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1. Forwarded as inclosure is a report, subject as above.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECAG...THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

19 DEC 67

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After Action Report to CFORD 3-67, 31 March to 19 April 1967.

1. References:
   Company C, 5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF, Operation Order 3-67 OCONEE (Blackjack 12), dtd 241000 hrs Mar 67.
   HQ, 5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF OPLAN BLACKJACK 12, dtd 010840 hrs Mar 67.
   CO, III MAF Operation Order 6-67 OCONEE dtd 211136 hrs Mar 67.

2. Task Force Organization
   a. 8 USASF
   b. 4 AATTY
   c. 160 Indigenous

3. The mission of Mobile Guerrilla Task Force 768 was to conduct a reconnaissance in force of a defined WOA to determine Viet Cong infiltration routes, interdict the infiltration routes, and fix any VC installations.


5. Conduct of Patrol.
   b. The terrain throughout the operation area was rugged and mountainous with tree growths ranging from 70-90 feet and elephant grass from 8-12 feet tall.
   c. The only major obstacle was the dense terrain which sometimes compelled us to move along the existing trail networks.
   d. There were no mines or booby traps encountered.
   e. Actions upon encounter with enemy forces: See Incl 1, Debriefing of "Operation OCONEE".

6. Enemy Information: See Incl 1 Debriefing of "Operation OCONEE".

7. Results of enemy encounters:
   a. Friendly losses:
      (1) KIA - 1 (AATTY)
      (2) WIA - 8 (one in hospital; seven treated and released)
      (3) MIA - 0
   b. Enemy Losses:
      (1) KIA - 28
      (2) KIA - 35
      (3) WIA - 12 (escaped)
      (4) KIA - 0
      (5) Equipment
         (a) 1 M-1 Carbine
         (b) 2 pair binoculars w/ Chinese markings
         (c) 2 M-2 type Chinese compasses

Incl 23 to 5th SFGA ORIL 1 Feb - 30 Apr 67

FOR OT RD

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After Action Report to OPORD 3-67 (contd)

(d) 3 magazines AK-47
(e) 600 booby trap devices
(f) One VC personnel roster designating Company 61-B and its CO, LE HOANG HOA.

8. Significant Activities: See Incl 1, Debriefing of "Operation OCONUS".


10. Conclusions and Recommendations.

   a. The main infiltration route runs east - west as shown in Incl 2, Trail Network. There are many north-south feeder trails which run into this main trail. The VC infiltrate much new equipment, such as that captured, by utilizing human carriers. The fact that no food is carried indicates the infiltration parties eat at way stations located on or near the valley floor and then proceed, via the north-south feeder trails, or, to the main east-west trail. Also noted were several very large food growing areas on the valley floor.

   b. The following problems are identified and recommendations made in the hope that they will assist any future Blackjack Operations in I Corps Area:

      (1) S-1 - None
      (2) S-2 - None
      (3) S-3 - None
      (4) S-4

   a. Problem Area: The Al-E resupply method was considered to be a problem area for two main reasons. First was the very rugged terrain of I Corps. The grass ranges 8-12 feet tall and the tree growth 70-90 feet with a secondary growth of 12-18 feet. This makes contact with the A/C very difficult at times, and therefore, if release of containers is one second late, recovery is very time consuming and loss of one or several containers is probable. Once recovery has been accomplished, disposal of the containers is very difficult. Secondly, the reason for the utilization of the Al-E resupply is to provide means by which resupply can be effected and still allow the MIF to remain clandestine. Experience has proven this objective is not accomplished. By the time of the first scheduled resupply, the presence of the MIF in an area has almost assuredly been detected. The exact location, in all probability, has not yet been fixed by the enemy. The use of the Al-E to deliver supplies in the type terrain in which Blackjack 12 was conducted almost always caused more problems than necessary, and the additional time needed by the MIF to find and dispose of containers spread all over increased our chances of becoming fixed by the enemy in the vicinity.

   b. Recommendations. That resupply by chopper by considered in the I Corps area. This method would decrease the time element of recovery and issue. The equipment could be dropped from directly overhead in sandbags. There would be no lost or scattered containers and the issuance to the troops would be accomplished as rapidly as the helicopter arrived. This would enable the MIF to take what is actually most important passive defensive measures in this type operation: to receive and issue the supplies in the quickest possible time and move immediately to a more secure area free from enemy observation.
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After Action Report to OPORD 3-67 (contd)

C. Transmission for request of necessary medical and QM items was much too lengthy.

1. Problem Area. Transmission for request of necessary medical and QM items was much too lengthy.

2. Recommendations. For a 30 day operation, a complete issue of clothing (tiger suits, boots and socks) be pre-packed for issue on or about I+15. US jungle boots, if available, should be issued to the indigenous. This would probably negate our boot resupply requirements. During the preparation phase, at daily sick call require NOP detachment medics to maintain detailed health and medical records. In this manner they can best determine what they will need for the first half of the operation. A similar amount could be pre-packed for issue on or about I+15.

3. Problem Area. Candy and US cigarettes were a good morale factor; however, candy wrappers presented a critical security problem and cigarettes a slight security (coughing) problem. We requested and received 5 packs of cigarettes and one bag of candy per man per resupply.

4. Recommendations. Cigarettes be cut to three packs per resupply and candy to one bag candy every other resupply.

5. Problem Area. Out unit has been trained as a combat force; our mission of reconnaissance, with accompanying instructions to avoid all contact was difficult for our troops to understand; i.e., why didn't we deploy, engage, and destroy as trained.

6. Recommendations. That all future Blackjack operations be given a combat rather than reconnaissance mission.

JULES J. BONAVOLONTA
CPT, Df
Commanding

Incl.
1. Debriefing of "Operation OCCONEE"
2. Operation and Trail Network Overlay

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Debriefing of Operation OCONEE

1. (C) The following is the result of a debriefing of the participants from "Operation OCONEE" conducted during the period 31 March through 19 April 1967. The debriefing was conducted chronologically from insertion to extraction.

a. On 31 March 1967 Mobile Guerrilla Force 768 consisting of 8 WISP, 4 Australian and 160 indigenous personnel accompanied by 6 USAF, 5 Australian and 176 indigenous personnel of the Mike Force departed Marble Mountain Airstrip, DaNang East at 1545 hrs for insertion at a landing zone located at AT926656. By 1840 hrs 31 March 1967, the Mobile Guerrilla Force (MGF) and the Mike Force (MF) were inserted without incident. The IZ was secured by the MGF at 1815 hrs and was found to be too small for both the MGF and the MF so the MGF moved to the high ground at AT916648 prior to the MF landing. The MF landed and moved to AT 920646. The last two locations were night locations. There were no incidents or sightings during that day.

b. On 1 April the MGF and the MF departed their night locations at 0715 hrs and moved to AT906642 where they stopped due to the intense heat. The MF stayed about 500 meters to the rear and then moved to AT904655. At 1630 hrs the MGF moved to their night location at AT902642. The MF followed and at this time required a medevac for five indigenous due to heat prostration. Three MF indigenous deserted with weapons and the CO, MGF ordered the deserters to be shot on sight. The MF night location was AT904657. There were no sightings or contacts during the day. The terrain was extremely difficult and movement was slow.

c. On 2 April 1967 the MGF and MF departed their night locations at 0630 hrs and moved to AT884655. The MF arrived in the vicinity of AT891655 at 1330 hrs and the pre-planned deception plan was put into effect; to have the MF extracted by helicopter and returned to Co C, 5th SF(A, Danang. The first helicopter touched down at 1730 hrs and the last at 1825 hrs. The extraction of the MF took place without incident and the deception plan was successful. The MGF moved to a night location at AT884655. There were no contacts or sightings on 2 April 67.

d. On 3 April 1967 the MGF departed their night location and moved to AT855655 and further to a night location at AT853663. There were no sightings or contacts. The terrain was difficult, mostly 8-12 foot elephant grass.

e. On 4 April 1967 the MGF departed their night location and moved west to AT926659 where they made contact with 2 VC. The VC were wearing black pajamas and one was carrying a MAS-36. During the fire fight one VC was KIA, the other VCIA. 1 USAF and 2 indigenous were WIA. The VC who was killed was carrying a pack containing a ground sheet, a US canteen, US insect repellent and a khaki uniform. The VC WIA ran and was followed until he went into a valley. The MGF located a trail running east to west from AT853663 to AT906652. The trail was well used and well concealed. It was wide enough to provide easy travel for men walking in single file. Between AT853663 and AT825655, the MGF passed five graves (freshly dug) and two destroyed way-stations. Night location for the MGF was AT916648.
Debriefing of "OPERATION OCONEE" (contd)

f. On 5 April 67, the MGF moved west along the trail (possibly a main infiltration route) and observed many NVA ration packets with American "Punny-Face" Kool-Aid wrappers strewn throughout the area. Personnel of the MGF estimated that there were at least 10,000 ration packets in the area, all having been used and then left with no attempt to bury or cover them. At AT799649 one NVA company moving north along another well used trail was sighted at AT795656. The MGF could see the trail extending from AT795653 to AT798660. Each man of the NVA company was armed with either an AK-47 or K-50. They were wearing black uniforms and NVA helmets. No contact was made nor was assistance called as the MGF did not want to give away their position. At the same time a VC platoon was spotted to the south at AT799646. There were approximately 20 VC, armed and wearing white shirts and shorts. The MGF considered that they were possibly being surrounded. Three VC made contact with the rear platoon, negative casualties. The VC withdrew south with negative casualties. The MGF immediately moved to the west and no further contact was made. The MGF moved to ZC210553 and received a resupply, then moved to their night location at ZC210552.

g. On 6 April 67, the remainder of the airdrop was located. A USAF O-1E FAC crashed at ZC197642 at approximately 1510 hrs and the remainder of the day was spent in getting to the crash site, securing the area and attempting to recover the bodies. The MGF night location was at ZC198642.

h. During the early morning hours of 7 April 1967, bombing took place at AT803969 and ZC189648. The MGF departed their night location at 0630 hrs and moved west along the trail. During the afternoon hours one of the indigenous platoon leaders overheard a radio transmission on a PRC-25 (freq 10-2 meg.) from a VC Company Commander. The VC was talking to the Montagnards in the area, rallying them for reasons unknown. The CO, MGF assumed that the MGF presence in the area was thus far undetected as the VC transmission stated nothing concerning troops in the area. The CO, MGF assumed that the MGF presence in the area was thus far undetected as the VC transmission stated nothing concerning troops in the area. The MGF 1st Platoon moved to ZC176641 and the CRP and the 4th Platoon moved to ZC178653. The 2nd, 3rd and HQ Platoons moved to ZC126651 where resupplies were received. The bodies of the two US from the O-1E were evacuated along with one indigenous MGF who had been wounded earlier. The MGF remained in the vicinity of the evacuation point for the night.

