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operation greeley 17 june - 11 october

CONFIDENTIAL
1. The attached Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GREELEY, is submitted for information of all concerned.

2. a. Operation GREELEY was initiated by the 173d Airborne Brigade under the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division on 17 June. Initially, two battalions and the brigade headquarters moved to DAK TO in response to an apparent NVA build-up in Western KONTUM Province indicating a possible major enemy monsoon offensive against ARVN installations in this Northern Highlands province. Just prior to the movement of US units into the DAK TO area, a CIDG element from the special forces camp located at DAK TO had been engaged by a large NVA force southwest of the camp. During the next several nights the special forces camp and airstrip at DAK TO had received mortar attacks and the 42d ARVN Regimental Headquarters compound at TAN CANH received 122mm rocket and mortar attacks. On 22 June a company from the 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry engaged an NVA battalion in one of the most violent meeting engagements of the war to date.

b. As a result of this engagement, the third battalion of the 173d Airborne Brigade was moved into the DAK TO area on the same day; followed on 24 June by the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division and the 1st ARVN Airborne Task Force. Both moved into KONTUM City and prepared to conduct search and destroy missions north and northeast of the city to seek out and engage an enemy force that had infiltrated the area. In addition, the 4th Infantry Division established a forward Tactical Command Post at KONTUM.

c. During subsequent search and destroy operations enemy contacts were made to the west and southwest of DAK TO on 28 June, 10 July and 21 July by elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade. In each instance the NVA force engaged was occupying a well-prepared bunker complex. These fortifications proved to be extremely difficult to penetrate because of mutually supporting machine guns and other automatic weapons positions that were unseen until the enemy chose to open fire.
d. The areas north and northeast of Kontum were systematically searched by the 1st ARVN Task Force and the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division during July with very light contact. The enemy avoided contact with our forces and withdrew from the area. A significant engagement did occur on 12 July when a reinforced NVA company exfiltrating the area was ambushed by a special forces CIDG unit from the Plateau GI Special Forces Camp. Artillery from the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division fired in support of the CIDG forces. These aggressive ARVN-US operations disrupted any planned attack on Kontum City or the GVN New Life Hamlet north of the city on Highway 14.

e. During the last several days of July the Special Forces Camps at Dak Seang and Dak PeK received nightly mortar and direct fire attacks. On 3 August a CIDG company was ambushed within a 1000 meters of the Dak Seang Camp. That same afternoon the 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment reacted by combat assaulting southwest of the contact area and the 1st ARVN Airborne Task Force was helilifted into the vicinity of the Special Forces Camp. The following day the 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment became heavily engaged as they assaulted a hilltop bunker complex which later proved to be a company-size position of the 2d Battalion, 174th NVA Regiment's base camp. That same day the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion made contact with an NVA company west of Dak Seang in vicinity of the CIDG ambush. Pursuit of this enemy force led a day later to an engagement on the hill mass north of where 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment was continuing in their attempts to seize the well-entrenched enemy positions. During the night of 6-7 August the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion threw back five assaults by the NVA battalion's forces. On the morning of 7 August the enemy's base camp was occupied by the ARVN units as the enemy withdrew west towards the Lao-Thai Border. The large quantities of ammunition and personal gear left behind indicated the enemy suffered much heavier losses than the 189 bodies found in two mass graves. It appeared that the only thing the NVA unit was able to take with them were their wounded and weapons. Also discovered in this base area was an extensive mock-up of the Dak Seang Special Forces Camp indicating that the enemy's intention, before being so soundly defeated, was a ground attack to overrun the camp.

f. At the same time the battle was taking place west of Dak Seang the reinforcement of the Dak PeK Special Forces Camp was initiated on 4 and 9 August by helilifting two battalions of the 173d Airborne Brigade into the vicinity of the camp. On 10 August a ten day search and destroy operation to the west was initiated by these two US battalions with company size CIDG units from the Dak PeK camp attached. A blocking position was established near the Lao-Thai Border employing a CIDG company from Dak PeK and a Mike Force company from Pleiku. These extensive operations failed to produce any direct contact with enemy forces; however, several bunker complexes were discovered and destroyed.
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GREELEY

16 December 1967

The weather conditions throughout the operation were much less than favorable. The towering mountain ranges combined with moving ground fog and low ceilings in the valleys to postpone many planned airlifts. Nevertheless, any tactical emergency situation that required supporting Army aviation or TAC air always found them readily available, although many times the flying conditions were marginal at best. The effect of the monsoon weather on the terrain, especially the roads and bridge approaches, required a maximum effort by the supporting 299th Engineer Battalion. Initially, many of the bridges on Route 14 had to be rebuilt to support the tactical and daily resupply convoys from KONTUM to DAK TO. By the end of August, despite all the valiant efforts of the engineers, the torrential monsoon rains had turned the seven kilometer stretch of Route 512 from TAN CANH to the New DAK TO airfield into a quagmire that twice during September closed the road to resupply convoys for several days placing a greater reliance on airlift for the resupply of DAK TO.

The essential element of this combined US-ARVN operation was cooperation. The 4th Infantry Division Forward Tactical Command Post was located adjacent to the ARVN 24th Special Tactical Zone headquarters and Detachment B-24, US Special Forces in KONTUM City to facilitate the coordination in the area of operations of all the FWMPAF. The ARVN and US battalions deployed into KONTUM Province with little advance notice or time to prepare or conduct reconnaissance of this unfamiliar area; however, with the US Special Forces advised CIDG forces operating with US units and furnishing their knowledge of trails and terrain this potential problem was minimized. The ARVN Airborne and Infantry units often operated in areas of operations adjacent to the US battalions and on several occasions established blocking or screening positions in coordination with the maneuver scheme of an adjacent US battalion. The employment of local and regional forces of KONTUM to provide security for critical bridges on Route 14, the overland supply route, freed the maneuver battalions to be more profitably employed on search and destroy missions.

It was the concerted efforts of all the US and ARVN units that produced the successes of this operation during some of the most difficult weather and over some of the most rugged terrain in VIETNAM.

1 Incl

as

W. R. PEERS
Major General, USA
Commanding

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## COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT — GREELEY

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96252

AVDDH-GC

16 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

THRU: Commanding General
       I Field Force, Vietnam
       ATTN: AVFA-GC
       APO 96350

TO: Commander
    US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
    ATTN: J343
    APO 96243

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation GREELEY - Search and Destroy.


3. (U) LOCATION: GREELEY area of operations is shown at inclosure 1. (Reference: Map VIETNAM, Scale 1:250,000; Series JOG (G) 1501; Sheets ND 48-4, 42-8, 49-1, 49-5; and map VIETNAM, Scale 1:50,000; Series L 7014; Sheets 6539 II, III; 6639 II, III; 6538 I, II, III, IV; 6638 I, II, III, IV; 6537 I, IV; 6637 I &IV; 6437 I; 6438 I, II; 6439 II.

4. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division.

5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Principal commanders and senior staff officers participating in the operation are listed at inclosure 2.

6. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION: Inclosure 3.

7. (C) INTELLIGENCE:
   a. Enemy Composition, Disposition and Strength Prior to Operation GREELEY.

   (1) Prior to Operation GREELEY, NVA forces had avoided major contact with friendly units in KONTUM. It was believed that NVA units would try to establish themselves in the KONTUM area and attempt to keep the PLEI TRAP and DAK AKOI Valley areas open for infiltration of new units into RVN. Acts of terrorism, village harassment and propaganda, mining and attacks by fire by the VC/NVA operating in the area were anticipated.
(2) Summary of enemy composition, disposition and strength prior to the beginning of Operation GREELEY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>DISPOSITION</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>24th NVA Regt</td>
<td>1285</td>
<td>Vic AS 9127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq and Support Units</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Vic AS 9127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>Vic AS 9127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>Vic AS 9127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn (Believed operating independently and subordinate to B-3 Front)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Vic ZB 0019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>304th VC MF Bn</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-101 D Bn</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Vic YB 9017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200th VC Bn</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Enemy Activity during Operation GREELEY.

(1) Operation GREELEY began 17 June. The same day DAK SEANG Special Forces Camp received a light mortar attack and TAN CANH, Headquarters of the 42nd ARVN Regiment, was hit with approximately 30 rounds of mortar and 122mm rocket fire. Numerous agent sightings and small scale guerrilla activities prevailed in this area prior to the attack. The first major contact of the operation was made in June when elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade made contact with the 6th Battalion, 24th Regiment southwest of DAK TO. In this engagement 106 NVA were KIA. Intelligence gained from this contact revealed that the 6th Battalion had participated in the attack on TAN CANH and DAK TO earlier in the month. During the latter part of July elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade engaged elements of the DOC LOP Regiment (KLOID Battalion) a newly identified unit which was believed to have been part of the old 101C Regiment. This contact accounted for 12 enemy dead.

(2) While the above activity was occurring in June and July in the DAK TO area, mortaring and harassment of DAK SEANG and DAK PEK Special Forces Camps, located along the LAOTIAN Border, increased. By mid-July it was obvious that a newly infiltrated NVA Regiment was responsible for these attacks. In late July two HOI CHANHS identified the 174th NVA Regiment. The mortar attacks on both camps ceased in early August after the 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment and the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion made a series of contacts with the 2d Battalion, 174th Regiment west of DAK SEANG. Friendly units accounted for 189 enemy KIA. The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 174th NVA Regiment were never contacted.

(3) After this contact a mock-up of the DAK SEANG Special Forces Camp was discovered just west of DAK SEANG in what was believed the 2d Battalion, 174th Regiment's base area. It was estimated that elements of the 174th Regiment had planned attacks on both DAK SEANG and DAK PEK Special Forces Camps. It was later determined that the 3d Battalion, 174th Regiment had been located just west of DAK PEK and had been mortaring that area. It was estimated that the 4-6 August contact interdicted the enemy's plan to attack and overrun DAK SEANG. Due to the casualties suffered, the 174th Regiment was forced to withdraw to the LAOTIAN Border area.
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(4) Enemy activity in and around the area of DAK Pek and DAK Seang ceased almost immediately after the 174th NVA Regiment withdrew.

(5) Shown below is the enemy composition, disposition and strength encountered during Operation GREELEY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>DISPOSITION</th>
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<tr>
<td>K-101D Bn</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>YB 8614</td>
<td>PW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-6 Bn, 24th Regt</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>ZB 0017</td>
<td>PW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn, 174th Regt</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>YB 8043</td>
<td>PW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bn, 174th Regt</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>YB 6987</td>
<td>PW</td>
</tr>
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</table>

c. During Operation GREELEY the following enemy techniques were used against friendly forces.

(1) Enemy use of 122mm rockets.
   
   (a) The first indication of enemy units employing long range rockets in the 4th Infantry Division area of operations was 17 June when an NVA unit fired mortar and 122mm rockets on TAN CANH at ZB053217.
   
   (b) It was estimated that up to 26 rounds of mortar and four rounds of rockets were fired.

(2) Enemy technique in tactical intelligence:

   A PW taken from the DAK SEANG area in late July revealed an intelligence technique used for their operational planning. The early mortarings on DAK SEANG were designed as a casualty inflicting tactic. However, the NVA were also noting very closely the defensive measures taken by the camp and whether reinforcements were sent to the camp. The reconnaissance effort was geared toward what was believed to be a future ground attack on the camp. A mock-up of the camp was later found confirming this contention. The enemy was in this case very thorough in the operational planning for a future ground attack. Much preparation was employed with little concern for the time involved.

d. Terrain.

(1) The area of operations is situated in an extremely mountainous region in western KONTUM Province. The tropical rain forest areas are heavily covered with triple canopy vegetation and interspersed by numerous streams and rivers. Principal drainage for the area is provided by the DAK POKO River running north to south. Rolling plains and less vegetated areas are on either side of the DAK POKO. Highway 14, which runs north from KONTUM, is the only road leading to either DAK POKO or DAK SEANG.
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(2) Military aspects of the terrain.

(a) Observation and fields of fire: Observation and fields of fire are severely reduced by the dense vegetation that covers the area. Flat trajectory fires are limited in hills and mountains, and can be easily deflected by the dense undergrowth. In the more rolling and less vegetated areas, observation and fields of fire become less a problem. Vegetation and terrain irregularities limit target acquisition and adjustment of fire for high angle fire weapons.

(b) Cover and concealment: Cover and concealment from flat trajectory fire is excellent in most parts of the area of operations. The rugged mountainous terrain and dense foliage provides natural concealment as well as cover. In the more open portions (along the DAK POKO) this cover is somewhat reduced.

(c) Obstacles: The major obstacle is the DAK POKO River which forms a barrier for east-west travel. This river is fordable during the dry season.

(d) Key terrain features: The NGOK TANG Mountain vicinity YB9517 and its connecting mountain range is the key terrain feature southwest of DAK 10.

(e) Avenues of approach: There are several avenues of approach into the area. They are from the west along Route 512; from the north along Route 14; and other avenues of approach in the northwest portion of the area which offer the enemy unlimited access to the area from LAOS via valleys and infiltration routes.

(f) Weather: The weather throughout was fair to poor due to the monsoon season and the large amount of rainfall. Air operations were consequently limited and maximum usage of air power could not be made.

