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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) 14 Mar 67 FOR OT

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Operation Atlanta, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment 20-68

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report, Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Operation Atlanta (20 October 1966 - 8 December 1966). Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION ATLANTA

1. (U) REFERENCES:
   b. OPORD 09-66 (Operation ATLANTA), Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 6 September 1966.

2. (U) NATURE AND TYPE OF OPERATION: 11th Armored Cavalry Operation ATLANTA
   Search and Clear, Base Camp Security, and RoadPatrols.


b. (C) GENERAL: On 27 September 1966, II Field Force Vietnam directed the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to secure a base camp area in the vicinity of KRG 6456 to clear and secure highways and lines of communications in portions of Ben Hoa, Long Khanh and Phouc Tuy Provinces. Execution of the mission was initiated under the code name Operation ATLANTA. The operation commenced on 20 October 1966. Initially the operation was confined to the securing of National Highway 1 from KRG 700 to XU Working LOC and a portion of Interprovincial Route 2 to the area of the new base camp. Concurrently, security would be provided for the engineer work parties involved in the clearing and preparation of the area for occupancy by the Regiment in the latter part of November. A few days after the operation started the 1st Squadron and engineer units were joined by the 2nd Squadron which organized and operated out of a combat base in the Dong Que rubber plantation (FS 999) for about a month. The Regiment's general area of operation is depicted in Annex E. Initially this area of operation was divided into 3 areas as shown on the enclosed map. Later the general area was expanded to include 5 areas.

While the 1st and 2nd Squadrons were operating out of their combat bases in the KRN LOC area, the 3rd Squadron was securing the Regimental Staging Area in KRN 999 and providing security for the KRN 999 - LONG Binh area (Operations DK1M2 and JABJABJ). In addition to providing security, the 3rd Squadron conducted aggressive patrolling activities and provided artillery fire support for the DONO DAT sensitive area. By the end of the first week in November the command elements of the Regiment were operating out of the base camp area to be followed in the next 4 weeks by the remaining headquarters elements and the 3rd Squadron.

The Regiment continually demonstrated its versatility and maneuverability throughout the operation. It was not uncommon to find the squadrons operating on three independent missions covering terrain from LK REI (Operation ATTLEBORO) to the northern most limits of the 1st Australian Task Force TACR as shown in Annex K. The Blackhorse Regiment remained constantly on the alert ready to exploit its tremendous firepower and inherent cross-country mobility.

a. The reporting officer of this report is Colonel William W. Cobb, Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

b. Task Organization. Control of the operation was exercised by Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, operating initially out of a tactical command post at KRN 999 which later moved to the base camp area. The initial task organization is indicated below. Due to the duration of the operation and the additional requirements placed on the Regiment, frequent changes in task organization were necessary and are shown as occurred in paragraph 8, Execution. Commanders are shown in Annex D.
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1st Squadron
2nd Squadron
3rd Squadron

Regional Control
27th Engineer Company

37th Medical Company
55th Light Maintenance Company (DS)

59th Radio Research Detachment
23rd Military Intelligence Detachment

17th Public Information Detachment
28th Military History Detachment

5. (c) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to Operations:

(1) VC Main Force:

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<td>Long KIENH Province</td>
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Incidents: VC activities along National Highway 1 from BTN No 7 to XULIN LOC, south along National Highway 1 and Intercorporal Route 2 to BA RIA, ranged from ambushes of 0Vn and ARVN forces to roadblocks and tax collection points. The nature of the incidents indicated an attempt by the forces operating along these lines of communication to restrict the movement of civilian traffic while denying their use by friendly forces. A complete list of incidents is outlined in Annex F to this report.

(b) Reported movements:

(a) An ARVN agent reported that a VC Battalion located vicinity TD 2392 on 1 October moved to the XULIN TRANG area vicinity TD 110585. US evaluation B/2. (Comment: No main force battalions are held to be operating in this area at this time).

(b) An ARVN agent reported a VC Battalion vicinity TT 3503 to TT 3504 to TT 3502 on 29 September 1966. ARVN evaluation F/3. US evaluation 1/2. (Comment: Reliable agent report has unit vicinity TT 3301 on 3 October. Possibly company size element of the 5th VC Division or the unconfirmed Long KIENH Provincial Company, (1105).

(c) An ARVN agent reported the UV 83 B artillery battalion was being transported from TT 670 to 1 October to CSM DAO (location unknown)

Page 2 of 26 Pages
on 5 October by local laborers: ARVN evaluation C/3. (Comment: No unit is listed under that number, however, elements of the 844 Artillery Regiment are known to be infiltrating South Vietnam and reportedly headed for III CTZ. Leading elements could have reached Xuan Loc area by this time. The regiment was reportedly equipped with the U1 60mm rocket firing weapon. Characteristics: Maximum range 10km, effective range 5000m, kill radius 200m. US evaluation F/6.

(5) Enemy situation. The VC can be expected to harass convoys with mines, sniping, minor attacks of up to platoon size anywhere along routes in the Regimental sector. Mortar and minor harassing attacks could also be expected on base camps and combat base areas. Although not presently indicated, the VC does possess the capability of mounting a regimental size ambush on convoys and attacks on the 11th Armored Cavalry Base Camp.

(6) Intelligence sources: The following sources were utilised to plan the operation:

(a) II Field Force V Intelligence Report.
(b) Agent reports.
(c) 3rd Division (ARVN), (Formerly 10th Division).
(d) Central Intelligence Operations.
(e) National Police.
(f) Intelligence Estimate - III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ).
(g) MACV monthly order of battle updated.
(h) 11th Field Force V Intelligence Imagery.
(i) Photograph maps.
(j) Visual reconnaissance.

(7) The intelligence information compiled for Operation ATLANTA varied in currency from four days in the case of order of battle (OB) reports to a little over a week for the incident reports. The information incorporated in the initial operation order was only two to four days old.

b. During the month of November the VC continued to harass the 11th Armored Cavalry with units up to platoon size. His actions were characterised by mining incidents along the Saigon - Xuan Loc railroad, sabotage and harassment of ARVN's, VC dumps, bridges, and acts of terrorism on the local populace. His activities were restricted primarily to the Long Khanh - Bien Hoa area. Information (agent reports) received on 13 November noted the presence of VC platoons and companies operating in Area of Operations 3 (AO3) thus giving him the capability of massing main force units in AO3 for a direct attack on the base camp. However, available information indicated no such threat was imminent. Agent reports further disclosed the presence of the 24th VC Regiment along National Highway 1 between North and South grid lines 50 and 60. Other reports disclosed the construction of ambush positions on the north and south of Highway 1 vicinity Phuoc Tuy. Documents discovered in the vicinity of Highway 309 (TT 9002) indicated the presence of the 84th Rear Service Unit which normally operates in Phuoc Tuy Province. Visual reconnaissance flights by Forward Air Controllers (PAC) revealed the possible evacuation by women and children from villages northeast of the base camp. No appreciable amount of information of immediate combat value was gleaned from the ARVN ADIC and SLIM missions flown in support of Operation ATLANTA.

c. Terrain was a consideration, but not a limiting factor on Operation ATLANTA. The primary area of operation was confined to Long Khanh Province. The central portion of Long Khanh Province generally has rolling terrain covered with plantations and cultivated fields. North of Xuan Loc the terrain consists of a series of long ridges radiating from Hill 396 (TT 3962). Vegetation in this area consists mainly of plantations along Route 20 to the east of Hill 395. The area is interspersed with cultivated fields and hamlets. To the east of Xuan Loc the terrain is dominated by CHUA CHAM (YT 6010) and is covered with dense forest. On the south, high ground follows generally along Interprovincial Route 2 with long
ridges extending east and west. To the east of Inprovincial Route 2, the terrain is broken by hills as is the area southwest of Xuan Loc. Vegetation in this area consists of isolated rubber plantations interspersed with cultivated fields, but the majority of the vegetation is dense first growth, with some secondary growth. Streams traverse the area draining generally to the east and west of Xuan Loc. The majority of these streams are non-potable.

d. CA/STO:

(1) Psychological Operations:

(a) Psychological operations during ATLANTA began initially by using a "Good Guy" leaflet drop and utilizing loudspeaker transmissions to announce the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's arrival in the XUAN LOC area. Reports later received indicated this method was appreciated by the people of the District of Xuan Loc thus developing an immediate rapport with the local populace. Leaflet drops were made on suspected and known Viet Cong positions and on Viet Cong controlled hamlets. In conjunction with the drops and during tactical operations loudspeaker transmissions both live and taped were directed at the Viet Cong from overhead. Information received from ralliers and prisoners indicated that the loudspeakers were heard and that the leaflets were being read.

(b) Activities. During Operation ATLANTA the following support missions were conducted:

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<th>Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>Drop missions</td>
<td>1,979,500 leaflets were dropped during leaflet</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>missions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 loudspeaker missions were flown for a total of</td>
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<td>13.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3 &quot;No Dose&quot; missions were flown totaling 10.8</td>
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<td>hours.</td>
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<td>4,000 curfew posters were distributed.</td>
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<td>5,000 news letters were distributed.</td>
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<td>1,000 Vietnamese calendars were distributed.</td>
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(2) Civic Action: On December in conjunction with a cordon and search operation conducted by the 3rd Squadron of the villages of GIEN and BHN DA) a MEDCAP plan was initiated. In addition to medical assistance basic foodstuffs (powered milk, bulgar wheat, rice, and cooking oil) were distributed to the villagers.

Once the villages had been cordoned off the people were airlifted to district headquarters at LOC TAHN for questioning and issuing of identification cards. Overhead, communications were provided in the operation. However, only 20 of those questioned by the MEDCAP team to administer any medical aid. It was quite apparent from the outset that the people had been well indoctrinated by the Viet Cong on the dire consequences and effects if any of them should accept medical help from US troops. The food was received in much the same manner.

This was the first time the Blackhorse Regiment has encountered a locale where so many of the people were pro-Viet Cong. In order to counteract this situation an extensive psychological program has been initiated in this area stressing the importance of the people rallying to the cause of the Government of Vietnam.

6. (C) MISSION: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment secures a base camp vicinity TS 6209; clears and secures National Highway 1 and Inprovincial Route 333 from BIEN HOA (TT 0012) to GIEN DA (TT 6312); Interprovincial Route 2 from XUAN LOC to the boundary of the 1st Australian Task Force (1st A.T.F.) TRN 10 at TS 6570; National Highway 20 from junction of National Highway 1 (TT 6510) to vic BA 7571; Interprovincial Route 333 from GIEN R Y (TT 6512) to VO DAM (TT 7312) opens and clears a route from vicinity TS 7501 to 1040 THAO (TS 1382).

7. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The overall concept of the operation was developed with the idea of covering the plan in four phases.

a. Phase I would involve a clear and secure operation along National Highway 1 from BIEN HOA (TT 0012) to XUAN LOC (TT 6506) by the 1st squadron with the 219th Engineer Company preparing to assist in base camp development. The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons would continue to provide security for the staging area with the 2nd Squadron ready to assume the mission of the 1st Squadron and provide a troop raise reaction force.
b. Phase II would commence with the 2nd Squadron assuming the mission of the 1st Squadron and occupying a combat base vicinity of the road junction of National Highways 1 and 20 while the 1st Squadron would move to occupy a combat base vicinity YT 4301 and secure the Regimental Base Camp site (YS 6396). In addition the 1st Squadron would be prepared on order, to clear and secure National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 333 south and east from XUAN LOC (YT 4508) to CIA RAY (YT 6152). 3rd Squadron to continue securing the staging area and be prepared on order to establish a combat base vicinity YS 3995 and secure and clear Interprovincial Route 2 from XUAN LOC (YT 4508) to the boundary of 1st ATF TAOR (YS 4679). The 919th Engineer Company (Armored) would be prepared on order to move to the base camp and assist in its development.

c. In Phase III the 1st Squadron would continue to secure the base camp and conduct route security on National Highway 1 from XUAN LOC to CIA RAY (YT 6312) while being prepared to conduct a route security mission on Interprovincial Route 333 from CIA RAY (YT 6312) to FG DAT (YT 7332). 2nd Squadron would continue its route security mission on National Highway 1 while conducting search and clear operations south of the road junction of Routes 1 and 20 at the same time clearing routes to NAM JI rubber plantation vicinity YS 3996 and on order relieve 1st Squadron of base camp security mission. The 3rd Squadron would on order secure a combat base vicinity YS 3995; on order clear and secure Interprovincial Route 2 from XUAN LOC to the boundary of the 1st ATF TAOR and be prepared to open and clear a route from the Regimental Base Camp to LONG THANH (YS 1392) and provide base camp security. 919th Engineer Company would continue to provide assistance for base camp development and combat engineer support for the squadrons.

d. During the final phase, Phase IV, the 1st Squadron would on relief of base camp security by the 2nd Squadron continue its route security mission on National Highway 1 from XUAN LOC to CIA RAY and initiate similar operations on Interprovincial Route 333 to FG DAT. 2nd and 3rd Squadrons and 919th Engineer Company would continue with their assigned missions stated in Phase III.

8. EXECUTION: 20 October - Changes in Task Organisation

1st Squadron
Troop L, 3rd Squadron

1st Squadron initiated Operation ATLANTA at 0200H moving out on National Highway 1 from the Regimental Staging Area in LOKO BINH (YT 0612) organizing a combat base vicinity YT 4313. During the move small arms fire was received by Company D and Hootsier Battery. 2nd Squadron remained in the staging area preparing for movement on 23 October while the 3rd Squadron provided support for 2nd Battalion, 49th Artillery to XUAN LOC.

