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3. GENERAL: On 24 April 1966, MACV directed Operation BIRMINGHAM commenced under control of the 1st Infantry Division. Division OPORD 8-66, dated 19 April 1966, specified that the operation was to be conducted in TAY NHIN Province. The area was bounded on the west and north by the CAMBODIAN Border, on the south by the SONG VIENG River and TAY NHIN City and on the east by the 40 N - 3 grid line (Annex A, Operation Overlay). The two brigade (rein) operation was launched to locate and destroy VC forces and bases in the area of operations. Two reinforced brigades operated in assigned areas, and moved rapidly to successive areas by helicopter to exploit new intelligence on VC troop and supply installations. Planning was continuous and orders were issued for operations in new areas as the situation developed.

   a. The reporting officer for this report is Major General William E. DePuy, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division.

   b. Task Organization. Control of the operation was exercised by Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division. A Command Group, comprised of Headquarters and Headquarters Company (-), 1st Infantry Division, operated from a tactical command post.

   1st Brigade Task Force
   (24 April - 6 May)
   HHC 1st Bde (-)
   1st Battalion, 2d Infantry
   (24 April - 1 May)
   2d Battalion, 16th Infantry
   2d Battalion, 13th Infantry
   (29 April - 6 May)
   1st Battalion, 20th Infantry
   Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry
   (6 May - 6 May)
   1st Battalion, 5th Artillery (-)
   (with Battery B, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery attached)

   2d Brigade Task Force
   (6 May - 15 May)
   HHC 2d Bde (-)
   1st Battalion, 2d Infantry
   (6 May - 7 May; 8 May - 10 May)
   2d Battalion, 16th Infantry
   1st Battalion, 16th Infantry
   (10 May - 15 May)

   Lieutenant COL. R. W. DEPUTY
   Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division

   Lieutenant COL. R. W. DEPUTY
   Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division
2d Battalion, 18th Infantry
(6 May - 13 May)
1st Battalion, 20th Infantry
(13 May - 15 May)
1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry
(8 May - 10 May)
1st Battalion, 5th Artillery
(with Battery B, 2d Battalion,
13th Artillery attached until
10 May)

3d Brigade Task Force
Col William D Brodbeck

HHC 3d Brigade

1st Battalion, 21st Infantry
(1 May - 6 May; 10 May - 16 May)
2d Battalion, 21st Infantry
(26 April - 3 May)
2d Battalion, 18th Infantry
(26 April - 27 April; 6 May - 8 May)
1st Battalion, 28th Infantry
(6 May - 10 May; 12 May - 13 May)
2d Battalion, 23d Infantry
(3 May - 16 May)
1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry
(10 May - 11 May)
Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry
(9 May - 10 May)
2d Battalion, 33d Artillery
(with Battery B, 1st Battalion,
7th Artillery attached)

Support Command
Col Freddie W Ormaning

HHC 1st Support Command

1st Supply and Transport Battalion
Lt Col Herbert F Smith
1st Medical Battalion
Maj Richard H Bailey
701st Maintenance Battalion
Lt Col Charles Kolankiewicz

Division Troops

1st Engineer Battalion
Lt Col Howard L Sargent
1st Aviation Battalion
Lt Col Harold C Keaugh
11th Aviation Battalion (DS)
Lt Col John L Lauterbach
12th Signal Battalion
Lt Col R.R. O'Grington
1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry
(22 April - 7 May; 11 May - 16 May)
Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry
(22 April - 6 May; 10 May - 16 May)
1st Battalion, 20th Infantry
(6 May - 10 May)
1st Battalion, 28th Infantry
(10 May - 12 May)
Battery B, 2d Battalion, 13 Artillery
(10 May - 16 May)

Division Artillery
Col Martin W Camp

HHC Division Artillery

8th Battalion, 6th Artillery
Lt Col John R McIlharr
34 Battalion, 39th Airborne
Artillery
Lt Col William H Nordis

CONFIDENTIAL
Battery A, 6th Battalion, 27th
Artillery; Battery A, 2d Bat-
talion, 32d Artillery; Battery
C, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery
(6 May - 16 May)
1st Battalion, 2d Infantry
(7 May - 8 May)
1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry(-)
(7 May - 8 May)
Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry
(5 May - 9 May)

4. INTELLIGENCE: a. Intelligence Prior to Operation: As Operation
BIRCHGREN began the intelligence picture contained three significant
items: (1) War Zone C is the headquarters area of COVN and an area
where enemy forces could be rested, trained, and outfitted for future
operations; (2) Vast storage, supply, and medical facilities were
located in the zone, mostly along the MAC AIEI BAC River on the
CAMBODIAN Border; and (3) Only two confirmed battalions were held to
be in the area with the possibility that two other battalions were
located there. The VC had free use of War Zone C and located many
support facilities there. The area is well suited for the enemy hit
and run tactics for which he has ample time to plan, train, and rehearse
the details of an operation in this area, including the critical with-
drawal phase. The VC have a thorough knowledge of the area and a well
established intelligence net which provides them with political and
combat intelligence and warning of friendly movements. They possess
the usual stringent and generally effective security arrangements. The
enemy has developed a high degree of self-sufficiency, but currently
was receiving external support. His organization and control through-
out TAI KIMI Province gives him the ability to draw from the people the
manpower, intelligence, subsistence, supplies, finances, and most other
materials required to support his actions.

Confirmed or probable units operating in the AO included the C230
and C320 Battalions, and two possible unidentified battalions. Also
reported and rated F6 were three unidentified regiments, 512 and 531
Battalions, and C335 Company. In addition, the information available
on political organizations indicated the following:

COVN (cover designation: Anh Trong, Chin Nam, and R) Location -
WT 9324; Political Officer - Lieutenant General Hai Hau.

TAI KIMI District Committee (Cover # B03) Location - XT 210650;
Secretary - Sung.

DING LINH CHAU District Committee (Cover # B06) Location -
XT 3052; Secretary - Vam Nam.

(CAGAISTI) HOI SONG District Committee (Cover # B17) Location -
XT 185666; Secretary - An Doan.

Town Committee (Cover # B15) Location - XT 205550; Secretary -
Nguyen Van Ly.

The VC had conducted regimental and possibly multi-regiment size
attacks in the MICHILIN Rubber Plantation adjacent to War Zone C.
Elements of 271 and 273 Regiments had inflicted heavy casualties on
the ARVN 7th Regiment in November. Previous operations by friendly
elements in LONG HINH, BD 32, and War Zone D areas gave evidence that
the VC would defend his base areas.
A primary weakness of the enemy in War Zone C was his dependence on
the support of the people. Friendly troops operating within the area
could expect to encounter personnel who had been forcibly conscripted or
recruited and sent there for training. Most of these personnel could
not be expected to be highly motivated and indoctrinated and not yet
fully trained or equipped. His infiltration points were subject to inter-
diction and although his logistical system is effective, it is also primi-
tive and unsuited for sustained operations.

The enemy had the capability to:

(1) Attack anywhere in War Zone C with up to four main force
battalions supported by local force units.

(2) Reinforce with two main force regiments and two main force
battalions within three days.

(3) Defend his bases with any part of or all the forces listed in
(1) and (2).

(4) Withdraw into safe havens in CAMBODIA.

(5) Restrict or deny, for limited periods, the use of LOC's by
interdiction, sabotage, and ambushes.

(6) Ambush friendly forces with any of the forces listed in (1)
and (2).

(7) Conduct harassing and sabotage attacks against friendly forces
and installations.

(2) Conduct regimental size attacks against friendly areas in
BINH DUONG, TAY NINH, BINH HOA, and HAU NGHIA Provinces in an
attempt to draw friendly forces out of War Zone C and inflict heavy losses on
the forces defending these areas.

Based on the intelligence estimate, the VC probable courses of
action were:

(1) Continue to use sabotage, harassing fire, and ambushes to
inflict losses, interdict LOC's, and overrun small forces or lightly
defended areas.

(2) Defend larger base areas with forces available, especially
when escape is denied, but withdraw from lesser bases. The enemy would
probably not oppose large scale operations with major units nor rein-
force with units outside the area.

(3) Evacuate necessary supplies, equipment, political and military
headquarters, and large main force units to CAMBODIAN or other secret
areas adjacent to War Zone C.

(4) Start the "Monsoon Offensive", choosing to attack those areas
weakened by the deployment of forces, particularly ARVN, or other
isolated government bases and Special Forces Camps.

b. Enemy Situation During Operations: The intelligence picture at the
beginning of the operation was accurate. Although COSVN installations
such as the radio station, military headquarters, and political head-
quarters were not penetrated by ground troops, little doubt remained
that they are located north of the 75 east-west grid line in War Zone C.
Installations uncovered show that the area is used for recuperation, training, and supply. COSVN logistics bases near the CMC/DN/Al Border were hit hard.

On 30 April, an enemy battalion was engaged in vicinity of LO GO (XT 9775). Although not positively identified, it was probably the C230 Main Force Battalion. Intelligence developed during the operation indicated that the 70th Regiment, not previously identified, is probably the military headquarters that controls and administers the various units assigned to War Zone C. C230 Main Force Battalion may be the 3d Battalion subordinate to the 70th Regiment. On 29 April a raider stated that the 3d Battalion of the 70th Regiment was in the vicinity of LO GO. Up until this time all VC encountered were local force guerrillas.

The frequency and extent of contacts increased, indicating an attempt to discourage U.S. Forces from continuing along the river. Collateral intelligence indicated that the VC were dispersed in widely separated squads and half squads and that their mission was to delay the advance of U.S. Forces. It seemed apparent that what ever major defenses that existed in TAY NINH were further north in the COSVN headquarters area.

Of the 50 suspects detained on 24 April, 5 were confirmed as VC. On 10 May, 1st Battalion, 25th Infantry captured nine men including the squad leader of a 12 man local VC squad. Interrogation revealed that the unit had been formed 15 days previously and had had no military training. On 24 April, a returnee, NGUYEN KHOI NHIT, rallied. He reported a base camp called B65 in the vicinity of XT 445540, containing 3,000,000 piastres worth of supplies guarded by 30 men. Twenty sampans were observed by "Lightning Bug" on 1 May and two were sunk there on 12 May. A bridge capable of carrying track traffic was destroyed by air on 13 May and artillery damaged a loading dock in the same vicinity. Two hundred tons of rice and a large building were uncovered by another airstrike. On 15 May an additional 200 tons of rice were uncovered.

On 26 April, training facilities were found including mock-ups of UH-13 helicopters and U.S. howitzers. A number of documents dated in 1965 were found in the base camp, most of which related to the 165A Regiment. The 165A Regiment has been a training unit and this was probably one of its training camps.

By the end of April some reports indicated that 271, 272, 273 Main Force Regiments and 101 NVA Regiment were poised to attack LOC NINH (XT 7309) sometime shortly after 9 May. Other reports indicated that the 271 and 273 Regiments had left War Zone D headed for War Zone C for rest and training and that they left War Zone D abruptly on 24 April, the date Operation BURNINGMAN began.

By 8 May the enemy in TAY NINH Province appeared to be operating in five general areas:

1. The seven VC seen in the vicinity of LZ SALT 10 (XT 2797) were probably from the local forces charged with the defense of important COSVN installations north of east-west grid line 90;

2. East of Route 4 (XT 2689 - 3085) to about the 45 north-south grid line where patrols and visual reconnaissance indicated the location of battalion and possible regimental forces (this could be the area to which 271 or 273 moved, if they did move into War Zone C);
(3) Aircraft continued to draw fire from the jungle, the center of which is XT 2367 (the enemy force was believed to be relatively small with the mission of harassing movement along Routes 22 and 4);

(4) From the beginning of the operation the woods via XT 1743, south of the division base, was the scene of several small but violent contacts with elements of a VC company believed to be C40;

(5) Small groups of guerrillas and possible elements of 0230 Battalion continued to mine roads and harass movement with small arms and automatic weapons fire along Route 22 from TAY NINH City south-east to XT 3041 and generally east of the city to the SAIGON River.

Operations in the HIGHEIN Plantation area were characterized by the employment of mines and booby traps by the VC. This was consistent with past military experience in this area. No main force units were within the plantation area but reports indicated that the 272 Regiment was probably in the LONG NGUYEN area east of the HIGHEIN. A VC killed on 12 May 12 kilometers northwest of XT 66344 and had an ID card identifying him as a member of 0602. 0602 is a cover name for J104, Battalion of 272 Regiment. This indicated the 272 Regiment probably moved in that direction as our forces entered the LONG NGUYEN area. However, there were no contacts with larger VC forces in the final phase through LONG NGUYEN. Large base camps were located, the largest of which was located at XT 65944, and probably serves as the base area of 272 Regiment. The area is laced with trails and has trenches and foxholes scattered throughout.

c. Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols: The Long Range Patrol Detachment, Project Delta, 5th Special Forces Group, operated in support of the division from 7 - 11 May. Many sightings were made of small groups of VC and indications of a large volume of movement throughout the area. On 9 May the teams from Project Delta located a VC battalion vicinity of XT 382351. Sixteen air sorties were employed, with several strikes hitting groups of VC resulting in a probable 150 KIA. This battalion was probably from 271 or 273 Regiments.

Division Long Range Patrols were also used during the operation. Two patrols were infiltrated into the suspected area of COSVN Headquarters vicinity XT 2192. Base areas large enough to support battalion size forces were located, but the teams were discovered and had to fight for extraction.

d. Counterintelligence: OORD 8-66 called for the development and execution of a deception plan (Annex B). The deception plan area of operations was disseminated during coordination visits with senior advisors to the 35th and 25th ARVN Divisions. A deception Fqag Order 42-66 was introduced into ARVN channels by Headquarters, VI FORCEN. The deception scheme was employed to deceive the VC as to the actual area of operations and cause him to move into the actual area of operations. Tight security was maintained on the actual operations plan. Reconnaissance flights over the actual area in central and western TAY NINH Province were kept to a minimum, but increased over the deception plan area. Artillery fires and pre-planned air strikes were planned and requested for assigned zones in the deception plan Flag Order. In addition to the original plan, operations were planned for the plantation area to the southeast of TAY NINH City to focus attention away from the planned four-battalion raid against COSVN Headquarters.

e. Terrain and Weather: War Zone C in the northeast corner of TAY NINH Province is low, flat land with gentle slopes. With the exception
of NUI BA DIN (VT 2593), all elevations are less than 100 meters, and most less than 50 meters. The area is generally heavily foliated with dense jungle and is interspersed with many marshes, wastelands, streams and canals. Vehicular movement is generally restricted to existing roads and trails. National Route 22, Provincial Route 4, and several unnumbered roads comprise the principal road network. Numerous LZs exist but they are subject to flooding during the rainy season. In the jungle areas, concealment is generally excellent and offers some cover. In the rubber plantations, concealment from air observation is excellent because of the tree canopy, but the ground is usually clear of secondary growth.

No navigable rivers exist within War Zone C except during the rainy season. Agriculture is the economic base for the area, although some light industry is present. Approximately 10,000 people live in enemy controlled area of TAI Binh Province.

Initial operations in the area indicated the VC were not making extensive use of the area east of the RACH CAI 34G River because of a lack of water, sparse trail activity, and thick jungle.

Weather, initially was hot, dry, and dusty. Temperatures ranged from maximums in the high 90’s to minimums in the mid 70’s, but with April and May being the transitional months between the dry and wet monsoon seasons, temperatures dropped with the onset of rainy weather. By 8 May, the weather had turned bad and interfered with the completion of a raid against the suspected COSVN Headquarters. The start of the helilift into LZ ST. LO was delayed 17 hours because of low ceilings and poor visibility. The same factors precluded timely preparation of LZ VZ501. A series of thunderstorms moved from the southwest across the objective area and the routes to the objective. The weather deteriorated to the point where the operation had to be cancelled. On 9 May, rainfall at the division base was .31 inches with greater amounts falling over the objective area. A total of 3.5 inches had fallen in the previous four days. Cross-country vehicular trafficability was poor, with many roads requiring extensive engineer effort to keep traffic moving.

f. CA/PSYOP:

(1) Concept and execution of PSYwar/CA operations.

(a) The PSYwar/CA operations during Operation BIRCHGLEN were characterised by intense activity aimed at utilization of all available media targeting two major groups. The first of these groups consisted of two targets: the North Vietnamese Regular Force (NVA) and the Viet Cong of SVN. The second group consisted of the civilian populace. This group ran the gamut from SVN supporters to VC sympathisers; generally, they were apathetic and adopted a "wait and see" attitude.

(b) As expected VC military morale was initially high because of lack of previous significant contact with SVN or U.S. units in the past. VC living conditions in the objective area had also been reasonably comfortable. B-52 strikes had previously been made but their success and effect on enemy morale was at first, generally unknown.

(c) The general tenor of approach to COSVN and NVA forces was to remind them of the physical difficulties encountered during their extensive march to the south to liberate a people who do not desire to be liberated. These forces were exposed to air attacks, sickness, and lack of other than a bare subsistence diet. 1st Infantry Division PSYwar played upon these conditions and the uncertainties that the future held for them. The approach also continued the psychological pressures on the NVA soldiers that were imposed on his travels down the HO CHI MINH Trail.
The objectives of the PsyWar Campaign against NVA forces were to generate disaffection, defection, reduce combat effectiveness in NVA personnel in NVA and VC units in SWN, by creating dissention between cadre and rank and file, and increasing suspicion and security precautions.

(d) The approach toward the Viet Cong was somewhat different, playing on family separation, cadres from outside South Vietnam, and to exploit the destruction of the myth of VC invincibility. The major appeal to the South Vietnamese was the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) campaign.

(e) Chieu Hoi interrogations indicate that although some personnel attempted to defect or rally near ARVN and US military base camps or SVN facilities, the best opportunities for defection occurred during and immediately following combat. 1st Infantry Division leaflets and loudspeaker appeals were responsive to field requirements and exploited unit identifications and situations and specifically took advantage of ralliers and prisoners gained during the operation. To facilitate the exploitation of prisoners and ralliers for psychological warfare a Specified Information Collection Requirement (SICR) was passed to G2. Division PsyOp shifted from general policy announcements to specific themes, information and directions in the first hours of D-Day. Strip maps showing rallying points were coordinated with Province Officials and publicized on D+1. The National Standard Safe Conduct Pass was used throughout the operation.

(f) Mass leaflet drops on the civilian population were executed immediately after D-Day. A policy statement explaining to the populace why the division was in the area was used initially. Targeting of civilians was closely coordinated with JUSPAG and VN Minister of Information by Maj. Ray Spencer, 1st Infantry Division JUSPAG Representative. Spencer drafted and coordinated the message for the division. Follow-on leafletting and loudspeaker broadcasts urged the people to remain calm, stay away from operational areas, and to provide information. The division used ARCP/CA projects as a focal point to assist G2/MI to gather information. Special attention was paid to VC controlled hamlets with appeals made to VC wives to urge their husbands and sons to rally.

(g) Among the opportunities initially developed for exploitation were destruction of base camps, security complexes and logistical caches; impending danger to civilian cadre in COSVN; U.S. operational victories; and the physical display of U.S. Forces.

(h) Several missions for the first two days were proclaimed. Included were aerial leafleting and the division land tail of the convoy handing out Intelligence Information Leaflets. These leaflets were cleared by G2/MI who assured the division the money to pay for the information.

(i) On the evening of D-Day the division began producing locally developed leaflets at a rate of approximately 100,000 every eight hours. Development and coordination was expedited by the establishment of a full time 1st Division G5 Liaison Officer at ARVN Sector Headquarters. The division started using locally prepared leaflets at 1200 hours, D+1.

(j) In addition to media previously mentioned, Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) performed ground loudspeaker missions in coordination with ARVN and U.S. PsyOp detachments. The use of banners, newspapers and posters prepared by the Division JUSPAG Representative enhanced division coverage. Civic action operations were primarily oriented through ARCP II and refugee relief. ARCP teams treated
patients throughout the capital city, surrounding hamlets, and in disputed areas. The location of specific MEDCAP sites were coordinated with province officials. Joint GVN/1st Infantry Division MEDCAP operations were conducted as a result. The cooperation of provincial health workers increased the number treated and enhanced the image of both the division and local officials. MEDCAP operations were supported by attached ARVN Civil Affairs and Psychological Operation Teams. Exploitation of MEDCAP by H1 personnel developed useful psychological operations information. The division distributed relief supplies to ten refugee camps on three occasions in coordination with district officials. School supplies, sewing and cloth kits, rice and other foods were distributed to 230 needy families (approximately 1,400 people). Direct face to face communication with over 18,000 people was accomplished by the attached ARVN/CA and Paydar Teams. These included speeches to MEDCAP groups, groups at market squares and street corners, and house to house visits. This highly personal effort by the attached Vietnamese units increased the impact of Division Paydar themes.

(b) Division loaded 12,000 leaflets in 200 artillery 105mm projectiles for on call requests. This leaflet was a surrender appeal to surrendered or cut off VC units and for rapid exploitation of local actions. The division had an additional 300 rounds of propaganda projectiles available.

(2) As a separate action within the framework of Operation BERTRAMSHAL, the 1st Infantry Division moved to the area of the MICHELIN plantation to conduct a week's operations. It was decided to conduct "fear" operations using the following general approach:

(a) Convince members of the VC military forces that the danger of death is so great that they will rally in spite of their other fears.

(b) Reassure them of good treatment by the US/GVN officials to whom they report, and good treatment by the Government of Vietnam thereafter.

(c) Hold out a tangible hope that their families can be evacuated from VC controlled areas and thereby, removed from danger.

(d) "Fear" propaganda topics.
   2. Fear of the B-52, regarding its surprise destructiveness and the inadequacy of shelter once thought safe.
   3. Fear of artillery strikes, especially VT.
   4. Fear of bombing and strafing from all types of aircraft and helicopters.
   5. Fears induced by the mounting casualty rate.
   6. Fear of being abandoned, wounded on the battlefield, especially under the VC policy of giving priority for evacuation and treatment to the lightly wounded.

(3) Results.

(a) Approximately 20,000,000 leaflets were dropped during the 20 day period. Five thousand, five hundred MEDCAP patients were
treated and a multitude of engineer Civic Action projects were accomplished. One thousand, four hundred refugees were provided supplies, including 150 generated by division operations.

(b) "County Fair" and "May Day" Paydar Offensive Operations appeared to be effective. Initial analysis of the 1st Infantry Division May Day Paydar Offensive reveals that utilization of the Division Paydar and ARVN 1st Paydar Battalion Cultural Team in conjunction with a weapons display, HHCAP teams and house to house GA operations forced the VC on the defensive. There were no VC inspired May Day incidents reported in TAY NINH City.

(c) Thirty-eight Chieu Hoi ralliers returned to division/CHV officials during operations. Thirty were attributed to 1st Infantry Division operations. Criteria utilized was that a rallier stated the primary reason for defection was 1st Infantry Division Paydar activities. Generally it was found that the average rallier was 30 years old, literate and a local guerilla. All stated during interrogation that they had read 1st Infantry Division leaflets, however only two leaflets were brought in. Most ralliers stated that no leaflets were brought in because the cadre had declared a death penalty for possession of a leaflet. Two ralliers, VC guerrillas, had in their possession a Safe Conduct Pass, numbers 224735AR and 9574972. Additional Chieu Hoi returnees can be expected to rally at the first opportunity as a result of division operations.

1. Ralliers gave the following reasons for rallying: lack of sufficient food; lack of medical care; no pay; loneliness for family; unkempt promises and leaders who treated them like "dogs".

2. Specific research was conducted as to the effect of B-52 Bombers. Of the 23 ralliers questioned on this subject, 23 stated that they had read about or seen the B-52 raids. Following are their fears in order of priority: fear of being buried alive; fear of the bomb fragment; fear of the noise caused by the explosion of the bomb and blast; fear of the bomber itself (unseen, unheard, ghostlike).

2. More unusual is that 24 ralliers expressed fear of the helicopter gunship. This can be attributed to the abnormal amount of division fire teams operating in an area where only a few have operated previously.

(d) Leaflets prepared. Attached at Annex C are samples and translations of leaflets prepared by 1st Infantry Division Paydar elements.

5. MISSION: The 1st Infantry Division was assigned the mission by CHV of conducting operations deep into War Zone C in conjunction with ARVN III Corps Forces to locate and destroy VC forces supply caches and base camps.

6. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: OPORD 8-66 specified that Operation BIRMINGHAM would be conducted in five phases.

Phase 1 (24 Apr - 25 Apr). During this phase the division(-) was to move into the area of operation. 3d Brigade would introduce one infantry battalion and one artillery battery by helicopter to secure an LZ for the remainder of the brigade to deploy. A fixed wing circuit shuttle, to TAX NH 3, was to start on the morning of D-Day to bring in the remainder of the 3d Brigade, the 1st Brigade, and the infantry battalions of the 2d Brigade. Battalions would then be ballifted to
LZ's in respective AO's after closure into TAY NINH 3 airfield. A road convoy would deploy to the division base at TAY NINH to position combat support and combat service support elements and establish a division base area for the operation. Phase I was to terminate when all forces are in the AO.

Phase II (24 Apr - 30 Apr). Operations to be conducted in AO NIM and FORD. During this phase, brigades will conduct search and destroy operations in assigned areas of operation. Because the strength and location of VC in the AO were unknown, operations would initially be of battalion size. Intelligence reports indicated the area of operation contained major base camp complexes defended by heavy forces. The objective of Phase II therefore was to locate and destroy the base camps and their defenders.

Phase III (29 Apr - 5 May). During this phase, brigades were to conduct operations in AOs NAMI and OLDZULI. Operations in AO NIM and FORD deleted U.S. Forces operating in these AOs and allocated these areas to the 25th ARVN Division Task Force.

Phase IV (5 May - 10 May). Operations in AO DODGE and PLATF.AIL. The objective during this phase was for brigades to conduct operations to locate and destroy VC forces reported in vicinity XT 217918. Because of unknown strength and location of VC forces, brigades would conduct operations in battalion size formations.

Phase V (10 May - 15 May). Redeployment to base camps. During this phase, brigades will extract forces to base camps by fixed and rotary wing aircraft. A vehicle convoy would be utilized to redeploy supplies and equipment to assigned areas.

Fire support planning included artillery, tactical air, and armed helicopters to be placed on LZ's and to be provided throughout the operation as harassing and interdiction fires and fires on targets of opportunity.

Planning called for flexibility in execution. Areas of operation were to be adjusted, taking advantage of new intelligence.

Frag Order 44-66: The maneuver units were to occupy an assembly area with 3d Brigade on 1 May followed by 1st Brigade on 2 May. Operations would be conducted to the east and northeast (Annex D), preparing to continue operations in War Zone C by airmobile assault to north of Base 5.

Frag Order 45-66: During this phase of Operation BIRMINGHAM, each brigade would conduct a series of specific battalion size operations. Battalions were to conduct saturation patrolling, cordons and search operations and aerial flights in assigned AO's to cover maximum terrain in the limited time available. Fire support would be provided by D3 and G0 artillery. (Annex F)

Frag Order 46-66 directed that Operation BIRMINGHAM continues during the period 7 - 9 May. Forces would be employed to locate and destroy the headquarters of Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN) reportedly located at XT 273910. The raid type operation would be conducted in four phases.

Phase I (5 - 8 May) A deception plan would be implemented with the alternate COSVN Headquarters located at XT 32612 as the objective. A forward artillery base would be established at Base 4 and intense
artillery fire and air strikes would be directed into the deception plan area.

Phase II (3 May) One infantry battalion and one artillery battalion from TF Hollingsworth would be landed at a forward artillery base near the CAMBODIAN Border. After a B-52 strike on COSVN Headquarters, a massive artillery and air preparation would be placed on landing zones. The remainder of TF Hollingsworth (three infantry battalions) would land in the objective area and move to the objective while blocking on the north and south (Annex 2). One ARVN Airborne battalion was to land vicinity LZ ST. LO and conduct local search and destroy operations.

Phase III (6 - 9 May) After completion of the initial attack on COSVN Headquarters, TF Hollingsworth would conduct a search to locate and destroy additional elements and base camps in the same area.

Phase IV (9 May) Artillery to be conducted by helicopter.

Air support was to be provided from two artillery bases and by close air support sorties.

Para Order 47-66 directed that the division continue Operation BIRIDGEMI by conducting search and destroy operations in the MICHELIN Plantation and LONG NGUYEN/Iron Triangle area (Annex G).

Phase I (9 - 12 May) An ISR was to be established and operations conducted in the MICHELIN Plantation area, searching villages and reported VC wire stations.

Phase II (14 - 20 May) Brigades operate east and south of MICHELIN. 2d Brigade would attack south along SAIGON River to objective vicinity XT 584 and XT 7422, while 3d Brigade was attacking east through LONG NGUYEN area to LAI KHE.

7. EXECUTION:

D-1 (23 April). The 1st Infantry Division prepositioned the following units and elements in final preparation for Operation BIRIDGEMI:

1st Brigade - Land tail of the brigade convoy (HER, 1/2 Inf, 1/7 Inf) departed PHU OC and closed DI AN.

2d Brigade - 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry and B Battery, 1st Battalion, 7th artillery were airlifted with 24 C-123 sorties from BEAR CAT to DAI TIENG. Company B, 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry was airlifted to CU GIY with 5 OH-1D helicopters to provide personnel for safe flights to be conducted on D-Day for convoy security. The remainder of the battalion moved from BEAR CAT to BIEN HOA. The land tail of 2/10 Inf, 2/10 KI, and 1/7 Army closed to DI AN.

3d Brigade - Land tail of the brigade (HER, D Co 1st Argr BN, 2/23 Inf) moved from BEAR CAT to PHU LOI.

Div Arty - 2 Troop, 1/4 Cav, Engr Det, and 3/6 Arty depart PHU LOI and closed CU GIY.

D-Day (24 April). PHASE I of Operation BIRIDGEMI commenced at 0600 with a long air assault involving Air Force and Army fixed wing aircraft and Army helicopters. The infantry battalions and supporting
artillery were lifted simultaneously into LZ's while the remaining four infantry battalions, supporting artillery, command and logistical troops and equipment were moved to the operational area by road convoy, and C-130 and CV-2 aircraft. The first brigade move to the area of operation was accomplished with a combination of a motor convoy and airlift of elements of all three battalions from BIEN HOA and PHUOC VINH Airfields.

The 3d Brigade moved to the operational area by land and air. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry had staged at DAU TIENG on 23 April and was airlifted to the forward area. The battalion had a fire fight with VC at XT 042575 and captured 3 of the enemy. The 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry detained 50 VC at XT 033785, of which were later confirmed as VC. The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry closed into AO FORD without contact.

Land tail elements closed the base camp at TAY NINH with only minor instances of sniper fire being directed at the convoy.

D+1 (25 April). Operation BIRMINGHAM continued with two brigades conducting extensive search and destroy operations in AOs FORD and BUICK. The 1st Brigade searched generally in the southeastern portion of AO BUICK. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry and 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry conducted sweep operations and 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry patrolled the area around LZ RED (XT 0256), maintaining one company on 30 minute alert as a rapid reaction force. There were no significant contacts or discoveries made during the search. The 3d Brigade continued operations with three battalions sweeping to the south in AO FORD. The brigade CP was moved to Base 3 and established at XT 037576. The FCL was established between 2d and 3d Brigades along 623 - W grid line. The 2d battalion, 2d Infantry swept with two companies and airlifted Company A by UH-1D to Base 3 to provide security for the brigade CP. The 4.2 mortar platoon and B Battery, 2/33 Artillery were lifted to the new brigade CP location utilizing UH-1D and CH-47 aircraft.

During the sweep by 1/16 Inf, a short fire fight ensued with two VC. The VC fled and left one weapon. The 2/18 Inf had negative contact during the sweep from Base 1 to Base 3. Elements of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry provided security for artillery and engineer units and supported CIDG forces conducting search and destroy operations vicinity of TAY NINH.

