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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Operation Atlanta, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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HEADQUARTERS
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO San Francisco 96257

COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION ATLANTA

1. (U) REFERENCES:
   b. OPERO 09-66 (Operation ATLANTA), Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry
      Regiment, 6 September 1966.

2. (U) NATURE AND TYPE OF OPERATIONS: 11th Armored Cavalry Operation ATLANTA
   Search and Clear, Base Cam Security, and ROADRUNTER.

   b. (G) GENERAL: On 27 September 1966, II Field Force Vietnam directed the
      11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to secure a base camp area in the vicinity of 13N 1856
to clear and secure highways and lines of communications in portions of Phu Bai,
Long Khanh and Phouc Tuy Provinces. Execution of the mission was initiated under
the code name Operation ATLANTA. The operation commenced on 20 October 1966.
Initially the operation was confined to the securing of National Highway 1 from
BINH HAI to XIII LOC and a portion of Interprovincial Route 2 to the area of
the new base camp. Concurrently, security would be provided for the engineer work
parties involved in the clearing and preparation of the area for occupancy by
the Regiment in the latter part of November. A few days after the operation
started the 1st Squadron and engineer units were joined by the 2nd Squadron which
organized and operated out of a combat base in the long Que rubber plantation
(13N 629) for almost a month. The Regiment's general area of operation is depicted
in Annex E. Initially this area of operation was divided into 3 areas as shown
on the enclosed map. Later the general area was expanded to include 9 areas.

While the 1st and 2nd Squadrons were operating out of their combat bases
in the BINH LOC area, the 3rd Squadron was securing the Regimental Staging Area
in RINH KAI and providing security for the BINH KAI - LONG BINH area (Operations
ZIMMOM AND KHALKI). In addition to providing security, the 3rd Squadron
conducted aggressive patrolling activities and provided artillery fire support
for the DOM PAT sensitive area. By the end of the first week in November the
command elements of the Regiment were operating out of the base camp area to be
followed in the next 4 weeks by the remaining headquarters elements and the 3rd
Squadron.

The Regiment continually demonstrated its versatility and maneuverability
throughout the operation. It was not uncommon to find the squadrons operating on
three independent missions covering terrain from X1 KRE (Operation ATTLEBORO) to
the northernmost limits of the 1st Australian Task Force (TAG) as shown in Annex E.
The Blackhorse Regiment remained constantly on the alert ready to exploit its
tremendous firepower and inherent cross-country mobility.

a. The reporting officer of this report is Colonel William W. Cobb,
   Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.
   b. Task Organisation. Control of the operation was exercised by Head-
   quarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, operating initially out of a tactical
   command post at LONG BINH which later moved to the base camp area. The initial
   task organisation is indicated below. Due to the duration of the operation and the
   additional requirements placed on the Regiment, frequent changes in task organ-
   isation were necessary and are shown as occurred in paragraph 8, Execution.
   Commanders are shown in Annex D.

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Page 1 of 25 Pages

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5. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to Operation:

(1) VC Main Force:

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(3) Incidents: VC activities along National Highway 1 from BTH HAA to XOUN LOC, south along National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 2 to BA RIA, ranged from ambushes of NPA and ARVN forces to roadblocks and tax collection points. The nature of the incidents indicated an attempt by the forces operating along these lines of communication to restrict the movement of civilian traffic while denying their use by friendly forces. A complete list of incidents is outlined in Annex F to this report.

(b) Reported movements:

(a) An ARVN agent reported that a VC Battalion located vicinity TS 2322 on 1 October moved to the XUNH TRAI area vicinity TS 11546, US evaluation C/3 (Comment: No main force battalions are held to be in operation in this area at this time).  

(b) An ARVN agent reported a VC Battalion vicinity TS 3950 to TS 3020 on 29 September 1966, ARVN evaluation C/3, US evaluation J/3. (Comment: Reliable agent report has unit vicinity TS 3951 on 2 October. Possibly company size element of the 5th VC Division or the unconfirmed LONG XUNH Provincial Company, C305).

(c) An ARVN agent reported the UW 8 3/8 Artillery Battalion was being transported from TS 679 to 1 October to CSM 4400 (location unknown).
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on 5 October by local laborers: ARVN evaluation C/3. Comments: No unit is
listed under that number; however, elements of the 144 Artillery Regiment are known
to be infiltrating South Vietnam and reportedly headed for III CTZ. Leading ele-
ments could have reached DANG LOC area by this time. The regiment was reportedly
equipped with the 152 60mm rocket firing weapon. Characteristics: Maximum
range 100m, effective range 50m, kill radius 25m. US evaluation F/4.

(5) Enemy situation. The VC can be expected to harass convoys with
mines, sniping, minor attacks of up to platoon size anywhere along routes in the
Regimental sector. Mortar and minor harassing attacks could also be expected on
base camps and combat base areas. Although not presently indicated, the VC does
possess the capability of mounting a regimental size ambush on convoys and attacks
on the 11th Armored Cavalry Base Camp.

(6) Intelligence sources: The following sources were utilised to
plan the operation:
(a) II P Force V Intelligence Report.
(b) Agent reports.
   1 18th Division (ARMN), (Formerly 10th Division).
   2 Central Intelligence Operations.
   3 National Police.
(c) Intelligence Estimate - III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ).
(d) MACV monthly order of battle updated.
(e) II P Force V Intelligence Imagery.
(f) Photograph maps.
(g) Visual reconnaissance.

(7) The intelligence information compiled for Operation ATLANTA
varied in currency from four days in the case of order of battle (OB) reports to a
little over a week for the incident reports. The information incorporated in
the initial operation order was only two to four days old.

b. During the month of November the VC continued to harass the 11th
Armored Cavalry with units up to platoon size. His actions were characterised by
mining incidents along the Da Nang - Xuan Loc railroad, sabotage and harassment of
ARVN's, VC dumps, bridges, and acts of terrorism on the local populace. His acti-
vities were restricted primarily to the Lang Binh - Bien Hoa area. Information
(agent reports) received on 13 November noted the presence of VC platoons and
companies operating in Area of Operations 3 (AO) thus giving him the capability
of massing main force units in AO1 for a direct attack on the base camp. However,
available information indicated no such threat was imminent. Agent reports further
confirmed the presence of the 27th VC Regiment along National Highway 1 between North
South grid lines 55 and 60. Other reports disclosed the construction of subma-
ral positions on the north and south of Highway 1 vicinity TP 6005. Documents dis-
covered in the vicinity of Hill 301 (TP 6005) identified the presence of the 26th
Rear Services Unit which normally operates in PHUOC TUT Province. Visual recon-
naissance flights by Forward Air Controllers (FAC) revealed the possibility of evasion
by women and children from villages northeast of the base camp. No appreciable
amount of information of immediate combat value was gleaned from the ABN CHA and
SLAM missions flown in support of Operation ATLANTA.

c. Terrain was a consideration, but not a limiting factor on Operation
ATLANTA. The primary area of operation was confined to LONG XUAN Province. The
central portion of LONG XUAN Province generally has rolling terrain covered with
plantations and cultivated fields. North of XUAN LOC the area was dominated by a
series of long ridges radiating from Hill 396 (TP 3912). Vegetation in this area
consists mainly of plantations along Route 20 and to the east of Hill 396. The
area is interspersed with cultivated fields and hamlets. To the east of XUAN LOC
the terrain is dominated by CHIN CHAN (TP 6310) and is covered with dense forest.
On the south, high ground follows generally along Interprovincial Route 2 with long
ridges extending east and west. To the east of Interprovincial Route 2, the terrain is broken by hills as is the area southwest of Xuan Loc. Vegetation in this area consists of isolated rubber plantations interspersed with cultivated fields, but the majority of the vegetation is dense first growth, with some secondary growth. Streams traverse the area draining generally to the east and west of Xuan Loc. The majority of these streams are non-potable.

d. CA/STV:

(1) Psychological Operations:

(a) Psychological operations during ATLANTA began initially by using a "Good Guy" leaflet drop and utilizing loudspeaker transmissions to announce the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's arrival in the XUAN LOC area. Reports later received indicated this method was appreciated by the people of the District of Xuan Loc thus developing an immediate rapport with the local populace. Leaflet drops were also made on suspected and known Viet Cong positions and on Viet Cong controlled hamlets. In conjunction with the drops and during tactical operations loudspeaker transmissions both live and taped were directed at the Viet Cong from overhead. Information received from ralliers and prisoners indicated that the loudspeakers were heard and that the leaflets were being read.

(b) Activities. During Operation ATLANTA the following support missions were conducted:

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<td>Loudspeakers</td>
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3. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

The overall concept of the operation was developed with the idea of executing the plan in four phases.

a. Phase I would involve a clear and secure operation along National Highway 1 from B Jain (TT 0012) to XUAN LOC (TT 808) by the 1st Squadron with the 919th Engineer Company preparing to assist in base camp development. The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons would continue to provide security for the staging area with the 2nd Squadron ready to assume the mission of the 1st Squadron and provide a troop size reaction force.
b. Phase II would commence with the 2nd Squadron assuming the mission of the 1st Squadron and occupying a combat base vicinity of the road junction of National Highways 1 and 20 while the 1st Squadron would move to occupy a combat base vicinity YT 6301 and secure the Regimental Base Camp site (YS 6396). In addition the 1st Squadron would be prepared on order, to clear and secure national Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 333 south and east from XUAN LOC (YT 4508) to CIA RAY (YT 6112). 3rd Squadron to continue securing the staging area and be prepared on order to establish a combat base vicinity YS 3995 and secure and clear Interprovincial Route 2 from XUAN LOC (YT 4508) to the boundary of 1st ATF TAOR (YS 4679). The 919th Engineer Company (Armored) would be prepared on order to move to the base camp and assist in its development.

c. In Phase III the 1st Squadron would continue to secure the base camp and conduct route security on National Highway 1 from XUAN LOC (YT 4508) to CIA RAY (YT 6112) while being prepared to conduct a route security mission on Interprovincial Route 333 from YT 4501 to YT 6112 to VG DAT (YT 7532). 2nd Squadron would continue its route security mission on National Highway 1 while conducting search and clear operations south of the road junction of Routes 1 and 20 at the same time clearing routes to CIA RAY rubber plantation vicinity YS 3995 on order relieve 1st Squadron of base camp security mission. The 3rd Squadron would on order secure a combat base vicinity YS 3995; on order and clear and secure Interprovincial Route 2 from XUAN LOC to the boundary of the 1st ATF TAOR and be prepared to open and clear a route from the Regimental Base Camp to LONG THA (YS 1392) and provide base camp security. 919th Engineer Company would continue to provide assistance for base camp development and combat engineer support for the squadrons.

d. During the final phase, Phase IV, the 1st Squadron would on relief of base camp security by the 2nd Squadron continue its route security mission on National Highway 1 from XUAN LOC to CIA RAY and initiate similar operations on Interprovincial Route 333 to VG DAT. 2nd and 3rd Squadrons and 919th Engineer Company would continue with their assigned missions stated in Phase III.

8. (C) EXECUTION: 20 October - Changes in Task Organisation

1st Squadron

Troop L, 2nd Squadron

1st Squadron initiated Operation ATLANTA at 0230H moving out on National Highway 1 from the Regimental Staging Area in LOK0 BINH (YT 0612) organizing a combat base vicinity YT 11301. During the move small arms fire was received by Company D and Houtson Battery. 2nd Squadron remained in the staging area preparing for movement on 21 October while the 3rd Squadron provided security for 2nd Battalion, 49th Artillery to XUAN LOC.

21 October

Troop B and Company G conducted search and clear operations vicinity YS 6196 with only light contact. Numerous tunnels were unexplored and destroyed. Troop L conducted operations to the east, burning 30 huts and destroying 10 tunnels at YS 259297. At 0330 hours Troop B received a burst of automatic weapons fire wounding one man, and observed 13 VC probing perimeter positions vicinity YS 43092. Fire was returned with unknown results.

22 October

Operation ATLANTA continued with only minor incidents during the day. One 1013 (AK97) from Troop B was damaged by a pressure mine at YS 559575 with no casualties. Four Viet Cong Suspects (VCS) were detained by Troop B vicinity YS 476577 and evaded for interrogation.

23 October - Changes in Task Organisation

1st Squadron

Troop L reverted to 3/11 effective 1500 hours.

Operation ATLANTA continued with negative contact. A tank from the 919th Engineer Company was damaged by a mine at YS 499983 resulting in one US
WIA. 2nd Squadron moved from the staging at 0950 with Troop O and advance party elements to organize a combat base at O-99 QEI vicinity YS 3899.

24 October

Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron conducting search and destroy operations vicinity YS 5459 resulting in negative contact. A 4 ton truck with three passengers from the 690th Radio Research Detachment received one command detonated claymore mine and 3 rounds of small arms fire vicinity YS 486075, resulting in one US WIA, one US VIA, and one 4 ton truck damaged. The main body of the 2nd Squadron departed the staging area 0730 hours, closing in its combat base at 0900 hours without contact.