21 October

Troop B and Company G conducted search and clear operations vicinity YS 1348 with only light contact. Numerous tunnels were uncovered and destroyed. Troop L conducted operations to the east, burning 30 huts and destroying 10 tunnels at YS 351978. At 2120 hours Troop B received a burst of automatic weapons fire wounding one man, and observed 13 VC probing perimeter positions vicinity YS 140982. Fire was returned with unknown results.

22 October

Operation ATLANTA continued with only minor incidents during the day. One HU3 (ACM) from Troop B was damaged by a pressure mine at YS 155875 with no casualties. Four Viet Cong Suspects (VCS) were detained by Troop B vicinity YS 174967 and evacuated for interrogation.

23 October - Changes in Task Organisation

1st Squadron
Troop L reverted to 3/11 affective 1500 hours.

Operation ATLANTA continued with negative contact. A tank from the 919th Engineer Company was damaged by a mine at YS 140983 resulting in one UScasualty.
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WIA. 2nd Squadron moved from the staging at 0650 with Troop O and advance party elements to organize a combat base at OIC QIE vicinity YS 3979.

24 October

Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron conducting search and clear operations vicinity YS 44491, resulting in negative contact. A 4-ton truck with three passengers from the 109th Radio Research Detachment received one command detonated claymore mine and 3 rounds of small arms fire vicinity YS 44491, resulting in one US KIA, one US WIA, and one 4-ton truck damaged. The main body of the 2nd Squadron departed the staging area 0730 hours, closing in its combat base at 0900 hours without contact.

10 November - Troops A and B conducted a dismounted night march at 0230 hours encircling villages at YS 20496 and YS 46399 with no contact. The 27th Engineer Battalion continued to develop the base camp.

25 October

Operation ATLANTA continued with search and destroy operations vicinity of the Regimental Base Camp and the 2nd Squadron's combat base resulting in negative contact. 3rd Squadron provided security for the STARGAZ site (YS 050115) as part of STARGAZ (continuous operation - security for STARGAZ area).

26 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with negative contact. 1st Squadron conducted patrols vicinity of the Regimental Base Camp and ROADRUNNER operations along Interprovincial Route 333 from KUNA LOC (TT 460050) to OIA RAY (TT 630120). Day and night patrols were conducted by the 3rd Squadron from the staging area.

27 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron making a zone reconnaissance south of the Regimental Base Camp. During the reconnaissance at least 10 tunnels containing clothing, rice, hand grenades, cooking utensils and documents were located and destroyed. Three ACHAV's from Troop A were damaged by pressure type mines resulting in no US WIA. Negative contact was made by the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons.

28 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with search and destroy operations vicinity Regimental Base Camps and BUDDY operations with a local Popular Force (PF) platoon achieving negative results. Troop K provided a convoy escort for 186th Maintenance Battalion from LONQ BIMH TT 050120 to Blackhorse Base Camp without incident. In conjunction with the 1st Squadron's activities along Interprovincial Route 2, 165,000 leaflets were dropped from YS 6690 to YS 1650.

29 October - Operation ATLANTA continued without contact. Search and clear operations by Troop A disclosed a hut containing 12 expended 57mm M1 rounds, a home made battery, and anti-American propaganda, at YS 454935. Troop F continued BUDDY operations with a local PF platoon vicinity TT 410045.

30 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with local security operations around Blackhorse Base Camp. Contact was made with L-6 VC by an ambush patrol from Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron vicinity YS 458980 engaging the VC with small arms and hand grenades. The enemy returned fire with 7-10 rounds of small arms and then broke contact. VC casualties unknown no US casualties. Troop L continued to provide security for the LONQ BIMH ASP.

1 November - Troops A and B conducted a dismounted night march at 0230 hours encircling villages at YS 20496 and YS 46399 with no contact. The 27th Engineer Battalion continued to develop the base camp.
2 November - Changes in Task Organisation

1st Squadron

Troop F (OPCON 1/11 for base camp security)

Preparation for the displacement of the Regimental Headquarters elements continued while Troop C road marched to GIA RAY (IT 621110) along National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 333 without contact. Security measures were initiated by the 1st Squadron to assist Company C, 27th Engineer Battalion in securing the GIA RAY rock quarry. Security operations by the 3rd Squadron continued in the LO DO BINH - XEEM WAI area.

3 November - Changes in Task Organisation

Troop I (OPCON 2/11 for base camp security)

The Regimental Command Group closed in to the base camp area (IT 619155) at 0920 hours. Troop A with support from Howitzer Battery continued to operate along Interprovincial Route 333. Troops E and G received automatic weapons and small arms fire with Troop G observing at least six persons vicinity IT 618962. Troop F engaged two Viet Cong vicinity IT 625975 firing 3 rounds M79 cannister with unknown results.

4 November

1st Squadron

Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery attached to 1st Squadron.

Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron pushing northward in conjunction with BUDDY cordon and search operations in the SUOI CAT area. Sporadic mining and small arms incidents were encountered with no US casualties. Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery provided fire support for the operation from GIA RAY. Base camp security continued to be maintained by the 2nd Squadron while the 3rd Squadron secured the staging area.

5 November - Troop A provided security for engineer work parties constructing culverts in the vicinity CAT GIA HUYNH (IT 677198). Route clearing operations proceeded northward along Interprovincial Route 333. Company B, 27th Engineer Battalion commenced work on a rock quarry site off National Highway 1. In support of the Regiment's activities loudspeaker operations were conducted at VO DAT from IT 653 to IT 695. Base camp and staging area security continued to be maintained by the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons with no significant contact.

6 November - Security and route clearing operations continued along Interprovincial Route 333 with the 1st Squadron making a show of force at VO DAT. 600 pounds of victor were located (IT 650707) and evacuated by Troop C. Sniffer fire vicinity IT 650707 was received by Troop C resulting in one US WIA. Troop 3 and 2nd Squadron trains closed in the Regimental Base Camp from their contact base camp at OBI XEEM. Units of the 3rd Squadron continued to conduct security operations with elements of the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division; no significant contact made.

7 November

Troop A and B conducted dismounted patrols in AO while Troop C conducted a route reconnaissance on Highway 1. In conjunction with the patrols, BUDDY operations were run with elements of the 52nd Ranger Battalion vicinity IT 699205 east to IT 699225 and IT 777230. Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery deployed to IT 699218 to provide support east of VO DAT (IT 733). Construction of a culvert bypass (IT 672190) was completed by Company C, 27th Engineer Battalion and opened for traffic. Security of the base camp continued to be provided by the 2nd Squadron; staging area security was provided by the 3rd Squadron with Troop L and one platoon of tanks from Company H working with elements of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division providing a screen of the LONG BINH (SP), with no significant contact.

8 November - Changes in Task Organisation

1st Squadron OPCON to 1st Infantry Division effective 1600 hours.
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Troop I released to 3rd Squadron for Operations UNIONTOWN and MARSHALLTOWN

1st Squadron terminated its operations in the CIA RAY - VO OAT area at 1000 hours. Squadron elements cleared CIA RAY (YT 6311) at 1300 hours on their way to LAI KHE (XT 7738) stopping for - Class I and III resupply at the LONG BINH staging area. The first elements of the squadron arrived, 200km's later, in LAI KHE at 1630 hours, and by 1830 the entire squadron had closed. The move involved approximately 200 vehicles and 1000 men completely combat ready. Elements of Troop C relieved the 1st Squadron contingent of security operations around the rock quarry at CIA RAY while Troop E ran search and clear operations from the Blackhorse Base Camp vicinity of YT 6590. Occasional small arms fire was received by Troops F and I with negative results. However, Troop E had an ACAV detonate a pressure type mine (YS 457900) resulting in one US WIA and damage to the ACAV. The remaining Regimental units conducted security operations in the staging area and LONG BINH - BIEN HOA area.

9 November

1st Squadron continued under the OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division as part of Operation ATTLEBORO. 2nd Squadron continued to protect the base camp and dispatch patrols outside the perimeter with no contact. No significant activities occurred in the staging area. 3rd Squadron continued Operation UNIONTOWN.

10 November

Local patrols and security of the base camp area continued to be maintained by the 2nd Squadron while the 3rd Squadron secured the staging area and operated in the 173rd Airborne Brigade's TA0R as part of Operation UNIONTOWN. 1st Squadron remained OPCON 1st Infantry Division. No significant results were achieved.

11 November

1st Squadron continued under the OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division.

2nd Squadron continued patrolling and securing the Regimental Base Camp with one platoon from Troop C providing security for the CIA RAY rock quarry in the vicinity of YT 6311. Troop C had an ACAV hit by a claymore mine (YT 627071) resulting in one US WIA and negative damage to the track.

3rd Squadron continued Operation UNIONTOWN and provided security for the staging area. An M Company M48A3 Tank attached to Troop K detonated a pressure type mine vicinity of YT 058149 slightly damaging the vehicle. On National Highway 1 a 3/4 ton truck from Troop K traveling in convoy was hit by a claymore mine resulting in no US casualties and only minor damage to the vehicle.

12 November

1st Squadron remained under the OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division.

Security of the base camp and the rock quarry continued to be maintained by the 2nd Squadron.

3rd Squadron continued providing support for Operation UNIONTOWN and security for the staging area with no significant action.

13 November

1st Squadron continued to provide armor support for Operation ATTLEBORO under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division.

2nd and 3rd Squadrons continued to maintain security of the base camp and staging area respectively.

14 November

Activities remained the same with the maneuver elements continuing with their missions. Company H conducted search and destroy operations vicinity of XUAN LOC (YT 3310) with negative results.
15 November

1st Squadron continued to furnish support for Operation ATTLESBORO in the LAI KHE area.

Operation ATLANTA continued with the 2nd Squadron conducting local patrols in conjunction with the security of the base camp. Convoy continued to arrive and depart from the base camp daily, traveling National Highway 1 from LOC KHE to the Regimental Base Camp without incident. 3rd Squadron provided convoy escorts in addition to securing the staging area perimeter and providing one Troop for Operation UNIONTOWN.

16 November

At 0205 hours the Regimental Base Camp received an estimated 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 75mm recoilless rifle fire vicinity of YS 128981, YS 128972 and YS 135875. Fire was immediately returned with 105 mm howitzers, 4.2" mortars, and 75mm tank fire which quickly and effectively silenced the VC guns. Results of the attack were 8 US WIA and minor equipment damages. A later check of the VC gun positions indicated the enemy had departed in a hurry leaving unexpended 82mm mortar and 75mm Recoiless Rifle rounds.

1st Squadron remained OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division at LAI KHE.

2nd Squadron continued Operation ATLANTA conducting local patrols from the base camp and securing the OIA BAY rock quarry all with negative results.

3rd Squadron continued providing support for Operation UNIONTOWN and the security of the staging area. Troop 1 received 25 rounds of automatic weapons fire vicinity of YT 060805, fire returned with negative results. Troop I observed and challenged 2 civilians in black pajamas breaking a trail through the jungle (YT 057118). Upon being challenged they broke and ran at which time the troop fired 20 rounds of small arms, possibly wounding one of them.

17 November

Patrols from the 2nd Squadron searched the area around the base camp to locate the positions used by the VC to shell the camp the previous night. At 1135 hours Troop 0 found 32 expended 75mm Recoilless Rifle rounds and one live 75mm recoilless rifle misfire at YS 128979. A further search of the area found three mortar positions (YS 128974) with six 82mm rounds, assorted mortar fuses and night firing equipment.

1st Squadron continued Operation ATLANTA under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division at LAI KHE.

3rd Squadron continued to support Operation UNIONTOWN and provide security for the Regimental Staging Area. At 2115 hours an ambush patrol from Troop I heard noises at YT 080118 engaging the suspected area with one round of M79 cannon; two hand grenades were received on position. 8 - 10 rounds of M16 were also fired in the direction of the noises along with six rounds of 0.30 inch HE causing a secondary explosion after the patrol withdrew. No US casualties, VC casualties unknown.

18 November

1st Squadron continued Operation ATTLESBORO under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division.

2nd Squadron continued to conduct patrols and secure the base camp perimeter and the rock quarry. Probing actions were made along the perimeter in Troop E's sector at 0135 hours and 2325 hours. Suspected locations were engaged with M79 rounds, results unknown.

3rd Squadron continued to provide security for the staging area and support for Operation UNIONTOWN. The 2nd Platoon of Troop I at 1845 hours received 30 rounds of small arms fire vicinity YT 079246. Fire was returned with M79 and small arms fire, results unknown. Contact was broken at 1845 hours.
19 November

1st Squadron continued to participate in Operation ATLANTA now under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade effective 0700 hours.

2nd Squadron conducted patrols in the vicinity of the base camp (TS 10977) and provided security for the rock quarry. At 0025 hours a patrol from Troop F received 5-7 60mm mortar rounds from TS 10951 resulting in no US casualties. Artillery fire was returned with unknown results.

3rd Squadron continued UNIONTOWN operations and security of the staging area. The area of operation remained quiet with only occasional small arms firing. A squad size base camp was located (IT 095006) consisting of a 20 meter long trench, 5 foxholes, and cooking utensils.

20 November

1st Squadron was released from operational control of 173d Airborne Brigade and closed on the staging area at 2035 hours.

2nd Squadron continued to conduct patrols and provide security for the base camp.