D+2 (26 April). An increase in the number of VC contacts was noted on D+2 and three large supply base complexes were discovered. It had become apparent that major VC supply installations were located along the CAMBODIAN Border and the eastern bank of the RACH CAI RAC RIVER. Four battalions were deployed to the west to search the jungle area and suspicious landing sites along the river. VC contacts ranged from squad to platoon size forces, with brief engagements and VC fleeing after sharp exchanges of fire. 1st Brigade operations were extended searches in the western and southeastern portions of AO BUICK. The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in vicinity of area WT 982656 and WT 990695. Several large caches yielded 374 tons of rice, 132 tons of salt, 1250 meters of plastic material, 850 sheets of tin, 1615 gallons of fuel and one boat. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry and 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry conducted a relief in place operation. After the relief was affected, the battalion swept north and west along the RACH CAI RAC RIVER.

Three minor contacts were made during the day in which three VC were killed and a AK assault rifle was captured. One exchange of fire was with three VC across the river (in CAMBODIA) at WT 9766.

The 3d Brigade Commander deployed the 2/18 Inf on a sweep north and west and 1/16 Inf sweeping west. The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry remained
at the brigade CP in reserve. During the sweep by 1/16 Inf, base camps and way stations were discovered. Company C engaged an unknown number of VC in a base camp at XT 003975. Artillery and air were immediately employed to assist in cutting off the VC escape routes to the south and east. When contact was broken at 1830, U.S. Forces had killed 5 VC (BS) and captured four small arms. Four contacts were made by elements of 2/16 Inf, during their sweep west and north. Company C made contact with 6 - 8 VC in a base camp at WT 993619. The company pursued the VC but lost contact. At 1627, A Company engaged approximately 25 VC at WT 065531 killing 2 (BS).

The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry continued the mission of providing security and supporting CIDG forces. All operations were without incident.

D+3 (27 April). A thorough search of the banks of the RACH CAI BAC River was conducted where large supply installations had been uncovered. VC contacts were limited to brief encounters with snipers and squad or small unit elements. The 1st Brigade conducted extensive and detailed search and destroy operations in the west and southwestern portions of AO 2156, with attention directed to the river bank where large stores of material and food supplies had been discovered and destroyed. A link-up was made with 2d Brigade elements at XT 0264. The 1st Battalion, 21 Infantry secured an LZ for the introduction of 1/16 Inf, 2/33 Arty (-) and 21 Rce CP, then quickly reorganized and conducted an airborne assault into vicinity WT 975675. The 1st Battalion, 22th Infantry, uncovered large amounts of VC supplies during search and destroy operations along the river. Base camps and supply caches yielded the following: 6 huts, a mess hall and classroom, 44 GHQ screws, 150-5 tons of rice, 500 pounds of cloth in bolts, 200 pounds of grain, and assorted documents. Elements of the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry discovered and destroyed 63 tons of rice, 50 pounds of salt, 600 blank uniforms, 16 boats, and 6,000 khaki uniforms. The battalion had two contacts during the day. Three VC were killed and their small arms captured.

The 3d Brigade CP moved to vicinity of XT 023643 by CH-47. One helicopter was hit by sniper fire from XT 0337. The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry encountered 1,500 pounds of rice from vicinity of XT 015649. The battalion moved by CH-1D to vicinity XT 023543 and established overnight positions. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry searched south along the river. A battalion base camp was discovered at WT 991619 containing the following: five classrooms (100 - 150 persons each), 50 huts, and a supply point containing uniforms, a kitchen, 20 tons of rice and other miscellaneous supplies and documents. Several complexes were found along the river that indicated a series of way stations. The following items were found and destroyed: 200 huts, 50 tons of rice, 1 (25-50 HP) diesel engine, 1 gasoline generator, and 1 - 2 HP engine. Company B destroyed an ammunition manufacturing complex at XT 992687.

1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry continued the mission of security and patrolling. In two separate mine incidents, APC's suffered minor damage. Troop B engaged an estimated 20 VC in vicinity XT 142569 at 2012 hours with unknown results.

D+4 (28 April). Operation BURFORD continued with units conducting search and destroy operations along the RACH CAI BAC River and along the southern portion of AO BUIK to the RACH BER DA River. Numerous VC base camps, estimated to be company or battalion size, with various supply caches were discovered. A significant number of mines and booby traps were encountered along roads and trails, particularly leading to base camp areas. None of the installations were heavily
defended, with only VC units of squad or smaller size continuing to be encountered. The enemy continued his tactics of sporadic fire and fleeing, abandoning their camps or positions as division forces advanced.

The 1st Brigade continued extensive search and destroy operations in AO BUICK with emphasis on the saturation of the bank of the RACH CAI BAC River between WT 965715 and WT 963680. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry discovered a rice cache of 32 tons in vicinity of WT 969700. While the rice was being destroyed, an unknown number of VC were engaged by A Company, one VC was killed. Company B executed a rapid sweep to the east to maintain A Company's contact. Air and artillery were used to block the enemy's escape, but the contact was broken. The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry conducted operations without contact, but located several supply caches. Fourteen buildings were discovered at WT 993674, containing miscellaneous training aids and supplies. A rice cache of five tons and some medical supplies were found at WT 995679. Company C located a base camp with 30 buildings, one of which was a dining hall containing eight stoves. Three huts and ten tons of rice were discovered by the same company at WT 936677. The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry conducted operations along the river in conjunction with 1/2 Inf. Emphasis was placed on the thorough destruction of supplies found on 27 April.

There was no major contact by the two battalions sweeping in 3d Brigade Zone. The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry found a large base camp at XT 000639 containing the following: several CHICON Claymore-type mines, numerous booby-trapped CHICON grenades, several oxen, picks and shovels, male and female sleeping quarters, an 8-bed hospital, a cooking area for 50 people, 1,200 pounds of rice, and 10 huts. The 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry remained in reserve and secured the artillery base and brigade CP until relieved by 2/18 Inf at 1145 hours. The battalion then swept northeast without contact. The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry swept east to the RACH BZ DA River and then north and south along the west bank between 63 and 66 Z-W grid lines. Negative contact was made.

Two mine incidents damaged an APC and a tank of the 1/4 Cav.

D+5 (29 April). As Operation BIRMINGHAM continued, the 1st Infantry Division penetrated deeper into War Zone C with a two-battalion assault to position forces astride the main VC east-west supply route into War Zone C from CAMBODIA. 3d Brigade elements moved into AO LINCOLN, while the 1st Brigade commenced operations in AO HURRICANE. 1st Brigade elements were airlifted into the new base area. 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry continued search and destroy operation along the RACH CAI BAC River as it swept north into AO HURRICANE. Twenty-two tons of rice were destroyed in vicinity WT 977725. The L5 (XT 032710) was assaulted by 1/28 Inf and then swept north in conjunction with the remaining brigade elements. As estimated fifteen VC were engaged at XT 032710, situated in a fortified position with overhead cover. As the position was assaulted, the VC fled. The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry swept north along the river in conjunction with 1/2 Inf. A major hospital complex was discovered in vicinity WT 977726. The complex measured 100 x 300 meters and contained elaborate laboratory facilities, 1,000 pounds of medical supplies and 30 tons of rice, hospital wards, surgical facilities, and administrative and storage areas. The area also contained 16 buildings. During the day, the battalion located and destroyed a total of 106 tons of rice, however, no significant contact was made.

The movement of the 3d Brigade CP and 2/03 Arty (-) was made by CH-47 aircraft into LZ GREED (XT 025785). The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry was airlifted to LZ GREED by UH-1D, preceding the brigade element and secured the brigade CP and artillery base. The 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry.
Infantry was also lifted by UH-1D into LZ CHORD. Search and destroy operations were conducted to the northeast, but no contact was made with the VC. LZ RED (XT 020640) was secured by 2/18 Inf for extraction of 1st and 3d Brigades. The battalion then moved by UH-1D to AO HUMBER and was placed under operational control of the 1st Brigade.

D+6 (30 April). The 1st Infantry Division continued its search of the CAI BAC River along the CAMBODIAN Border. One company of 2d En, 16th Inf remained to destroy the medical center discovered 29 April, while the battalion (-) and 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry continued north along the river. 0845 hours, both battalions began to receive heavy SA fire from the tree line north of the village of LO GO (XT 9775), and simultaneously received AV fire from the west (CAMBODIAN) bank of the river. Fire was returned with SA, AV, and artillery, and effectively suppressed the firing from CAMBODIA. Company A, 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry succeeded in enveloping the right (eastern) flank of the VC force on the north, killing 8 VC and destroying a company size base camp. The 1st Bn, 2d Inf closed with the VC forces (estimated at a battalion on the east bank) and killed 42 VC (BC) plus another 75 (probable). 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry killed 4 more VC during mop-up operations. The total VC losses were 54 KIA (BC) and 100 KIA (probable - determined by aerial observation on the west bank of the river). Contact was broken at 1405 hours.

3d Brigade conducted patrolling out from the brigade CP with two infantry battalions. 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was placed on rapid reaction status at 0930 hours and was pulled back to the brigade CP area. 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry conducted S&D operations, north, destroying a bunker complex that encircled the brigade CP. Company A encountered a trench and bunker at XT 022797 which was defended by a small VC force.

1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry conducted a night sweep from its CP to XT 1569. Some SA fire was received but no major contact resulted.

D+7 (1 May). Only light VC contact was made as the division continued mop-up operations following the LO GO Battle. 1st Brigade conducted battalion size S&D operations in the southern portion of AO HUMBER netting 51 tons of rice and 3 VC. 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry was detached from 1st Brigade and lifted from AO HUMBER to LZ WILLOW RUN (XT 2147) where it was attached to 3d Brigade. The other 3d Brigade elements were extracted from AO LINCOLN to the plantation area vicinity LT 22797 which was defended by a small VC force.

1st Battalion, 16th Infantry conducted care and maintenance and stood down from active operations. Plans were begun for operations in AO JUIN between TAY NINH and DAI TIENG. 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry detained 3 VC while conducting security patrols vicinity XT 336448.
1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry secured the LZ vicinity XT 3140 for 1st Brigade. Some SA and AI fire was received 0635 hours but no damage resulted. Troop B plus tanks secured the road from XT 259500 to XT 371424 for 1st Engineer Battalion work parties. Two VC were killed during the day while this mission was being performed.

Division Artillery elements escorted by 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry displaced from Base 2 after the last infantry elements had departed and moved to a new base vicinity XT 3050. All elements closed 2035 hours without incident.

D+9 (3 May). Both brigades conducted care and maintenance in the plantation area east of TAY NINH. Plans were developed for operations in AO's AUSTIN and FIAT southeast of TAY NINH City. 3d Brigade relieved 1/16 Inf by 2/28 Inf in the operational area using a CV-2 shuttle from SUOI DA (XT 3350) to LAI KHE. At 2000 hours 1/2 Inf departed the perimeter and began moving toward the village at XT 4044 to conduct a cordon and search at first light.

D+10 (4 May). 1st Division elements continued active operations in Operation BRIGHT IV with 1/2 Inf searching a village at XT 4044. Four VC were killed and four SA captured when the VC tried to flee the village in the early morning. 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry moved to search Objective 32 (XT 3559) at 0655 hours. During the day four VOs were detained and several tons of rice and other supplies destroyed.

1st Brigade elements remained in their base camp perimeters until 1830 hours when 2/16 Inf moved to XT 343480 to position itself for the next day's operations.

1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry secured engineer work parties along the Route 22 bypass and attached Troop A to 1st Brigade. Troop C escorted 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery from XT 170740 to TAY NINH after extraction of 25th ARVN Division elements from AO's NASH and OLDSWILL.

1st Aviation Battalion participated in the emergency extraction of a CIDG company which was trapped by an estimated two VC companies vicinity XT 570760. Seven OH-10's and two fire teams were dispatched and effected the pick-up by 1630 hours.

D+11 (5 May). 1st Brigade conducted three separate battalion operations, with 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry searching the area around the brigade base, 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry attacking a suspect VC assembly area, and 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry conducting an airmobile assault into an LZ at XT 432451. Only light contact was made on the operations. 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry's attack was preceded by a CS preparation of the woods vicinity XT 375478 followed by TAC air and artillery fires. No contact was made but some munitions and rice were discovered.

3d Brigade continued operations in AO FIAT with no significant contact. 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault south of the ORIENTAL River into the TIEN THUAN Forest and attacked to the south toward RF/PF blocking forces. Fifteen tons of rice were destroyed but no major VC contact was made.

D+12 (6 May). Light VC contact continued in AO's AUSTIN and FIAT. 1st Brigade headquarters turned OPCON of 2/16 Inf, 2/18 Inf, 1/28 Inf, and 1/5 Artillery over to 2d Brigade at 1700 hours and moved its equipment and personnel to TAY NINH Airfield. 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry continued interdiction of VC communications and liaison routes in the BRI CULTF plantation west of DAD TIENG, killing two VC (BO) and eight more
(estimated) during the day. 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry was lifted by C-123 from BEAR CAT to TAY NINH and came under division control upon closure at 0915 hours.

3d Brigade continued eagle flights into the TIEU THUAN Woods with 2/28 4th Inf conducted search operations vicinity XT 328105 with 2/2 Inf. One VC was killed and several VC captured during the day's operations.

1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry escorted 3/6 Arty elements from their old area to positions vicinity XT 336582, and also relocated the squadron CP to that area. All elements closed 1830 hours without incident.

D+13 (7 May). All elements except 1/2 Inf and div arty remained in their perimeter areas at the plantation east of TAY NINH in preparation for a massive heliborne assault on a suspected VC headquarters at XT 215. 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry(-) and artillery units displaced by air and road to Base 4 (XT 2874), with Battery C, 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery, Battery A, 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery remaining at SUOI DA. While securing the LZ for 1/2 Inf, Troop h, 1/4 Cav engaged a small number of VC killing two and capturing two wounded.

D+14 (8 May). The division continued Operation BIRMINGHAM with the commencement of the attack by TF HOLLINGSWORTH (HQ 3d Bde, 2/2 Inf, 2/13 Inf, 1/28 Inf, 2/28 Inf, and 2/33 Arty) to the northernmost portion of Zone C. The initial lift of 2/2 Inf was delayed from 0630 to 0800 hours because of extremely poor weather. After the 2/2 Inf and almost two batteries of the 33d Artillery had landed at LZ ST. LO (236722) the weather again forced a delay and prevented further introduction of the task force elements. Accordingly the decision was made to extract the committed elements from LZ ST. LO and cancel the remainder of the landings in LZ VERDUN (XT 236922). The extraction started 1200 and was completed 1505 hours with all elements returning to their previous positions.

2d Brigade elements at 1330 hours commenced movement to Base 4, with 2/13 Inf and 2/28 Inf making landing at or near the base to contain a suspected VC buildup to the northeast. The brigade CP and 1/5 Arty displaced to SUOI DA and joined the div arty CP. 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and 1/2 Inf, already at Base 4, came under 2d Brigade control at 1430 hours.

1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, division reserve at TAY NINH, engaged 20 VC at 1125 hours vicinity XT 172474. The contact lasted until 1735 hours. Subsequently a BAR and some munitions were found and destroyed in a base camp at the same location.

D+15 (9 May). With the abandonment of the raid on the VC installations in the far north of TAY NINH Province, the division shifted Operation BIRMINGHAM to the east into the DAN TIENG - HORNELL PLANTATION area. 2d Brigade remained in the SUOI DA area conducted S&L operations with light contact. 3d Brigade displaced its CP and artillery to the HORNELL PLANTATION area vicinity XT 382500 after the area had been secured by 2/28 Inf. 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry supported by one battery airlifted to DAN TIENG, conducted an airborne assault into the BEN CHI Rubber Plantation west of DAN TIENG. 2d Battalion, 21 Infantry was subsequently lifted into the brigade CP area and took up security positions.

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1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry remained attached to 2d Brigade except for Troop A which joined 1/23 Inf in the BEN CUI Plantation.

D+16 (10 Nov). 2d Brigade displaced from the SUOI area to DAU TIENG to attack southeast along the SAIGON River with two infantry battalions. 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry was released from division control at 1600 hours and moved by air to DAU TIENG where it became 2d Brigade reserve. 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry with Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry attached, was released from OPCON 3d Brigade 1200 hours and became division troops with the mission of securing convoys and encampment elements in the BEN CUI area. Division artillery elements displaced from SUOI to vicinity XT 396434 closing 1710 hours.

24 Brigade elements conducted village searches in the HIGHELIN Plantation without significant contact. A total of nine VCS were taken by 1/28 Inf in the village at XT 464450. 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-) after escorting div arty to its new location, was attached to 2d Brigade and established security positions around the brigade CP and artillery.

D+17 (11 Nov). Operation BIRMINGHAM continued with 2d Brigade attacking southeast along the east banks of the SAIGON River from DAU TIENG and 3d Brigade continued operations in the HIGHELIN Plantation. 2d Brigade detained 12 VCS and destroyed four tons of rice but made no contact with armed VC forces. 3d Brigade searched several villages in the plantation area using all three infantry battalions (1/2, 2/28, 2/28) and the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry. The squadron returned to division control at 1300 hours.

1st Battalion, 28th Infantry remained under division control and conducted extensive patrolling in the BEN CUI area while securing the passage of div arty and 720 1st Infantry Division elements. Division artillery moved 8/6 Arty (-) to join 3d Brigade, while HEB and the two attached 8" batteries displaced to the west banks of the SAIGON River outside DAU TIENG. The division TAC CP moved by road from TATY to MU TIENG closing 1315 hours.

D+18 (12 Nov). 2d Brigade continued to search south along the SAIGON River with 2/16 Inf sealing and searching a village at XT 2239, and 2/16 Inf conducting small unit patrols from company bases. 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry discovered 75 tons of rice and VC uniforms in the village, but IPF personnel were not able to identify anyone in the village as VC. 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry discovered an arms cache containing 67 weapons and explosives.

2d Brigade moved from the HIGHELIN area to commence SLO operations east toward Route 13. 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry was placed under OPCON 3d Brigade 0700 hours and conducted an airmobile assault into an LZ at XT 662383. Company A commenced to search north along a streamline while Companies B and C searched to the west. 1510 hours Company B made contact with five VC at XT 619574 killing one and capturing one. 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, and 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry began sweeping east from the HIGHELIN with 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry and 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry making airmobile assaults into XT 619474 and XT 662455 respectively. While on the LZ, 2/23 Inf, through an error in smoke signals, was hit by a VC strike intended for a VC force south of the LZ. The three battalions searched to the east during the afternoon with negative contact.

D+19 (13 Nov). Both brigades continued south and east through the LONG HIGHELIN area and the SAIGON River bank. 2d Brigade received OPCON
1/28 Inf at 0915 hours when it closed by helilift into the new brigade CP area at XT 534381. 1st Battalion, 13th Infantry relieved 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry in place at XT 552403, whereupon 21 Battalion, 18th Infantry was lifted back to DAU TIG for return to BEAR CAT by CH-47. After the landing of 1/18 Inf, 2/16 Inf began searching south encountering sporadic SA fire. 2d Brigade CP and 1/5 Arty(-) moved by CH-47 to the LZ secured by 1/28 Inf closing 1740 hours.

3d Brigade continued to push east with three battalions encountering numerous mines and booby traps. At 1231 hours 2/28 Inf found a regimental size base camp at XT 659464, but no supplies were discovered. During the night Company A observed an estimated VC company at XT 650452. Artillery was called with unknown results.

1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry provided convoy escort for div arty convoys to TAT BAN and return. Troop B and the area rifle platoon of Troop D conducted a search of the village at XT 520516 detaining four VC.

D+20 (14 May). Operation BIRMINGHAM continued with 2d Brigade locating several supply caches near the CP and 3d Brigade thoroughly exploring the regimental base camp located 13 May. After sealing and searching villages at XT 585337 and XT 605341, 2/16 Inf and 1/16 Inf proceeded to search the adjacent river banks, while 1/28 Inf searched out from the CP. Sixty-one tons of rice, 15 tons of salt, and other supplies were destroyed.

2d Battalion, 28th Infantry investigated the regimental camp previously discovered and found it to be a series of camps over 1,500 meters long containing medical installations, munitions factories, and clothing caches. The entire complex had been recently abandoned. During the day the 3d Brigade CP and 2/33 Arty(-) displaced by CH-47 to vicinity BAN HANG (XT 707766) closing 1800 hours.

An air strike on a suspected VC storage area at XT 446532 uncovered a storage area estimated to contain 200 tons of rice. Approximately 20 tons were destroyed by the day's strikes and the area was marked for further destruction by air and artillery.

1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry conducted convoy escort and route security for div arty and 1st Engineer Battalion elements. Troop C conducted a search vicinity XT 501540 where a VC headquarters was reported by special intelligence sources. A small bunker complex was destroyed but no signs of any VC were found.

D+21 (15 May). 2d Brigade terminated participation in Operation BIRMINGHAM with the helicopter shuttle of 2/16 Inf and 1/13 Inf to PHU LOI for road movement back to BEAR CAT. 1st Battalion, 5th Arty(-) was moved by CH-47 to PHU LOI. After the extraction of all other elements, 1/28 Inf moved by UH-1 and CH-47 to its home base at PHUOC VINH, clearing the operational area at 1705 hours.

3d Brigade continued sweeping to the east until PL WINSTON (XT 6835 - IT 7714) was reached without significant contact. 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry escorted artillery elements from the former 3d Brigade CP and from DAU TIG to an intermediate position vicinity XT 371422. The squadron (less Troop A) then continued to TAT BAN to prepare for the move to the logistical base back to DI AN.

D+22 (16 May). Operation BIRMINGHAM terminated active operations 16 May with the road movement of the logistical, artillery, and command elements from TAT BAN and DAU TIG to DI AN, PHU LOI, BEAR CAT, and
LAI KIE, 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry was detached from 3d Brigade and returned to PHUC VINH by CV-2 from LAI KIE. The vehicle elements of the division departed LAI KIE at 0700 hours, and the last vehicle closed at 1955 hours into its home station or overnight base.

3d Brigade closed onto Highway 13 and took up positions along the route to permit passage of an ARVN resupply convoy north to BAU LANG. Several mines and booby traps were encountered during the day. 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry (-) moved from LAI KIE to assume 2/28 Inf portion of the route, and 2/28 Inf closed back into LAI KIE at 1604, terminating 3d Brigade's participation in Operation BIRMINGHAM.

On 2/13 (17 May), redeployment from Operation BIRMINGHAM was completed as the tanks of 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry left TAN SON NHUT at 0300 hours to return through SAIGON to their base at PHU LOI. The vehicles closed 1205 hours without incident.

Two trains of the 1st Brigade moved by convoy from the holding area at DI An to PHUC VINH departing DI An at 1300 hours and closing into PHUC VINH 1800 hours, officially terminating the operation.

8. SUPPORTING FORCES: a. Artillery:

(1) Size of Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Force Size</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 1st Inf Div Art</td>
<td>2/5 Btry</td>
<td>Lt Col Kevin W Camp</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 13th Art Atch</td>
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<td>Lt Col Gerald S Robinson</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d Bn, 1st Bde (24 Apr 7 May)</td>
<td>2/9 Btry</td>
<td>Lt Col Frank R Tins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 33d Art (-) w/8 Btry</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt Col John R McGiffard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 7th Art Atch</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt Col William Nordin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 33d Art (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capt Maurice L Savoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Bn, 319th Art (-) GS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capt James Dudley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 27th Art (8&quot;)</td>
<td>2/9 Btry</td>
<td>Capt James H Chapman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 27th Art (8&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt Col David C Rogers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 319th Art (-) GS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt Col Gerald S Robinson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn, 25th ARVN Div (27 Apr 11 May)</td>
<td>2/9 Btry</td>
<td>Capt Maurice L Savoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 13th Art Atch</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capt James Dudley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 33d Art (-)</td>
<td>2/9 Btry</td>
<td>Capt James H Chapman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 27th Art (8&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt Col David C Rogers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 13th Art Atch</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt Col Gerald S Robinson</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) How and When Deployed: Command and Control Group of 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry, and firing elements from the 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery, departed PHU LOI on 23 April under escort of 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (ALIC), to leave for the 3d Brigade residual operation on D-Day. These elements were moved to vicinity of 129K, which is the base for B-HDY, and established the 3d Artillery forward base. Battery B, 1st Battalion, 7th Artillery was lifted by C-123 from ESAR CAT to a staging area at BAU LANG. Other participating artillery units were introduced into their respective AO's on 24 April by US-10, C-47, C-130, and CV-2 aircraft as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/1/33 Arty (Atch 1/5 Arty)</td>
<td>PHU LOI</td>
<td>020944 (AO 24FC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1/5 Arty</td>
<td>PHUC VINH</td>
<td>020563 (AO 24FC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1/5 Arty</td>
<td>PHUC VINH</td>
<td>020764 (AO 24FC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1/3 Arty (Atch 2/33 Arty)</td>
<td>BAU LANG</td>
<td>023577 (AO 24FC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/2/33 Arty</td>
<td>LAI KIE</td>
<td>110500 (AO 24FC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**AF/33 Arty**

A/33 Arty, Log Base

* Phased at intermediate AOs at TAY NINH 3 Airfield.
* Originally scheduled for AO FORD but remained at Log Base and supported C Troop 1/4 Cav and CIICG companies.

Lead tails of participating units moved in convoys from Phu Loi and Da Nang, where they had assembled on 23 April, to div arty forward base and Log Base vicinity of TAY NINH.

Operation BINGHAM was adequately and continuously supported by artillery fire. On D-Day, 6th Arty fired a preparation and suppressive fire on the LZ at XT 0256, in support of the airborne assault by 1st Brigade elements. The Commanding Officer and S-3, 3d Arty, 319th Inf, 14th Inf, and Odi arty on 22 April to discuss the mission and concept of deployment of the battalion when it would be introduced into the operation in the near future. Heavy H&I fires were planned and executed by both D5 and GS artillery along the RACH CAI BAC River (XT 9671 - 9761) to cut off enemy withdrawal routes. H&I fires were supported by immediate artillery response to targets of opportunity generated by SAS and "Lightning Bag" intelligence. Local intelligence was exploited to intensify daylight H&I missions. On 26 April, 1st Bn, 5th Arty, fired a preparation to support an assault by 2d Bn, 16th Inf north and west along the RACH CAI BAC River. Afterwards the battalion fired 200 rounds prior to darkness and 300 rounds throughout the night on VC escape routes along the river.

Artillery was repositioned with the movement of the 1st and 3d Brigades to AOs HENRY and LINCOLN. Preparations and suppressive fires were conducted by 3d Bn, 6th Arty, 1st Bn, 5th Arty, and 2d Bn, 33d Arty. After the initial assault, the 1st Bn, 5th Arty was helilifted to vicinity 1st Brigade CP (XT 031718). The 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by CH-47 with the 3d Brigade CP to vicinity XT 025705.

Significant contact was made with an estimated VC Bn at the village of Lo 95 on 30 April. The 1st Bn, 5th Arty, reinforced by 2d Bn, 33d Arty, saturated the area on both sides of the CASBOGDAN Border.

By 3 May, direct support artillery units had been positioned to the brigade assembly area southeast of TAY NINH City. All 1st Division elements were stationed in AOs FLAT and AUSTIN to continue battalion size operations to the east. Concurrently planning was conducted for the raid to be conducted on the OSWN Headquarters in the north. Div arty was to play a predominant role in the operation, including the introduction of 81 mortars and 175mm guns. Support of operations in AOs FLAT and AUSTIN continued with preparations of LC's, H&I fires, and missions fired on targets of opportunity.

Div arty elements received an alert on 6 May to move to Arty Base 4 in support of operations to be conducted north and northeast of TAY NINH City. Btry C, 5th Bn, 6th Arty, displaced to vicinity of SWHD DA to support the movement of Div Arty to Base 4 on the next day. Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Arty occupied a position near SWHD DA (XT 3650) and came under SOUTH DIV arty control. Btry C, 2d Bn, 33d Arty and A Btry, 6th Bn, 27th Arty were attached to 3d Bn, 6th Arty and moved into position vicinity div arty base (XT 2351). On 7 May, the Div Arty Task Force, minus C Btry, 8th Bn, 6th Arty, and A Btry, 2d Bn, 33d Arty, moved en route to Base 4. Due to heavy rains, only a part of the task force reached Base 4. The elements remained in position at Base 4 to support TF HOLLINGS, but
because of deteriorating weather conditions, the heliborne assault was aborted. In lieu of this operation, TF HILLO was supported while conducting search and destroy operations around Base 4. Planning and preparation began in support of the operations to continue east in the BEN DAT - MICHILIN Rubber Plantation area and south to the IRON TRIANGLE. Artillery units too heavy for lift by helicopters were extracted from Base 4 following a major engineer effort on the rain damaged roads.

On 11 May, division artillery repositioned to continue support of Operation BIRKENHEAD east and south. The 3d Bn, 319th Arty terminated their participation and were extracted from the operation. By attaching the 155mm batteries to 1st Bn, 5th Arty, and 2d Bn, 33d Arty, a more favorable balance of artillery power was achieved.

The 2d Bn, 33d Arty was airlifted to BAU BANG on 14 May, while planning continued for repositioning of artillery units to support convoys returning to home station on 16 May. With termination of 2d Brigade participation on 15 May, 1st Bn, 5th Arty was helilifted to HUU VNH. While the 2d Bn, 33d Arty remained in position vicinity of BAU BANG to support 3d Brigade, div arty elements moved by convoy to home stations. After supporting an ARVN resupply convoy on 17 May, 2d Bn, 33d Arty, returned to LAM HIE.

Artillery support was continuous throughout the operation. Artillery units fired preparations, suppression, harassing and interdiction, counter-mortar and anti-personnel, equipment, and installation missions. In addition, missions were fired in support of resupply convoys and engineer work parties. A recapitulation of missions fired is at Annex H.

Commanding Officer, 5th Bn, 6th Arty was responsible for organization of the divarty base and coordination of security with 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav. Artillery liaison officers and forward observers were provided as follows:

1/5 Arty 1st Bde (subsequently to 2d Bde)
2/33 Arty 3d Bde
23d Arty Gp 1/4 Cav (3 FOs and one LNO)

Boundaries between AOs were established on fire coordination lines. Initial AOs were free fire areas, but operations in southern AOs required clearance from ARVN in most cases. Meteorological data was broadcast daily at 0200, 0300, 1400, and 2000 hours from div arty base, by phone on request. Preparations on LZs were planned and executed by direct support battalions and reinforced on-call by general support artillery. Units conducted registrations or fired check rounds in vicinity of LZs prior to firing preparations.

b. Engineer:

(1) Size of Unit:

Bo 1st Engr Bn (-)
A Company, 1st Engr (-)
D Company, 1st Engr Bn (-)
Bridge element, E Co
Heavy equipment element, Eq Co
Litter supply element, Eq
Platoon, G Company

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-3
(2) How and When Employed: The first major task given to the engineer battalion was obstacle clearing for the convoys moving to TAY NINH. A road clearing engineer task force moved to G3 CSII on 23 April. On 24 April, six mine detector teams with security were airlifted to six critical bridges on Routes 1 and 22. Simultaneously, a spearhead element of cavalry and engineers, equipped to replace blown bridges, moved ahead of the main elements. Engineer operations within the AO were devoted initially to improvement of roads and installations of water points at the log base near TAY NINH. The road between TAY NINH and GRU DI was repaired which included the construction of a timber bridge at XT 270313. The finished bridge was a Class 30 with a bypass to the east for heavier equipment such as tanks. Engineer tasks throughout the operation were involved with filling ruts, and removing berms, the VC had emplaced and widening narrow stretches to accommodate heavy vehicles. Many culverts were installed.