25 October

Operation ATLANTA continued with search and destroy operations vicinity YS 050115 as part of STARDOM (continuous operation - security for llBN 000 area).

26 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with negative contact. 1st Squadron conducted patrols vicinity of the Regimental Base Camp and ROADRUNNER operations along Interprovincial Route 333 from EIYAN LOC (TT 073050) to OIA RAY (TT 630120). Day and night patrols were conducted by the 3rd Squadron from the staging area.

27 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron making a zone reconnaissance south of the Regimental Base Camp. During the reconnaissances at least 10 tunnels containing clothing, rice, hand grenades, cooking utensils and documents were located and destroyed. Three A4AV's from Troop A were damaged by pressure type mines resulting in one US VIA. Negative contact was made by the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons.

28 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with search and destroy operations vicinity YS 6690 to YS 6683. Search and destroy operations by Troop A disclosed a hut containing 12 expended 57mm NRR rounds, a home made battery, and anti-American propaganda, at YS 65998. Search and destroy operations continued with the 27th Engineer Battalion from LONG BIMH TT 050120 to Blackhorse Base Camp without incident. In conjunction with the 1st Squadron's activities along Interprovincial Route 2, 165,000 leaflets were dropped from YS 6790 to YS 6783.

29 October - Operation ATLANTA continued without contact. Search and clear operations by Troop A disclosed a hut containing 12 expended 57mm NRR rounds, a home made battery, and anti-American propaganda, at YS 65998. Search and destroy operations by Troop O continued with BUDOR operations with a local PF platoon vicinity TT 411015.

30 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with search and destroy operations around Blackhorse Base Camp. Contact was made with 1-6 VC by an ambush patrol from Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron vicinity YS 459980 engaging the VC with small arms and hand grenades. The enemy returned fire with 7-10 rounds of small arms and then broke contact. VC casualties unknown. No US casualties. Troop L continued to provide security for the LONG BIMH ASP.

31 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with the advance elements of the Regimental Command Group closing in the base camp at 0900 hours. Search and destroy operations continued in the vicinity of the base camp while Troop C provided security for the bridge classification team from Company C, 27th Engineer Battalion (C) from EIYAN LOC along National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 333 to 0-6 OIA RAY (TT 630120). Troop C received 10-15 rounds of automatic weapons fire vicinity TT 660150 with negative results. Search and destroy operations by Troop A located a hut (YS 359928) containing 250 pounds of rice. Progress continued on the development of the base camp by the 27th Engineer Battalion. Troop S uncovered 200 pounds of rice, 100 BA-30 batteries and medical supplies vicinity TT 660351. Troop L continued to provide security for the LONG BIMH ASP with no contact.

1 November - Troops A and B conducted a dismounted night march at 0230 hours encircling villages at YS 130900 and YS 163996 with no contact. The 27th Engineer Battalion continued to develop the base camp.

Page 6 of 26 Pages

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2 November - Changes in Task Organisation

1st Squadron

Troop F (OPCON 1/11 for base camp security)

Preparation for the displacement of the Regimental Headquarters elements continued while Troop C road marched to GIA KAI (IT 621110) along National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 333 without contact. Security measures were initiated by the 1st Squadron to assist Company C, 27th Engineer Battalion in securing the GIA KAI rock quarry. Security operations by the 3rd Squadron continued in the LON BINH - XEN WI area.

3 November - Changes in Task Organisation

Troop I (OPCON 2/11 for base camp security)

The Regimental Command Group closed in to the base camp area (YS L31955) at 0920 hours. Troop A with support from Howitzer Battery continued to operate along Interprovincial Route 333. Troops E and G received automatic weapons and small arms fire with Troop G observing at least six persons vicinity YS L31952. Troop F engaged two Viet Cong vicinity YS L25975 firing 3 rounds M79 canister with unknown results.

4 November

1st Squadron

Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery attached to 1st Squadron.

Operation ITALIA continued with the 1st Squadron pushing northward in conjunction with BUDDY cordon and search operations in the SUOI CAT area. Sporadic mining and small arms incidents were encountered with no US casualties. Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery provided fire support for the operation from GIA KAI. Base camp security continued to be maintained by the 2nd Squadron while the 3rd Squadron secured the staging area.

5 November - Troop A provided security for engineer work parties constructing culverts in the vicinity GIA HUYNH (IT 677198). Route clearing operations proceeded northward along Interprovincial Route 333. Company B, 27th Engineer Battalion commenced work on a rock quarry site off National Highway 1. In support of the Regiment's activities, loudspeaker operations were conducted at VO DAT from IT 650210 to IT 680450. Base camp and staging area security continued to be maintained by the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons with no significant contact.

6 November - Security and route clearing operations continued along Interprovincial Route 333 with the 1st Squadron making a show of force at VO DAT. 600 pounds of steel were located (IT 649028) and evacuated by Troop C. Sniper fire vicinity of IT 650070 was received by Troop C resulting in one US VIA. Troop J and 2nd Squadron trains closed in the Regimental Base Camp from their contact base camp at CAN GHE. Units of the 3rd Squadron continued to conduct security operations with elements of the 3rd Brigade, 14th Infantry Division; no significant contact made.

7 November

Troop A and B conducted dismounted patrols in AO while Troop C conducted a route reconnaissance on Highway 1. In conjunction with the patrols, BUDDY operations were run with elements of the 22nd Ranger Battalion vicinity IT 648025 east to IT 650205 and IT 772220. Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery deployed to IT 602018 to provide support east of VO DAT (IT 7332). Construction of a culvert bypass (IT 672198) was completed by Company C, 27th Engineer Battalion and opened for traffic. Security of the base camp continued to be provided by the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons; staging area security was provided by elements of the 3rd Squadron with Troop L and one platoon of tanks from Company H working with elements of the 3rd Brigade, 14th Infantry Division providing a screen of the LON BINH 3SP, with no significant contact.

8 November - Changes in Task Organisation.

1st Squadron (OPCON to 1st Infantry Division effective 1600 hours.

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Troop I released to 3rd Squadron for Operations UNIONTOWN and MARSHALLTOWN

1st Squadron terminated its operations in the GIA RAY - VO DAT area at 1000 hours. Squadron elements cleared GIA RAY (YT 6311) at 1300 hours on their way to LAI KHE (XT 7738) stopping for Class I and III resupply at the LONG BINH staging area. The first elements of the squadron arrived, 200km's later, in LAI KHE at 1630 hours; and by 1830 the entire squadron had closed. The move involved approximately 200 vehicles and 1000 men completely combat ready. Elements of Troop G relieved the 1st Squadron contingent of security operations around the rock quarry at GIA RAY while Troop E ran search and clear operations from the Blackhorse Base Camp vicinity of YT 4590. Occasional small arms fire was received by Troops F and I with negative results. However, Troop E had an ACAV detonate a pressure type mine (YT 457900) resulting in one US WIA and damage to the ACAV. The remaining Regimental units conducted security operations in the staging area and LONG BINH - BIEN HOA area.

9 November

1st Squadron continued under the OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division as part of Operation ATTLEBORO. 2nd Squadron continued to protect the base camp and dispatch patrols outside the perimeter with no contact. No significant activities occurred in the staging area. 3rd Squadron continued Operation UNIONTOWN.

10 November

Local patrols and security of the base camp area continued to be maintained by the 2nd Squadron while the 3rd Squadron secured the staging area and operated in the 173rd Airborne Brigade's TAOR as part of Operation UNIONTOWN. 1st Squadron remained OPCON 1st Infantry Division. No significant results were achieved.

11 November

1st Squadron continued under the OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division.

2nd Squadron continued patrolling and securing the Regimental Base Camp with one platoon from Troop G providing security for the GIA RAY rock quarry in the vicinity of YT 6311. Troop G had an ACAV hit by a claymore mine (YT 627071) resulting in one US WIA and negative damage to the track.

3rd Squadron continued Operation UNIONTOWN and provided security for the staging area. An M Company M48A3 Tank attached to Troop K detonated a pressure type mine vicinity of YT 058149 slightly damaging the vehicle. On National Highway 1 a 3/4 ton truck from Troop K traveling in convoy was hit by a claymore mine resulting in no US casualties and only minor damage to the vehicle.

12 November

1st Squadron remained under the OPCON of the 1st Infantry Division.

Security of the base camp and the rock quarry continued to be maintained by the 2nd Squadron.

3rd Squadron continued providing support for Operation UNIONTOWN and security for the staging area with no significant action.

13 November

1st Squadron continued to provide armor support for Operation ATTLEBORO under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division.

2nd and 3rd Squadrons continued to maintain security of the base camp and staging area respectively.

14 November

Activities remained the same with the maneuver elements continuing with their missions. Company H co-opted search and destroy operations vicinity of XUAN LOC (YT 3810) with negative results.

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15 November

1st Squadron continued to furnish support for Operation ATLANTIC in the LAI KHE area.

Operation ATLANTA continued with the 2nd Squadron conducting local patrols in conjunction with the security of the base camp. Convoy continued to arrive and depart from the base camp daily, traveling National Highway 1 from LAI KHE to the Regimental Base Camp without incident. 3rd Squadron provided convoy escorts in addition to securing the staging area perimeter and providing one Troop for Operation UNIONTOWN.

16 November

At 2025 hours the Regimental Base Camp received an estimated 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 75mm recoilless rifle fire vicinity of YT 080065, YT 080065 and YT 080065. Fire was immediately returned with 105mm howitzer, 1.2” mortars, and 90mm tank fire which quickly and effectively silenced the VC guns. Results of the attack were 8 US WIA and minor equipment damages. A later check of the VC gun positions indicated the enemy had departed in a hurry leaving un expended 82mm mortar and 75mm Recoilless Rifle rounds.

1st Squadron remained OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division on Operation ATLANTIC.

2nd Squadron continued Operation ATLANTA conducting local patrols from the base camp and securing the OIA RAY rock quarry all with negative results.

3rd Squadron continued providing support for Operation UNIONTOWN and the security of the staging area. Troop I received 25 rounds of automatic weapons fire vicinity of YT 080065, fire returned with negative results. Troop I observed and challenged 2 civilians in black pajamas breaking a trail through the jungle (YT 050065). Upon being challenged they broke and ran at which time the troop fired 20 rounds of small arms, possibly wounding one of them.

17 November

Patrols from the 2nd Squadron searched the area around the base camp to locate the positions used by the VC to shell the camp the previous night. At 1135 hours Troop 0 found 32 expended 75mm Recoilless Rifle rounds and one live 75mm recoilless rifle misfire at YT 080065. A further search of the area found three mortar positions (YS 050065) with six 82mm rounds, assorted mortar fuzes and night firing equipment.

1st Squadron continued Operation ATLANTA under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division at LAI KHE.

3rd Squadron continued to support Operation UNIONTOWN and provide security for the Regimental Staging Area. At 0115 hours an ambush patrol from Troop I heard noises at YT 080065 engaging the suspected area with one round of M79 canister; two hand grenades were received on position. 8 - 10 rounds of M-16 were also fired in the direction of the noises along with six rounds of 1.2 inch HE causing a secondary explosion after the patrol withdrew. No US casualties, VC casualties unknown.

18 November

1st Squadron continued Operation ATLANTIC under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division.

2nd Squadron continued to conduct patrols and secure the base camp perimeter and the rock quarry. Probing actions were made along the perimeter in Troop B’s sector at 0135 hours and 2325 hours. Suspected locations were engaged with M79 rounds, results unknown.

3rd Squadron continued to provide security for the staging area and support for Operation UNIONTOWN. The 2nd Platoon of Troop L at 1225 hours received 30 rounds of small arms fire vicinity YT 070065. Fire was returned with M-79 and small arms fire, results unknown. Contact was broken at 1815 hours.
19 November

1st Squadron continued to participate in Operation ATLANTIC now under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade effective 0700 hours.

2nd Squadron conducted patrols in the vicinity of the base camp (TS LA127) and provided security for the rock quarry. At 0835 hours a patrol from Troop F received 5-7 60mm mortar rounds from TS J-30951 resulting in no US casualties. Artillery fire was returned with unknown results.

3rd Squadron continued UNIONTOWN operations and security of the staging area. The area of operation remained quiet with only occasional small arms firing. A squad size base camp was located (IT 095095) consisting of a 20 meter long trench, 5 foxholes, and cooking utensils.

20 November

1st Squadron was released from operational control of 173d Airborne Brigade and closed on the staging area at 2035 hours.

2nd Squadron continued to conduct patrols and provide security for the base camp.

3rd Squadron continued to support Operation UNIONTOWN and security of the staging area as well as the LONG TERM ASP.

21 November - Changes to Task Organisation,

Troop K and L OPCON 173d Airborne Brigade in support of UNIONTOWN.

