH radio is needed in maintenance for alerting a special crew for aircraft recovery, advising maintenance of mechanical failures and enabling maintenance to provide advice to correct failures when they occur and to be able to transmit essential information such as engine pressure and temperature reading.

(3) That a 100 kw generator and a rectifier to convert the power to DC and capable of carrying at least 100 amps be authorized.

(4) That four trained tower operators be authorized.

(5) That fire crews be given aircraft fire fighting clothing and an oxygen capability so they would be able to get to the aircraft in case of fire.
TO: Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96226

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

2. This Headquarters concurs with Section II, Commanders Observations and Recommendations, with the following exceptions:

   a. Reference Section II, paragraph 1a (2) and 1a (4): Nonconcur. This is the "One—the whole show" concept. Staff and all radio nets (air, ground, artillery, etc.) should be employed to increase breadth of unit's capabilities and effectiveness. This "one man show" concept is inadequate to handle a real combined arms operation. Too many agencies on the command net cause congestion and confusion. Proper command and staff techniques should be followed.

   b. Reference Section II, paragraph 2b (6): Nonconcur. OH23 aircraft are designed and are capable of carrying two passengers. Early engine failures are primarily caused by over boosting the OH23 engine. Those over boosts are normally caused by pilot inattention to weight and balance computations in relation to high density altitude operations resulting in the OH23 helicopter being over maximum authorized weight.

3. This Headquarters would like to further emphasize the following paragraphs of Section II:

   a. Reference Section II, paragraph 2d: Concur. If 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment is to conduct Regimental/Brigade (as opposed to separate squadron) operations, a capability for fire support planning and coordination is required.

   b. Reference Section II, paragraph 2g: Concur. Headquarters of tactical units become over burdened with problems of base development and base defense while concentrating on operations in the overall tactical area of responsibility. However, it is an inherent responsibility of the headquarters concerned to justify organization of provisional headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. H. PHELPS
CPT. AGC
Assl. A. G.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, HQ, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 31 July 1967 (RCS: CSFOR-65) (U)

DA HQ II FORCEN, APO San Francisco 96266. 8 NOV 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHOC-DH, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOZ-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) This headquarters has reviewed the attached report and concurs with the comments and recommendations with the following exceptions:

   a. Reference Section I, paragraph 7 b (3): The Command Deadline Reports submitted weekly during the reporting period by this unit do not indicate an excessive deadline rate for M134 vehicles. There have been instances when engines for these vehicles were out of stock, but not for an excessively long-time. MACV Directive 335-20, 13 Sep 66, Subject: Logistics Summary (RCS: LOGS-14) establishes a 15% deadline rate as a critical point for this item. This unit has maintained a deadline rate below 15%.

   b. Reference Section II, paragraph 2 e: The shortage of A and B gun shield kits for the M134 results from the equipping of vehicles not authorized this equipment. Additional kits are scheduled to arrive during the first quarter of 1968.

   c. Reference Section II, paragraph 2 f: This headquarters does not support the recommendation to build a railroad spur from Xuan Loc to Blackhorse. MACV Directive 55-9, 23 June 1966, Subject: Joint MACV/USAID Railroad Coordinating Committee, states that where valid requirements exist for rail lines for exclusive US military use, these lines must be funded by US military activities. Considering the shortage of US assets in South Vietnam and high priority requirements, the construction of a railroad to service a small community such as Blackhorse is not justified. US improvements or additions to the transportation system in Vietnam should fit into overall Vietnamese plans. This headquarters is not aware of current or future Vietnamese plans to build a railroad south from Xuan Loc.