i. On 8 April the MGF departed their night locations at first light and moved to hill 864 at ZC177637. Travel throughout the area was almost impossible as the MGF avoided use of the trails. Upon arrival at hill 864, the MGF drew heavy automatic fire from their flanks. During the ensuing fire, the VC withdrew to the southwest. The MGF Commander sent patrols to the south and southwest and called an airstrike into the vicinity of ZC175624. Patrols were dispatched with one encountering 30 VC dressed in shorts and white shirts at ZC179633. A FAC was called but prior to its arrival the VC detected the patrol and during the fire fight 3 VC were WIA. The VC fled west. An airstrike was called at ZC180633 resulting in three secondary explosions. There was no further contact with the enemy. This day no bomb damage assessment was made. Night location was at ZC184643.
Debriefing of "OPERATION OCONEE" (contd)

j. On 9 April 67, the MGF moved to ZC153642 and spotted one VC with pack moving from west to east at ZC163647. He fled north towards the valley leaving his pack after being fired on. The pack contained the following items of equipment: 2 pairs of binoculars ('East German), 2 M-2 type (Chinese Comm) compasses, 3 sealed containers of booby trap devices, 3 magazines for AK-47 with 90 rounds of new ammunition. The pack was booby trapped by the MDF and left at the site where it was found. At approximately 1725 hrs the MDF heard an explosion from the vicinity where they had left the pack. Throughout the day, many "feeder" trails loading north and south were spotted running into the main trail going east and west. Night location for the MDF was at ZC143643.

k. On 10 April 67, the MGF moved west and north and had six contacts with the enemy during the day. The first contact took place at ZC114645 with an estimated reinforced platoon. The enemy fired a red-star cluster just prior to the contact and the MGF was fired on from three sides. The MDF deployed and the VC withdrew west. There were 4 VC WIA and no friendly casualties. The second contact took place at ZC114646 with 2 squads of VC. The MDF deployed two platoons and the enemy withdrew to the west. There was 1 VC WIA and no friendly casualties. The third contact took place at ZC114646 with one squad of VC. The enemy withdrew to the west, with no casualties on either side. The fourth contact took place at ZC126550 with one squad of VC. The enemy withdrew to the northeast. There were 2 VC WIA and no friendly casualties. The fifth contact took place at ZC106551 with one squad of VC. The enemy withdrew to the west. There was 1 VC WIA and no friendly casualties. At ZC139654, the MDF came upon a new well-built way-station which was capable of accommodating a platoon. The way-station was not burned; however, 1 pig, numerous items of clothing, and approximately 50 kilos of rice were destroyed. As the MDF started to move out, the rear element made contact with two squads of VC at ZC139653. The VC withdrew to the northwest. There were no casualties on either side. The MGF then moved into a large food growing area at ZC135661. It is estimated there was enough food to feed a battalion. The MDF moved to their night location at ZC135664 and at this time requested extraction and reinsertion at the far end of their area of operations because it was felt that the reconnaissance mission was compromised and ineffective. The MGF made contact with the FAC and two airstrikes were called in, one hitting the way-station and destroying it. Napalm was requested to be dropped on the food growing area, but the MGF does not know if it was accomplished. At ZC106553 an AA position for a 12.7 mm gun was located. The MDF was informed that they would be extracted and reinserted at NAM DONG at 0900 hrs on 11 April 67. The most significant fact concerning the 6 contacts on the 10th of April was that with each contact the enemy’s strength was increasing and his knowledge of the terrain gave him an advantage over the MDF.

l. On 11 April 67 the MDF waited for extraction. They were informed that there would be no extraction, and so they received a resupply at their night location of 10 April. They then moved to a new night location at ZC136669. The terrain in this area was difficult with elephant grass 6-12 feet high. During the resupply 1 USASF and 2 indigenous were med-evacuated, the USASF with a sprained ankle and the indigenous with pneumonia. There were no enemy contacts on 11 April.
n. On 13 April 67 the MGF received a resupply at 0850 hrs and moved to ZC102687. The terrain was very steep and dense foliage with 8-12 foot bamboo and elephant grass. Night location was at ZC102687.

o. On 14 April 67 the MGF stayed at their previous night’s position and conducted a patrol in the area. One patrol spotted two civilians working in the fields. Another patrol picked up 2 civilian type bamboo packs containing bamboo knives, one cigarette lighter, tobacco and a small piece of sweet rice. One patrol found an infiltration route running east to west, concealed by tall grass and bamboo, between ZC095688 and ZC100686. Some civilians were sighted in the area, but they were avoided and they avoided contact with the patrols. The MGF believed that these civilians were guides, trail-watchers and food growers for the enemy. The MGF remained at ZC102687 overnight.

p. On 15 April 67 the MGF moved west. The terrain was still difficult with tree height from 70-90 feet, secondary growth 12-15 feet. At ZC076678, the MGF encountered 4 VC, two with carbines. The VC withdrew to the southwest with negative casualties. At ZC076678, 5 VC with AK-47’s were encountered. They withdrew to the southwest with negative casualties. At the night location ZC066678, 5 VC wearing black pajamas, NVA type helmets and carrying carbines patrolled the area. They were taken under fire with negative casualties.

q. On 16 April 67 the MGF moved to a night location at ZC065691. There was no contact during the day; however at ZC065691 a way-station was located and an airstrike was called for.

r. On 17 April 67 the MGF dispatched patrols to the west, north, and northeast. The patrol to the north noted a new trail being cut to the east at ZC065694. The patrol to the northeast noted nothing significant. The patrol to the west made contact with an estimated 2 squads of VC at ZC057668. The VC were wearing black pajamas and carrying automatic weapons (AK-47) and hand grenades. They appeared to have withdrawn to the southwest. While returning to the base area, the patrol ran into the same enemy unit at ZC056659. During the ensuing fire fight, the VC threw hand grenades, but they all fell short. Their fire discipline was very poor which led the patrol to believe that they were poorly trained. The patrol deployed and the VC withdrew to the southwest. There were no casualties. The MGF remained at ZC065691 overnight.

s. On 18 April 67 the MGF received a resupply and patrols again moved west, north and northeast. The patrols reported negative sightings. At 2000 hrs a MGF ambush patrol located to the south reported a large body of VC moving toward their night position. A flare ship was called and patrols were sent out to the south, southeast and southwest. The flareship arrived at approximately 2115 hrs. As no contact was made by the patrols, the MGF Commander told the flare ship to return. As the flare ship left the MGF Commander was notified by the flare ship that lights were observed north of the Tan Lo River and south of the MGF. Five flares were dropped and people were observed. 5000 rounds were fired into the area prior to departure of the flare ship. No other activity during the night. The MGF remained at ZC065691 for the night and a resupply drop.
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Debriefing of "OPERATION OCONEE" (contd)

On 19 April the MGF began to move north. They moved approximately 400 m to ZC065695 and were hit by what was first estimated to be a well dug-in NVA platoon. Fire increased from the ridge line running east to west at ZC065700. In the ensuing fire fight, one Australian was KIA and 3 indigenous were WIA. The Australian's platoon was moving up on the left front when he was hit in the eye by small arms fire. The MGF withdrew into a tight perimeter at ZC065691 to take advantage of the terrain, and the fire fight continued. The volume of fire from the front never decreased. At approximately 1200 hrs 2 NVA Platoons were spotted attempting to flank the MGF on the east and west. The MGF then realized that they were in contact with at least a reinforced NVA company. An airstrike was called on the NVA platoon flanking on the west resulting in 25 NVA KIA. During the bombing 10 more NVA were KIA. The NVA Platoons on the west and the north were contained. The NVA platoon on the north side of the MGF perimeter attempted to get to the perimeter in an effort to avoid the bombings. By this time the MGF had counted 23 NVA KIA (US confirmed). At 1430 hrs the MGF commenced their move to the northeast in order to be extracted and were again hit soon after they started to move. 4 NVA were KIA (US confirmed) 3 of which were carrying K-50's. The MGF continued to move and arrived at the Landing Zone (ZC060675) at approximately 1730 hrs. The LZ was secured and extraction commenced at approximately 1810 hrs. Heavy fire was coming from an area south of the LZ. The enemy were throwing red smoke in an attempt to draw the aircraft to that location. One helicopter gunner was WIA during the extraction. The extraction was completed at 1850 hrs.

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<td>1 Australian KIA</td>
<td>28 KIA (US confirmed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 USASF WIA</td>
<td>35 KIA (US confirmed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Indigenous WIA</td>
<td>12 WIA (US confirmed)</td>
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2. (S) S-2 Comments: Throughout the area traversed by the MGF numerous well used trails, food growing areas and the presence of NVA ration containers lend credence to previous reports that the area known as "Happy Valley" is being used as a main infiltration route. The fact that none of the enemy encountered possessed packs containing food indicate the possibility of permanently located NVA/VC forces base camps, training sites and caches. There was no evidence of PW camps nor the presence of rockets in the area traversed by the operation.

CECIL D. NICKERSON
CPT, USAS
S2

23-6

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This overlay contains a chronological listing of significant activities that occurred during Operation OCONUS. Also contained on this overlay is a red dotted line depicting those trails suspected to be prominent infiltration routes.

The numbers indicated on the overlay depict only those significant events. For more detailed discussion, refer to the attached debriefing report.

1. ( ) Infiltration Point. Task Force 768 infiltrated at 1745 hours on 31 March 1967.
2. ( ) Medevac. Five Mike Force personnel medevac due to heat prostration.
3. ( ) Mike Force Exfiltration. As part of the diversionary plan, the Mike Force was extracted from the operational area.
4. ( ) Contact with the VC. At 1200 hours on 4 April 1967 TF 768 made contact with VC elements. Results: 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA.
5. ( ) First resupply.
6. ( ) Oile Crash. While on visual reconnaissance, an Air Force O1-E crashed, vicinity TF 768. Reason unknown. Occupants were killed immediately.
7. ( ) Resupply and Medevac. Concurrent with medevac effort, a resupply of needed items was effected with TF 768.
8. ( ) Extraction Requested. Due to continuous contact, CO, TF 768 requested extraction in an effort to break contact with VC elements and immediately be reinserted at another point in the GWOA.
9. ( ) Resupply Area.
10. ( ) Resupply Area.
11. ( ) Resupply Area.
12. ( ) Contact with NVA. Made contact with estimated Company Reinforced NVA.
13. ( ) Extraction Point.
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Company C, 5th SFCA, 1st SF
Danang East (30072719), Vietnam
241500 Mar 67
KFI IV

OORD 3-67 (COOKES) (BLACKJACK 12)


Time Zone: Hotel

Task Organization:

Task Force 768
USASF Operational Det A-100
Combat Reconnaissance Platoon
Mobile Guerrilla Company
Mike Force Company

1. (C) SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces, Annex A, Intelligence
b. Friendly Forces.
   (1) III MAP
      (a) Continues current missions in I CTZ.
      (b) Provides ARCLIGHT strikes from ARCLIGHT allocations.
   (2) I Corps Advisory Group.
      (a) Provide normal tactical air support to include flare/mini
      gun ships and emergency airborne radio relay between Task
      Force 768 and Co C, 5th SFG (Abn).
      (b) Provide logistic air support to include obtaining 7th
      USAF AL-E (Pleiku based) aircraft for aerial resupply.
      (c) Provide aerial reconnaissance and FAC aircraft on a daily
      basis.
   (3) First MarDiv. Prepare to provide within 12 hours up to one
      infantry battalion reinforced as reaction/exploitation force.
   (4) First MAW
      (a) Provide helilift for infiltration on I-Day and deception
      withdrawal plan on I+2.
      (b) Provide helilift on two hour alert for emergency exfiltration
      of Task Force 768.
      (c) Provide lift within 12 hours for up to one infantry battalion
      reinforced.
   (5) 5th SFG (Abn). Provides logistical support through Co B,
      5th SFG (Abn), Pleiku.