The Regiment continued Operation ATLANTIC and was relieved of the UNIONTOWN mission by the 173d Airborne Brigade. At 1025 hours a regimental convoy traveling on National Highway 1 towards XUAM LOC was ambushed vicinity IT 293000 to IT 290099. Fire was immediately returned by the escort platoon from Troop C along with air strikes by helicopters and fighter aircraft in addition to artillery being fired in support of the beleaguered convoy. The 1st Squadron moved to the ambush site as a reaction force from the LONG BINN staging area. Major contact was broken at 1137 hours except for sporadic contact during the remainder of the day. US casualties were 7 KIA (7 from 11th Armored Cavalry), 8 WIA (7 from the 11th Armored Cavalry), 1 VC. Reasons captured listed in Annex A. US equipment losses included 1 M13 destroyed, 1 M13 damaged, 4 2.5 ton trucks destroyed, 1 UH-1B damaged; VC losses included 1 57mm RN, 1 M/7 rifle, 2 RPG rounds and miscellaneous documents.

1st Squadron remained in the area of the ambush to conduct a sweep the following day.

2nd Squadron remained at the base camp conducting security patrols around the perimeter.

3rd Squadron was released from Operation UNIONTOWN at 1100 hours by the 173d Airborne Brigade. Continued to provide security for the staging area.

22 November

1st Squadron conducted search and destroy operations south of the ambush site. Four more VC bodies were found with another 75-100 VC KIA (Possible. Eight 57mm RN rounds, a tugged wire mechanism for either a recoilless rifle or heavy machine gun was also located.

The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons continued to provide base camp and staging area security respectively.

23 November

1st Squadron performed base camp security for a portion of the perimeter with no significant events. Patrols from Troop C found a grave (IT 276072) containing a body with a pistol belt and one US grenade.
2nd Squadron conducted search and destroy operations in the vicinity of YT 1003 and provided security for a portion of the OIA RAT rock quarry. At 1131 hours Troop F heard 8-10 rounds of small arms fire near YT 100005; a search of the area was made with negative results. A platoon from Troop G received an unknown number of rounds of automatic weapons fire and heard one large explosion believed to be a Claymore vicinity YT 570083. Fire was returned with automatic weapons with negative results. A possible tax collection point was reported by the Air Observer at YT 575025.

3rd Squadron continued to secure the staging area and supported Operation UNIONTOWN.

21 November

Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron performing convoy escort missions from LONG BINH to the Regimental Base Camp; conducted search and destroy operations in the vicinity of their assigned sector of the base area perimeter. Troop C reported locating a fortification complex consisting of 80 bunkers and trenches forming a "T" from YT 219037 to YT 229072, and from YT 270000 east to YT 281079.

2nd Squadron conducted search and destroy operations (YS 3485) with Troop F and provided security for the OIA RAT rock quarry. On two different occasions persons were detected along the perimeter named by Troop E. A trip flare was ignited at 0315 hours revealing two persons. Fire was returned at this time resulting in US VPA. Two rounds of mortar fire were received at 1003 hours in the 2nd Squadron area. Light fire teams were scrambled and the howitzer batteries from the 1st and 2nd Squadrons were used to engage the suspected mortar position. Reinforcing fires were also requested and provided by the 5th Artillery Group in XUAN LOC.

3rd Squadron remained in the staging area providing security and support for Operation UNIONTOWN.

25 November

1st Squadron conducted search and destroy operations vicinity of YT 495012. 15 VC were apprehended in a hamlet containing VC propaganda material and empty 81mm mortar containers; seven were detained for further questioning. Troop B also conducted ROADRUNNER operations from YT 4497 to YT 5810 without incident.

2nd Squadron utilizing Troop F opened Route 320 for tracked vehicles, from the base camp (YS 439956) west to National Highway 15 (YS 140920). The bridge located at YS 205935 was determined passable only for wheeled vehicles with a bypass available for tracked vehicles. ROADRUNNER and security operations were performed by Troops E and G.

3rd Squadron continued to provide security for the staging area and support for Operation UNIONTOWN with Troops I and L under the operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Troop K conducted ROADRUNNER operations and convoy escort from LONG BINH to XUAN LOC without incident.

26 November

Operations remained quiet with the squadrons providing convoy escorts, limited search and clerical operations and base camp security. Support for UNIONTOWN activities continued to be provided by the 3rd Squadron.

27 November

Search and destroy operations by the 1st Squadron east of the perimeter uncovered 90 14.4 volt batteries of local manufacture in a tree wrapped in plastic. Troop A also found 9 VC packs with personal equipment and two black nylon pajamas.

The 2nd Squadron conducted search and destroy operations northwest of the base camp and continued to maintain security of the OIA RAT rock quarry site.

Security of the staging area and continued support of UNIONTOWN operations were provided by the 3rd Squadron. Convoy escorts were also provided for regimental vehicles moving to and from the base camp.
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28 November - Changes in Task Organization

Troop E relieved Troop L of its UNICOM mission effective 1200 hours.

1st Squadron continued Operation ATLANTA with search and destroy operations (YT 900) northeast of the base camp with light contact. ROADERRUNNER and convoy escort operations were run between Blackhorse Base Camp and LONG B NAC.

2nd Squadron operated north of the base camp on search and destroy operations and continued to maintain security for the rock quarry.

3rd Squadron continued to participate in UNICOM with Troops I and L under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade.

29 November

Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron making a reconnaissance in force along National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 333 from XUAN LOC to OIA RAY.

2nd Squadron assumed a portion of the UNICOM mission under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade. Troop F provided escort for regimental convoys and conducted search and destroy operations vicinity of YT 1(3). 3rd Squadron continued Operation ATLANTA with one Troop still participating in Operation UNICOM.

30 November

1st Squadron's reconnaissance in force operation continued with no contact. A report from a 10th ARVN Division F.S. indicated approximately 300 VC were observed at YT 1(3). 2nd Squadron units were dispatched to conduct a search and destroy operation which resulted in only minor contact.

3rd Squadron meanwhile maintained security of the staging area and continued to move its equipment and supplies to the base camp. Troop L completed its move to the base camp at 1315 hours.

1 December - Changes to Task Organization

Troop G relieved Troop I of UNICOM mission to 173d Airborne Brigade.

Troop I reverted to 3rd Squadron control.

1st Squadron secured the rock quarry and conducted ROADERRUNNER operations between OIA RAY and the base camp.

2nd Squadron Operation ATLANTA with negative contact and participated in Operation UNICOM with Troops E and G.

3rd Squadron (-) closed in the base camp at 1100 hours, with the remaining elements from the Provisional Squadron.

2 December

1st Squadron conducted an area reconnaissance (YS 1977) and a ROADERRUNNER operation to OIA RAY at the same time providing security for the OIA RAY rock quarry. At 1600 hours a resupply convoy consisting of 2 M60A1 Tanks and 3 ACAV's (from Company B and Troop L) and 2 24-1 ton trucks (one from the 27th Engineer Battalion) was ambushed by an estimated VC Main Force Battalion (Reinforced) at YT 67071 while returning from OIA RAY. A reaction force of the 1st Squadron (-) moved to the site shortly after contact was made. Reinforcing fire was received from 7 air strikes and artillery fire from the 5th Artillery Group at XUAR LOC. The main ambush force was positioned southeast of National Highway 1 with elements of the squadron positioned on the west, north and east sides of VC Positions. 24B air and artillery were utilized to seal off the escape routes to the south. Contact was broken at 1750 hours, with only sporadic firing continuing until 1950 hours.
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Illumination over the sealed area and suppressing fires were provided by an AC7 "Spool" ship after nightfall. As of 2300 hours US casualties were 13 KIA, 1 MACV destroyed, and 1 M-83 tank damaged. VC losses included 36 KIA (VC), 3 machineguns (2 with bipods) and 1 AKI7 assault rifle. The attackers were light blue uniforms with pistol belts and bundles of ammunition draped over their shoulders. The noticeable item of clothing lacking was that most of them were not wearing shoes. Expanded rounds of 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles were found near the ambush site.

2nd Squadron continued to secure the base camp and support Operation NITRO.

3rd Squadron secured the base camp and conducted area reconnaissance in the vicinity of coordinates TS 1189.

3 December

At 0700 hours the Regimental Command Group moved to the site of the ambush while the 1st Squadron continued search and destroy operations south and west of the ambush site. At 0730 hours Troop A uncovered an extensive tunnel system (YT 597063) and shortly thereafter captured 3 VC, 2 of whom were wounded. One of the VC stated that he was a member of the 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 275th Regiment, 5th VC Division. At 1105 hours Troop C captured another wounded VC and evacuated him for medical treatment. Prior to daylight the VC's route of withdrawal had been sealed by artillery from 275th Artillery and an Air Force AC-47 orbiting overhead.

The 2nd Squadron remained at the base camp and conducted ROADRUNNER operations between the Regimental Base Camp and L00 E06.

The 3rd Squadron moved from the base camp to establish blocking positions along National Highway 1 from YT 580065 to YT 630087 in support of 1st Squadron's search and destroy operations at the ambush site. Negative contact was made and the squadron closed in the base camp at 1815 hours.

4 December

1st Squadron continued to search the 2 December ambush site. At 1025 hours Troop C captured a 75mm recoilless rifle with T&E mechanism and tripod at YT 629073. Later on Troop C round 1 75mm recoilless round, 3 grenades, 8 entrenching tools, 25 foxholes and 1 VC KIA (VC) vicinity YT 634078. Total losses from the ambush were 1 US KIA (from 27th Engineer Battalion), 22 US WIA and 99 VC KIA (VC), 3 VC (WIA). See Annex B for breakdown of weapons captured.

2nd Squadron continued to conduct ROADRUNNER operations between the Regimental Base Camp and L02 E00 and provide support for Operation DUNDER.

3rd Squadron continued to improve its perimeter defenses while providing base camp security.

5 December

ROADRUNNER operations were conducted between GIA RAY and L006 E16 with negative contact by the 1st and 2nd Squadrons.

3rd Squadron mounted a BUDDY search and destroy operation with the 1st Battalion 3rd Infantry Regiment (ARVN) in the vicinity of TS 18 6550. The ARVN troops made an airmobile assault after the 3rd Squadron had cordoned off the area. Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery was attached for the operation and organised a fire support base at TS 18 6550. A detailed analysis and report of the operation is outlined in Annex C to this report.

6 December

1st Squadron continued Operation TL JATO with ROADRUNNER operations to GIA RAY and L02 E16. Troop B continued to provide security for the GIA RAY rock quarry.

The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons continued to secure the base camp and conduct ROADRUNNER operations to and from L00 E06.
7 December

The disposition of the Regiment remained the same except for the 2nd Squadron. With the 1st Squadron securing the rock quarry and the 3rd Squadron providing base camp security the 2nd Squadron terminated Operation ATLANTA and at 1800 hours and came under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade for Operation CAttkRf/DUCK.

8 December

The Regiment terminated Operation ATLANTA at 2100 hours.

9. (U) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery:

(1) Size of Force:

- Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
- Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
- Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
- 51st Artillery Group

(2) How and When Employed:

- Battery B, 2d BN, 35th Artillery (155mm SP) - 2 - 4 December - supported,
  1st Squadron on QIA RAT ambush (2 Dec).
- Battery B, 2d BN, 35th Artillery (155mm SP) - 2 - 4 December - supported 3rd Squadron on Operation ALEXANDRA along Interprovincial Route 2.

b. Signal:

(1) Units Employed: A detachment from Company B, 53rd Signal Battalion consisting of a radio relay terminal (AV/RRC-17), and HF radio van (AV/ORG-26D), a communications center (AV/WCC - 17) and 10 signal personnel under the command of Lieutenant Ing.

(2) Method of Employment: The detachment was utilized to terminate command and control telephone circuits to II F Force V, provide access to the Army Area Communications System, and to provide a communications center for the 11th Armored Cavalry.

(3) Execution: The Regimental Signal Officer determined what circuits were needed for the operation and issued his requirements to the II F Force V Signal Officer. II F Force V then submitted work requests for the installation of the necessary terminals which were established by the 53rd Signal Detachment. Lines from the terminals were extended by personnel from the Regimental Communications Platoon. Initially, circuits were established to the LONG BINH staging area. However, as the Regiment cleared the area these circuits were dropped and others established in the base camp area. The first circuits in the base camp were operational by 31 October 1966.

(4) Concept of Operations: The 53rd Signal Detachment deployed with the forward command post elements of the Regiment on 31 October and remained at the base camp providing communications between the Blackhorse CP and higher headquarters.
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(5) Results: The detachment provided continuous communications with high quality circuits throughout the operation. The operation of the Black-horse switchboard and installation of wiring to all organic and supporting units in the base camp was accomplished by the Regimental Communications Platoon thus providing all units access to the army area communications system.

c. Army Aviation:

(1) Units Employed:

(a) Aviation Platoon, HMT, 11th Armored Cavalry
(b) Aviation Section, HMT, 1/11th Armored Cavalry
(c) Aviation Section, HMT, 2/11th Armored Cavalry
(d) Aviation Section, HMT, 3/11th Armored Cavalry

(2) Method of Employment:

(a) Aviation Sections - General support of the Regiment.
(b) Aviation Sections - Direct support of their respective squadrons; cross-attached between squadrons as situation required.