2. (C) The following comments amplify referenced portions of the report.

   a. Reference Section I, paragraph 7 b (1): A new 28 day cyclic menu was recommended during the 1st Logistical Command Food Service Conference held in August 1967. It was indicated that upon consumption of
subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 31 July 1967 (RCS: CSFOR-65) (U)

excess "B" subsistance items all issues will be "A" rations except those "B" items issued to satisfy rotational requirements.

b. Reference Section I, paragraph 7 d: Saigon Support Command has requested that this unit notify them in writing of specific instances of poor laundry service. This is the correct method of initiating corrective action.

c. Reference Section II, paragraph 2 b: This headquarters concurs with the recommendations in the report and the comment in paragraph 2 b of the 1st Indorsement. The recommendations in paragraph 2 b (1) - (3) should be reported through maintenance channels by submitting Equipment Improvement Reports.

d. Reference Section II, paragraph 2 c: Although Ranger School at Fort Benning would be beneficial for long range patrol personnel, the IAV Recondo School at Nha Trang would continue to be an in-country training requirement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. M. McGREGOR
CPT, IIC
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHEC-DST
3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 19 DEC 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (AY6A) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning cyclic menu, section I, page 15, paragraph 7b(1): Concur. Fresh meats and vegetables are being provided wherever and whenever physically possible. The menu has recently been revised and the majority of the B type components have been removed. Emergency feeding stock is, however, necessary and it must be rotated. This rotation is accomplished by only 11 meals of the 28 day cyclic menu.

   b. Reference item concerning maintenance, section I, page 15, paragraph 7b(3), and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 1a: Concur with comment at 2d Indorsement, paragraph 1a. APC deadline for this unit is well below MACV standards. As better demand data is accumulated the PLL/ASL will be more valid and further reduce repair parts shortages.

   c. Reference item concerning laundry service, section I, page 15, paragraph 7d: Concur. Action has been taken through the 1st Logistical Command laundry and bath officer who will coordinate with 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the US Army Procurement Agency to correct the situation.

   d. Reference item concerning headsets, H161/U, section I, page 15, paragraph 7b(2)(b): Concur. Efforts are being made to expedite shipment of these headsets.

   e. Reference item concerning signal repair parts, section I, page 15, paragraph 7b(2)(c): Concur. This headquarters is aware of the problem. DA has been advised.

   f. Reference item concerning coordination of air strikes, section II, page 1, paragraph 2, and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2a:

      (1) Comments made in both references have merit. With proper radio discipline, one or two additional subscribers to the command net should

      [Redacted text]

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

not cause undue confusion and congestion.

(2) It is agreed that proper command and staff techniques should be followed but the employment of Forward Air Controllers and their participation in the command net, or "one man show" concept, should rest with the commander.

g. Reference item concerning employment of Vietnamese National Police, section II, page 4, paragraph 12: Concur. Action concerning deployment of Vietnamese National Police is not within the purview of Headquarters, USARV. This headquarters has notified MACV J-2 of this problem.

h. Reference item concerning M548 cargo carrier, section II, page 5, paragraph 2a. Comment: ENSURE and MTOE action in February and May 1967 was taken to substitute four M548 carriers for four 5 ton cargo trucks in the transportation section of the Cavalry Squadron Headquarters. Each M548 will be fitted with a pump and fuel cell. This MTOE is now pending approval at DA.

i. Reference item concerning TOE, section II, page 6, paragraph 2e. If a fire support element is required at Regimental Headquarters a MTOE should be submitted with trade-off spaces provided.

j. Reference item concerning A and B gun shield kits, section II, page 6, paragraph 2e: Concur. These kits have been the subject of General Officer correspondence but it appears the issue date is final.

k. Reference item concerning railroad, section II, page 6, paragraph 2f, and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 1c: Concur with remarks at 2d Indorsement, paragraph 1c. Priority for construction of railroad spurs must go to depot complexes and ports. Construction into a tactical base camp which may not remain in the same location is of questionable value and must be given a very low priority.

l. Reference item concerning assignment of Ranger School trained personnel to the Aero-Rifle Platoon of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, section II, page 6, paragraph 2c, and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2d, II Field Force Vietnam. Ranger personnel can be requested by proper annotation on normal requisitions if such personnel are authorized.
AVHGC-DST
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

3. (U) A copy of this endorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

G. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

cc: HQ, 11th Arm Cav Regt
    HQ, II FFORCEV
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 67 from Hq, 11th Armored Cav Regiment (UIC: WAY6AA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 25 JAN 68

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. The MTOE referred to in paragraph 2h, 3d indorsement, has been approved by DA and will be implemented in February 1968 by USARPAC General Orders.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