(g) Mining of the LOC's in the area of operations was negligible. No vehicles were damaged or destroyed as the result of mines. One MLAI mine was found at ZB094176 and destroyed.

(h) A total of 23 mortar attacks were experienced during Operation GREELEY. They were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>DAK TO</td>
<td>ZBO10218</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>81/82mm Mortar</td>
<td>1 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TAN CANH/</td>
<td>ZBO60220</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>120mm Mortar</td>
<td>5 WIA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42d ARVN Regt</td>
<td>ZBO60220</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>122mm RKT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hqs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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| 18 | TAN CANH/42d ARVN Regt Hqs | ZB 060220 | UNK | UNK |
| 20 | LRRP Radio Relay Team | ZB100200 | 7 | UNK |
| 20 | DAK SEANG | YB902490 | 6 | 82mm Mortar |
| 20 | TAN CANH/42d ARVN Regt Hqs | ZB062270 | UNK | UNK |
| 20 | DINH BIEN | ZB903176 | UNK | UNK |
| 22 | C/1–503 | ZB194225 | 15 | 60mm Mortar |
| 26 | DAK PEK | YB949684 | 15 | 82mm Mortar |
| 28 | FSB 4–503 | YB903183 | 15 | 82mm Mortar |
| 30 | Ambush Patrol | YB886161 | 3 | 82/8mm Mortar |
| 30 | D/4–503 | YB883157 | 3 | 82/8mm Mortar |

July

| 04 | FSB 1 | ZB004217 | 20 | 82mm Mortar |
| 21 | DAK SEANG | YB902409 | 2 | 82mm Mortar |
| 22 | DAK SEANG | " | 10 | 82mm Mortar |
| 23 | DAK SEANG | " | 5/3 | 82mm/RR |

| 25 | DAK SEANG | " | 34 | Mortar & RR |
| 26 | DAK SEANG | " | 2-4 | UNK |
| 27 | DAK SEANG | " | 3 | 120mm mortar |
| 27 | DAK PEK | YB949684 | 8 | UNK |
| 27 | DAK SEANG | YB902409 | 2 | UNK |
| 28 | FSB 9 2-503 | YB813157 | 20-30 | 82mm mortar |

August

| 14 | B/7-13 Arty | ZB160040 | 10-25 | 60mm mortar |

1. CA Evaluation of Population and Attitudes. The population covered in the Civic Action program was predominately MONTAGNARD. These people were generally more receptive to the US Forces and their efforts than to the VIETNAMESE. A Civic Action program emphasizing the close US/GVN cooperation was initiated so as to draw the MONTAGNARD population closer to the Government of VIETNAM. Aware of the benefits the US/GVN combined Civic Action program was according them; the overall MONTAGNARD population lost much of the complacency or hostility that had previously been displayed toward the GVN efforts.

2. (c) MISSION: The 4th Infantry Division conducted operations in the GREELEY area of operations to:

   a. Detect North VIETNAMESE Army (NVA) infiltration into Republic of VIETNAM (RVN).
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GREELEY

b. Conduct search and destroy operations to locate and capture or destroy 24th NVA Regimental elements and bases.

c. Provide security for LLOC from KONTUM to DAK TO.

d. Deploy forces for the relief/reinforcement of USSF/CIDG Camps, Regional and Popular Forces, Province/District Headquarters and critical signal sites within the GREELEY area of operations.

9. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

a. As the result of the shelling of DAK TO and TAN CANH by the NVA/VC on 17 June, the 173d Airborne Brigade was moved into the area to initially seize the high ground and observation points which controlled these areas. The most prominent of these was the hill mass south of DAK TO which was given priority. Subsequent to searching the hill mass, the forces were to continue the search and destroy operation to the southwest to find and fix the NVA/VC elements operating in this area and to interdict their supply lines from CAMBODIA.

b. Concurrently with this operation the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division and an ARVN Airborne Task Force conducted a double envelopment by air assault in the area northeast of KONTUM, between KONTUM and the DAK AKOI Valley, with the objective of cutting off the 24th NVA Regimental Headquarters and one of its battalions. One contact was established, the forces were to pursue in an attempt to cut the NVA elements off from their redoubt in southwest QUANG NGAI Province. Subsequently, the forces were to search out the area to locate and destroy elements of the 304th Local Force Battalion.

c. The forces in the area were also tasked to maintain a ready reaction capability to be deployed in the areas of the DAK SEANG, DAK PEK, MANG BUK and PLATEAU GI CIDG Camps in the event these installations were threatened by NVA/VC attacks.

10. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Operation GREELEY was initiated on 17 June by two battalions and a tactical command post of the 173d Airborne Brigade. They moved by air and road from CATECKA to the vicinity of the DAK TO Special Forces Camp. This move was to strengthen the FMAF in western KONTUM Province since there were indications that a major NVA unit had moved into this area.

(1) On 15 and 16 June an element from DAK TO Special Forces Camp had engaged a company size NVA force approximately 1400 meters southwest of their camp and had incurred heavy casualties including two USSF personnel MIA in this contact. Early on the morning of 17 June the DAK TO camp received mortar fire and at TAN CANH, the 42d ARVN Regiment’s Headquarters was hit by mortars and, at the same time, became the first installation in the II Corps Tactical Zone to receive 122mm rocket fire. TAN CANH was also attacked by mortar fire on the nights of 18 and 20 June possibly in preparation for a later ground attack.
(2) The 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry, each with a CIDG company from the DAK TO Special Forces Camp attached, initiated operations southwest of DAK TO to locate the USSF and CIDG personnel missing from the 15 June engagement. They also attempted to locate and destroy the enemy force attacking installations in vicinity of DAK TO and TAN CANH. On 18 June Company C, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry recovered the bodies of all the MIA's from the previous CIDG action. The 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry found several indications of extensive enemy activity and presence throughout the area south of DAK TO. On the morning of 22 June Company A, 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry left its night position and began moving north down a finger-like ridge line planning to close into the 173d Airborne Brigade CP at DAK TO late that afternoon. Soon after moving out of their night location, the point squad of Company A engaged 10-15 NVA to their front. The point fell back and the leading two platoons formed a perimeter. Artillery was called in to their north. Initially, the NVA attacked this perimeter in platoon and company size force and were repulsed. Artillery was lifted for air strikes and gunship runs as the enemy force had moved in closer to the perimeter on three sides. The enemy force, later determined to have been the 6th Battalion, 24th Regiment, began an assault of the two US platoons in larger numbers. This attack was also repulsed, but only after heavy casualties had been sustained by the small perimeter. The remaining two platoons of Company A were sent to reinforce from the company minus perimeter about 200 meters south of the contact. Companies B and C began moving toward Company A. At 1100 hours the company command group lost contact with the platoons. Shortly thereafter a group of wounded survivors made their way back to the command group's location and together they moved further up the finger and began cutting an LZ. Company C reached this location at 1400 hours. Late in the afternoon Company C attempted to get down into the area where Company A's platoons had formed their perimeter but were repulsed by enemy sniper fire. Meanwhile, Company B had combat assaulted into an LZ north of the battle area. After securing the LZ they began to move south where they received fire from an estimated NVA platoon. Heavy movement was heard on their flanks so they formed a defensive perimeter and called for air and artillery. The next day the battle area was swept accounting for all friendly MIA's and during this and later sweeps a total of 106 NVA bodies were found. Further to the south of Company A's contact, the 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry had received mortar and automatic weapons fire and had several times sighted NVA troops. It was apparent that NVA/VC forces were in this area in strength and were preparing to initiate a major monsoon offensive against FMNMAC and GVN installations in KONTUM Province. The 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry began deploying to DAK TO even as Company A was still engaged. On 23 June the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division became OCPON to the 173d Airborne Brigade and on 26 June the 1st ARVN Airborne Task Force and the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division began arriving at KONTUM City from SAIGON and from BONG SONG. The 4th Infantry Division established a forward Tactical Command Post at KONTUM adjacent to the ARVN 24th Special Tactical Zone Headquarters to facilitate control of the US forces and to coordinate with the ARVN units that were operating within the Operation GREELEY area of operations.
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(3) In the rugged, mountainous area southwest of DAK TO units of the 173d Airborne Brigade which now included the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry OPCON from the 1st Air Cavalry Division, were continually having brief contacts with small NVA units or trail parties and were discovering enemy base camps and caches of weapons, ammunition and supplies. These finds further indicated the presence of a major NVA unit. On 28 June, Companies A and B, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry made contact first with a reinforced NVA platoon and later with an NVA company about 10 kilometers southwest of DAK TO. Contact was broken off in late afternoon after Companies A and B linked up. Six NVA bodies were counted and one NVA WIA was captured. On 4 July, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry reverted to OPCON of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry and was helilifted from DAK TO to KONTUM.

(4) The three battalions of the 173d Airborne Brigade continued to conduct search and destroy operations throughout the area, still having scattered contact. On 10 July Companies A, B, and D, 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry were moving west toward their day's objective when, in mid-afternoon, Company A made heavy contact with a dug-in enemy unit on a hill to their front. Company A received machine-gun fire from three heavy machine guns at close range. Artillery was called in on the enemy. Company B began a flanking movement to the right of Company A; however, as Company B began maneuvering two heavy machine guns in previously undetected bunkers opened up. Light automatic weapons and mortar fires were also encountered. The enemy positions were mutually supporting and estimated to be occupied by a reinforced NVA company. Company D, who had been in reserve, began to maneuver to relieve pressure on the two companies. The enemy broke contact at 1800 hours and withdrew leaving nine bodies and three weapons behind. Two days later two NVA WIA's were captured in a base camp to the southwest of the contact area.

(5) On 21 July Company B, 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry discovered an NVA platoon in an ambush position. The company flanked the ambush and called mortar and artillery fire as the enemy attempted to withdraw to the southwest. A sweep of the area disclosed 13 NVA KIA; four of them snipers in trees. The 173d Airborne Brigade units continued to operate throughout the region southwest of DAK TO and found numerous and various indications of enemy units having been in the area, but there was no further significant contact.

(6) On 26 June the 1st ARVN Airborne Task Force had initiated a search and destroy operation in an area of operations extending from the KONKO New Life Hamlet on Highway 14 northeast as far as the DAK AKOI Valley. The 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division initiated operations to the northeast of KONTUM City on 27 June and were to move generally from south to northeast. Weather was extremely adverse to the air cavalry operations and several of their planned CA's and helilifts were delayed or cancelled. A systematic search of each area was carried out, but the enemy avoided contact and neither the ARVN force nor the battalions of the Air Cavalry could locate a significant enemy force.
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(7) The only activity in this area occurred on 11 July when a 30 man CIDG patrol from PLATEAU GI Special Forces Camp ambushed a reinforced NVA company traveling west to east on an infiltration trail. The initial contact killed two NVA. A 50 man patrol and a 40 man patrol from the special forces camp reinforced the ambush patrol, and after an airstrike was called in on the deployed enemy the combined CIDG force were put on line to assault. However, it was soon evident that the automatic weapons of the NVA company had established fire superiority. Medium artillery from the Air Cavalry was in range and began firing in support of the withdrawal of the CIDG elements. The following day three companies from the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry were helilifted to the PLATEAU GI Special Forces Camp, but sweeps in the contact area produced negative results.

(8) On 20 July the three battalions of the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division had completed sweeping northeast to the limit of their AO and initiated a return sweep back towards KONTUM. Also on 20 July the 2d Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment moved into blocking positions to the south of the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry. This joint operation was designed to trap the VC units harassing the villages to the north of Route 5B between KONTUM and KON BRAITH, however it failed to develop any significant contact. On 25 July the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division began preparations to depart the area of operations.

(9) Almost nightly during the last half of July, the DAK SEANG and DAK PEK Special Forces Camps, 20 and 45 kilometers north of DAK TO respectively received mortar, rocket, and recoilless rifle attacks. On 3 August a CIDG element from DAK SEANG made contact with two NVA Platoons within 1000 meters of the special forces camp. Since a ground attack appeared imminent, the 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment was combat assaulted into an LZ southwest of DAK SEANG. The same day the 5th and 8th ARVN Airborne Battalions, with their task force headquarters and artillery battery, were helilifted directly into DAK SEANG. On 4 August the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion moved out of the special forces camp and immediately made contact with an NVA company on the high ground to the west. Contact lasted for two hours until the NVA force withdrew. The enemy was pursued by the airborne unit which they found eleven NVA KIA and captured two POW's. They also recovered two US Special Forces and five CIDG bodies from the previous day's engagement. On the same day the 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment made contact with an NVA company as they tried to seize hill 1129, west of DAK SEANG. Contact was heavy throughout the day and the ARVN unit was unable to force the NVA from their hilltop position. The battalion dug-in at the foot of the hill for the night while the 5th ARVN Airborne Battalion provided security for the special forces camp. On 5 August the 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment again made an unsuccessful attempt to take the hill. It became apparent that the NVA force did not want to give up their positions. The 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion began moving toward the contact area from the north to help take pressure off the 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment. The 5th ARVN Airborne Battalion moved out of DAK SEANG to the west to provide flank security north of the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion. While moving toward the contact area on 6 August, the 8th ARVN
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Airborne Battalion made contact with 10 NVA who were quickly reinforced by two NVA companies. An assault by the lead element of the ARVN battalion was thrown back from the strong defensive positions on the high ground to their front. These enemy positions were on the hill to the north of the hill the 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment had not been able to occupy. During the afternoon the airborne battalion prepared defensive positions under small arms fire and called airstrikes and artillery into the area. Late in the afternoon the battalion began receiving mortar and B-40 rocket fire, followed by an attack by a strong NVA force directed at the flanks of the friendly position. During the night the NVA made five assaults on the battalion's perimeter advancing each time to within hand grenade range, but the tremendous volume of friendly small arms, automatic weapons, artillery fire and Spooky flare/gunships repulsed each attempt to penetrate their perimeter.