On 6 May the engineer battalion was given the mission to construct and repair the road from XT 33577 to XT 282678 for the passage of divoty supporting maneuvering infantry units in the north. Work on the road began with the filling of ruts caused by the early morning rain and the passage of tanks and APC's. Laterite of a good quality was not available so dry fill taken from two pits opened by the engineers was used. Culverts had to be installed along many roads to keep the standing water from deteriorating the sides of the road. Each bulldozer and dump truck teaming was necessary for the extraction of the artillery from Base 4.

The next major task of the engineer included the building of bridges, filling cuts, and reinforcing existing bridges for the passage of artillery and supply vehicles to the NIEUWPLANTATION area. During the 24 days of the operation four bridges were repaired or replaced, approximately 100 kilometers of road were repaired, numerous culverts and by-passes were installed, and water was supplied utilizing the following equipment:

- 3 graders
- 3 rcp+y loaders
- 2 bulldozers
- 2 tank dozers
- 3 excavators
- 1 steel wheel roller
- 1 wobbly wheel roller
- 13 dump trucks
- 1 wrecker
- 6 3/4 ton trucks
- 2 3/4 ton trucks
- 6 2 ton trucks
- 2 ML trucks
- 11 bridge trucks

a. Signal:

(1) Size of Force:

- Hq 121st Sig En
- A Co
- B Co
- C Co
- 1st Med Sig Plt
- 31st Med Sig Plt

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How and When Employed: The battalion provided VHF, HF, and FN radio, and secure on-line teletype service to Division Advance TCO, 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigade Forward CPs, and Division Artillery Forward. Company C was tasked with the mission of providing the communication forward while communications were terminated at DI AN by A Company and at PNU LOI by B Company. A reinforced platoon from C Company deployed and provided the following:

(a) Termination five VHF systems (60 channels) providing telephone hot line and common user circuits to higher, lower, and rear echelons, requiring four AN/ARC-69's.

(b) Communications center service to all elements at TAY NINH, utilising an AN/ARC-29 with four secure, half duplex, teletype positions.

(c) Local and trunk switching service for all elements in TAY NINH, requiring one AN/ICS-7 switchboard and 90 telephones.

(d) Secure radio teletype communication forward and rear for logistical traffic and back up communication center teletype. One AN/URG-26 and one AN/GC-46 were utilised.

(e) C1 relay for two Brigade Command Nets and CG Command Net. Three AN/VRC-49's were installed in a 3/4 ton shelter and airlifted to PNU BA DWH. On 21 April the triple C1 retransmission set was airlifted to PNU BA DWH. By 1630 hours on 24 April, VHF contact was established with Div Arty Forward, DI AN, and PNU LOI.

The 3d Forward Signal Platoon moved with the 3d Brigade Trains to TAY NINH. However, while displacing the AN/ARC-69, it was dropped by a CH-47 and totally demolished. Circuits were provided to 3d Brigade over the 1st Brigade system. When the 3d Brigade moved on 23 April, C1 communications was used for the remainder of the operation.

The 1st Forward Signal Platoon moved to the AO with 1st Brigade Trains on 24 April. While displacing on 27 April, the AN/ARC-69 was dropped during the airlift and C1 radios were used for communications for the remainder of the operation.

On 11 May a system to Danger TAC at DAU THIN was activated and supported by the Forward CP Platoon at TAY NINH. This system was operational through 15 May.

Requirements for communication support for the TCO/Log Base at TAY NINH were much greater than anticipated. Representative figures reflect this as follows:

(a) Installed wire - WD-1, 40 miles
Spiral-4, 10 miles

(b) Installed telephones - 92

Circuits installed:

(a) Hot line - 23
(b) Common user - 19
(c) Teletype - 6

No enemy electronic warfare was noted during Operation DURHAM HILL.
d. U.S. Air Force Close Air Support:

(1) Size of Force. During Operation BIRMINGHAM, a total of 1,046 TAC close air support air sorties were flown in support of 1st Infantry Division elements as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
<th>LZ STRIKE</th>
<th>AIR</th>
<th>INTERDICT</th>
<th>SPOT</th>
<th>BOMBS/DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 Apr</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(CAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Apr</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(Interdict)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Apr</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(CAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Apr</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>(CAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Apr</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>(CAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Apr</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(CAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(CAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>(CAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 May</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(CAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(VC in open)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>(CAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(CAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 May</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(Interdict)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>(CAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(Cover)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 May</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>(CAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 May</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(VC in open)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 May</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(LZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 May</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(Cover)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,046</strong></td>
<td><strong>89</strong></td>
<td><strong>60</strong></td>
<td><strong>731</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>163</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) How and When Employed: The 7th USAF had the mission of providing air support for the operation. TAC air was employed on targets in the priorities listed below:

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(a) Neutralization of enemy forces in contact.
(b) Destruction of reported enemy formations and occupied base areas.
(c) Interdiction of enemy routes of reinforcement and withdrawal.
(d) Destruction of known bases and storage areas.

(3) Control Measures: All but the SKY SPOT (Radar bombing) flights were FAC controlled. Target clearance was controlled through several means. Brigade AO boundaries were utilized as FCL’s during the operation and all strikes in the AOs were cleared by respective brigade ground elements prior to execution. Areas outside brigade AOs but within the division AO were cleared by G3 Air.

(4) Communication:
(a) Preplanned requests were initially submitted by brigades to G3 Air (Fwd) on VHF sole users circuits. These were then passed to II MRFOR3V, with G3 Air (Rear) monitoring. The VHF capability to the brigades was lost midway through the operation and preplans were passed by either USAF HF radio or Liaison Officer. Although the method was not as satisfactory as the original method, requests were generally submitted in a timely manner.

(b) Immediate requests were submitted in the standard manner by the FAC passing the request by VHF to either G3 Air (Fwd) or Rear, who would then pass it to DASC via VHF sole user. No immediate requests were submitted directly to the DASC by units on HF. It is doubtful if the attempt would have been successful due to interference and antenna limitations.

(5) Effectiveness:
(a) Close air support missions in support of units in contact or destruction of targets located by units were highly effective. During the extraction of a Long Range Patrol in contact with a sizeable VC force, 150 VC were killed by air. Success of the extraction is attributable to the use of tactical air.

(b) Interdiction missions were attempted by the division for the first time on a large scale. Some of the results were not wholly satisfactory and the interdiction program was inhibited by the following factors:

1. Lack of experience in conducting an interdiction program at all levels.

2. Lack of sufficient G1 aircraft. Consequently FACs were able to operate only in the vicinity of brigade AOs. Interdiction targets over ten miles away from the AO could be hit only on a limited basis.

3. Lack of ordnance, especially medium and large general purpose bombs. As a result, a small number of available sorties hit fewer targets than was desired.

4. Lack of definite targeting data in the initial phases of the operation. Most information was not current and its source could not be evaluated. As the operation progressed, intelligence improved and more lucrative targets were developed during the latter stages.
### (6) Results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings destroyed</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers destroyed</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannons destroyed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery emplacement destroyed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice destroyed (tons)</td>
<td>100 (est)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL Crums destroyed</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges destroyed</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA (BC)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA (est)</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary explosion</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (7) Ordnance expended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordnance Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>383.5 Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm</td>
<td>439.7 Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>34.6 Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGB</td>
<td>203 Cannisters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>16.9 Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuni Rockets</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### e. USAF Tactical Airlift:

1. **Deployment.** Initial plans called for five infantry battalions, five artillery batteries, and two brigade headquarters to make a combat assault landing at TAK NHU 3 Airfield (4600 foot laterite strip) on D-Day. To accomplish this, 13 C-130 aircraft would have to complete 75 sorties. Each infantry battalion would initially secure the strip and the remainder of the units would be landing utilizing a 10 minute interval corridor operation.

   During a planning conference, IACV-J4 personnel stated that the strip would be unable to support 75 sorties in one day, but would probably support a maximum of 60. Plans were adjusted whereby one battalion of infantry and one artillery battery were pre-positioned at DAU TIIEC on D-1 by C-123 and a second infantry battalion was lifted into the small dirt strip at IACV-3A on D-Day by CV-2. The remaining elements were to be lifted in approximately 67 sorties to TAK NHU 3. All combat elements would be moved by 7 C-130 in 57 sorties on D-Day. The remainder would be moved on D+1.

   On D-Day, 2d Bn, 16th Inf, landed at 0625, utilizing a formation assault landing, closing in 20 minutes. During the day 2200 passengers and 4500.3 tons of equipment were air landed by C-130. Fifty-eight sorties were flown and at no time was the area congested. By utilizing high density loading techniques, the 53 sorties on D-Day lifted all but five loads which were delivered on D+1. It was readily apparent that the strip could have supported more than 60 sorties on D-Day.

2. **Resupply.** Initially, all resupply was to be by air with the majority of Class I, III, and V carried by USAF fixed wing aircraft. It was the responsibility of 1st Logistic Command to program this resupply to their forward elements at TAK NHU. A total of 6,460 tons were delivered, primarily by C-130 aircraft, with a daily average of 306.4 tons. Some resupply missions continued all night. Some difficulty was experienced by pilots in finding the field which was lit by "bean bag" portable lights and flare pots.
(3) Extraction. The initial plan called for extraction of the majority of the units by fixed wing aircraft from TAY NINH. Due to the change in the area of operation, many units were in close proximity to their base camps at the termination. Consequently, the USAF participation in the extraction was limited to movement of equipment and material that could not be moved by road convoy from TAY NINH, such as fork-lifts and salvage vehicles. Twenty sorties were flown to complete the extraction phase.

A total of 716 C-130 and C-123 sorties were flown during Operation BIRINFLAM, carrying 7063.6 tons. The airstrip remained in excellent condition throughout the operation, requiring a minimum of maintenance effort in spite of moderate rainfall during the latter stages.

f. U.S. Army Aviation:

(1) Size of Force:

1st Aviation Battalion
11th Aviation Battalion
116th Aviation Company (UH-1)
123rd Aviation Company (UH-1)
162nd Aviation Company (UH-1)
173rd Aviation Company (UH-1)
147th Aviation Company (CH-47)
173rd Aviation Company (CH-47)
125th ATC (Air Traffic Control Team)

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) 1st Aviation Battalion. The battalion provided general aviation support for the 1st Infantry Division. An Aviation Air Traffic Control facility was provided at TAY NINH (West) and DAU TINH Airfields during the operation. The battalion moved to TAY NINH (West) Airfield on 24 April and established a division base airfield operation which continued until termination of Operation BIRINFLAM. The battalion provided three UH-1D aircraft for the Division Command Group and four OH-13 aircraft for the Division Tac CP.

The following was accomplished during the period 24 April - 16 May:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOURS FLIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CARGO PASSAGERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1 - 1,141; OH-13 - 400; 4,311 71.7 Tons 4,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OV-1 - 121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) 11th Aviation Battalion. The battalion was placed in direct support of the division. Initial planning indicated that support could best be rendered from a forward location within the area of operations. The Headquarters Detachment(-), two airmobile companies, and one medium helicopter company(-) deployed to TAY NINH 1 Airfield. Battalion liaison officers were attached to each of the participating brigades and support command. One air mobile company was placed in direct support of each brigade for resupply missions and the medium helicopter company was placed in general support for logistic resupply of the division. All requirements for aerial resupply of the brigades were channeled through the brigade liaison officers direct to the battalion for execution.

The battalion, with four airmobile companies, provided 30 UH-1D's and 12 CH-47's to airlift elements of the division from LAK NINH and the forward staging areas and conducted combat assaults into preselected landing zones in the area of operation.
The following was accomplished during the course of Operation BIRKENHEAD:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
<th>Cargo (Ton)</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>116th</td>
<td>5,396</td>
<td>9,397</td>
<td>463.1</td>
<td>1,740.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128th</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>635.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162d</td>
<td>5,147</td>
<td>6,779</td>
<td>376.4</td>
<td>1,613.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172d</td>
<td>1,141</td>
<td>3,977</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>507.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147th</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>305.1</td>
<td>168.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170th</td>
<td>2,071</td>
<td>6,133</td>
<td>2,795.2</td>
<td>697.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14,633</td>
<td>29,496</td>
<td>3,918.6</td>
<td>5,374.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Chemical Operations Summary: During Operation BIRKENHEAD, an unprecedented amount of riot control agent was expended for 1st Infantry Division operations. A total of ten E-153 Air Droppable CS Clusters and three hundred barrels of CS-1 (24,000 lbs) were delivered from Army aircraft against known and suspected VC troop concentrations. In each case, CS use was followed up by air strikes, artillery preparations, and/or infantry attacks within ten minutes after completion of the drop. In all CS attacks but two, targets were located so deep in the jungle that follow-up by ground attack was not possible at the time. In two attacks, with E-153 clusters, the targets were enemy troops who were directing fire against helicopters. In both instances, the fire was suppressed after the clusters functioned on the target. In two CS attacks followed up by ground forces, no VC were found in the target area.

9. RESULTS:

a. Friendly losses:

- KIA 56
- WIA 324
- MIA 1

Equipment lost: None

Equipment destroyed:

1. 0-1
2. 1-113 APC's
1. 5-ton truck
1. M/RE-69
1. 14-ton trailer
2. 10 kw generators
1. 2-ton truck

Equipment damaged:

15. 01-10's
6. CS-67's
7. 1-113 APC's
1. 1-134 tank
2. 5-ton bridge trucks
2. 5-ton trucks
1. M/RE-69
1. Fuel tanker
1. Front loader
1. 2-5-ton truck

b. Army losses:

- KIA (Body Count) 118
- KIA (Probable) 307
- WIA 22
- MIA 162
- Returns 30

Equipment destroyed or captured:

130 - weapons
66 - base camps
68 - caches

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6 - aid stations
3 - hospitals
4 - factories
6 - FML dumps
1 - Political Indoctrination Center
1 - boat repair shop
4 - miscellaneous production facilities
2 - bicycle repair shop
106 - mines and booby traps
358 - grenades
3,839 - 50 lb mortars
24 - mortar rounds
16 - howitzer rounds
43 - CBU bomblets
2,103 - rice (tons)
323 - salt (tons)
35 - wheat (tons)
165 - miscellaneous foodstuffs (tons)
1,240 - cooking oil (gal)
1,332 - motor oil (gal)
13,949 - shirts
5,600 - pants
175 - bicycles
21 - sewing machines
2,590 - kerosene (gal)
163 - boats and sampans
3 - typewriters
5,000 - cement (lbs)
6 - motors
905 - sheets of tin
2 - refrigerators
1 - threshing machine
13,000 - lumber (board feet)
1 - generator
1 - printing press
3 - stoves
810 - huts
1,162 - batteries (R-30)
1,300 - soap (bars)
3,000 - Fuel (gal)
16,633 - documents screened (pages)

10. ADMINISTRATIVE PAYING: a. Logistics:

(1) Preparation. Preparation for Operation BULLENGHA included a
detailed analysis of experience gained during previous operations,
especially Operation ABLEL. Close coordination was affected between
all elements of the 1st Division Support Command, G-4, participating
G-4's, and 1st Logistical Command. Specific areas which proved of most
importance were:

(a) Prepositioning aircraft fuels at TAY NIIN 1 Airfield prior to
D-Day.

(b) Establishment (by the 1st Logistical Command) of a Forward
Ammunition Supply Point and controlling the movement of all classes of
sunlly to the forward areas from EISH NOA and TAN JOH HIBUT Air Bases. In addition, 1st Logistical Command furnished the required materiel Handling Equipment (HHE), and augmented the refueling equipment of the division.

(a) The establishment of a central coordinating point for control of logistic aircraft within the Division Transportation Office.

(b) A composite maintenance facility and a composite medical clearing station for the support of the entire forces set up at the logistical base.

(c) Establishment of a scheduled passenger and cargo flight daily between each base camp and the logistical base.

Although some adjustments were required during the operation, the basic plans and preparations made prior to the operation were sound, and resulted in the support command providing outstanding logistical support to all units during the entire operation. The extension of the live frame of the operation and introduction of additional forces required the augmentation of certain facilities. This was done quickly and effectively without hindering the logistical support rendered.

(2) Execution:

(a) Supply:

1. Class I. The supply of this commodity was accomplished with minimum difficulty. Sufficient "A" ration components were furnished to provide all troops with at least one modified "A" meal daily. Support troops, and all combat units during the "rest period", were provided modified "A" rations, three times daily. Sufficient ice was made available through local procurement with Expost Funds and resupply from DI All base. Sundry packs were issued every five days. Volume of Supply:

- "A" ration components: 18,330 rations
- "B" ration components: 133,615 rations
- "C" ration: 72,312 rations
- 313,543 or 710.4 short tons

2. Class II and IV (less repair parts). Units carried anticipated Class II and IV requirements in their battalion trains. However, experience during the operation indicated that some units did not carry adequate Class II and IV items to sustain them during the operation; this was noticed early in the first week when emergency requisitions were placed for basic re-supply items which should have been available in battalion trains. Extension of the operation time frame increased the number of demands received for Class II and IV items. All were filled in a minimum of time. Typical of items requested were gas masks and component parts, barrier materials, ponchos, lanterns, water cases, nylon rope and marker panels. Volume of Class II and IV during the operation totaled 40 short tons.

3. Class III. Fuel dispensing equipment was the limiting factor on speed and efficiency of refueling operations. Additional equipment...
POL resupply of the logistical base was accomplished almost entirely by air, utilizing the Air Force "Flying Cow", and 500 gallon collapsible drums. Sufficient POL of all types was on hand during the entire operation. Volume of operations:

- MGAS 106,720 gallons
- DIESEL 111,127 gallons
- JP-4 1,021,125 gallons
- AVGAS 56,917 gallons
- TOTAL 1,295,389 or 3,444.9 short tons

4. Class V. Personnel from the 1st Logistical Command's 3d Ordnance Battalion drew the required ammunition from the LONG BINN Ammunition Depot, transported it to the BINN HDA Air Base, loaded the items on USAF C-130 aircraft, off-loaded, and stored it at their forward ASP at TAY NHN (Vert). They provided the personnel and material handling equipment (MHE) at both aerial ports to support the operation. 1st Infantry Division units drew the required ammunition from the forward ASP as required. The forward ASP was automatically resupplied, based on the daily required rate of supply established by the 1st Infantry Division DAO. Stocks were adjusted based on changes in the daily required rate of supply.

At the time the daily required rate of supply for 105mm and 155mm artillery ammunition tripled, it became necessary to augment the airlift capability with land ammunition convoys. 1st Log Command's goal was to establish a three day supply on the ground at the forward ASP by the seventh day of the operation. This was accomplished on the sixth day. 1st Logistical Command later required the forward ASP to have three days of supply on the ground with an additional two days on the vehicles generated by the second land convoy.

The DAO section established an office at the forward ASP providing the units drawing ammunition with "one stop" service. Ammunition Transportation Orders (DA Form 581) were vouchered, authenticated and reviewed by DAO personnel located at the ASP Operations and Stock Control Office. This also provided the 1st Infantry Division and support command staff with instantaneous Class V stock status information throughout the operation. With this information, critical Class V items were closely monitored and adjustments in the amounts on hand made before a shortage problem developed. At no time during the operation were units tactically restricted due to lack of ammunition.

The brigade and artillery trains, located at the Division Log Base, resupplied forward units by land, and airlift from their trains supply. They, in turn, replenished their trains from the forward ASP, as required. By close liaison, and coordination between the DAO, and the brigade and artillery battalion S-4's, anticipated requirements were known and provided for in sufficient time to preclude any problem areas. The trains were always full, and the forward units were always supplied. The only resupply problems, continually faced by the units, was one of availability of aircraft for lifting ammunition forward.

During the final phase of the operation, a large amount of ammunition was on hand at the forward ASP. All 1st Infantry Division trains were filled to capacity upon the termination of the operation. The excess of ammunition on hand at the dissolution of the operation was issued to the 25th Infantry Division, and the TAY NHN Detachment, 5th Special Forces Group. Approximately 72 tons were back-bailed to the LONG BINN Ammunition Depot by 1st Logistical Command and 1st Infantry Division's S-4 battalion vehicles. Double of operations totaled 3,238 short tons.
(b) Services.

(1) Laundry. This service was provided to all units. It was not used extensively and was relatively slow, averaging 60 hours from turn-in to completion. However, it is believed that this service is necessary and continued efforts will be made to improve it. Approximately 350 bundles were processed.

(2) Bath. Initially, bath service was provided by prefabricated shower facilities. During the rest phase of the operation, the bath unit located at DI AN Base was moved to the rest area for troop use during that period. After the rest phase, the unit was moved to the logistical base, and provided shower facilities for personnel at the logistical base. Water was furnished by a 5,000 gallon tanker, provided by the 1st Logistical Command.

(3) Graves Registration. During the period 24 April 1966 through 15 May 1966, the following number of remains were processed, and evacuated from the Forward Collection and Evacuation Section to the 1st Infantry Division Collection Point at DI AN, Vietnam. One enemy dead was evacuated to the 5th Special Forces Detachment at TAT VINH, Vietnam, on 24 April 1966.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number by Day</th>
<th>Number by Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 Apr</td>
<td>1st Bn, 2d Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Apr</td>
<td>2d Bn, 16th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Apr</td>
<td>1st Bn, 20th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Apr</td>
<td>2d Bn, 2d Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Apr</td>
<td>2d Bn, 28th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Apr</td>
<td>(1 non-div)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr</td>
<td>1st Bn, 16th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>4th Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 May</td>
<td>1st Bn, 18th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>2d Bn, 16th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May</td>
<td>1st Bn, 28th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>2d Bn, 28th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 May</td>
<td>74th Avn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May</td>
<td>3rd Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May</td>
<td>6th Arty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 May</td>
<td>7th Sp Force Gp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May</td>
<td>Total: 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 May</td>
<td>1st Bn, 16th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Maintenance. The maintenance element initially took direct exchange (DE) items, i.e., carburetors, regulators, distributors, a small amount of major assemblies (generator engines), and gaskets to sustain a two week operation. Resupply of other supply items was accomplished by air from TAT VINH Log Base. Initial planning provided two C-47's and one UH-1 to support command elements for logistics resupply. These were frequently not available to resupply repair parts from DI AN to TAT VINH. A 22-ton truck load of repair parts was required daily. Special flights had to be requested each day to transport these parts. The C-2 courier service could not be used since the aircraft was frequently loaded by the time it reached NINH NIN and lacked room for the load of repair parts. Resupply would have been more responsive if a C-47 had been available on a daily basis. The following jobs were completed during the operation:

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Removal of unserviceable sub-assemblies (regulators, generators, etc), by using units hindered the repair of equipment. The piece of equipment could not be completed until the unit returned the items it had been removed. Aircraft maintenance was accomplished on site by a contact team which remained in the log base area. Minor repairs and adjustments were made on site. Major repairs were accomplished by the maintenance base at PHU 101. The organic aircraft flew a total of 38.8 hours and carried 52 passengers and 3,150 pounds of cargo.

(d) Medical. Treatment of casualties at field locations was excellent. Infantry platoon aidmen displayed outstanding ability and ingenuity in using field expedients. Patients came to clearing station with arm and leg splints made from tree limbs and ponchos. Also, litters were improvised from tree limbs and ponchos. Hospitalization was furnished by 93d Evacuation Hospital, 3d Surgical Hospital, Mobile Army, and 3d Field Hospital. Two surgical teams from 3d Surgical Hospital, Mobile Army, consisting of six officers, and eight enlisted men, were attached to 1st Medical Battalion for Operation BIRINGHAM. They performed five major surgical procedures, and assisted in medical treatment, and provided medical guidance concerning care of numerous other patients.

Medical equipment repair was not needed which indicates excellent first echelon maintenance of medical equipment throughout the division.

DUSTOFF made approximately 150 field pickups, evacuating 286 casualties. At all times there were two standby aircraft, and three during the last eight days of the operation.

This division provided 4,755 pounds (200 cubic feet) of medical supplies. One hundred and thirty units of whole blood were furnished to the forward area. Method of resupply was exclusively by DUSTOFF, to include three emergency resupply missions and one mission flown for resupply of whole blood.

An evaluation of the medical portion of Operation BIRINGHAM shows that medical support was adequate. The following casualty figures indicate medical support furnished by forward elements of 1st Medical Battalion:

| KIA's DDA's | 54 |
| Injured as a result of hostile action | 307 |
| Non-battle injuries | 244 |
| Diseases | 356 |
| Died of wounds in clearing station | 7 |
| Number of air evacuations from forward area to hospitals and rear clearing station | 413 |

(e) Transportation. Aircraft requests for logistical resupply were coordinated by the DSO throughout the operation. Both the DSO Forward and DSO Rear were used extensively for this purpose. A courier aircraft (C-47 Caribou) was made available to all units. Each base camp had utilization of at least one full aircraft for a round trip to and from the division log base. This aircraft was used extensively for
re-supply. The DTO operated an aircraft request and coordination center
for all types of aircraft. Requirements which could not be met with airc-
raft in the operational area were placed on the DTO Rear where addi-
tional aircraft were obtained. The courier aircraft (C-2B) was under
the operational control of DTO Forward. The original schedule, estab-
lished prior to the operation, was found to be inadequate to the needs
of the operation, and an additional aircraft was acquired. At the sug-
gestion of AACC Rear, the schedule was completely changed, reducing the
number of aircraft to one, and eliminating the round-robin schedule in
favor of a direct round trip flight to each base camp. When initiated
this new schedule was found most satisfactory in that it provided greater
lift capability to each base camp while simultaneously reducing the num-
ber of aircraft required. The courier flight averaged fourteen sorties
daily. Each sortie carried 5,000 pounds cargo or passenger equivalent.
The DTO supervised the operations of the Air Transport Control Office
(ATCO). ATCO personnel were provided by the 1st Aviation Battalion.

(f) Engineer Support. One of the primary missions of the 1st
Engineer Battalion, during Operation BIRMINGHAM was to open and maintain
roads from XT 35S00 to XT 271678 and XT 371424 to XT 433469. These roads
were opened and passed wheel vehicles to and from forward areas despite
adverse construction weather. Four T-17 membranes were installed to be
used as hasty helicopter landing pads. Approximately 240,000 gallons
of resupply water were processed. Mine clearing operations were extremely
extensive; approximately 23 mines in various locations were encountered
and either removed or detonated in place.

(g) Communications. The hot line to Division Supply Forward was
not installed until D+2, causing minor delays prior to and during the
early days of the exercise. The logistics operations are dependent upon
rapid, reliable communication with the forward area.

b. Personnel: Strengths of engineers, artillery, and cavalry were as
follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Start of Operation</th>
<th>End of Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf BN (-)</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HB Div Arty (-)</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd BN, 6th Arty (-)</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th BN, 5th Arty (-)</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d BN, 33d Arty (-)</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d BN, 319th Arty (-)</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Btry, 2d BN, 13th Arty</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Btry, 1st BN, 7th Arty</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Btry, 6th BN, 27th Arty</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Btry, 2d BN, 32d Arty</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Btry, 2d BN, 32d Arty</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Sqdn, 4th Cav</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Administrative matters for 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades are included
in Annexes I, J, and K.

11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: a. Fifty-five Gallon Drums of
CS-1. Fifty-five gallon drums, each containing 50 pounds of CS-1 (as
shipped) were rigged with two 5-lb Incendiary Bursters, a length of safety
fuses, and a fuse lighter. The fuse was cut to allow the drum to function
with a height of burst of about ten feet. The drums were dropped from
CH-47 and C-2 aircraft, after ignition of the fuse with the attached
fuse lighter. Four missions were flown, three with 90 drums each (7,200
pounds of CS-1) and one with 30 drums (2,400 pounds of CS-1). All missions
were against suspected Viet Cong targets and one mission, after air and artillery preparation, was followed within ten minutes by an infantry attack. Ground forces reported heavy residual contamination of the target area, with eye irritation reported nine kilometers downwind from the target.

b. Experimental Fuze XH595. Tests of this fuze were conducted by 8th Bn, 6th Arty (155mm) and 1st Bn, 5th Arty (105mm) on 6, 9, and 10 July. Sixty-seven rounds were expended. The fuze is designed to allow rounds to penetrate the jungle canopy, but burst prior to striking the ground. The rounds fitted with this fuze during the test were erratic in detonating and were observed to detonate above the canopy and between the canopy and on the ground using the same time setting after a time registration. Most of the rounds that did not burst in the air, struck the ground as duds. Height of canopy was estimated to be 20 meters. Recomend additional tests be conducted where a higher canopy exists to derive valid conclusions as to the fuse effectiveness.

c. Propaganda Shell. Ten rounds of 105mm shell, containing 600 leaflets each were fired over the area south of the village of LO GO. The projectiles functioned well at all heights of burst and excellent coverage was obtained within the target area. This represented the first use of artillery for dispensing leaflets by the division.

d. AN/TPS-25 Radar. Division Artillery utilized the AN/TPS-25 Surveillance Radar in conjunction with firing elements. The radar proved especially effective in detecting movement of personnel, with at least 12 targets being located by radar. The equipment also provided surveillance of artillery placed on these targets.

e. T-17 Membranes. T-17 membranes were used on helipads. These proved to be very effective for DUSTOFF pads in the medical area and refueling pads in the POL area.

f. H-79 Canister Round. The 1st and 2d Bns, 28th Inf tested the canister round for the H-79 grenade launcher. The round proved marginal in its initial tests. The range is quite limited and it was necessary to aim extremely low when engaging targets at a distance of 40 meters. This round is more effective than the HE round in dense jungle vegetation.

12. COMMENTS AND ANALYSIS: Operation BIRDINGHAI was another highly successful operation in which the division again demonstrated its ability and willingness to move rapidly to a distant area of operations for the conduct of extended jungle operations while retaining high morale and fighting effectiveness. This operation was the first deep penetration of War Zone C since 1961 and would have been deeper and more prolonged had the approaching monsoon season not intervened.

The most significant aspect of Operation BIRDINGHAI was the large scale destruction of vast quantities of VC supplies and facilities enumerated in paragraph 9b. This operation is certain to have a long term adverse impact on VC ability to shelter, feed and equip large numbers of personnel while immediate results may force postponement or cancellation of the predicted VC "Monsoon Campaign". Notwithstanding, the material losses, the loss of prestige and control in an area formerly considered as safe haven is expected to result in a demoralizing blow to VC stability and influence in TAY NINH Province.

Possibly, no other operation in Vietnam has accomplished such extensive damage to VC logistics and base systems. Unquestionably, some of the largest supply caches of the Vietnamese conflict were located and
destroyed during the three week offensive. As the operational area shifted westward to the RACH CAI BAC River, large stores of captured material confirmed reports of numerous supply installations along the CAMBODIAN Border. The location of installations in this area is attributed to the convenient access to supply routes from CAMBODIA, the use by the VC of the RACH CAI BAC River and its tributaries as water routes, and the fact that B-52 strikes have been offset 500 - 1000 meters from the border to preclude bombs striking CAMBODIAN territory. The type of VC installations discovered revealed that the area is used primarily for recuperation, training, and as a massive supply base. There were few food producing areas encountered, further substantiating the premise that most foodstuffs are transported from other locations into the area. In analyzing the location of storage areas, it is now established that supplies are moved rapidly, at night, from their border locations eastward into way stations between War Zones C and D, thus effectively avoiding B-52 strike zones.

The operation did not succeed in engaging major VC forces although one battalion of the 70th Regiment was severely crippled at LO GO. The number of VC killed and captured, although not as high as some of our past operations, represents a respectable total. An encouraging feature of the operation was the return of thirty VC to GVN control, their defection credited largely to division operations in War Zone C. The Battle of LO GO further proved the effectiveness of the combined arms team. Following heavy artillery and air preparations, two infantry battalions demonstrated their ability to maneuver in close terrain and successfully engage and destroy enemy forces. Despite this successful battle engagement, there still exists a requirement for additional training at squad and platoon level in fire and movement, marksmanship, and quick reaction battle drills. To remedy this deficiency squad and platoon battle courses have been designed at all brigade base locations.