HEAVIRN SHIDER
CTZ, AGC
Asst AG
AMBUSH AFTER ACTION REPORT: 21 May 1967

First Platoon, Troop K, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, commanded by Lt Michael Boyd, was conducting a normal resupply run along National Route 1 from the GIA RAY Rock Quarry to the junction on National Route 1 and Interprovincial Route 2 on the morning of Sunday 21 May 1967. Shortly before, the platoon had completed clearing Route 1 for mines and VC activity between GIA RAY Rock Quarry, where the bulk of Troop K was providing security for an element of the 595th Engineer Company, and SUOI CAT village to the west. This distance of approximately 6 kilometers had proved in the past to be the stretch of road most generally interdicted by VC activity. The clearing operation had proved uneventful, and the platoon had returned to GIA RAI, picked up the troop mess truck and an engineer jeep, and proceeded down the cleared route through SUOI CAT village.

When passing through SUOI CAT village, none of the members of the platoon noticed anything out of the ordinary. The usual civilian traffic was on the road, farmers were tilling their fields, and children were waving to the troopers and begging for candy. The advance guard cleared the village, crossed the bridge over SONG RAI stream (See figure 1), and moved west without incident. The main body followed, deployed as shown in figure 2.

The first indication of danger came suddenly at about 0850 hrs when the advance guard, about 600 meters ahead of the main body, was cresting a slight ridge 2 kilometers west of the bridge. The lead ACAV was suddenly hit from the right flank with a 75mm recoilless rifle round that penetrated the vehicle and hit the nearest ditch. SSG Pittman, the vehicle commander and acting platoon sergeant, barely had enough time to hurriedly give a radio call of “ambush, ambush, ambush” to the platoon before he and the driver, SP4 Steidl, were forced by exploding ammunition to abandon the flaming ACAV. Prior to leaping from the vehicle, however, SSG Pittman had enough presence of mind to seize a number of hand grenades from the ACAV. Likewise, SP4 Steidl quickly dismounted one of the side mounted M-60 machineguns from the ACAV and began to lay down a heavy volume of suppressive fire.

As soon as the lead vehicle was hit by recoilless rifle fire, a huge volume of recoilless rifle, mort, RPG-2, automatic weapons, and small arms fires erupted from both sides of the road as inst the entire length of the column. The rear of the column had just cleared the bridge over SONG RAI stream when it was hit. The main body of the column extended from SONG RAI stream to the west a distance of about 1 kilometer. Dust conditions were so bad that the vehicles had been forced almost 100 meters distance to conserve the visibility.

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The platoon leader's ACAV, K-16, was the second vehicle in the main body. It was driven by Lt Hendrickson, a platoon leader with the 595th Engineer Company, which manned the GIA RAY Rock Quarry. Lt Hendrickson was returning to LONG GIAO Base Camp to attend to personal business and had expressed a desire to drive an ACAV. K-16 followed the M48A3 Tank, K-34, attached to the platoon from Company H, 3rd Sqdn, for added fire support.

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Simultaneously, Lt. Boyd, the Platoon Leader, heard SSG Pittman’s excited radio message of “ambush, ambush, ambush” and saw the tank ahead of him take a hit from a recoilless rifle on its right and become lost in a cloud of smoke. The crew of K-16 watched as the tank fired one round in reply from its 90mm cannon and moved on. The tank took several more hits and began to angle left on the road, coming to a halt 100 meters west of the point where the initial round had struck.

The Platoon Leader’s initial reaction was to try to radio the four trail ACAVs which he did not think were yet in the killing zone. He instructed them to go south along SOUI RAI stream and set up a base of fire while he attempted to fight through the ambush. Boyd did not know whether his trail ACAVs received his message since he did not receive an answer from any of them. K-16 itself went forward, stopping momentarily at the tank. There was no sign of human activity at the tank. Boyd assumed that the crew was either dead or had abandoned the vehicle. As automatic weapon and small arms fire was starting to build up in this area from both sides of the road, K-16 moved on around the tank and continued west on the road. Boyd tried to contact his Troop Headquarters at GIA RAI by radio and give information on his increasingly desperate situation, but by some fluke, his radios had ceased functioning at this critical moment.