(3) Concept of Operations:

(a) The Regimental Aviation platoon provides a limited lift capability within the transport section utilizing six UH-1D's, and command and control support utilizing the two OH-23D's in the command and control section.

(b) The UH-1D's provided aviation support in a variety of ways such as command and control, logistical troop and cargo lifts, combat troop and cargo lifts, medical evacuation, reconnaissance, training, aircraft maintenance, administration, mail delivery, POC, psychological warfare, and hauling of perishable rations.

(c) The OH-23D's were used primarily for command and control and administrative missions. They were also used quite extensively for convoy escort, artillery adjustment and reconnaissance operations.

(d) The UH-1C's were effectively used in such roles as ambush suppression, escort of airmobile operations, truck convoy escort, daily perimeter reconnaissance of the base camp, and as a standby immediate reaction security force.

(b) Significant engagements during which Army Aviation played a major role:

(a) Ambush suppression and search and destroy operations, vicinity coordinates YT 2810, 21-23 November 1966.

(b) Ambush suppression and search and destroy operations, vicinity coordinates YT 6307, 2-5 December 1966.

(c) Operation Alexandria in support of 3/11, search and destroy operations vicinity of coordinates TS 1384.

(5) Statistical data on Army Aviation support operations.

(a) Hours flown:

1. OH-23D's - 687 hours.
2. UH-1D & AH-1C - 1367 hours.

(b) Sorties flown:


(c) Cargo transported - 52.5 tons.

(d) Passengers transported - 4,357.

Page 15 of 25 Pages CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

6 (6) Elements supporting organic aviation units:

(a) 60th Assault Helicopter Company (airlifted 1/4 ARVN Regt on Operation Alexandria 5 Dec).

(b) 565th CM Co provided FOL support at the Regimental Base Camp.

c. U.S. Air Force:

(1) Employment:

U.S. Tactical air elements were employed in support of the 11th Armored Cavalry throughout Operation ATLANTIC. O-1 Aircraft of the 25th Pave were flown daily in the support of operations. Missions flown consisted of VR, from which valuable intelligence data was collected and submitted; FAC, in which tactical fighter and bomber aircraft were employed against both preplanned and immediate targets selected and requested by the Regimental S-2 and S-3 sections; convoy escorts during which both O-1, and when required, fighter aircraft escorted 11th Armored Cavalry convoys; and Artillery Adjustment, in which the FAC's in the O-1 aircraft adjusted both Regimental and other support artillery against targets within the area of operations. Administrative flights were flown by the O-1 aircraft but these were mainly in support of TACP requirements.

(2) Control:

All Air Force elements utilized during the operation were under the command and control of the 7th U.S. Air Force (PACAF).

(3) Effectiveness:

The majority of the tactical fighter and bomber strikes were, as determined by subsequent agents reports, considered very effective. These agents reports must be relied upon because ground follow up action was generally impossible due to the terrain and/or other tactical considerations. On two occasions when the Regiment had convoys ambushed by sizable Viet Cong forces tactical airpower was instrumental in keeping friendly losses to a minimum and was of great aid in dispatching the enemy force. Killed by air body count in these encounters was low due to the Viet Cong tactic of rapidly evacuating their killed and wounded. Again, subsequent agent reports supported the fact that the Tactical air forces employed were very effective and the actual body count told only a small portion of the story.

(4) Statistical Data on Air Force Support Operations:

(a) Sorties Flown:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{VR} & : 132 \\
\text{FAC} & : 39 \\
\text{Escort} & : 13 \\
\text{Artillery Adjustment} & : 10 \\
\text{Administrative} & : \\
\text{Combat Strike} & : 135 \\
\end{align*}
\]

(b) Types aircraft flown with breakdown of number of sorties per type:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{F-100} & : 89 \\
\text{F-5} & : 29 \\
\text{B-57} & : 12 \\
\text{A-1} & : 4 \\
\text{AHC-7} & : 1 \\
\text{C-1} & : 203 \\
\end{align*}
\]
A total of 190 tons of ordnance was expended with the following breakdown by type:

- MK-56: 1000# Bomb (143)
- M-217: 750# GP Bomb (16)
- MK-82: 500# Bomb (172)
- MK-61: 250# Bomb (26)
- BLU-1/27B: 750# Napalm (22)
- Cannisters of CBU (All Types): 20
- 2.75m FFAR (172)
- Illumination Flares: 19
- .30 Cal Ammo (Rounds): 15,000 (2500)
- .20mm HEI (Rounds): 9,500 (400)

(c) Engineer:

(1) Units:
919th Engineer Company (Armored)

(2) Method of Employment:

During the operation engineer elements were attached to the squadrons based on their assigned missions. Attachments in some cases were made down to troop and company level with an engineer squad providing the support. Tasks assigned the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) ranged from base camp development and security to combat engineer support (clearing mines, destruction of fortifications and construction of temporary bridging).

(3) Execution:

On 20 October the 1st Platoon attached to the 1st Squadron moved to the area of the base camp and began clearing fields of fire, utilizing three tank dozers and one full tracked bulldozer. While the fields of fire were being cleared and the base camp perimeter secured each of the three platoons were providing combat engineer support to the various armored cavalry troop when an independent mission was required. Specifically, a squad from the 1st Platoon supported Troop A by probing and clearing mines in suspected areas and destroying bunkers, tunnels and booby traps. One of the other squads from the 3rd Platoon while supporting Troop B on a reconnaissance mission encountered an ingeniously employed mine complex designed to disable an armored vehicle and once stopped, destroy it with a charge that was placed at a higher elevation than the first. They also destroyed enemy bunkers and tunnels as they were located. While the 3rd Squad of the 1st Platoon supported Troop L on a search and destroy mission it constructed a hasty bridge across in order for the troop to continue with its mission.

On 26 October the 1st Platoon moved back to the staging area to assist the Company Headquarters in their move to the base camp. The following day the 3rd Platoon completed its move to the base camp.

By 31 October the entire company had dispersed to the base camp area and was busily engaged in constructing defensive positions and sandbagging living areas. Building materials were obtained and present for use in construction of permanent bunkers for the base camp. In conjunction with the installation of the perimeter defenses technical assistance was provided to the various troop units occupying the camp.

(h) Results:

By 8 December the perimeter wire and bunker system was 60% completed in the base camp area and 80% on the base camp roads and drainage ditches were 50% completed. Vertical construction was in its initial stages with priority of effort going to latrines, showers and messhalls. All base camp development projects were accomplished in conjunction with the 27th Engineer Battalion (C).
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Mobile forces activities were confined mainly to hasty bridge and route surveys. This was caused primarily because of the nature of the duties placed upon the engineer platoons by the units to which they were attached. These missions included tunnel and fortification destruction and minor road and bridge repairs.

10. (C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly Losses:

- XIA - 8
- UGL - 4

- Equipment lost or destroyed:
  - AGLV - 3

- Equipment damaged:
  - AGLV - 9
  - Tank 12/46 - 3
  - UHIB = 3
  - GHLV - 1
  - OR20L - 1

b. Enemy Losses:

(1) Personnel:

- KIA (DC) - 136
- KIA (Voss) - 101
- VC9 - 58
- VCS - 270

(2) Guns and ammunition:

- Recoilless rifle:
  - 75mm - 7
  - 57mm - 2
- Anti-aircraft gun - 5
- Rocket gun - 6
- Mortar howitzer - 1
- Mortar 60mm - 1
- Small Arms - 8
- Artillery Rounds - 2
- Mortar rounds - 25
- Recoilless Rounds - 11
- Rockets - 2
- Mines - 28
- Grenades - 28
- Small Arms ammunition - 2700

(3) Installations:

- Base camps - 8
- Fortifications:
  - Tunnels - 61
  - Trenches - 59
- Tunnel/Bunker Complex - 3
- Foxholes - 20

(4) Foodstuffs:

- Rice - 12/3 tons
- Peanuts - 1 ton
- Salt - 1 ton
- Miscellaneous - 1100 lbs
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(5) Supplies:

- Uniforms - 77 sets
- Bicycles - 6
- Cooking Utensils - 52
- Batteries - 168
- Packs and individual web gear - 18 sets

(6) Miscellaneous:

- Documents - 111 lbs
- Medical Supplies - 54 lbs (+)
- Flag - 1 (metal)
- Oil - 120 gallons
- Money - 53,000 $VN
- Electrical wire - 2200 meters

11. AMMUNITIONS M.T.T.R.S.

a. Logistics:

(1) Methods. 1st Logistical Command on request of the Regiment established a forward supply point (FSP) in the Regimental Base Camp area. During Operation ATLANTA, resupply of Class I, III and IIIA was handled by supply point distribution from the FSP. Class V resupply was and still is being accomplished by supply point distribution from the 3rd Ordnance Munitions Supply Point (AGP) at LORID BBN. Class III and IV supply (except MIL repair parts) were received through the 294th Quartermaster Supply and Service Battalion at LORID BBN.

(2) Techniques. Logistical convoys were used to provide the primary mode of resupply for the units of the Regiment and the FSP. Aerial resupply was employed only on an emergency basis.

(3) Basic Loads:

a. Class I. Each unit of the Regiment carried a 3 day supply of M14's on their vehicles with a 2 day supply in their unit trains.

b. Class III. Each Squadron Support Platoon is authorised seven 1200 gallons tank and pump units by MOE. Additionally, each squadron has been authorized two 5,000 gallon tankers with tractor by MOE (BR Form L7). Experience during the operation has shown that the Regiment used an average of 67,133 gallons of Class III and IIIA per week broken down as follows: JP-1, 8, 904 gallons; AVAL, 1,506 gallons; M50, 35,187 gallons; M56, 21,215 gallons.

c. Class V - Below is listed a consolidated list of the Regimental basic load:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCAG #</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1306-001</td>
<td>Ctg, 12 Ga., Shotgun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1306-006</td>
<td>Ctg, .50 BMG, Ball</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1306-003</td>
<td>Ctg, .50 BMG, Tracer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1306-012</td>
<td>Ctg, .50 BMG, Tracer, Compo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1306-018</td>
<td>Ctg, .50 BMG, Ball, 5 rd Clip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1306-011</td>
<td>Ctg, .50 BMG, Linked, Ball and Tracer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1306-017</td>
<td>Ctg, .50 BMG, Linked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1306-016</td>
<td>Ctg, Cal. .50 Carbine, Ball, 6 rd Clip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1306-015</td>
<td>Ctg, Cal .50 Ball</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1306-027</td>
<td>Ctg, Cal .50 Ball and Tracer, Linked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1306-028</td>
<td>Ctg, M18, 12mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1306-027</td>
<td>Ctg, M18, 12mm, Linked</td>
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<tr>
<td>1306-025</td>
<td>Ctg, 9mm, Smk, JP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1306-024</td>
<td>Ctg, 9mm, Canister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1306-026</td>
<td>Ctg, 9mm, SS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1306-028</td>
<td>Ctg, 9mm, AP</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOMENCLATURE</th>
<th>BASIC LOAD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Otg, 105mm, w/o Fuse</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otg, 105mm, Illum, w/fuse M530</td>
<td>255</td>
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<tr>
<td>Otg, 105mm, Sek, Green, w/fuse M930</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otg, 105mm, Sek, HC, w/fuse M930</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otg, 105mm, Sek, VP, w/fuse PD</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otg, 105mm, Sek, Yellow, w/fuse M530</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otg, L*2 Mortar, 105mm, w/o Fuse</td>
<td>2,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otg, L*2 Mortar, 105mm, w/o Fuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Otg, L*2 Mortar, 105mm, w/o Fuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gren, Hand, Frag</td>
<td>0,132</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gren, Hand, Incend</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gren, Hand, Incend</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren, Hand, Sek, White, HC</td>
<td>950</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gren, Hand, Sek, Green</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren, Hand, Sek, Red</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gren, Hand, Sek, Violet</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rkt, HE, 3.5&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mine, AP, M501, Non-bounding, Non-metallic</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy, Round 105, No. 10T lb drum</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, Illum, Aft, Red</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, Illum, Aft, Yellow</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, Illum, Aft, Green</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sig, Illum, Red Star Cluster</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, Illum, White Star Cluster</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, Illum, Green Star Cluster</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, Sek, Red, Rad</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, Sek, Yellow, Rad</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, Sek, Green, Rad</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flare, Aft, Para</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flare, Surface, Trip, 1/2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chgs, Demo, Block, Comp, Ch</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chgs, Demo, Block, TNT, 1/2 lb</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chgs, Demo, Block, TNT, 1/2 lb</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chgs, Demo, Block, TNT, 1/2 lb</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chgs, Demo, Block, TNT, 1/2 lb</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap, Blasting, Spec-Elec, J2</td>
<td>1,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap, Blasting, Spec-Elec, J2</td>
<td>1,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det, Explosive, M20</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cerd, Det, Reinforced</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuse, Blasting, Time, Explosive loaded</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignite, 8# Blasting Fuse, Full Wire Type</td>
<td>1,850</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rkt, 2.75&quot;, Vinyler</td>
<td>350</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rkt, 65mm, Heat, M72</td>
<td>600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuse, Point Deton, M78, CP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuse, Point Deton, M78 series</td>
<td>1,970</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuse, Deton, M77 series</td>
<td>261</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuse, Proximity, M51 series</td>
<td>2,103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weapons densities (Regiment and attached units) are indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOMENCLATURE</th>
<th>MTH</th>
<th>Q/H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, 115</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, 115</td>
<td>2,021</td>
<td>2,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG, 7.62mm, M50</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG, 7.62mm, M50</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG, 7.62mm, M73</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbine, M1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fusil, M51A1</td>
<td>1,806</td>
<td>1,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submachinegun, M3A1</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG, Cal .50, M2</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenade Launcher, 779</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG59 (2 tubes each)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket Launcher, 3.5&quot;</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG (25mm serial)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Page 28 of 28 Pages
b. Transportation. The Regiment relied principally on organic transportation support located in the support platoons of the squadrons for its combat service support. Token support was provided by the Saigon Area Transportation Officer to move 2,500 short tons of WABTCC, COHNEX containers and tents from the staging area to the base camp area. The Regiment was required to pickup Class II and IV supplies (less repair parts) and Class V from supply points in the LCA'QHN area (an approximate 110km turn around). The same combat service support vehicles were also used to deliver from the base camp supply point to the squadrons which in some cases involved another 110km turn around. The use of tactical support vehicles to return to rear area supply points as well as deliver forward supply point to the unit of the Regiment has resulted in the accumulation of excessive mileage on the tactical support vehicles of the Regiment. This situation will be alleviated somewhat when a planned forward supply point for Class V is established in the base camp. However, the problem of Class II and IV will continue until such time as a FSP is established for these supplies.