The division continued to improve airmobile assault techniques. The problem of delivering concentrated firepower on LZ's was resolved by compressing the time devoted to the preparation and increasing the close air support sortie rate and preparatory artillery concentrations. More advanced control measures have been developed to provide continuous firepower on the perimeter of LZs subsequent to the airlanding of assault elements. Greater emphasis is also being placed on early liaison by supporting airmobile elements down to the infantry battalion level. This latter requirement has materially improved the precision of our airmobile assaults. During this operation a standardized system of smoke signals was prescribed and coordinated with interested agencies for use throughout Vietnam.

In the logistics area, the division attempted for the first time in Vietnam to utilize direct exchange of T-50A (tropical fatigue jackets and trousers) clothing during a combat operation away from base camp. Direct exchange of unmarked clothing permitted mass laundering and eliminated the need for individual bags, unit segregation, and controlled handling of laundry. The direct exchange was only partially successful because of limited availability of replacement clothing which permitted exchange of only 400 sets of fatigue in each infantry battalion. Accordingly, a few elements of the infantry battalions and all combat and combat support units did not benefit from the system.

13. LESSONS LEARNED: a. Troops employed on ambush sites have a tendency to fire prematurely when observing enemy targets. Additional indoctrination is necessary to emphasize letting the enemy move in closer with the higher possibility of achieving first round kills. Units must also conduct additional marksmanship training while in base camps with emphasis on rapid, snap fire shooting and aiming low.

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b. A guide for the length of time a unit should be involved on extended search and destroy operations during the rainy season is from eight to ten days. Personnel operating for longer periods in wet clothing are quite prone to the development of sores, heat rashes, and respiratory ailments. These ailments can be minimized with emphasis on personal hygiene and immediate treatment, but they will not be eliminated entirely.

c. One of the most effective methods of surrounding and sealing villages is to move elements during the hours of darkness, completing the move prior to first light, thus trapping local VC in their homes. Varying the times and methods of surrounding the villages enhances the chances for success.

d. Company size units require drying boxes or rooms for radios and optical equipment to permit them to commence operations with dry radios and batteries, thus insuring greater reliability of the equipment.

e. There is a distinct need for battalion commanders to have an LOH at their disposal. The lack of prominent terrain features coupled with the dense growth normally encountered in Vietnam are sufficient to disorient the most experienced land navigators. The LOH capability becomes more imperative during movement to contact and during pursuit to assist in vectoring units to desired intermediate objectives.

f. Long range reconnaissance patrols are one of the most effective intelligence gathering agencies. These patrols must be rapidly reinforced once engaged to further develop the situation and fix the enemy.

g. The use of T-17 membranes on heli-pads are extremely effective, particularly for DUSTOFF (helicopter medical evacuation) and refueling pads. Membranes can be emplaced with a minimum of time and effort. Sandbagging is preferable to burying the edges to permit more rapid displacement to a new location.

h. Expedient earth filled causeways and culverts are the best solution to improving and upgrading roads particularly where VC have access to the area at night and can easily demolish bridges. Culverts, unlike bridging, are not removed upon termination of operations in the area.

i. Massive CS attacks on suspected or known enemy locations are feasible and practical. The application of CS should be approximately 30 drums (2,400 pounds) per square kilometer of target area. This munition is effective for terrain contamination and creates an effective cloud that drifts with the wind. CS strikes should be followed by air and artillery preparation and when possible, exploited by ground forces.

j. Troops should carry a minimum of two quarts of water on all operations and no less than eight salt tablets per day. With profuse sweating, eight tablets may be consumed daily, each dose to be taken with water.

k. When their unit becomes engaged commanders are very often reluctant to use all available fire support because of the difficulty in identifying their own front line positions in the jungle. Commanders must nevertheless continue to call on available air and artillery support to block enemy routes of withdrawal or reinforcement and to strike probable VC rallying or attack positions.

l. VC base camps, caches and logistical installations continue to be discovered along roads, water routes and trails. Operations conducted in dense jungle areas lacking routes of communication are generally unproductive.

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m. The direct exchange of unmarked fatigue clothing to allow mass laundering requires sufficient stocks of clothing to provide two sets for all combat and combat support troops engaged in the operation.

ANNEXES:

A — Operations Overlay
B — Deception Plan Operations Overlay
C — PayOps Leaflets
D — Operations Overlay Frag Order 44-66
E — Operations Overlay Frag Order 45-66
F — Operations Overlay Frag Order 46-66
G — Operations Overlay Frag Order 47-66
H — Recapitulation of Artillery Missions Fired
I — After Action Report 1st Bde
J — After Action Report 2d Bde
K — After Action Report 3d Bde
ANNEX A

OPERATIONS OVERLAY
Annex to Combat Ops After Action Report
OPN BIRMINGHAM
Sheet 2 of 2 Sheets
Annex C (OPN 0/LAY) To FAC 0 ART-66
ANNEX C (OPN O'LAY) TO FRAG O
SHEET 2 OF 2 SHEETS
CONFIDENTIAL

13 - 23 MAY

FRAG O 47-66
CAMEL

OBJ
Annex C (OPN O'LAY) TO FRAG O
SHEET 2 OF 2 SHEETS
ANNEX A (CONT)

{ANNEX B (OPN O'LAY) TO OPOD 8-66 (OPN BIRMINGHAM)}

{REFERENCE: SAME AS BASIC REPORT}
Annex A to Combat Opn After Action
Opn Birmingham
C-1 to OPORD 8-66 Adjusted Boundary
231000 APRG6
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45

ACTION REPORT

BOUNDARY

WILLYS

OLDSMOBILE

BASE 5
ANNEX A TO COMBAT OPERATIONS
OPN BIRMINGHAM
C-2 TO OPN O’LAY
ANNEX B

DECEPTION PLAN OPERATIONS OVERLAY
ANNEX B TO COMBAT OPERATION AFTER ACTION
OPERATION BIRMINGHAM
DECEPTION PLAN
TRANSLATION OF LEAFLET #1025.

ATTENTION YOU!

THE LONG RANGE OF OUR ARTILLERY CAN REACH YOU ANYWHERE. WHETHER YOU ARE IN THE MOUNTAINS, THE JUNGLES OR THE PAVILIONS, THERE IS NO ESCAPE. IF YOU TRY TO HIDE IN TUNNELS OR CAVES THAT WILL BECOME YOUR GRAVES WHEN WE COLLAPSE THEM ON YOU. IF YOU REMAIN IN THE OPEN YOU WILL BE TORN TO PIECES. THERE IS NO DEFENSE. WHY DO YOU CONTINUE TO STRUGGLE AGAINST OUR OVERWHELMING POWER?

SAVE YOURSELVES FROM A HORRIBLE DEATH. RALLY NOW TO SURVIVE AND SEE YOUR FAMILY AGAIN.
TRANSLATION OF LEAFLET "POOS" (also used as an LSA by the ARVN)

CADES, SOLDIERS AND DRAFTED OF TRAINING CENTER "B"

ATTENTION FRIENDS,

THIS IS THE VOICE OF THE ARVN AND THE ALLIED FORCES. WE HAVE YOUR TRAINING CENTER SURROUNDED.

WE KNOW THAT YOU WERE FORCED TO JOIN THE BLOOD-THIRSTY VIET-CONG AND BETRAY YOUR COUNTRY. WE SINCERELY CALL ON YOU, AT THIS OPPORTUNITY, TO TURN YOUR WEAPONS AND SHOOT THE V.C. LEADERS IN ORDER TO SURRENDER TO THE OPERATING FORCES. DO NOT WAIT ANY LONGER.

DEATH IS WAITING FOR YOU SINGE THE FORCES IN OPERATION GIANT AIRPLANE WILL STRIKE AND DESTROY THIS TRAINING CENTER. IT IS UP TO YOU TO CHOOSE BETWEEN DEATH AND LIVING. IF YOU DO NOT CHOOSE NOW, YOU WILL HAVE NO SECOND CHANCE.

LISTEN TO OUR APPEAL TO RETURN. WHEN YOU COME OUT, CARRY THIS LEAFLET AND REPORT TO ANY OPERATION FORCES NEAREST TO YOU. YOU WILL BE WELCOMED BY ARVN AND ALLIED FORCES AND BE TAKEN TO A SAFE AREA AND SEE YOUR FAMILY AGAIN.
TRANSLATION OF LEAFLET VFOO

WHY DID YOU LEAVE YOUR VILLAGES AND LIVING WITH HARDSHIPS IN JUNGLES WITH NO FOOD, NO CLOTHES, NO MEDICINES WHEN YOU GET SICK? WHO HAS DECEIVED, LURED YOU TO LIVE A MISERABLE LIFE? WHO MAKES YOU DIG HOLES ON ROADS AND PLANT MINES TO KILL YOUR OWN COUNTRYMEN? WHO TOLD YOU TO USE VIOLENCE AND FORCE THE PEOPLE TO PAY TAXES?

THEY ARE THE COMMUNIST LEADERS, UNDER THE MASK OF LIBERATION, WHO HAVE DECEIVED YOU.

LOOK AT YOUR FORMER COMRADES, HOW MANY OF THEM ARE STILL WITH YOU? WHERE ARE THEY? WHAT HAPPENING TO THEM? THEY DIED OF HOMES AND BULLETS, SICKNESS OR RETURNED TO THE JUST CAUSE AND ARE LIVING HAPPILY WITH THEIR FAMILIES.

THE REVOLUTION IS WELCOME TO WELCOME YOU.

JST C.T.A. BCS.
TRANSLATION OF LEAFLET

OLD MEN, SOLDIERS AND MEMBERS IN VC RANKS.

WHY ARE THE ARVN ABLE TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS DEEP INTO YOUR HIDEOUTS? IT IS DUE TO:

- INFORMATION PROVIDED BY OUR AGENTS PLANTED IN YOUR UNITS.
- INFORMATION GIVEN BY THE PEOPLE TO THE GOVERNMENT.

WE KNOW WHERE YOU ARE.

WE KNOW WHERE YOU WILL BE GOING.

FACING THE ATTACKS, AIR STRIKES AND CONSTANT ARTILLERY FIRE OF THE ARVN AND THE ALLIES, WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO YOUR LIFE?

THINK OF YOUR OLD MOTHER, YOUNG WIFE AND CHILDREN WHO ARE WAITING FOR YOU.

31ST C.T.A. H.Q.S.
TRANSLATION OF LEAFLET #3920

FRONT: (Caption) "SOMEBODY IS MISSING AT HOME—YOU"

BACK: (Text)

MEMBERS OF THE VIET CONG!


USE THE NATIONAL SAFE CONDUCT PASS AND RALLY TO THE JUST CAUSE. THE VN WILL GIVE YOU A LIFE OF PEACEFUL LIVING WITH YOUR FAMILY.
ATTENTION VC1

THE EYES OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ARE EVERYWHERE. THEY'RE NOT...
IN THE VILLAGES AND JUNGLES, BUT ALSO IN THE SKY ABOVE YOU. THE RECONNAISSANCE
PLANES OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION CAN STRIKE SILENTLY ANYTIME, ANYWHERE.
ONCE THEY SPOT YOU THEY CAN CALL IN MASSIVE ARTILLERY POWER AND DEADLY AIR-
STRIKES ON YOUR POSITIONS. THEY FORCE YOU TO LIVE LIKE ANIMALS, ALWAYS HIDING,
AFRAID TO LIGHT COOKING FIRES FOR FEAR OF GIVING AWAY YOUR POSITIONS. WHY DO
YOU CONTINUE SUCH A MISERABLE LIFE FOR A WRONG CAUSE? RALLY NOW TO THE GUN
AND BEGIN A NEW LIFE OF HIGHNESS AND HONOR.
TRANSLATION OF LEAFLET #24037

FRONT: (Caption) "DO YOU WANT TO HELP THE VC PROLONG THE WAR IN YOUR HOMELAND?"

BACK: (Text)

PEOPLE OF THAN DINH,

THE VC HAVE DUPED THE PEOPLE TOO LONG, MAKING THEM BUY WORTHLESS "PUBLIC TREASURE" COUPONS IN EXCHANGE FOR "PROTECTION". PROTECTION FROM WHAT? PROTECTION FROM A CHANCE TO BUILD A BETTER LIFE WHILE THE VC EXPLOIT YOU BY TAKING YOUR RICE AND MAKE YOU PAY ILLEGAL TAXES? THESE DAYS OF EXPLOITATION BY THE VC ARE NUMBERED. AREAS WHICH THE VC HAVE CONSIDERED AS HAVENS ARE RECEIVING UP TO 400 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY PLUS AIR STRIKES EVERY DAY. OWN FORCES ARE MOVING FURTHER AND FURTHER INTO VC AREAS EVERY DAY. NO EFFORT WILL BE SPARED TO DESTROY THE VC AND THEIR HIDING PLACES.

HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO WISH TO HARM INNOCENT CIVILIANS. TOO OFTEN THE VC USE THE PEOPLE AS HUMAN SHIELDS. TO PROTECT YOURSELVES AND YOUR FAMILIES, MOVE TO A OWN CONTROLLED AREA. THE GOVERNMENT WILL GIVE YOU LAND AND MONEY TO HELP YOU START A NEW LIFE ON PROVIDE YOU WITH HELP UNTIL IT IS SAFE TO MOVE BACK TO YOUR OWN AREA.

RELEASE THE YOKE OF VC OPPRESSION, COME TO THE GVN.

[Image: Drawing of two people taking a gun]

ĐỒNG BẢO CÓ MUON GIÚP VIỆT CÔNG KẸO DÀI CUỘC CHIẾN TRANH TẤN PHÁ QUÊ HƯƠNG KHÔNG?
TRANSLATION OF LEAFLET #027

FRONT: (CAPTION) "WHY DO THE VC HAVE TO RESORT TO KIDNAPPING YOUTHS TO FILL THEIR EMPTY RANKS?"

BACK: (TEXT)

YOUR 15- AND 16-YEAR OLD SONS ARE BEING TAKEN AGAINST THEIR WILL AND USED AS CANNON FODDER BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CADE. IN CAM-SON VILLAGE, HAI HAMLET 20 YOUNG YOUTHS WERE FORCED TO LEAVE THEIR FAMILIES BECAUSE NO ONE WANTED TO VOLUNTEER IN THE VC CAUSE. COULD IT BE THAT NO ONE BELIEVED SOME OF THESE CAM-SON CHILDREN WOULD RETURN TO THEIR FAMILIES AND WERE SHOT IN COLD BLOOED BY THE VC. HO-VAN-NIEN, WHO WAS TAKEN FROM HAI HAMLET BY THE VC, IS VC WELL FEED, RECEIVING GOOD MEDICAL ATTENTION AND LIVING IN SAFETY WITH THE OWN DISTRICT AUTHORITIES IN DU-TIENG.

WHY DO YOU ALLOW YOUR SONS TO BE TAKEN INTO SERVICE BY THE VC AS THEY DID IN CAM-SON? SEND THEM TO GVN CONTROLLED AREAS WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT FORCE CHILDREN TO FIGHT IN THE PLACE OF MEN. TRAIN YOUR SONS TO LOVE THE PEACE GIVEN BY THE GVN WHEN ALL THIS FIGHTING IS OVER. YOU HAVE SEEN THE POWER OF THE GVN AND ALLIED FORCES AND MUST KNOW THAT THE END FOR THE VC IS NEAR. JOIN THE OTHER PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND DO NOT ALLOW YOUR YOUNG YOUTH TO BE TAKEN BY THE VC.

TAI SÄO VIẾT CÔNG PHÁT BÁT CÔC THIỂU NIỆN ĐỂ THAY VÃO CÁC CHỞ THIỂU NGƯỜI TRỞ THÀNH CÁC CHỞ CHIẾM LÝ? (WHY DID THE VC USE YOUNG PEOPLE TO TAKE THE PLACE OF MEN?)
TRANSLATION OF LEAFLET #922
TARGET AUDIENCE: CIVILIANS

FRONT: (ILLUSTRATION OF CHILDREN BEING BLOWN UP.)
BACK: (TEXT)

ON SUNDAY, 8 MAY 1966, TWO LITTLE CHILDREN WERE INJURED BY A VC MINE NEAR AN-PHOOC-NOA VILLAGE FOUR KILOMETERS EAST OF TAY-NINH, AN AREA WHERE CHILDREN ARE KNOWN TO PLAY. THE VC MUST KNOW, AS WELL AS WE, THAT YOU CANNOT KILL INNOCENT CHILDREN MALIGNANTLY AND HOPE TO SELL THE PEOPLE. IF THE VC REALLY CARED FOR THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE, AS THEY SAY, THEY WOULD NOT HAVE PLACED A MINE IN AN AREA WHICH IS OFTEN USED BY CIVILIANS OR THEY WOULD HAVE NOTIFIED THE PEOPLE OF THEIR INTENTION TO PLANT SUCH A MINE. WHAT DO YOU THINK?
TRANSLATION OF LEAFLET #1003

ATTENTION VIET CONG!

YOUR CADETS CONSTANTLY TELL YOU THAT VICTORY IS CERTAIN; HOWEVER, YOU CANNOT HOPE TO CONTINUE FIGHTING IF YOU HAVE NOTHING TO EAT. ON 25 APRIL 1966, SOLDIERS OF THE 3RD BRIGADE, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, CAPTURED VAST RICE STORES NEAR PHOM BO NOONG, TAY NINH PROVINCE. THIS POWERFUL ALLIED FORCE WILL CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR AND DESTROY YOU AND YOUR STOLEN FOOD CACHES. YOUR SACRIFICES IN FIGHTING FOR A LOST CAUSE WILL ONLY RESULT IN DEATH BY STARVATION OR, IF YOU ARE LUCKY, BY RAPID DEATH AGAINST THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION'S MASSIVE FIREPOWER. WHY DIE USELESSLY? SAVE YOURSELVES BY USING THE NATIONAL SAFE CONDUCT PASS AND RALLYING TO THE NEAREST GVN OFFICIAL OR TO ANY ARVN OR ALLIED SOLDIER. THE GVN GUARANTEES YOU HUMAN TREATMENT AND COMPLETE FORGIVENESS. RALLY NOW!

CÁC QUÂN NHÂN HOA KỲ ĐANG TÌM KIẾM KHÔ LƯỢNG THỰC CỦA CÁC BẠN.

CÁC BẠN CÓ HY VỌNG GIẢI CHIẾN ĐAU KHÔNG CỦA LƯỢNG THỰC?
TRANSLATION OF LEAFLET FRONT

FRONT: (Caption) "THE ALLIED FORCES WORK FOR THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE"

BACK: (Text)

THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ASSISTS THE GVN IN MANY WAYS. IN ADDITION TO ACTUALLY FIGHTING THE VC, THE SOLDIERS OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION AID IN MANY CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS IN SUCH FIELDS AS SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION AND MEDICAL HELP. ONE OF THE PROJECTS THEY ARE CURRENTLY WORKING ON IN THE TAN-MIH AREA IS ROAD IMPROVEMENT.

ENGINEERS OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION HAVE IMPROVED THESE ROADS TO EASE TRANSPORTATION IN THE AREA AND TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR FARMERS TO GET THEIR PRODUCE TO MARKET.

IN VC CONTROLLED AREAS THE PEOPLE GET FALSE PROMISES AND TERRORISM WHILE IN GVN AREAS THE GOVERNMENT IS CONSTANTLY BUILDING TOWARD A BETTER LIFE FOR THE PEOPLE.
ANNEX D

OPERATIONS OVERLAY FRAG ORDER 44-66
ANNEX E

OPERATIONS OVERLAY FRAG ORDER 45-66
ANNEXE TO COMBAT OPN AFTER OPN BIRMINGHAM
TO FRAC O 45-66
Annex A (OPN O'Law)
TO FRAG O 45-66
Annex A (Open O Law)
Annex A (OPN O'LAY) TO FRAG O 45-66
Annex E to Combat Opn After Action Report
Opn Birmingham
ANNEX F

OPERATIONS OVERLAY FRAG ORDER 46-66
Annex F to Combat Opn After Action Report Opn Birmingham
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ANNEX A (OPN O'LAY)
TO FRAG O  46-66
Annex G to Combat Opns After A OPN BIRMINGHAM
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(Note: The table contains data for various dates and months, with columns indicating different criteria or values. The exact nature of the data requires additional context to interpret accurately.)
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RGS/13/32)

THRU: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
APO U.S. Forces 96345

TO: Commander
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: MACV-J321
APO U.S. Forces 96345

1. In accordance with MACV Directive Number 335-8 the following report is submitted:

1ST BRIGADE, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION OPERATION
"BIRMINGHAM"

2. During the period 220700 April 071113 May 1966, the 1st Brigade conducted a search and destroy operation with the mission of locating and destroying VC forces and base camps in TAY HIN Province (War Zone "C"), WT 9775, WT 9963, XT 1364, XT 1375, XT 3055, XT 4055, XT 3046, and XT 4046 in AO's BUICK, MERCURY and FIAT respectively. The 1st Bde OPORD 14-66 was issued at 220800 April 66, outlining plans for the operations.

a. The reporting officer is Colonel Edgar H. Glotzbach.

b. Task Organization and Task Force commanders were as follows:

1/2 Inf, Lt Col Richard L. Prillaman, Commanding
1/28 Inf, Lt Col Robert Baldage, Commanding
2/16 Inf, Lt Col Richard Hathaway, Commanding
2/18 Inf, Lt Col Herbert McCrystal, Commanding
1/5 Arty (-), Lt Col David O. Rogers, Commanding
D Battery, 2/13 Arty, Capt Dennis R. Brunsis, Commanding
A Troop, 1/4 Cav, Capt Ralph Sturgis, Commanding

3. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy Situation: Intelligence received on the area of operation, located adjacent to Cambodian in War Zone "O", established it as a major logistical base area through which men and material are infiltrated from Cambodia into SWW. One hospital complex, two production sites and numerous supply and storage points were reported located in the

Downgraded At 3 Yr Intervals
Declassified After 12 Yrs

CONFIDENTIAL C
1st Bde area of operation. Prior to this operation the VC had unrestricted use of the area, free of intrusion by ARVN and other FWF. This provided the VC with the ideal place for training newly conscripted personnel, forming new units and an opportunity to refit, regroup and rest his active units.

Order of battle information received was one to three months old. It indicated the 9324ogt, K8-72 Rogt, C230 Bn, C 517 Bn, one unidentified Regt and several unidentified battalions as having been or still being in the operational area.

Although the enemy was credited with the ability to attack anywhere in War Zone "C" with up to four (4) Main Force Battalions supported by local force units and to reinforce with two (2) Main Force Regiments and two (2) Main Force Battalions within three days, it was felt that he would only defend his major installations, resort to sabotage, harassing fires and ambushes to inflict casualties and other wise avoid decisive engagements.

b. VC Strength, Activity and Situation Found During the operation:

(1) During the conduct of the operation it became evident that the intelligence information received and estimate made prior to the operation were basically correct. Numerous supply points, storage areas, rice caches and one hospital complex (located approximately 7000 meters further north than previously reported by intelligence) were found along the South Vietnamese side of the RACIH CAI BAC River in area of Operation BUICK. Locations of installations reported and actually found are contained in inclosures to this report. A complete list of equipment and material captured or destroyed is contained in paragraph 8, RESULTS. VC uniforms captured indicated manufacture in Red China and infiltration packs captured tend to confirm infiltration routes through War Zone "C".

Several training areas and areas, instructional aids and field manuals captured substantiate the use of War Zone "C" as a training area. The absence of elaborate field fortifications other than protection from air attacks, depicts the sense of security from ground attacks enjoyed by the VC in this area. It is interesting to note that when A 1/28 Inf returned to a supply point on 27 April to complete destruction of material captured the previous day, A 1/28 found that the VC had booby-trapped the area overnight. This indicates that many of the mines and booby-traps encountered by friendly forces had hastily been placed in their path of advance, underlining that the VC had not anticipated an intrusion into this secure area. Although designations were taken from captured documents no positive identifications by actual contact were made.

The actions of the VC were in accord with the intelligence estimate. VC continually harassed friendly units with SA fire both day and night. On two occasions indirect fire was received at night. With the exception of light SA fire on three occasions, helicopter assault landings and extractions were unopposed although VC ground fire against aircraft was quite frequent. The VC did not defend their installations which were entered either unopposed or after brief engagements with light delaying forces.

During the entire operation only one major engagement, the battle of LO GC (XT 9775) was fought, on 30 Apr. Prior to 30 April the 1/2 Inf had received sporadic SA fire from the Cambodian side of the RACIH CAI IAC River while executing a search and destroy mission while advancing north along the river. During the morning hours of April 30 the 1/2 Inf made light contact with the VC which by noon had developed into a major battle at LO GC (XT 9775). The VC Battalion size force was deployed partially at LO GC facing south with the remainder of the force deployed on the Cambodian side of the river facing east and attempting to cross over. The valiant effort of the 1/2 Inf and 2/16, combined with artillery fire power and supported by IAC Air thwarted the crossing attempt and eventually caused the enemy located east of the river to retreat into Cambodia, leaving 54 KIA (BC) and another 100 KIA possible on the battle field.
It was surprising that a VC battalion size force having neither a numerically superior force, the element of surprise, fighting from well fortified positions or some other tactical advantage stood against two US Battalions. Since the operational plan had not included an advance north of LO GO it can be only theorized that VC losses of equipment and material of the previous days had made him desperate to the point of attacking the US Force in an attempt to delay the advance to gain time to evacuate material further north and into Cambodia. A second reason could have been to gain time to prepare these installations for defense to include reinforcements.

c. Terrain and Weather:

(1) During the early phases of the operation the weather was dry and hot, changing to cloudy skies, thunderstorms and increased humidity towards the end. The terrain in Area BUICK was primarily heavy jungle, yet with sufficient clearings to allow helicopter resupply. In Area FIAT the terrain was mostly open with rubber plantations.

(2) Field fortifications encountered consisted mostly of trenches and AA weapons emplacements, with air sacs torn in base camps. No extensive tunnel systems were located. A diagram of a hospital located at vic WT 977736 is attached as inclosure 5. Diagrams of base camps found vic XT 006674 and vic XT 429473 are attached as inclosures 6 and 7.

4. MISSION: From 1st Infantry Division OPORD 8-66 (Operation HURRICANE) dated 19 April 1966:

1st Brigade:

(1) Attached 2/16 Inf on afternoon of 24 May 66.

(2) One airmobile company IS effective 23 Apr 66.

(3) Move by C-130 aircraft to TAY NINH 3 airfield on 24 Apr 66.

(4) Conduct airmobile assault in AO BUICK on 24 Apr 66.

(5) Conduct search and destroy operations in AO LUICK.

(6) On order, conduct search and destroy operations in AO NASH and AO DODGE.

5. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: 1st Brigade operations will be conducted in five (5) Phases: (See Operations Overlay) (Inclusions 1-4)

a. Maneuver:

Phase I (24 April): 1st Brigade moves by C-130 and CV-2 aircraft from PHUC VINH to TAY NINH, and PHUC LONG XT 331575, transloads to helicopters, conducts airmobile assault on LZ RED, establishes army base on LZ RED, closes the area continuous to LZ RED, prepares to conduct search and destroy operations in same on 25 Apr 66.

Phase II (25 Apr - 28 Apr): 1/2 Inf and 1/28 Inf conduct search and destroy operations in same commencing 250730 Apr 66.

Phase III (29 Apr - 2 May): 1st Bde conducts operations in AO NASH.

Phase IV (3 May - 6 May): 1st Bde conducts operations in AO DODGE.
Phase V (7-8 May): 1st Bde redeploy to PHUOC VINH by air and ground convoy.

b. Fires:
   (1) Arty: 1/5 Arty provides and coordinates arty fire support.
   (2) Air:
      (a) Preplanned requests to this lqs by 0600 hrs the day preceding the strike.
      (b) Immediate requests: SOP
      (c) Armed helicopters support this operations as required.

c. 1/2 Inf: Three (3) deo teams A 1st Engr SPT
   (1) Move by CV-2 (Caribou) from PHUOC VINH to PHUOC LONG XT 331575.
   (2) Upon arrival at PHUOC LONG XT 331575 transload to HUHD helicopters.
   (3) Conduct landing on LZ RED.
   (4) Secure area contiguous to LZ RED out to 1000 meters.
   (5) Occupy west portion of Bde perimeter.
   (6) Conduct search and destroy operations in zone commencing 250730 Apr 66.
   (7) Furnish one (1) rifle squad to Bde lqs on 23 Apr 66 for defense of Bde TAC CF.

d. 1/26 Inf:
   (1) CO 1/26 Inf designated PHUOC VINH Base Camp commander effective 241200 Apr 66.
   (2) Furnish one (1) rifle squad to B 1/4 Cav during hours of darkness during conduct of this operation.
   (3) Prepare to execute 1st Bde OPLAN 2-65 (STOPCAP).
   (4) Furnish one rifle squad to Bde lqs on 23 Apr for defense of Bde TAC CF.

e. 1/28 Inf: Three (3) deo teams 1st Engr SPT:
   (1) Move by C-130 from PHUOC VINH to TAY MINH.
   (2) Upon arrival TAY MINH transload to HUHD helicopters.
   (3) Conduct airmobile assault on LZ RED.
   (4) Secure LZ RED and receive one (1) btry (105) 1/5 Arty.
   (5) Upon closing of 1/2 Inf on LZ RED secure area contiguous to LZ RED out to 100 meters.
   (6) Occupy east portion of Bde perimeter.
Conduct search and destroy operations in zone commencing 250730 Apr 66.

Furnish one (1) rifle squad to Bde Hqs on 23 Apr for defense of Bde TAC CP.

2/16 Inf:
1. On order, move to LZ RED on 25 Apr 66.
2. Upon arrival LZ RED secure Arty Base.
3. Maintain one (1) rifle company on 30 min alert in base area.
4. Conduct operations in area adjacent to LZ RED as directed by this Hqs.

1/5 Arty (-) (DS):
1. Move by C-130 aircraft from PHUOC VINH to TAY NINH.
2. Upon arrival at TAY NINH transload to CH-47 aircraft.
3. On order move to LZ RED.
4. Coordinate Arty fire to insure continuous support.

B 1/4 Cav:
1. Troop (-) remains under OPCON of parent battalion.
2. B 1/4 Cav remain continue present mission.
3. B 1/4 Cav prepare to receive one (1) rifle squad 1/26 Inf during hours of darkness for defense of troop perimeter.

A 1st Engr (-) (DS):
1. Two platoons remain under OPCON parent battalion.
2. Furnish three (3) Demolition demolition to 1/2 Inf and 1/28 Inf for this operation.
3. Repair detachment continue present mission.

IBG 1st Bde:
1. Move 1st Bde TAC CP to Bde base area on 24 Apr.
2. Provide and coordinate support of 1st Bde TAC CP.

1/1 MP (DS)
1. Provide two (2) squads to IBG 1st Bde on 23 Apr 66.
2. Platoon (-) continue present mission.

Coordinating Instructions:
1. Command and control aircraft NUD/LOH/available on mission basis.
2. Riot control agents authorized for use against tunnel and bunker complexes.
(3) All personnel will carry protective masks.

(4) Units use close-in indirect fire around defensive perimeters during the hours of darkness.

(5) Artillery fires around defensive perimeters will be registered prior to darkness.

(6) Units carry sufficient smoke grenades and marking panels to mark positions during Air/Artillery strikes.

(7) Destroy VC caches in place only on approval of this Hq.

(8) Units participating in Operation BIRMINGHAM leave minimum force behind to provide base camp security.

(9) Commanders will insure that non-combatants and their property are safeguarded consistent with the tactical situation.

(10) Units carry additional claymore mines consistent with load carrying capability.

(11) Units carry sufficient concertina to provide single hand around defensive perimeters (base areas).