After passing the tank, K-16 moved west for about 60 meters before it too was hit by a recoilless rifle round from the left. The round penetrated the vehicle directly under the radio, wounding the entire crew, and spinning the ACAV to the left. Lt. Hendrickson quickly regained control of the vehicle and, aided by heavy suppressive fire from the two side mounted L-60 machineguns manned by SP4 McOe and SP4 Shelton and the fires of PFC Henry and SP4 Poceman, moved his way through the ambush to where SSG Pittman and SP4 Steidl were fighting beside the burning K-10. The ACAV suffered two more recoilless hits in the area during this dash which further injured the crew members. Between the tank and K-10, the crew members of K-16 had counted no less than six recoilless rifles with crews and numerous RPG-2 teams. All the Viet Cong seemed to be dressed in black, and all appeared to be unconcerned about the fire directed against them. This fact, noticed by many survivors of the platoon gave then the impression that the VC were “doped up”.

K-16 halted by K-10, picked up Pittman and Steidl and overtook K-11 which was still moving to the west. Boyd hailed the ACAV, and it stopped. Pittman mounted K-11, and both vehicles then turned back into the ambush, K-11 leading and K-16 stopping periodically while Boyd sprayed both sides of the road with his .50 caliber machinegun.

The rear portion of the column was also undergoing its special little hell. With the Platoon Leader’s loss of communications and the Platoon Sergeant’s loss of his vehicle, all concerted action as a Platoon ceased and the flight degenerated into a series of uncoordinated actions on the part of single vehicles and individuals. The Troop K ness truck, K-4, followed the Platoon Leader’s ACAV. In it were the driver, PFC Gregory, and the Troop Motor Sergeant SSG Jackson.

As soon as the ambush was sprung, Jackson and Gregory jumped from the truck with their K-16 rifles and hit the ditch to the south of the road. They saw about 20 VC in mixed uniforms kneeling behind some shallow mounds and firing. The VC seemed to be more interested in plugging holes in the truck than firing at Jackson and Gregory; some of the VC were exposing themselves unconcernedly and firing from a standing position. A heavy machinegun was also raking the truck from the woodline to the south of the road. Jackson and Gregory fired at the VC to their front until they had only half a clip of ammunition left apiece. Between then they had dropped several VC and the incoming fire had subsided somewhat because the heavy machinegun had been neutralized. They decided to return to the truck and attempt to make a run for it.

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Upon leaving the truck, Gregory had forgotten to turn off the engine. Miraculously, when they returned to it the truck was still operational and the engine running. They moved down the road through a hail of small arms fire for about 50 meters before an RPG-2 round hit the truck in the middle of the driver's seat. Gregory only avoided being killed because he was hunched down in the seat in order to avoid small arms fire only his eyes peering over the dash board, His flak jacket protected him from the shrapnel effect of the blast; but he was stunned and lost control of the vehicle. It veered to the left, ran off the road, and came to a halt about 60 meters to the left rear of the tank. Jackson leaped from the vehicle and tried to get to the tank, but was cut down midway between the tank and the truck by Viet Cong small arms fire from the south. PFC Gregory jumped from the truck and as he hit the ground was struck by fire from a group of VC standing about 20 meters away. He fell to the ground and his .50 caliber pistol dropped about 2 feet from his body. Still alive, Gregory decided that the best course of action was to play dead. His ordeal of terror had just begun.

For what seemed to him an eternity, PFC Gregory lay beside the truck as the VC fired at him and the truck thinking that so long as the VC were firing in his direction they would not come over to determine if he were still alive. Finally the firing ceased and a group of Viet Cong approached Gregory. The VC turned Gregory over on his back and calmly fired two shots into his left side. He was already so numb with pain that he did not react physically to this indignity. The Viet Cong then sat on Gregory's face and rifled his pockets while the other VC explored the truck. As luck would have it, the truck carried a 25 gallon drum of CS crystals in its bed. Spraying during the firing, bullets had penetrated the CS drum and the tear gas began to permeate the area in overwhelming waves. This drove the VC from the area. Gregory, because of his low position was not overly bothered by the tear gas fumes and lapsed into unconsciousness. He awakened slightly and half remembers the truck firing on the opposite side of the truck. He was rescued by the Troop K relief force about 20 minutes later.