2. (C) MISSION

   Company C, 5th SFG (Abn) deploys a Mobile Guerrilla Force, Task Force 768 on
   I-Day into GWOA HENRY to conduct a reconnaissance in force for approximately
   30 days.

23-10

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a. Concept of Operation.

1. Maneuver. The operation will be conducted in three phases:
   (a) Phase I, Infiltration. On I-Day Task Force 768 and one Mike Force Company will be helilifted to LZ vicinity Hieu Duo (AT9368) and commence a two day sweep operation to the southwest. On I+2, the Mike Force Company will be exfiltrated by helicopter vicinity AT8863. The extraction will be made at last light by the same number of helicopters used for insertion and conducted in a manner to give illusion of two companies being extracted. Upon completion of extraction of the Mike Force, Task Force 768 will infiltrate the GWOA by foot.
   (b) Phase II, Reconnaissance in force. Conduct assigned mission.
   (c) Phase III, Exfiltration. 5th SF (Abn), Task Force 768 will be exfiltrated from the GWOA. The primary means of exfiltration will be by helicopters from a LZ to be selected by Task Force CO during the conduct of the operation. The secondary means of exfiltration will be by foot through friendly lines for subsequent airlift to Danang.


b. Task Force 768.

(1) Infiltrate as a part of a two company force on I-Day vicinity Hieu Duo. Conduct two company sweep to southwest until D+2.
(2) On exfiltration of Mike Force Company at last light I+2, move west into the GWOA.
(3) Organize and operate from a series of guerrilla bases within the GWOA.
(4) Conduct extensive reconnaissance within the GWOA with emphasis on locating enemy LOC, base areas, installations, POW camps and cache sites.
(5) Conduct offensive actions as required to insure continued operations and existence of the task force in the GWOA.
(6) Report targets lucrative for interdiction by air and provide EDA.
(7) Exfiltrate on order of CO, Co C, 5th SF (Abn) Mike Force Company

(1) Infiltrate as a part of a two company force on I-Day vicinity Hieu Duo. Sweep to southwest until D+2.
(2) Exfiltrate by helicopter on I+2 vicinity AT8863. Conduct exfiltration in manner to give the illusion of two companies being extracted.
(3) On return to Danang revert to control of CO, Co C, 5th SF (Abn) and continue basic training.

d. Reserve. 1st Marine Division.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) CO, Task Force 768 exercises OPCON over Mike Force Company from I-Day to completion of exfiltration.
(2) Annex D, Air Movement Plan.
4. (a) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.
   a. Annex E, Administration.

5. (c) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
   b. Command
      (1) Co, Co C, 5th SFG (Abn) exercises command and control from Company TOC, Danang East.
      (2) Co, Co C, 5th SFG (Abn) in C&C helicopter during insertion.

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ANNEXES: A-Intelligence
         B-Operations Overlay
         C-Tactical Air Support Plan
         D-Air Movement Plan
         E-Administration
         F-Signal

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Annex A (Intelligence) to OPORD 3-67

References: A. Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 5440, 1, II, 6540
I, II; III, IV and 6640 III, IV; Joint Operations Graphic
1:250,000, Series 1501, Sheets NE 49-16, 49-13, ND 49-4, 49-1.

B. III MAF Intelligence Estimate 4-67.

1. (c) SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION:
   a. Appendix 1; Situation Overlay.
   b. Appendix 2, Intelligence estimate No 1-67 (Thuong Duc).
   c. Current OB holdings carry no confirmed enemy units in the GWOA.

The 402nd Sapper Bn is carried generally southeast of the GWOA (ZC 135280) and is believed to have permanent installations including training sites in this area, some of which are possibly located in the southeastern edge of the GWOA.

No more accurate estimate of enemy strength or units within the GWOA can be made, however it is believed that the enemy in the area consist mainly of cadre and security for installations, trail watchers, and occasional carrying parties or infiltrating units. From statements of ralliers and POW's it is known that infiltration routes enter the GWOA from the west and feed out of it into the Danang TAOR. Recent ARVN escapees reported the major route is also used by carrying parties for transport of rice and other supplies from the plains area of Quang Nam to storage areas within the GWOA and for movement of ammunition and weapons from northern areas into Quang Nam. Escapees also report the route is used to infiltrate VC into and out of Quang Nam Province. Several installations are also located in the GWOA along the infiltration routes.

These include PW camps, rice caches, and other unknown type installations. Heavy canopy prevents observation of these installations from the air and according to the escapees, previous bombings have damaged the trail, but not the VC facilities. It is probable that an extensive and well maintained trail network through the GWOA connects the various VC facilities. It is also probable that all approaches into the area are under continuous surveillance and that there are numerous security elements consisting of listening posts and trail watchers within the area itself.

2. (c) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION:
   a. Essential Elements of Information:
      (1) What is the enemy strength, disposition, composition and unit identification in the area?
      (2) What are the locations of base camps, rest areas, way stations, command and control facilities?
      (3) What are the locations of PW camps? How are they guarded, how many prisoners are in each camp? Are there any US or FWMP PW's?
      (4) Will the enemy fight to preserve the installations and PW camps or will they withdraw? If he withdraws, which direction will he move?
      (5) Will the enemy reinforce his forces already in the area? If so, when, from where and with what forces?
What trails are in use by the enemy? With regard to trail depicted on situation overlay, what is the volume of traffic passing over this trail, what type, frequency, origin and destination, and what is being transported?

(7) What security measures are employed along trails and in the vicinity of enemy installations?

b. Other Intelligence Requirements

(1) Are there areas which can be used as landing fields or pads for helicopters? Are they defended, booby-trapped, mined?

(2) How effective is the enemy base security and ground to air defense system? What measures are used? Strengths, identifications and mission of forces involved?

(3) Are the communications facilities located in the area? Types, locations? Special attention to land line communications systems?

(4) Are there developed base area facilities with buildings, training sites, hospitals, warehouses? Locations?

(5) Are there fortifications, including tunnels, in the area? Where, extant, nature and use?

(6) What evidence is there of enemy possession of 37mm AA weapons? 120mm mortars? 140mm rockets? Where, how employed, and what security is on the weapons?

(7) Are there indications of Chicom or other advisors working with enemy units in the area?

(8) What is the enemy counterintelligence capability in the area?

What is the probable enemy counterintelligence reaction to the introduction of friendly forces into the area?

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS:

a. Orders to subordinate and attached units: None.

b. Request to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units.

(1) III MAI is requested to provide information as obtained of:

(a) Photo coverage.

(b) Red Haze coverage.

(c) Interrogation reports and document translation.

(d) Special Agent Report.

(e) SLAR coverage.

(2) JTAD is requested to provide as obtained:

(a) All agent reports of enemy activities in the area.

(b) Intelligence capabilities of enemy forces.

4. (C) MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL:

a. Prisoners of War. Only PWs of Battalion Commander level or higher, political prisoners of equal status, or others who give indications of possessing information of extreme value will be held for extraction (particular emphasis on 140mm rocketry). Instructions for the extraction of VIP PWs will be requested subsequent to capture. On-the-spot interrogation will be effected and will follow the line prescribed by EMI.
b. Captured material. Captured documents will be secured by USASF personnel and held until unit is extracted. A destruction plan for captured material and documents will be implemented if compromise appears imminent. Material of particular interest includes firing tables for crew served weapons (emphasis on 140mm rockets), communications and signal devices, SRI's and SII's, documents of payops interest and demolitions equipment.

5. (c) DOCUMENTS AND/OR EQUIPMENT REQUIRED:
   b. Appendix 1; Situation Overlay.
   c. Appendix 3, Climatology.

6. (c) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:
   a. Stringent counterintelligence measures will be implemented throughout the operation. Maps carried will be unmarked, with marginal data removed. ID cards and tags will be worn. All personal effects will be secured at Company C.

7. (u) REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION:
   Nil.

8. (c) MISCELLANEOUS:
   a. Twenty-four hour weather forecasts will be transmitted daily at predesignated times in accordance with current SDF.
   b. Communications will be kept to a minimum consonant with operational requirements. SDF’s will be destroyed if compromise appears imminent.

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Appendices: Appendix 1; Enemy Situation Overlay (omitted from ORL)
Appendix 2; Intelligence Estimate 1-67 (Thuang Dao)
Appendix 3, Climatology (omitted from ORL)

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Appendix 2 (Intel Estimate) to Annex A (Intelligence) to OPORD 3-67

Reference: Maps, Vietnam, 1:50,000 Series L7C14, Sheets 6440 I, II, 6540 I, II, III, IV, Joint Operational Graphic 1:250,000, Series 1501, Sheets NE 49-16, NE 49-33, ND 49-4, ND 49-1

1. (c) MISSION
On order Company C conducts a reconnaissance in force into a defined GWOA located west of Thuong Duc Special Forces Camp employing Mobile Guerrilla Force (XGF) 768 to determine Viet Cong infiltration routes, Viet Cong strength and future intentions, interdict infiltration routes, and strike fixed Viet Cong installations.

2. (c) THE AREA OF OPERATIONS
a. Weather
   (1) Existing Situation. See Appendix 3 (Climatology) to annex A (Intelligence) to Reference B.
   (2) Effects on enemy course of action. Periods of high visibility will limit undetected movement of enemy forces. He will be unable to mass sufficient forces to attack or defend because they will be subjected to friendly air attack. Reinforcement and withdrawal by small units will be enhanced due to easy cross-country movement utilizing existing trail network.
   (3) Effects on our course of action. Limited rain and moderate temperatures will raise the morale and increase the operational effectiveness of the force. Early morning ground fog will provide concealment for our movement yet the predominately clear skies at night will favor night operations and 24 hour a day air support. Clear skies during daylight hours will aid our observation of the enemy. The small amount of rain expected will effect operations only slightly and for a very short period from the standpoint of resupply and tactical air support.

b. Terrain:
   (1) Existing Situation.
      (a) The GWOA is 25 kilometers wide on the west, 12' kilometers on the east, and 35 kilometers long. The center of the area is YO920600 which is approximately 60 kilometers from Danang. The area is moderately populated by the Katu Montagnard Tribe.
(b) Terrain in the area is rugged and mountainous. Elevations run from 600 meters on the valley floors to an average of 1200 meters. Slopes are steep and in most cases covered by dense forest. Jungle canopy is moderate to heavy throughout the area and obscures most structures and small installations, not located in the valleys, from air observation. Areas not covered by forest have ground cover of thick brushwood and elephant grass. Cultivation exists in the form of rice crops in the valley floors near accessible water supplies. Jungle and vegetation tend to be thickest in the area of stream beds. The area drains generally south to southeast into the Song Boung, Song Cai, and Song Vo Gia Rivers. The mountains are cross-compartmented making movement east to west difficult.

(e) There are no roads in the AO. An extensive trail network does exist, the most prominent of which is the main trail running east and west across the northern portion of the area.

(d) An adequate supply of water exists throughout the AO and is considered to be contaminated.

(2) Effects on enemy operations.