6. EXECUTION: The 4th initiated CONORD 15-66, Operation BIRMINGHAM, on 24 Apr 66 with 4th elements moving by C-130 and CV-2 aircraft to TAY-NINH 3 Airfield, translocating to HQH10 and CH-47 helicopters to a Bde base area located at XT 02652. The following events occurred during conduct of Phase I (24 Apr): At 1510 hrs, 1/28 Inf conducted directed assault on LZ WITE. On engaged unknown number of VC at 1735 hrs via XT 0064 resulting in 7 US WIA and 13 US KIA. 1/28 Inf and 2/16 Inf closed LZ RED without incident at 1350 and 1643 hrs with negative contact, and both units began saturation patrolling via LZ RED (XT 02652).

Operations in AO BUICK (25 -27 Apr) were as follows: At 2510201 1/28 Inf located and destroyed a VC Base Camp via XT 0064 consisting of three (3) huts, trenches, clothing, a bicycle and some food. B 2/16 Inf received SA fire and three (3) rifle grenades from vic XT 02652, at 251105H, no casualties or damage received. At 251205H via XT 026550, Recon 2/16 received one (1) rd sniper fire and a (2) rifle grenades resulting in one (1) US KIA. Armed helicopters struck the location and VC evaded upon pursuit. 1/28 Inf reported negative contact during their saturation patrolling operation. At 260700H, 1/2 Inf secured LZ for its extraction and introduction of 2/16 Inf. 1/2 Inf assumed mission of securing Artillery base and completed hallift to LZ RED at 0845 hrs. At 261405, 2/16 Inf engaged a VC force of undetermined size via XT 976560 resulting in one (1) VC KIA (Est). At 261400H 1/28 Inf, conducting operations between WT 996553 and WT 996565 along the RGH GAI DAI River, came under SA fire vic WT 996566. During pursuit of VC, the Bn located and destroyed 2 small base camps with natural and foodstuffs. C 2/16 captured an AK assault rifle and killed one VC at 261435H vic WT 996568. At 261400H, 1/2 Inf received SA fire from 3 VC across river, unit returned fire and resulted in 1 VC KIA (Est). At 270224H 1/2 Inf received 3 rds of friendly Artillery in their base camp position sustaining three (3) WIA. L 1/28 found large amounts of VC supplies and a rice cache vic WT 976552 at 0840 hrs. Rice cache was booby trapped and unit sustained 13 WIA. At 0950 hrs, B 2/18 located and destroyed at WT 996545, 50 (6) huts, bamboo and other small VC camps with natural and foodstuffs. G 2/16 captured an AK assault rifle and killed one VC at 261435H vic WT 996568. At 261400H, A 2/16 received SA fire from VC across river, unit returned fire and resulted in 2 VC KIA (Est). At 270224H 1/2 Inf received 3 rds of friendly Artillery in their base camp position sustaining three (3) WIA. L 1/28 found large amounts of VC supplies and a rice cache vic WT 976552 at 0840 hrs. Rice cache was booby trapped and unit sustained 13 WIA. At 0950 hrs, B 2/18 located and destroyed at WT 996545, 50 (6) huts, bamboo and other small VC camps with natural and foodstuffs. G 2/16 captured an AK assault rifle and killed one VC at 261435H vic WT 996568. At 1030 hrs, B 1/28 located and destroyed 100 tons of rice, 25 tons of rock salt, 500 lbs of cloth in bolts and 5 metal animal drawn carts via WT 996565. Two (2) tons of rice was destroyed by G 2/16 at 1103 hrs via WT 964666. At 1245 hrs D 1/28 located the following items via WT 986465: One (1) bottle magnesium sulfate crystals, one (1) bottle of vitamin, one (1) bottle of vitamins, pepper, one (1)
A 2/16 engaged approximate VC squad at 1250 hrs vic WT 960658 resulting in three (3) US WIA and two (2) VC KIA (BC) and the capture of one (1) each US carbine and Russian Rifle. At 1310 hrs, 1/2 Inf conducted an air mobile assault on LZ BLUE. The unopposed assault was preceded by a 30 min airstrike and a 20 minute Artillery preparation. At 1558 hrs A 2/16 located and destroyed 600 black uniforms, 63 tons of rice, 16 boats, and 6000 khaki uniforms vic WT 961077. At 1645 hrs, B 1/28 located and destroyed 5.9 tons of rice vic WT 996659. Recon 2/16 discovered a trench system at WT 969678 at 1647 hrs and 9,5 tons of rice was located and destroyed at 1710 hrs vic WT 989647.

\[\text{At 1030 hrs B 1/28 located and destroyed 22 tons of rice vic WT 970677 and B 2/16 located and destroyed 30 tons of rice vic WT 967724 while clearing a tunnel network at 1130 hrs.} \]

\[\text{At 1115 hrs, while securing LZ FIVE (XT 032710) A 1/28 located and destroyed one (1) claymore mine intact with wire and battery. At 1120 hrs C 1/2 Inf located and destroyed 22 tons of rice vic WT 970720 and B 2/16 located and destroyed 30 tons of rice vic WT 967724 while clearing a tunnel network at 1130 hrs.} \]

\[\text{At 1300 hrs, B 2/16 exchanged SA fire with undetermined number of VC vic WT 574728 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC).} \]

\[\text{At 1442 hrs B 1/28 made contact with one VC. Unit pursued VC into jungle. Fire was exchanged and B 1/28 sustained one (1) US WIA. At 1632 hrs 2/16 Inf became OPCON 1st Bde and conducted an air mobile assault on LZ ORANGE (XT 015730). An UH-1D lifting element from 2/18 received SA fire from vic XT 636547 wounding one crew man. Armoed helicopters took area under fire.} \]

\[\text{CONFIDENTIAL} \]
2/18 closed LZ ORANGE at 1726 hrs. At 1735 hrs, B 1/2 Inf sustained 3 US KIA and 4 US WIA from a claymore mine vic WT 970740. At 1740 hrs, 1/2 Inf engaged a sniper vic WT 971743 sustaining one US KIA and 8 US WIA while inflicting 33 KIA (BC) on the VC and 75 KIA (POSS). 2/18 Inf located and destroyed a small VC base camp with accommodations for approximately two (2) VC companies, at 0930 hrs vic XT 013641. At 1013 hrs the 2/18 Inf maneuvered to block VC engaged by 1/2 Inf and 2/16 Inf but could not gain contact. At 0940 hrs 2/16 Inf maneuvered with 1/2 Inf on east side of the KCHI GAI DAC River inflicting 8 KIA (BC) on the VC on east side of the river and 25 KIA (POSS) on the west side. At 1205 hrs B 1/28 sighted one VC vic XT 027714 and took him under fire. A search of the area was made revealing a blood trail leading into the jungle, accounting for one VC KIA (POSS). At 1335 hrs C 1/28 made contact with six (6) VC vic XT 04705. Company maneuvered and engaged with SA fire and artillery. VC returned fire, fled their positions by means of trenches and disappeared in the jungle, action resulted in one US KIA and two (2) US WIA. An air strike was called on VC avenues of escape. A search of the area revealed a base camp with miscellaneous supplies and 20 buildings. C 1/28 Inf destroyed the buildings and evacuated the supplies and equipment. 1/26 Inf discovered and destroyed a VC base camp vic XT 035694 at 010300 H, capturing 2 VC women, one child. Other VC fled into jungle and was pursued by Artillery. At 1101 hrs B 1/28 captured one VC armed with a Thompson SMG vic XT 036692. A 1/28 received one WIA from sniper fire at 1120 hrs at XT 032713. At 1201 hrs 2/16 Inf was directed to conduct a rapid overnight reconn with early morning search on Objectives 1 (XT 37057) and 2 (XT 375468). C 2/16 reached attack position near Objective 1 at 050300 H and sealed area. At 0630 hrs 2/16 Inf located and destroyed a derelict munitions cache at XT 375479 containing 51 tons of rice, and 25 huts at 1421 hrs vic XT 036666. All Bde elements reported negative contact during the hours of darkness.

On 02 May 66 operations commenced in AO FIAT with 1st Bde elements moving by helilift to vic XT 3250 commencing 0645 hrs and closing area at 1429 hrs. The remainder of the day and 3 and 4 May 66, were used to establish defensive perimeters and to conduct maintenance and care and cleaning of equipment. Operations in AO FIAT continued with the following actions: At 041200 H, A 1/4 Cav was attached to 1st Bde and reverted to O&O of 3rd Bde, closing AO AUSTIN at 1224 hrs. At 1305 hrs 1/28 Inf located and destroyed a derelict munitions cache at XT 010730 and an old bolt action rifle was found. At 1330 hrs a sniper fired several rds of SA fire into Log Base area vic XT 3248, elements returned fire resulting in one (1) VC KIA (BC) and no friendly casualties. C 1/28 located and destroyed 51 tons of rice, and 8 huts at 1421 hrs vic XT 036666. All Bde elements reported negative contact during the hours of darkness.
At 1310 hrs, C 2/18 Inf engaged an unknown number of VC vic XT 420477, unit pursued VC but lost contact when VC dispersed and fled into jungle. At 1317 hrs B 2/18 located and destroyed a small base camp vic XT 429473 consisting of 7 huts, 2 small trenches and bunkers. At 1330 hrs A 1/4 Cav, conducting local security operations approached two (2) VCS at XT 415443 and one (1) VCS at XT 395439 and evaucuated them to division base. C 1/28 approached one VCS vic XT 295479 at 1337 hrs and D 1/28 located and destroyed two (2) ox carts, one bicycle, one tow chain, 450 punji stakes and 20 fox holes with overhead cover vic XT 342511 at 1400 hrs. At 1530 hrs, C 2/18 Inf in pursuit of an unknown number of VC vic XT 435475, sustained 2 US IA and 7 WIA from Artillery which had been called in to cut off VC avenues of escape. At 1550 hrs, D 1/28 located and evacuated two mortar rounds, caliber unknown, vic XT 336507. On 06 May at 0918 hrs, A 1/28 located and destroyed a commandations liaison station vic XT 238512 consisting of six (6) buildings, several books, cooking utensils, two (2) grenades and 25 lbs of rice. Several documents and the books were evacuated to division base. 2/18 Inf received light SA fire throughout the morning and first contact was established by the Redon Plt at 1034 hrs vic XT 450468, VC fled into jungle and one was believed to be wounded. At 1054 hrs, C 1/28 located and destroyed three (3) foxholes with overhead cover vic XT 390481. B 2/18 made contact with unknown number of VC at 1119 hrs vic XT 455457, resulting in one VC KIA (BC) 6 VC MIA (POSS) one M-1 rifle captured. VC fled into jungle and broke contact at 1230 hrs. At 1230 hrs, A 2/18 engaged and pursued 4 VC vic XT 450450 who returned fire, dispersed and fled into jungle breaking contact at 1258 hrs. Results were 5 US WIA and 2 VC KIA (FGS). On 07 May at 0730 hrs, Bde HIC commenced airlift to base camp, PHUOC VINH, utilizing 10 lifts of C 130 aircraft closing base camp 1430 hrs, thus terminating Operation BIRMINGHAM.

7. Supporting Forces:

a. 1st Bn, 5th Arty (-) (DS)

(1) This organization consisted of Headquarters and Service Battery and two (2), firing batteries (A & B) with B 2/13 Arty attached from 24 Apr 66 thru 7 May 66.

(2) How and When Employed:

(a) Hqs, A, and B Btry's: Were airlifted into TAY VINH 3 Airfield by C-130 and CV-2 Aircraft. Personnel & equipment were then lifted by CH-47 aircraft to Arty Base vic L2 RED, (XT 0246) established defensive positions and provided fire support for area of operation.

(b) Btry D: Provided fires in support of base camp area vic PHUOC VINH (XT 5849).

(c) Btry D 2/13 Arty: Was airlifted into area of operation by CH-47 Aircraft. The btry was attached to 1/5 Arty (-) to give additional support to 1st Bde and occupied firing positions vic Arty Base (XT 0246)

(d) Period and number of lbs fired by type 24 Apr 66 thru 2 May 66:

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<tr>
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TOTAL HAT MISSIONS: 1193

TOTAL PREPARATIONS: 37
b. U.S. Air Force: In support of Operation LUMI NGHAM (24 April-6
May 66), a total of one hundred and eight (108) strike missions were flown
resulting in a total of 324 sorties. Fighter sorties were as follows:

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8. Results of Operation:

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<td>Bicycles</td>
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b. Equipment Destroyed:

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<td>240.55 Tons</td>
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<tr>
<td>.9 Tons</td>
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<tr>
<td>2305</td>
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<tr>
<td>5067</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole Blood</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.45 caliber Ammunition</td>
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<td>Plows, Steel</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shawls</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts, Dispersing Machinery</td>
<td>15 lbs</td>
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<tr>
<td>1100 lbs (approx)</td>
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</table>
QUANTITY |
| ITEM |
| 250 lbs (approx) |
| Parts, Doct, Motor |
| 2 |
| Typewriters |
| 1 |
| Printing Press |

c. FRIENDLY LOSSES:

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<thead>
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<th>DOM</th>
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<tr>
<td>6 May 66</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

TOTAL 75 29 1 1

d. FRIENDLY MATERIAL LOSSES:

| QUANTITY |
| ITEM |
| 1 |
| AN/IC 65, Destroyed |
| 1 |
| 5 KW Generator, Destroyed |

e. ENEMY LOSSES:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>KIA (K)</th>
<th>KIA (POSS)</th>
<th>VPC CAPTURED</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Apr 66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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CONFIDENTIAL
21. (LPOSS) 30 Apr 66 53 101 0
   1 May 66 3 2 4
   2 May 66 0 0 0
   3 May 66 0 0 0
   4 May 66 0 0 0
   5 May 66 0 0 4
   6 May 66 3 5 0
   TOTAL 67 117 8

9. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Administrative matters were adequate to ensure resupply of committed units. The utilization of the direct support aviation company for resupply aircraft greatly assisted in the rapid response to known requirements and changes due to the tactical situation.

   (1) Supply:

   (a) Techniques of supply used during the operation were of three (3) types:

   1. Six (6) each UH-1D helicopters were used daily to deliver supplies to the forward base area and ROW positions north of the Division Logistical Base. During the early morning and late afternoon hours maximum effort was placed on the extraction of unnecessary equipment in ROW positions. The remainder of the day was devoted to resupplying the forward base area normally occupied by an artillery battalion, a infantry battalion and an element of brigade headquarters. This system was used when resupply could not be affected by road convoy.

   2. CH-47A helicopters were used to deliver artillery ammunition and when UH-1D helicopters were not available for resupply of units in the forward base area. However, the use of CH-47A helicopters is not feasible for delivery to ROW positions as normally large LZ's are not available and loading and unloading is time consuming since supplies must be manually handled.

   3. When the Brigade units were located in the rubber plantation vic XT 3247, road convoys were utilized on a daily basis to resupply those except when battalions were conducting search and destroy operations away from this base. Usually the battalion carried enough supplies to sustain themselves until they returned to the base area or ammunition were delivered by UH-1D helicopters.

   (b) During the operation, 300 tons of materiel was delivered by UH-1D helicopters. An undetermined tonnage of artillery ammunition was delivered by CH-47A aircraft as well as resupply of units by road during the latter part of the operation.

   (c) Units entered the operation with a basic load of ammunition, rations and necessary supplies and replenished expenditures from the Division Logistical Base as required.

<CONFIDENTIAL>
(d) Weapons and ammunition carried by assault troops of infantry battalions included M-16 rifles and 60mm mortars. Some mortars with crew and ammunition were airlifted into RON positions at night and extracted the following morning. Those units who brought 107mm mortars to the operational area utilized those weapons in the defense of the Division Logistic Base.

(2) Maintenance: No significant problems were encountered by attached units. The utilization of Division maintenance control teams appears to be more responsive to unit requirements as repair parts can be obtained easier and faster from an element of this type rather than the shipment of parts from the Brigade Home Base.

(3) Treatment of Casualties and Evacuation and Hospitalization (see para (6) below)

(4) Transportation: The use of CV-2 aircraft for the delivery of men and material from Brigade Home Bases was encouraged. However, units observed that under the schedule of multiple stops prior to arrival at the Division Logistic Base, the aircraft was filled before arriving at the Brigade Home Base (FSGO VIF1) and consequently negligible cargo or passenger space was available. The change of the schedule to incorporate a trip from the Division Logistic Base to the Brigade Home Base and return, insured that each major unit had ample space for men and supplies.

(5) Communications: No major communications problems were experienced during the operation. Communications employed were adequate to meet the requirement of the Brigade Commander and subordinate unit commanders. During the first phase of the operation, VHF between division and brigade was established, however, it is believed that the VHF configuration is too bulky for mobile type operations. The airlift requirements for the VHF facilities was three (3) CH-47A helicopters. The generator trailer and AN/VQC-69 shelter were both sling-loaded on a CV-47 and while lifting to a LZ, the sling broke resulting in complete loss to both items.

(6) Medical Evaluation: During the operation, a composite clearing station was established in the forward area. This clearing station consisted of doctors, dentists, medical staff and medical supplies from the Brigade and Battalions size units involved. A nurse anesthetist and surgical team from the Third Surgical Hospital was also available. Medical evacuation helicopters were on “Stand-By” at all times.

The medical coverage afforded by this clearing station was excellent. The presence of the medical evacuation aircraft at the clearing station markedly decreased evacuation time from the front lines to the medical installation. The location of the clearing station in a fairly secure area with medical facilities and capable physicians and medical supplies resulted in excellent emergency care. On one occasion, the surgical team performed life-saving surgery. Once the patient had been stabilized at the clearing station, evacuation further to the rear was accomplished with a minimum of danger and discomfort.

b. Personnel Status During Operation DURHAM:

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<th>On Initiated</th>
<th>On Terminated</th>
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<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASIGN</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FID</td>
<td>863</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
10. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. The employment of an increase of massive artillery fires to seal and clear areas for advancing ground forces conducting search and destroy operations, proved very effective and enhanced the maneuver elements to move uninterrupted and rapidly.

b. The airmobile move of the AIE TAC CP to forward locations by CH-47 aircraft was another technique introduced and used effectively.

c. Special equipment used (See appendix 1)

11. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: The most significant aspect of Operation BIRMINGHAM was the destruction of vast quantities of VC supplies and facilities along the BACH DAC River between Cambodia and South Vietnam. The impact of this operation should have a long term effect on VC ability to shelter and feed large numbers of personnel.

The battle of LO GO once again demonstrated the effectiveness of the combined arms team. Following a devastating artillery and air preparation, two Infantry Battalions demonstrated their ability to maneuver in close terrain and successfully engage and destroy an enemy force.

Notwithstanding the material losses, the loss of prestige and control in an area formally considered a safe haven should result in a demoralizing blow to VC stability and influence in TAY NINH Province. This Brigade plans to exploit its victories over the VC in TAY NINH Province through its widespread Psychological Warfare media.

Another aspect of the operation which has tactical significance was the ability of the Brigade Task Force to react rapidly to a fluid tactical situation. By use of HU-1D and CH-47 aircraft the Brigade was able to move swiftly, orienting itself on suspect VC locations rather than specific geographic objectives.

Operation BIRMINGHAM added another first to the 1st Brigade list of achievements by having been the Brigade furthest west into War Zone C.
In Conclusion, Operation BIRKINHAM becomes another Hallmark in the counter-insurgency effort in Vietnam.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

90

1. Op Overlay in AO BUICK
2. AO MERCURY
3. Op Overlay in AO FIAT
4. Op Overlay in AO FIAT
5. Hosp Base Area
6. Base Camp
7. Base Camp
8. Intell Legend
9. CS After Action Report
10. PSY War Op

SAMUEL J. WIZZERLI
Major, Infantry
Adjutant
Inclosure 1 (Op Overlay in AO BUICK) to After Action Report, 1st Bde Operation DURINGHAM, dtd 24 May 66.
Inclusion 2 (AO MERCURY) to After Action Report, 1st Bde Operation DURHAM, dt 24 May 66.
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Inlosure 3 (Op Overlay in AC FLAT) to After Action Report, 1st Int. Operation
HERINGHAM, dtd 24 May 63.
Inclosure 4 (Op Overlay in AO FIAT) to After Action Report, 1st Bde Operation DIMINGHUM, 3rd 24 May 56.
Inclosure 6 (Base Camp) to After Action Report, 1st Dco Operation DURHAM,
cld 24 May 66.
Inclosure 7 (Base Camp) to After Action Report, 1st Dde Operation DEEKENAHAN, dtd 24 May 66.
Inclosure 8 (Intell Legend) to After Action Report, 1st Dde Operation HENNINEM, 24 May 69.

LEGEND FOR REPORTED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

- REPORTED P/6
- DETENTION CAMP
- BASE CAMP
- MEDICAL FACILITY
- STORAGE/SUPPLY AREA
- PRODUCTION AREA
- ADMINISTRATIVE FACILITY
- STRONG POINT
- ROAD CUT
- INFILTRATION POINT
- TRENCH

LEGEND FOR ACTUAL LOCATIONS

- 1 BASE CAMP
- 2 SUPPLY/STORAGE POINT
- 3 RICE AND/OR SALT CACHE
- 4 FUEL DUMP
- 5 DEFENSIVE AREA
- 6 HOSPITAL
- 7 GX CURT FACTORY

Sheet 1 of 2 Sheets

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, Use of CS on Objective 2, 1st Brigade

1. PURPOSE:

a. To test the effectiveness of Riot Control Agent (RCA) CS in the preliminary portion of the preparatory fire on a selected target area suspected to contain VC in permanent and/or semi permanent underground positions.

b. To test the capabilities of masked troops to operate in heavily wooded areas contaminated by agent CS under long periods of time.

2. MISSION: Support the mission of 2/16 Inf to search and clear approximately one square kilometer of jungle area, (center of mass XT 374478) by use of massive concentration of RCA CS.

3. GOVERNING FACTORS:

a. Design of CS Drum Bomb:

(1) Each drum contained 80 pounds of agent CS in 10 each 8 pound sacks. Total weight of filled drum 168 pounds.

(2) Detonating charge for each drum consisted of two each M-4 bursters, a non-electrical blasting cap, a length of time fuse cut to a specific length to obtain an optimum height of burst, and a M2 non-electric fuse lighter.

b. Delivery of CS Drum Bomb:

(1) The drums were dropped manually from CH-47 helicopters, each fuse lighter was pulled individually to light the time fuse and the drum pushed out of the helicopter.

(2) Factors that determined the HOB of each drum were:

(a) Length of the time fuse

(b) Altitude of the helicopter

(c) Lag time from when the lighter is activated until the drum is dropped from the helicopter.

c. Weather Conditions:

(1) An inversion condition existed in the target area. Wind speed was approximately 1 knot in a westerly direction.

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AFFIRMATIVE

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Use of CS on Objective 2, 1st Brigade
FRG ORDER 5-66 Operation HUDDLES

(2) Wind speed and direction was determined by colored smoke grenades thrown by 2/16 Inf to mark their positions as the helicopters approached the target area.

a. Two passes by three CH-47 helicopters, 30 drums per helicopter, were made over the target area. The first pass began at 0800, along a line from XT 372474 to XT 380480. The second pass was made at 0807 along a line from XT 387483 to XT 368477.

b. Immediately after the CS drop an airstrike was made by five Air Force fighter bombers followed by artillery to kill enemy driven above ground by the CS.

c. Troops from companies A & B, wearing masks, entered the target area at approximately 0900. Masks were kept on until 1030 when an all clear was given.

(1) Troops were told to remask 5 times for periods from 5 to 15 minutes from 1030 to 1230 as contaminated areas were uncovered.

(2) Troops masked initially at approximately 0820 when CS traveling down wind reached their attack position.

(3) Total time troops were masked between 0820 to 1230 was approximately 3 hours.

5. Effects of CS Bombs in the Target Area:

a. Drums that detonated above ground caused a contamination radius extending to 75 meters around the impact area.

b. Vegetation was contaminated causing stinging to exposed skin.

c. The impact of drums was sufficiently close together to form a barrier thru which unprotected personnel could not pass.

d. Premature detonation of CS drum bombs caused CS to be detected up to an altitude of 1300 ft and 7000 meters down wind from the high air burst.

e. The affected area retained the CS contamination longer, as wind in dense jungle areas did not remove CS in air suspension thereby allowing it to settle on underbrush.

6. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. A requirement for a more accurate method of detonating at desired HOB must be developed because the HOB for individual drums varied from ground level to an altitude of 750 ft.

b. CS contamination of the target area was sufficient to cause unprotected personnel great discomfort and render them incapable of effectively defending positions.

c. Thick jungle underbrush reduces the overall effective radius of each CS bomb.
SUBJECT: After Action Report, Use of CS on Objective 2, 1st Brigade PRAG
ORDER 5-66 Operation BIRMINGHAM

1. Masked troops can operate in CS contaminated areas with minimum difficulty in movement through the heaviest underbrush.

2. Large areas can be contaminated by this type of CS bomb forming impassable areas to unprotected personnel. The expected length of persistence of such a barrier is approximately 30 days.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. A timing device be used to obtain low, 25-50 feet, height of burst to reduce downwind loss of agent from the target area. The timing fuse used on the E-158 CS bombshell would be sufficient for this use.

b. Future targets be selected that are known enemy strongpoints. This Type CS bomb is an overkill for reconnaissance type usage.

c. Drops should not be made when troops are downwind from the target area to reduce the time masks must be worn.

d. Troops be instructed to cover as much exposed skin as possible prior to entering a CS contaminated area.

e. This type CS bomb be employed to form impassable barriers for unprotected personnel.

f. Aviation units within the operational area must be notified when CS is to be employed due to the effects caused by climatic conditions and the method of detonation presently used.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

SAMUEL J. AZZARELLI
Major, Infantry
Adjutant
Phase I 24 April 1966  PSY WAR OPERATIONS

C-47 based at Bien Hoa flew coordinates WT 9967-WT 0164-WT 9964-XT 0164 dropping 100,000 leaflets (50,000 #Sp-893, 25,000 #137, and 25,000 #191).

Phase II 25 April 1966

C-47 based at Bien Hoa flew coordinates WT 9768-WT 0068-WT 9770-WT 0071 dropping 100,000 leaflets (50,000 #Sp-893, 25,000 #188, 25,000 #191).

26 April 1966

U-10 flew coordinates WT 9767-WT 0167-WT 0169-WT 9669-WT 9671-WT 9771 dropping 54,000 leaflets (15,000 #Sp-893 #AH30000-AH50000, 25,000 #186 and 10,000 #192).

28 April 1966

U-10 flew over coordinates XT 0664-XT 0764-XT 0672-XT 0872 playing 1 hour Chieu Hoi tape #64, XT 0072-XT 0275-WT 9895-WT 9873-WT 9773-WT 9973 dropping 20,000 #137, XT 0373 dropping 5,000 1st Div Good Guy Leaflets, XT 9975-WT 9777-XT 0883-XT 0881 dropping 20,000 #192, XT 0976-WT 0765-WT 0695-WT 0699 dropping 19,000 Sp-893 #AH98001-AH100000, XT 0172 Americans are here to defeat the VC, 10,000.

29 April 1966

U-10 flew over Vicinity of Lo Go dropping 40,000 #193 and playing 3 hours of Chieu Hoi tapes #38 and #58 along Rts 13 and 22.

30 April 1966

U-10 flew coordinates WT 9965-WT 9968-WT 0565-WT 0568 dropping 79,000 leaflets (19,000 #Sp-893 #AH247000, 20,000 #186, 20,000 #137, 20,000 VC Life vs ARVN Life).

Phase III 1 May 1966

U-10 flew coordinates WT 9675-WT 9775-WT 9676-WT 9776 dropping 25,000 #FB09.

2 May 1966

U-10 flew coordinates XT 4943-XT 5345-XT 5634-XT 5835 dropping 50,000 leaflets (40,000 #100 and 10,000 #969).

3 May 1966

Moved to 1st Bde Hqs and coordinated #7. 8-5.

4 May 1966 planned for 5 May 1966 sweep of Plantation.

U-10 flew over entire Ben Cui Plantation dropping 200,000 leaflets (50,000 #Sp-893, 50,000 #137, 60,000 #F03, 40,000 No Safe Haven leaflets) and playing Chieu Hoi tapes for 2 hours.
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5 May 1966

Moved out with 2/18, 2nd Bde in Ben Cuil Plantation sweep.

6 May 1966

Returned with 2/18 and 1st Bde to Tay Ninh.

**TOTAL LEAFLETS FOR OPERATION AND THREATS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
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<th>Leaflets</th>
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<td>25,000 $137 Surrender Instructions</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25,000 $151 Unable to Fight On Our Terms</td>
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<tr>
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**TAPES AND THEMES**

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ANNEX J
AFTER ACTION REPORT 2D BDE
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OPERATION
BIRMINGHAM

2ND BRIGADE

1ST INF DIV

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MAJ: RCS/13/32) (Operation BIRMINGHAM)(U)

THRU: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVID-T
APO U.S. Forces 96345

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J321
APO U.S. Forces 96214

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation BIRMINGHAM, Brigade Search and Destroy Operation.

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 081300H May - 151515H May 66 (2d Brigade participation).

3. (C) GENERAL: Operation BIRMINGHAM was initiated by Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division OPORD 8-66 (BIRMINGHAM) dated 191200H April 1966. The original plan for this operation envisaged the employment of only two Brigades, the 1st and 3rd Brigades. However, on 1 May, the 2d Brigade was ordered into the operation area in TAT QUANG Province, 31st ARVN GTA. Entering combat on 5 May, the brigade assumed command of forces at BASE IV, a critical cross-road, menaced by sizable VC forces. Once the VC threat subsided, 2d Brigade's area of operations shifted to BINH DUONG Province, 32d ARVN GTA. 2d Brigade OPPLAN 8-66 issued 072300H May, became OPORD 9-66 at 091200H May 66. Operating under this order, 2d Brigade moved to LAU TIM to 10 May. The Brigade tactical plan for this portion of the operation called for an attack on the left bank of the Saigon River toward the IRQN SHAPE.

Throughout Operation BIRMINGHAM, the 2d Brigade maintained a Rapid Reaction Force that could be employed in the event an element of the Brigade made contact with a major VC force.

The operation was conducted in six phases. See paragraph 6. During these phases, 2d Brigade was never out of range of its DS Artillery, which provided continuous support during the operation. 2d Brigade participation in Operation BIRMINGHAM was conducted under 1st Infantry Division control. Operations were in conjunction with 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, conducting similar type operations in the same general area.

a. Reporting Officers: Col. A.E. Milloy, CMO

b. Task Organization: (Initial)

- 2/2 Inf: Lt Col E.L. Farmer, CMG
- 2/5 Inf: Lt Col W.S. Hathaway, CMG
- 1/18 Inf: Lt Col L.R.W. Barton, CMG
- 1/28 Inf: Lt Col L. Davis
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2/18 Inf: Lt Col H. McCrystal, Cmg
1/4 Cav: Lt Col L. Lewina, Cmg
8/5 Arty: Lt Col J.R. McGiffert II, Cmg
1/5 Arty (DS)(Reinf): Lt Col D.C. Rogers, Cmg
Brigade Troops:
HHC 2d Bde (-)
2d Plt, 1st MP Co

a. Available information prior to commencement of Operation BIRMINGHAM indicated that a VC buildup was in progress within Zone C. The 271, 272 and the 273rd VC Regiments were reported, from various sources, to have moved from Zone D to unknown locations in Zone C. COSVIN Headquarters was also reported in the operational area. Other information consisted primarily of reported enemy installations and fortifications. All intelligence information initially came from G-2, 1st Infantry Division.

b. Enemy Situation: No major engagements between large VC units occurred during this operation. The VC conducted harassing and defensive tactics, employing mines, booby traps and sniper activity to protect their installations. Significant installations discovered during the operation included:

(1) Recon Platoon, 1/2 Infantry at 091/00H May, located a base camp/commo center vic XT297697. Two rifles, a 40mm rocket launcher and a document containing uncoded communications information were captured. The complex also contained a radio of unknown nomenclature believed to have been destroyed by SA fire.