The four rear ACAVs which bore the brunt of the ambush, had varying fortunes. K-14 stopped behind the hillock 2/2 ten truck after the ambush warning and took up a temporary firing position to the left facing south. K-14 could not close upon the tank to the direct front of the 2/2 ten truck because of heavy recoilless and RPG-2 fire. The ACAVs quickly sustained RPG-2 hits on the right side about midway on the truck. Sgt Dickinson, the vehicle commander, then jumped from the TO hatch over the drivers compartment, seizing the driver's helmet and, with a grenade and then duck back into the vehicle as protection against the intensive small arms fire. K-14 stopped behind the hillock 2/2 ten truck because of heavy fire from a group of Viet Cong approached Gregory. One of the most startling sights was three small babies and RMI-2's. There were still many civilians lying prone in the field between the firing lines. The group of VC that had initially engaged from the right had shifted to the rear of the column and had infiltrated the village of BON CAY from which they fired on the ACAVs with small arms and RPG-2's.

ACAV number K-13 following directly behind K-14, was hit by a recoilless rifle in the first burst of firing. The entire crew was wounded and everyone disabled except PFC Miller, a machine gunner. He was knocked inside the vehicle, and as he attempted to get up, another recoilless round hit the left side rounded machinegun and knocked it off. Miller found a box of hand grenades and started throwing them in an arc around the vehicle to prevent the VC from closing with the vehicle. He would pop his head out of the vehicle just long enough to throw a grenade and then duck back into the vehicle as protection against the intensive small arms fire. Miller saw three VC lying behind a mound about 20 meters to his south. Two of them were armed with rifles and one carried a radio. He tried to grenade them but could not reach them as his right arm had been severely injured by shrapnel. The ACAV was then hit again by a recoilless round and Miller was knocked out of the vehicle, losing consciousness. The next thing he remembers is his Troop Commander arriving with the relief force. He was the only survivor of ACAV number K-13.
ACAVs number K-17 and K-18 were the last two vehicles in the column. Sgt Lee, the vehicle commander of K-17, received Pittman's message of "ambush, ambush, ambush," just as he spotted a large number of VC on his left and alerted his crew with the words "VC on the left." The crew immediately began firing right and left. Lee saw K-13 take its initial recoilless hit in front of him and, thinking the vehicle lost, ordered the driver PVC Timberlake to move on through the ambush. K-18 followed K-17, as the two ACAVs passed K-14 firing from its position to the south of the road. K-18 sustained a recoilless hit that disabled the vehicle. It ground to a halt directly west of K-14 and took several more recoilless hits. There were no survivors from K-18.

K-17 kept moving. SP4 Force, the platoon medic, was nothing mechanics. He saw VC to the south of the road firing small arms on several VC behind a berm about 75 meters for the road firing crew served automatic weapons. He engaged all targets he could see and saw several VC fall. Civilians were lying all over the fields. The small arms fire was extremely heavy and accurate, causing Force to fire through his gun shield and allowing him only a very limited view of the battlefield. In moving a distance of 400 meters, the ACAV was hit 6 times with RPG-2 rounds. It had not suffered any damage, but the shrapnel from the last blast had caused Force to fire through his gun shield, only to find his machine gun malfunctioning and superficially wounded most of the crew members. The driver halted the ACAV temporarily.

Force applied immediate action to his weapon as SP5 Centers, the platoon mechanic, provided covering fire with his M-16 rifle. Force finally gave up on the machine gun and grabbed his M-16 to engage the numerous VC to the south. Over the din of battle Force heard SP4 Williamson, the right machine gunner, cry "hand me ammo." Force handed him a box of 7.62mm machine gun ammunition but Williamson said "no, K-18." His machine gun was inoperable also.