3rd Squadron continued to support operation UNIONTOWN and security of the staging area as well as the LON DIAP ASP.

21 November - Changes to Task Organisation.

Troop F and L OPCON 173d Airborne Brigade in support of UNIONTOWN.

The Regiment continued Operation ATLANTA and was relieved of the UNIONTOWN mission by the 173d Airborne Brigade. At 1025 hours a regimental convoy traveling on National Highway 1 towards DAO LOC was ambushed vicinity TS 27300 to TS 295099. Fire was immediately returned by the escort platoon from Troop C along with air strikes by helicopters and fighter aircraft in addition to artillery being fired in support of the beleaguered convoy. The 1st Squadron moved to the ambush site as a reaction force from the LOGO BNN staging area. Major contact was broken at 1137 hours except for sporadic contact during the remainder of the day. US casualties were 7 KIA (5 from 11th Armored Cavalry), 8 WIA (7 from the 11th Armored Cavalry). VC losses included a final total of 20 KIA (10 US, 10 VC) were captured listed in Annex A. US artillery losses included 1 M19 2.36 ton truck. VC losses included 1 57mm RG, 1 M13 damaged, 4 2t ton trucks destroyed, 1 UH1B damaged; VC losses included 1 57mm RG, 1 M13 rifled, 2 RPG rounds and miscellaneous documents.

1st Squadron remained in the area of the ambush to conduct a sweep the following day.

2nd Squadron remained at the base camp conducting security patrols around the perimeter.

3rd Squadron was released from Operation UNIONTOWN at 1100 hours by the 173d Airborne Brigade. Continued to provide security for the staging area.

22 November

1st Squadron conducted search and destroy operations south of the ambush site. Four more VC bodies were found with another 75-100 VC KIA (Possible. Eight 57mm RG rounds, a tripod mounted weapon for either a recoilless rifle or heavy machine gun was also located.

The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons continued to provide base camp and staging area security respectively.

23 November

1st Squadron performed base camp security for a portion of the perimeter with no significant events. Patrols from Troop C found a grave (IT 276072) containing a body with a pistol belt and one US grenade.

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2nd Squadron conducted search and destroy operations in the vicinity of TT 1003 and provided security for a portion of the GIA RY rock quarry. At 1130 hours Troop F heard 8-10 rounds of small arms fire vicinity TT 125005; a sweep of the area was made with negative results. A platoon from Troop G returned an unknown number of rounds of automatic weapons fire and heard one large explosion believed to be a claymore vicinity TT 57008. Fire was returned with automotive weapons with negative results. A possible tax collection point was reported by the Air Observer at TT 575025.

3rd Squadron continued to secure the staging area and supported Operation UNIONTOWN.

23 November

Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron performing convoy escort missions from LONG BINH to the Regimental Base Camp; conducted search and destroy operations in the vicinity of their assigned sector of the base camp perimeter. Troop C reported locating a fortification complex consisting of 20 bunkers and trenches forming a "T" from YT 21907 to YT 21907, and from YT 270000 east to YT 28079.

2nd Squadron conducted search and destroy operations (YS 3495) with Troop F and provided security for the GIA RY rock quarry. On two different occasions persons were detected along the perimeter named by Troop E. A trip flame was ignited at 0315 hours revealing two persons. Fire was returned at this time resulting in one US WIA. Two rounds of mortar fire were received at 1600 hours in the 2nd Squadron area. Light fire teams were scrambled and the howitzer batteries from the 1st and 2nd Squadrons were used to engage the suspected mortar position. Reinforcing fires were also requested and provided by the 5th Artillery Group in XUAN LOC.

3rd Squadron remained in the staging area providing security and support for Operation UNIONTOWN.

25 November

1st Squadron conducted search and destroy operations vicinity of YT 490012. 35 VCS were apprehended in a hamlet containing VC propaganda material and empty 60mm mortar containers; seven were detained for further questioning. Troop B also conducted ROADRUNNER operations from YS 4497 to YT 2810 without incident.

2nd Squadron utilizing Troop F opened Route 320 for tracked vehicles, from the base camp (YS 439956) west to National Highway 15 at LONG THANH (YS 140920). The bridge located at YS 205935 was determined passable only for wheeled vehicles with a bypass available for tracked vehicles. ROADRUNNER and security operations were performed by Troops E and G.

3rd Squadron continued to provide security for the staging area and support for Operation UNIONTOWN with Troops I and L under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade. Troop K conducted ROADRUNNER operations and convoy escort from LONG BINH to XUAN LOC without incident.

26 November

Operations remained quiet with the squadrons providing convoy escorts, limited search and cleramb operations and base camp security. Support for UNIONTOWN activities continued to be provided by the 3rd Squadron.

27 November

Search and destroy operations by the 1st Squadron east of the perimeter uncovered 90 40 volt batteries of local manufacture in a tree wrapped in plastic. Troop A also found 9 VC packs with personal equipment and one black nylon backpack.

The 2nd Squadron conducted search and destroy operations northwest of the base camp and continued to maintain security of the GIA RY rock quarry site.

Security of the staging area, and continued support of UNIONTOWN operations were provided by the 3rd Squadron. Convoy escorts were also provided for regimental vehicles moving to and from the base camp.
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28 November - Changes in Task Organisation

Troop E relieved Troop L of its UNITOWN mission effective 1200 hours.

1st Squadron continued Operation ATLANTA with search and destroy operations (YT 1300) northeast of the base camp with light contact. BSA RUNNER and convoy escort operations were run between Blackhorse Base Camp and LONG BIRD.

2nd Squadron operated north of the base camp on search and destroy operations and continued to maintain security for the rock quarry.

3rd Squadron continued to participate in UNITOWN with Troops I and L under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade.

29 November

Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron making a reconnaissance in force along National Highway I and Interprovincial Route 333 from LOC to GT A R Y.

2nd Squadron assumed a portion of the UNITOWN mission under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade. Troop F provided escort for regimental convoys and conducted search and destroy operations vicinity of YT 1202.

3rd Squadron continued an Operation ATLANTA with one Troop still participating in Operation UNI TOWN.

30 November

1st Squadron’s reconnaissance in force operation continued with no contact. A report from a 10th ARVN Division FRC indicated approximately 300 VC were observed at YT 1205. 2nd Squadron units were dispatched to conduct a search and destroy operation which resulted in only minor contact.

3rd Squadron meanwhile maintained security of the staging area and continued to move its equipment and supplies to the base camp. Troop L completed its move to the base camp at 1315 hours.

1 December - Changes to Task Organisation

Troop G relieved Troop I of OPCON mission to 173d Airborne Brigade.

Troop I reverted to 3rd Squadron control.

1st Squadron secured the rock quarry and conducted BSA RUNNER operations between GIA RAY and the base camp.

2nd Squadron Operation ATLANTA with negative contact and participated in Operation UNI TOWN with Troops E and G.

The 3rd Squadron (-) closed in the base camp at 1100 hours, with the remaining elements from the Provisional Squadron.

2 December

1st Squadron conducted an area reconnaissance (YS 1307) and a BSA RUNNER operation to GIA RAY at the same time providing security for the GIA RAY rock quarry. At 1600 hours a resupply convoy consisting of 2 M60A1 tanks and 3 ACAV’s (from Company B and Troop L) and 2 25 ton trucks (one from the 27th Engineer Battalion) was ambushed by an estimated VC Main Force Battalion (Reinforced) at YT 67071 while returning from GIA RAY. A reaction force of the 1st Squadron (-) moved to the site shortly after contact was made. Reinforcing fire was received from 7 air strikes and artillery fire from the 5th Artillery Group at XULU LOC. The main ambush force was positioned southeast of National Highway 1 with elements of the squadron positioned on the east and west sides of VC positions. 250 air and artillery were utilized to seal off the escape routes to the south. Contact was broken at 1750 hours, with only sporadic firing continuing until 1950 hours.

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Illumination over the sealed area and suppressing fires were provided by an AC-119 "Spooky" ship after nightfall. As of 2400 hours US casualties were 11 KIA, 1 ACAV destroyed, and 1 M60 tank damaged. VC losses included 22 KIA, 3 machineguns (2 with bipods) and 1 AKM assault rifle. The attackers were light blue uniforms with pistol belts and bandoleers of ammunition draped over their shoulders. One noticeable item of clothing lacking was that most of them were not wearing shoes. Expended rounds of 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifle were found near the ambush site.

2nd Squadron continued to secure the base camp and support Operation UNCONT.

3rd Squadron secured the base camp and conducted area reconnaissances in the vicinity of coordinates TS 1184.

3 December

At 0700 hours the Regimental Command Group moved to the site of the ambush while the 1st Squadron continued search and destroy operations south and west of the ambush site. At 0720 hours Troop A uncovered an extensive tunnel system (TT 597065) and shortly thereafter captured 3 VC, 2 of whom were wounded. One of the VC stated that he was a member of the 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 275th Regiment, 5th VC Division. At 1105 hours Troop C captured another wounded VC and evacuated him for medical treatment. Prior to daylight the VC's route of withdrawal had been sealed by artillery from 2/35th Artillery and an Air Force AC-130 orbiting overhead.

The 2nd Squadron remained at the base camp and conducted ROADRUNNER operations between the Regimental Base Camp and L0F0B2 until 1915 hours.

The 3rd Squadron moved from the base camp to establish blocking positions along National Highway 1 from YT 580065 to YT 630087 in support of 1st Squadron's search and destroy operations at the ambush site. Negative contact was made and the squadron closed in the base camp at 1815 hours.

4 December

1st Squadron continued to search the 2 December ambush site. At 1025 hours Troop C captured a 75mm recoilless rifle with T&E mechanism and tripod at YT 629073. Later on Troop C recovered 1 75mm recoilless round, 3 grenades, 8 entrenching tools, 25 foxholes and 1 VC KIA (BC) vicinity YT 634075. Total losses from the ambush were 1 US KIA (from 27th Engineer Battalion), 22 US WIA and 99 VC KIA (BC), 3 VC (WIA). See Annex B for breakdown of weapons captured.

2nd Squadron continued to conduct ROADRUNNER operations between the Regimental Base Camp and L0F0B2, and provide support for Operation UNCONT.

3rd Squadron continued to improve its perimeter defenses while providing base camp security.

5 December

ROADRUNNER operations were conducted between GIA RAY and L0F0B2 with negative contact by the 1st and 2nd Squadrons.

3rd Squadron mounted a BUDDY search and destroy operation with the 1st Battalion 3rd Infantry Regiment (ARVN) in the vicinity of TS 645550. The ARVN troops made an airmobile assault after the 3rd Squadron had cordoned off the area. Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery was attached for the operation and organized a fire support base at TS 64556. A detailed analysis and report of the operation is outlined in Annex C to this report.

6 December

1st Squadron continued Operation TL UWA with ROADRUNNER operations to GIA RAY and L0F0B2. Troop B continued to provide security for the GIA RAY rock quarry.

The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons continued to secure the base camp and conduct ROADRUNNER operations to and from L0F0B2.
7 December

The disposition of the Regiment remained the same except for the 2nd Squadron. With the 1st Squadron securing the rock quarry and the 3rd Squadron providing base camp security the 2nd Squadron terminated Operation ATLANTA and at 1800 hours and came under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade for Operation CONCAT/DUCK.

8 December

The Regiment terminated Operation ATLANTA at 2000 hours.

9. (U) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery:

   (1) Size of Force:
   - Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
   - Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
   - Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
   - 5th Artillery Group

   (2) How and When Employed:
   - Battery B, 2d Bn, 35th Artillery (155mm SP) - 2 - 4 December - supported,
     1st Squadron on GIA RAT ambush (2 Dec).
   - Battery B, 2d Bn, 35th Artillery (155mm SP) - 3 December - supported 3rd Squadron on Operation ALEXANDO along Interprovincial Route 2.

b. Signal:

   (1) Units Employed: A detachment from Company B, 53rd Signal Battalion consisting of a radio relay terminal (AV/RE-17), and HF radio van (AV/RCG-26D), a communications center (AV/MCC-17) and 10 signal personnel under the command of Lieutenant Ing.

   (2) Method of Employment: The detachment was utilized to terminate command and central telephone circuits to II F Force V, provide access to the Army Area Communications system, and to provide a communications center for the 11th Armored Cavalry.

   (3) Execution: The Regimental Signal Officer determined what circuits were needed for the operation and prepared his requirements to the II F Force V Signal Officer. II F Force V then submitted work requests for the installation of the necessary terminals which were established by the 53rd Signal Detachment. Lines from the terminals were extended by personnel from the Regimental Communications Platoon. Initially, circuits were established to the LONGBIN staging area. However, as the Regiment cleared the area these circuits were dropped and others established in the base camp area. The first circuits in the base camp were operational by 31 October 1966.

   (4) Concept of Operations: The 53rd Signal Detachment deployed with the forward command post elements of the regiment on 31 October and remained at the base camp providing communications between the Blackhorse CP and higher headquarters.

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Results: The detachment provided continuous communications with high quality circuits throughout the operation. The operation of the Blackhorse switchboard and installation of wire to all organic and supporting units in the base camp was accomplished by the Regimental Communications Platoon thus providing all units access to the army area communications system.

c. Army Aviation:

(1) Units Employed:

(a) Aviation Platoon, HMT, 11th Armored Cavalry
(b) Aviation Section, HT, 1/11th Armored Cavalry
(c) Aviation Section, HMT, 2/11th Armored Cavalry
(d) Aviation Section, HMT, 3/11th Armored Cavalry

(2) Method of Employment:

(a) Aviation Sections - General support of the Regiment,
(b) Aviation Sections - Direct support of their respective squadrons; cross-attached between squadrons as situations required.