(2) C 2/18 Infantry located a VC base camp at 120900H May vic XT560391 containing a weapons cache of 23 US Cal .45 pistols (pistols were wrapped in waterproof paper marked "To South America"), 25 P38 pistols, 19 Cal .22 single shot Russian rifles, 3 Cal .22 magazine loaded Czech rifles, 52 mines, grenades and booby traps and 250 lb blocks of TNT. 25 bicycles and 150 uniforms were also discovered. Documents in the complex indicated the camp was occupied by 963 Bn which changed its name to Group 48 in 1965.

c. Fortifications: No significant fortifications were found.

d. General: The area contained various small supply caches, generally located near populated areas and well defined trails and streams. These appeared to be defended by guerrillas or local force units acting as caretakers. Two villages, vic XT560580 and XT555838, were believed to be under VC control along with the plantation vic XT54928.

One VC stated that the plantation owner was a VC who provided jobs during the day for the VC and gave them missions at night. The majority of the surrounding populace seeking to be sympathetic towards the VC.

e. Pay War/Civil Affairs: Civic action given on Operation BIRMINGHAM was primarily in the medical field. Six medical patrols and one large sick call were conducted for a total of 1,350 persons receiving symptomatic treatment. Psychological operations were conducted during the seizure and search of the village of BEN SUC (XT560325). Airborne loudspeaker appeals were used to move the entire population (approximately 700) out of the village, to facilitate the search. Once assembled, the populace was treated by the medops team and spoken to by the Vietnamese Province Chief, BEN DUONG Province. The 8-5, TRI TRAM District, assisted
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2/10 Inf: Lt Col H. McCrystal, CSM
1/4 Cav: Lt Col L. Leisure, CSM
8/3 Arty: Lt Col J.R. McGiffert II, CSM
1/5 Arty (R): (Reinf): Lt Col D.C. Rogers, CSM

Brigade Troops:
HHC 2d Bde (-)
2d Plt, 1st MP Co

b. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Available information prior to commencement of Operation BIRMINGHAM indicated that a VC buildup was in progress within Zone C. The 271st, 272nd and the 273rd VC Regiments were reported, from various sources, to have moved from Zone D to unknown locations in Zone C. COSVIN Headquarters was also reported in the operational area. Other information consisted primarily of reported enemy installations and fortifications. All intelligence information initially came from G-2, 1st Infantry Division.

b. Enemy Situation: No major engagements between large VC units occurred during this operation. The VC conducted harassing and defensive tactics, employing mines, booby traps and sniper activity to protect their installations. Significant installations discovered during the operation included:

(1) Recon Platoon, 1/2 Infantry at 0100L May, located a base camp/commo center via XT2769. Two rifles, a PPG 40, 60mm rocket launcher and a document containing uncoded communications information were captured. The complex also contained a radio of unknown nomenclature believed to have been destroyed by SA fire.

(2) 2/18 Infantry located a VC base camp at 1209Z May, vic XT5439 containing a weapons cache of 23 US Cal .45 pistols (pistols were wrapped in water proof paper marked "To South America"), 25 P38 pistols, 2 Cal .22 single shot Russian rifles, 2 Cal .22magazine loaded Czech rifles, 92 mines, grenades and booby traps and 250 lb blocks of TNT. 25 bicycles and 10 helmets were also discovered. Documents in the complex indicated the camp was occupied by D963 Bn which changed its name to Group h in 1965.

c. Fortifications: No significant fortifications were found.

d. General: The area contained various small supply caches, generally located near populated areas and well defined trails and streams. These appeared to be defended by guerrilla or local force units acting as caretakers. Two villages, vic XT530380 and XT565360, were believed to be under VC control along with the plantation vic XT5439. One VC stated that the plantation owner was a VC who provided jobs during the day for the VC and gave them missions at night. The majority of the surrounding populace seems to be sympathetic towards the VC.

e. Pay War/Civil Affairs: Civic action given on Operation BIRMINGHAM was primarily in the medical field. Six medical patrols and one large sick call were conducted for a total of 1,250 persons receiving symptomatic treatment. Psychological operations were conducted during the seizure and search of the village of BEN SIC (XT580335). Airborne loudspeaker appeals were used to move the entire population (approximately 700) out of the village, to facilitate the search. Once assembled, the populace was treated by the medkap team and spoken to by the Vietnamese Province Chief, BEN SIC District, assisted.

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the effort. Coordination was achieved through MACV Advisory Team #91 at DAU TIENG. An extensive printed media, psychological campaign was conducted in support of the Brigade action. The leaflet drops were controlled and supervised by the Division 6-5 and attached Psy War units.

5. (C) MISSIONS:

a. 2d Brigade assumes command of forces at BASE IV, defends BASE IV, prepares for operations to north (8-9 May).

b. 2d Brigade conducts cordon and search, search and destroy operations via BASE II and SE to Objective 21 (10-15 May).

6. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

a. Maneuver: This operation was conducted in six phases as follows:

Phase I: A verbal order issued on 4 May, initiated this phase of Operation BIRMINGHAM. On 5-6 May, Brigade Headquarters (-) and 1/18 Inf moved to BASE I located at TAY NINH airfield and began planning for Brigade's deployment in Operation BIRMINGHAM.

Phase II: A verbal order issued on 8 May, sent the 2d Brigade into combat at BASE IV, a critical crossroads 15 miles NE of TAY NINH. Once operational, the Brigade assumed OPCON of four Battalions and began patrolling extensively from this site. A co-located fifth Battalion (ARVN) worked with the Brigade in close coordination and cooperation.

Phase III: OPORD 9-66 and FRAGO 01 to OPORD 9-66 were published on 10 May 66. Bde conducted an administrative airmobile move to DAU TIENG airfield. On arrival, two Battalions moved to assembly areas in zones, a third Battalion remained v/c of airfield as Brigade Rapid Reaction Force.

Phase IV: On 11 May, two Battalions attacked SE in zone to seize Objectives ALPHA and BRAVO, destroying VC forces, facilities and bases enroute. The third Battalion remained as the Brigade Rapid Reaction Force.

Phase V: FRAGO 02 to OPORD 9-66. On 13 May, two Battalions continued to attack SE to seize Objectives 21 and 21A. A third Battalion was employed as the Brigade Rapid Reaction Force.

Phase VI: FRAGO 03 to OPORD 9-66. 2d Brigade elements, redeployed from Operational Area by air to PHU LOI where they boarded trucks for a motor march to BERMACAT base camp.

b. Fire Support: Fire support was provided by Artillery, TAC Air and UTTs. These were used for on call fires, and also to interdict VC concentrations and routes of withdrawal. The direct support artillery battalion was reinforced by a 155mm/8" battery during a portion of the operation. As often as possible, the Brigade maintained at least one helicopter fire team on standby at the Brigade CP to escort resupply and Dust off missions, provide air cover for convoy moves and conduct experimental night recon flights with the aid of Starlight Scopes.

7. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Chronology:

19 April - 2d Brigade received op Division OPORD 8-66 (BIRMINGHAM). 2/16 and 2/18 Inf, Brigade units to participate, began planning.

23 April 4 2/16 Inf (1 Co attached to 3/1 Cav upon arrival last Bde), 2/18 Inf (attached to 3rd Bde upon arrival), and 2 Bty, 1/1 Arty (attached to 2/18 Inf) departed base camp for Operation BIRMINGHAM.
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1 May - At 0600h, 2d Brigade received verbal orders from Division to cease operations and be prepared to move to BIRMINGHAM AO. At 0612h, HHC 2d Brigade and 2/16 Inf were ordered to move by air to TAY NINH WEST airfield on 5 May and 6 May respectively. Planning for movement continued throughout the day.

2 May - At 0600h, 1/2 Inf was airlifted to TAY NINH WEST by C-123 aircraft. A quartering party from 1/18 Inf accompanied this move. At 0615h, final elements closed TAY NINH WEST. HHC 2d Brigade occupied a sector of the perimeter defense around TAY NINH WEST airfield (Division Base). 2d Brigade began planning for employment in subsequent phases of Operation BIRMINGHAM.

3 May - At 0630h, 2d Brigade published OPLAN 5-66 (BIRMINGHAM), a contingency plan to reinforce TF HOLLINGSWORTH during operations near the Cambodian Border.

4 May - A moving party from 1/18 Inf was airlifted to TAY NINH WEST. 2/18 Inf was delayed until after extraction of 3rd Brigade from LZ to the north. At 0615h, 2d Brigade received verbal orders from Division to move to TAY NINH WEST. HHC 2d Brigade was lifted to BIRMINGHAM AO. At 0617h, 2d Brigade received Division FRAW 0 46-66 (BIRMINGHAM). At 0618h, 2d Brigade occupied a sector of the perimeter defense around TAY NINH WEST and closed to any location north, at 0619h.

5 May - Beginning at 0630h, 2d Brigade began planning for future operations. At 0630h, 1/2 Inf was airlifted to TAY NINH WEST. At 0615h, FRA 0 46-66 (BIRMINGHAM) was published by 2d Brigade, directing it to conduct search and destroy operations in the MICHELIN Plantation Area. At 0620h, 2d Brigade published OPLAN 5-66 (BIRMINGHAM), a contingency plan for operations SE in the MICHELIN Plantation Area.

6 May - 1/16 Inf and 1/5 Artillery were placed under OPCON 2d Brigade. At 0618h, Brigade received Division FRAO 0 46-66 (BIRMINGHAM). At 0620h, 2d Brigade published OPLAN 6-66 (BIRMINGHAM), a contingency plan to reinforce TF HOLLINGSWORTH during operations near the Cambodian Border.

7 May - At 0700h, 2d Brigade published OPLAN 6-66 (BIRMINGHAM), a contingency plan for operations SE in the MICHELIN Plantation Area.

8 May - To counter VC threat NE of TAY NINH, 2d Brigade was ordered to move the 2/16 and 2/16 Inf to BASE IV and assume control of US forces there. 2/16 Inf began moving to BASE IV at 0612h, closing there at 0619h. Upon arrival of 2d Brigade's Command Group at 0619h, 2d Brigade assumed control of 1/2 Inf and 1/5 Artillery. At 0615h, 1/2 Inf and 1/5 Artillery were placed under OPCON 2d Brigade. At 0618h, Brigade received Division FRAO 0 46-66 (BIRMINGHAM). At 0620h, 2d Brigade published OPLAN 5-66 (BIRMINGHAM), a contingency plan to reinforce TF HOLLINGSWORTH during operations near the Cambodian Border.

9 May - During the evening of 8-9 May, maneuver Battalions of 2d Brigade defended their sector of the perimeter around BASE IV, embushing extensively. At first light, Battalions sent out platoon and company sized patrols within their AO. Patrols from 2/16 Inf, 2/16 Inf, ARVN 7th Rn and 1/5 Artillery ranged throughout their areas without contact. In operations NE, Recon 1/2 Inf located a VC village and later came in contact with VC elements in a jungle communications complex. The complex was destroyed. Recon 1/2 Inf was called upon to maneuver SW to NE and engage the retreating VC on their flank. Before elements of 1/2 Inf could link up contact had been broken by the VC. B and Recon 1/2 Inf then joined together and continued to patrol their sector throughout the night without further contact. During the day, the 7th ARVN Battalion was airlifted from BASE IV and sector of responsibility within the perimeter were adjusted. 8/6 Artillery, which had been ES to 2d Brigade, moved during the day to the Artillery Base and reverted to a 2S mission. 1/5 Artillery remained ES from the Artillery Base. At night, Battalions established 11 ambush sites without contact. At 0912h, OPLAN 6-66 (BIRMINGHAM)
10 May - After ambushing extensively all night without contact, 2d IDa units reinserted their ambush sites at first light and began preparing for an airmobile move to DAU TIENG airfield and subsequent offensive action to SE. By 100720H, Recon and B 1/2 Inf, which had continued to patrol NE during the evening without contact, had returned to BASE IV. With 1/1 Cav securing the PF, 2d Brigade units commenced movement to DAU TIENG. Upon departure of the last helicopter from BASE IV, 1/6 Cav returned to Division control. Upon arrival at DAU TIENG, 1/2 Inf received a mission change and reverted to OPCON 3rd Brigade. By 100930H, 2/18 Inf had closed at DAU TIENG airfield and had moved SE in zones, conducting detailed searches along their routes into RON positions. At 101600H, 1/18 Inf, which had been OPCON 1st Infantry Division, reverted to 2d Brigade control and began to move to DAU TIENG closing there at 102700H. Upon arrival, they assumed mission of Brigade Rapid Reaction Force, via DAU TIENG airfield.

11 May - Commencing at 110000H, 2/16 Inf moved from RON position and surrounded the village of THANH AN. At 110615H, Battalion began a search of the village, collecting a total of 55 villagers. After screening the villagers, all of them were considered VC suspects and evacuated. While searching the village, Battalion drew several rounds of SA fire from a treeline to the south. At 111100H, 2/16 attacked SE towards Objective BRAVO, securing it at 111610H. Battalion established RON position and called for resupply. During resupply, Battalion received SA fire from S & SE along with approximately 32 rifle grenades sustaining 3 WIA. Gun ships were dispatched and mortar fire placed on the source of this fire. Ambushes were then sent out by all 2/16 elements. While emplacing an ambush north of THANH AN, C 2/16 engaged an unknown number of VC, suffering 5 US WIA. Enemy casualties were unknown. In action to the east of 2/16 Inf, 2/18 Inf ambushed extensively during the night of 10-11 May and attacked SE at 110800H May 55, towards Objective ALPHA. During the day they located and destroyed 1,625 tons of rice and an old base camp. By 111510H, they had secured Objective ALPHA and commenced active patrol activity in the vicinity. Throughout the day, 1/18 Inf remained Brigade Rapid Reaction Force.

12 May - During the night of 11-12 May, 2d Brigade units established 17 ambush sites. One of these ambushes made VC contact on two separate occasions. Under cover of darkness, 2/16 Inf surrounded the village of THANH AN, completing encirclement at 120655H. Search of the village began at first light. At 120620H, A 2/16 received SA fire south of the village, suffering 5 WIA. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 120730H, Bn received SA fire north of the village. US casualties from this sniper fire were 1 KIA and 1 WIA. Gun ships were sent out to the area but sniping continued throughout the morning resulting in 10 additional WIA. The intensity of this fire ordinarily increased when Med Evac helicopters landed to extract wounded but by 121000H, all casualties had been extracted. Within the village, 2/16 Inf found a uniform factory with 100 black uniforms in various stages of assembly, 75 tons of rice, some tunnels and trenches, some medical supplies, and many\ VC signs. At 121555H, the District Adviser, District representatives, a local Pay Kor Tamm and CA representatives of 0-5 departed by helicopter from THANH AN where they established a collection and screening station for villagers. After assisting in screening 200-250 villagers, 2/16 moved into a series of ambush sites around the village of THANH AN.

During the day, 2/18 Inf conducted saturation patrolling to the south, east and north in zones. By 120700H, all companies had established patrol bases from which to conduct operations for the day. Patrols reported small encounters with VC during the day, killing 1 VC (BO) and wounding 1 (Prob). At 120900H, C 2/18 came upon a large weapon's cache at which fuel, rice, medicines, medical supplies, miscellaneous documents and two sampans were also located. Later B 2/18 Inf patrol was hit by a claymore set off in a tree. The patrol suffered 2 US WIA, a third US
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WIA resulted from subsequent sniper firing. Throughout the day, 1/18 Inf remained at Dai Tieng as Brigade Rapid Reaction Force, on two hour alert for employment as Division Rapid Reaction Force, and at various times on alert to assist in the evacuation of downed aircraft.

13 May - During the night of 12-13 May, 2d Brigade units established ambushes vicinity AO positions. In the morning, Brigade assumed OPCON of 1/28 Inf and transported them into positions vicinity Objective BRAVO, airlifted 1/18 Inf into positions of 2/18 Inf, and extracted 2/18 Inf back to BMARCAT base camp. During the day, 1/5 Artillery and Brigade CP also deployed to new locations north of THanh AN. At 131130H, 1/28 Inf, which had secured an LZ for the arrival of 1/28 Inf continued their attack SB in zone. At 131130H, lead elements suffered 1 WIA from claymores and made contact with an unknown number of VC. At 131720H, a small arms cache was located. VC sniper activities hindered the Battalions movement throughout the day. At 131130H, 1/18 Inf began attacking SB in zone. At 131350H, 1/18 Inf made contact with unknown number of VC suffering 3 WIA from claymores and sniper activity. An Air Force Evac helicopter was requested but came under heavy sniper fire as it hovered over the pickup area and began to lower a hoist. The Air Force Evac helicopter then aborted the evacuation attempt. Wounded were then taken to a distant clearing and evacuated by team leader of UTT fire team. Sniping activity directed against Battalions continued throughout the afternoon. Throughout the day, 1/28 Inf patrolled extensively in THanh AN area without contact. At night, however, their perimeter was probed by VC force of undetermined size on two separate occasions. Results unknown.

14 May - Under cover of darkness, 2/16 Inf attacked SB to surround the village of BEN SU. While moving into position to search the village, a man in a 2/16 Inf Command Group stepped on a mine, 7 WIA resulted. By 140050H, Battalion had surrounded the village, which was protected by an earthen berm, barbed wire and a mine field. Periodic SA and grenade fire were received from VC within. At 150500H, a Pay War team arrived and began broadcasting for the inhabitants to evacuate the village. The Pay War effort was successful and villagers evacuated BEN SU as ordered. At 151000H, a village elder led a patrol to the entrance of a tunnel network, protected by a fortified bunker. A brief fire fight ensued in which the patrol suffered 2 US WIA. The tunnel network was explored for several hours without results. At 184200H, the sweep of the village began. No arms or supply caches were found, but 29 emplaced mines were discovered. At 190000H, Battalion moved to RN position. At 190000H, 1/18 Inf attacked SB to surround village of SUCI CAT. Lead elements discovered two small base camps/food caches enroute and on one occasion made fleeting contact with a small VC force. By 191500H, encirclement of village was complete, but search revealed village was partly burned and sparsely inhabited. No arms or supply caches were found. During encirclement, a 1/18 killed 1 VC (Prob). Battalion began moving to RN positions in late afternoon, closing there before dark. Enroute, the Battalion discovered a base camp and made contact with three VC. While pursuing them, lead elements were hit by claymores, 2 US WIA resulted. At 193000H, A 1/18 engaged 2 VC, killing one (Prob). 1/28 Inf patrolled vigorously around Objective BRAVO during the day locating three extensive tunnel networks and destroying 15 sampans, a large wheat and rice cache and considerable kerosene. Contact with VC throughout the day was fleeting.

15 May - During the evening of 14-15 May, 2d Brigade units conducted local patrolling and established ambushes vicinity Objectives BRAVO and 2L. On 15 May, patrol suffered 1 KIA from friendly artillery during the night. Continuing at 150000H, 1/18 and 2/18 Inf were extracted from a LZ via Objective 2L and airlifted to PHU LOC. From PHU LOC, led by motor vehicles, 2/18 Inf moved back to base camp. Brigade Headquarters (-) avhilarited from 2L via Objective BRAVO to PHU LOC and from there also moved by motor march back to base camp. 1/5 Artillery (-) and 1/28 Inf, being 1st Brigade units, were airlifted directly to PHU LOC. During the day, 2/18 and 1/18 Inf had no VC contact. However, 1/28 Inf, which
remained on Objective BRAVO until almost 151700H, encountered VC on three separate occasions, capturing 1 VC, killing 1 VC (BC) and wounded 1 VC (Prob). Miscellaneous supplies were also discovered by this Battalion during the day. At 151700H, the Battalion began airlift to PHOC VINH by UH-1D, CH-47 and CH-3 aircraft. Upon arriving at PHOC VINH, the Battalion reverted to OPCON 1st Brigade.

8. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery: 1/5 Arty, which was in Direct Support of the 2d Brigade throughout this operation, operated effectively. On one occasion, this battalion was reinforced by an 8" Battery from 8/6 Arty.

b. Air Force: TAC Air was employed on both preplanned and immediate targets. The Brigade ALO processed all air requests for the Brigade and encountered no problems. The effects of TAC Air strikes were hard to gauge, however, as troops usually did not enter all the areas struck. Air Force rescue helicopters with winches were employed on one occasion without success as the helicopter was hit by SA fire as he came into pick-up a casualty.

c. Army Aviation: On four separate occasions, Battalions moved by means of army aviation. Movements made were well coordinated and effectively executed.

9. (C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly Losses:

KIA: 3
WIA: 26

b. Enemy Losses:

KIA: 3 (BC)
KIA: 21 (Prob)
WIA: 4 (Prob)
VC: 1
VC: 15
Ralliers: 1
Weapons: 80
TNT Charges: 250
Miscellaneous SA Amo
Bobby Traps: 15
Grenades: 100
Bicycles: 25 & parts for making 75-100 more
Base Camps: 9
Huts: 3
Tunnel Complexes: 4
Several Trenches, Bunkers & Foxholes
1 Comm Center w/1 radio set, 1 headset & 18' wire
Rice: 155.975 Tons
Tobacco: 1.5 Tons
Salt: 15½ Tons
Peanuts: 200lbs
250 Uniforms (Black)
1 Harness
1,110 gallons Fuel
100 Cans: 10 gal
10 x 10 sheets of tin
24 x 40 Duplicate Ink
1,056 Flashlight Batteries
Miscellaneous clothing, medical supplies, equipment and documents.

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10. (c) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Personnel:

(1) Strength 23 April 1966 to 4 May 1966:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Rear Detachments</th>
<th>Prior to Ops</th>
<th>After Ops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/16 Inf</td>
<td>209 to 170</td>
<td>31 1</td>
<td>809 37 1 856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/18 Inf</td>
<td>190 to 258</td>
<td>36 2</td>
<td>823 39 2 837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B 1/7 Arty</td>
<td>10 to 15</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>134 11 5 183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Strength 5 May 1966 to 15 May 1966:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Rear Detachments</th>
<th>Prior to Ops</th>
<th>After Ops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC 2d Bde</td>
<td>86 to 94</td>
<td>25 4</td>
<td>130 28 6 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/16 Inf</td>
<td>218 to 259</td>
<td>37 1</td>
<td>871 37 1 908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/18 Inf</td>
<td>355 to 419</td>
<td>37 1</td>
<td>883 37 2 914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/18 Inf</td>
<td>236 to 307</td>
<td>38 2</td>
<td>836 39 2 878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B 1/7 Arty</td>
<td>9 to 10</td>
<td>1 6</td>
<td>35 1 7 0 97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Administrative Plans: Administrative plans and procedures continue to be adequate.

c. Logistics: The Brigade Trains consisted of the Brigade 8-4 section (-) and attached Battalion Trains.

(1) Medical: The forward clearing station was operated by Co B, 1st Med Bn with attached elements of the 93d Evacuation and 3rd Surgical Hospital.

(2) Maintenance: Contact teams of signal, automotive, armament and small arms, provided by Headquarters and Co 1st Maintenence Battalion, were adequate.

(3) Supply: Prescribed loads carried were considered adequate.

(4) Transportation: Resupply within the Brigade was conducted from the Division Log Base utilizing air delivery techniques. Items not available from the Division Log Base were delivered to the Log Base from Base Camp utilizing OV-2 aircraft.

(5) Class III: All Class III requirements were fulfilled on a 24 hour basis by the Division S6 Battalion.

11. (c) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. Battalion frequently uncovered sizeable caches of rice and other foodstuffs in the jungle. Because of the size and location of these caches, it was often impossible to extract them by helicopter and they had to be destroyed in place. Under these conditions, adequate destruction of rice and foodstuffs was usually time consuming and required excessive amounts of conventional explosives or special equipment. One unit of this Brigade reported that, when time is critical, detonation of a claymore mine buried close to the bottom of the rice facing WP, spread the rice over a sufficiently wide area that the cache was considered destroyed.

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b. Evacuation of wounded personnel continued to be a problem. Once contact had been made with the VC and the first US casualty taken, the ground commander was all too frequently faced with the choice of allowing the VC to break contact so that he could call in a med evac helicopter, or using litter teams to carry casualties forward while attempting to maintain contact. By insisting that litters be carried by company medics, company commanders within this Brigade were able to maintain contact with the VC for longer periods of time after they had received some casualties. This did not mean that they delayed calling a med evac helicopter, rather it meant that they continued moving while waiting for the helicopter to arrive in the area.

12. (C) COMMANDERS ANANLYSIS

An analysis of the statistical results of 2d Brigade operations is not truly indicative of the impact of operations in the Birmingham AO. While the amount of supplies which were destroyed by this Brigade is imposing, the operation was even more successful in light of the following:

a. In Phase III, the 2d Brigade reacted quickly to a changing situation and stopped the planned attack of three VC Regiments in an area N of TUY NING.

b. In Phases IV and V, the Brigade deployed rapidly to DAI TIMG. From there it moved southerly into an area never before searched by US forces. Since GVN forces had not been in this area for over a year, 2d Bde operations along the east bank of the SAIGON River were able to re-establish government contact with the village of BEN SUC.

13. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

a. Conclusions:

(1) While relatively successful, search and destroy operations in the BIRMINGHAM AO would have been even more successful had battalions been able to return to areas they had rapidly passed through and conduct more extensive searches.

(2) The rapid displacement of DS Artillery by helicopter to areas inaccessible by air contributed significantly to the 2d Brigade's freedom of movement.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) Green troops have a tendency to fire too soon when observing a target. They must be indoctrinated to let the enemy get close with the idea of a first round kill.

(2) When a break is planned during an operation, battalions should, if feasible, have their own mess halls. Two per Battalions would suffice.

(3) One hot meal each day would have a tremendous impact on the morale of troops and provide a break in the steady diet of "C" rations.

(a) Hot meals should be planned prior to each operation to insure proper accountability for rations drawn.

(b) A minimum of two messes should be utilized to prepare the meal. Unit mess personnel should accompany the meal to insure proper distribution. Mess personnel remain overnight and go out on the morning extraction.

(c) The use of paper plates and plastic spoons reduces the cleaning requirement in the field and at Trains.

(b) Heavier Trains are required for sustained operations.

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in the field. Battalion S-1's should be able to draw from S&T in the field to replace lost and/or damaged equipment. One of the most difficult problems is need of a laundry facility to provide a steady rotation of clothes for the units in the field. This should be located within the trains area.

(5) Airmobile operations are getting better and better, however, they still require planning and an opportunity for the ground commander to coordinate with the lift commander or a responsible representative, sufficiently in advance to permit time for adjustments to be made.

(6) Aircraft for resupply should be, in so far as possible, kept separate so that units can resupply at a time most compatible with each unit's tactical situation. One aircraft per battalion would suffice.

(7) Too many men evacuated from the field for necessary but minor medical reasons were evacuated all the way to the rear.

(8) In the interest of the unity of effort and smooth response to order, the tactical tailoring of units based on habitual association is extremely desirable when practicable.

(9) Comprehensive load lists for all types of aircraft are mandatory if the battalion is reacted rapidly and smoothly to an order for an airmobile operation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WINSTON R. JAMES

2 nd Lt
1 - Phase III Major Infantry
2 - Phase IV Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
20 - O3, 1st Inf Div
1 - CO
1 - XO
1 - 2/16 Inf
1 - 1/18 Inf
1 - 2/18 Inf
1 - 1/7 Arty
1 - 1/4 Cav
6 - 53 Files
OPERATION
BIRMINGHAM

3D BRIGADE
1st Infantry Division

WILLIAM D. BRODERICK
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

THAW: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO US Forces 96345

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J321
APO US Forces 96243

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation BERLINER - Search and Destroy

2. DATES OF OPERATION: 24/7/70 April to 3/21/70 May 1966

3. LOCATION OF OPERATION: Ta Hieu Province and WZ 205b C

4. COMPLMNT HINDU-PI: 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division

5. UNIT CONSTITUTE:

Brig Gen James Hollingsworth, Task Force Hollingsworth
Colonel William D Bruckner, CO 3d Brigade
Lt Col Kyle W Sample, CO 2/28 Infantry
Lt Col Lee J Henry, Jr, CO 1/16 Infantry
Lt Col Jack J Cony, CO 2/2 Infantry
Lt Col Richard Prillman, CO 1/2 Infantry
Lt Col Hunter McPherson, CO 2/28 Infantry
Lt Col Robert Haldane, CO 1/28 Infantry
Lt Col Frank R Tims, CO 2/23 Artillery

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

Headquarter 3d Brigade
2/28 Infantry
1/16 Infantry
1/2 Infantry
2/2 Infantry
2/28 Infantry
1/28 Infantry

7. NAME AND LOCATION:

a. 2/23 artillery

(1) Size of Force: Four 105mm howitzer batteries, two 155mm howitzer batteries and Headquarters Battery (-) in direct support of the 3d Brigade Task Force. One of the 105mm batteries was attached from the 1/7 Artillery throughout the operation. Another battery was attached from the 1/5 Artillery for a short period of time. Two 155mm howitzer batteries from the 8/6 Artillery were also in direct support of the Brigade Task Force for a short period of time. Headquarters Battery (-), one 105mm howitzer battery, one 120mm howitzer battery, and one 175mm gun battery were in support of the LAI HX base camp.

(2) How and When Deployed:

1
AVID-WJ-C

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (400/BCS/13/32)

15 June 1966

(a) The 2/33 artillery (-) moved by C130 aircraft from Lea KHE to TaL KHE 3. The battalion (-) was moved from TaL KHE 3 into the operational area by CH47. One battery was moved directly from Lea KHE by CH47 aircraft into the operational area.

(b) During Operation HUNGR joking the battalion with attached batteries expended 25,721 rounds of 105mm and 1,298 rounds of 155mm on a total of 3,304 separate missions.

(3) Results of Effectiveness: Throughout operations the fires of the battalion were accurate and violent. All missions were accomplished in a highly professional manner. The battalion gained much needed experience in air mobile operations by displacing over 200 miles by air. Although no large Viet Cong forces were encountered the battalion with attached batteries fired over 25,000 rounds on preparation fires for landing zones, preparation fires in support of infantry plans, and known and suspected VC targets.

b. Air Force: The Air Force flew 497 close air sorties in support of the 3d Brigade Task Force during Operation HUNGR. Twenty sorties were flown to prepare landing zones. The fighter sorties were flown as listed below:

24 Apr 1966 - 35 sorties
25 Apr 1966 - 21 sorties
26 Apr 1966 - 36 sorties
27 Apr 1966 - 24 sorties
28 Apr 1966 - 35 sorties
29 Apr 1966 - 31 sorties
30 Apr 1966 - 24 sorties
1 May 1966 - 40 sorties
2 May 1966 - 26 sorties
3 May 1966 - 11 sorties
4 May 1966 - 20 sorties
5 May 1966 - 21 sorties
6 May 1966 - 9 sorties
7 May 1966 - 0 sorties
8 May 1966 - 42 sorties
9 May 1966 - 6 sorties
10 May 1966 - 8 sorties
11 May 1966 - 21 sorties
12 May 1966 - 29 sorties
13 May 1966 - 21 sorties
14 May 1966 - 20 sorties
15 May 1966 - 26 sorties

There were 19 sorties used as immediate air strikes suppressing sniper fire. The remainder of the sorties were used to destroy base camps, supply areas and to search for possible VC locations and base camp areas. There were no significant sightings or findings through the air support portion of Operation HUNGR.

c. Army Air Support: During Operation HUNGR the 3d Brigade Aviation Section flew a total of 515 missions for a total of 307 hours. The section operated forward maintenance elements at the Brigade site location to accomplish daily maintenance. The Brigade AVN See scheduled two CH21G helicopters daily in support of the operation. On some occasions operations a minimum of one CH13 for each battalion and one CH13 for Brigade Headquarters will be required. The 3d Brigade Aviation Section cannot support this requirement with current resources. No significant operational problems were encountered by the 3d Brigade Aviation Section during Operation HUNGR.

11/3 Avn Co in 152 of 3d Bn flew 589 sorties for a total of 1,442,336 hours, which included 937 passengers and 465,1 tons of cargo.

8. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Estimate of VC Strength: Intelligence received on the operational area, War Zone C, established it as a major VC logistical base, training area and safe haven for VC forces utilizing three major infiltration routes along the Vietnamese-Cambodian border at Ngam Ba Mt7978, 10 00 Mt7975, and Xuan Ghia Mt7969.

Estimates of VC strength were not given; however, OD information listed the VC G300 battalion (XTC9A1) and G30 (XTA2A4) as the only confirmed
units in the operational area. Possible units were two unidentified battalions (XT2668 and XT2666). Reported units consisted of three unidentified regiments (XT2869, XT7676 and XT9577), the 512th battalion (XT0372), the 531st Battalion (XT0450) and 0355 Company (XT2666).

Other units that were reported as influencing the area of operations as operation MINIMAL progressing were COO Company (XT1943), 305th Regt (XT1866), 9763 and 9764 Regiments (XT9659, XT9557, XT9555 and XT9755), 50th Regiment (XT0190), 70th Regiment (exact location unknown; however, 1 battalion was reported to be in BRIE DONG Province and a second battalion from XT2869 to XT5685 and a third battalion from XT3389 to XT0976), 527 Regiment believed to be in the MICHELIN PLANTATION area.

OB information indicated the largest concentration of VC installations such as base camps, storage areas, medical facilities, and production areas in the land mass between the Kach C.1 DaC river and the Kach and Da river (XT9757, XT0557, XT9773 and XT0571).

b. Source of Intelligence Received Prior to the Operation: Headquarters 1st Infantry Division was the primary source of intelligence information prior to and during the operation. OB information was given in the form of overlays and proved to be a tremendous improvement over previous practices of producing detailed lists of OB information which required posting and evaluation at Brigade level prior to dissemination to units. Photo coverage prior to D-DAY for the raid on COSVN headquarters was excellent in quality of photos and allowed sufficient time for units to propose sand table plans for the execution of the raid.

c. Situation Anticipated in Objective Area: It was generally felt that the same situation would be encountered as has been experienced in previous Division or Brigade size operations—that the VC would not stand and fight due to the size of the force deployed, except when trapped or to protect important bases of installations. It was anticipated that the VC would use mines, booby traps and snipers extensively to harass and delay the advance of US troops to allow time for evacuation of important installations and to avoid heavy engagements.

d. Situation Encountered During the Operation: There was no major contact made by elements of the 3d Brigade Task Force; however, several instances of contact were made by units on discovery of base camps and other installations as the personnel manning these installations fought rear guard and harassing actions. The most significant engagements were made by the 1/15 Infantry in a base camp area near XT02576 when they engaged a VC force of 18 to 24 VC. The VC in this camp were well trained and decisive in their reactions and defended the camp and its contents stubbornly until driven out. Four VC had been positioned and tied in to near the camp to provide security and sniper fire. The VC were driven from the camp to provide security and sniper fire. The VC were driven from the camp with 9 VC KIA (Est), 5 VC KIA (Est), 8 VC WIA (Est) and 4 US KIA. Four 1960 model bolt action rifles were captured, a large amount of medical supplies and documents were discovered upon search of the camp. The camp consisted of a heavily trenched and tunnelled system to include six huts. The camp had not been adequately prepared for ground defense although the trenches and tunnels did provide excellent cover from either artillery or airstrikes. 1 of the VC KIA was a medic and from the unusually large amount of medicines found in the camp it appears to be an aid station.

A VC Infantry made contact with an estimated 25 VC in a tunnel and from XT9366 at the late afternoon of 26 April 1965. In engaging this VC force they discovered an ammunition storage area. However, it was late in the day and the storage complex was not fully exploited at that time. The following day 2/18 Infantry in making further search of the area encountered several booby traps that had not been there earlier. This action of the VC gives an indication of the relative security enjoyed by the VC in that ZOMC C as in most base camp complexes discovered by US troops primary fortifications were for the protection from airstrikes and not from the advance of ground troops. On the whole less booby trap devices were encountered than had been anticipated.

In the vicinity of XT0266 there were indications of a major VC training area as evidenced by the number of wooden simulators of CHINIC potato waist grenades and simulated bunker positions made of nodal sand.
At an LZ and later at 3d Brigade CP (XT0278) an extensive bunker and trench system was found by 2/2 Infantry from vic XT020781 to XT027380 along the wood line. Although this trench and bunker system did not show signs of recent use and had probably been built for resistance to French paratroop techniques, it could have been fairly successful in resisting US heliborne operations had it been properly manned and had the VC chosen to fight in that particular area.

In the populated areas southeast of Tan Nhut City local operations gave evidence of VC control of the local population.

Rosters of persons inhabiting the area were found as well as extensive amounts of propaganda material. It appeared that no large VC units were in the area, but that village and hamlet governments were pro-VC.

The OB information provided by G2 1st Infantry Division proved to be quite reliable information. Specific locations of new camps and other installations were not always correct, but in areas where OB information held numerous installations this always proved to be true.

**Terrain Features, Obstacles and Weather:**

Terrain in the area was flat land with gentle slopes, with the exception of Nui Da Bien Mountain (XT101). Most elevations were less than 50 meters. No operations were carried on in the vicinity of Nui Da Bien Mountain so it was not a hindrance but rather an aid in air and land navigation as a very distinctive terrain feature.

- Dense jungle area interspersed with rice paddies, stream areas, and some jungle clearings which provided helicopter landing zones was the type of terrain encountered in the area north of Tan Nhut City.

- Terrain in the area southeast of Tan Nhut City was flat paddy area except for rubber plantation and small patches of jungle.

- Natural obstacles in the area were the Rach Cal Bach and Rach Ben De Rivers which were too deep in most places to be forded. VC field fortifications were primarily trenches and protective shelter from aircraft raids.

- Weather during the early part of Operation BIRMINGHAM was hot, dry, and humid; however, the monsoon rains began on about 6 May 1966. Weather prevented the accomplishment of the raid by Task Force Hollingsworth on the reported location of GSVN headquarters as driving rains restricted the use of helicopterborne operations.

### 9. MISSION: From 1st Infantry Division CPORD 8-66 (Operation BIRMINGHAM) (U), dated 12000 April 1966

1st Infantry Division in conjunction with ARVN III Corps conducts operations deep into War Zones C to locate and destroy VC forces and base camps during the period 24 April to 7 May 1966.

9a. **1st Brigade:**

- **(1) Attached:** 2/2 Inf on 23 Apr 66.
- **(2) A Marine company** is effective 23 Apr 66. Conduct initial airborne assault into AO FORD from Lai Khe on 24 Apr 66 with 1 infantry battalion and 1 artillery battery.

9b. **2nd Brigade:**

- **(1) Deploy LST (=) to Tan Nhut 200 aircraft on 24 Apr 66**
- **(2) Conduct search and destroy operations in AO FORD.**
- **(3) On order conduct search and destroy operations in AO OLIVETTE and PLYMOUTH.**
- **(4) Be prepared to release 2 infantry battalion as Division reserve on 1 hour.**
- **(5) Move 1 rifle company from battalion remaining at Lai Khe for the defense of AO 101 on 23 Apr 66.** On arrival this company attached to Div Artillery for the defense of PHU 101.

9c. **Coordinating Instructions:**

- **(1) Submit aircraft requirements to this headquarters ASAP.**
- **(2) Authority granted to Brigade Commander to employ ECM in accordance with existing directives.**
10. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: From 3d Brigade OPORD 8-66 (Operation BIRMINGHAM)

EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operation: 3d Brigade TF moves by ground and air to AO FORD on 23 Apr 66 and 24 Apr 66 to conduct S&G operations against VC forces and installations. TF VALLEYS prepositions at Ltr TIMING on 23 April 1966 and is attached to 3d Brigade upon arrival. TF DEVIL conducts an air mobile assault via BASE 1 to establish Brigade base followed by an air mobile assault by 2/18 Inf. to secure BASE 3. Bde (-) moves by C130 to TAL MINH 3, transloads to HHIB and CH-47 helicopters for movement of 1/16 Inf to BASE 3 and 2/33 arty (-) and Bde CP to BASE 1. B Btry 1/7 arty moves by CH47 from Ltr TIMING to BASE 1. 1/16 Inf and 2/18 Inf on order conduct coordinated S&G in AO MERCURY and LINCOLN. 2/2 Inf conducts independent company size operations in AO CEASE and FALCON. Air Force only for preparation of LZ's vic BASE 1 and BASE 3. Thereafter 16 battalion supports from BASE 1, GS from BASE 2. Can preplanned and on call.

b. TF DEVIL:

(1) Release B Btry 2/33 arty upon arrival of command group 2/33 arty into BASE 1.

(2) On order be prepared to revert to Division Reserve within 1 hour.

c. 1/16 Inf: S&G in AO MERCURY on order.

d. TF VALLEYS:

(1) Secure BASE 3 for landing of 1/16 Inf.

(2) S&G in AO LINCOLN on order.

(3) B Btry 1/7 arty detached upon departure from Ltr TIMING.

e. 2/28 Inf:

(1) Conduct operations along Hwy 13 on 23 Apr 66 for passage of Brigade Trains.

(2) Ltr KHE base camp security force.

f. 2/33 arty: BS.

g. B Btry 1/7 arty:

(1) Move from Ltr TIMING to BASE 1 by CH47 on 24 Apr 66.

(2) Upon arrival in BASE 1 attached to 2/33 arty,

h. B Co 1st Engr bn: Provide engineer demo teams to each infantry battalion less Ltr KHE 1-3-3 camp security force.

i. Div Trains:

(1) Move by motor march to PHU LOI on D-1 to arrive NLT 1530 hrs.

(2) Attached Div arty on arrival for motor march to AO.

j. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) The 2/2 Inf and 1/16 Inf will leave behind at Ltr KHE a minimum of one 81mm mortar and crew per company and a minimum of two 4.2 inch mortars.

(2) Departing units submit their stay-behind foxhole strength to Brigade 03 NLT 2300 Apr 66.

(3) All personnel will carry protective mask.

(4) Upon VC contact is made, all efforts will be made to fix and destroy the enemy force.


(6) Infantry battalions when under Division control will submit written daily sitreps to arrive at Division NLT 0000 hours each day.

(7) Rice caches will be destroyed on approval this headquarters.

11. ENDED:

The 3d Brigade Task Force initiated Operation BIRMINGHAM at 224700 April 1966 with the 1/16 Infantry, 2/2 Infantry, 2/18 Infantry and 2/33 Artillery. The 3d Brigade was airlifted by C130 aircraft from Ltr KHE to a staging area vic TAL MINH. The 2/18 Infantry was airlifted into a staging area vic Ltr TIMING on 23 April 1966.

On 24 April the 2/2 Infantry conducted a heliborne assault into LZ vic ZP108605 and secured the area for the landing of B Battery 2/33 Artillery. The
2/18 infantry conducted a heliborne assault into LZ vic XT045592 and secured this area for the landing of the 1/16 infantry at the brigade CP. The 1/16 infantry was moved by air into LZ vic XT040598. The 2/18 artillery moved 1 battery by CH-47 to Base Area 1 vic XT00600. 1 artillery battery from the 1/7 artillery moved into Base Area 3 at XT830570. The remaining elements moved by C-30 to the Division Log Base vic T21 NiMi 3 (XT160570).

On 25 April at 0000 hrs B 2/2 infantry and C 2/2 infantry conducted S&K from their RON position to XT080585 and XT078680. A 2/2 infantry, battalion CP and B Battery 2/33 artillery returned to XT113504. At 0130 April 2/2 infantry began movement by UH1D to vic Brigade CP. At 0210 2/2 infantry closed vic Brigade CP and assumed security of the Brigade CP. At approximately 0215/4 April 2/2 infantry began to S&K to the west vic XT055595 arriving Brigade CP location at 2515/4 with negative contact. The 1/16 infantry dispatched 3 platoon size patrols at 250700 April to the following locations: A 1/16 Inf at XT025833, B 1/16 Inf at XT042595 and C 1/16 Inf at XT085653. At 0503 April 3 1/16 infantry patrol made contact with 2 VC vic XT050590. In the fire fight 1 VC was KIA and his weapon captured. At 1025 hrs B and C 1/16 infantry began to S&K to the north vic XT042595 and then west. A 1/16 infantry remained in vic of RON position providing security for the Brigade CP. At 1325 hrs a 1/16 infantry was relieved of the mission of Brigade security and moved out to follow 1/16 Infantry (-). At 0900 hrs 2/18 infantry began to S&K to the following locations: A 2/18 Infantry XT99205, B 2/18 Infantry XT90618, C 2/18 Infantry XT99832, battalion CP moved with 2/18 Infantry. There was negative contact. At 1935 hrs a 2/18 Infantry suffered 1 KIA from sniper fire vic XT025257.

On 26 April the 2/2 infantry conducted local patrols vic Brigade CP. At 261017 April 2/2 infantry patrol found 1 ton of rice vic XT045595 and 1/2 ton of rice vic XT00859. A 2/2 infantry patrol destroyed a tunnel vic XT043527 at 1235 hrs. A 2/2 infantry patrol found 2,200 pounds of rice, numerous picks and some fish vic XT043592. At 1500 hrs C 2/2 infantry battalion and evacuated 1 ton of rice vic XT012572. At 1835 hrs C 2/2 Infantry linked up with 1/26 infantry and closed into vicinity Brigade CP. At 1955 hrs a 2/2 infantry fired on approximately 10 VC vic XT028585 with negative results. The 1/16 infantry conducted S&K operations to the west at 260810 April. A 1/16 infantry found an old base camp vic XT001590. This camp contained several foxholes, 2 huts, 150 pounds salt and 80 pounds rice. The salt, rice and huts were destroyed. At 1611 Infantry continued their S&K operations. B 3/16 infantry found a way-station vic WT988599 which could accommodate 100 persons and contained a kitchen, several huts and several bunkers which were destroyed. Indications were that this camp had been recently used. At 1230 hrs B Company 1/16 infantry found 3,000 pounds rice and 50 pounds salt vic WT985195 which was destroyed in place. At 1900 hrs C 1/16 infantry made contact with an estimated 6 VC vic XT003594 and began to pursue. As the pursuit continued, C Company ran into a VC base camp vic XT003594 which was defended by an estimated 20 VC. A violent fire fight developed and C 1/16 infantry maneuvered against the VC force. Realizing that they were outnumbered the VC withdrew to the southeast. Artillery fire and aircraft were called in behind the VC. Contact was broken at 1430 hrs. C 1/16 Infantry sustained 3 KIA and 4 WIA. The VC suffered 5 KIA (26), 5 KIA (Puc), and 7 WIA (Pos). Also 4 weapons were captured. This base camp contained a truck, a tank, 2 mortars, 4 KIA bunkers, a blackboard, medical supplies and documents were destroyed at the base camp. The camp was destroyed and the supplies and documents were burned. At 1900 hrs 1/16 infantry closed into their RON position with 1/26 infantry. At 2130/45 April 1/16 infantry began to S&K to the west. At 0950 hrs C 2/18 infantry received via vic WT994609. Fire was returned without known results. At 1130 hrs 2/18 infantry began to S&K to the west and at 1245 hrs 2/18 infantry was ordered to move B 2/18 infantry closer to C 2/18 infantry. The 2/18 infantry was later instructed to move west and search the east bank of the river today. While searching this area D 2/18 infantry received SA and M79 fire from a base camp vic WT995622. At 1213 hrs C Company suffered 1 WIA and 2 KIA from M79 fire vic WT995618. The VC that were engaged with D 2/18 infantry broke contact at 1207 hrs. At this time elements of D 2/18 infantry commenced to search the base camp vic WT995618. The camp contained 1 bunker and 4 huts. D 2/18 infantry suffered 1 WIA from M79 grenade during the search of the camp complex. The estimated VC force in the camp when D 2/18 infantry arrived was 20. This action resulted in 1 VC KIA (26) and an estimated 3 VC KIA and 3 VC WIA. At 1350 hrs D 2/18 infantry found an elaborate base camp vic WT996622. This camp was capable of accommodating 300 persons and contained a bicycle repair shop, medical
On 27 April at 0900 hrs the 2/2 Infantry began movement to vic XT023645 by CH47. At 1200 hrs a CH47 was hit by sniper fire vic XT0337 wounding one of the pilots. The 2/2 Infantry at 1700 hrs began to ERC to the south of their RON positions along the river. At 0918 hrs B 2/2 Infantry found 1,600 lbs of rice vic XT045565 which was evacuated. At 0941 hrs B 2/2 Infantry moved to vic XT034594 where they found a rice cache on 26 April and discovered that the rice had been removed during the night. At 1200 hrs B 2/2 Infantry received 6A fire from snipers vic XT043310. B 2/2 Infantry took the area under fire with negative results. B Company returned to their RON position at 1200 hrs with no further contact. At 1600 hrs 2/2 Infantry began movement by road to vic XT023643 and closed this area at 1720 hrs. Upon closure 2/2 Infantry moved to their RON position vic XT035545 and closed that area at 1800 hrs 27 April. At 0800 hrs a patrol from 0 1/16 Infantry found a base camp vic XT045538 which contained 8 huts and a trench system. 3 men were seen leaving the camp. They were taken under fire with negative results. At 1300 hrs 1/16 Infantry moved by UH-1D from their RON position to vic XT031435 and closed at 1330 hrs. At 1530 hrs from C1/16 Infantry was wounded by sniper fire vic XT031456. 1/16 Infantry received vic of the Brigade CP during the night of 27-28 April 1966. At 2707 April 1968 2/2 Infantry began to ERC. At 1300 hrs a 2/2 Infantry moved to WT886600 and began to ERC north along the river. B 2/2 Infantry returned to the ammunition area vic XT043323 and destroyed the ammunition which they had discovered in a previous search of that area. At 0900 hrs they received 2 HAM from snipers while searching the area. At 1000 hrs Headquarters 2/2 Infantry discovered a battalion size base area vic WT896690. The camp contained 200 buildings (100-100 persons each), 50 huts and a supply point that contained uniforms, kitchen, 20 tons of rice, 25 hogs, 25 chickens, 3 bicycles and one treadle-powered sewing machine. All were destroyed except the uniforms which were evacuated. Documents containing 120 names indicated that the VC 11th Company was occupying the camp. Along the length of the river that the 2/2 Infantry searched many complexes were found. The following items were found along the river: 200 huts, 56 tons rice, 45 gallons of syrup, 40 gallons of fish sauce, 25-50 16P216ICALS , 1 rice hanger, 1 rice grater, 1 generator, 1 2HP engine, 4 bicycles, 2 ox carts, various types of livestock and assorted tea, coffee, salt, etc. 2/2 Infantry moved to vic WT896670 and closed this area at 2200 hrs 27 April. In the vicinity of WT896670 2/2 Infantry attacked the ammunition complex and 1 US HAM airframe. There were approximately 4-500 men of VC in this complex. In the vicinity of WT896670 2/2 Infantry found 2 bicycles, numerous documents and 1 tape recorder. At 0000 27 April all 2/2 Infantry units closed their RON positions. In addition to ground action the air Force flew 27 sorties in close support of 3d Brigade TF. They also destroyed 1 POL dump vic WT896620 and a fuel and ammunition storage area vic XT035545.

On 28 April at 0900 hrs the 2/2 Infantry began ERC operations from its RON position and east to the Vinh 20 River vic XT043615. Upon reaching the river at 1245 hrs the 2/2 Infantry began to ERC north and south along the west bank between the 63 and 65 B-52 strike lines. The 2/2 Infantry had negative contact and at 1515 hrs began to move to vic XT013445 where at 1837 hrs they linked up with 1/16 Infantry. They remained in this position for the night. The 1/16 Infantry remained in reserve during the morning of 28 April and secured the artillery base and Brigade CP. Upon the arrival of the 2/2 Infantry at 1115 hrs the 1/16 Infantry began to ERC to the northeast in the area XT0355 with negative enemy contact. At 1430 hrs 1/15 Infantry closed into the RON position.
At 0830 hrs 2/18 Infantry began to S&R to the east from their RON position W1991-640. The 2/18 Infantry moved on 2 axes. At 0930 hrs they found a large base camp where, upon entering, they observed VC running away. Lead elements of 2/18 Infantry took them under fire. One VC was estimated to be WIA and one shotgun was captured. The base camp contained the following items: several Chinese claymore mines; several booby trapped Chinese grenades; numerous axes, picks and shovels; sleeping quarters for men and women; an 8-bed hospital; a ping-pong table; several gallons of whiskey; cooking area for 50 persons; a wooden cabinet; 1200 lbs rice; eating utensils; 75 1A30 batteries; 10 huts and numerous foxholes and trenches. All items were destroyed. The 2/18 Infantry then continued to S&R to the east and closed via 806 CP at 1145 hrs and became Division Rapid Reaction Force.

On 29 April the Brigade CP and the 2/33 Artillery (-) began movement to 0417 to LZ CHORD via XT02785. At 1105 hrs the Bde CP began operating from via LZ CHORD. At 1415 hrs 2/33 artillery (-) closed into LZ CHORD. At 1424 hrs 2/33 Artillery moved from its RON position to via the Brigade CP where they were picked up by UH-1D at 0933 hrs and moved to LZ CHORD where they took over security of the artillery base and Brigade CP. Locations of the 2/3 Infantry patrols for the night of 29-30 April were XT023771 and XT023772. The 2/3 Infantry (-) remained in the vic of the Brigade CP. At 0015 hrs the 1/16 Infantry moved from its RON position to via the Brigade CP where they were lifted by UH-1D and conducted an airmobile assault into LZ CHORD at 0905 hrs after an air and artillery preparation. At 0915 hrs the 1/16 Infantry received SA fire from the south end of LZ CHORD via XT02785. Fire was returned with negative results. At 1015 hrs the 1/16 Infantry received SA fire from via XT02785 resulting in 2 WIA. At 1104 hrs the 1/16 Infantry departed LZ CHORD and began to S&R to the northeast along the road. At 1224 hrs the 1/16 Infantry arrived at its RON position via XT049793 and sent out three patrols to the following areas: A Company patrol to XT048800, B Company patrol to XT0377-779 and C Company patrol to XT052802. At 1515 hrs C 1/16 Infantry received 5 to 6 SA rounds and 1 rifle grenade from via XT053796 resulting in 1 WIA. All 1/16 Infantry patrols returned to vic of battalion CP by 1745 hrs with no further contact.

Location of 1/16 Infantry for the night of 29-30 April via XT049793. The 2/18 Infantry secured LZ R&D for the extraction of the 1st and 3d Brigades. At 1200 hrs they received sniper rounds via LZ R&D resulting in 1 WIA. The 2/18 Infantry returned to the bunker complex with one killed and one wounded. The 1/16 Infantry moved onto via XT049793. At 1500 hrs a 2/18 Infantry suffered 2 KIA and 2 WIA while assaulting these bunkers. At 1730 hrs a 2/18 Infantry suffered 3 more WIA while sweeping through the bunker complex. A 2/18 Infantry continued its sweep to the north via XT02785. At 1500 hrs a 2/18 Infantry returned to the bunker complex and destroyed it. At 1615 hrs B 2/18 Infantry closed via Brigade CP and at 1642 hrs a 2/18 Infantry closed. The 2/18 Infantry remained via Brigade CP for the night. At 1642 hrs a 2/18 Infantry returned several rounds of SA fire via XT02785 resulting in 2 WIA. One VC ran to the southwest and was taken under fire with unknown results. At 1800 hrs the 1/16 Infantry began to S&R with C 1/16 Infantry headed toward XT070792 and 2/16 Infantry (-) heading toward XT063769. At 0930 hrs 1/16 Infantry was ordered to move back to its RON position via XT02785. At 1030 hrs 1/16 Infantry received several rounds of sniper fire via XT053796 with negative results. At 1118 hrs the 1/16 Infantry moved from its RON position to via Brigade CP where it closed at 1300 hrs and occupied a portion of the perimeter in conjunction with the 2/2 Infantry. At 1400 hrs the 1/16 Infantry was placed on 1 hour alert as rapid reaction force to be committed to the area of the 1st Brigade if needed. The battalion remained vicinity 34th Brigade CP for the night. At 1700 hrs a supply helicopter received heavy SA fire from via XT02783. Helicopter gun teams, airstrike and artillery were called in. Several VC were flushed into the area and taken under fire by 1/16 Infantry.
Infantry sent a patrol from B Company to check the area at this time. B Company killed 2 VC in khaki uniforms and captured 1 carbine rifle and 1 AK4 rifle.

On 1 May 1966 at 0950 hrs the 2/33 Artillery (-) and the 3d Brigade CP began to move by CH47 from PZ LASING to area WILLOW Run via XT2752. At 1142 hrs the 3d Brigade forward CP began operations from WILLOW Run. During the day the 2/2 Infantry secured PZ LASING for the extraction of 1/16 Infantry 2/33 Artillery (-) and 3d Brigade CP. The 1/16 Infantry encountered scattered sniper fire around the PZ throughout the day, at 1230 hrs helicopters received SA fire from vic XT050792. At 1350 hrs the 2/2 Infantry received 3 to 4 rounds of 5a fire from vic XT202765 resulting in 1 US KIA. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 1522 hrs the 2/2 Infantry engaged a sniper vic XT002787 and killed 1 VC (BC) and captured 1 sub-machine gun. At 1500 hrs the 2/2 Infantry killed 1 more sniper vic XT035722 and captured his weapon. At 1530 hrs the 2/2 Infantry began movement from PZ LASING to WILLOW Run by UHID and occupied the western edge of the Brigade perimeter. At 1537 hrs the 1/16 Infantry began movement by UHID from PZ LASING to WILLOW Run. Upon reaching WILLOW Run the 1/16 Infantry swept the area and put 1 company in each battalion area around the perimeter. At 1300 hrs the Recon Platoon 1/16 Infantry picked up 3 VC by XT202450. These suspects were evacuated to TAI NAI. The 1/16 Infantry occupied the southern and southeastern portion of the Brigade perimeter. The 1/16 Infantry CP was located at XT311457. At 1304 hrs the 1/2 Infantry closed into WILLOW Run from 60 MARSHALL and upon closing became attached to the 3d Brigade. The 1/2 Infantry occupied the northern and northeastern portions of the Brigade perimeter. Their battalion CP was located at XT318472.

On 2 May at 0630 hrs the Recon Platoon of the 1/2 Infantry moved to secure a landing zone vic XT275505 for the arrival of 1st Brigade elements. The area was secured by 0655 hrs. The Recon Platoon 1/2 Infantry closed back into their battalion perimeter at 0815 hrs. The 1/2 Infantry conducted ambush patrols during the night of 2 - 3 May. The battalion CP remained in the same location. 2/2 Infantry conducted care and maintenance of personnel and equipment and conducted ambush patrols during the night of 2 - 3 May. The 2/2 Infantry CP remained in the same location. The 1/16 Infantry conducted 3 patrols during the day to vic XT275450, XT305840 and XT330850. At 1330 hrs C-1/16 Infantry (-) conducted care and maintenance of personnel and equipment and conducted ambush patrols during the night of 2 - 3 May. The battalion CP remained in the same location.

On 3 May at 0700 hrs A Troop 1/4 Cavalry secured the road from vic 3d Brigade CP to vic XT3357. At 0700 hrs the 1/16 Infantry began movement by truck from their RAIN position (XT318452) to the airstrip at S401 DA (XT3357). At 0800 hrs the 1st elements of 2/28 Infantry arrived at S401 DA by C-2 aircraft from LAK XHI and the 1/16 Infantry departed by the same C-2 for LAK XHI to assume the mission of LAK XHI base camp security. 2/33 Infantry upon arrival moved to the area of the 3d Brigade CP by truck. The 1/16 Infantry Recon Platoon was moved from LAK XHI to NHI 101 by C-2 and attached to Division Artillery at 1612 hrs. Recon Platoon 2/28 Infantry was moved to the operational area. The 1/16 Infantry closed LAK XHI at 1610 hrs. The 2/23 Infantry closed the operational area at 1647 hours. The 1/2 Infantry conducted care and maintenance of personnel and equipment. At 2000 hrs the 1/2 Infantry moved to OJB 31 (vic XT4044).

On 4 May at 0310 hrs the village of OJB 31 was surrounded by the 1/2 Infantry on the west, B 1/2 Infantry on the south and southeast and G 1/2 Infantry on the north and northeast. At 0555 hrs the 1/2 Infantry was fired on by 2 VC vic XT405440. Fire was returned and 1 VC KIA (BC) was found and 2 rifles were captured (later, an airborne FAC spotted a second VC body lying near this area). At 0620 hrs a 1/2 Infantry engaged a number of VC to the south of the village vic XT080383 and killed 2 more VC and captured 2 more shoulder weapons. At 0700 hrs a Psy/Ops helicopter containing GWI officials to include the district chief made an announcement which instructed the members of the village to assemble in the market place. At 0815 hrs the GWI officials, members of the Civil affairs team, G5 representatives and SEEICAP teams entered the village to talk with the occupants. 2 VC's were picked up and evacuated from the village. A total of 61 people were found in the village. At 1020 hrs the 1/2 Infantry began to move back to their battalion RAIN position and closed that position at 1120 hrs, At 040555 hrs the 2/2 Infantry began to move from its RAIN position (XT315377) and conducted SAD operations to the southeast. At 0555 hrs the 2/2 Infantry was located in the vic of XT335433. At approximately 1000 hrs 7/2 Infantry found a
Infantry sent a patrol from D Company to check the area at this time. D Company killed 2 VC in khaki uniforms and captured 1 carbine rifle and 1 M14 rifle.

On 1 May 1966 at 0950 hrs the 2/32 Artillery (-) and the 3d Brigade CP began to move by CH-47 from PHU 16 to ASOA WILLOW HILL via XT32474. At 1114 hrs the 3d Brigade Forward CP began operations from WILLOW HILL. During the day the 2/2 Infantry engaged PZ LANDING via XT3173 for the extraction of 1/26 Infantry, 2/33 Artillery (-) and 3d Brigade CPs. The 1/26 Infantry encountered scattered sniper fire around the PZ throughout the day. At 1535 hrs helicopters received Saigon fire from XT050792. At 1350 hrs the 2/2 Infantry received 3 to 4 rounds of 50 caliber fire from XT022785 resulting in 1 US KIA. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 1522 hrs the 2/2 Infantry engaged a sniper via XT037878 and killed 1 VC (ho) and captured 1 sub-machine gun. At 1500 hrs the 2/2 Infantry killed 1 more sniper via XT037878 and captured his weapon. At 1630 hrs the 2/2 Infantry began movement from PZ LANDING to WILLOW HILL by UH-1 and occupied the eastern edge of the Brigade perimeter. At 0917 hrs the 1/16 Infantry began movement by UH-1 from PZ LANDING to WILLOW HILL. Upon reaching WILLOW HILL the 1/16 Infantry swept the area and put a company in each battalion area around the perimeter. At 1300 hrs the recon platoon 1/16 Infantry picked up 3 VC's via XT320550. Those suspects were evacuated to PHU 16. The 1/16 Infantry occupied the southern and southeastern portion of the Brigade perimeter. The 1/16 Infantry CP was located at XT31647. At 1304 hrs the 1/2 Infantry closed into WILLOW HILL from 3D MERCURY and upon closing became attached to the 3d Brigade. The 1/2 Infantry occupied the northern and northeastern portions of the Brigade perimeter. Their battalion CP was located at XT316472.

On 2 May at 0530 hrs the Recon Platoon of the 1/2 Infantry moved to secure a landing zone via XT375505 for the arrival of 1st Brigade elements. The area was secured by 0655 hrs. The Recon Platoon 1/2 Infantry closed back into their battalion perimeter at 0845 hrs. The 1/2 Infantry conducted ambush patrols during the night of 2 - 3 May. The battalion CP remained in the same location. 2/2 Infantry conducted care and maintenance of personnel and equipment and conducted ambush patrols during the night of 2 - 3 May. The 2/2 Infantry CP remained in the same location. The 1/16 Infantry conducted 5 patrols during the day to via XT295450, XT308440 and XT330440. At 1350 hrs C 1/16 Infantry (-) conducted care and maintenance of personnel and equipment and conducted ambush patrols during the night of 2 - 3 May. The battalion CP remained in the same location.