(a) The terrain throughout the area favors the enemy in his operations. The relatively isolated mountainous areas provide a measure of security to the enemy within their base areas and for troop movements.

(b) The mountainous terrain and heavy vegetation limit observation and fields of fire to short distances.

(c) The heavy vegetation and mountainous terrain provides excellent cover and concealment and allow the enemy's camps, supply caches, and other installations to remain hidden. Extensive areas of good cover and concealment also provide the enemy with relatively safe routes to his attack and/or ambush positions.

(d) Steep slopes and dense undergrowth in the jungle areas will tend to channelize friendly troop movements along existing trails and defiles. Such channelizing favors the enemy use of mines and/or delaying or destructive obstacles, preplanned mortar fires, and ambushes.

(3) Effect on our operations.

(a) The mountainous terrain of the area with its good cover and concealment favors mobile guerrilla operations. Broken terrain and heavy vegetation will limit observation required for control of close air support and the receiving of air resupply. Observation and fields of fire will be limited to short distances.
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App 2 (Intel Estimate) to Annex 2 (Intel) to OPCORD 3-67 (cont'd)

(b) Excellent cover and concealment throughout most of the area will limit the effectiveness of friendly surveillance agencies. The excellent cover and concealment will provide the MIF with covered approaches to attack positions and protection from enemy fires.

(e) Steep slopes and dense vegetation will limit cross-country movement and make trail movement more attractive where the MIF will be channelized and more susceptible to ambush, delaying obstacles and preplanned mortar attack.

(d) Steep slopes, rugged terrain, and dense foliage will limit the number of suitable HLD's. The most suitable terrain is in the valleys throughout the area.

(e) The Katu Montagnard tribe inhabit the majority of the operational area. According to missionaries from within the people were violently hostile to the French due to their failure to respect tribal customs. The abandonment of the USASF camp at APO (YOS952) is considered by the Katu to be a broken promise. The VC/WNA appear to have gained strong support of these people by living among them. Because of this situation contact with the people by the MIF should be avoided.

3. (c) ENEMY SITUATION. Appendix 2 (Enemy Situation Overlay) and paragraph 1a, Ref. B.

4. (c) ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. Enumeration:

(1) Attack any target within the GWA at any time with a force of up to two companies.

(2) Defend at a time and place of his choosing with a force of up to two companies.

(3) Conduct limited small scale attacks, ambushes, sniping and harassment within the GWA.

(4) Reinforce capabilities (1), (2) and (3) above with all or elements of one battalion within a 12 to 24 hour period.

(5) Evade direct contact with the MIF and resort to small unit operations such as ambushes, mining and use of booby traps.

(6) Effect a deliberate withdrawal of all or portions of his forces prior to or after insertion of the MIF utilizing mines and booby traps whenever necessary for the purpose of concealing or displacing equipment, caches and PW camps.

b. Analysis in DISCUSSION:

(1) Capability No 1: Inductions which favor this capability are: the enemy's knowledge of the avenues of approach, routes of withdrawal and reinforcement, river and stream fordings, natural obstacles; the enemy's knowledge and association with the local population; the enemy's ability to keep targets under surveillance at close range; his control of the entire area and the availability of adequate areas for assembly of forces and preparation for an attack to include gathering of preattack intelligence.
Indications which militate against adoption of this capability are the enemy's occupation of favorable offensive positions and his probable reluctance to give up a principle infiltration route into the vicinity of Danang.

(2) Capability No 2. Indications which favor adoption of this capability include his occupation of favorable defensive terrain; the enemy's prerogative of selecting the battle area; his desire to conserve forces and his requirement to protect his installations. Indications which militate against adoption of this capability include his reluctance to give up a principle infiltration route into the vicinity of Danang.

(3) Capability No 3. Indications which favor adoption of this capability include his occupation of favorable defensive terrain; the enemy's prerogative of selecting the battle area; his desire to conserve forces and his requirement to protect his installations. Indications which militate against adoption of this capability include his reluctance to give up a principle infiltration route into the vicinity of Danang.

(4) Capability No 4. Indications which favor adoption of this capability include his occupation of favorable defensive positions against an organized attack in order to adequately defend his installations by employment of additional forces; the relative freedom of movement throughout the area, and his desire to hold an infiltration route which has in the past probably serviced the area east of Danang. Indications which militate against adoption of this capability include the vulnerability of redeploying reinforcing units to detection and destruction by friendly fire; the possible limited enemy logistical support capability for additional forces and the reluctance of the enemy to mass forces.

(5) Capability No 5. Indications which favor adoption of this capability are that this is a basic enemy tactic; provides the enemy with the capability of inflicting significant damage on the MIF; it minimizes the effects of supporting arms fires and as long as his capability is successfully employed it minimizes danger to the enemy installations within the GWA. The only indications which militate against adoption of this capability would be the desire to immediately displace his control elements and prisoner camps to a new and perhaps a less susceptible area by using all available local forces as a covering force.

(6) Capability No 6. Indications which favor adoption of this capability are the past indications of the enemy reaction to a hostile force within their area of control; basic VC/NVA tactics call for withdrawal when confronted by a determined or superior force in areas they control but do not consider vital. Indications which militate against adoption of this capability are the occupation of available defensive terrain and the necessity to protect vital installations.
5. (C) CONCLUSIONS.
   
   a. Probable Courses of Action. The probable courses of action are summarized below:

   (1) Against friendly attacks in the GWG the enemy would probably attempt to neutralize the MIF with particular emphasis on ambushes, mines, booby traps, and defensive mortar fires. In the event the vital installations, such as weapons, ammo, and rice caches were threatened, or should he become entrapped, the enemy can be expected to execute a strong defense.

   (2) Should the MIF attempt to penetrate his vital installations the enemy would probably attempt to divert friendly forces and counterattack, if feasible, while utilizing available forces to execute a strong defense.

   (3) Should the MIF attack the enemy in other than vital installations or base areas, the enemy will most probably avoid direct contact and resort to small unit harassment attacks, ambushes, mines and booby traps in an effort to inflict maximum casualties on the MIF.

   b. Vulnerabilities. Enemy forces, when massed are vulnerable to air attacks; he is also vulnerable to friendly artillery and his base areas to air attacks. They are vulnerable to sustained combat and aggressive pursuit, and will normally attempt to break contact when meeting a superior force or when the circumstances of the engagement are not in their favor.

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Annex C (Tactical Air Support Plan) to OPORD 3-67

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References: Maps, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6510 I, 6520 IV; Joint Operations Graphic 1:250,000, Series 1501, Sheet ND 48-4

1. (G) SITUATION.
   b. Friendly Forces:
      (1) OPORD 3-67
      (2) 1st MAW supports III MAF in I Corps.
      (3) 7th AF supports military forces in Vietnam.
   (h) SAC support military forces in Vietnam.

2. (G) MISSION

   Company C, 5th SF O (A) deploys a Mobile Guerrilla Force 768 on I-Day into O\O HENH to conduct reconnaissance in force for approximately 30 days.

3. (G) EXECUTION
   a. Concept of operation. OPORD 3-67.
   b. Air Support.
      (1) General. Immediate tactical (Tac Air) support is available to Task Force 768 through 1st MAW daily sorties allocated to support of III MAF. Tac Air support is of both FAC directed and radar (MSQ-77) controlled types. Immediate B-52 bombing (ARCLIGHT) support is available (up to 10 hours) through ARCLIGHT sorties allocated III MAF.
      (2) Allocations.
         (a) All tactical air sorties are from allocated to support of III MAF in I CTZ. III MAF authorizes 1st MAW to provide 15 to Task Force 768.
         (b) ARCLIGHT sorties are from those allocated to III MAF in I CTZ.
         (c) FAC's and flareships available on request through I TOC.
   c. Coordinating Instructions.
      (1) Task Force 768 request Tac Air from Company C. Company C submits requests direct to 1st MAW.
      (2) Task Force 768 request ARCLIGHT of Company C. Company C submits request direct to III MAF G-3 Air or III MAF G-3 COC Watch Officer.
      (3) Task Force 768 request FAC's and flareships of Company C. Company C submits request to 1st MAW.
      (4) Task Force 768 has capability to contact FAC and flareships through AN/PRC-25 FM radio.

4. (G) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
   a. Annex E, Administration

5. (G) COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   a. Signal. Annex F, Signal to OPORD 3-67 and SOI.

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Annex D (Air Movement Plan to CPORD 3-67)

Reference: Maps, Vietnam, 1:50,000 Series 17021h, Sheets 6610 I, II, 6510 I, II, III, IV, 6610 I, IV, Joint Operations Graphic 1:250,000 Series 1501, Sheets NE h9-16, NE h9-13, ND h9-7, ND h9-1

1. (0) AIR MOVEMENT TABLE
   Appendix 1, Air Movement Table.

2. (0) LANDING PLAN
   a. Location of landing zones is appendix 1, Air Movement Table.
   b. Landing Schedule. Appendix 1, Air Movement Table.

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Appendix 1, Air Movement Table

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Annex E (Administration) to OPORD 3-67

Reference: Maps, Vietnam, 1:50,000 Series L7011h, Sheets 64h0 I, II, 65h0 I, II, III, IV, 66h0 III, IV, Joint Operational Graphic 1:250,000 Series 1501, Sheets NE 49-16, NE 49-13, NE 49-4, NE 49-1

1. GENERAL

This administration provides for the administrative and logistical support Task Force 768 during the operation. All administrative and logistical installations remain at Co C, 5th SFRA, Danang East.

2. MATERIAL AND SERVICES

a. Supply

(1) Class I

(a) All personnel initially carry five days rations.

(b) Scheduled on-call resupply every five days thereafter with automatic 24 hour and 48 hour weather delays.

(2) Class II and IV. Replacement issue on call with scheduled resupply.

(3) Class V.

(a) All personnel initially carry double basic load per individual weapon.

(b) Allowances for crew served and special weapons as prescribed by Task Force CO.

(h) Aerial Resupply

(a) Co C, 5th SFM will supply Task Force 768 through a system of preplanned on call resupply drops. Supplies will be delivered in modified napalm containers by Al-E Sky Raider aircraft or para-dropped from C7A (Caribou) or other fixed or rotary wing aircraft.

(b) Supplies will be prepared in man portable loads. Items will be requested by identifying code and amounts. Supplies will be pre-positioned at departure airfield.

(c) Normal technique to effect resupply as follows:

(1) Task Force located by FAC aircraft.

(2) FAC directs delivery aircraft to general location of Task Force. FM voice communications established between Task Force and delivery aircraft. Supply containers released over Task Force on voice command by Task Force CO.

(3) Alternate resupply method will be by parachute drop from C7A or other suitable aircraft.

(d) In event radio contact is not made with Task Force 768 for a 72 hour period in preplanned emergency bundle composed of communication, food and medical supplies will be flown to drop zones pre-designated by CO Task Force 768 prior to infiltration. DZ marked in accordance with SOL. Resupply flight will be flown for five days between 2200 and 0400 hours until contact made.

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Annex E (Administration) to OORD 3-67 (cont'd)

b. Transportation
   (1) Sh, Co C, 5th SFU provides sufficient vehicle to transport Task
       Force 768 and Mike Force Company from Co C compound to departure
       airfield on 1-day.
   (2) Sh, Co C 5th SFU provides sufficient vehicles to move Mike Force
       Company on return to compound 1-2.