(3) Concept of Operations:

(a) The Regimental Aviation platoon provides a limited lift capability within the transport section utilizing six UH-1D's, and command and control support utilizing the two OH-23D's in the command and control section.

(b) The UH-1D's provided aviation support in a variety of ways such as command and control, logistical trooo and cargo lifts, combat trooo and cargo lifts, medical evacuation, reconnaisance, training, aircraft maintenance, administration, mail delivery, P/O, psychological warfare, and hauling of perishable rations.

(c) The OH-23D's were used primarily for command and control and administrative missions. They were also used quite extensively for convoy escort, artillery adjustment and reconnaissance operations.

(d) The OH-1C's were effectively used in such roles as ambush suppression, escort of airmobile operations, truck convoy escort, daily perimeter reconnaissance of the base camp, and as a standby immediate reaction security force.

(4) Significant engagements during which Army Aviation played a major role:

(a) Ambush suppression and search and destroy operations, vicinity coordinates YT 2810, 21-23 November 1966.

(b) Ambush suppression and search and destroy operations, vicinity coordinates YT 6307, 2-5 December 1966.

(c) Operation Alexandria in support of 3/11, search and destroy operations vicinity of coordinates TS 69M.

(5) Statistical data on Army Aviation support operations:

(a) Hours flown:

- UH-23D = 687 hours.
- UH-1D & AH-1C = 1387 hours.

(b) Sorties flown:

- Command and control = 955 sorties.
- Combat Support = 3207 sorties.
- Combat Assault = 337 sorties.

(c) Cargo transported = 82.5 tons.

(d) Passengers transported = 4,357.

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(6) Elements supporting organic aviation units:

(a) 68th Assault Helicopter Company (aerial lifted 1/13 ARVN Regt on Operation Alexandria 5 Dec).

(b) 506th CMC Co provided PEL support at the Regimental Base Camp.

d. U.S. Air Force:

(1) Employment:

U.S. Tactical air elements were employed in support of the 11th Armored Cavalry throughout Operation ATLANTIC. O-1 Aircraft of the 11th Armored Cavalry were flown daily in the support of operations. Missions flown consisted of VR, from which valuable intelligence data was collected and subitted; FAC, in which tactical fighter and bomber aircraft were employed against both preplanned and immediate targets selected and requested by the Regimental S-2 and S-3 sections; convoy escorts during which both O-1, and when required, fighter aircraft escorted 11th Armored Cavalry convoys; and Artillery Adjustment, in which the FAC's in the O-1 aircraft adjusted both Regimental and other support artillery against targets within the area of operations. Administrative flights were flown by the O-1 aircraft but these were mainly in support of TACP requirements.

(2) Control:

All Air Force elements utilised during the operation were under the command and control of the 7th U.S. Air Force (PACAF).

(3) Effectiveness:

The majority of the tactical fighter and bomber strikes were, as determined by subsequent agents reports, considered very effective. These agents reports must be relied upon because ground follow up action was generally impossible due to the terrain and/or other tactical considerations. On two occasions when the Regiment had convoys ambushed by sizable Viet Cong forces tactical airpower was instrumental in keeping friendly losses to a minimum and was of great aid in dispatching the enemy force. Killed by air body count in these encounters was low due to the Viet Cong tactic of rapidly evacuating their killed and wounded. Again, subsequent agent reports supported the fact that the tactical air forces employed were very effective and the actual body count told only a small portion of the story.

(4) Statistical Data on Air Force Support Operations:

(a) Sorties Flown:

VR - 138
FAC - 39
Escort - 13
Artillery Adjustment - 10
Administrative -
Combat Strike - 135

(b) Type aircraft flown with breakdown of number of sorties per type:

F-100 - 89
F-5 - 29
B-57 - 12
A-1 - 4
AC-1 - 1
C-1 - 203

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A total of 190 tons of ordnance was expended with the following breakdown by type:

- **MK-56 1000# Bomb** 43
- **MK-117 750# GP Bomb** 46
- **MK-82 500# Bomb** 172
- **MK-61 250# Bomb** 20
- **BLU-10/24** 750# Frag Bomb 26
- **Canisters of CBU (All Types)** 30
- **2.75mm FFAR** 361
- **Illumination Flares** 19
- **.30 Cal Ammo (Rounds)** 15,000
- **.30mm HEI (Rounds)** 9,600

### e. Engineer:

1. **Units:**
   - 919th Engineer Company (Armored)

2. **Method of Employment:**
   - During the operation, engineer elements were attached to the squadrons based on their assigned missions. Attachments in some cases were made down to troop and company level with an engineer squad providing the support. Tasks assigned the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) ranged from base camp development and security to combat engineer support (clearing mines, destruction of fortifications and construction of temporary bridging).

3. **Execution:**
   - On 20 October the 1st Platoon attached to the 1st Squadron moved to the area of the base camp and began clearing fields of fire, utilizing three tank dozers and one full tracked bulldozer. While the fields of fire were being cleared, the base camp perimeter secured each of the three platoons were providing combat engineer support to the various armored cavalry troops when an independent mission was required. Specifically, a squad from the 1st Platoon supported Troop A by probing and clearing minefields in suspected areas and destroying bunkers, tunnels and booby traps. One of the other squads from the 1st Platoon while supporting Troop B on a reconnaissance mission encountered an ingeniously placed mine complex designed to disable an armored vehicle and once stopped, destroy it with a charge that was placed at a higher elevation than the first. They also destroyed enemy bunkers and tunnels as they were located. While the 3rd Squad of the 1st Platoon supported Troop L on a search and destroy operation it constructed a hasty bridge across in order for the troop to continue with its mission.

   - On 26 October the 1st Platoon moved back to the staging area to assist the Company Headquarters in their move to the base camp. The following day the 2nd Platoon completed its move to the base camp.

   - By 31 October the entire company had displaced to the base camp area and was busy engaged in constructing defensive positions and sandbagging living areas. Building materials were obtained and present for use in construction of permanent bunkers for the base camp. In conjunction with the installation of the perimeter defense technical assistance was provided to the various troop units occupying the camp.

4. **Results:**
   - By 8 December the perimeter wire and bunker system was 60% completed in the base camp area and 30% on the base camp roads and drainage ditches were 50% completed. Vertical construction was in its initial stage with priority of effort going to latrines, showers and messhalls. All base camp development projects were accomplished in conjunction with the 277th Engineer Battalion (G).
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Confidential activities were confined mainly to hasty bridge and route surveys. This was caused primarily because of the nature of the duties placed upon the engineer platoons by the units to which they were attached. These missions included tunnel and fortification destruction and minor road and bridge repairs.

10. (C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly Losses:

- X1A = 8
- U2A = 1

Equipment lost or destroyed:

- ACAV = 3

b. Enemy Losses:

1. Personnel:

- KIA (Dead) = 136
- KIA (Wounded) = 101
- Wounded = 270

2. Weapons and ammunition:

- Recoilless Rifle:
  - 75mm = 1
  - 75mm w/tank = 1
  - 75mm w/tank = 1

- 37mm antitank = 5
- 37mm antiarmor = 6
- 37mm antiarmor = 1
- 50mm antiarmor = 1

- Small Arms = 8
- Artillery Rounds = 2
- Mortar Rounds = 25
- Recoilless Rounds = 11
- Rockets = 2
- Mines = 20
- Grenades = 20
- Small Arms Ammunition = 270

3. Installations:

- Base Camps = 1
- Fortifications:
  - Tunnels = 61
  - Trenches = 59
- Tunnel/Bunker Complex = 3
- Foxholes = 26

4. Foodstuffs:

- Rice = 1/2 ton
- Peanuts = 1 ton
- Salt = 1 ton
- Miscellaneous = 1100 lbs
Supplies:

- Uniforms - 77 sets
- Bicycles - 6
- Cooking Utensils - 52
- Batteries - 168
- Packs and individual web gear - 18 sets

Miscellaneous:

- Documents - 11 lbs
- Medical Supplies - 54 lbs (+)
- Flag - 1 (metal)
- Oil - 120 gallons
- Money - 53,000 $VN
- Electrical wire - 2200 meters

Resupply:

(1) Methods. 1st Logistical Command on request of the Regiment established a forward supply point (FSP) in the Regimental Base Camp area. During Operation ATLANTA, resupply of Class I, III and III was handled by supply point distribution from the FSP. Class V resupply was and still is being accomplished by supply point distribution from the 3rd Ordnance Ammunition Supply Point (AGP) at LORI BDN. Class II and IV supply (except M16 repair parts) were received through the 266th Quartermaster Supply and Service Battalion at LORI BDN.

(2) Techniques. Logistical convoys were used to provide the primary mode of resupply for the units of the Regiment and the FSP. Aerial resupply was employed only on an emergency basis.

(3) Basic Loads:

(a) Class I. Each unit of the Regiment carried a 3 day supply of M16's on their vehicles with a 2 day supply in their unit trains.

(b) Class III. Each Squadron Support Platoon is authorized seven 1200 gallons tank and pump units by MOD. Additionally, each squadron has been authorized two 5,000 gallon tankers with tractor by MOD (12-49 Form M17). Experience during the operation has shown that the Regiment used an average of 67,133 gallons of Class II and III per week broken down as follows: JP-1, 8, 904 gallons; AV56, 1,506 gallons; MOD, 35,087 gallons; DSS, 21,215 gallons.

(c) Class V. Below is listed a consolidated list of the Regimental basic load:

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<tr>
<td>1305-001</td>
<td>12 Ga. Shot.</td>
<td>120,000</td>
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<td>1305-066</td>
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<td>1305-093</td>
<td>5.56mm, Tracer</td>
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<td>7.62mm, Tracer, Carbon</td>
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<td>1305-137</td>
<td>7.62mm, Ball, 5 rd Clip</td>
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<td>1305-147</td>
<td>Cal .30 Carbine, Ball, 5 rd Clip</td>
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<td>1305-151</td>
<td>Cal .50 Ball and Tracer, Linked</td>
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(d) Weapons densities (Regiment and attached units) are indicated below:

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<tr>
<th>NOMENCLATURE</th>
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<th>QTY</th>
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<td>Rifle, M16</td>
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<td>Rifle, M40</td>
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<td>MG, 7.62mm, M60</td>
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<td>MG, 7.62mm, M50</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG, 7.62mm, M73</td>
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<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbine, M1919</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>1,007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submachinegun, M3A1</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG, Cal .50, M2</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenade Launcher, 179</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG5 (12 tubes each)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket Launcher, 3.5&quot;</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS (4mm serial)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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b. Transportation. The Regiment relied principally on organic transportation support located in the support Platoons of the squadrons for its combat service support. Token support was provided by the Saigon Area Transportation Officer to move 2,500 short tons of WABTCC, COHNEX containers and tentage from the staging area to the base camp area. The Regiment was required to pick up Class II and IV supplies (less repair parts) and Class V from supply points in the LCQ 3INH area (an approximate 110km turn around). The same combat service support vehicles were also used to deliver from the base camp supply points to the squadrons which in some cases involved another 110km turn around. The use of tactical support vehicles to return to rear area supply points as well as deliver from forward supply points to the units of the Regiment has resulted in the accumulation of excessive mileage on the tactical support vehicles of the Regiment. This situation will be alleviated somewhat when a planned forward supply point for Class V is established in the base camp. However, the problem of Class II and IV will continue until such time as a FSP is established for these supplies.

o. Medical Evaluation and Hospitalization.

(1) Concept: The squadron medical platoons would provide immediate treatment and prepare casualties for evacuation to the 37th Medical Company and/or request "Dust Off" support. Aeromedical support could be provided by either the Regimental Aviation Platoon or Aeromedical units located at LCQ 3INH depending on the availability of aircraft.

(2) Execution: Each armored cavalry troop normally had medical personnel and evacuation vehicles attached to them from the squadron headquarters troop. Initial medical aid was provided by these teams while awaiting aerial evacuation. Whenever a landing zone could not be secured or the terrain was such that the helicopters could not land, the attached evacuation vehicles were utilized to move the casualties to the squadron aid station and subsequently to the 93rd Evacuation Hospital in LCQ 3INH or the 3rd Field Hospital in SAIGON. Over 90% of the Regiment's casualties were evacuated by air. Response to "Dust Off" requests was immediate and highly effective. On several occasions the "Dust Off" requests were made and transported in an effective manner. The evacuation of the wounded was conducted quickly and efficiently in order to evacuate a critically wounded trooper.

12. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT/ TECHNIQUES: No special techniques or equipment were employed or developed during Operation ATLANTA.

13. COUNTERFEET LIST: Operation JUKE proved to be a most successful operation not only from the standpoint of casualties inflicted on the Viet Cong but the number of lines of communication that have been opened to friendly traffic. No longer can the Viet Cong freely utilize them for movement of their forces and supplies or set up tax collection points to harass and extort money from the local populace. The persistent, aggressive and far reaching actions of the Regiment have continually kept him off balance thus preventing him from mounting of forces for any sizable attack. The two instances (ambushes) that were able to mount an offensive action resulted in complete routs. Geographical locations heretofore considered secure Viet Cong sanctuaries were breached by the armored columns of the Blackhorse Regiment destroying base camp, fortifications, and capturing precious stores of food. The operation only further demonstrated the flexibility, effectiveness, and prowess of an Armored Cavalry Regiment in an insurgency environment. The situations encountered by the Blackhorse were so well planned and executed that the enemy was decisively engaged and felt the full combat power of the Regiment with telling results. Throughout the operation the Regiment has been able to move at will in LCQ 3INH and Binh Tuy Province and the northern most portion of Duc Tuy Province both on and off the highways experiencing little difficulty with terrain or geographical obstacles.