c. Medical Evaluation and Hospitalization.

(1) Concept: The squadron medical platoons would provide immediate treatment and prepare casualties for evacuation to the 37th Medical Company and/or request "Dust Off" support. Aero-medical support could be provided by either the Servicemen Station Platoon or Aeromedical units located at LCA'QHN depending on the availability of aircraft.

(2) Execution: Each armored cavalry troop normally had medical personnel and evacuation vehicles attached to them from the squadron headquarters troop. Initial medical aid was provided by these aidmen while awaiting aeromed evacuation. Whenever a landing zone could not be secured or the terrain was such that the helicopters could not land, the attached evacuation vehicles were utilized to carry the casualties to the squadron aid station and subsequently to the 93rd Evacuation Hospital in LCA'QHN or the 3rd Field Hospital in SAIGON. Over 90% of the Regiment's casualties were evacuated by air. Response to "Dust Off" requests was immediate and highly effective. On several occasions the "Dust Off" pilots exposed themselves and their aircraft to heavy enemy fire as well as friendly artillery fire in order to evacuate a critically wounded trooper.

12. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TACTICS: No special techniques or equipment were employed or developed during Operation ATLANTA.

13. CONCLUSION: Operation JUNEAU proved to be a most successful operation not only from the standpoint of casualties inflicted on the Viet Cong but the number of lines of communication that have been opened to friendly traffic. No longer can the Viet Cong freely utilize them for movement of their forces and supplies or set up tax collection points to harass and extort money from the local populace. The persistent, aggressive and far reaching actions of the Regiment have continually kept the VC off balance thus preventing them from mounting attacks. The two instances (ambush) than as was able to mount an offensive action resulted in complete routs. Geographical locations heretofore considered privileged Viet Cong sanctuaries were breached by the armored columns of the Blackhorse Regiment destroying bases, fortifications, and capturing precious stores of food. The operation only further demonstrated the flexibility, effectiveness, and prowess of an Armed Cavalry Regiment in an insurgency environment. The situations encountered by the Blackhorse from the enemy from RO DRUKKER and convoy escort missions to cordon and search operations whereby the squadron had to seal of' and then move in and physically root the Viet Cong Forces. On each occasion the enemy was decisively engaged and felt the full combat power of the Regiment with telling results. Throughout the operation the Regiment has been able to move at will in LCA'QHN and Binh Tiu Provinces and the northern most portion of Binh Tiu Province both on and off the highways experiencing little difficulty with terrain or geographical obstacles.
Operation ALEBT was the Regiment's initial operation in the XD&1! LOC - NO DAT areas and initial efforts were being expended securing and organizing the base camp. However, at least two occasions ARVN and Popular Force units participated in search and clear/destroy operations in the Blackhorse TACR. Most of the Regiment's preliminary efforts were devoted toward establishing lines of communication with the 18th ARVN Division, District and Province officials and the National Police. Currently the Regiment has exchanged liaison officers with the 18th Division and has established 24 hour contact with the local Vietnamese officials. Additionally, a limited program has been instituted whereby the National Police accompany the squadrons on their operations which so far have proved most beneficial to all concerned. Future plans call for an expansion of this program with the ultimate goal of speeding up the pacification effort in LONG KHAN and SINDI TOT Provinces.

II. Lessons Learned

a. Operations

(1) Item: Obtaining clearance to engage sampans.

Discussion: When there is a possibility of helicopter fire teams encountering sampans, target clearances and identification problems may arise since clearance must be obtained from District. This requirement causes undue delay and often results in the target escaping before clearance can be obtained.

Observation: The problem can be greatly simplified and facilitated by having a Vietnamese Official on board one of the ships who is authorized to give permission to fire once the target has been identified.

(2) Item: Employment of combat engineer platoons.

Discussion: During operations adequate and efficient engineer support is not always provided because the platoons are often fragmented even though operational requirements and missions sometimes do not warrant the employment of an entire platoon.

Observation: Commanders should evaluate their engineer support available and in consonance with the mission at hand assign tasks to the engineer commander at the same time maintaining support flexibility.

(3) Item: Control of airspace over the battle area.

Discussion: During ambushes there were four observation aircraft, four HUH gunships, a medical evacuation helicopter, and one command helicopter all over the ambush site at one time or the other. With the possible exception two of the four observation aircraft were there by necessity. In addition high performance aircraft were making strikes on each side of the road which resulted in a few near misses.

Observation: The airborne element should coordinate the airspace above the battle area with more than one type of aircraft in overflown in the area. The old rule of thumb that the slower aircraft should temporarily leave the area until the faster ships have delivered their ordnance would be very appropriate in this case.

(4) Item: Convoy reaction force.

Discussion: The ambushes of 21 November and 2 December clearly indicated the need for the value of a highly mobile, and self sustaining force with the capability of rapidly closing with the enemy.

Observation: Convoy reaction forces should be composed of armored elements, if possible, supplemented with armed helicopters (AH-1C).

(5) Item: Reaction of convoy escorts in an ambush.

Discussion: Recent experiences have shown that the first minutes of contact and reaction thereafter by the escort are most critical.
Without exception if the escort had not, once clear of the killing zone, returned to the ambush site firing every weapon available the convoy would have been overrun by the VC.

Observation: Maximum firepower and bold execution of counterambush techniques will effectively neutralise the ambushing forces.

(6) Item: Location of Viet Cong ambush forces.

Discussion: During the 21 November 1966 ambush the Viet Cong positioned themselves in the grass and undergrowth flanking (2 to 3 meters) the road with the idea that the gunners field of observation would be masked by their own vehicle (ACAV).

Observation: ACAV gunners should be trained to fire ahead, to the rear, and down as the vehicle passes through a killing zone.

(7) Item: Employment of hand grenades in an ambush.

Discussion: Experience has shown that the Viet Cong position their closest forces just off the road sometimes in the drainages ditches. Machineguns located on the ACAV's experienced difficulty in effectively covering the close-in, immediate area on either side of the vehicle.

Observation: The hand grenade is an excellent close in counterambush weapon.

(8) Item: Employment of snipers as part of the ambush force.

Discussion: The employment of snipers particularly in ambush sites having rubber or similar height trees can inflict heavy casualties on the ambushed element. Snipers are very effective because the ambushed force normally is concentrating its attention on the forces on the ground.

Observation: Plans for fire distribution should include the engagement of possible sniper locations once contact has been made.

(9) Item: Utilisation and employment of armed helicopters.

Discussion: The armed helicopters (AH-1C) organic to the Armored Cavalry Regiment can be utilised and employed when designated at the Regimental level (air cavalry troop). This allows greater flexibility and continuity of support for committed reconnaisance (squadron) forces.

Observation: Armed helicopters conducted for combat and combat support missions will allow continuous and greater aerial support for the armored cavalry squadrons.

(10) Item: Liaison requirements.

Discussion: During Operation ATLANTA a liaison officer was assigned to the 10th ARVN Division in 2511 LOC and the 10th ARVN in turn assigned an ARVN officer to HQ, 11th Arm Cav Regt. This made rapid coordination possible and has proven invaluable.

Observation: Timely liaison with other units in an area of operations is of great importance, and can provide information that would be otherwise unattainable.

(11) Item: Control of convoys.

Discussion: During Operation ATLANTA numerous convoys moved to and from the Regimental Base Camp. Control of these convoys during movement and limiting their size became a problem. During movement there is the ever present threat of ambush, especially against such lucrative targets as resupply convoys, and control becomes even more difficult and important.

Observation: Convoys must be effectively controlled and their size limited to reduce the possibility of VC exploitation of weak points.
(12) Item: Signal support.

Discussion: When a regimental forward or tactical command post is employed, a multi-channel radio link is necessary to extend necessary command and control circuits. This support must be requested from a higher headquarters. If there is sufficient time for planning, support can be programmed and obtained. However, if a situation develops rapidly, this support may not be available to deploy with the tactical CP.

Observation: A need exists for a permanently assigned multi-channel radio link within an armored cavalry regiment. Equipment has been requested expected in-country in July.


Discussion: When the command post vehicle M-577A1 is used as a "fixed station" CP, the heat build-up inside the vehicle causes deterioration of parts in the communication equipment. There are measures that can be taken to alleviate the heat build-up.

1. Insure adequate ventilation.
2. Utilize a fan to cool equipment.
3. Keep radio transmissions to a minimum.
5. When not transmitting, place the T-195 in the standby position.

Observation: Radio operators and supervisors should be made aware of the measures to be taken to prevent damage to communications equipment in the M-577A1 when operating in a static position.

(14) Item: Frequencies.

Discussion: The frequency spectrum has proven to be extremely crowded in IIT CTZ. Constant command emphasis and supervision is needed to minimize interference and expedite traffic passage.

Observation: Frequency interference exists, but units can communicate and make effective use of assigned frequencies by observing established procedures.

b. Training.

Item: Rules of engagement training.

Discussion: Rules of engagement as imposed in parts of Vietnam require the individual soldier to initiate combat under varying conditions and with a variety of weapons. Without specific training oriented towards this type of engagement the results could be detrimental to our efforts in Vietnam.

Observation: COMET training for Vietnam bound troops should include some of the general rules of engagement i.e. action against snipers in towns, protection of weapons to be used and destruction of homes and huts and why these rules are necessary. Once assigned to a unit in-country the individual should receive further instruction on any rules common only to that unit.

c. Intelligence.

Item: Patrooms.

Discussion: Daylight recon patrols and night ambush patrols in the vicinity of both the staging area and base camp have been found to be extremely effective in deterring VC attacks on these areas.

Observation: An aggressive plan for patrolling the areas around base camps will deny the VC opportunities to plan, practice and execute attacks.
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d. CA/PSIOPS.

(1) Item: Loudspeaker operations.

Discussion: Information received from Viet Cong prisoners and ralliers indicates that loudspeaker missions are not effective when flown above 2,000 feet or on windy days.

Observation: The altitude and wind activities will have a direct effect on the overall results of loudspeaker missions.

(2) Item: Chieu Hoi Program.

Discussion: Reports continue to come in from the field stating that the Viet Cong do not trust the allied forces in particular the Americans. It is quite apparent that Viet Cong propaganda is still able to influence their thoughts. All the ralliers in DAOI KHU District during Operation ATLANTA turned themselves in to GVN and ARVN forces.

Observation: Leaders at all echelons of command must be aware of and stress the importance of the Chieu Hoi Program and especially how to identify and handle a rallier.