The last attack, just prior to dawn on 7 August, was noticeably weak as the enemy had spent himself in his determined efforts to keep this base complex. Contact was broken by the enemy during the morning as the 8th ARVN Battalion moved up into the enemy's positions. The 5th ARVN Airborne Battalion moved through the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion and had brief contact with a reinforced NVA platoon on the next hill complex to the west. The three hilltops formed regimental size base area with battalion size positions on each hill and several command, VIP type bunkers including an elaborate mock-up of the DAK SEANG Special Forces Camp. The 1st Battalion, 42d Regiment had sporadic contact as they seized the hill they had been trying to occupy since 4 August. The NVA withdrew to the west. On 7 August the 3d ARVN Airborne Battalion arrived at DAK SEANG from SAIGON and assumed a reserve mission in the vicinity of the special forces camp. The 174th NVA Regiment had sustained heavy losses and was able to evacuate only its wounded and weapons. Large quantities of ammunition and personnel gear were left behind. The results of the three days of contact were 189 NVA KIA, 3 NVA CIA.

(10) The contacts in close proximity to DAK SEANG gave increased weight to the possibility that the mortar attacks on DAK PEK were also supported by sizeable NVA/VC forces poised for a ground attack. On 4 August the 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry was airlifted to the vicinity of DAK PEK Special Forces Camp to reinforce the CIDG forces in the area. On 9 August three companies of the 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry moved into DEK PEK. On 9 and 10 August the two airborne battalions initiated search and destroy missions to the south and west of DAK PEK on parallel axes. A unit of 40 to 60 CIDG was attached to each battalion to act as guides, operating with the point elements of each company. When the two US battalions began their sweeps toward the border, a 200 man CIDG element already on an operation to the northwest of DAK PEK, moved south five miles in 24 hours into a blocking position within 500 meters of the LAOTIAN Border. The next day they were reinforced by a MIKE Force Company from PLEIKU. On 14 August the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry conducted a combat assault to the southwest of the DAK PEK and on 16 August found an enemy bunker complex. Another CIDG element from DAK PEK Special Forces Camp began an operation to screen the flank of the 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry and act as a blocking force as the US battalion began moving towards the north. These
extensive search and destroy operations around DAK PFK produced no contact
with an enemy force although several bunker complexes were discovered and
destroyed. The reaction to the threat and the 10 day combined search and
destroy operations of US Forces and CIDG elements thwarted a possible enemy
attack. On the 20 and 21 August the two US battalions were helilifted back
to the DAK TO area.

(11) After the three day engagement west of DAK SEANG in early
August there was very little contact in the Operation GREELEY area of oper-
ations. From 5-13 September ARVN and US units continued to conduct search
and destroy operations west of DAK TO and centered around the site of a
proposed special forces camp at BEN HET, 15 miles west of DAK TO on Route
512. An 11 day operation northeast of DAK TO again resulted in negative
contact although numerous trails and punjii stakes were found.

(12) On 16 August the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion departed for
SAIGON, followed on 28 August by the 5th ARVN Airborne Battalion and the 1st
ARVN Airborne Task Force Headquarters. The 3d ARVN Airborne Battalion remained
in the KONTUM area until 6 October. On 8 October the 23d ARVN Ranger Battalion
moved into KONTUM and was placed under the control of the 24th Special Tact-
ical Zone. The 173d Airborne Brigade headquarters and the 1st Battalion,
503d Airborne Infantry and the 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry departed
DAK TO for TUY HOA. On 17 September the 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry,
with attached armor and cavalry units, formed Task Force 77 and conducted
operations in the DAK TO area with negligible enemy contact until 11 October
when Operation GREELEY terminated.

11. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Non-organic and non-attached supporting forces.

(1) 7th Air Force.
(2) 52d Artillery Group.
(3) 937th Engineer Group.
(4) 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.
(5) 145th Combat Aviation Battalion.
(6) Det, 5th Air Commando Squadron.
(7) 9th Air Commando Squadron.
(8) Det, 245th Psyops Company.
(9) USAID, KONTUM Province.
(10) JUSPAO, KONTUM Province.
b. Artillery Support.

(1) Direct support for the 173d Airborne Brigade was provided by its own organic artillery, 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (105T). The 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division was supported by 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery (105T), composed of three 105mm batteries and an aerial rocket artillery battery (-). The 42d ARVN Regiment direct support artillery was provided by the 221st ARVN Artillery Battalion (105T). The 1st ARVN Airborne Task Force was supported by Battery A, ARVN Airborne Artillery Battalion. Reinforcing medium artillery support was provided by attaching Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155T) to the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery and attaching Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155T) to 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery. Battery A, 37th ARVN Artillery Battalion (155T) provided reinforcing medium artillery to both the Airborne Artillery Battalion and the 221st ARVN Artillery Battalion. Heavy artillery support was initially provided by placing Battery D, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (8-inch SP) in general support from 25 – 28 June and later by Battery C, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (8-inch/175mm) and Battery C, 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (8-inch/175mm) of the 52d Artillery Group in general support. Convoy coverage and route security was accomplished by positioning battery B, 3d Battalion, 7th Artillery (105 SP) between Kontum and DAK TO.

(2) A fire support element was established as a part of the division tactical CP in Kontum. Its mission was coordination and clearance of all fires for the general support artillery. The TAC CP also was a coordinating headquarters for all artillery support of units participating in Operation GREELEY.

(3) Elements of the 52d Artillery Group performed the following missions during Operation GREELEY:

(a) Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155T):
Reinforcing 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery.

(b) Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155T):
Reinforcing 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery.

(c) Battery C, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (8-inch/175mm):
General Support.

(d) Battery C, 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (8-inch/175mm):
General Support.

(e) Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105SP):
General Support (Route Security).

(4) On 26 July the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division terminated its portion of Operation GREELEY. At this time, Battery B, 1st Battalion,
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92d Artillery was released from attachment and returned to the FRANCIS MARION area of operations.

(5) The 173d Airborne Brigade continued to operate in the GREELEY area of operations with their organic and supporting artillery with no change in mission with the exception of Battery C, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery whose mission was changed to General Support-Reinforcing the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery. On 6 August Battery A, 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (105T) and a platoon of Battery A, 37th ARVN Artillery Battalion (155T) were helilifted to DAK SEANG to reinforce Battery A, ARVN Airborne Artillery (105 T) in support of the heavily engaged 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment and the 6th ARVN Airborne Battalion west of the special forces camp. On 17 September a portion of the maneuver elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade and Batteries B and C, 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery departed the area of operations. The remainder of the 173d Airborne Brigade; Battery A, 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery; Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery, and Battery C, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery continued operations until the termination of the operation.

(6) Ammunition expenditures for Operation GREELEY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn, 319th Arty</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>41,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn, 6th Arty</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>5,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn, 13th Arty</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>1,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 19th Arty</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>6,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 21st Arty</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>8,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 77th Arty</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>8,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 92d Arty</td>
<td>155mm</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Bn, 16th Arty</td>
<td>8-inch</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 14th Arty</td>
<td>8-inch</td>
<td>4,457</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 14th Arty</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 32d Arty</td>
<td>8-inch</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 32d Arty</td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
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</table>

TOTAL: 97,980

c. Air Support.

(1) The 7th US Air Force provided the close air support to the 173d Airborne Brigade; the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division; ARVN units assigned to the 24th Special Tactical Zone and the 1st ARVN Airborne Task Force; and the CIDG elements from the Special Forces Camps in KONTUM Province.

(2) The following table indicates the close air support requested, sorties flown, type of aircraft utilized and damage assessment of the missions...
flown in support of Operation GREELEY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Mission</th>
<th>Flown</th>
<th>A-1E</th>
<th>B-57</th>
<th>F-4C</th>
<th>F-100</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>AC-47</th>
<th>Huts Bunk Av/ Sec Est.</th>
<th>AA Exp KBA</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC Immed</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS Immed</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOOKY</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) The damage assessment is a relatively conservative estimate and probably does not reflect the total damage caused by TAC air to enemy personnel and structures. A true assessment of all strikes is very difficult to obtain. Due in part to the rugged terrain of this area, only 20% of the damage assessment was by ground exploitation. This many times took place hours after the strike had been put in. Assessment of the majority of the targets was by aerial observation which was extremely limited because the dense jungle covering most of the area prevented the observer from seeing the ground.

(4) Weather: During the period 17 June through 30 September, low ceilings and limited visibility restricted the type of close air support missions. All FAC preplanned missions had a CSS back up in the event adverse weather prevented the mission from being put in by a FAC. An indication of the effect that the weather had on air support missions is disclosed in the chart which shows that only 60% of the preplanned strikes were flown. In addition, because of the influence of the weather, there were more preplanned CSS strikes than FAC preplanned, whereas under better flying conditions a two-to-one ratio of FAC over CSS preplans is normal. Numerous missions were flown when only A-1E aircraft were able to place the strike under the marginal weather.

(3) B-52 Strikes: As in other operations, B-52 strikes provided a tremendous source of concentrated fire power. There were 22 B-52 strikes flown in support of Operation GREELEY, covering a total target area of 56 square kilometers. (See Inclosure 6).

d. Army Aviation Support.

(1) The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion was assigned the mission
to provide general helicopter support to Operation GREELEY. This was accomplished by placing an additional assault helicopter company in support of the division. The division aviation battalion operations would assign the aircraft to missions requested by either the 173d Airborne Brigade or the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division to reinforce their organic and direct support aviation assets. The ARVN units assigned to the 24th Special Tactical Zone were provided aviation support for helilift, combat assault and resupply missions by aviation assets of all US units participating in the operation.

(2) The 335th Assault Helicopter Company, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion was in direct support of the 173d Airborne Brigade throughout the operation. However, after 17 September when the brigade headquarters and two battalions left the GREELEY area of operations, the remaining battalion task force was furnished direct support by the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

(3) In the GREELEY area of operations roads were non-existent for tactical operations. All tactical moves and artillery displacements were by helilift. By the last week of August the monsoon rains had overtaken the engineer's efforts on Route 512 from its junction with Route 14 west to the New DAK TO airfield and 173d Airborne Brigade Headquarters, closing it to resupply convoys twice in September and requiring a greater reliance on resupply by helicopter during the last month of the operation.

(4) The following is a summary of operational support furnished by the 52d Aviation Battalion:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat cargo lifts</td>
<td>10,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat troop lifts</td>
<td>19,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed helicopter</td>
<td>6,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>2,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial reconnaissance</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty evacuation</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft recovery</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>38,700</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hours flown</th>
<th>Sorties completed</th>
<th>Passengers carried</th>
<th>Tons of cargo transported</th>
<th>Casualties evacuated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,234</td>
<td>25,749</td>
<td>22,087</td>
<td>4,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>977</td>
<td>2,951</td>
<td>10,834</td>
<td>4,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Figures for the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion are not exact totals since the battalion's records combine all support to the 4th Infantry Division and do not differentiate between Operation GREELEY and Operation FRANCIS MARION.
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e. Engineer Support.

(1) The 299th Engineer Battalion (Combat), 937th Engineer Group with the attached 15th Engineer Company (LE) provided the general engineer support to Operation GREELEY. The major tasks assigned to the supporting engineers included:

   (a) Opening Route 14 from PLEIKU to DAK TO and upgrading Route 14 from KONTUM to Route 512 to a class 55, all-weather road;

   (b) Improving and maintaining Route 512 from Route 14 to New DAK TO airfield;

   (c) Constructing aircraft revetments at New DAK TO and KONTUM airfields;

   (d) Constructing an FSA at New DAK TO airfield and maintaining and improving the FSA at KONTUM;

   (e) Providing direct support to the 173d Airborne Brigade and general support to the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division.