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Operation TULIP was the Regiment's initial operation in the IZMAI LOC - NO DAT areas and initial efforts were being expended securing and organizing the base camp. However, on at least two occasions ARVN and Popular Force units participated in search and clear/destroy operations in the Blackhorse Area. Much of the Regiment's preliminary efforts were devoted toward establishing lines of communication with the 18th Division, District and Province officials and the National Police. Currently the Regiment has exchanged liaison officers with the 18th Division and has established 24 hour contact with the local Vietnamese officials. Additionally, a limited program has been instituted whereby the National Police accompany the squadrons on their operations which so far have proved most beneficial to all concerned. Future plans call for an expansion of this program with the ultimate goal of speeding up the pacification effort in LONG KHAN and SHER TUY Provinces.

11. (a) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Operations:

(1) Item: Clearing to engage sampans.

Discussion: When there is a possibility of helicopter fire teams encountering sampans, target clearances and identification problems may arise since clearance must be obtained from District. This requirement causes undue delay and often results in the target escaping the area before clearance can be obtained.

Observation: The problem can be greatly simplified and facilitated by carrying a Vietnamese Official on board one of the ships who is authorized to give permission to fire once the target has been identified.

(2) Item: Employment of combat engineer platoons.

Discussion: During operations adequate and efficient engineer support is not always provided because the platoons are often fragmented even though operational requirements and missions sometimes do not warrant the employment of an entire platoon.

Observation: Commanders should evaluate their engineer support available and in consonance with the mission at hand assign tasks to the engineer commander at the same time maintaining support flexibility.

(3) Item: Control of air space over the battle area.

Discussion: During an ambush there were four observation aircraft, four UH-1D gunships, a medical evacuation helicopter, and one command helicopter all over the ambush site at one time or the other. With the possible exception two of the four observation aircraft were there by necessity. In addition high performance aircraft were making strikes on each side of the road which resulted in a few near misses.

Observation: The airborne element should coordinate the airspace above the battle area and insist more than one type of aircraft be operating in the area. The old rule of thumb that the slower aircraft should temporarily leave the area until the faster ships have delivered their ordnance would be very appropriate in this case.

(4) Item: Convoy reaction force.

Discussion: The ambushes of 21 November and 2 December clearly indicated the need for the value of a highly mobile, and self sustaining force with the capability of rapidly closing with the enemy.

Observation: Convoy reaction forces should be composed of armor elements, if possible, supplemented with armed helicopters (AH-1C).

(5) Item: Reaction of convoy escorts in an ambush.

Discussion: Recent experiences have shown that the first minutes of contact and reaction thereafter by the escort are most critical.

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Without exception if the escort had not, once clear of the killing zone, returned to the ambush site firing every weapon available the convoy would have been overrun by the VC.

Observation: Maximum firepower and bold execution of counterambush techniques will effectively neutralise the ambushing force.

(6) Item: Location of Viet Cong ambush force.

Discussion: During the 21 November 1966 ambush the Viet Cong positioned themselves in the grass and undergrowth flanking (2 to 3 meters) the road with the general idea that the gunners field of observation would be masked by their own vehicle (ACAV).

Observation: ACAV gunners should be trained to fire ahead, to the rear, and down as the vehicle passes through a killing zone.

(7) Item: Employment of hand grenades in an ambush.

Discussion: Experience has shown that the Viet Cong position their closest forces just off the road sometimes in the drainage ditches. Machineguns located on the ACAV’s experienced difficulty in effectively covering the close-in, immediate area on either side of the vehicle.

Observation: The hand grenade is an excellent close in counterambush weapon.

(8) Item: Employment of snipers as part of the ambush force.

Discussion: The employment of snipers particularly in ambush sites having rubber or similar height trees can inflict heavy casualties on the ambushed element. Snipers are very effective because the ambushed force normally is concentrating its attention on the forces on the ground.

Observation: Plans for fire distribution should include the engagement of possible sniper locations once contact has been made.

(9) Item: Utilisation and employment of armed helicopters.

Discussion: The armed helicopters (AH-1C) organic to the Armored Cavalry Regiment can only be utilised and employed when coordinated at Regimental level (air cavalry troop). This allows greater flexibility and continuous support for committed maneuver (squadron) forces.

Observation: Armed helicopters utilised for combat and combat support missions will allow continuous and greater aerial support for the armoured cavalry squadrons.

(10) Item: Liaison requirements.

Discussion: During Operation ATLANTA a liaison officer was assigned to the 10th Armored Division in Xuan Loc and the 10th Armored in turn assigned an AH-1C officer to HQ, 11th Arm Cav Regt. This made rapid coordination possible and has proven invaluable.

Observation: Timely liaison with other units in an area of operations is of great importance, and can provide information that would be otherwise unattainable.

(11) Item: Control of convoys.

Discussion: During Operation ATLANTA numerous convoys moved to and from the Regimental Base Camp. Control of these convoys during movement and limiting their size became a problem. During movement there is the ever present threat of ambush, especially against such lucrative targets as resupply convoys, and control becomes even more difficult and important.

Observation: Convoys must be effectively controlled and their size limited to reduce the possibility of VC exploitation of weak points.
Item: Signal support.
Discussion: When a regimental forward or tactical command post is employed, a multi-channel radio link is necessary to extend necessary command and control circuits. This support must be requested from a higher headquarters. If there is sufficient time for planning, support can be programmed and obtained. However, if a situation develops rapidly, this support may not be available to deploy with the tactical CP.

Observation: A need exists for a permanently assigned multi-channel radio link within an armored cavalry regiment. Equipment has been requested expected in-country in July.

Discussion: When the command post vehicle M-577A1 is used as a "fixed station" CP, the heat build-up inside the vehicle causes deterioration of parts in the communication equipment. There are measures that can be taken to alleviate the heat build-up.

1. Insure adequate ventilation.
2. Utilise a fan to cool equipment.
3. Keep radio transmissions to a minimum.
5. When not transmitting, place the T-195 in the standby position.

Observation: Radio operators and supervisors should be made aware of the measures to be taken to prevent damage to communications equipment in the M-577A1 when operating in a static position.

Item: Frequencies.
Discussion: The frequency spectrum has proven to be extremely crowded in II CTZ. Constant command emphasis and supervision is needed to minimize interference and expedite traffic passage.

Observation: Frequency interference exists, but units can communicate effectively by observing assigned frequencies and procedures.

b. Training.

Item: Rules of engagement training.
Discussion: Rules of engagement as imposed in parts of Vietnam require the individual soldier to initiate combat under varying conditions and with a variety of weapons. Without specific training oriented towards this type of engagement the results could be detrimental to our efforts in Vietnam.

Observation: COMBAT training for Vietnam bound troops should include some of the general rules of engagement i.e. action against snipers in towns, progression of weapons to be used and destruction of homes and huts and why these rules are necessary. Once assigned to a unit in-country the individual should receive further instruction on any rules common only to that unit.

c. Intelligence.

Item: Patrols.
Discussion: Daylight recon patrols and night ambush patrols in the vicinity of both the staging area and base camp have been found to be extremely effective in deterring VC attacks on these areas.

Observation: An aggressive plan for patrolling the areas around base camps will deny the VC opportunities to plan, practice and execute attacks.
Item: Loudspeaker operations.

Discussion: Information received from Viet Cong prisoners and ralliers indicates that loudspeaker missions are not effective when flown above 2,000 feet or on windy days.

Observation: The altitude and wind activities will have a direct affect on the overall results of loudspeaker missions.

Item: Chieu Hoi Program.

Discussion: Reports continue to come in from the field stating that the Viet Cong do not trust the allied forces in particular the Americans. It is quite apparent that Viet Cong propaganda is still able to influence their thoughts. All the ralliers in DON DIEN Province during Operation ATLANTA turned themselves in to GVN and ARVN forces.

Observation: Leaders at all echelons of command must be aware of and stress the importance of the Chieu Hoi Program and especially how to identify and handle a rallier.

- Additional lessons listed in Annex C Operation Alexandria
ANNEX A

21 NOVEMBER AMBUSH NARRATIVE
INTRODUCTION (C)

On 21 November 1966 a large convoy escorted by nine Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles (ACAV's - Modified MIL Armored Personnel Carriers mounting a .50 caliber machine gun with hatch armor and two side mounted 760 machineguns, each with an armored gun shield) was ambushed on National Highway One between BỊEN HÀ and XUAN LOC (YT 2750970 YT 2990977) by elements of two battalions of the Vńl Cong 27th Regiment. The escort successfully defended the convoy despite the fact that the VC were well entrenched and employed 57 and 75mm recoilless rifles, mortars, automatic weapons, and small arms and grenades.

BACKGROUND (C)

Operation ATLANTA, which began on 20 October 1966, was the operation in which the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment cleared, secured, and occupied a base camp in the vicinity of LONG GIAP, YT 1635, 12km south of XUAN LOC, RVN. The convoy of 21 November was one of many convoys moving supplies, equipment, and men from the staging area to the base camp. Operation ATLANTA progressed.

Units represented in the convoy included Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry, 6th Military History Detachment, 32nd Chemical Detachment, 11th Armored Cavalry Tactical Air Control Party, 518th Military Intelligence Detachment, 18th Transportation Group, as well as elements of the S1, S2, S3, and S4 staff sections of Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry.

The terrain and vegetation in the area provided good fields of fire and concealment for the ambush force. On the south side of Highway One, where the heaviest concentration of enemy troops was located, the brush, jungle and secondary growth begins at YT 275099 and continues to YT 282100, where an area of grass and banana trees begins (see sketch map). This area continues to YT 292098 where brush and high grass dominate the area. The north side of the road is generally level or with only gentle slopes and consists of high grass vegetation interspersed with low scrub brush, throughout the ambush area.

Less than ten minutes prior to the ambush, an intelligence report was received by 1st Battalion, 11th Armored Cavalry, indicating that VC forces were in position at a point a short distance to the southeast. This information was passed immediately to the 1st Squadron, parent unit of the convoy escort platoon.

THE AMBUSH OF 21 NOVEMBER 1966 (C)

The escort commander received warning of the impending ambush when his own vehicle was less than 1,000 yards from the ambush site. All vehicles except the lead ACAV were notified of the impending ambush before the VC commenced firing. As the convoy and escorts passed by the ambush site they employed reconnaissance by fire which was returned by a heavy volume of small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, recoilless rifle, and hand grenade fire.

Approximately one-half of the convoy passed through the killing zone safely before a truck was hit by recoilless rifle fire which stopped and burned in such a position that no other vehicles could pass. Within two minutes the three trucks behind the first one to be hit were destroyed on the road. The two ACAV's closest to the firing moved immediately to protect the trucks under fire engaging the enemy with all their available weapons. This action, combined with the small arms fire returned by the personnel who had remained from the trucks when the rear portion of the convoy was forced to halt, kept the enemy elements from overrunning the convoy. After a brief but furious exchange of fire, both of the ACAV's that were hit by enemy rounds, and had to be evacuated by their crews, most of whom had become casualties.

As the fire fight was raging in the killing zone, the escort platoon leader organized a hasty escort from three ACAV's in the lead and moved that section of the convoy on towards XUAN LOC. As soon as the platoon leader was on the move, the fire from the ACAV's that had been disabled began to abate. Halfway to the burning trucks, the platoon leader was forced to leave the ACAV accompanying his vehicle to act as security for the DUST-OFF helicopter coming in to evacuate the wounded.
wounded. As he continued along his vehicle was struck by a recoilless rifle round which disabled only the radio; on the vehicle, but wounded two crewmen. Before reaching the scene of the action the platoon leader’s vehicle engaged the ambush force on both sides of the road until the enemy fire stopped. During this time he adjusted the ordnance delivered by an air-strike, and supervised the evacuation of wounded by DUST-OFF.

FIELD SUPPORT (U)

There was no artillery fire in support of the ambush fight, however, later in the day artillery was placed to support search and clear operations in the area. There was a total of four firing runs made by armed helicopters and two airstrikes flown in support of the convoy. Later in the day an additional air strike was flown in support of search and clear operations.

The Light Fire Team from the Aviation Platoon, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment placed the following ammunition on the ambush:

1st Firing Run
2 UH1B
12 Rockets (2.75 FFRQ)
12,500 rounds 7.62 MD (+)

2nd Firing Run
3 UH1B
18 Rockets
12,500 rounds 7.62 MD

3rd Firing Run
3 UH1B
10 Rockets
12,500 rounds 7.62 MD

4th Firing Run
3 UH1B
2 Rockets
12,720 rounds 7.62 MD
12 Rockets
12,500 rounds 7.62 (+)

TOTAL
50,000 rounds 7.62 (+)

The Air Force delivered the following ordnance on the site of the ambush:

1st Air Strike
Flight of 3 F100’s
6-500 pound bombs
6-750 pound napalm bombs
7200 rounds 20mm

2nd Air Strike
Flight of 2 F5’s
2-500 pound bombs
2-750 pound bombs
2-Type 2A CBU clusters

RESULTS

(U) Enemy losses included:

Personal:

KIA (MC) 30
KIA (POSS) 75 - 100

Equipment:

57mm Recoilless Rifle 1
AKA L7 Assault Rifle and Tripod 1
RPG-2 AT Rockets 2
RED AT hand grenade 1
Stick grenades 35
Tail fin assemblies
from expended RPG-2 2
AT rockets 3
75mm BR Casing 3
Unfired 57mm HE M304...