3. MEDICAL EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION
   a. Evacuation.
      (1) Seriously wounded US and indigenous personnel assigned to the MIF
          medevac by helicopter on call from Company C.
      (2) Spot report format used to report deceased and seriously wounded per-
          sonnel and to call medevac.
   b. Hospitalization.
      (1) Medevac US personnel will be hospitalized at the US Navy Hosp, Danang;
          US Med Hosp Ship "Repose".
      (2) Medevac of indigenous personnel will be hospitalized at US Marine Hosp,
          Hue-Phu-Bai ("A" Med); US Marine Hosp, Danang ("C" Med); US Naval,
          Danang; ARVN Hospital, Quang Ngai (1st Field Hosp); USAID Hosp, Danang
          or LLDB Dispensary, Danang; ARVN Hosp, Hue-Phu-Bai.
   (3) Indigenous personnel must be provided a note on their person denoting
       they are a member of the COM in order to be accepted for treatment
       at the medical facilities.

b. PERSONNEL
   a. Maintenance of unit strengths.
      (1) Strength Reports. Spot report format used to report changes in US
          and indigenous personnel status (KIA, WIA, MIA, Deserter). S-1, Co C,
          maintain daily strength reports utilizing consolidated spot reports.
      (2) Replacements.
          Replacement for US communications and medical personnel KIA, MIA, and
          WIA infiltrated by helicopter or air drop. Determination of need for
          replacements by Co, MIF. Determination of means of infiltration by
          Co, Co C. No provision for replacement of indigenous personnel.
   b. Personnel Management.
      (1) Personnel procedures. All personnel actions performed by Co C.
      (2) Civilian personnel. Indigenous interpreters accompanying force only
          civilians authorized on operation.
      (3) Prisoners of War. Annex A (Intelligence).
   c. Development and Maintenance of Morale.
      (1) Morale and personnel services. Personnel mail held at Co C until
          completion of operation.
      (2) Graves Registration.
          (a) Deceased US and indigenous personnel medevac if tactically
              feasible if not tactically feasible, deceased personnel buried
              in GCA. Feasibility determined by Co, MIF.
          (b) Exact location and description of burial site reported by spot
              report for possible future recovery of remains.
   d. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.
      (1) US personnel.
          (a) CO, Co C exercises power of arrest and confinement.
          (b) CO, Co C retains Article 15 jurisdiction for US personnel.

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Annex E (Administration) to OPORD 3-67 (cont'd)

(o) CO, 5th SFG (Abn) retains courts-martial jurisdiction for US personnel.
(2) AATNF: CO, MIF exercises power of arrest and confinement.
(3) Indigenous personnel (including interpreters).
(a) CO, MIF exercises life-or-death disciplinary control.

5. CIVIL AFFAIRS (excluding civilian interpreters)
   a. Contact with civilians will be avoided.
   b. No provision made for medevac or confinement of civilians without high intel value.

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Annex F (Signal) to OFORD 3-67

Reference: Map, Vietnam, 1:250,000, series L70II, Sheets 64h,0 I, II, 65h,0 I, II, III, IV, 66h,0 III, IV, Joint Operations Graphic 1:250,000 Series 1901, Sheets NE, l9-16, NE, l9-13, l9-4, ND, l9-1

1. (C) SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces: Annex A, Intelligence. It is assumed that the enemy has the capability to intercept and jam on the HF and VHF bands.
   b. Friendly Forces:
      (1) Det A-105, Kham Duc, monitors the primary Company C command net HF SSB frequency from 0600 to 2200 hrs daily, and the primary Company C air-ground frequency 24 hrs per day and relays traffic to and from Task Force 768 as required.
      (2) Det A-109, Thong Duc, monitors the primary Company C command net HF SSB frequency from 0600 to 2200 hrs daily, and the primary Company C air-ground frequency 24 hrs per day and relays traffic to and from Task Force 768 as required.
      (3) 220th Avn Co, Marble Mountain Air Facility, provides daylight aerial relay station (PM) when radio contact with Task Force 768 is lost for more than 12 hrs.
      (4) Air Force FACs provide air-ground coordination during the conduct of air strikes and provides daily overflights.
       c. Attachments and detachments: None

2. (C) MISSION. Install, operate and maintain secure radio communications for operation Coones.

3. (C) EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation: When deployed, Task Force 768 will maintain daily radio contact with Company C TCO. Contacts will be made at 1200 hrs and 1800 hrs daily. In addition to the contact frequency specified in the Special SOI, the Signal Section, Company C will maintain a 24 hr watch on the primary company SSB frequency, the company emergency guard frequency and the 5th SFGA guard frequency. Task Force 768 may establish contact at any time of the day on these frequencies. Detachments A-105 and A-109 will monitor the Company C SSB and FM frequency and will relay for Task Force 768 in the event the base radio station is unable to establish contact with Task Force 768. Under normal circumstances Task Force 768 and Company C will pass traffic on the operation frequency specified in the Special SOI.
   b. Signal Section, Co C, 5th SFGA:
      (1) Coordinate all communications in support of Task Force 768,
      (2) Provide logistical, maintenance and cryptographic support to all communications facilities involved in the operation,
      (3) Provide necessary communications to pass intelligence, operational administrative and logistical traffic to higher and adjacent headquarters.
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Annex F (Signal) to OPORD 3-67 (cont’d)

(4) Accept and coordinate requests for medevac, close air support
and bombing in support of Task Force 768.

a. Task Force 768.
   (1) Install, operate and maintain a mobile field radio station in
   accordance with this plan.
   (2) Make at least two contacts per day on CW with Company C.
   (3) Maintain the capability to communicate with overflying and
   resupply aircraft on FM, VHF (HT-2), and UHF (213.0) mc as required.

b. Detachment A-105, Kham Duc.
   (1) Monitor the primary Company C command SSB frequency from 0600
   hrs to 2400 hrs daily and the company air-ground FM frequency 24 hrs per day.
   Monitor the operational frequency for 15 minutes at the scheduled contact times.
   (2) Act as relay station between Company C and Task Force 768.
   (3) Be prepared to assist FAC's operating in the GWO.

c. Detachment A-109, Thuong Duc.
   (1) Monitor the primary Company C command SSB frequency from 0600
   hrs to 2400 hrs daily and the company air-ground FM frequency 24 hrs per day.
   Monitor the operational frequency for 15 minutes at the scheduled contact times.
   (2) Act as relay station between Company C and Task Force 768.
   (3) Be prepared to assist FAC's operating in the GWO.

d. Coordinating Instructions.
   (1) All traffic will be encrypted or encoded.
   (2) All instance of actual or suspected electromagnetic interference
   or interception will be reported giving details of: Who, what, where, when, how.
   (3) If Task Force 768 establishes contact with Company C on other than
   the prescribed operational frequency at other than the scheduled contact times,
   both stations will QSY to the operational frequency if the tactical situation
   permits. If QSY is tactically unsound base radio station will instruct all
   other Company C stations to move to the secondary traffic frequency.
   (4) Task Force 768 will be capable of establishing contact with various
   5th SFGA stations as indicated in Special SOI items 2-2 and 3-2.

4. (G) ADMINISTRATION ANNEX E.

5. (G) COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   a. Special SOI in effect.
   b. Command.

Acknowledges:

Distribution: Special

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OPERATION OVERLAY TO OPLAN 3-67 BLACKJACK 12
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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Blackjack 11C (Operation Arrowhead)

1. TASK FORCES ORGANIZATION:

   Co D/C-4, VNSF Forward CP
   C & C Ship
   1 platoon gunships

   Task Force Alpha
   TF 39A - Co D Mike Force
   2 Companies CIDG, Tinh Bien

   Task Force Bravo
   Command Element, Co E
   3 Companies 5th SFQA Mike Force
   Task Force 588, Co D Mobile Guerrilla Co.

   Task Force Charlie
   B-12/B-18 VNSF
   1 Company CIDG, Vinh Gia
   1 Company CIDG, Ba Xoi
   1 Company CIDG, Tinh Bien

2. MISSION:

   Company D exploits intelligence gathered by TF 399A and conducts operations to seal off Nui Giai Mtn; inflict maximum casualties on VC forces in the area; destroy VC command and supply installations; deny the VC further use of Nui Giai Mtn (Area WHITE).

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE AND RETURN:

   H-hour for Operation Blackjack 11C was 130645 May. The operation terminated at 181030 May.

4. CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION:


   b. Route of Infiltration. TF 399A already located in operational area since 20 April. TF Bravo infiltrates by airborne assault on DZ Blackjack (See attached overlay). TF 588 infiltrates into operational area at 120001 May using Route Gray. Two companies CIDG, Tinh Bien infiltrate 13 May using Route Brown.

   c. Narrative: TF 399A had been operating on Nui Giai Mtn since 20 April. On 9 May TF 399A obtained intelligence that one company from the 512th VC Bn was operating on Nui Giai and would defend the mountain. It was decided to launch a large scale operation to seal off Nui Giai Mtn, and clear it of VC. The operation began at 130645 May with 3 companies from the 5th SFQA Mike Force conducting an airborne assault on DZ Blackjack, south of Nui Giai. TF 399A moved from Chì Lang at 130001 May and assumed a blocking position on the southeastern tip of Nui Giai to provide security for the drop. Elements from B-12 assumed blocking positions on the north, west, and northeast of Nui Giai. During the first three days of the operation the blocking forces conducted probes from the south of Nui Giai. On the fourth day of operations all elements began deep probes into the Mtn. Contact was made with VC every day.

Incl 16 to 5th SFQA GRL, 1 May-31 Jul 67

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AFT ACTION REPORT: Blackjack lC (Operation Arrowhead) (CONTD)

except 15 May. The heaviest concentration of VC was located in the draw vicinity coord VS 935567. TF Bravo made repeated contact with an estimated 2 platoons of VC armed with 2 IMGs, 60mm mortar, BARs, and assorted small arms. VC were in fortified, camouflaged positions. A total of 7 airstrikes were conducted on this location, to include one CBU-19A strike and one napalm strike conducted immediately following a drop of 12-55 gallon drums of diesel fuel and gasoline on the area. TF 399A was evacuated from the mountain on 16 May. The operation terminated on 181030. One company from Vinh Gia and one company from Tinh Bien remain on Nui Giai to continue to conduct operations and deny the VC further use of the mountain.

d. Chronological sequence of events:

13 May: At 0530 hrs Co D personnel arrived at Det A-429, Ba Xoi, to establish the Forward CP. Personnel included XO, Co D, assistant S-3 officer, S-2 NCO, and 3 radio operators.

0615 hrs 5th SFGA Mike Force made para-assault on DZ Blackjack. The drop took place from 5 C-130's flying in 2000 ft trail. No resistance was encountered on the DZ. At 0900 hrs all elements were assembled and proceeded to their blocking positions. The C&C helicopter with CO, Co D was over the DZ during the drop.