(2) Company B, 299th Engineer Battalion had previously been alerted to the contingency mission of opening and upgrading Route 14 from KONTUM to the junction of Route 512; rebuilding of seven kilometers of Route 512 from the intersection of Route 14 to New DAK TO airfield; and extending and upgrading Route 512 to the site of the proposed BEN HET Special Forces Camp. Company B left PLEIKU early on 17 June with the immediate mission of constructing an M4T6 float bridge at ZB093175. As a result of a delay, construction did not begin until the afternoon; however, the bridge was completed by 2230 hours. During the night of the 17th, Companies D and E, 4th Engineer Battalion constructed 120' of M4T6 float bridge across the DAK TA KAN River south of DAK TO. On Route 14 the bridge at ZB065218 was inspected and it was found that it would not support heavy equipment, necessitating emergency repairs before Company B could cross. Company B closed into New DAK TO airfield at approximately noon on 18 June. The company's initial task was to support the 173d Airborne Brigade in construction of their forward CP and base camp in the vicinity of the New DAK TO airfield. During the first week of the operation bunkers were constructed and 1500 meters of single apron and triple concertina tactical wire was installed. Concurrent with the construction of the brigade CP work began on 33 permanent, all-weather, L-shaped UH-1 helicopter revetments which were completed on 1 July; later three CH-47 and six O-1 aircraft revetments were added to the project. Also during this period, three fire support bases were cleared by Company B. In the first week of July the company began working on the DAK TO FSA constructing, enlarging and improving existing berms of the ASP and scooping out 10 emplacements for 10,000 gallon fuel bladders. Simultaneous with their work around DAK TO Company B was repairing and upgrading the roads and bridges on Route 14 from the bridge at ZB093175 north to Route 512 and on Route 512
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to the New DAK TO airfield. Company B installed 360' of tactical bridging at two locations and built 135' of timber bridging on Route 14. On Route 512, while reshaping and improving drainage, Company B began work on two bridges; a 120' double double Bailey bridge at ZB057222 to replace an existing float bridge and a four span, timber trestle with timber bents, dry gap bridge at ZB002222. As the monsoon rains increased in intensity, approaches to these two bridges required extensive corduroying to keep them passable. On 24 August Company B began a switch of locations with Company D in KONTUM. On 10 September Company B replaced the bridge at ZA197973 that had been damaged by enemy elements the previous night with a double barrel, 48 inch culvert. After moving to KONTUM Company B continued to operate the sand pit that supplied sand to all units in the KONTUM-PLEIKU area.

(3) Company C, 299th Engineer Battalion established a base camp at TRI DAO (ZB155048) adjacent to Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery on 22 June. Their mission was to upgrade Route 14 from KONTUM to the float bridge at ZB093175, the southern limit of Company B's responsibility on Route 14. With technical assistance provided by the 509th Engineer Company (PB), Company C emplaced 110 feet of double double Bailey bridging, 80 feet double single bridging, and 90 feet of double single Bailey bridging at three locations; constructed a total of 204 feet of timber trestle bridging at eight locations; and one bridge was replaced by two 48 inch concrete culverts. In addition to the extensive bridge construction, Company C improved bypasses and fords, and cleared the vegetation out to 150 meters and laid tactical wire around the bridge sites. The bridge and road upgrading on this section of Route 14 was completed on 10 July. It was determined that one engineer platoon could maintain this section of road and its bridges, thus Company C turned over the maintenance of Route 14 from KONTUM to ZB093175 to Company D and prepared to return to PLEIKU. On the night of 10-11 July, VC elements blew the north abutment of the bridge at ZA229906. Before returning to PLEIKU, Company C emplaced an AVLB provided by the 4th Engineer Battalion at this critical bridge site. On 29 August Company C accompanied by the 299th Engineer Battalion Headquarters and the 15th Engineer Company (LE), returned to Operation GREENLEY and set up a base camp in the vicinity of old DAK TO airfield on Route 512. The torrential monsoon rains had caused Route 512 to deteriorate to a quagmire, requiring as much as three hours for a 30 vehicle resupply convoy to travel the seven kilometers to New DAK TO airfield and then only with assistance from engineer bulldozers. Throughout the remainder of Operation GREENLEY, Company C was committed, along with the 15th Engineer Company, to projects that attempted to keep Route 512 passable to tactical and resupply convoys. Efforts to keep the road open resulted in extensive use of logs to corduroy bridge approaches and the construction of 500 feet of plank road in one particularly bad spot. M8A1 SSP and T-17 membrane were also used; however, despite these efforts, the previously unimproved Route 512 continued to deteriorate in the face of the torrential monsoon rains; causing the road to be closed for approximately 25 days during September and early October. It was estimated that the entire engineer battalion would have been required to keep this one seven kilometer stretch of road passable since much of the work had to be done by hand in areas inundated by 3 to 4 feet of mud.
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(4) Company D, 299th Engineer Battalion moved into KONTUM on 21 June. Their initial task was the rehabilitation of ramps and taxiway at KONTUM airfield. On 24 June Company D began providing general support to the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division which included the construction of 33 UH-1, six CH-47 and six OH-23 helicopter revetments. In addition, Company D began work improving the FSA located at KONTUM airfield, its interior roads and the airfield drainage system. This work included six berms for 10,000 gallon fuel bladders in the Class III area and a nine-module Class V storage area. The company hauled 4450 cubic yards of sand for the storage area and FSA roads in addition to installing 70 feet of culvert to improve the roads and drain the airfield. The concrete abutments on the bridge at ZA189999 on Route 14 were failing under the heavy traffic and Company D, who had assumed the maintenance of Route 14 from Company C on 11 July, replaced the bridge with a double barrel 48 inch culvert. Company D laid 400 feet of corduroy on both approaches to the bridge at ZB155054. During the first week of August when it became apparent that one platoon could accomplish the maintenance of Route 14 and since the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division had departed the area, the company minus one platoon returned to PLEIKU. On the night of 13-14 August the bridge at ZB155054 was damaged by enemy action. Company D, minus one additional platoon, was alerted to move back to KONTUM Province. The company moved to TRI DAO, in the vicinity of the damaged bridge, with elements of the 509th Engineer Company (PB) and completed the bridge repairs. On 7 September Company D moved to the vicinity of DAK TO to replace Company B. Two battalions and the brigade headquarters of the 173d Airborne Brigade were airlifted from DAK TO on 17-19 September requiring 131 sorties of C-130 aircraft to land and take off from the DAK TO airstrip during a period of heavy rainfall. This combination of heavy use and the elements required extensive patching of the runway, by Company D, after the airlift operation.

(5) For a detailed abstract of bridge and bridge approach construction by the 299th Engineer Battalion see inclosure 7.

(6) Company A, 299th Engineer Battalion was committed to road maintenance and rehabilitation on Route 19 east of PLEIKU, but was continually alert to a possible contingency mission in Operation GREELEY. For a brief period during the first part of the operation a platoon of Company A was OPCON to Company C when the company was heavily committed to constructing bridges on Route 14. Although the preponderance of engineer support was furnished by the 299th Engineer Battalion, the 173d Engineer Company, 173d Airborne Brigade, and Company C, 8th Engineer Battalion, 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division furnished the organic, direct engineer support to their respective units. The density and thickness of the vegetation and the lack of LZ's in the area of operation made their job extremely difficult. Company B, 202d ARVN Engineer Battalion furnished direct engineer support to the 24th Special Tactical Zone forces.
f. Psyops Support.

(1) Psychological operations were conducted in conjunction with tactical operations to spur disaffection and desertion of enemy soldiers through CHIEU HOI themes and to deny support to the NVA/VC by encouraging support for the GVN.

(2) The greatest problem encountered in psychological operations was that of communication with the local populace. The literacy rate of the MONTAGNARDS is very low, therefore printed materials had little or no meaning to the majority of the population. This problem was overcome by designing leaflets and posters that expressed a theme through the use of pictures. Some of the themes depicted were the CHIEU HOI Program and rewards for weapons and information.

(3) Another factor that affected psychological operations was the southwest monsoon weather. The adverse weather conditions greatly reduced the number of flights normally flown by the 9th Air Commando Squadron. This reduction in flights reduced the number of leaflets dropped and air loudspeaker time. To counter this reduction in fixed wing flights an increased number of missions were flown using HU-1 helicopters when available. The 250 watt loudspeakers of the attached 245th Psyops Company HB teams were mounted in the helicopters to provide an air broadcast capability.

(4) During the operation, a total of 3,355,000 leaflets were dropped and 24 hours of air loudspeaker time were broadcast.

g. Civic Action Support. Civic Actions carried out during Operation GREELEY stressed mainly a hamlet visitation program within the area of population concentration from the intersection of Highway 14 and Route 512 west along Route 512 to YB92025 and along Highway 14 from KONTUM to Old DAK TO. Hamlet visits were made daily by civic action personnel. These visitations stressed short-range, high-impact programs which included 1829 MEDCAPS, distribution of 1289 pounds of food and 650 pounds of clothing, personal hygiene demonstrations with soap and toothbrush/toothpaste distribution and repair of existing dispensaries in the area. Solatium payments presented in the area included 400 pounds of rice, 120 pounds of wheat and 33,000 $VN. Special distributions of food and clothing were made to the widows and children of 42d ARVN Regiment soldiers.

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Summary of enemy personnel and equipment losses.

(1) Personnel.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>ARVN</th>
<th>CIDG</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) KIA (BC)</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Detainees</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PW</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(2) Weapons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>ARVN</th>
<th>CIDG</th>
<th>PF</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Served</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

(3) Ammunition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>ARVN</th>
<th>CIDG</th>
<th>PF</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>1055</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>1478</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Served</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1405</td>
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</table>

(4) Explosives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>ARVN</th>
<th>CIDG</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TNT (lbs)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Grenades</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Structures and fortifications destroyed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>ARVN</th>
<th>CIDG</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structures</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortifications</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Foodstuffs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice (Tons)</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2More than 23 weapons were actually captured. It was estimated that at least 40 were captured. The units were hesitant to fully report all weapons captured as in the past they have been confiscated by higher headquarters, thus depriving the capturing unit of any material benefits from contact with the enemy. Police of the battlefield was difficult because of the heavy vegetation and intensity of contact. The NVA had sufficient time on the night of 6 August to police weapons (aided by flare illumination from flare ship). Reports of the captured weapons did not distinguish between small arms and crew served.

3Much ammunition was captured and destroyed including 82mm mortar, B-40 rockets, 60mm mortar, 12.7 HMG, 7.62 small arms and hand grenades. Approximately 75 gas masks and numerous items of individual equipment were captured.
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(7) Body count and estimates of enemy losses during Operation GREELEY were affected by several pertinent factors.

(a) Terrain and vegetation. The difficult terrain and dense vegetation in the area of operations assisted the enemy in his efforts to evacuate casualties from the immediate areas of major contacts and made the friendly effort to search for and locate enemy casualties more difficult. The absence of landing zones and clearings suitable for helicopter extraction of casualties, required units to cut clearings in the jungle immediately following contacts with the enemy so that the seriously wounded could be evacuated. At this time the enemy was able to remove his own casualties from the battle area.

(b) Proximity to CAMBODIAN and LAOS. The proximity of the CAMBODIAN/LAOTIAN Border to the sites of most of the major contact areas and B-52 strike areas made it possible for the enemy to transport most of his casualties to his CAMBODIAN/LAOTIAN safehaven for burial or medical treatment.

(c) Enemy recovery of casualties. The enemy consistently makes a determined, almost fanatical effort to recover his casualties from each contact. His preparations for such recovery and his demonstrated efforts and willingness to risk fresh casualties to police his dead and wounded have generally proven successful for him. Enemy battle orders for defense of landing zones and plans for attacks on FWMAF positions have invariably included emphasis on all NVA dead or wounded being evacuated.

(d) As a result of the factors described above, it is concluded that the actual body count of enemy KIA during Operation GREELEY is not a complete count of enemy KIA and is far less than the actual enemy KIA during the operation. Unit after action critiques and reports have indicated that in almost every contact with the enemy, FWMAF personnel, who observed kills or hits on enemy personnel, found the enemy had evacuated these casualties when contact was broken.

(9) The following is an estimate of enemy losses computed using the MACV formula. The total estimated enemy KIA is determined by multiplying the actual body count (BC) by .28.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTUAL BC</th>
<th>MACV COMPUTED ADDNL LOSSES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>407</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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b. Summary of Friendly Losses.

(1) Personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>DEATHS</th>
<th>INJURY</th>
<th>TOTAL LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>173d ABN BDE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 173d Bde</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-503 Inf</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-503 Inf</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>141</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-503 Inf</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-319 Arty</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D BDE, 1st CAV (AM)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-7 Cav</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>1-12 Cav</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-12 Cav</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Div Troops</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>363</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Abn Bn</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Abn Bn</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Abn Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1-42 Inf</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>2-42 Inf</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>94</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>USSF/CIDG</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ALL FORCES</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(2) Equipment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>LOST</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>36/3/184</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Set AN/PRC-25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Personnel Carrier</td>
<td>4^/16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. (c) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. General.

(1) The concept of logistic support for Operation GREELEY was
to furnish required support as far forward as possible. To accomplish this,
forward logistic bases were relocated with the FSE's of the 173d Airborne
Brigade (Separate) and the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division at DAK TO
and KONTUM respectively. The forward logistic base provided Class I, III
and V supplies and barrier material. Necessary service support was provided
by forward support activities (FSA's) organized from 1st Logistical Command
resources.

(2) Initially one FSA was established at DAK TO (ZB004215) in
support of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate). This FSA became
operational on 19 June, and remained so when Operation GREELEY terminated
on 11 October and Operation MAC ARTHUR began on 12 October.

(3) With the introduction of the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry
Division in the GREELEY area of operations a second FSA was established at
KONTUM (ART70880) and became operational on 25 June. When the 3d Brigade
returned to its parent organization on 25 July, the FSA operation simultaneously
closed.