The driver moved the ACAV cut through the guantlet again, driving and weaving to avoid the hail of anti-tank rockets directed at the tank. Sgt Lee was still firing his caliber 30 machine gun to the left and right of the road, and Force, Williamson, and Centers were blazing away with their rifles, while SP4 Wheeler, an ex-cook newly assigned to the platoon, belted out ammo from inside the vehicle. However, K-17 kept sustained hits. Williamson was hit in the stomach with a burst of shrapnel from an RPG-2 that penetrated the right side of the track. Finally an RPG-2 round penetrated the driver's compartment, killing the driver, Timberlake, and Sgt Lee. The ACAV stopped. Force leaped up to the top of the TC hatch to attempt first aid on Lee, but was knocked off the track by another RPG-2 round that hit the front of the TC cupola. He was slightly wounded by shrapnel, but still held grimly on his rifle. He tried to regain the ACAV but could not because of the heavy volume of small arms fire directed against it. Force crawled into the ditch paralleling the road and started crawling south looking for other GI's. He heard the ACAV take at least three more RPG-2 hits. Force remained alone in the ditch desperately hoping he would not be shrapnelized by the VC until the relief column arrived. He then returned to K-17 and found Wheeler still alive in the vehicle and gave him first aid. Centers' body was found 25 meters to the rear of the ACAV riddled by small arms fire.

It had initially appeared to LT Boyd that the M8A3 tank K-34, loading the main body of the column, had been critically damaged and abandoned by its crew. This was far from the case. The tank was a little late in getting into the battle, but when it did, it made its presence felt. The tank crew had just received Pittman's warning, and Sgt Wheelock, the tank commander, had notified SP4 Blencowe, the driver, of the situation, when a recoilless round hit the TC cupola a plunging blow and destroyed the caliber 30 machine gun. The tank was about 400 meters west of SUO1 Ed Green and, at this time, FPC Lohse, a recent replacement, who had never been under fire and disliked any real VC threat, was tank leader. He was riding on the tank equipment rack and was severely wounded by the blast from the first recoilless round.
The tank replied with one round of 80mm cannister fire to its right side and continued to roll. It moved another 100 meters before a second recoilless round hit the underside of the tank's front slope and scattered Emerson's, the driver unconscious. The tank rolled to the left of the road and halted. Simultaneously, a third round penetrated the front turret traversing the face of SSG Sog weighting, and disabling the coaxially mounted 57mm anti-tank cannon. Leisal was severely wounded and lying on top of the tank exposed to heavy small arms fire. Wright had fired his submachine gun through the 70's cupola into the tank. Nelson helped fit Leisal into the relative security of the gunner's seat and slid over to the lower's position just as another recoilless rifle round took the left rangefinder cover off the tank.

By this time, all the tank sights were inoperative because of recoilless hits. Wright came up from the Tank Commander's cupola and saw two VC at a distance of about 100 meters to the left rear of the tank. Thinking that the tank's entire fire control system was destroyed, Wright used the only weapon available, his caliiber .45 service pistol. The results were predictable; he missed. Nelson then came up with his caliber .45 submachine gun and emptied two clips of ammunition at the VC with no greater success than Wright. At this time, the tank was hit by another recoilless rifle round that pierced the turret wounding Leisal again.

Leisal became hysterical and leaped into incoherency. Wright dropped into the turret to check on him and noticed that the 90mm gun light switches were on. Hoping that the main gun sight function, Wright yelled to Nelson, "Let's try it!," and traversed the gun until it paralleled the a wall side of the roof pointing east. Wright hit the switch and the main gun fired. Nelson and Wright then began to fire south of the roof from east to west traversing the gun slightly after each round until they had completed an arc covering the south of the roof. While this transpired, the tank suffered four or five more recoilless rifle hits, one of which temporarily blinded Nelson who just kept on loading. Wright was firing from his TO override; however, Leisal, at one time came out of shock long enough to fire two rounds from his gunner's switch.

After completing this maneuver, Wright came up and began to engage targets of opportunity. About 125 meters directly to the west, straight south of the road Wright spotted two VC with a 57mm Recoilless rifle firing at the tank. There was no way for him to aim the gun, so he just pointed and fired. The white phosphorus round landed abut 50 meters short, so Wright made a visual adjustment as Nelson loaded a cannister round and fired again. The gun position was destroyed. The tank then received two more rounds of RPO-2 fire from the two VC to the left rear that Wright and Nelson had previously engaged with their pistol and submachinegun. Wright turned the main gun and fired two rounds of cannister at them. The tank received no more fire from this direction.