At 0900 hrs 2 companies CIDG from Tinh Bien proceeded up the northern slope of Nui Giai to link up with TF 399A. The companies made contact at 0930 hrs with an estimated VC squad vic coord VS 935582 and suffered casualties to include 2 CIDG KIA and 1 USASF (CPT Syring, CO, Det A-423) WIA. On the way down the slope with casualties, an element from Tinh Bien and Mike Force personnel made contact again with an estimated squad in the same location and became dispersed. The 2 companies from Tinh Bien became dispersed and came down into Ba Chuc FOB to organize and be helilifted back on the mountain the following day. One company from Vinh Gia was placed into a blocking position on the west side of Nui Giai at 131800 hrs. No other contacts were made during the day. Results for the day: Enemy: 9 VC KIA, confirmed. Friendly: 2 CIDG KIA, 4 CIDG WIA, 3 USASF WIA (2 slight), SFC Wells, A-423; SFC Thompson, A-423.

Captured: 1.45 cal pistol, 1 M-1 rifle; 2 US carbines.

TF Bravo apprehended 48 VC suspects during the day. The suspects were helilifted into Ba Chuc for interrogation.

14 May: At 0815 hrs 4 slicks and a section of gunships commenced the helilift of two Tinh Bien companies from Ba Chuc to the top of Nui Giai to link up with Task Force Alpha. The lift was completed at 1020 hrs.

At 0800 hrs TF Bravo elements moved into the draw from the south. At 0850 elements made contact with an estimated 40 VC armed with a 60mm mortar and an IMG, vicinity coord VS 935567. One section of gunships and FAC (Bart 95) were in support. Contact was broken at 1030 hours and TF Bravo continued to move north up the draw.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Blackjack 11C (Operation Ax head) (CONT'D)

At 1100 hrs TF Bravo again established contact with an estimated 80 VC vic coord VS 932568. 155 artillery and an airstrike were called in by the FAC. At 1200 hrs TF Alpha moved to vic coord VS 930577 to block from the north. Two sorties of F-101's were flown. At 1500 hrs Task Force Bravo again made contact with an estimated 80 VC in the same area. Another airstrike was called by the FAC and contact was broken. Unit locations on the night of 14 May are as shown on the overlay. A CBU-19A strike was requested for the morning of 15 May.

Results for the day: Enemy: 10 VC KIA, 8 VC WIA, USASF confirmed. Friendly: 1 MF WIA, 2 USASF WIA (slight), Lt Chase, Sgt Kelly, Det A-503.

15 May: At 0745 a CBU-19A strike was conducted vic coord VS 935570, followed by an airstrike ten minutes later. TF Bravo elements observed the strike from approx 1000 meters to the south. TF Alpha elements blocked from the north. Distribution of the CBU-19A was approx 1 km square. At 1200 hrs TF Bravo moved out to check the strike area. At 1645 hrs elements of TF Bravo discovered heavy blood trails and marks of heavy objects being dragged at vic coord VS 935565. The blood trails were leading north. The elements received sporadic sniper fire while in vicinity coord VS 935562 to VS 940565. Task Forces Alpha and Bravo were resupplied with ammunition and rations from the forward CP at Det A-429. An airstrike was requested for the morning of 16 May. Results for the day: Enemy: Unknown. Friendly: None.

Plans were made for all elements to begin moving up Nui Giai Mtn on the morning of 16 May. Vinh Gia company would move from the west, TF Bravo from the south, Tinh Bien Company moving east toward the draw. Plans were also made to evacuate TF Alpha from Nui Giai on the 16th. TF Alpha would begin moving northwest, across Hill 181, into Ba Chuc for further movement to Ba Xoai. See attached overlay.

16 May: At 0755 Vinh Gia company began to move up the western slope of the mountain. At approx 0830 the Vinh Gia Co made contact with an estimated 2 Platoons VC vic coord VS 908585. 1.2 inch mortar from Ba Chuc supported. Contact was broken at 1030 hrs. There were negative casualties.

At 0815 TF Bravo elements began to move into the draw from the south. The airstrike could not be flown.

At 0800 hrs TF 399A began to move northwest toward Hill 181.

At 0905 hrs TF Bravo elements made contact with an estimated 2 squads VC armed with IM and 60mm mortar vic coord VS 938565. At 0945 contact was broken. Results: 4 VC KIA. TF Bravo continued to move.

At 1015 hrs TF Bravo elements again established contact with an estimated 2 squads VC vic coord VS 936576. The friendly elements closed in, supported by organic 81mm mortars. Results: 2 VC KIA.

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At 1130 hrs TF Bravo again made contact with the VC element, armed with one LMG. Contact was maintained until approximately 1500 hrs. One section of gunships supported.

At 1805 hrs TF Bravo again made contact with an estimated 2 Platoons VC, armed with 60mm mortar, 1 LMG, BAR's, and assorted small arms. The VC were located in fortified and camouflaged positions, vic coord VS 936567. Contact was broken at approx 1830 hrs. All units assumed defensive positions for the night with ambushes set throughout the area.

Results for the day: Enemy: 3 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA, USASF confirmed. Friendly: 10 MF WIA (5 serious), 1 USASF WIA, Sgt Scrauder, Det A-503. Captured: 3 US carbines, 50cc penicillin.

Artillery from Chi Lang fired H & I fires into the draw, vic coord VS 934569 all night. 1.2 inch mortars from Ba Chuc and Ba Xoai fired H & I fires into vic coord VS 920595 to VS 929595 all night.

At 1400 hrs TF Alpha completed evacuation of Nui Giai Mtn and closed on Ba Xoai. The Task Force was further moved by truck to Chi Lang for further deployment to Don Phuc.

17 May: At 0725 hrs airstrike commenced on vic coord VS 933568, with one sortie of F-100's followed by one C-7A drop of twelve 55 gallon drums of diesel and gasoline on the area. This was followed by another airstrike using a heavy mix of napalm. The last sortie was hampered by heavy fog over the target area, and results of the napalm could not be evaluated. Organic 81mm mortars using WP were also fired into the area during the airstrike. At 0825 TF Bravo elements moved out to search the strike area. TF 588 moved from the NE to south, one company from TF Bravo moving from NE to south, and two companies moving north from the base of the hill.

At 1000 hrs TF 588 encountered a heavily booby trapped area vic coord VS 933576. Results: 1 CIDG KIA.

At 1210 hrs TF 588 made contact with estimated 2 Platoons of VC armed with 2 LMG's, 1 60mm mortar, M-79's and assorted small arms vic coord VS 934576. TF Bravo supported with 60mm mortars. The contact lasted through the afternoon, with TF 588 and the Mike Force elements attempting to assault the fortified enemy position. The area was heavily booby trapped causing TF 588 to take casualties.

At 1800 hrs friendly elements forced the Mi's to withdraw and occupied the machine gun complex.

At 1630 hrs one company from Vinh Gia encountered booby traps vic coord VS 915585. Two CIDG were KIA from booby traps.

Results for the day: Enemy: 8 VC KIA, USASF confirmed. Friendly: 6 CIDG KIA, 8 CIDG WIA, 3 MF WIA, 3 USASF WIA (slight), Sgt Bolanos, Sgt Beair, MSG Kittleson, TF 588.
Captured: 1 US carbine, assorted documents, field equipment.
Destroyed: 3,000 lbs rice, 10 sqd size huts, 15 caves.

At 2110 hrs TF 588 and one company Mike Force made contact with estimated VC platoon vic coord VS 935579. VC armed with 1 LMG and grenades. Two Spookys arrived over the area at 2220 hrs to place suppressing fire and illumination over the area. Contact was broken at approximately 2300 hrs. Dustoff evacuated 2 dead and five wounded from the TF Bravo CP vic coord VS 936561 at 180030 hrs.

18 May: At 0615 hrs one company Mike Force and TF 588 commenced to sweep south from their positions occupied during the night. No contact was made. At 1020 hrs those two elements joined with TF Bravo at the CP and the operation terminated.

At 1200 hrs control of Nui Giai Mtn was turned over to Det B-42. One company from Tinh Bien and one company from Vinh Gia remain on Nui Giai Mtn to continue operations and deny further use of the mountain to the VC.

At 1600 hrs TF Bravo was evacuated to Chl Lang by helicopter and trucks. At 1600 hrs the move was completed and Co E Mike Force arrived at Binh Thuy AB for further movement to Nha Trang.

On 18 May one member of the Co E Mike Force died of wounds at the Can Tho ARVN hospital, bringing the total friendly KIA for the operation to 9.

e. Obstacles and Booby Traps:

Booby traps were found throughout the area, causing numerous casualties to friendly troops. Booby traps were of the trip-wire type making use of grenades, and 40mm M-79 rounds.

f. Terrain:

Heavily wooded, steep, interlaced with crevices and deep caves.

g. Fire Support:

(1) Artillery: 155mm artillery support was provided from Chl Lang on call, 105mm artillery provided by Tri Ton. All task forces had overlays with artillery concentrations from both locations and were able to call their own artillery support. 4.2 inch mortar support was provided by Det A-429, Ba Xoai, and Ba Chuc FOB. TF Bravo had two organic 81mm mortars for close in support.

(2) Air: Airstrikes were preplanned by the Co D forward CP thru IV CTZ TOC. Immediate airstrikes for units in contact were called by the FAC supporting the operation. Two sections of gunships were also used throughout the operation.

h. Resupply: 16-5
All resupply for the task forces was conducted by helicopter from the Co D Forward CP location at Ba Xoai. The task forces were resupplied with ammunition, demolitions, smoke, rations, blankets and cigarettes. Regularly scheduled resupply runs were made from Can Tho into Chi Lang or airdropped directly into Ba Xoai and delivered to the operational area by helicopter.

1. Communications: Co D Forward CP communications consisted of 1 NWM-2A and 3 PRC-25 radios. The NWM-2A was used for direct voice communications with Company D, one PRC-25 to communicate with the task forces on the ground-ground command net, one PRC-25 to communicate with air support and artillery support on the air-ground net, and one PRC-25 to monitor the internal ground-ground of the Task Force when they were in contact. All task forces had PRC-25 radios to communicate with the Forward CP. In addition, TF Bravo had a PRC-74. Communications between all units and Company D were excellent throughout the operation.

5. ENEMY INFORMATION: Reports from WIA's and 2 Chieu Hoi's who came into Tri Ton on 16 May indicated that the C-3 company of the 512th Provincial Battalion was operating on Nui Giai Mtn. Uniforms were black pajamas and in one instance, on 13 May the VC were naked when they made contact with 2 companies from Tinh Bien. It is assumed that this was done for easier identification between the VC elements. The VC were armed with 2 light machine guns, 1 60mm mortar, BAR's and assorted small arms.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY:

| Enemy:  | 10 KIA, USASF confirmed. |
| Friend: | 12 WIA, USASF confirmed. |
| Captured: | 1 pistol, cal .45 |
| 6 US carbines |
| 1 rifle, M-1 |
| 3 homemade weapons. |

| Equipment Captured: | 500cc penicillin |
| Assorted documents |
| Field equipment |
| Equipment Destroyed: | 3,000 lbs rice |
| 10 squad size huts |
| 15 caves |
| 1 command post |

7. CONCLUSIONS/LESSONS LEARNED: The biggest single lesson learned is that a large scale operation, such as Blackjack 41C, involving 11 companies and an airborne assault marshalled out of Nha Trang, can be assembled and launched in a very short time. The operation was conceived, planned, and launched in a time

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frame of less than 36 hours. Only 18 hours elapsed from the time the operations
order was issued to all Task Force commanders at Can Tho to the time the first
elements dropped on DZ Blackjack. This may account for the lack of any VC
resistance on DZ Blackjack on 13 May. No preparatory fires were used on the DZ
or area White prior to the assault, and complete surprise was maintained. The
Forward CP was located at Det A-429, Ba Xoai. This proved to be a great
advantage in maintaining communications, resupply of the operational units,
MEDEVAC's, and running the CP itself. All requests for emergency resupply of
ammunition or demolitions were filled immediately by using the existing stocks
of Detachment A-429. The supplies were then replaced by regularly scheduled
resupply runs to Chi Lang or into the camp from Company D. Having the CP
located at an A camp provided the CP with an extra means of communications, by
using the existing communications of the A detachment. Medevacs were first
brought out of the operational area by organic helicopters and received first
rate medical attention at the A-429 dispensary while waiting for the regular
dustoff helicopter to evacuate them further.