(4) Resupply of the forward logistical base at DAK TO was
initially accomplished by ALOC. A three day level of supply was established
at the FSA. By 25 June, the road from PLEIKU to DAK TO was operational and
LOC became the primary means of resupply. Also, the level of supply was
raised from a three day to a five day level. This was considered necessary
for three principal reasons. First, resupply convoys were being locked in
at DAK TO because of excessive travel time over poor roads. Secondly the
five day level would provide a back-up for the heavy contact then being
experienced by the 173d Airborne Brigade and for those days when monsoon
rains would make the road impassable. Finally, the limited availability
of USAF aircraft at that time reduced the reliability of accomplishing an
emergency resupply mission within the effective time period. By 2 July, road
conditions between PLEIKU and DAK TO had improved to the extent that daily
resupply with no required lock-in of vehicles was assured. This factor

^Small arms losses are shown for US/ARVN/USSF-CIDG

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Coupled with the current and expected tactical situation allowed the level of supplies to be reduced to three days. The level of supply continued at three days for the remainder of the operation although quantities were lessened when the task force was reduced from brigade size to battalion size. By mid-August, the MSR had been so deteriorated by the monsoon rains and heavy traffic that resupply by LLOC was impossible. For the remainder of the operation resupply was accomplished primarily by C-130 aircraft.

(5) Resupply of the forward logistical base at KONTUM was by LLOC throughout the operation. A three day level of supply was established and maintained until 10 July, when it was reduced to a two day level in preparation for a projected reduction of forces in the area. Stockage levels were further phased down beginning on 20 July in anticipation of the departure of the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division from the GREELEY area of operations.

b. Material and Services.

(1) Supply. The majority of supplies consumed during Operation GREELEY were issued through FSA's operated by 1st Logistical Command. Approximately 2000 tons of supplies were issued directly to units from rear base areas. Supplies issued from rear base areas included fuel utilized by aircraft and vehicles in direct support of combat operations and Class II and IV supplies issued to units from BIEN HOA and AN KHE.

(a) A summary of supplies issued through the supporting FSA at DAK TO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUPPLY CLASS</th>
<th>AVERAGE DAILY ISSUE</th>
<th>TOTAL ISSUE</th>
<th>WEIGHT (S/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A&quot; Rations</td>
<td>4,102</td>
<td>471,818</td>
<td>1415.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;C&quot; Rations</td>
<td>1,626</td>
<td>187,710</td>
<td>525.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5,728</td>
<td>659,528</td>
<td>2940.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III (gallons)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>13,731</td>
<td>1,589,200</td>
<td>5085.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>104,600</td>
<td>358.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOGAS</td>
<td>2,049</td>
<td>305,700</td>
<td>947.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIESEL</td>
<td>1,941</td>
<td>225,300</td>
<td>781.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18,656</td>
<td>2,225,800</td>
<td>7173.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V (S/T)</td>
<td>42.14</td>
<td>4,916.27</td>
<td>15030.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL TONNAGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(b) A summary of supplies issued through the supporting FSA at KONTUM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUPPLY CLASS</th>
<th>AVERAGE DAILY ISSUE</th>
<th>TOTAL ISSUE</th>
<th>WEIGHT (S/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A&quot; Rations</td>
<td>5,801</td>
<td>174,325</td>
<td>523.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;C&quot; Rations</td>
<td>1,937</td>
<td>58,116</td>
<td>172.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7,747</td>
<td>232,441</td>
<td>995.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III (gallons)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP4</td>
<td>18,666</td>
<td>560,000</td>
<td>1,792.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>17,790</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOGAS</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>87,200</td>
<td>270.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIESEL</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>67,155</td>
<td>235.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>24,397</td>
<td>732,145</td>
<td>2,350.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V (S/T)</td>
<td>66.76</td>
<td>2,063.09</td>
<td>2063.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL TONNAGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,408.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Recapitulation of supplies consumed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUED FROM</th>
<th>WEIGHT (S/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FSA DAK TO</td>
<td>15,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSA KONTUM</td>
<td>5,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REAR AREA</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>22,438</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) In addition to the tonnage of Class III and V used by the 173d Airborne Brigade and 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, the US Air Force expended the following Class III and V in supporting Operation GREELEY.

**Class III**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>QTY (Gallons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>12,540,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52's</td>
<td>39,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>52,140,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Class V**

Delivered by Fighters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE</th>
<th>QTY</th>
<th>WEIGHT (S/T)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>5,101</td>
<td>1,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Delivered by Fighter & AC-47 (SPOOKY).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE</th>
<th>QTY</th>
<th>WEIGHT (S/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20mm</td>
<td>73,600</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>

Delivered by B-52's.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombs</th>
<th>QTY</th>
<th>WEIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>2,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Services.

(a) FSA DAK TO

| Laundry (Pounds) | 199,245 |
| Baths (Individual) | 38,594 |
| GRBBG (Remains) | 129 |

(b) FSA KONTUM:

| Laundry (Pounds) | 31,680 |
| Baths (Individual) | 13,680 |
| GRBBG (Remains) | 3 |

(1) Maintenance support for the 173d Airborne Brigade was provided from within their organic resources.

(2) Maintenance support for the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division was provided by their parent division and accompanied the brigade.

d. Transportation.

(1) Traffic density on the MSR required the establishment of military Traffic Control Points at CP-40 (north of PLEIKU) and at CP-45 (south of KONTUM). Additional support was provided by a mobile forward traffic regulating team out of CP-45. During the initial phase of the operation security from KONTUM to DAK TO was provided by the 173d Airborne Brigade, augmented by a platoon from the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor and the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry provided security later in the operation. Methods of securing the convoy varied throughout the operation. Strong pointing, escorts and combinations of both were used. Air cover by two armed helicopters was provided daily. At times a 105mm howitzer battery was positioned between KONTUM and DAK TO to provide on-call indirect fire. ARVN and RF/PF forces were also placed along the MSR to help provide road and bridge security and to provide a back-up reaction force.
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(2) The MSR from PLEIKU to KONTUM was open daily. A north-bound convoy departed each day between 0600 and 0700 hours and traveled from PLEIKU to KONTUM. This convoy was escorted by Military Police gun jeeps. At KONTUM the convoy rendezvoused with a security element from the 173rd Airborne Brigade and proceeded to DAK TO. To accommodate the movement of other traffic requirements between PLEIKU and KONTUM, the MSR was open to controlled traffic after the DAK TO convoy had departed. Regulating teams would marshal vehicles into convoys at CP 40 and CP 45. The MP's would then escort the convoys between the two cities. All convoy movements and marshalling areas were monitored by TCF personnel who advised the DTO of the current situation. Since security forces did not accompany the convoys and convoys were a conglomeration of vehicles from many units, MP's were schooled in FO procedures and expected to call for and adjust artillery fires should the need for fire support arise.

(3) In addition to routine administrative and resupply convoys, the DTO coordinated the move of the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division from KONTUM to LZ ENGLISH. The 3d Brigade land convoy consisted of 91 vehicles. The airfield elements required 78 C-130 sorties.

(4) PLEIKU Sub Area Command resupplied the FSA at DAK TO and KONTUM. With this additional vehicle support, the 4th Infantry Division did not experience a shortage of cargo vehicles. Each command provided vehicles to the other as required. A total of 17,591 vehicles traveled the MSR and smooth traffic coordination was effected throughout the entire operation.

e. Medical.

(1) Medical support for the 173d Airborne (less MEDEVAC) was provided from within their organic resources.

(2) Medical support for the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (less MEDEVAC) was provided by their parent division and accompanied the brigade.

f. Problem Areas:

(1) Transportation office TO&E. Traffic regulation has become an increasingly difficult problem as the division has extended its area of operations. The small staff presently authorized is not adequately manned nor equipped to regulate and oversee land convoy while simultaneously accomplishing its other missions. Additional personnel and equipment especially radios are needed to provide ample traffic management.

(2) Route 14 North. Route 14 North deteriorated rapidly during the height of the monsoon season. By mid-August the road between KONTUM and DAK TO was closed and seldom used thereafter. Resupply had to be accomplished by USAF aircraft. The daily use of these aircraft limited their availability for emergency use in other areas. It is not economically sound to constantly use aircraft when ground means can be made available. This problem can be eliminated by paving the roads. A paved road will
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decrease turn around time and vehicle maintenance, thereby increasing vehicle life and logistic and economic efficiency.

g. Communications.

(1) In addition to the organic signal platoons of the participating 173d Airborne Brigade and the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, the 12th Signal Battalion and the 54th Signal Battalion provided additional communications support and the 43d Signal Battalion (STRATCOM) provided the long range communication support required during Operation GREELEY.

(a) VHF and FM multi-channel systems:

1. A 12 channel VHF system was established to the 173d Airborne Brigade CP at DAK TO airfield with relays on Dragon Mountain and the DAK TO Special Forces Camp MACV tower.

2. A 12 channel VHF system was provided to the 173d Airborne Brigade main CP at CATECKA for strap through of circuits from their forward CP location during the period 17-26 June when the CP was split.

3. A 12 channel VHF system was established to the division's TAC CP at KONTUM from Camp Enari. Initially, this system was relayed through PLEIKU; however, the relay was eventually discontinued and the system went directly from base camp to KONTUM. A MRC-34 was used to terminate the system at the TAC CP initially and was later replaced by a MRC-69.

4. A 12 channel system was established from the division TAC CP at KONTUM to the 173d Airborne Brigade CP at DAK TO.

5. A 12 channel system was established between the 173d Airborne Brigade CP at DAK TO and two battalion task force located at DAK SEANG.

6. A four channel MRC-112 system was established from DAK SEANG to DAK PEK to support a two battalion task force from the 173d Airborne Brigade.

(b) FM Operations:

1. On 19 June FM relays were set up at POLEI KLENG and PLATEAU GI Special Forces Camps to establish contact in Command Net #1 for the 173d Airborne Brigade's forward CP. Contact was established through the relay at POLEI KLENG and Dragon Mountain retransmission station. Later the relay at PLATEAU GI was moved to DAK TO MACV tower where the VRC-49 relay was able to operate with the Dragon Mountain retransmission station. The relay at POLEI KLENG was then discontinued. The relay stations were equipped with KY-8 equipment for secure voice capability.
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(c) Land lines were extended from the division TAC CP to the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division Forward CP in KONTUM to provide the brigade with common user, sole user and teletype communications to their parent division base camp.

(d) AM and SSB Radio Operation:

1. A VSC-2 (SSB) radio was installed at the division TAC CP to the 173d Airborne Brigade Forward CP and DAK PkK as voice and teletype backup. Provisions were made for a station at the brigade CP to enter Division Net #3. Frequent electrical storms interrupted net operation, but overall, AM RATT was a satisfactory backup for other teletype circuits to the brigade.

(2) Considerable difficulty was encountered in the installation and operation of all the VHF systems during the first week of the operation. KONTUM and DAK TO, based on profiles of the area seemed virtually inaccessible to VHF and the area proved to be almost as impervious to FM signals, hence a rather complicated system of FM relays was installed. After several different relay sites were tried it was found that VHF and FM stations could be reached satisfactorily through DAK TO Special Forces MACV tower from the Dragon Mountain retransmission station. This facilitated not only good FM communications but proved much easier to service then distant relay sites.

(3) In spite of the many acclaims that have been awarded the "yaggi" antenna when used with FM nets, it was found that the RC-292 ground plane antenna was the most reliable for operations in this area. Communications were established every time with the RC-292, when it often proved impossible with the "yaggi" antenna.

14. (c) LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Lessons Learned,

(1) Many of the lessons learned during Operation GREELEY were peculiar to operations in the Central Highlands and are the same or similar to those included in the Combat After Action Report, Operation FRANCIS MARION. Therefore, those lessons have not been repeated in this report. Additional lessons learned follow.

(2) Operations,

Units Mutually Reinforcing

Item: Units mutually reinforcing in dense jungle areas of known enemy activity.

Discussion: In the mountainous and thickly vegetated areas of the Central Highlands units must be employed so that they can quickly reinforce each
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other in the event of contact with the enemy. The contacts, when they occur, are with well-disciplined North VIETNAMESE regulars, are sharp and fierce, and of relatively short duration. The enemy usually is the one that selects the terrain and the time for the contact, but not until he feels he has all the advantages and a numerically superior force. In the dense, thickly canopied jungle, landing zones are few and consequently any reinforcing must be done overland.

Observation: In operations in the mountainous and dense jungles against NVA forces the ability to rapidly reinforce is mandatory. Reaction time is the factor. Two companies conducting search and destroy operations within mutual support distance may each be considered a reaction force. Time, not distance, between units should be the governing factor. With the majority of the contacts being of such short duration, one hour's reinforcing time should be considered the standard.

**Maneuvering Against Bunkers**

**Item:** Maneuvering against an enemy bunker complex.

**Discussion:** The bunker complexes discovered in the mountainous and dense jungle of KONTUM Province were well concealed and elaborately prepared. They were nearly always either "L" shaped or two separate complexes mutually supporting. Our forces when they would come upon a complex would initially be engaged by a portion of the complex. One friendly element would engage the enemy and another would attempt to flank the enemy position. As they began to maneuver the flanking element would be taken under fire by the remainder of the complex. By that time both friendly elements would be too close to the bunker complex to gain the maximum effectiveness of supporting air and artillery.

Observation: When friendly units engage a dug-in, bunkered enemy force in the dense jungle where visibility is extremely limited, they should withdraw a short distance and call in sufficient supporting air and artillery to soften the objective before maneuvering against it.