- Additional lessons listed in Annex C Operation Alexandria
21 NOVEMBER AMBUSH NARRATIVE
INTRODUCTION
On 21 November 1966 a large convoy escorted by nine Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles (ACAVs - Modified M113 Armored Personnel Carriers mounting a 50 caliber machine gun with hatch armor and two side mounted 50 caliber machine guns, each with an armored gun shield) was ambushed on National Highway One between BIEN HOA and XUAN LOC (YT 27509970 YT 2750977) by elements of two battalions of the Viet Cong 27th Regiment. The escort successfully defended the convoy despite the fact that the VC were well entrenched and employed 57 and 81mm recoilless rifles, mortars, automatic weapons, and small arms and grenades.

BACKGROUND
Operation ATLANTA, which began on 20 October 1966, was the operation in which the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment cleared, secured, and occupied a base camp in the vicinity of LONG GIA, YT 100/6, 12km south of XUAN LOC, RVN. The convoy of 21 November was one of many convoys moving supplies, equipment and men from the staging area to the base camp of Operation ATLANTA.

Units represented in the convoy included Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry, 3rd Military History Detachment, 3rd Chemical Detachment, 11th Armored Cavalry Tactical Air Control Party, 31st Military Intelligence Detachment, 30th Transportation Group, as well as elements of the S1, S2, S3, and S6 staff sections of Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry.

The terrain and vegetation in the area provided good fields of fire and concealment for the ambush force. On the south side of Highway One, where the heaviest concentration of enemy troops was located, the brush, jungle and secondary growth begins at YT 275099 and continues to YT 282099, where an area of grass and banana trees begins (see sketch map). This area continues to YT 292098 where brush and high grass dominate the area. The north side of the road is generally level or with only gentle slopes and consists of high grass vegetation interspersed with low scrub brush, throughout the ambush area.

Less than ten minutes prior to the ambush, an intelligence report was received by Sr, 11th Armored Cavalry, indicating that VC forces were in position at what soon proved to be the ambush site. This information was passed immediately to the 1st Squadron, parent unit of the convoy escort platoon.

THE AMBUSH OF 21 NOVEMBER 1966
The escort commander received warning of the impending ambush when his own vehicle was less than 1,000 yards from the ambush site. All vehicles except the lead ACAV were notified of the impending ambush before the VC commenced firing.

As the convoy and escorts passed by the ambush site they employed reconnaissance by fire which was returned by a heavy volume of small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, recoilless rifle, and hand grenade fire.

Approximately one-half of the convoy passed through the killing zone safely before a truck was hit by a recoilless rifle fire which stopped and burned in such a position that no other vehicles could pass. Within two minutes the three trucks behind the first one to be hit were destroyed on the road. The two ACAV's closest to the firing moved immediately to protect the trucks under fire engaging the enemy with all their available weapons. This action, combined with the small arms fire returned by the personnel who had dismounted from the trucks when the rear portion of the convoy was forced to halt, kept the enemy elements from overrunning the convoy. After a brief but ferocious exchange of fire, both of the ACAV's that had come up to protect the trucks took disabling recoilless rifle rounds, and had to be evacuated by their crews, most of whom had become casualties.

As the fire fight was raging in the killing zone, the escort platoon leader organized a hasty escort from three ACAV's in the lead and moved that section of the convoy on towards XUAN LOC. He then immediately turned around, and with one other ACAV, scored at top speed back toward the sound of the guns. Halfway to the burning trucks, the platoon leader was forced to leave the ACAV accompanying his vehicle to set as security for the DUST-OFF helicopter coming in to evacuate...
wounded. As he continued along his vehicle was struck by a recoilless rifle round which disabled only the radio, on the vehicle, but wounded two crewmen. Before reaching the scene of the action the platoon leader's vehicle engaged the ambush force on both sides of the road until the enemy fire stopped. During this time he adjusted the ordnance delivered by an air-strike, and supervised the evacuation of wounded by DUST-OFF.

FIELD SUPPORT (U)

There was no artillery fire in support of the ambush fight, however, later in the day artillery was placed to support search and clear operations in the area. There was a total of four firing runs made by armed helicopters and two air-strikes flown in support of the enemy. Later in the day an additional air strike was flown in support of search and clear operations.

The Light Fire Team from the Aviation Platoon, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment placed the following ammunition on the ambush:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firing Run</th>
<th>UH-1B</th>
<th>Pods (7.62 M)</th>
<th>12,500 rounds 7.62 M (+)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12 Rockets</td>
<td>12,500 rounds 7.62 MD (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10 Rockets</td>
<td>12,500 rounds 7.62 MD (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 Rockets</td>
<td>12,500 rounds 7.62 MD (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 Rockets</td>
<td>12,500 rounds 7.62 MD (+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 50,000 rounds 7.62 (+)

The Air Force delivered the following ordnance on the site of the ambush:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Flight</th>
<th>Bombs</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1st</td>
<td>6-500</td>
<td>6-750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>2-500</td>
<td>2-750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RESULTS

(U) Enemy losses included:

Personnel:
- KIA (US) 30
- KIA (POSS) 75 – 100

Equipment:
- 57mm Recoilless Rifle
- AA 1.7 Assault Rifle
- RPG-2 AT Rockets
- 2-750 pound bombs
- Type 2A CBU clusters
- 30-75-100
- 35

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Explosive 57mm FR HEAT Rounds
- 0

Explosive 57mm FR casings
- 6

Explosive booster charge casings for RPG
- 2

Sets of web equipment and accessories
- 10

Aidman's medical kit with splints
- 1

Documents identifying 1st Bn, 27th, and 2nd Bn, 27th VC Regiment were taken from bodies.

(c) Friendly losses included:

Personnel:
- KIA
- 7
- WIA
- 8

Equipment:
- ACAV's destroyed
- 2
- 2½ ton trucks destroyed
- 1

CONCLUSIONS (c)

Information obtained from documents found on the VC bodies indicated elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 27th VC Regiment comprised the ambush force.

Though the VC destroyed 2 combat and 1 administrative vehicles the convoy was not overrun, despite the fact that the major portion of the enemy force only had to contend with the small arms of the escorted personnel and two ACAV's. This was determined by three factors:

First was the counter fire from the ambushed column, which began as soon as the trucks stopped.

Second was the fact that the escort unit was warned of the ambush and entered the killing zone firing their automatic weapons. This undoubtedly inflicted casualties on the enemy and may well have caused the VC to initiate the ambush prematurely.

Third it must be accepted that the tremendous volume of fire put out by the ACAV's was instrumental in causing the VC to break contact and flee.
ON 2 December 1966 elements of the 1st Squadron were ambushed by the 275th Viet Cong Main Force Regiment on National Highway 1 northeast of Xuan Loc. The ensuing action dramatically displayed the efficacy of proper countermount techniques and action. So violent was the execution of the countermount that within 70 minutes the squadron had rendered the 275th VC Regiment ineffective as a fighting force without the loss of a single trooper. This one action assisted immeasurably in paving the way for more extensive operations by the Blackhorse Regiment to the north and east of Xuan Loc.

BACKGROUND (C)

Operation ATLANTA began on 20 October 1966 with the 1st Squadron conducting a clear and secure operation along National Highway 1 from Bien Hoa to Xuan Loc and securing the site of the Regiment's permanent base camp south of Xuan Loc. Operation ATLANTA was not only conceived on the idea of carving out a piece of real estate and building a base camp, but in creating up and securing roads and permitting the flow of civilian commerce throughout the provinces around Xuan Loc. Once the base camp area had been secured, search and destroy and ROADRUNNER operations were conducted toward Xuan Loc along National Highway 1, and Interprovincial 333, and south from the base camp on Interprovincial Route 2 to the 1st AIF TAG.

Convoys with supplies, equipment and troops continued to arrive from the LONG Binh staging area in ever increasing amounts throughout the remainder of October and the entire month of November. On 2 November the Regiment began providing security for a company from the 27th Engineer Battalion (C) in the vicinity of Gia Rai adjacent to National Highway 1 at the base of Chua Chan Mountain.

Viet Cong activities in the 11th Armored Cavalry's area of operation were relatively minor in nature during the month of November except for the ambush of 21 November. On 27 and 28 November the Regiment received RED HAZE reports of approximately 80 emissions south of National Highway 1 (via TT 2005 - 2107 - 2007) and agent reports of movements north and south of National Highway 1 in the vicinity of SOU 1 AT and Chua Chan Mountain. On the 29th the 1st Squadron moved into the area of the reported activity and conducted a zone reconnaissance north and south of Highway 1 as far as Gia Rai remaining overnight, returning the next day without contact. On the same day the 1st Squadron returned to the base camp, a FAC from the 15th ARVN Division (formerly the 10th Division) reported receiving saddle weapon fire and observed an estimated Viet Cong battalion off Interprovincial Route 2 vicinity of Xa Bang (TT 2005).

The terrain in the area of the ambush is gentle, sloping to the southeast from the commanding terrain in the area, Chua Chan Mountain (elevation 872m). Drainage flows from the mountain to the northeast to the southeast. The highway is flanked by elephant grass on both sides turning into heavy secondary growth approximately 60 meters off the road. The initial area of contact was flanked to the west by a portion of a rubber plantation. Trafficability was limited once the vehicles entered the undergrowth. However, it did not impede the advance of the Blackhorse Troopers. The weather was hot and clear continuing throughout the night and the next day.

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On the second of December Troop B plus a platoon of tanks from Company D were securing the site of the rock quarry while Troop A manned the squadron's sector of the base camp perimeter. A resupply convoy had arrived earlier in the day at the base camp and was on its way back to the rock quarry when it was ambushed at 1:54 hours by an estimated 2 battalion Viet Cong force. The area selected by the enemy for the ambush is located on a stretch of Highway 1 that has come to be known as "Ambush Alley" (TT 602064 to TT 602068; along Highway 1) (see sketch 1). The convoy, consisting of 2 tanks, 3 ACAV's and 2 1/2-ton trucks, reacted violently to the attack with the armored vehicles escorting the two trucks out of killing zone than returning immediately to rake the entire killing zone with 90mm cannisters, 50 Cal and 7.62 machinegun fire, grenades and M-16 fire (see sketch 2).

Word of the ambush was received by the 1st Squadron units in the base camp and Troop B located 5 kilometers north of the ambush at the rock quarry. Within seven minutes after the squadron received the information, Company D (-) was on the move towards the ambush to be followed 10 minutes later by Troop C. Meanwhile, Troop B had arrived at the ambush site, moving right into the killing zone smothering the Viet Cong positions, many of which were only off the shoulder of road, with withering fire. A Viet Cong recoilless rifle round hit one of the tanks knocking off the commander's cupola, but it did not deter the crew as they continued to fight and in the ensuing battle fired every round of 90mm on the tank.

By this time the tanks of Company D began to arrive on scene having traveled 22 kilometers in 25 minutes, commenced moving through the ambush area raking one side of the highway while Troop B worked over the other side. Howitzer Battery which followed Troop C and was in turn followed by Troop A 45 minutes later, moved into a fire support position near SOUT CIV. Once Troop C reached the ambush site it moved through the killing zone firing everything it had, and taking up positions on Highway 1 beyond the AX of 333 and 34 in an effort to seal off the Viet Cong's routes of withdrawal.

The Viet Cong apparently thinking that Troop C was the last of the reinforcements began to fire again on the road only to be caught in a crossfire between the on-charging Troop A and the tanks of Company D. This fire fight lasted about ten minutes than Charlie began to lose his taste for combat with the Troopers of the Blackhorse. Troop A moved into positions astride Highway 1 east of Troop C while Troop C shifted further south in an attempt to block the Viet Cong's escape routes (see sketch 3).

Reinforcing fire was provided both from the ground by the 5th Artillery Group and fighter aircraft based at VINH HOA directed by the Regiment's FAC personnel observing the ambush site from overhead. Further support was provided by the Squadron's light fire team and aircraft from the Regimental Aviation Platoon.

The Viet Cong had dug-in and covered positions on both sides of the road (see sketch 2) covering the killing zone with heavy and light machineguns, 60mm mortars, at least one 75mm recoilless rifle and small arms. Viet Cong forces were also positioned close to the shoulder of the road with grenades, with the apparent hope of damaging the suspension systems of the ACAV's and tanks which proved to be fruitless. They did however provide lucrative targets for the gunners on the passing ACAV's as they dropped their hand grenades and fired their M79 Launchers with deadly accuracy.

At 1750 hours contact was broken by the Viet Cong with only sporadic firing continuing until 1950 hours. In order to seal off the escape routes to the south (see sketch 3) a combination of artillery and air support was utilized to fire throughout the night on suspected avenues of withdrawal (trails, stream beds, ridge lines). Illumination and suppressing fires were delivered by rotating AC-130 "Spook" ships over the area until morning light. An initial check of the area indicated the VC had 88 DA (BC) in the 70 minute encounter with the 1st Squadron's fire teams.