Wright could not see any GI's on the road when he looked out of the tank. All he could see were two burning ACAV's, one 200 meters to his west and another 200 meters to his east. He also spotted two VC at about 150 meters distance, crossing the road to his east, carrying a litter. He repeated his previous maneuver and fired a cannister round: "This is the satisfaction of seeing the VC's and the litter go flying." The tank fired two more times with unknown results in the general direction from which it had received recoilless rounds. Before the relief column arrived, Wright could remember firing his .45 pistol at a VC in the ditch 75 meters to his West. When the relief column arrived, Wright and Nelson saw for the first time SSG Jackson's body slumped between them. The tank had sustained a total of 14 hits from recoilless weapons, not including numerous other glancing hits and near misses. But the tank would still run, and all the crew members had survived the battle, although Leisal died of wounds shortly afterwards.
As the battle progressed in the vicinity of K-14, SP4 Walker, now running the caliber 50, saw a VC caliber 50 firing at the track and jeep in front of him from a position in the woodline to his south. He and FTO Fails on the left K-18 track took it under fire with about 100 rounds apiece and silenced it. The crew noticed a VC officer dressed in fatigue shirt and camoufage trousers carrying a .45 pistol followed by a warm small-arms fire from the woodline to the south. As both Fails and Walker were loading their weapons, they could not fire, and the strange pair quickly fled into the woods again. At this time, the VC who had infiltrated the village, opened up again with MG-2's and a secret two glancing hits on the jeep ramp but obtained no penetration. In quick succession a mortar shell scored a direct hit on the left machinegun, destroying it and wounding SP4 Dickinson the grenadier and tow leader, and heavy small arms fire was directed at the vehicle from both sides of the road.

All the crew members were pinned down by the fire and could not operate their weapons. Senses their opportunity, four VC advanced from the left and 3 VC advanced from the right. One VC was dressed in an ARVN uniform complete with web gear and steel helmet. Another, the lead man on the right, carried a M-26 hand grenade in his belt. In this desperate situation, SP4 Hutchins, the vehicle driver rose to the occasion. Employing his driver's periscope, he thrust his head forward, sighted on the VC, and fired a 45 pistol followed by about 100 rounds apiece. A strange thing then happened. Lt. Boyd, having had no communications since the fight began, suddenly came over the radio of K-14 loud and clear, saying, "move out, move out!" It was later determined that Boyd had been talking to his own driver, and by some chance, had accidentally transmitted this message. K-14, however, quickly complied, but immediately took a recoilless hit that penetrated the left side, wounding both Fails and Walker. The ACAV, however, moved out and soon took another hit from the left through the driver's compartment just as it passed the tank. At this time, Walker noticed the 18.5mm track that had stalled in front of his ACAV and saw a VC dressed in fatigue trousers and black shirt and armed with an M-26 climbing on the track. He quickly tore him to pieces with the .50 caliber. As the battle progressed in the vicinity of K-14, Lt. Boyd pulled his ACAV up directly behind them. He loaded the crew on his vehicle and took them to the AVN LOG dispensary.

K-14 continued down the road spraying the VC lining the road on both sides of the road with machine gun and M-26 fire. The crew engaged a group of 6 VC carrying three 60mm light mortars with unknown rounds. Finally, K-14 was cut off the ambush. It continued slowly west on the road for another two kilometers until its engine quit. As the crew looked behind them, Lt. Boyd pulled his ACAV up directly behind them. He loaded the crew on his vehicle and took them to the AVN LOG dispensary.

The Engineer jeep following the K Troop Hesco Truck received the warning of "ambush, ambush," over its vehicle mounted radio. The driver FTO Happen decided to stop for a few minutes but to move on. The road was lined on both sides of the road were firing small arms at the jeep. SP4 Cruz was riding shotgun, and SP4 Friend was manning the M-60 machine gun mounted in the rear of the vehicle. Both men sprayed the sides of the road with fire. The dust and smoke on the road were too heavy that none of the jeep occupants could see. They made it a distance of about 100 meters before a recoilless round hit the right front of the jeep and smashed it into the ditch at the right of the road.