Expended 57mm HE casings 6

Expended booster charge casings for RPD 2

Sets of web equipment and... 10

Aidman's medical kit with splints 1

Documents identifying 1st Bn, 275th, and 2nd Bn, 275th VC Regiment were taken from bodies.

(c) Friendly losses included:

Personnel:

KIA 7

WIA 8

Equipment:

ACAV's destroyed 2

2½ ton trucks destroyed 1

CONCLUSIONS (C)

Information obtained from documents found on the VC bodies indicated elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 275th VC Regiment comprised the ambush force.

Though the VC destroyed 2 combat and 1 administrative vehicles the convoy was not overrun, despite the fact that the major portion of the enemy force only had to contend with the small arms of the escorted personnel and two ACAV's. This was determined by three factors:

First was the counter fire from the ambushed column, which began as soon as the trucks stopped.

Second was the fact that the escort unit was warned of the ambush and entered the killing zone firing their automatic weapons. This undoubtedly inflicted casualties on the enemy and may well have caused the VC to initiate the ambush prematurely.

Third it must be accepted that the tremendous volume of fire put out by the ACAV’s was instrumental in causing the VC to break contact and flee.
ANNEX B

2 DECEMBER AMBUSH NARRATIVE
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NARRATIVE OF THE AMBUSH OF 2 DECEMBER 1966

INTRODUCTION (C)

On 2 December 1966 elements (resupply convoy) of the 1st Squadron were ambushed by the 275th Viet Cong Main Force Regiment on National Highway 1 northeast of XUAN LOC. The ensuing action dramatically displayed the epitome of proper counterambush techniques and actions. So violent was the execution of the counterambush that within 70 minutes the Squadron had rendered the 275th VC Regiment ineffective as a fighting force without the loss of a single trooper. This one action assisted incalculably in paving the way for more extensive operations by the Blackhorse Regiment to the north and east of VO DAT.

BACKGROUND (C)

Operation ATLANTA began on 20 October 1966 with the 1st Squadron conducting a clear and secure operation along National Highway 1 from BIEN HCA to XUAN LOC and securing the site of the Regiment’s permanent base camp south of XUAN LOC. Operation ATLANTA was not only conceived on the idea of clearing out a piece of real estate and building a base camp, but in opening up and securing roads and permitting the flow of civilian commerce throughout the provinces around XUAN LOC. Once the base camp area had been secured, search and destroy and ROADRUNNER operations were conducted toward VO DAT along National Highway 1, and Interprovincial 335, and south from the base camp on Interprovincial Route 2 to the 1st ATP TAOR.

Convoys with supplies, equipment and troops continued to arrive from the LONG Binh staging area in ever increasing amounts throughout the remainder of October and the entire month of November. On 2 November the Regiment began providing security for a company from the 27th Engineer Battalion (C) in the vicinity of OIA RAY adjacent to National Highway 1 at the base of CHUA CHAN Mountain.

Viet Cong activities in the 11th Armored Cavalry’s area of operation were relatively minor in nature during the month of November except for the ambush of 21 November. On 27 and 28 November the Regiment received RED HAZE reports of approximately 50 emissions south of National Highway 1 (vic. TT 3050 - 2U07 - 2U07 - 2007) and agent reports of movements north and south of National Highway 1 in the vicinity of SOUVAT and CHUA CHAN Mountain. On the 27th the 1st Squad moved into the area of the reported activity and conducted a zone reconnaissance north and south of Highway 1 as far as OIA RAY remaining overnight, returning the next day without contact. On the same day the 1st Squadron returned to the base camp, a FAC from the 15th ARVN Division (formerly the 10th Division) reported receiving automatic weapon fire and observed an estimated Viet Cong battalion off Interprovincial Route 2 vicinity of XA BANG (TT 3050 - 3U07). Shortly thereafter a second report was received, this one from KINH LOC subsector indicating another Viet Cong battalion was located (TT 3050 to TT 3095) west of XUAN LOC approximately 8 kilometers. The 2nd Squadron was immediately dispatched to check the reported activity to the south on Interprovincial Route 2 while the 1st Squadron moved to the west on Highway 1 to search the other suspected area. Both operations produced negative contact.

The 1st and 2nd Squadrons returned to the base camp resuming their mission of base camp security. The next day Troop B relieved elements of the 2nd Squadron providing security for the OIA RAY rock quarry. Agent reports still indicated enemy activity around OIA RAY. Consequently, reaction forces were continually on the alert and each convoy’s movement was closely scrutinized.

The terrain in the area of the ambush is gentle, sloping to the southeast from the commanding terrain in the area, Chua Chan Mountain (elevation 827m). Drainage flows from the mountain to the northeast to the southeast. The highway is flanked by elephant grass on both sides turning into heavy secondary growth approximately 60 meters off the road. The initial area of contact was flanked to the west by a portion of a rubber plantation. Trafficability was limited once the vehicles entered the undergrowth. However, it did not preclude the advance of the Blackhorse Troopers. The weather was hot and clear continuing throughout the night and the next day.
On the second of December Troop B plus a platoon of tanks from Company D were securing the site of the rock quarry while Troop A manned the squadron's sector of the base camp perimeter. A resupply convoy had arrived earlier in the day at the base camp and was on its way back to the rock quarry when it was ambushed at 1634 hours by an estimated 2 battalion Viet Cong force. The area selected by the enemy for the ambush is located on a stretch of Highway 1 that has come to be known as "Ambush Alley" (approximately 6020966 to 6020814 along Highway 1) (see sketch 1).

The convoy, consisting of 2 tanks, 3 ACAV's and 2 1½ ton trucks, reacted violently to the attack with the armored vehicles escorting the two trucks out of killing zone then returning immediately to rake the entire killing zone with 90mm canister, 50 Cal and 7.62 machinegun fire, grenades and M-16 fire (see sketch 2).

Word of the ambush was received by the 1st Squadron units in the base camp and Troop B located 5 kilometers north of the ambush at the rock quarry. Within seven minutes after the squadron received the information, Company D (-) was on the move towards the ambush to be followed 10 minutes later by Troop C. Meanwhile Troop B had arrived at the ambush site, moving right into the killing zone smothering the Viet Cong positions, many of which were only off the shoulder of road, with withering fire. A Viet Cong recoilless rifle round hit one of the tanks knocking off the commander's cupola, but it did not deter the crew as they continued to fight and in the ensuing battle fired every round of 90mm on the tank.

By this time the tanks of Company D began to arrive on scene having traveled 22 kilometers in 25 minutes, commenced moving through the ambush site raking one side of the highway while Troop B worked over the other side. Hedgerow Battery which followed Troop C and was in turn followed by Troop A 15 minutes later, moved into a fire support position near SOU 333. Once Troop C reached the ambush site it moved through the killing zone firing everything it had, and taking up positions on Highway 1 beyond the JS of 333 and 1 in an effort to seal off the Viet Cong's routes of withdrawal.

The Viet Cong apparently thinking that Troop C was the last of the reinforcements began to fire again on the road only to be caught in a crossfire between the on-charging Troop A and the tanks of Company D. This fire fight lasted about ten minutes then Charlie began to lose his taste for combat with the Troopers of the Blackhorse. Troop A moved into positions astride Highway 1 east of Troop B while Troop C shifted further south in an attempt to block the Viet Cong's escape routes (see sketch 3).

Reinforcing fire was provided both from the ground by the 5th Artillery Group and fighter aircraft based at Thua Thien airfield directed by the Regiment's FAC personnel observing the ambush site from overhead. Further support was provided by the Squadron's light fire team and aircraft from the Regimental Aviation Platoon.

The Viet Cong had dug-in and covered positions on both sides of the road (see sketch 2) covering the killing zone with heavy and light machineguns, 60mm mortars, at least one 75mm recoilless rifle and small arms. Viet Cong forces were also positioned close to the shoulder of the road with grenades, with the apparent hope of damaging the suspension systems of the ACAV's and tanks which proved to be fruitless. They did however provide lucrative targets for the grenadiers on the passing ACAV's as they dropped their hand grenades and fired their M79 Launchers with deadly accuracy.

At 1750 hours contact was broken by the Viet Cong with only sporadic firing continuing until 1950 hours. In order to seal off the escape routes to the south (see sketch 3) a combination of artillery and air support was utilized to fire throughout the night on suspected avenues of withdrawal (trails, stream beds, ridge lines). Illumination and suppressing fires were delivered by rotating AGH "Spook" ships over the area until morning light. An initial check of the area indicated the VC had 88 DA (BC) in the 70 minute encounter with the 1st Squadron's fire power.

After regaining position all night along the road the 1st Squadron started to clear the ambush site, sending dismounted patrols approximately 200 meters off the road. Mounted patrols conducted search and clear operations on the trails traveling 10 kilometers into the jungle. To further tighten the knot around the area the 3rd Squadron moved from the base camp assuming the 1st Squadron's blocking positions while the 2nd made a sweep of the area. A forward CP from the...
At the time of the ambush there were no preplanned fires or air strikes, however, within ten minutes after the ambush started, supporting fires from fighter aircraft and the 55th Artillery Group were on the way. Thus providing Hoodser Battery, 1st Squadron enough time to position itself at SOUI CAT where it was able to provide direct support for the entire ambush area. Prior to darkness a Battery from the 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery was dispatched from ZUAN LOC to provide further support. Highway 1 was established as the fire coordination line (see sketch A) with the air strikes directed to the east and south of the highway and the artillery to the west and north. 750 personnel from the Regiment directed, in coordination with the ground command, seven air strikes from their light observation aircraft observing the ambush site. CBU's, 250 pound bombs, napalm and 20mm cannon were directed into the area uprooting trees and cutting huge gouges out of the jungle below. During the hours of darkness a AC17 "Spook" ship was continually overhead providing illumination and suppressing fires on request and as targets of opportunity appeared. Supplementing the above mentioned fire support were light fire teams from the 1st Squadron and Regiment. The light fire team from the 1st Squadron personally bagged at least 5 Viet Cong when it caught a group of them in the open.

A total of 22 sorties were flown as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Flights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F100</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ordnance expended included:

- CBU 30 bomblets
- Bomb, 500 lbs 16
- Bomb, 750 lbs 6
- Napalm, 750 lbs 22
- FFAR, 2.75" 76
- 20mm (HE) 10,000 rds
- 30 Geliber 10,000 rds

There was a minimum of one PAC overhead at all times and at some times as many as 3 in the air at once. Continuous communications were maintained with the ground commander for the duration of the ambush.

Artillery direct support was provided by Hoddsmer Battery, 1st Squadron. Reinforcing fires were provided by Battery H (155mm), 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery. A total of 1700 rounds were fired in support of the operation.

RESULT

(U) Enemy losses included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (30)</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA (POSS)</td>
<td>100-150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCO</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75mm RB</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 Hvy HB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 Lt HB (Type 58)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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7.62 Lt 1D (Type 56) 4
AK 47 Assault Rifle 3
Chicom Carbine w/Bayonet 1
RHO RD02 Rocket Launcher 1
60mm Mortar 1
529 Sub 1D 1
Carbine M2 (US) 1
Small Arms Ammunition 1500 rounds
Grenade (Fragmentation & Concussion) 45
RPG 2 grenade 2
Mortar Ammunition (60mm) 15

(C) Friendly losses included:
Personnel:
KIA - 1 (27th Engr BN)
WIA - 22

Equipment:
JCAV (destroyed) - 1
Tand 12.5A3 (damaged) - 1

CONCLUSIONS (C)

A search of the ambush area and information obtained from captured documents and prisoners indicated that the 275th VC Bngt (Main Force) reinforced with heavy weapons sprung the ambush which 70 minutes later turned into a disastrous defeat. The decisive defeat of the Viet Cong can be attributed to several things:

First and foremost is that at no time in the ambush was the Viet Cong able to gain control of the situation even though he had the advantages of surprise and fortified positions. The violent reaction by the escort force completely stripped him of any advantages he might have had. Once out of the killing zone the escort force limited the trucks charged head long down the road belching fire on both sides of the road. This spontaneous action held at bay the attacking force until the reaction forces arrived.

Secondly, the rapid reaction of the remainder of the squadron in reaching the ambush site within 25 minutes after traveling a distance of approximately 22 km.

Third, the immediate establishment of a fire coordination line (Highway 1) thus permitting maximum utilization of both air and ground supporting fires.

Fourth, the ability of the convoy to withstand the initial shock and then be able to retaliate so effectively.

The final results might have been even better if it had stayed light another two hours. However, weather conditions did not limit the ability of control personnel to place effective fire on the enemy positions.

Inclusions:
Sketch map 1, Sketch map 2, Sketch map 3, Sketch map 4, and Topographic Map.
Sketch 2

Local Guerrillas

Highway 1

Suo Cat

3 KM

75 mm

60 mm

12.7

Route 333
Sketch 4
ANNEX C

AFTER ACTION REPORT - OPERATION ALEXANDRIA
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COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION ALEXANDRIA

References:
OPORD 09-66 (OPERATION ALEXANDRIA), Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry
Regiment, 2 Dec 66.