After regaining position all night along the road the 1st Squadron started to clear the ambush site sending dismounted patrols approximately 300 meters off the road. Mounted patrols conducted search and clear operations on the trails leading to the ambush site into the jungle. To further tighten the knot around the area the 3rd Squadron moved from the base camp assuming the 1st Squadron's blocking positions while the 2nd made a sweep of the area. A forward CP from the
Regiment was also moved into the area to facilitate command and control of the operations. As the clearing operation progressed, the Viet Cong body count climbed, reaching 99 with at least another 100 KIA (POSS). At approximately 1630 hours the 3rd Squadron and Regimental CP moved back to the base camp leaving the 1st Squadron to continue their clearing of the area.

**(PEC) JÜTPORT (U)**

At the time of the ambush there were no preplanned fires or air strikes, however, within ten minutes after the ambush started, supporting fires from fighter aircraft and the 55th Artillery Group were on the way. Thus providing Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron enough time to position itself at 5000 feet where it was able to provide direct support for the entire ambush area. Prior to darkness a Battery from the 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery was dispatched from XUAN LOC to provide further support. Highway 1 was established as the fire coordination line (see sketch) with the air strikes directed to the east and south of the highway and the artillery to the west and north. 750 personnel from the Regiment, directed, in coordination with the ground commander, seven air strikes from their light observation aircraft observing the ambush site. CBU's, 250 pound bombs, napalm and 20mm canister were directed into the area unmasking trees and cutting huge gouges out of the jungle below. During the hours of darkness a ACU7 “Spook” ship was continually overhead providing illumination and suppressing fires on request and as targets of opportunity appeared. Supplementing the above mentioned fire support were light fire teams from the 1st Squadron and Regiment. The light fire team from the 1st Squadron personally bagged at least 5 Viet Cong when it caught a group of them in the open.

A total of 22 sorties were flown as follows:

- A01 = 3
- F5 = 5
- F100 = 10
- ACU7 = 4

**Ordnance expended included:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBU</td>
<td>3,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb, 500 lbs</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb, 750 lbs</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm, 750 lbs</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPAR, 2.75”</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20mm (HE)</td>
<td>10,000 rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Geliber</td>
<td>10,000 rds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was a minimum of one FAC overhead at all times and at some times as many as 3 in the air at once. Continuous communications were maintained with the ground commander for the duration of the ambush.

Artillery direct support was provided by Howitzer Battery 1st Squadron, reinforcing fires were provided by Battery B (155mm), 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery. A total of 1,700 rounds were fired in support of the operation.

**RESULT:**

**(U) Enemy losses included:**

**Personnel:**

- KIA (30) = 99
- KIA (POSS) = 100-150
- VCC = 3

**Equipment:**

- 75mm Ht = 1
- 7.62 Ht Ht = 1
- 7.62 Lt Ht (Type 58) = 1

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7.62 Lt ID (Type 56)  4
AK-47 Assault Rifle  3
Chicen Carbine w/Bayonet  1
RHO K502 Rocket Launcher  1
60mm Mortar  1
R56 Sub Gun  1
Carbine 12 (US)  1
Small Arms Ammunition  1500 rounds
Grenade (Fragmentation & Concussion)  45
R55 AT grenade  2
Mortar Ammunition (60mm)  15

(C) Friendly losses included:

Personal:
KIA - 1 (27th Engr Bn)
WIA - 22

Equipment:
JCIV (destroyed) - 1
Tand 125A3 (damaged) - 1

CONCLUSIONS (C)

A search of the ambush area and information obtained from captured documents and prisoners indicated that the 275th VC Bnjg (Main Force) reinforced with heavy weapons sprung the ambush which 70 minutes later turned into a disastrous defeat. The decisive defeat of the Viet Cong can be attributed to several things:

First and foremost is that at no time in the ambush was the Viet Cong able to gain control of the situation even though he had the advantages of surprise and fortified positions. The violent reaction by the escort force completely stripped him of any advantages he might have had. Once out of the killing zone the escort force, minus the trucks, charged headlong down the road belching fire on both sides of the road. This spontaneous action held at bay the attacking force until the reaction forces arrived.

Secondly, the rapid reaction of the remainder of the squadron in reaching the ambush site within 25 minutes after traveling a distance of approximately 22 km.

Third, the immediate establishment of a fire coordination line (Highway 1) thus permitting maximum utilization of both air and ground supporting fires.

Fourth, the ability of the convoy to withstand the initial shock and then be able to retaliate so effectively.

The final results might have been even better if it had stayed light another two hours. However, weather conditions did not limit the ability of control personnel to place effective fire on the enemy positions.

Inclusions:

Sketch map 1, Sketch map 2, Sketch map 3, Sketch map 4, and Topographic Map.

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Sketch 2

Local Guerrillas

Highway 1

Suo Cat

3 km
Sketch 4
ANNEX C

AFTER ACTION REPORT - OPERATION ALEXANDRIA
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COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION ALEXANDRIA

References:
OPORD 09-66 (OPERATION ALEXANDRIA), Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 2 Dec 66.

1. NAMES OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION.
a. OPERATION ALEXANDRIA
b. Search and Destroy:

2. DATES OF OPERATION. 013030 - 051957 Dec 66.

3. LOCATION. Duc THANH and XUAN LOC PROVINCES.

4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

5. REPORTING OFFICER. LTC Palmer A. Peterson.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION. See Annex A.

7. SUPPORTING FORCES.
a. Air Support

(1) Preplanned air strikes. There were two preplanned air strikes at 050700 LST on suspected VC routes of withdrawal. The effectiveness could not be judged because of the dense vegetation in the strike area.

(2) Immediate air strikes. There was one immediate air strike at 051100 Dec called in by Tm I to reduce enemy machine gun and small arms fire. The strike which followed artillery and an assault by two light fire teams reduced the volume of fire to the extent where ground elements could effect a search.

b. Squadron and Regimental Aviation.

(1) A total of 25 hours and 50 minutes of air time was recorded by helicopter pilots flying in support of the ground action. 13 hours 50 minutes were recorded in UH-1B aircraft and 11 hours 50 minutes were recorded in OH-23D aircraft that flew PLO's and other observers.

(2) A total of four strikes were recorded. Three by the Third Squadron Light Fire team and one by the Second Squadron Light fire team. Targets were enemy routes of withdrawal from the objective area, tunnels, and bunkers. The assaults were observed to be most effective in suppressing enemy fires from these positions.

(3) The following Ordnance was expended:
   (a) 2.75" air-to-ground rockets - 37
   (b) 7.62mm Linked - 6,000 rounds

(c) Other Aviation.

(1) Two Dust Offs were completed for this operation.

(2) 68 hours were flown by 10 UH-1B aircraft of the 50th Aviation Support Company. The company air-lifted the 13th Infantry into objective Alpha and out at the end of the day. Also, these elements were used to evacuate 500 VC's to an interrogation point six kilometers from objective A.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (IWO nAVY J3-32 (Cont)

d. Artillery

(1) General Artillery support for the operation was supplied by three sources.

(a) Howitzer Battery 3d Squadron fired the following missions:

1. 050200 to 050300 Dec. HA fired in various areas. 40 rds HE were fired. It was unobserved, effectiveness unknown.

2. 050515 to 050715. 297 rds HE and 42 rds WP were fired for preparatory fires and to seal off the objective areas. It was unobserved and results unknown; however, based on the number of VCF detained it can be assumed that it was effective in helping to establish the seal.

3. 050600 Dec. 2 rds of WP fired as a navigational aid to TM L.

4. 050900 Dec. 366 rds HE and 48 rds WP were fired for a blocking barrage which was requested by S-3. An FO observed and reported the fire effectively blocked avenues of escape.

5. 051045 to 051400. 395 rds of HE and 32 rds WP were fired for combined assault on line by TM I, TM K and TM L. At one point on this mission a dead space was encountered in a deep draw. The assault elements could not effectively clear the area without halting the assault. Howitzer Battery effectively closed their sheet and was able to completely fill the draw with fire and reduce enemy harassment from that position.

6. 051630 to 051645 Dec. 137 rds HE and 13 rds WP were fired by the 105 Battery and 155 Battery massed as a final protective fire for TM I and TM L as they withdraw from the area. This was a TOT mission. Artillery batteries are not usually located together in Vietnam to allow them to mass their forces in this way. However, the mission was effectively accomplished.

(b) B Battery 2/35 Artillery 155MM SP fired 454 rds HE and 10 rds WP in missions ranging from H & I to a TOT. As this battery has a range of 3 to 4 miles and its effect on a target is three times that of a 105, the battery provided a valuable asset to the operation.

(c) Provisional Mortar Battery, composed of the mortars in the Armored Cavalry Troop massed in one battery, fired four HE missions in the vicinity of objective Alpha. As a supplement to our Howitzer Battery and a second source of indirect fire the Provisional Mortar Battery is very valuable.

8. INTELLIGENCE

(a) Prior to Operation: Numerous sources, 1st Australian Task Force, Phuoc Tuy Province and Sector Headquarters, Doc Thanh Advisor and aerial observation all indicated that an unknown local force was operating in the area. Countless incidents of sniper fire, mines, road cuts and tax collection points had been reported by these sources. It was suspected that the local force units provided cuts to allow the 274 and 275 VC Regiments to cross interprovincial Highway #2. They also served as guides to the Regiments when in the area.

The S-2 American advisor in Phuoc Tuy Province further indicated that the area could harbor a transient VC Base Camp as there were tunnels and trenches sighted on several occasions, and the fortifications were on a VC east-west route of movement.

(b) Value of prior intelligence: Prior intelligence was a valuable indication of what might be expected in the area. Expected terrain limitations came as no surprise and full advantage was taken of those areas where we knew armored vehicles could operate best. The 43 ARVN Inf Bn was requested to cope with expected unfavorable terrain where it existed and to provide a search element for widely dispersed and isolated huts in objective A. Prior intelligence from aerial observation allowed for preplanned artillery to be placed on expected routes of enemy withdrawal. Actual enemy resistance did exceed that which was expected and planned for.

(c) Intelligence during the operation: Intelligence gained from OPERATION ALEXANDRIA definitely identified the local force to be local force Company C-20. Of the 42 confirmed VC captured interrogators found one who was a member of the 274th VC Regiment. Documents collected have not been fully evaluated but one revealed the location of a VC mine field. Tunnels and bunkers indicated a defensive position and verified suspicions that the area was utilized as a transient Base Camp.

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MISSION. To conduct search and destroy operation 0609 December 1966, via YS449562, Can My 2 (YS446956), Ap Huir (YS462925) to seize VC and VCS in area.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Maneuver. To conduct opn in 3 phases:

(1) Phase I. Atk on 2 directions of atks to seal obj's A and B. Secure landing zones for 43 Inf (ARVN) (-).

(2) Phase II. Cont to seal obj's A and B. 43 Inf (ARVN) clears obj's A and B. VC and VCS airlifted to sector interrogation center via YS449562.

(3) Phase III. On order, Th L cont atk to search obj C. Th L cont atk to search obj D.

b. Fires:

(1) Artys. Prt of fire Th I init. Th K on order. Prep H-30 to H-hour to seal obj A and B.

(2) TAG Airs. On call.

11. EXECUTION

General. Headquarters 3d Sqn 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment issued ORDER 09-66 (OPERATION ALEXANDRIA) on 2 Dec 1966 assigning the mission as stated in paragraph 9 above. On 21000 Dec all unit commanders were briefed on the mission. At 021500 Dec coordination was made with the participating ARVN unit. The Squadron Commander, O-3, a liaison officer and the Regimental 2 traveled to Ha ria on 7 Dec to effect coordination with Phouo To officials and American advisors, the Battalion Commander of the 43 Inf, and Liaison officer of the 68th Airmobile Company. On 4 Dec liaison was made with B 2/35 Arty.

4 December 1966

At 084500 Dec, How Battery deployed to the Coutaney Rubber Plantation at YS458920 in preparation to fire H&I fires and direct support missions on 5 Dec 66.

Th L mounted, moved south on route Black at 084745 Dec and from YS458956 to YS472935 the team dismounted and took position on either side of Route 2 to ensure that portion of the route for the road march on 5 Dec. Th L occupied these positions by 0846 Dec. Th L vehicles returned to Base Camp after the dismounted personnel took position.

5 December 1966

Phase I of the operation commenced at 0615 hrs with Howitzcr Battery and B Battery 2/35 artillery conducting preparatory fires in objectives A & B to seal the area until the teams could take position.

At 0615 Th K crossed AP and proceeded south on route BLACK travelling south to effect a seal on objective Alpha. Th L brought its vehicles to the positions it occupied on route BLACK to position on objective Alpha. Th L brought its vehicles to the positions it occupied on route BLACK. The team mounted and proceeded south to complese the seal on objective Alpha. Provisional Mortar Battery followed in march order and deployed to the south on route BLACK to YS458920 where the Battery was laid. 3/919 Engineers was last in march order and took up position with Provisional Mortar Battery.

At 0645 How Battery stopped preparatory files and started interdiction files on suspected route of withdrawal from objectives A & B.