On 3 May at 0700 hrs A Troop 1/4 Cavary secured the road from via 3d Brigade CP to via XT3375. At 0700 hrs the 1/16 Infantry began movement by truck from their ROK position (XT32762) to the airstrip at SLOD DA (XT3375). At 0800 hrs the 1st elements of 2/28 Infantry arrived at SLOD DA by CH-52 aircraft from LAI KHE and the 1/16 Infantry departed by the same CH-52 for LAI KHE to assume the mission of LAI KHE base camp security. 2/33 Infantry upon arrival moved to the area of the 3d Brigade CP by truck. The 1/16 Infantry Recon Platoon was moved from LAI KHE to HU 101 by CH-52 and attached to Division Artillery at 1512 hrs. Recon Platoon 2/28 Infantry was moved to the operational area. The 1/16 Infantry closed LAI KHE at 1610 hrs. The 2/23 Infantry closed the operational area at 1847 hours. The 1/2 Infantry conducted care and maintenance of personnel and equipment. At 2000 hrs the 1/2 Infantry moved to OBJ 31 (via XT40440).

On 4 May at 0310 hrs the village at OBJ 31 was surrounded by the 1/2 Inf with the 1/28 Infantry on the west, 1/28 Infantry on the south and southeast and C 1/2 Infantry on the north and northeast. At 0555 hrs the 1/2 Infantry was fired on by 2 VC via XT30540. Fire was returned and 1 VC KIA (ho) was found and 2 rifles were captured (later, an airborne FAC spotted a second VC body lying near this area). At 0620 hrs a 1/2 Infantry engaged a number of VC to the south of the village via XT30438 and killed 2 more VC and captured 2 more shoulder weapons. At 0700 hrs a Fire/ops helicopter containing GVN officials to include the district chief made an announcement which instructed the members of the village to assemble in the market place. At 0915 hrs the GVN officials, members of the Civil affairs teams, G5 representatives and MiDCAP teams entered the village to talk with the occupants. 2 VC's were picked up and evacuated from the village. A total of 31 people were found in the village. At 1020 hrs the 1/2 Infantry began to move back to their battalion ROK position and closed that position at 1120 hrs. At 1605 hrs the 2/2 Infantry began to move from its ROK position (XT315477) and conducted SAD operations to the southeast. At 0935 hrs the 2/2 Infantry was located in the vector XT33433. At approximately 1000 hrs 2/2 Infantry found A
were picked up and evacuated at 1300 hrs. The 2/2 Infantry found 3 motor bikes and several bicycles along with some documents via XT300400. At 1600 hrs the 2/2 Infantry began to search a reported VC secret zone via XT325408 with negative results. At 1645 hrs the 2/2 Infantry found 6 tons of fertilizer in sacks via XT324-408. The fertilizer was destroyed. The 2/2 Infantry closed its RON position at 1800 hrs. A and C Company were located at XT352202. B Company was located at XT372296. At 00028 May the 2/28 Infantry began moving from its RON position (XT320-470) to via XT342446 to secure an area for Battery 1/7 Artillery. At 0815 hrs the area was secured and battery moved into that location in order to support 1/2 Infantry and 2/2 Infantry. The battery was in position to fire at 0850 hrs.

A 2/28 Infantry and Battery 1/7 Artillery remained in this position throughout the night to provide support to the 2/2 Infantry. The 2/28 Infantry (-) remained via 3d Brigade CP as security for the Brigade CP and artillery base and as Brigade Reserve.

On 5 May at 0645 hrs the 2/33 Artillery (-) moved from vic Brigade CP to vic XT332375 over Route 22 to be in position to support the 2/2 Infantry and the 2/28 Infantry. A Battery 2/33 Artillery was released from Division control and joined with the 2/33 Artillery (-). The 2/33 Artillery (-) closed into vic XT324-323 and was ready to fire at 1100 hrs. Upon closure of 2/33 Artillery (-), B Battery 1/7 artillery moved from vic XT340445 and closed vic 3d Brigade CP at 1158 hrs. The 1/2 Infantry remained via 3d CP as Brigade reserve and security force and conducting patrol via 3d Brigade CP. 1 company of 1/2 Infantry was on 90 minute alert for possible commitment to assist the 2/28 Infantry. The battalion CP remained in the same location. The 2/2 Infantry continued to conduct saturation patrolling via ODM 31. All units continued to S&D from their RON positions. At 0930 hrs B 2/2 Infantry destroyed 500 pounds of rice via XT377384. At 1055 hrs elements of the 2/2 Infantry received light sniper fire via XT355382. They pursued with negative results. At 1200 hrs the 2/33 artillery (-) received light sniper fire via XT323795. 1 element of C 2/2 Infantry moved to that location to check it with negative contact. All elements of the 2/2 Infantry closed into RON positions at 1715 hrs with no further contact. The location of the 2/2 Infantry for the night of 5 - 6 May was XT353402. At 1117 hrs the 2/28 Infantry began an airborne assault from vic Brigade CP with B 2/28 Infantry assaulting a landing zone via XT280-300. At 1129 hrs the landing zone was assaulted with negative contact. A 2/28 Infantry then conducted an airborne assault from their RON position (XT304446) into JZ via XT298317. At 1144 hrs with negative results. Upon landing, elements of the 2/28 Infantry began to S&D to the southeast toward a blocking position established by ARVN NDFP Forces via XT393271 and XT310288. After initial landings, numerous personnel were seen moving out of the area to the south toward the ARVN positions. At 1250 hours the ARVN forces picked up a VC who stated that there was a VC company dug in from XT301287 to XT506292. Air and artillery were called in on these locations with unknown results. At 1450 hrs the 2/28 Infantry reported seeing 50 VC in the open vic XT292292. An attempt was made to take them under fire, but due to a sudden cloud burst this became impossible. Air and artillery were called in on this location with unknown results. The 2/28 Infantry continued its search to the southeast. At 1541 hrs a 2/28 Infantry destroyed 15 tons of rice vic XT305290. At 1700 hrs all elements of the 2/28 Infantry had completed their search and at 1731 hrs began extracting via PZ. At 2300 hrs the 2/28 Infantry (-) moved to vic 3d Brigade CP closing at 1815 hrs. A 2/28 Infantry was moved to vic 2/33 Artillery (-) vic XT332373. During the day 3 V/C were picked up by General De Puy and General Hollingsworth.

On 6 May the 1/2 Infantry provided security for the 3d Brigade CP and acted as Brigade reserve. The 1/2 Infantry conducted local patrols vic 3d Brigade CP. At 1700 hrs A 1/2 Infantry came under operational control of the 2d Brigade. At 2300 hrs the 2/2 Infantry moved from vic its RON position to surround the village vic XT324805. At 0615 hrs the 2/2 Infantry moved into the village and at 0633 hrs B 2/2 Infantry spotted 12 personnel, 7 with weapons, who upon seeing the US troops began to flee and were taken under fire. This action resulted in 1 KIA (VC), 1 wounded VC and 1 captured VC. A thorough search of the village resulted in 3 more VC captured. Several documents were taken from the VC and evacuated. Upon completion of the search the 2/2 Infantry conducted S&D, operations to the north to vic the 3d Brigade CP. At 1230 hrs the 2/2 Infantry closed vic the Brigade CP with no further contact. The unit remained in the vic XT324600 for the night of 6 - 7 May 1966. A 2/28 Infantry conducted an airborne assault into a landing zone vic XT377381. On the initial landing C 2/28 Infantry received several small arms rounds from north of the river via XT265316. During
stop this movement. A platoon of 2/28 Infantry was landed via CH-46E to establish a blocking position. This platoon comprised about 30 personnel who were checked by the Brigade TF team and turned over to ARVN. No known VC were found at this time. 2/28 Infantry (-) and the Recon Platoon conducted S&D operations in the southwest toward the ARVN blocking position at XT265316. No contact was made during this sweep. After the movement of 2/28 Infantry was completed the helicopters airdropped a 2/28 Infantry (-) from LZ 2/33 Art (-) and brought them to their CP. At 1400 hrs a wrecker from Headquarters Battery 2/33 Art (-) tanked a ZT at XT263988, damaging the truck with no casualties to personnel.

On 8 May at 0630 hrs the 2/2 Infantry was lifted from LZ ALLISON (XT308460) and made an airborne assault on LZ ST LO (XT770470) at 0637 hrs. There was no contact on this LZ. At 0650 hrs elements of the 2/33 Artillery landed at ST LO, a 2/33 Artillery closed into ST LO at 0716 hrs and began registering. II Battery 1/7 Artillery then began to land at ST LO. At 0915 hrs a patrol from 2/2 Infantry spotted two groups of VC via XT263984. The VC were taken under fire but fled to the west. At 1035 hrs brigade was landed at ST LO. At 1100 hrs the weather began to get worse and cloud cover and rain developed. At 1130 hrs Brig Gen Hollingworth called a hold to the airborne because of the weather. At this time approximately 3/4 of 2 Battery 1/7 Artillery had been airdropped into LZ ST LO. At 1140 hrs the weather was still bad and the decision was made to call off the rest of the lift and extract those forces on LZ ST LO as the weather cleared. At 1300 hrs 2 men from 2/2 Infantry were killed from short sniper attacks made by VC. At 1430 hrs an 81mm mortar round fired by 2/2 Infantry around LZ ST LO. At 1500 hrs the 2/2 Infantry was returned to the LZ and closed at 1446 hrs. Upon completion of the extraction of the 2/2 Infantry was extracted by UH-1D at 1523 hrs and closed via LZ ALLISON at 1605 hrs. The 2/18 Infantry was placed under the operational control of the 3d Brigade at 1600 hrs. The 1/28 Infantry and 2/28 Infantry were on standby to lift into LZ VERDUN until this operation was cancelled. At this time the 1/28 Infantry was placed on alert to assist 2/2 Infantry if needed. The 1/28 Infantry was taken off alert upon the extraction of the 2/2 Infantry. The location of units for 8 - 9 May remained the same. The 3d Brigade reverted to control of Colonel Droubeck upon the return of the unit to LZ ALLISON.

On 9 May at 1440 hrs the last elements of the 2/2 Infantry were lifted by UH-1D from their LZ positions to OBJ 33 (via XT383500). 2/2 Infantry closed this position at 1633 hrs. At 1730 hrs the 2/2 Infantry was placed on 1 hour alert for possible commitment. At 1800 hrs the 2/2 Infantry was taken off alert. The 2/2 Infantry for the 2/2 Infantry for the night of 9 - 10 May were via XT586499. At 0700 hrs a Troop 1/4 Cavalry was attached to 1/28 Infantry and was given the mission of securing an engineer work party while they repaired the road from OBJ 71 to XT383500. At 1030 hrs 1/3 Infantry conducted an airborne assault into an LZ via XT444445 with no contact. Upon landing, the 1/28 Infantry conducted saturation patrolling in the BON GUI BORDER PLANTATION to OBJ 71 (XT74545). At 1300 hrs a 1/28 Infantry received sniper fire from OBJ 7444445. At 1330 hrs a 1/28 Infantry had 1 man wounded from their own mortar fire. At 1332 hrs a 1/28 Infantry found a trench about 75 meters long via XT4444445. Artillery was called on this location with unknown results. At 1330 hrs 1/28 Infantry picked up 1 VC via XT444445. After questioning, he was released at 1800 hrs.
On 10 May at 1200 hrs 1/2 Infantry came under the operational control of the 3d Brigade (upon closure into DAU TLIN) At 0943 hrs the 1/2 Infantry (-) conducted local patrolling via their RON position and care and maintenance of personnel and equipment. At 1215 hrs a 1/2 Infantry received 10 rounds of 54 fire from vic XT543478. Artillery was placed on this location with negative results. A patrol was dispatched into this area with negative contact. B 1/2 Infantry remained vic DAU TLIN and was attached to the 1/4 Cavalry (-) upon link-up. Location of 1/2 Infantry (-) for the night of 10 - 11 May was XT528473. At 0815 hrs the 2/2 Infantry moved from their RON position (XT565496) by foot and set up a base camp vic XT580540. From this location they conducted local S&O operations. At 1038 hrs the 2/2 Infantry destroyed 300 lbs of rice and 2 bunkers vic XT583326. At 1230 hrs C 2/2 Infantry destroyed 250 lb bomb vic XT575543. The 2/2 Infantry remained in their base camp location for the night of 10 - 11 May at XT580540. At 0905 hrs the 1/28 Infantry moved to recon the village of OBJ 72 (XT564250) prior to daylight. The result of this operation was 11 VCO and 2 single shot rifles being captured. The VCO were evacuated to DAU TLIN and later it was learned that 9 of them were confirmed VCO. At 0929 hrs the 1/28 Infantry made contact with 1 sniper vic XT56446. Artillery was called in with negative results. At 1011 hrs the 1/28 Infantry received sniper fire vic XT564389. At 1053 hrs C Troop 1/4 Cavalry found 2 mortar rounds (105mm) buried in the road. They were blown in place. At 1200 hrs A Troop 1/4 Cavalry came under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. At 0540 hrs the 2/28 Infantry (-) moved to surround the village at OBJ 53 (XT575705 and OBJ 54 (XT565805). C 2/28 Infantry remained vic 3d Brigade CP to provide security for the artillery base. The 2/28 Infantry (-) found 5 VCO vic OBJ 54 and discovered that the village at OBJ 53 was abandoned. Indications were that this was once a training center. The 2/28 Infantry (-) returned to their RON position vic Brigade CP at 0815 hrs. At 1300 hrs patrols were dispatched by the 2/28 Infantry to search the area vic the Brigade CP. At 1630 hrs one of those patrols found 3 tons of rice vic XT591499. The rice was evacuated. 2/28 Infantry remained in the vicinity of the 3d Brigade CP for the night of 10 - 11 May 1966. The 1/4 Cavalry (-) came under operational control of the 3d Brigade at 1730 hrs and was attached to B 1/2 Infantry. 1/4 Cavalry (-) moved into a RON position vic XT974180 for the night of 10 - 11 May. B Troop 1/4 Cavalry and B 1/2 Infantry RON position for the night of 10 - 11 May was XT51465.

On 11 May the 1/2 Infantry surrounded a village vic OBJ 82 (XT54464) with A and C Companies before first light. 0 Troop 1/4 Cavalry was attached and remained in reserve vicinity XT527474. At 0537 hrs approximately 20 VC broke through A 1/2 Infantry cordon and fired. The 1/2 Infantry (-) conducted a thorough search of the village with negative results. At 0844 hrs the 1/2 Infantry (-) moved from OBJ 82 to a blocking position vic XT547474 and linked up with A and C 1/2 Infantry at 1000 hrs. The 1/2 Infantry then went into a defensive perimeter vic XT552468. Then conducted local patrolling vic B and C Companies. The 1/2 Infantry returned to 1/2 Infantry control and B Troop 1/4 Cavalry returned to the 1/2 Infantry. The 1/2 Infantry spent the night of 11 May vicinity XT552468. 0335 hrs 2/2 Infantry moved from their RON position at XT580540 to surround OBJ 61 vic XT550540. At 0440 hrs the 2/2 Infantry began searching the village and found many people including a large group of males in the village. Vietnamese officials were brought out to screen the males, and as a result 1 VCO was apprehended. At 0740 hrs 2/2 Infantry found a directional antenna in a house in OBJ 61. At 1030 hrs C 2/2 Infantry received automatic weapon fire from 7 VC north of OBJ 61 vic XT552542. The VC were taken under fire with unknown results. At 1135 hrs the 2/2 Infantry surrounded OBJ 62 vic XT5534. At 1130 hrs they spotted 30 VC placing a 155mm round in the road vic XT553042. The VC were taken under fire and two were seen to be hit. The remainder of the VC fled.

15 June 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (HHC/RCS/13/32)

AWID-C

A wire ran into the house but no radio equipment was found. At 1550 hrs B 1/28 Infantry destroyed a booby trap vic XT542447 and at 1623 hrs A 1/28 Infantry received sniper fire fromXT440440. Artillery fire was placed on this location with unknown results. At 1800 hrs all units of 1/28 Infantry had closed their RON positions. Locations for the night of 9 - 10 May were A 1/28 Infantry XT433454; B 1/28 Infantry and battalion CP XT443457; C 1/28 Infantry XT444740. Troop A 1/4 Cavalry RON position was XT400437. At 1115 hrs 2/28 Infantry conducted an airborne assault into OBJ 33. 2/28 Infantry closed OBJ 33 at 1230 hrs with negative contact. Upon closing the 2/28 Infantry conducted patrols around OBJ 33 and at 1530 hrs elements of 2/28 Infantry captured 1 VC vic XT592499. The 2/28 Infantry remained vic the 3d Brigade CP for the night of 9 - 10 May (XT585499).
2/2 Infantry then returned to their RON position via XT650540 closing this location at 1500 hrs. The 2/28 Infantry moved from via 3d Brigade CP at 0400 hrs to surround OId 52 (XT6549). A search was made of the village at this location. No VC were found. Several VC posters were found in the village school. The MAGTF team was brought in to treat the villagers. The 2/28 Infantry departed OId 52 at 0945 hrs and closed back in via 3d Brigade CP at 1100 hrs. The 2/28 Infantry remained in the same location. B Troop 1/4 Cavalry and 1/2 Infantry moved at first light to surround OId 43 (XT5132). At 0715 hrs B Troop picked up 4 VC in OId 43. At 0810 hrs B 2/28 Infantry and D Troop moved to surround OId 43 (XT5153). VC propaganda leaflets were also found via OId 43. The search of OId 43 was completed at 1030 hrs. B Troop and 1/2 Infantry set up north of OId 43. The Brigade CP remained in the same location.

On 12 May at 1347 hrs 1/2 Infantry conducted a combat assault into LZ DONJUT. After an air and artillery preparation the 1/2 Infantry closed into the LZ at 1405 hrs and began to SBD to the east at 1445 hrs with 1/2 Infantry north along the northern edge of the woods (XT623459) and 1/2 Infantry along the trail (XT62470) and C 1/2 Infantry in the center. The 1/2 Infantry continued to SBD to the east with negative contact and closed into a RON position via XT629523 at 1300 hrs. The 1/2 Infantry began moving at 0755 hrs from their RON position (XT500240) to search OId 63. At 0904 hrs the search was completed. The 2/2 Infantry found numerous punji stakes. Foxholes indicated recent occupancy in the vicinity XT675574. A 2/2 Infantry started to SBD to the east, at the same time C 2/2 Infantry began to SBD to the southeast. Headquarters and 1/2 Infantry remained in the RON position until completion of extraction of excess equipment. At 1225 hrs 2/2 Infantry spotted 3 VC via XT675541 and took them under fire, estimating 1 VC KIA. The VC fled to the west. At 1330 hrs extraction of equipment was completed and 2/2 Infantry began to move to the east and south with negative contact. At 1650 hrs 2/2 Infantry closed its RON position via XT629507. At 0700 hrs 1/28 Infantry cam under the Operational control of the 3d Brigade. At 0758 hrs 1/28 Infantry conducted a combat assault into LZ DONY (XT662503). The 1/28 Infantry closed at 0825 hrs with negative contact. At 0918 hrs a patrol from 1/28 Infantry searched to the southwest at 1050 hrs; A 1/28 Infantry reached XT64610D with negative contact and began to return to LZ DONY closing at approximately 1230 hrs. After 1/28 Infantry closed B and C Companies began to SBD to the west at 1510 hrs. 1/28 Infantry found a base camp containing several buildings and some clothing via XT593976. Upon entering the camp 1/28 Infantry wounded 5 VC who escaped; killed 1 VC by body count and captured 1 VC. B 1/20 Infantry had 1 WIA who was evacuated. At 1510 hrs 0/28 Infantry found a base camp containing 10 buildings and several command type buildings. There was also an assortment of clothing in the camp located via XT621573. Upon entering the camp 1/28 Infantry wounded and captured 1 VC. They also found 1 sewing machine and 1 typewriter. This base camp was destroyed and the VC was evacuated. At 1530 hrs 1/28 Infantry began to move back to the east to their RON position via XT650563 and closed at 1635 hrs. At 1141 hrs the 2/28 Infantry conducted a combat assault into LZ DONY (XT632458). As 2/28 Infantry was landing an aerial observer spotted about 30-50 VC via XT630643. He marked the location of the VC with violet smoke and the FAC began to call in an airstrike on the violet smoke. At this time soldiers on DEFIRIS also throw violet smoke and a fighter made a CAS run over the LZ wounding 56 men and killing 2. During the evacuation of the wounded a 3d Brigade OH-13 helicopter was damaged by a WACI. The OH-13 had to be evacuated which was completed at 1111 hrs. At this time the 2/28 Infantry began to SBD east along the valley. A destroyed OH-13 helicopter was found via XT632450 with tail number 62135. The 2/28 Infantry continued to SBD to the east with negative contact. The 2/28 Infantry closed into its RON position via XT637453 at 1625 hrs. At 1733 hrs 2/28 Infantry received SA fire from the northwest and south of their RON position. 2/28 Infantry sent patrols to investigate with negative results. During the day the 1/2 Infantry destroyed 40 bags of cement via XT630475. 2/2 Infantry suffered 1 WIA from an anti-personnel mine via XT632077. The Brigade CP remained in the same location.

On 13 May at 0645 hrs C 1/2 Infantry received small arms fire from 6 VC via XT633450. The VC were taken under fire with unknown results. At 0752 hrs C 1/2 Infantry encountered several booby traps via XT632450 and suffered 4 WIA. The 1/2 Infantry had been SBD to the east when elements ran into heavy contact.
On 14 May at 0500 hrs B 1/16 Infantry moved from LZ KHI north along Route 13 to secure an area for the Brigade CP and the 2/33 Artillery via XT677/32. At 0630 hrs B 1/16 Infantry encountered a booby trap resulting in 2 US WIA via XT677/29. 1/16 Infantry secured the artillery base area by 0830 hrs with no further incidents. At 0955 hrs the first lift of 2/33 Artillery departed for XT677/32 by CH47. The 2/33 Artillery and the Brigade CP closed into XT677/17 at 1045 hrs. The 1/2 Infantry began to SBD north and east from their RON position at 0800 hrs. At 0920 hrs they discovered 2 very old base camps via XT677/34. These camps showed no sign of recent use. The 1/2 Infantry was held up temporarily until the artillery was in position to fire via XT677/32. They were able to start movement again at 1200 hrs. No contact was made during the day and at 1700 hrs the 1/2 Infantry moved into a RON position via XT677/32. The 2/2 Infantry began to SBD to the east in zone at 0700 hrs. At 0910 hrs they deployed 1 small base camp via XT677/31, 1 anti-personnel mine via XT677/34, and a wooden bridge via XT677/31. At 1245 hrs the 2/2 Infantry found a base camp via XT677/32 which apparently was used for manufacture of ammunition. The camp was destroyed. The 2/2 Infantry continued to SBD to the east with no further contact and closed into a RON position via XT677/31 at 1705 hrs. At 0700 hrs 2/2 Infantry checked an area via XT677/32 where there had been some VC the night before and artillery had been fired. The 2/2 Infantry found some clothing, depot supplies and medical supplies that had been abandoned by the VC. Upon completion of this search the 2/2 Infantry SBD along the valley. At 1017 hrs they suffered 3 WIA from a booby trap via XT677/34. The 2/2 Infantry continued to SBD east with negative contact and closed into their RON position via XT677/34. On 15 May at 0430 hrs the 1/28 Infantry was deployed to SBD southeast from their RON position via XT677/34 along the valley. At 0630 hrs a report was received from AVH that there was a VC company via XT677/34. An airstrike was placed on this location and the 1/28 Infantry checked the area out with negative results. The 1/28 Infantry continued to SBD east with negative contact and closed into a RON position via XT677/31 at 0700 hrs. At 0930 hrs the 1/28 Infantry was checked by a VC platoon spotted 2 VC with black shirts and branches on their backs, vicinity XT677/31. The VC fled before they could be taken under fire. At 1205 hrs 1/28 Infantry discovered a regimental size base camp via XT677/31. The 1/28 Infantry continued to SBD to the east with negative contact and closed into their RON position via XT677/34 at 1200 hrs. 1/28 Infantry continued to provide security for the Brigade CP and artillery base via XT677/34. During the morning
Infantry continued to secure Brigade CP and artillery base. At 0300 hrs 2/28 Infantry began to S&O west in same. At 0455 hrs 2/28 Infantry received SA fire from an estimated VC squad via XT723459. Artillery fire was called on this area with unknown results. At 0332 hrs 2/28 Infantry had 1 man KIA from sniper fire via XT724470. The 2/28 Infantry continued to S&O to the east with no further contact and closed into a RON position via XT775445 at 0730 hrs. The brigade CP remained in the same location.

On 16 May 1966 at 1230 hrs the 1/23 Artillery (-) continued to support the operation from vic of 1/23 Artillery (-) moved from their RON position (XT757491) to Highway 13 vic XT775445 where they arrived at 0743 hrs. A 1/2 Infantry remained vic of RON position where at 0845 hrs a portion of them was picked up by UH-1D and transported to the Lai Khe airstrip to link up with aircraft to transport them to Phouc Vinh. At 1104 hrs 1/2 Infantry (-) began movement on Highway 13 by truck to the Lai Khe airstrip. The 1/2 Infantry continued movement throughout the day to Phouc Vinh and upon closure under the control of the 1st Brigade. The 2/2 Infantry conducted operations along Highway 13 from Bu Dinh to XT794453. At 0805 hrs the 2/2 Infantry moved a mine in the road vic XT767531. At 0813 hrs the 2/2 Infantry destroyed 2 booby trapped CSU bombs vic XT764496 and 3 booby trapped 122 grenades vic XT766532. At 0930 hrs a tax collection point was located vic XT792553. At 1215 hrs the 2/2 Infantry moved a Mauser from a sniper. At 1245 hrs the recon platoon had reported that a sniper jumped out of a tree at XT7799508. The recon platoon pursued and killed 2 VC by body count and captured 2 weapons and at 1300 hrs 2/2 Infantry killed 1 VC and captured 1 weapon possibly belonging another VC vicinity XT789469. At 1430 hrs the recon platoon 2/2 Infantry destroyed 45 gallon drums of gasoline and six 5 gallon containers of oil vic XT778512. At 1516 hrs 2/2 Infantry destroyed a mine vic XT744892. It had about 100 meters of wire leading from the mine. At 1525 hrs 2/2 Infantry moved a CSU bomb rigged as a mine vic XT765558. At 1540 hrs 2/2 Infantry received sniper fire at XT700379 and placed 4.2 inch mortar fire on this area with unknown results. At 1615 hrs 2/2 Infantry destroyed an AP 2.75 inch rocket rigged as a mine vic XT754492. At about 1730 hrs the ARVN convoy began passing the area secured by 2/2. After the convoy cleared the area the 2/2 Infantry moved into a RON position vic XT785417 at 1945 hrs. At 160355 hrs 1/16 Infantry moved from Lai Khe to surround a VC position 50 S&O vic XT79431 in conjunction with the 2/28 Infantry and to secure Highway 13 from the north check point at Lai Khe to XT790420. At 0905 hrs 1/16 Infantry suffered 1 KIA and 2 WIA from a claymore mine vic XT753437. At 1645 hrs 1/16 Infantry received sniper fire vic XT783475. At 1655 hrs a man from A Company 608 off a pressure mine along the road vic XT723435 destroying a 105 jeep and resulting in 1 KIA and 2 WIA. At 1827 hrs the ARVN convoy cleared the 1/16 Infantry area and at this time the 1/16 Infantry moved into a RON position vic XT784464. At 1910 hrs a man hit a pressure mine resulting in 1 WIA. 1/16 Infantry closed into their RON position at 2130 hrs. At 2220 hrs 2/28 Infantry moved from its RON position (XT775445) to surround the village of AP 50 S&O vic XT79431 in conjunction with 1/16 Infantry. The village was searched and a total of 75 VC were picked up at 0030 hrs. The VC set off a command detonated mine against the 2/28 Infantry with negative results vic XT795438. At 0900 hrs 2/28 Infantry received SA and M79 fire from vic XT794345. Mortar fire was placed on this area with unknown results. At 1130 hrs B/2/28 Infantry moved by truck to Lai Khe and at 1336 hrs the 2/28 Infantry (-) was relieved in place by B 1/16 Infantry and moved by truck to Lai Khe closing at 1600 hrs and assume base camp security.

On 17 May 1966 the 2/2 Infantry and the 1/16 Infantry operated along Highway 13 from Bu Dinh (XT7754) to Lai Khe for passage of an ARVN convoy to the south. The 2/23 Artillery (-) continued to support the operation from vic XT797446. The 1/16 Infantry encountered numerous booby traps and was harassed by small groups of VC throughout the day with negative casualties. The ARVN convoy cleared the 3d Brigade TAOS at 1900 hrs and all units began to return to Lai Khe by vehicle. All units closed into Lai Khe at 172903 May 1966 terminating Operation JERUSALEM.
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Total WIA: 159, Total KIA: 19

### Enemy Losses

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### 13. INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS

The logistical base for the 3d Brigade Task Force was at BAY KD13. The brigade elements normally resupplied from 0600-0800 hrs and from 1500-1800 hrs daily by UHlD and CH47 helicopters. At least two hot meals were provided daily to include cold drinks and comfort items within the tactical situation permitted. The Brigade averaged 50 UHlD sorties per day with a total...
The artillery battalion averaged 10 sorties per day with total tonnage of 36 tons by CH47. Medical evacuation and support was provided by Division elements. Laundry was returned to LaI BN as required for pitching by 624th BN. The battalion lots of exchange clothing provided by the Class 1 section of lst S&T Battalion did not work out as well as planned. There were not enough uniforms for a change for every man and most of the uniforms extra large in size. During the period 24 - 26 May 1966 it became necessary to displace elements of the Brigade Trains to the base camp in order to provide quite logistical support. The time and distance and aircraft availability posed this requirement. The move was conducted with available UH1D helicopters but it is recommended that in future operations transport fixed wing aircraft be used for this type of movement.

14. **SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:**

a. The 2/23 Infantry experimented with the new howitzer round for the M79 grenade launcher. This round proves marginal in its initial tests. The range is quite limited and it is necessary to aim extremely low when engaging targets at a distance of 40 meters. In order to train personnel in the employment of this ammunition and develop confidence it is recommended that sufficient numbers of this ammunition be issued to train all personnel.

b. Chain saws were utilized for clearing helicopter landing pads in dense jungle.

15. **COMMANDERS' OBSERVATIONS:**

Some lessons learned during Operation BIRMINGHAM were:

a. Surrounding objectives prior to first light by moving elements during the hours of darkness proved to be very effective and will be used more often in the future.

b. There is a definite need for marksmanship and rapid fire training within the brigade.

In many cases during Operation BIRMINGHAM the VC were able to escape because of the inability to kill rapidly on the part of our soldiers.

c. Not enough LORIS are available. Each maintenance section needs exclusive use of an LORIS for two or three hours per day when moving in the jungle.

d. The length of SAD operations during the rainy season should be limited to 2 - 10 days for health reasons. Many of Brigade personnel developed sore, itchy, and respiratory ailments after about 8 days due to wet clothing and boots.

e. There is a definite need for training of Glim mortar crews to eliminate accidents.

f. Pathfinders supporting the 3d Brigade must know the exact pickup site and number of aircraft available prior to the conduct of an operation. The Pathfinder must be at the pickup site no later than one hour prior to arrival of the aircraft.

g. Each company sized unit needs a drying box or room for radios and equipment. Some radios went to the field in a damp condition and soon went out. To start with dry radios and batteries would insure longer availability.

COMMANDERS' OBSERVATIONS

1. The selection of the 3d brigade to be the unit to attack COSEN Headquarters is an indication of the competence and military capabilities of the unit and staff that comprise our fighting force. The attack was planned nicely and had the