9. PROBLEM AREAS:

a. The biggest problem throughout the operation was the difficulty
experienced in obtaining preplanned airstrikes on relatively short notice.
IV CTZ TOC has to have a 24 hour notice for all preplanned airstrikes. This
was not possible in a fast moving and changing situation. On one occasion,
16 May, an airstrike was requested the evening before but could not be flown
due to the short notice. Immediate requests for airstrikes for units in contact,
however, were immediately granted and flown.

b. Communications presented a problem the first day of operation of the
CP due to the location of Ba Xoai. However, by using the existing communications
of A-429, communications were maintained while the CP established its own
communications set up.
AFTER ACTION REPORT: BLACKJACK 42

1. (C) COMPOSITION OF TASK FORCE 399:

The task force consisted of three platoons of thirty-three CIDG and three USAF each. The Forward Operation Center consisted of one interpreter and three USAF.

2. (C) MISSION:

Conduct unconventional warfare against Viet-Cong installations, interdict lines of communication, gain intelligence within the Long Toan Secret Zone and, where possible, influence the local populace to move into areas currently under GVN control and/or determine their loyalty to GVN assistance and control.

3. (U) TIME OF DEPARTURE:

FOC established 31 May 1967, operational elements departed TO CHAU 3 June 67. TF 399 returned to TO CHAU 3 July 67.

4. (C) CONDUCT OF OPERATION:

a. Area of operation: Long Toan Secret Zone.

b. Route of infiltration: TF 399 moved from To Chau to Can Tho on 3 June by C7A. An LCM was utilized for the movement down the Bassac River to an LST stationed vicinity XR 480530. Infiltration routes from the LST are shown as overlay #1.

c. Narrative: BLACKJACK 42 was an unconventional warfare operation lasting 30 days. Operational elements of Detachment A-402 were designated TF 399. The operational area was Long Toan District which is in Vinh Binh Province and is located approximately 100 KM South of Saigon. TF 399 operated in three platoon-sized elements with elements assigned zones of operation within the CMDA. Each element consisted of 33 CIDG and 3 USAF. The movement of these elements was controlled by a forward operation center located at the Long Toan MACV Outpost XR 594624. Resupply was made to each element separately at 3 to 5 day intervals utilizing C7A Aircraft. The resupply times were either first or last light at low altitude. There was one-hundred percent recovery on all resupply drops. Distress marker lights and ground to air communication were adequate control measures for the resupply mission. Approximately 126 Square KM were covered during the 30 days spent in the operational area. Squad and platoon sized search and destroy and night ambushes were conducted by each operational element. Two company-sized search and destroy operations were conducted. Each element, acting on intelligence supplied by the FOC or gained by the element itself, conducted search and destroy operation during the day and set up ambushes on likely lines of communication at night.

d. Chronological Sequence of Events:

Incl 17 to 5th SFGA ORL, 1 May - 31 Jul 67 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200,10

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(1) 6 May - The general area of operation was assigned. Intelligence briefing and other information was received from IV CTZ, US Advisory Team 9th ARVN, Sector Advisory Team, and the District Advisory Team.

(2) 18 May - Received approval of operation plan and infiltration date of 28 May.

(3) 26 May - Infiltration date changed to 3 June due to non-availability of assets.

(4) 31 May - Forward Operation Center established XR 59624 with 3 USSF and 1 Marine NGF Coordinator. Communications were established with Company D. Navy Seal Team 2, Detachment A conducted reconnaissance for possible landing sites and to determine VC beach surveillance sites.

(5) 1 June - Communications established with LST Garrett Country vicinity XR 460560. Seal Team continued reconnaissance.

(6) 02 June - TF 399 CO arrived at FOC to coordinate landing site information with CO Seal Team.

(7) 03 June - 0800 hrs TF 399 departed To Chau for Binh Thuy AFB by C7A. 1400 hrs TF 399 departed Can Tho VIA LCM along the Bassac River. 2030 hrs TF 399 boards LST with troops in well deck.

(8) 04 June - Lading plan confirmed: Zone 1-050400 XR 489576 Zone 2-050030 XR 559590 Zone 3-050345 XR 626555

(9) 05 June - Landing postponed due to high seas. CO TF 399 arrived FOC to select landing zones for airlift operation from LST in the event high seas continued. Two landing zones were selected XR 579618 and XR 624635. An alternate infiltration plan utilizing helicopters was approved to begin at 051945, landing two elements in their operational zones. Due to lack of helicopter support only one element was airlifted into the GWOA, closing into Zone 2 at 052125 June 67.

(10) 06 June - Begun sea infiltration of element into Zone 1. Initial landing site XR 489576 proved unsatisfactory. Element made unopposed landing 0550 at XR 495570. 061650 discovered abandoned weapons factory XR 493574. Found one rifle copied from US Carbine. 061800 contact with 2 VC YR 488582 captured documents and ammunition, destroyed sampan.

(11) 07 June - Final element made successful sea infiltration at XR 488582. 071030 one VC captured XR 583583 with 8 man sampan and motor, VCS exfiltrated by water to FOC at 071225, suspect name Le Van Khanh. 071300 radio relay site established with 2 USASF at XR 524615. 071855 medical evacuation of punji stake victim vicinity XR 501573. 071900 two VCS captured with one sampan XR 581600.

(12) 08 June - All elements received resupply with 100% recovery. 081500 one VC evacuated to Company D. 081515 two VCS exfiltrated to FOC, one
AFTER ACTION REPORT: BLACKJACK 42 (CONTD)

VCS confirmed by District Chief as VC Name Bui Van Chuyen. Deserted from local PRU 7 May with carbine.

(13) 09 June - Normal Activity.

(14) 10 June - 0200 two VC KIA, two motorized 8 man sampans with 800 kilos rice captured XR 578574. At 100100 captured motorized sampan and 400 kilos rice with one female VC at same location. 101100 contact with VC squad. 1 CIDG KIA and 6 WIA, 4 VC WIA XR 565574. 102020 ambushed 3 motorized sampans XR 535579, 5 VC KIA, 3 captured; equipment captured, four medical books, one stethoscope, 35 rounds 7.92 ammunition, 10 rounds 45 cal. and 3 rounds 9mm. No friendly casualties.

(15) 11 June - 0630 Large sampan in new condition with in-board motor found at XR 519567. Sampan could transport 30 men. Contained one VC Flag awarded for best unit during training phase.

(16) 12 June - 1600 Medical evacuation of one CIDG for snake bite XR 525578. 1855 - Contact with 5 VC in sampan XR 527583, 2 VC KIA (UNC), 3 WIA, captured one 8 man sampan, one Thompson Submachine Gun and one M-26 hand grenade, no friendly casualties. 1930 - Resupply of 2 elements with 100% recovery.

(17) 13 June - 1000 - Two VCS evacuated to Company D with captured documents.

(18) 14 June - 0230 XR 538576 two CIDG slightly wounded by hand grenade. One VC escaped. Troops showing sign of fatigue and have colds due to the constant exposure to water and mud. Requested two additional elements be sent from To Chau to provide relief for initial force. Each element will be given five days rest at the FOC, with a new element infiltrating into zone as replacement. 163820 at XR 536585 a VC Propaganda Headquarters was discovered containing 15 VC flags, one mimeograph machine, 2 loud speakers, busts and pictures of Ho Chi Minh, 10 kilos propaganda and one large map of South East Asia.

(19) 15 June - 1505 Contact made with estimated VC squad XR 543 587. Results 5 VC WIA, 3 KIA (UNC). 8 CIDG WIA, 2 serious. 1530 airlift of additional elements began from Tra Vinh to Long Toan, airlift completed 1800.

(20) 16 June - 1200 exfiltrated element into FOC for 4 days rest. 1540 contact made with estimated VC platoon XR 496615. FAC aircraft drew ground fire and called for airstrike. Results 9 VC KIA, no friendly casualties.

(21) 17 June - 1200 two POWs and documents evacuated from operational area.

(22) 18 June - 0945 - Ambush at XR 550590 resulted in one VC KIA, 1 WIA, one 8 man sampan destroyed, one M-3 Sub-machine Gun, One Russian carbine and 2 hand grenades captured. VC wore Khaki trousers with black PJ shirts.

(23) 19 June - Normal Activity.
AFTER ACTION REPORT: BLACKJACK 42 (CONTD)

(24) 20 June - 1730 First replacement element arrived from To Chau. 2020 Element infiltrated into operational area. 2030 contact with estimated VC platoon XR 557580 resulted in 1 CIDG KIA, 1 interpreter KIA, 2 USSF and 1 CIDG WIA. AGL and Navy Gun Fire Team supported. VC casualties unconfirmed. Later informant reported 6 VC KIA and 8 WIA. Medical evacuation completed 2330.

(25) 21 June - Second replacement element closed FOC 1300. 1530 Element extracted from operational area for 4 days rest. New element infiltrated operational area.

(26) 22 June 1000 - Small hut 6 X 15 and 15 ft lookout tower destroyed at XR 595606.

(27) 23 June 1130 - One USSF evacuated for snake bite.

(28) 24 June 0905 - Element on search and destroy operation discovered VC rest area at XR 630638 which could accommodate two platoons. Area contained garden with fresh vegetables, 2 volleyball courts, three 8 man huts with cooking utensils. Area was defended by four VC, one mine field and booby traps. Defense was oriented to the West. Results, all building destroyed, one VC KIA, one WIA, one CIA. Negative friendly casualties.

(29) 25, 26, 27 June - Normal Activity.

(30) 28 June 1930. 4.2 inch mortar moved from FOC to XR 535615 for support of planned operation. 2400 TF 399 began movement to XR 519622.

(31) 29 June - Contact was made with estimated squad at XR 504613. Squad withdrew west. VC turned over to District Chief.

(32) 30 June 0215 - Operational activities terminated. Results, 20 huts destroyed, 30 grenades destroyed, 4 ea 8 man sampans destroyed, 1 motor destroyed, 2 Russian carbines, 8 kilo document, 3 kilo medicine, 2 stethoscopes, 2 non-US gas masks captured. A total of 14 VC turned over to the District Chief; 1 VC KIA. VC continued to withdraw through 3 defensive lines of booby traps. 1 hut destroyed containing material to produce grenades and booby traps. This VC element is a security squad to provide early warning to a larger force passing through or resting in area.