**CIDG Forces**

**Item:** Operations with CIDG units.

**Discussion:** CIDG elements often worked with the US forces during the operation. They were employed on search and destroy operations as a separate force operating in conjunction with the US units or were attached to the US units.

Observation: The value of CIDG forces in assisting US units was greatly increased when they were attached to the infantry units. The CIDG's knowledge of the terrain and the enemy was used to offset the advantage the NVA and VC had in weather and terrain.
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Resupply in Adverse Weather

Item: Resupply during periods of adverse weather.

Discussion: During a prolonged period of adverse weather like that experienced in KONTUM Province during the monsoon season in which flying often was prevented until late morning or early afternoon, item priorities must be established so the combat essentials are provided to the infantry companies. When the units are over 30 minutes flying time from an FSA, a small forward resupply point can be established at the battalion firebase areas with two days rations, 750 gallons of water in blivets and a minimum basic load of ammunition. This will facilitate and expedite resupply when only a few flying hours are available.

Observation: Priorities must be established for the delivery of supplies; ensuring that essential items are lifted first since rain showers and premature darkness can cause a cessation of scheduled resupply sorties. A forward resupply point set up at the battalion CP when the FSA is a considerable distance away can facilitate a minimum resupply of essential items during periods of prolonged marginal flying weather.

(3) Civic Action.

Civic Action

Item: Civic actions in areas not recently reached by existing programs.

Discussion: In DAK TO and vicinity the US forces that moved into the area had to establish a Civic Action program in an area that had never received visits from US civic action teams. The US forces that moved into the area rapidly established contact with GVN District and Province officials to formulate a Civic Action program to be carried out concurrently with the initiation of search and destroy operations.

Observation: The initial curiosity of the local people toward the presence of US forces within an area can quickly be turned into friendship toward, and alignment with, the GVN by an aggressive Civic Action program which cooperates with and builds on the VIETNAMESE effort in the area.

b. Recommendations.

Appropriate recommendations are contained in the lessons learned and in the Combat After Action Report, Operation FRANCIS MARION.

15. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

Operation GREELEY was conducted in KONTUM Province in an area in which enemy activity had been light for quite some time. The last US-ARVN
operation of any size that had been conducted in the area was Operation PICKETT from 6 December 1966 to 19 January 1967. That combined US-ARVN operation concentrated mainly on the upper PLEI TRAP Valley west of KONTUM near the CAMBODIAN Border and the DAK AKOI Valley northeast of KONTUM. At that time contact was light and generally with only squad-sized enemy forces. In May and early June however, intelligence reports showed evidence of an increased enemy build-up in the province and in particular in the mountains south of DAK TO and in the DAK AKOI Valley area.

For an understanding of the geography, population and weather in the area the following factors should be considered:

a. KONTUM Province is mountainous and covered by thick double and triple canopy jungle. Most clearings that appear on the maps are choked with 15 to 20 foot high bamboo. Landing zones are sparse and much effort must be exerted to construct even a one ship landing area.

b. The province is sparsely populated with the majority of the population concentrated along Highway 14 from the city of KONTUM north to Old DAK TO. The bulk of the population is concentrated in KONTUM City.

c. In this Central Highland province the weather is generally cooler than in the coastal regions. The summer months are also the southwest monsoon season during which visibility and flying weather are severely limited because of the rains and the fog that hangs in the valleys.

It was in this environment that the 173d Airborne Brigade, under operational control of the 4th Infantry Division, began operations to search out and destroy elements of the 24th NVA Regiment which had set up base areas in the province.

The tactics the enemy employed against our forces closely approximated those which had been encountered in the division's operations elsewhere in the Highlands. These included:

a. The extensive use of snipers in trees.

b. Attempts to pin down maneuver elements who were in a position to reinforce units in contact.

c. The use of trail watchers to observe and report the movements of the patrolling units.

d. The use of hugging tactics when in contact with our units to neutralize our fire support superiority.

One change from recent tactics encountered was that instead of the enemy fighting from unprepared or hastily prepared positions, two out
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of the three major engagements of the operation were fought against NVA forces in well prepared bunker complexes. This change may be attributed in part to the channelizing effects of the rugged terrain that force our searching units to move mainly along the established trails.

When a battalion from the 24th NVA Regiment threatened KONTUM City we reacted swiftly and moved the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division and the 1st ARVN Airborne Task Force into areas of operations that extended northeast from KONTUM to the DAK AKOI Valley. The enemy did not choose to fight and avoided contact with the searching forces.

Early in August when the CIDG Camps at DAK SEANG and DAK PEK were threatened, the ARVN Airborne Battalions and a battalion from the 42d ARVN Regiment deployed to meet the threat at DAK SEANG, while two battalions of the 173d Airborne Brigade were helilifted north to DAK PEK. This coordinated move of the two forces totally disrupted the enemy plans. The ARVN forces attacked and overran the base camp of elements of the newly arrived 174th NVA Regiment who were preparing to attack DAK SEANG and the arrival of the US Airborne forces at DAK PEK dissolved any threat in that quarter.

The combined US-GVN forces drove the enemy regiments from KONTUM Province. But the success of the operation was not limited to that one fact alone. The close cooperation and coordination developed and maintained between the US-ARVN-CIDG forces actively engaged in the operation, that contributed greatly to driving the enemy from the area, was in itself a factor of success.

It is this combined spirit of cooperation, as displayed by the US-ARVN-CIDG forces in Operation GREELEY, that will ultimately spell the success of the FWMAF in VIETNAM.

W. R. PEERS
Major General, USA
Commanding

9 Inclosures

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1 - CG, Americal Div
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1 - CG, 9th ROK Inf Div
6 - CG, 173d Abn Bde (Sep)
1 - DSA, II Corps
1 - SA, 24th STZ
1 - CO, 52d Arty Gp
1 - CO, 937th Engr Gp
1 - CO, 52d Avn Bn
1 - CO, 20th Engr Bn
1 - CO, 5th USSF Gp
1 - CO, Co B, 5th USSF
2 - CO, 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
2 - CO, 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div
2 - CO, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
2 - CO, Div Arty
2 - CO, DISCOM
1 - CO, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav
1 - CO, 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav
1 - CO, 7th Sqdn, 17th Air Cav
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 69th Armor
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 8th Inf
1 - CO, 2d Bn, 8th Inf
1 - CO, 3d Bn, 8th Inf
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 12th Inf

1 - CO, 3d Bn, 12th Inf
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 14th Inf
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 22d Inf
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 35th Inf
1 - CO, 2d Bn, 35th Inf
1 - CO, 4th Avn Bn
1 - CO, 4th Engr Bn
1 - CO, 124th Sig Bn
1 - CO, 4th Med Bn
1 - CO, 4th S&T Bn
1 - CO, 704th Maint Bn
1 - ACofS, G1
1 - ACofS, G2
1 - ACofS, G3
1 - ACofS, G4
1 - ACofS, G5
1 - Comdt, 4th Div Repl Tng Det
5 - TACP (ALO), 4th Inf Div
30 - CO, 29th Mil Hist Det
1 - AG File

1 - Comdt, Inf Sch
5 - TACP (ALO), 4th Inf Div

GREELEY
AREAS OF OPERATIONS
MAP 1: 250,000
SERIES J06 (6) 1501
SHEETS ND 48-4, 48-8, 49-1, 49-5
Principal commanders and senior staff officers participating in this operation were:

**4th Infantry Division Headquarters.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Peers, William R</td>
<td>17 Jun to 11 Oct</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acting CG</td>
<td>Walker, Glenn D</td>
<td>12 Jul to 18 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC-A</td>
<td>Commors, Robert E</td>
<td>30 Aug to 11 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ryder, Charles W Jr</td>
<td>30 Jul to 29 Aug</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>17 Jun to 19 Jul</td>
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<td>Connors, Robert E</td>
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<td>CofS</td>
<td>Jackson, Charles A</td>
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<td>Miller, Judson F</td>
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<td>Crizer, Pat W</td>
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<td>Kunze, Melton H</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ACoFS, G3</td>
<td>Livsey, William L</td>
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**Division Artillery.**

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**173d Airborne Brigade (Sep).**

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<tr>
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<td>Dep CO</td>
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<td>O'Mary, Paul R</td>
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**1st Battalion, 503d Infantry.**

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**2d Battalion, 503d Infantry.**

<p>| CO   | LTC  | Partain, Edward A                      | 17 Jun to 11 Oct |                 |
|------|------|----------------------------------------|------------------|                 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion/Brigade</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
<th>Senior Commanding Officer</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Battalion, 503d Infantry.</td>
<td>LTC Johnson, James H</td>
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<td>3d Battalion, 31st Artillery.</td>
<td>LTC Drake, Charles F</td>
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<td>3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM).</td>
<td>COL McKenna, James O</td>
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<td>MAJ Deshler, Robert C</td>
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<td>1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry.</td>
<td>LTC Rhiddlehoover, Lloyd P</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry.</td>
<td>LTC Ross, Marian C</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry.</td>
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<td>2d Battalion, 21st Artillery.</td>
<td>LTC Oder, Lowell E</td>
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TASK ORGANIZATION

1. (U) The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) was the principal unit participating in the operation. The brigade was under operational control of the division throughout the operation.

2. (U) The 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry was under operational control of the 4th Infantry Division during the period of the brigade's participation in the operation - 24 June to 25 July.

3. (C) Task Organization for Combat.

   a. Control headquarters was Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division.


   173d Abn Bde (Sep)
   HHC, 173d Abn Bde
   1-503 Abn Inf
   2-503 Abn Inf
   E/17 Cav
   Flat D/16 Armor
   B/1-92 Arty (155) (T)
   A/3-319 Arty (105) (T)
   C/3-319 Arty (105) (T)
   173d Engr Co (-)
   723d Sig Plat (-)
   B/173d Med Bn (-)
   39th Inf Plat (Sct Dog) (-)
   Sect, IFW Tm
   Sqd, MP Co

   c. 4-503 Abn Inf with B/3-319 Arty was committed to Operation GREELEY by VOCG on 22 June 1967.


   173d Abn Bde
   Add: 2-12 Cav
   C/1-77 Arty

   Add: 3d Bde, 1st Air Cav Div
   HHC, 3d Bde, 1st ACD
   1-12 Cav
   5-7 Cav
   1-21 Arty
   B/2-19 Arty
   C/1-21 Arty
   B/2-20 ARA GS
   D/5-16 Arty with 1-21 Arty

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e. 2-12 Cav with C/1-77 Arty released from 173d Abn Bde and placed 
OPCON to 3d Bde, 1st ACD on 5 July 1967.

f. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 2-24-67, effective 25 July 
1967.

(1) 3d Bde, 1st Air Cav Div released from OPCON 4th Inf Div 
and returned to parent organization.

(2) One plat 1-10 Cav OPCON to 4th Div (Fwd) attached 173d 
Abn Bde.

g. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 3-24-67, DTG 011220Z August 
1967.

Plat 1-10 Cav detached from 173d Abn Bde.

h. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 4-24-67 effective 17 
September 1967.

(1) 173d Abn Bde (-) released from OPCON 4th Inf Div and departed 
GREELEY area of operations.

(2) TF-77 (2-503 Abn Inf plus atchmts) remained in the area of 
operations.

i. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 5-24-67 effective 12 October 
1967.

TF77 (2-503 Abn Inf plus atchmts) released from OPCON 4th Inf 
Div returned to parent unit.
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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

OPERATION GREELER

17 June. Task Force McQuarrie (2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry) initiated Operation GREELER by road march and airlift movements to ZBO121, vicinity of DAK TO, closing at 1715 hours.

18 June. 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry and 173d Airborne Brigade Command Post conducted air movement to DAK TO, closing at 1800 hours. 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry began search and destroy operations vicinity DAK TO.

19 June. 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry Command Post moved to YB902186. Companies A, B, and C, 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry continued search and destroy operations in conjunction with CIDG Company from DAK TO.

20 June. At 0800 hours, Company C, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry found two USSF and eight CIDG bodies at YB908178 from a previous contact. At YB91511A Company C found one NVA KIA and one SKS rifle.

21 June. At 1930 hours Company C, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry conducted a combat assault into an LZ at YB192225 to locate one US MIA from Recondo Patrol 3F.

22 June. At 0730 hours vicinity ZBO02170, Company A, 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry made contact with an estimated two NVA battalions. Company A received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from all sides. At 1050 hours, contact was lost with one platoon of Company A. At 1145 hours, Company B, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry combat assaulted to ZBO00130, and at 1240 hours made contact with 15 NVA in vicinity of the LZ. Contact was broken at 1330 hours; results, one US KIA, five US WIA. At 1429 hours Company C, 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry linked-up with Company A. Contact was broken at 1628 hours; results unknown (See 24 June). At 0627 hours vicinity ZB194225, Company C, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry received 15 60mm mortar rounds followed by a ground attack by an unknown size enemy force. Contact was broken at 0647 hours; results, two US KIA, five US WIA. At 1330 hours Company C again had contact, this time with two NVA squads at ZA198226. Contact was broken at 1415 hours. At 2245 hours, Company C, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry received two hand grenades in their night perimeter resulting in one US WIA. The 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry began moving by convoy and air to vicinity of DAK TO.