Happen was killed by small arms fire at this time. Cruz ran! Friend were hurled from the jeep into the adjacent field. Cruz regained and crawled west in the ditch until he was picked up by Lt. Boyd's ACAV on its initial run through the ambush. Friend was dead when he was thrown from the jeep and had some trouble regaining his senses. He went to the road and saw an ACAV about 100 meters to his west. Friend tried to run toward it and saw two VC behind a mound of dirt to his right with rifles aimed at him. He hid his head in his arms and ran past them. Strangely, the VC did not fire, but only looked at Friend bewildered. Friend ran on a few feet more and found his path blocked by another VC carrying a rifle at sling arms. As he had lost his rifle when the jeep was destroyed,
Friend was unarmed except for a hunting knife. He quickly unsheathed it, without losing stride and drove it into the VC's belly with a whirling stroke. The VC screamed on the road, and Stoidal raced on until he found Stoidal standing beside K-16, firing his M-60. Stoidal and Friend were also picked up by K-16.

Just as K-16 and K-11 had turned back into the ambush, several of the crew members of K-16 faintly recalled seeing K-14 move past them heading west. It appeared to them as though all the crew members were wounded. K-16 stopped to fire as it moved down the road to the east, soon lost sight of K-11. K-16 picked up several wounded and engaged a large number of VC on the road. Hendrickson and K-11 then proceeded west through heavy small arms and machine gun fire until it was clear of the ambush. K-16 continued west until it pulled up beside K-14. The wounded crow was loaded into K-16, and it moved west again until it met an AAV column near the junction of Routes 1 and 2.

As K-11 moved down the road to the west ahead of K-16, it sustained several close-in hits from 10-20's, one of which entered the rear of the vehicle and killed St4 Roybal and FPC Seme. When passing the tank, a VC stepped into the road and fired at the ACAV, the round struck the transmission of K-16, and it ground to a halt just east of K-13. During his ride back into the ambush, Pitman had finally contacted SFO radio relay on his radio and was calling for air and artillery, but he had negative radio contact with anyone. The crew sighted large numbers of VC firing at them from both sides of the road. The VC, dressed in mixed black pajamas and fatigue uniforms, seemed unaccustomed and moved very slowly and deliberately.

K-16 moved to a position slightly east of the tank, which was obscured by smoke and dust. Neither Boyd nor Hendrickson could see any signs of life at this point, so the decision was made to turn around and fight their way out. As the AAV turned around, a recoilless round smashed into its side, wounding Boyd's hand. Directly to the front of the ACAV Boyd spotted a recoilless rifle with its two men crow attempting to close the breach on the weapon. It was located just off the road. Boyd and lost crew in his hand and could not fire it.
hard right, move out!”. It Burr, the troop commander, speculated from the highly excited tone of his voice and the fact that he had no other communication with him, that Boyd was in an ambush. On this basis alone, Captain Hoffman, the K Troop Commander, committed his other two platoons as a relief force. Perhaps, if SSG Littman, the acting platoon sergeant, had been riding in K-17 the platoon sergeant’s vehicle with its dual radio capability, he could have notified his troop headquarters of the situation earlier. As it was the fight had been going on some 15 to 20 minutes before Captain Hoffman received notification and committed his relief force.

Number two, both Littman and Boyd were at the head of the column. There was no strong directing hand among the four rear ADAM’s who took the majority of the casualties. If Littman had been with the main body rather than the advance guard (no place for a platoon sergeant in the first place), he might have been able to organize them and coordinate their movement. However, the battalion (4) size ambush and the huge volume of anti-armor weapons employed by the VC in what was basically an ambush by fire would probably still have overcome any action the platoon might have taken.

The ambush in itself was thoroughly planned and devastatingly executed by the VC. Against a single cavalry platoon, unsupported by either air, artillery or friendly ground forces, the result was a foregone conclusion. That as many men survived as did is a tribute to the courage and initiative of the individual American soldier.
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<th>Vehicle</th>
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<td>K-10</td>
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**Advance Guard**

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 July 1967

CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Supplementary Notes

N/A