(33) 1 July Rest and refitting of TF 399.

(34) 2 & 3 July TF 399 exfiltrated from operational area and closed To Chau 031330.

e. Obstacles and Booby Traps (Overlay #3)

Booby traps were home made grenades, pipe or any metal which would hold a powder charge. Some fragmentation grenade bodies were utilized. Trip wires were placed on avenues of likely approach and were laid very loose on the ground with the grenades or booby traps placed on a tree about waist high. In
AFTER ACTION REPORT: BLACKJACK 42 (CONT'D)

some cases the grenades were in clusters of 6-8 attached to a trip wire extending 15-20 feet across an open field. Some of the booby traps utilized as early warning devices, Punji stakes were tied in with a line of grenade booby traps and canalized movement forward toward emplacements or trench works. The minefields (2) were also covered by booby traps. The minefield at XR 624,636 is 100 X 25 meters and contained several electrically denoted AP mines. The minefield at XR 505,604 is 25 X 25 meters and contained anti-personnel type mines.

f. Terrain:

The entire operational area is predominately swamp interlaced with canals. The mangrove trees coupled with thatch vegetation restricts movement of any large forces to the canals. The canals are from 50 to 150 meters wide but can be crossed with poncho rafts. Fields of fire in the mangrove area are limited to canals and then maximum range is impossible due to the twisting routes of the canals. The defoliation effort produced the following: all plant and insect life has been killed, movement through the area is still very difficult due to the noise and cannot be easily detected from the air due to camouflage techniques. Fresh water is a constant problem but the frequent rain provides some relief. Fresh fish life is plentiful as well as edible plant life in the area of nondefoliation. The rich paddie areas can be traveled on foot with some difficulty. The fording of these paddies is dependent on the tide. The dikes in the area canalize foot movement and are, in most cases, protected by booby traps. Punji stakes are located in area of likely crossing points. In most cases all booby traps were easily detected and can be disarmed or by-passed with out difficulty.

g. Fire Support:

(1) The MACV Outpost is supported by one 105mm Howitzer and two 4.2 inch mortars. Adequate coverage can be gained from these weapons. Initially, the response to fire request was very slow but as the ARVN crews gained experience the fire support became satisfactory.

(2) Air support was provided by the IV CTZ Visual Reconnaissance Platoon (Shotgun) commanded by CPT Raymond Rau. The support received from this element was outstanding. The local FAC & VR pilots assisted also.

h. Resupply:

Resupply was by air using C7A aircraft. The resupply drops were from an altitude of approximately 300 ft. The control measures were distress marker lights SDU-5/E, panels and ground to air communications. All drops were recovered and within 100 meters of target. The most suitable time for drop was first light. On one occasion, an L-19 wing drop was satisfactorily effect-ed. Four emergency wing drop containers were pre-packed and pre-positioned at Soc Trang to be dropped on call. These loads contained small amounts of ammunition. This system was used one time with a delivery time of 40 minutes.

i. Communications:

The initial communication plan consisted of a AN/PRC-74 from the FOC to Company D, 2 PRC-25's with each operational element for communication
to the FOC, and HT-1's for internal communications. Due to the salt water the HT-1's were soon inoperative and were exfiltrated from the operational area, the PRC-74 could not maintain constant contact with Company D and the addition of a KWM-2A became necessary. Ground tactical frequencies were changed period-
ically to prevent compromise. However, all FM frequencies were assigned on a non-interference basis and 5 of our 9 assigned FM frequencies could not be used.

5. (C) ENEMY INFORMATION:

Intelligence available prior to the operation indicated the following units in the operational area: (1) 501st Mobile Provincial Bn., (2) 529th Costal Water Company.

a. Uniforms:

The only uniform worn by the VC was khaki trousers and black shirts. The VC guerrillas did not wear any particular description uniform.

b. Tactics:

The percentage of contacts were friendly influenced. The VC in the area seemed to be an early warning type element which would only fight if pressed and then shoot and run.

c. Documents:

Attached as inclosures 1-4. Copies were furnished the MACV Team at Long Toan.

d. Logistics:

Sampans were utilized to the fullest extent, transporting personnel and material. The local VC relied on rebuilt grenades for booby traps and other suitable material for constructing booby traps. Information obtained from documents and POW's indicated the sources of material and control was from the area vicinity DON CHAU, XR 491665. The local populace in La Ghi, XR 489615 was periodically taxed 100 p's and 1 kilo of rice.

e. Contacts:

(1) XR 488582 - 3 VC & 1 dog, documents captured indicate VC were Plt Sgt, Diep Van Long and Plt Ldr, Diep Van Lam (Incl 1).

(2) XR 578574 - 2 VC KIA, 1 female POW. 2 motorized sampans with 400 kilos rice. POW admitted selling rice to VC. POW Evacuated to C-4.

(3) XR 565574 - Element ambushed by estimated VC squad armed with 2 AV and ASA. 1 CIDG KIA, 6 CIDG WIA, 4 VC WIA. VC wearing khaki trousers and black shirts.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT: BLACKJACK 42 (CONT'D)

(4) XR 535579 - 9 VC in 3 motorized sampans on canal. Results: 5 VC KIA, 3 VCC, and 1 escaped. Uniforms, khaki trousers and black shirts. Document captured indicates the presence of a medical unit and security element (Incl 3).

(5) XR 527583 - 5 VC moving north in unmotorized sampan. 2 KIA, not confirmed.

(6) XR 538576 - Estimated 4 VC attacked element with hand grenade slightly wounding 2 CIDG.

(7) XR 534587 - Estimated VC squad armed with 1 AW and ASA caused 8 CIDG WIA. Cartridges found after firefight were AK-47.


(9) XR 550590 - 2 VC travelling southeast on canal in unmotorized sampan were ambushed. Results: 1 KIA, 1 WIA. Uniform, khaki trousers and black shirts.

(10) XR 557580 - Friendly element was hit by estimated platoon from southeast armed with 2 AW, ASA and grenades. Results: 2 USAF WIA, 1 CIDG WIA, 1 CIDG KIA, 1 interpreter KIA. VC Casualties unknown but later informant reported 8 VC WIA.

(11) XR 630638 - 2 VC were discovered in rest area. Friendly element opened fire and moved forward. An estimated VC squad withdrew North-East. Results: 1 VC KIA, 1 VCC, 6 ea 6 man huts destroyed.

(12) From FO to XR 579622 company search and destroy discovered 5 VC security element. 1 VC KIA, 3 WIA, destroyed 20 huts, 30 grenades and 4 ea 6 man sampans.

f. Installations & Misc:

(1) XR 493574 - Abandoned ammo factory, rusty machinery and 60mm shells. Wells 5 inch thick. Building later destroyed.

(2) XR 576572 - 2 platoon size bunkers with overhead cover. Log construction very old.

(3) XR 524583 - Small thatch house 8 X 12 feet. Some booby traps in immediate area.

(4) XR 605598 - 2 wooden signs 8 X 16 inches with inscription in VN, "Keep Off Limits, He Who Comes Here Dies".

(5) XR 521591 and XR 578591, cement water storage tanks 12' X 9' X 4'.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT: BLACKJACK 42 (CONT'D)

(6) XR 536585 - Propaganda headquarters destroyed.

(7) XR 535593 - 100 kilo salt cache destroyed

(8) XR 551593 - Thatch hut 8' X 12' destroyed.

(9) XR 555578 - 2 emplacements 15 X 20 X 8 ft were discovered. Area was booby trapped but had not been used recently. Area also contained 8 ea 55 gallon drums, numerous foxholes and a variety of cooking utensils.

One freshly dug grave complete with body was discovered. Body was probably from action on 15 June at XR 534587.

(10) XR 565587 - Platoon-sized bivouac area discovered recently used. Could have been same element that ambushed friendly unit XR 565574.

(11) XR 555598 - 2 10' X 10' thatch huts destroyed. Numerous foxholes around area. One hut recently used.

(12) XR 595606 - 1 thatch hut and lookout tower destroyed.

(13) XR 601615 - Barbed wire barrier discovered on east-west canal.

(14) XR 565574 - Waterpoint

(15) XR 575572 - 1 ea 8' X 12' hut destroyed. Contained 2 ea 3 ft high urns of rice and one 55 gallon drum.

(16) XR 523578 - 14 booby trap hand grenades destroyed. Signs of recent activity were apparent.

(17) XR 630638 - VC rest area containing 6 ea 6 man huts, cooking utensils, 2 volleyball courts complete with equipment and a large vegetable garden.

(18) XR 624636 - AP and AT mine field 100 X 25 meters extending northeast. 4 bunkers with 4 ft overhead cover and 6 ft walls were destroyed

(19) XR 505564 - Grenade factory and flag producing factory were destroyed. AP mine field 25 X 25 meters was discovered. Documents captured (incl 4).

6. (C) RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH VC: (ANNEX A).

7. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. In order to deny the VC a free run of the Long Toan Area, it is necessary to gain and maintain control of the main canals on the North of the operational area. The local populace is more than ready for GVN control and could provide a local force for their own security if assisted by GVN. After a search and destroy mission through XR 505613, twelve families moved to Long Vinh village.
b. Movement at night is restricted to the canals and therefore is not sound. Each element halts early each day and sets up ambushes on the canals.

8. (C) PROBLEMS AREAS:

a. Orientation was a constant problem unless the main canals were used for travel. VR aircraft were utilized for the purpose of locating and direction.

b. Fresh water was very difficult to obtain from the area. Water for body needs, plus water for preparation of rations required frequent air drops of water.

c. HT-1 radios and PRC-25 batteries and handsets were short lived due to the constant moisture.

d. A clothing resupply was necessary due to the effect of the water rotting all clothing.

e. The maintenance of weapons and ammunition was a very serious problem. The salt water made it necessary to clean all ammunition three or four times daily.

1. (C) FRIENDLY CASUALTIES:

A. KIA CIDG (1)
   INTERP (1)
B. WIA USSF (2)
   CIDG (20)

2. (C) ENEMY LOSSES:

A. Enemy Casualties.

KIA as result of friendly initiated ambush (20)
KIA (UNC Intel Reports) (12)
KIA USSF Confirmed (20)
WIA USSF Confirmed (8)
WIA (UNC Intel Reports) (13)
POW's (Captured) (8)
VCS Captured (11)

B. Enemy Equipment captured and/or destroyed.

2. Document - 50 kilos
3. VC Flags - 18 (2) Communist.
4. Sampans - 21 (10) w/motors
5. Huts - 30
6. Stethoscope - 2
7. Gas Mask - 2

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8. Rice  - 1600 Kilos
9. Salt  - 500 Kilos
10. Loud Speakers - 2
11. Mineograph machine - 1
12. Bobby Traps - 52
13. Volley Ball Nets - 2
14. Volley Ball - 1
15. Ammunition:
   2.75 Rockets - 800 rds
   7.62 Russian - 25
   20mmrds - 8
   Mines, foreign - 2
16. Picture: Ho Chi Minh - 1 ea
17. Map: South East Asia - 1 ea
18. Medical Supplies; - 3 kilos.
1. (C) USSF Personnel:

TF 399,

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<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
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2. Mobile guerrilla Company of Det A-402 involved in operation
OVERLAY OMITTED FROM
COPIES 9 - 35