23 June. At 0930 hours Company A, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry vicinity ZB 160180 found the body of the missing RTO from Recondo Patrol 3F; his weapon and radio were missing. Companies B and C, 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry conducted a search of the battlefield, finding one NVA KIA, and 75 bunkers without overhead cover; 50 of the bunkers contained traces of fresh blood. Three AK-47's, one SKS, one B-40 RL and 50 rucksacks also were found. At 1115 hours Company B, 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne

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Infantry at ZBO00172 made contact with two NVA squads; contact was broken at 1205 hours. In the same area at 1300 hours Company B again made contact with an NVA platoon which lasted until 1405 hours, resulting in one US KIA, two US WIA; one NVA KIA, one AK-47 captured. The 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry became OPCON to the 173d Airborne Brigade.

24 June. Companies B and C, 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry continued their search of the battlefield and found six NVA bodies, three crew-served weapons, six small arms and two 60mm mortar rounds. 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division moved by air to KONTUM and became OPCON to the 4th Division. Adjusted casualty totals for the 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry's action on 22 June were 76 US KIA, 22 US WIA, 106 NVA KIA.

25 June. At 1115 hours at ZBO00170, Troop E, 17th Cavalry found one CHICOM machine gun. At 0820 hours at ZBO00176, Company B, 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry found two CHICOM B-51 AM radios, three RPD's, 12 AK-47's, 12 SKS, two ML carbines, two ML rifles. 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division continued deployment by air to Operation GREELEY AO. The brigade command post closed KONTUM at 1935 hours.

26 June. At 1300 hours Troop E, 17th Cavalry made contact with four NVA; results, one NVA KIA, two NVAC (WIA), three rifles captured. At YB912-131, Company B, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry found six crew-served weapons, 20 small arms, two AN/PRC-25, three HT-1 radios, three tons of rice and miscellaneous equipment and ammunition.

27 June. 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division initiated operations in the DAK AKOI Valley with one battalion.

28 June. From 0555 until 0600 hours, the Command Post of the 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry received 15 rounds unknown type mortar fire; all rounds landed outside the perimeter. At 0820 hours at YB926143, Company B, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry made contact with an estimated NVA platoon. Contact was broken at 1000 hours; results, three US KIA, one US WIA; six NVA KIA, one NVAC. Company A, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry linked up with Company B and contact was regained at 1100 hours, then broken at 1150 hours with negative results. At 1535 hours Company A made heavy contact with an enemy force. Company B linked up with Company A at 1800 hours and contact lasted until 1910 hours. Results of this latter action were seven US KIA, five US WIA; enemy losses unknown.

29 June. Company A, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry, while conducting blocking action for the battalion, found at YB904167 two USSF KIA and six M1 KIA from a previous action. At 1700 hours and 1725 hours at YB907117, Company B, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry detonated two booby traps resulting in seven US WIA.

30 June.

1 July. Company C, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry found five NVA bodies in graves at YB902166.
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2 July. Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry observed movement in their area at AS88226. Gunships were employed; results, two NVA KIA, two weapons captured. At YB912164, Company C, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry found one NVA body in a grave.

3 July. At 1820 hours the fire support base, Company C, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry received sniper fire resulting in one US WIA. Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry found two NVA KIA at AS891227. At 1550 hours at LZ Arbuckle a CH-54 lifting a 155mm howitzer crashed and burned; results were six US injured, one CH-54 and one 155mm howitzer destroyed.

4 July. At 1815 hours, Company C, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry found punji stakes vicinity AS854189; resulting in three US WIA.

5 July. At 1358 hours at AS887218, Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry made contact with two NVA; results, two NVA KIA. In same location Company D observed 22-25 NVA in kahki moving south and attempted to surround the NVA force. At 1600 hours at AS882223, Company D found one NVA KIA and captured one weapon. At 1700 hours at AS871213, Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry captured two NVA with weapons. The 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry moved from DAK TO to KONTUM, closing 1530 hours.

6 July.

7 July.

8 July. Company B, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry found at AS890227 two VC KIA estimated to be two days old.

9 July. At 1855 hours at YB836155, Company A, 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry heard movement outside their perimeter. Artillery was called; results, three US KIA, six US WIA.

10 July. At 1600 hours at YB860140, Companies A and B, 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry made contact with an estimated enemy company. The companies received small arms and mortar fire. Contact was broken at 1800 hours; results, 25 US KIA, 50 US WIA; nine NVA KIA.

11 July. At 1750 hours a command and control helicopter from 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry crashed resulting in two US KIA, five US WIA.

12 July.

13 July.

14 July. 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry discovered a grave containing one NVA body at YB860120. 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry took one NVA under fire; result, one NVA KIA.

15 July. At 1530 hours at AS895159, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry observed and fired on three VC; result, one VC KIA. Company D, 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry received one short, friendly artillery round; result, one US KIA, five US WIA.
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16 July. Company C, 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry found a grave at YB883123 containing one NVA body.

17 July. Company C, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry discovered one grave at YB834125 containing one NVA body.

18 July. At 0537 hours an ambush patrol from 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry made contact with an unknown size NVA unit at YB840120 resulting in one US WIA.

19 July. At 1640 hours a UH-1D helicopter flying an APD mission was hit by a heavy volume of small arms fire in the vicinity AR900002. The aircraft burst into flames and crashed; result, one US KIA, three US WIA; the personnel detector and the helicopter were destroyed. At 1750 hours two helicopters operating with 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division collided in proximity of the refueling pad at LZ Hasty resulting in two helicopters destroyed; negative casualties.

20 July. At 2315 hours Company B, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry received two rounds of friendly artillery fire in their night location resulting in two US KIA, six US WIA. At 1115 hours in the vicinity of BS 266225, a C-123 aircraft flying a II Corps' trail dust mission flew into the trees and crashed, destroying the aircraft and killing all five persons aboard.

21 July. At 1100 hours Company B, 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry made contact with an NVA platoon at YB792142; results, 10 US WIA; 13 NVA KIA; one SKS rifle, one RPD machine gun captured. At 1147 hours, the fire support base of 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry received one round of sniper fire wounding one individual.

22 July. At 0800 hours at AS886057, Company C, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry received shrapnel from friendly artillery resulting in three US WIA.

23 July. At 1355 hours Recondo Patrol 3F made contact with an unknown size enemy force; results, one US WIA.

24 July. Companies C and D, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry airlifted into Kontum at 1532 hours. 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry conducted airlift to Kontum closing at 1830 hours.

25 July. 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division commenced deployment to LZ English. 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry and the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry closed into LZ English. 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry began redeployment to LZ English.

26 July. Operation GREELEY continued with the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) conducting search and destroy operations.

27 July.

28 July.

29 July.

30 July.

31 July.
1 August.

2 August.

3 August. At 1020 hours a DAK SEANG CIDG company made contact with an estimated two NVA companies at YA875410. A relief force from DAK SEANG Special Forces Camp made contact at 1310 hours. At 1330 hours contact was re-established in the area of initial contact. Three CIDG companies were being engaged in the same vicinity. Artillery and TAC air were employed. Contact was broken at 1420 hours; results were two USSF WIA, 11 CIDG KIA, 11 CIDG WIA; 16 NVA KIA.

4 August. At 1245 hours the 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment made light contact with an enemy force estimated at two Platoons in vicinity of YB856379. At the same time in vicinity of YB881441 the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion made contact with two NVA companies. Artillery, TAC air and gunships employed. Results of both contacts were seven ARVN KIA, 22 ARVN WIA, two ARVN MIA; 43 NVA KIA; eight small arms, one RPG-7 and 25 82mm mortar rounds captured.

5 August. At 1730 hours at YB851376 the 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment made contact with two NVA companies and began receiving small arms, automatic weapon and 57mm Recoiless Rifle fire. Artillery and TAC air were employed; result, three ARVN KIA, 13 ARVN WIA, enemy casualties unknown.

6 August. West of DAK SEANG at approximately 1230 hours the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion made contact with 10 NVA at YB850407. The NVA reinforced with estimated two companies. The NVA were in strong defensive positions on high ground. Artillery and TAC air were employed. At 1600 hours the friendly unit began receiving 60mm, 82mm mortar and B-40 rocket fires. At 1700 hours an estimated NVA regiment initiated assaults and again at approximately 2100 hours assaulted to within five meters of the friendly position with the NVA using rockets, Bangalore torpedos and hand grenades. At 2130 hours "Spooky" arrived.

7 August. At 2400 hours probing attacks were launched by the NVA against the flanks of the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion. At approximately 0200 hours, 0400 hours and just before dawn the NVA launched heavy assaults against the friendly perimeter; all were repulsed. At 0620 hours air strikes were put in on the NVA positions to the front of the friendly perimeter. At 0730 hours contact was broken; results, eight ARVN KIA, 37 ARVN WIA. At approximately 1100 hours the 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment engaged an unknown size force vicinity YB847389 and contact was broken at 1245 hours. At 1500 hours vicinity YB856414 5th ARVN Airborne Battalion had contact with an estimated reinforced NVA platoon; results one ARVN KIA, one ARVN WIA. 3d ARVN Airborne Battalion was airlifted from SAIGON to DAK TO and then helilifted to DAK SEANG. At 1015 hours vicinity ZB221538 MIKE Force A-25 made contact with an estimated company of VC/NVA. Contact was broken at 1630 hours resulting in one USSF WIA, two MP WIA, 12 VC/NVA KIA, five weapons captured. A MIKE Force from 29THK was airlifted to DAK TO to reinforce closing at 1910 hours. At 0730 hours a gunship received heavy ground to air fire vicinity YB8542 resulting in one US WIA.
8 August. 1st Battalion, 22d ARVN Regiment found in vicinity of YB844385 a base camp containing 100 huts, 100 82mm mortar rounds and 40 graves containing a total of 48 bodies. At YB833394 th 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion found six mass graves containing 50 NVA bodies. The total enemy casualties for the three days of contact were 189 NVA KIA, three NVAC.

9 August. In vicinity of YB832392 the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion found an extensive mock-up of the DAK SEALB Special Forces Camp and one case of 12.7 AA ammunition. The 3d ARVN Airborne Battalion exchanged locations with the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion. The 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment exchanged locations with the 2d Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment.

10 August. Company A, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry located a company size base camp in vicinity of YB928657 that had been used within the last week. The area contained three mortar positions and 50 plugs from mortar rounds.

11 August. Company B, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry found a mortar position at YB934650 that had been used within the last three days. Within this position were five 82mm mortar rounds. The 1st ARVN Airborne Task Force (minus 3d ARVN Airborne Battalion) prepared for airlift to SAIGON.

12 August. Company A, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry found a base camp vicinity YB936646 containing three mortar positions and one NVA body estimated to be 2-3 days old. Company C, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry found a battalion size base camp vicinity YB925645 containing 146 bunkers with overhead cover that had been occupied within the last five days.

13 August.

14 August. At 0200 hours Troop E, 17th Cavalry, while providing security for artillery fire base #5 received 20-60mm rounds and small arms fire resulting in one US KIA.

15 August. An individual from Company A, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry triggered a booby trap grenade at YB917677 resulting in one US WIA.

16 August.

17 August.

18 August. At 1220 hours Recondo Patrol 3A was engaged and exchanged fire with a VC force vicinity ZB105347 resulting in one US WIA and one US MIA. Patrol 3A was extracted at 1405 hours. Company B, 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry was lifted into the area to search for the MIA.

19 August. At 0830 hours vicinity of ZB907342 Company B, 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry found the body of the MIA from Recondo Patrol 3A.

20 August.

21 August.
22 August. At 1340 hours Company B, 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry made contact with unknown size enemy force at ZB036115. Contact was broken at approximately 1400 hours. Results were one US KIA, one US WIA; enemy losses unknown.

23 August.

24 August.

25 August.

26 August.

27 August. At 0715 hours one 81mm mortar round impacted on Company C, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry location vicinity ZB186165 resulting in one US KIA, three US WIA (non-battle).

28 August. Troop E, 17th Cavalry escorting a resupply convoy from KONTUM to DAK TO made contact with an unknown size enemy force vicinity ZB137153. Small arms and automatic weapons fire and one hand grenade were received. Fire was returned and artillery called into the area, enemy casualties unknown.

29 August. At 2300 hours a radio relay team and an ARVN squad located at YB099245 received small arms and machine gun fire from an unknown size enemy force. Contact was broken approximately 2330 hours; results, one US WIA.

30 August. Two individuals from the 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry sustained minor punji stake wounds vicinity ZB198219.

31 August.

1 September.

2 September.

3 September.

4 September.

5 September.

6 September.

7 September.

8 September. Vicinity ZB 122329 an aircraft received hits from automatic weapons resulting in one US WIA. TAC air was employed; destroying five automatic weapons positions.

9 September.

10 September. The bridge at ZA197974 on Highway 14 was blown during the night. An AVLB from 4th Engineers emplaced until repairs to the brigade completed.
11 September.

12 September. Six members of the 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry were injured by booby traps; Company D sustained one WIA when an individual stepped on a shotgun shell; Company C incurred five WIA when a booby trapped grenade was triggered by one of the individuals.