1. NAMES OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION.
   a. OPERATION ALEXANDRIA

2. DATES OF OPERATION. 01J030 - 01J037 Dec 66.

3. LOCATION. DOC THANG and XUAN LOC PROVINCES.

4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

5. REPORTING OFFICER. LTC Palmer A. Peterson.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION. See Annex A.

7. SUPPORTING FORCES
   a. Air Support

   (1) Preplanned air strikes: There were two preplanned air strikes
       at 050700 LV to two suspected VC routes of withdrawal. The effectiveness could not
       be judged because of the dense vegetation in the strike area.

   (2) Immediate air strikes: There was one immediate air strike at
       051100 Dec called in by TM 2 to reduce enemy machine gun and small arms fire. The
       strike which followed artillery and an assault by two light fire teams reduced the
       volume of fire to the extent where ground elements could affect a search.

   b. Squadron and Regimental Aviation.

   (1) A total of 25 hours and 40 minutes of air time was recorded by
       helicopter pilots flying in support of the ground action. 13 hours 50 minutes were
       recorded in UH-1B aircraft and 11 hours 50 minutes were recorded in OH-230
       aircraft that flew PO's and other observers.

   (2) A total of four strikes were recorded. Three by the Third
       Squadron light fire team and one by the Second Squadron light fire team. Targets
       were enemy routes of withdrawal from the objective areas, tunnels and bunkers. The
       assaults were observed to be most effective in surprising enemy fires from those
       positions.

   (3) The following Ordnance was expended:

   (a) 2.75" ch. ground rockets - 37

   (b) 7.62mm Linked - 6,000 rounds

   e. Other Aviation.

   (1) Two Dust Offs were completed for this operation.

   (2) 68 hours were flown by 10 OH-1B aircraft of the 68th Aviation
       Support Company. The company air-lifted the 2nd Infantry into objective Alpha
       and out at the end of the day. Also, these elements were used to evacuate 600
       VCS to an interrogation point six kilometers from objective A.

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d. Artillery
   (1) General: Artillery support for the operation was supplied by three sources.
   (a) Howitzer Battery 3d Squadron fired the following missions:
      1. 050200 to 050300 Dec. 41 rds HE were fired. It was unobserved, effectiveness unknown.
      2. 050515 to 050715. 297 rds HE and 42 rds WP were fired for preparatory fires and to seal off the objective areas. It was unobserved and results unknown; however, based on the number of VCM detained it can be assumed that it was effective in helping to establish the seal.
      3. 050600 Dec. 2 rds of WP were fired as a navigational aid to Tm I.
      4. 050900 Dec. 366 rds HE and 48 rds WP were fired for a blocking barrage which was requested by S-3. An FO observed and reported the fire effectively blocked avenues of escape.
      5. 051045 to 051400 395 rds of HE and 32 rds WP were fired for combined assault on line by Tm I, Tm K and Tm L. At one point on this mission a dead space was encountered in a deep draw. The assault elements could not effectively clear the area without halting the assault. Howitzer Battery effectively closed their sheet and was able to completely fill the draw with fire and reduce enemy harassment from that position.
      6. 051630 to 051645 Dec. 137 rds HE and 13 rds WP were fired by the 105 Battery and 155 Battery massed as a final protective fire for Tm I and Tm L as they withdrew from the area. This was a TOT mission. Artillery batteries are not usually located together in Vietnam to allow them to mass their forces in this way. However, the mission was effectively accomplished.
   (b) Battery 2/35 Artillery 155MM SP fired 454 rds HE and 10 rds WP in missions ranging from H&I to a TOT. This battery has a range of 3 to 4 miles and its effect on a target is three times that of a 105; the battery provided a valuable asset to the operation.
   (c) Provisional Mortar Battery, composed of the mortars in the Armored Cavalry Troop massed in one battery, fired four H&I missions in the vicinity of objective Alpha. As a supplement to our Howitzer Battery and a second source of indirect fire the Provisional Mortar Battery is very valuable.

b. INTELLIGENCE
   (a) Prior to Operation: Numerous sources, 1st Australian Task Force, Phuoc Tuy Province and Sector Headquarters, Doc Thanh Advisor and aerial observation all indicated that an unknown local force was operating in the area. Countless incidents of sniper fire, mines, road cuts and tax collection points had been reported by these sources. It was suspected that the local force units provided cuts to allow the 274 and 275 VC Regiments to cross Interprovincial Highway #2. They also served as guides to the Regiments when in the area.
   (b) The American advisor in Phuoc Tuy Province further indicated that the area could harbor a transient VC Base Camp as there were tunnels and trenches sighted on several occasions, and the fortifications were on a VC east-west route of movement.
   (c) Value of prior intelligence: Prior intelligence was a valuable indication of what might be expected in the area. Expected terrain limitations came as no surprise and full advantage was taken of those areas where we knew armored vehicles could operate best. The 43 ARVN Inf BN was requested to cope with expected unfavorable terrain where it existed and to provide a search element for widely dispersed and isolated huts in objective A. Prior intelligence from aerial observation allowed for preplanned artillery to be placed on expected routes of enemy withdrawal. Actual enemy resistance did exceed that which was expected and planned for.
   (d) Intelligence during the operation: Intelligence gained from OPERATION ALEXANDRIA definitely identified the local force to be local force Company C-20. Of the 42 confirmed VC captured, interrogators found one who was a member of the 274th VC Regiment. Documents collected have not been fully evaluated but one revealed the location of a VC mine field.
   (e) Tunnels and bunkers indicated a defensive position and verified suspicions that the area was utilized as a transient Base Camp.
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SUJEC: Combat Operat, After Action Report (RVN: MA J3-32(Cont))

9. MISSION. To conduct search and destroy operation 050609 December 1966, via YS445852, Can Ty 2 (T943658), Ap Hinh (T9462825) to seize VC and VCS in area.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:
   a. Maneuver. To conduct opn in 3 phases:
      (1) Phase I: Seal on 2 directions of atks to seal obj's A and B. Secure landing zones for 43 Inf (ARVN) (-).
      (2) Phase II: Cont to seal obj's A and B. 43 Inf (ARVN) clears obj's A and B. VC and VCS airlifted to sector interrogation center via YS45862.
      (3) Phase III: On order, TM cont atk to search obj C.
   b. Fires:
      (1) Artillery Fire: TM I init.
      (2) TAG Air: On call.

11. EXECUTION
   General: Headquarters 3d Spdn 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment issued ORDER 05-66 (OPERATION ALEXANDRIA) on 2 Dec 1966 assigning the mission as stated in paragraph 9 above. On 211800 Dec all unit commanders were briefed on the mission. At 021500 Dec coordination was made with the participating ARVN unit. The Squadron Commander, S-3, a liaison officer and the Regimental 2 traveled to Ha Ria on 7 Dec to affect coordination with Phouo Tay officials and American advisors, the Battalion Commander of the 43 Inf, and Liaison officer of the 68th Armoinces Company. On 4 Dec liaison was made with B/35 Art.

   4 December 1966
   At 031500 Dec, How Battery displaced to the Outenican Rubber Plantation at YS458920 in preparation to fire H&I fires and direct support missions on 5 Dec 66.
   TM L mounted, moved south on route Black at 041745 Dec and from YS438956 to YS445975 the team dismounted and took position on either side of Route 2 to secure that portion of the route for the road march on 5 Dec. TM L occupied these positions by 041846 Dec. The TM L vehicles returned to Base Camp, after the dismounted personnel took position.

   5 December 1966
   Phase I of the operation commenced at 0515 hrs with Howitzer Battery and B Battery 2/35 Artillery conducting preparatory fires in objectives A & B to seal the area until the teams could take position.
   At 0515 TM K crossed BP and proceeded south on route BLACK travelling south to effect a seal on objective Alpha. TM L brought its vehicles to the positions it occupied on route BLACK. The team mounted and proceeded south to complete the seal on objective Alpha. TM L brought its vehicles to the positions it occupied on route BLACK. The team mounted and proceeded south to complete the seal on objective Alpha.
   Provisional Mortar Battery followed in march order and displaced to the south on route BLACK to YS457840 where the Battery was laid.
   3/919 Engineers was last in march order, and took up position with Provisional Mortar Battery.
   At 0545 How Battery stopped preparatory fires and started interdiction fires on suspected route of withdrawal from objectives A & B.
   At 0630 TM K had completed the seal on objective Bravo. TM L reported the portion of the seal for objective Alpha was complete at 0647. At 0656 the first lift, one company of the 43rd Infantry (ARVN) was on the landing zone. At 0700 TM M reported they were in position and were sealing their position and completed the seal at 0735.
   Phase II. At 0640 TM K commanded a search of area Bravo. The search in objective Bravo revealed several posters and leaflets which were anti-American. At coordinates YS465950 in the vicinity of a concrete plantation house TM K found a 30 meter long tunnel. By 0727 TM K had taken about 200 VCS and requested air evacuation for the suspects so that they could be taken to the interrogation point at Sinh Dzin. At 0745 TM L reported having located 2000 pounds of pamae which they destroyed.
   The second lift of the 43 Infantry was completed at 0800. At this time the ARVN force moved south from the landing zone at YS417862 and moved into objective Alpha to initiate a search of the area.

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followed by Tn L, Tn E and Tn E. By 0030 the enemy was closed on Base

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12. Results:
   a. Friendly
      (1) Personnel
         US - 2 KIA, 10 WIA.
      (2) Equipment (Damaged or lost)
         2 tanks suffered track and suspension damage.
      1 M-79 lost.
   b. Enemy
      (1) Personnel
         (a) 4 VC KIA (BC)
         (b) 2 VC WIA (Confirmed)
         (c) 0 VC KIA
         (d) 600 VC captured.
         (e) 42 VC detained.
      (2) Tunnels and Fortifications
         (a) 24 major tunnels were found.
         (b) 2 fortified positions were explored. Punjabi stakes, booby traps, sniper holes and anti-aircraft were among the defenses employed.
         (c) None of the tunnels or fortifications could be completely destroyed as it would have required major engineer effort and time not available to the Squadron.
         (d) Captured and/or destroyed.
            4100 lbs of peanuts destroyed.
            175 tons of rice destroyed.
            29 tons of rice evacuated.
            70 Chicom stick grenades destroyed.
            2 claymores destroyed.
            2 Pressure type anti-tank mines captured.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: As OPERATION ALEXANDRIA involved only a single day, problems in administrative procedures were at a minimum. Some of the following areas are worthy of comment.
   a. Treatment of Casualties: Tn L suffered a KIA early in the action. However, evacuation could not be effected for several hours. Dustoff would not evacuate a KIA even though the body could easily have been placed on a dustoff ship when it was in the area to evacuate a wounded soldier. The UH-1's organic to the Squadron could not evacuate the body due to the extreme weight of the Ordnance carried by the aircraft. A swifter method will have to be devised for KIA evacuation. Not only is the presence of a dead comrade a definite morale factor, but the body creates a handicap when the unit must move rapidly and frequently. Unit must be ready to evacuate casualties or KIA by armored ambulance to a safe landing zone for pick-up.
   b. Communications: In future operations the Squadron would like to switch all airmobile communications to the admin/log net as traffic becomes intense on the command net. At one time a request for dustoff and a request for a fire mission were in competition with each other, indicating a need for established priorities on radio traffic.

14. GENERAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: The only item of equipment that met full combat utilization for the first time was the M132 Flame Thrower. The ability of this weapon to burn thick brush and route a hidden enemy is unequalled. It is such a valuable weapon when readily available to the troop that it is felt that two M132's should be organic to each troop.

15. COMBAT ANALYSIS: OPERATION ALEXANDRIA was most successful in terms of physical damage inflicted upon the enemy, numbers of confirmed VC captured, and the psychological advantage gained by easily entering an enemy stronghold and establishing control in the area. Further, indispensable intelligence was gained about activities and operations in the 1st Platoon 55th. The stores and fortifications found definitely established the area as a staging area used by the 5th VC Division for east-west movement. The single most important success was the capture of important local VC leaders who gave valuable information on terrorist rings and infrastructure of the area. The operation also provided the opportunity to assault entrenched positions, utilize the Squadron's tunnel rats, and practice the processing and evacuation of prisoners and documents. The troops also encountered Punjabi stakes and other booby traps.
To I and To M started searching in the vicinity of their blocking positions and at 0820 To I discovered a large number of inter-connecting tunnels running under houses. Smoke was placed in the tunnels and "tunnel rats", recently trained in the Squadrons, entered the tunnels for a detailed search.

At 0825 sniper fire wounded a tank commander and loader in the head at coordinates TS438848. Dustoff was called for at that location by To T.

To I called in a light fire team to make a run on the location that the sniper fire came from. The air observer and 83 called in artillery to fire a blocking barrage to seal the area while To I searched the positions. At 0905 To I made further contact with heavy volumes of machine gun and small arms fire at TS438848. The light fire team made an assault on the position but artillery was not used due to aircraft in the area.

High performance aircraft was also kept on stand-by pending the completion of Dustoff. One attempt at Dustoff failed at 0924 when the aircraft suffered tail damage from hostile fire and was forced to land at Base Camp. At 0920 the wounded tank commander died, and To I requested the body be evacuated.

To the south of objective Alpha where To M was in blocking position. A limited search was conducted. By 0958 To M had discovered 5000 lbs of rice and had 35 VCS to be evacuated.