13 September.

14 September.

15 September. 173d Airborne Brigade prepared for air movement into a new AO. Task Force 77 (2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry; Battery A, 3d Battalion 319th Artillery; Company D, 16th Armor and Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery) assumed the mission of Operation GREELEY and were located vicinity DAK TO.

16 September.

17 September. 173d Airborne Brigade (-) initiated air movement from GREELEY AO.

18 September. 173d Airborne Brigade (-) cleared the GREELEY AO at 1530 hours.

19 September.

20 September.

21 September. Task Force 77 initiated operations north of DAK TO in conjunction with the 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment and the 27th MIKE Force Company.

22 September.

23 September.

24 September. 3d ARVN Airborne Battalion conducted helilift to KBO90345 at 1500 hours and joined the 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment northwest of DAK TO.

25 September.

26 September.

27 September.

28 September.

29 September.

30 September.
1 October. The 27th MIKE Force Company departed the GREELEY AO 1715 hours.

2 October.

3 October.

4 October.

5 October.

6 October. 3d ARVN Airborne Battalion departed the GREELEY AO for SAIGON.

7 October.

8 October.

9 October.

10 October.

11 October. Task Force 77 units prepared for airlift DAK TO to TUY HOA and return to control of 173d Airborne Brigade.

Operation GREELEY terminated at 112400 hours October 1967.
YB 957693
1-503 4-20 AUG
4-503 9-19 AUG

ARVN
4-7 AUG

2-503 30-31 AUG
2-503 1-12 SEP

85
35
CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATION GR

FIRE SUPPORT BASES AND SIG

MAP: 1: 50,000 SERIES L7014
SHEETS: 6539 II III; 6639 III; 6538 I IV
6638 I II III; 6547 I XIV; 6637 I

-503 4-14 SEP

0-31 AUG
12 SEP
2-12 CAV 24 JUN
4-503 6-7 SEP

2-503 9-11 JUL / 31 JUL - 1 AUG
1-503 29 JUN - 3 JUL
4-503 23 JUL - 17 JUL
2-2 CAV 2-3 JUL

2-2 CAV 25-26 JUL
MOCT
N-1 JULY, 4 JUL
3-8 AUG, 20-21 AUG, 5 SEP, 14-16 SEP
JUL, 2-29 AUG, 13-23 SEP, 30 SEP-11 OCT
9-10 JUL, 29 JUL-3 AUG, 21-23 AUG
503 15-17 SEP

4-503 22-31 AUG
1-503 24 AUG-3 SEP
4-503 1-4 SEP
1-503 9-11 JUL 31 JUL-1 AUG
503 29 JUN-3 JUL
4-503 23 JUN 17 JUL
2-3 CAV 2-3 JUL

2-12 CAV 25-26 JUL

1-503 11-16 JUN
2-503 4-8 JUL 12-14 JUL

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSE 54 112
2-503 22 JUN

4-503 1-2 AUG

CONFIDENTIAL
4-503 22-31 AUG
1-503 24 AUG-3 SEP
4-503 1-4 SEP
CONFIDENTIAL
OPERATION GREEL
FIRE SUPPORT BASES AND SIGNIFICANT

MAP 1:50,000 SERIES L7014
SHEETS 6539 II, III; 6639 III; 6538 II, III, IV;
6639 II, IV; 6537 III, IV; 6637 I, III, IV

2-12 CAV 8-16 JUL
LEY
CONTACTS

1-12 CAN 10 JUL
5-7 CAV 29 JUN-4 JUL

5-7 CAV 27-28 JUL

CONFIDENTIAL
LIMA 6
29O705
JUL

LIMA 56
290725
JUL

IFFV ALTERNATE 306
2T 031136 H
9 ACFT
AS 892773
AS 898780
AS 875785
AS 833793
OPERATION GREELEY

B-52 STRIKE MISSIONS

MAP 1: 50,000 SERIES L 7014
SHEETS 6539 II, III; 6639 III; 6538 I, II, III, IV;
6638 I, II, III, IV; 6537 I, II, III, IV;
6637 I, II, III, IV

00

AS

BS 50
OPERATION GREELEY
B-52 STRIKE MISSIONS

MAP 1:56,000 SERIES 7014
SHEETS 6539 I, II, III; 6639 III; 6538 I, II, III, IV;
6638 I, II, III, IV; 6537 I, II, III, IV;
6437 I, II, III, IV

INCLUSION 6-2
BRIIDGE AND APPROACH CONSTRUCTION DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bridge Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Date Completed</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 - 10</td>
<td>(AR768876)</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>2 Lanes</td>
<td>existing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 - 11</td>
<td>(ZA229906)</td>
<td>timber</td>
<td>80/60</td>
<td>existing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: On the night of 10-11 July, VC elements blew the north abutment; AVLB was emplaced by 4th Engineers and Company C on 11 July; north pile bent replaced 20 July; bridge repair work completed on 29 July by Company D with timber used from bridge 14-17. A culvert bypass was installed during construction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bridge Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Date Completed</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 - 12</td>
<td>(ZA220915)</td>
<td>110' DD-Bailey</td>
<td>65/70</td>
<td>1 July</td>
<td>Co C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: On 25 July, work began to place 400' of corduroy on both approaches and covered with sand; completed on 9 August by Company D.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bridge Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Date Completed</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 - 13</td>
<td>(ZA215928)</td>
<td>timber</td>
<td>existing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: Heavy traffic caused the abutments to collapse on 1 July; AVLB placed over the gap; Company C installed 40' double barrel 48" culvert; completed on 4 July.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bridge Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Date Completed</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 - 14</td>
<td>(ZA210843)</td>
<td>25' timber</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>5 July</td>
<td>Co A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 - 15</td>
<td>(ZA203966)</td>
<td>18' timber</td>
<td>50/50</td>
<td>25 June</td>
<td>Co C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 - 16</td>
<td>(ZA197974)</td>
<td>2 span timber</td>
<td>with timber bents</td>
<td>7 July</td>
<td>Co C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: Bridge was blown by VC elements on the night of 9-10 Sept.; AVLB was emplaced; bridge was replaced by double barrel 48" culvert on 24 Sep by Company B.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bridge Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Date Completed</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 - 17</td>
<td>(ZA187987)</td>
<td>23' timber</td>
<td>75/55</td>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>Co C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: Concrete abutments were of poor quality and were rapidly deteriorating under heavy traffic; it was decided to replace the bridge with a 48" double barrel culvert. Work completed on 22 August by Company D.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bridge Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Date Completed</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 - 18</td>
<td>(ZA186992)</td>
<td>DS-Bailey</td>
<td>existing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: Extensive maintenance on draining for the bridge approaches using sand, logs and ditching was accomplished by Company D.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bridge Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Date Completed</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 - 19</td>
<td>(ZA184996)</td>
<td>timber</td>
<td>60/40</td>
<td>existing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inclosure 7
CONFIDENTIAL

14 - 20 (ZB168017) 70' DS-Bailey 60/70 25 June Co C

Comments: Bridge was built on existing abutments; north ramp is 20' in length and south ramp is 30' in length.

14 - 21 (ZB165028) 27' timber 35/50 27 June Co C

14 - 22 (ZB155054) 90' timber 40/45 27 June Co C

Comments: Bridge was built on hand evacuated pile abutments; ford was improved as a bypass and used during monsoons until 210' of north causeway could be stabilized with 500 log corduroy and 6" sand fill; completed on 23 July by Company D.

14 - 23 (ZB152068) 43'4" span 75/55 5 July Co C

14 - 24 (ZB153085) 37'5" span 75/55 7 July Co C

14 - 25 (ZB093175) float bridge 17 June Co B

14 - 26 (ZB088175) type unknown existing

Comments: This bridge had heavily deteriorated stringers and sills and they would not support a class 55 load; AVLB was placed to bear the weight of a company of tanks on 14 September.

14 - 27 (ZB065218) timber 40/30 existing

14 - 28 (ZB062229) 2 span timber 75/55 29 July Co B

14 - 29 (ZB055246) 3 span timber 75/55 9 August Co B

Comments: Highwater caused delay of installation of the timber bents; culvert was installed as bypass.

512 - 1 (ZB052222) 120' M4T6 float 17 June 4th Eng

120' DD-Bailey 12 August Co B

Comments: On 10 July Company B began installing pile abutments for Bailey bridge and completed abutments and deadmen by 25 July. Approaches to float bridge became inundated with 3-4' of mud as the monsoon progressed. Approaches to Bailey upgraded with 2,700 cubic yards of select fill. Installation of 120' DD-Bailey bridge by Company B completed by 12 August. West approach to Bailey required 120' of log corduroy and east approach required over 700 logs, cut by Companies A and B, 70th Engineer Battalion. Extensive repair required for east approach after a battery of SP artillery and a platoon of tanks passed over it 24 September; repair work completed 2 October by two platoons of Company C.
trestle dry gap

92' 5 span timber 75/55 26 July Co B
pile pier, 3 bents
1 existing concrete bent

Comments: Fifteen piles driven on 19 July for 3 timber bents and 3 existing concrete columns used for fourth bent. Drainage on west approach was done by hand because muddy conditions prevented use of equipment; approach built up 8' with fill.
The OPORD, FRAGOs and changes thereto, as listed below, were pertinent to Operation GREELEY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>DTG</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN 24-67 (GREELEY) (U)</td>
<td>042000H June 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 1 to OPLAN 24-67 (GREELEY) (U)</td>
<td>152200H June 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAGO 1-24-67 (GREELEY) (U)</td>
<td>240740Z June 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 1 to FRAGO 1-24-67</td>
<td>280410Z June 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAGO 2-24-67 (GREELEY) (U)</td>
<td>231710Z July 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAGO 3-24-67 (GREELEY) (U)</td>
<td>011220Z August 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 1 to FRAGO 3-24-67 (GREELEY) (U)</td>
<td>110145Z August 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAGO 4-24-67</td>
<td>Undated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAGO 5-24-67</td>
<td>Undated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional references for this operation are:

- Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GREELEY, Headquarters 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) 24 October 1967
ABBREVIATIONS

List of abbreviations used in text (Local, common usage, standard Army).

AA         Anti-Aircraft
ALOC       Air Line of Communication
AM          Air Mobile
AO          Area of Operations
APD         Airborne Personnel Detector
ARVN        Army Republic of VIETNAM
ASP         Ammunition Supply Point
ASR         Available Supply Rate
AVLB        Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge
AW          Automatic Weapon
CA          Civic Action
CA          Combat Assault
CAS         Close Air Support
C&C         Command and Control
CHICOM      Chinese Communist
CI          Counterintelligence
CIDG        Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CP          Command Post
CS          Tear Gas
CSS         Combat Sky Spot
DISCOM      Division Support Command
DS          Direct Support
DTO         Division Transportation Office
DTOC        Division Tactical Operations Center

Inclosure 9
FAC  Forward Air Controller
FDC  Fire Direction Center
FO  Forward Observer
FRAGO  Frag Order
FSA  Forward Support Area
FSB  Fire Support Base
FSE  Forward Supply Element
FWMAF  Free World Military Assistance Forces
GREEG  Graves Registration
GS  General Support
GSR  General Support Reinforcing
Gun, Gunship  Armed UH-1 Helicopters
GVN  Government of VIETNAM
Hawkeye Team  Four Man Hunter-Killer Team
H&I  Harassment and Interdiction
Headhunter  O-1E Aircraft Used for Visual Reconnaissance
Hook  CH-47 "Chinook" Helicopter
I FFORCEV  I Field Force, VIETNAM
INRHA  Injuries Not the Result of Hostile Action
IPW  Interrogation Prisoner of War Team
IRHA  Injuries the Result of Hostile Action
Jackson Hole  Brigade CP Area at LE THANH, YA898315
JUSPAO  Joint US Public Affairs Agency
KBA  Killed by Air
KIA  Killed in Action
LF  Local Force
LRRP  Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol, Recondo Patrol
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LLOC</td>
<td>Land Line of Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ</td>
<td>Landing Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, VIETNAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDCAP</td>
<td>Medical Civic Action Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF</td>
<td>Main Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>Missing in Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR</td>
<td>Main Supply Route</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTOE</td>
<td>Modified Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>North VIETNAMESE Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVAC</td>
<td>North VIETNAMESE Army Captive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oasis</td>
<td>Brigade CP Area at ZA110275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>Operation Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Popular Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLWAR</td>
<td>Political Warfare (ARVN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW, PW</td>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Preplanned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PZ</td>
<td>Pick-up Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCA</td>
<td>Riot Control Agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD</td>
<td>Revolutionary Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Regional Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL</td>
<td>Rocket Launcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>Republic of VIETNAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D</td>
<td>Search and Destroy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slick</td>
<td>UH-1 Helicopter Used Primarily for Air Lift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Self Propelled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNCLASSIFIED

Spooky
Air Force Minigun Armed AC-47 Flareship

TAC
Tactical

TAOR
Tactical Area of Responsibility

TOE
Table of Organization and Equipment

USAID
United States Agency for International Development

USARV
United States Army, VIETNAM

USSF
United States Special Forces

VC
Viet Cong

VCC
Viet Cong Captive

VETCAP
Veterinary Civic Action Program

VMC
Viet MONTAGNARD Cong

VMCC
Viet MONTAGNARD Cong Captive

VR
Visual Reconnaissance

VT
Variable Time

VTR
Vehicle, Tank Recovery

WIA
Wounded in Action