Dustoff was not accomplished for To M until 1052 almost two hours after it had been requested. Upon completion of Dustoff To M called in artillery as small arms and automatic weapons persisted. The artillery was lifted at 1058, and the light fire team followed by TAC air assaulted the area.

At 1102 To I requested a second dustoff. The second dustoff was completed at 1140. To I still had a KIA at its location as neither dustoff nor our light fire team could pick up the body. One of the aircraft from the 6th Airmobile support company finally evacuated the body. To M found in the vicinity of its blocking position a total of 3900 lbs of rice which was destroyed and 45 VCS. By 1147 To L had 50 VCS in the vicinity of its blocking position.

45 Infantry had completed a rather haphazard search of objective Alpha by 1020 hours. The Battalion Commander set his companies in position along Highway 2 and remained there for the rest of the operation. The search performed by the ARVN Force resulted in several burned huts. Nine VCS, some handgrenades of various manufacture, one anti-tank mine, and several pigs, chickens, bicycles and one sewing machine were taken by the 43 Infantry.

Feeling a more detailed search of objective Alpha was necessary at 1200 hours To L, To K and To M swiftly formed on line to the north of the objective and performed a mounted search of the area with one company of the 43 Infantry searching behind the vehicles. Artillery was employed during this search to fire into draws and thick jungle ahead of the search elements to drive out anybody hidden in such places.

This search revealed numerous tunnels, bunkers, body traps, punji pits, and firing positions. Four VC KIA were discovered and 400 rice VCS were found. In addition rice, handgrenades and some uniforms were taken. The positions where KIA were found were entrenched and the enemy was killed at close range. There was one instance of an enemy assaulting two ACV's with a handgrenade at 15 meters.

At 1342 To K moved to objective Charlie and conducted a search that yielded 43 VCS.

A MEDCAP operation was conducted at the interrogation point. The operation met with only limited success as the people who had been evacuated to the interrogation point all demonstrated a reluctance to participate because of VC propaganda that discredited MEDCAP as dangerous and brutal. Attempts by 8-5 to give away various foodstuffs was also only partly successful because the VC propaganda labeled the food as poisoned.

Because of approaching darkness and the time required to airlift the 43 Infantry to Ba Ria, Phase III, the search of objective Delta was never accomplished.

At 1512 hours To K returned 43 Infantry to the parent unit and moved south on route BLACK from the southern sector of To L to the landing zone at YS456841. To M secured the landing zone until the 43 Infantry (LPS) had been completely airlifted out of objective Alpha. At 1544, 105th Battery moved north and returned to the base camp at Br 137. The 43 Infantry (LPS) was clear of the area by 1600. To K moved north on route BLACK.

One disappointment in the operation was with the performance of the 43 Infantry (ARVN). It was hoped that they would provide the task force with a capable means of conducting a detailed ground search of the objective areas. However, the ARVN infantry troops lacked disciplined leadership and the conduct of the search was rapid and sloppy. Those areas that were searched were burned after the troops confiscated all pigs, chickens, bicycles, and other assorted items of value to them.

It is hoped that another mission will be undertaken with the 43 Infantry and that through a more definitive command relationship more skillful teamwork can be formed.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS. See Annex B.
ANNEX A to Combat Operations After Action Report to G-2 LEMNOS

TASK ORGANIZATION (Initially).

TH I
1/3-11 Arm Cav (-1 plat)
2/3-11 Arm Cav
1 FO/How/3-11 Arm Cav
1 M132

TH II
1/3-11 Arm Cav
1 FO/How/3-11 Arm Cav
1 M132

TH III
K/3-11 Arm Cav
K Co/3-11 Arm Cav
1 Co/3-11 Arm Cav
2 GVN National Police

TH IV
K/3-11 Arm Cav (-2 plat)
1 FO/How/3-11 Arm Cav

TF CON
How Btry
Prov Mort Btry
1 Bigr Recon Tm/27 Engrs
1 Lt Fire Tm/3-11 Arm Cav
1 M1/3-11 Arm Cav
2 FO/How/3-11 Arm Cav
ANNEX B to Combat Operations After Action Report to OP ALEXANDRIA

LESSONS LEARNED OPERATION ALEXANDRIA

1. ITEM: RECON BY FIRE
   a. Discussion: Rather than random reconnaissance into heavily vegetated areas such as woodlines, jungles or banana groves reconnaissance by fire should start short of the suspected area and be walked into the target.
   b. Observation: Fire discipline and coordination exhibited by the enemy indicated that well conducted reconnaissance by fire can cause an enemy unit to reveal itself by return fire, or it will suppress his fire.

2. ITEM: FIRE DISCIPLINE
   a. Discussion: When a team or a vehicle crew has more than one automatic weapon they should closely control their fire during enemy contact so that there is always at least one automatic weapon firing while the others reload.
   b. Observation: Wounded personnel in OPERATION ALEXANDRIA indicated they were wounded because all automatic weapons ran out of ammo at the same time and the crew had no suppressive fire while they reloaded. This clearly dictates the need for control on firing automatic weapons.

3. ITEM: LAND NAVIGATION AT NIGHT
   a. Discussion: Night movement under blackout conditions can either achieve great surprise and success or create chaos. Surprise and success will be achieved if the following procedures are adopted:
      (1) Know the distance between SP and objective and have the lead element measure the distance on his odometer to insure that the objective or turn off to the objective is found.
      (2) Line of sight compasses are valuable as an added reference for movement and to quickly determine general direction.
      (3) Preplanned artillery concentrations utilizing WP are an important aid to determining exact location and achieving proper positioning on the objective area.
   b. Observation: On OPERATION ALEXANDRIA the Third Squadron enjoyed a successful night movement by employing the procedures listed. It is recommended that considerations be SOP for movement during hours of darkness.

4. ITEM: CLOSING ON A KNOWN OR SUSPECTED ENEMY POSITION
   a. Discussion: When moving against a known or suspected enemy position armed vehicles should lead the dismounted elements so that any anti-personnel mines, booby traps or automatic weapon fire will be absorbed by the armor. Dismounted personnel can be utilized best by following behind to conduct a detailed search of the area, utilizing the protection of the armor and automatic weapons.
   b. Observation: The combination of a mounted-dismounted team advancing on an enemy position proved effective in OPERATION ALEXANDRIA however greater speed and skill could be achieved if training were conducted in this procedure by ARVN units.

5. ITEM: DETECTING UNDERGROUND BUNKERS AND FIRING POSITIONS
   a. Discussion: On OPERATION ALEXANDRIA some underground bunkers and firing positions were detected by long mounds of earth. This was prevalent in banana groves, and in most cases trenches, bunkers and firing positions were found under the mound.
   b. Observation: Search elements should be instructed concerning mounds and what they could indicate.

6. ITEM: ENEMY DEPLOYMENT OF PUNJHI STICKS
   a. Discussion: Punjhi stakes were found around an enemy defensive position. They were easily recognizable in the grass and the points were aiming away from the position.
   b. Observation: Troops should be trained to look for punjhi sticks and read into them what their employment could mean i.e., the direction they are pointing is expected route of friendly force advance. The opposite direction might hide an enemy position.

7. ITEM: USE OF M-132
   a. Discussion: For maximum utilization of the M-132 the following techniques were found to be most effective:
      (1) Fire mixture short of target and allow the flame to roll into objective.
      (2) Fire low when possible as the mixture will dissipate if fired higher than necessary.
ANNEX B to Combat Operations After Action Report to OP ALEXANDRIA (Cont)

l. Observation: Crews on K-132 should be trained in the techniques mentioned.

8. ITEM: ASSAULT ON LINE
   a. Discussion: At one point Tm I, Tm K and Tm L came on line to
      assault a wide area that contained enemy positions. With the help of an
      aerial observer 79 armored vehicles easily formed on line and advanced,
      all weapons trained on the enemy positions.
   b. Observation: Armor can be employed successfully in mass formations
      in certain areas of Vietnam.

9. ITEM: CONTROL OF COMMAND NET.
   a. Discussion: During the operation there were times when valuable
      transmissions had to compete for the opportunity to use the command net.
      Request for dustoff were being cut out by spot reports which competed
      with commanders controlling air strikes. It was resolved to shift all airmobile
      transmission to the admin/log net.
   b. Observation: Airmobile communications may remain on the admin/log net to lessen transmissions on command not. Other suggestions include training people to listen before transmitting and fairly establishing their own priorities should important traffic be on the net.

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ANNEX C (Entrenchments Encountered on OPERATION ALEXANDRIA) to Combat Operations After Anti- Report to OPERATION ALEXANDRIA

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ANNEX C (Entrenchments Encountered on OPERATION ALEXANDRIA) to Combat Operations After Action Report to OPERATION ALEXANDRIA

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[Diagram showing entrenchments, wire, and stakes]

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ANNEX D

ROSTER OF COMMANDERS

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - COL William W. Cobb

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regt - CPT Marvan L. Doerr

1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - LTC Martin D. Howell

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron - CPT Richard H. Fanning (20 Oct - 23 Nov) 1LT Franklin F. Wing (24 Nov - 8 Dec)

Troop A, 1st Squadron - CPT John E. Bailey
Troop B, 1st Squadron - CPT John L. Landry
Company D, 1st Squadron - CPT Bill Faseley
Headquarters Battery, 1st Squadron - CPT William K. France

2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - LTC Ruben M. Horsn

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 2nd Squadron - CPT Bob E. Shamberger
Troop K, 2nd Squadron - CPT Richard H. Miller
Troop L, 2nd Squadron - CPT Howard C. Batt
Troop M, 2nd Squadron - CPT John G. Russell
Headquarters Battery, 2nd Squadron - CPT William R. Perry

3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - LTC Palmer A. Peterson

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3rd Squadron - CPT Calvin J. Neese (20 Oct - 6 Dec) CPT Tedd A. Welsh (6 Dec - 8 Dec)

Troop I, 3rd Squadron - CPT Peter F. Horosehak (20 Oct - 9 Nov)
Troop J, 3rd Squadron - CPT Joe R. Parker (10 Nov - 8 Dec)
Troop L, 3rd Squadron - CPT Wayne P. Halsted
Troop N, 3rd Squadron - CPT Larry L. Hensley
Company H, 3rd Squadron - CPT Herbert C. Hartel Jr.
Headquarters Battery, 3rd Squadron - CPT Leonard Dees

37th Medical Company - CPT Dannie J. Blais

919th Engineer Company (Armored) - CPT Donald J. Crocker

909th Radio Research Detachment - CPT Lee Centry

91st Military Intelligence Detachment - CPT Alfred J. Dirking (20 Oct - 18 Nov) MAJ Cornelius L. Gray (19 Nov - 6 Dec)

13rd Chemical Detachment - LIT James T. Price

17th Public Information Detachment - MAJ Paul Blackwell (20 Oct - 7 Dec) CPT Owen Hitchfield (8 Dec)

19th Military History Detachment - MAJ Bruce R. Wilson

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ANNEX F

VIET CONG INCIDENT REPORTS

26 MAY 1964 - 3 OCTOBER 1966
1. (C) INCIDENTS: BISH NOA to XUAN LOC on/near National Highway One.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>COORDINATES</th>
<th>INCIDENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 May 61</td>
<td>TS 177126</td>
<td>Ambush of RVNAF personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jul 61</td>
<td>TS 166112</td>
<td>Ambush of Civil Officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun 66</td>
<td>TS 234128</td>
<td>Ambush of RV personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Jun 66</td>
<td>TS 214108</td>
<td>Roadblocks and mines, small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Jun 66</td>
<td>TS 359058</td>
<td>arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Jul 66</td>
<td>TS 34101</td>
<td>Roadblock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Jul 66</td>
<td>TS 359101</td>
<td>Small arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 369101</td>
<td>Small arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 595056</td>
<td>Roadblock, Small arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 57100</td>
<td>Possible extortion point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Sep 66</td>
<td>TS 237100</td>
<td>Roof-topped roadblock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sep 66</td>
<td>TS 278192</td>
<td>Road cut.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (C) INCIDENTS: XUAN LOC to PHUOC LE (BARIO) on Routes 1 and 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>COORDINATES</th>
<th>INCIDENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 Jun 61</td>
<td>TS 165938</td>
<td>RF Mil pers ambush - 6 KIA, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jun 61</td>
<td>TS 166961</td>
<td>WIA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jun 61</td>
<td>TS 169280</td>
<td>RF Mil pers ambush - 3 KIA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jun 61</td>
<td>TS 169280</td>
<td>Small arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun 65</td>
<td>TS 168918</td>
<td>AT mine found - destroyed in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul 66</td>
<td>TS 169817</td>
<td>place over 6yd long - not clear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165851</td>
<td>Roadblock, dirt mounds, cuts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165851</td>
<td>Road cut - passable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Small arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>3 mines - APC -1 blown damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Road reported mined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Dirt mound across road, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>just off road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>One dirt mound on each side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Crater in road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Dirt road block.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Deep trench across road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Two trees across road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Crater in road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>2 brushwood roadblocks-ID0s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>apart.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Barbed wire barrier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Mine, hit by truck.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Mine, hit by truck.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>APC, hits mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Jeep, hits mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Numerous but passable cuts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>APC destroyed by mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Truck hits mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Aug 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>ARVN APC damaged by mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sep 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Command activated mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sep 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>U/I explosion, small arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sep 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Oct 66</td>
<td>TS 165863</td>
<td>Small arms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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