At 0630 Th K had completed the seal on objective Bravo. Th L reported the portion of the area for the seal on objective Alpha was complete at 0647. At 0656 the first lift, one company of the 43rd Infantry (ARVN) was on the landing zone. At 0709 Th L reported they were in position and were sealing their position and completed the seal at 0735.

Phase II. At 0640 Th K commenced a search of area Bravo. The search in objective Bravo revealed several posters and leaflets which were anti-American. At coordinates YS458950 in the vicinity of a concrete plantation house Th K found a 30 meter long tunnel. By 0720 Th K had taken about 150 VCS and requested air evacuation for the suspects so that they could be taken to the interrogation point at Binh Da. At 0745 Th K reported having located 2000 pounds of potatoes which they destroyed.

The third lift of the 43 Infantry was completed at 0800. At this time the ARVN Force moved from the landing zone at YS417862 and moved into objective Alpha to initiate a search of the area.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVN) MACV J3-32 (Cont.)
followed by Tn I, Tn L and Tn K. By 1700 11 Jul 72 closed on Base Camp.

12. Results:
   a. Friendly
      (1) Personnel
         US - 2 KIA, 10 WIA.
      (2) Equipment (Damaged or lost)
         2 tanks suffered track and suspension damage.
         1 M-79 lost.

   b. Enemy
      (1) Personnel
         (a) 4 VC KIA (BC)
         (b) 2 VC MIA (Confirmed)
         (c) 0 VC KIA
         (d) 600 VCS captured.
         (e) 42 VC detained.
      (2) Tunnels and Fortifications
         (a) 24 major tunnels were found.
         (b) 2 fortified positions were explored. Punjabi stakes, booby traps, and anti-aircraft were among the defenses employed.

      (c) None of the tunnels or fortifications could be completely destroyed as it would have required major engineer effort.
      (d) Captured and/or destroyed:
         4000 lbs of peanuts destroyed.
         2500 tons of rice destroyed.
         25 tons of rice evacuated.
         70 Chicom stick grenades destroyed.
         2 claymores destroyed.
         1 Pressure type anti-tank mines captured.

13. Administrative Matters:
   a. Operation Alexander involved only one single day; problems in administrative procedures were at a minimum.
   b. Some of the following areas are worthy of comment:
      a. Treatment of Casualties:
         Tn I suffered a KIA early in the action; however, evacuation could not be effected for several hours.
         Dustoff would not evacuate a KIA even though the body could easily have been placed on a dustoff ship when it was in the area to evacuate a wounded soldier. The UH-1's organic to the Squadron could not evacuate the body due to the extreme weight of the Ordinance carried by the aircraft.
         A swifter method will have to be devised for KIA evacuation. Not only is the presence of a dead comrade a definite morale factor, but the body creates a handicap when the unit must move rapidly and frequently.
         The UH-1's must be ready to evacuate casualties or KIA by armored ambulance to a safe landing zone for pick-up.
      b. Communications:
         To switch all airmobile communications to the admin/log net as traffic becomes extremely on the combat net. At one time a request for dustoff and a request for a fire mission were in competition with each other, indicating a need for established priorities on radio traffic.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques:
   The only item of equipment that met full combat utilization for the first time was the M132 Flame Thrower. The ability of this weapon to burn thick brush and drive a hidden enemy is unequalled. It is such a valuable weapon when readily available to the troop that it is felt that two M132's should be organic to each troop.

15. Combat Analysis:
   Operation Alexander was most successful in terms of physical damage inflicted upon the enemy, numbers of confirmed VC captured, and the psychological advantage gained by easily entering an enemy stronghold and establishing overall control in the area. Further, indispensable intelligence was gained about activities and operations in the Pogolanta River. The stores and fortifications found have definitely established the area as a staging area used by the 5th VC Division for east-west movement. The single most important success was the capture of important local VC leaders who gave valuable information on terrorist rings and infrastructure of the area. The operation also provided the opportunity to assault entrenched positions, utilize the Squadron's tunnel rats, and removed the processing and evacuation of prisoners and documents. The troops also encountered punjabi stakes and other booby traps.
SUBJECT: Combat Ope: Ions After Action Report (RVC)

To I and To M started searching in the vicinity of their blocking positions and at 0820 To I discovered a large number of inter-connecting tunnels running under houses. Smoke was placed in the tunnels and "tunnel rats", recently trained in the Squadro, entered the tunnels for a detailed search.

At 0825 sniper fire wounded a tank commander and loader in the head at coordinates TS438848. Dustoff was called for at that location by To I. To I called in a light fire team to make a run on the location that the sniper fire came from. The air observer and S3 called in artillery to fire a blocking barrage to seal the area while To I searched the position. At 0905 To I made further contact with heavy volumes of machine gun and small arms fire at TS438848. The light fire team made an assault on the position but artillery was not used due to aircraft in the area.

High performance aircraft was also kept on stand-by pending the completion of Dustoff. One attempt at Dustoff failed at 0904 when the aircraft suffered tail damage from hostile fire and was forced to land at Base Camp. At 0920 the wounded tank commander died, and To I requested the body be evacuated.

To the south of objective Alpha where To M was in blocking position. A limited search was conducted. By 0958 To M had discovered 5000 lbs of rice and had 35 VCS to be evacuated.

Dustoff was not accomplished for To I until 1002 almost two hours after it had been requested. Upon completion of Dustoff To I called in artillery as small arms and automatic weapons persisted. The artillery was lifted at 1058, and the light fire team followed by TAG air assaulted the area.

At 1102 To I requested a second dustoff. The second dustoff was accomplished at 1140. To I still had a KIA at its location as neither dustoff nor our light fire team could pick up the body. One of the aircraft from the 6th Airmobile support company finally evacuated the body. To M found 4500 lbs of rice in the vicinity of its blocking position. At 1147 To L had 50 VCS in the vicinity of its blocking position.

43 Infantry had completed a rather haphazard search of objective Alpha by 1020 hours. The Battalion Commander set his companies in position along Highway 2 and remained there for the rest of the operation. The search performed by the ARVN force resulted in several burned huts. Nine VCS, some handgrenades of various manufacture, one anti-tank mine, and several pigs, chickens, bicycles and one sewing machine were taken by the 43 Infantry.

Feeling a more detailed search of objective Alpha was necessary at 1200 hours To I, To K and To L swiftly moved on line to the north of the objective and performed a mounted sweep of the area with one company of the 43 Infantry searching behind the vehicles. Artillery was employed during this search to fire into draws and thick jungle ahead of the search elements to drive out anybody hidden in such places.

This search revealed numerous tunnels, bunkers, body traps, punji pits and firing positions. Four VC KIA were discovered and 440 lbs of rice were found. In addition rice, handgrenades and enemy uniforms were taken. The positions where KIA were found were entrenched and the enemy was killed at close range. There was one instance of an enemy assaulting two ACVs with a handgrenade at 15 meters.

At 1342 To K moved to objective Charlie and conducted a search that yielded 43 VCS.

A MEDCAP operation was conducted at the interrogation point. The operation met with only limited success as the people who had been evacuated to the interrogation point all demonstrated a reluctance to participate because of VC propaganda that discriminated MEDCAP as dangerous and brutal. Attempts by 8-5 to give away various foodstuffs was also only partly successful because the VC propaganda labeled the food as poison.

Because of approaching darkness and the time required to airlift the 43 Infantry to Ba Ria, Phase III, the search of objective Delta was never accomplished.

At 1612 hours To K returned 4-43 Infantry to the parent unit and moved north on route BLACK from the SP to YS456841. At 1658 hours two tanks of To L ran over pressure detonated mines at YS456844. No injuries were inflicted.

To I secured route BLACK from the southern sector of To L to the landing zone at YS456841. To M secured the landing zone until the 43 Infantry (LRF) had been completely airlifted out of objective Alpha. At 1544, pursuit Battery moved north and returned to the base camp at 1837. The 43 Infantry (LRF) was clear of the area by 1837. To K moved north on route BLACK.
One disappointment in the mission was the performance of the 43 Infantry (ARVN). It was hoped that they would provide the task force with a capable means of conducting a detailed ground search of the objective areas. However, the ARVN infantry troops lacked disciplined leadership and the conduct of the search was rapid and sloppy. Those areas that were searched were burned after the troops confiscated all pigs, chickens, bicycles, and other assorted items of value to them.

It is hoped that another mission will be undertaken with the 43 Infantry and that through a more definitive command relationship more skillful teamwork can be formed.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS. See Annex B.
ANNEX A to Combat Operations After Action Report to OIF ALEXANDRIA.

TASK ORGANIZATION (Initially).

**On I**
- L/3-11 Armd Cav (-1 plat)
- 1/N/3-11 Armd Cav
- 1 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav
- 1 M132

**On L**
- L/3-11 Armd Cav
- Lt Sec 3/1-11 Armd Cav
- 1 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav
- 1 M132

**On K**
- K/3-11 Armd Cav
- KV Sec 3/M/3-11 Armd Cav
- 1 Co/1-43 Inf (ARVN) (OPCON)
- 1 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav
- 2 OTN National Police (OPCON)

**On M**
- M/3-11 Armd Cav (-2 plat)
- 2/I/3-11 Armd Cav
- 1 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav

**TF CON**
- How Btry
- Prov Mort Btry
- 3/919 Engrs
- 1 Engr Recon Tm/27 Engrs
- Lt fire 2sm/2-11 Armd Cav (OPCON)
- M1 Tm/11 Armd Cav
- 2 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav
ANNEX B to Combat Operations After Action Report to OP ALEXANDRIA

LESSONS LEARNED OPERATION ALEXANDRIA

1. ITEM: RECON BY FIRE
   a. Discussion: Rather than random reconnaissance into heavily vegetated areas such as woodlines, jungles or banana groves reconnaissance by fire should start short of the suspected area and be walked into the target.
   b. Observation: Fire discipline and coordination exhibited by the enemy indicated that well conducted reconnaissance by fire can cause an enemy unit to reveal itself by return fire, or it will suppress his fire.

2. ITEM: FIRE DISCIPLINE
   a. Discussion: When a team or a vehicle crew has more than one automatic weapon they should closely control their fire during enemy contact so that there is always at least one automatic weapon firing while the others reload.
   b. Observation: Wounded personnel in OPERATION ALEXANDRIA indicated they were wounded because all automatic weapons ran out of ammo at the same time and the crew had no suppressive fire while they reloaded. This clearly dictates the need for control on firing automatic weapons.

3. ITEM: LAND NAVIGATION AT NIGHT
   a. Discussion: Night movement under black out conditions can either achieve great surprise and success or create chaos. Surprise and success will be achieved if the following procedures are adopted.
      (1) Know the distance between SP and objective and have the lead element measure the distance on his odometer to insure that the objective or turn off to the objective is found.
      (2) Logistic companies are valuable as an added reference for movement and to quickly determine general direction.
      (3) Preplanned artillery concentrations utilizing WP are an important aid to determining exact location and achieving proper positioning on the objective area.
   b. Observation: On OPERATION ALEXANDRIA the Third Squadron enjoyed a successful night movement by employing the procedures listed. It is recommended these considerations be SOP for movement during hours of darkness.

4. ITEM: CLOSING ON A KNOWN OR SUSPECTED ENEMY POSITION
   a. Discussion: When moving against a known or suspected enemy position armored vehicles should lead the dismounted elements so that any anti-personnel mines, booby traps or automatic weapons fire will be absorbed by the armor. Dismounted personnel can be utilized best by following behind to conduct a detailed search of the area, utilizing the protection of the armor and automatic weapons.
   b. Observation: The combination of a mounted-dismounted team advancing on an enemy position proved effective in OPERATION ALEXANDRIA however greater speed and skill could be achieved if training were conducted in this procedure by ARVN units.

5. ITEM: DETECTING UNDERGROUND BUNKERS AND FIRING POSITIONS
   a. Discussion: On OPERATION ALEXANDRIA some underground bunkers and firing positions were detected by long mounds of earth. This was prevalent in banana groves, and in most cases trenches, bunkers and firing positions were found under the mounds.
   b. Observation: Search elements should be instructed concerning mounds and what they could indicate.

6. ITEM: EMPLOYMENT OF PUNJLI STICKS
   a. Discussion: Punjli stakes were found around an enemy defensive position. They were easily recognizable in the grass and the points were aiming away from the position.
   b. Observation: Troops should be trained to look for punjli sticks and read into them what their employment could mean i.e. the direction they are pointing is expected route of friendly force advance. The opposite direction might hide an enemy position.

7. ITEM: EMPLOYMENT OF M-132
   a. Discussion: For maximum utilization of the M-132 the following techniques were found to be most effective.
      (1) Fire mixture short of target and allow the flame to roll into objective.
      (2) Fire low with possible the mixture will dissipate if fired higher than necessary.
ANNEX B to Combat Operations After Action Report to OP ALEXANDRIA (Cont)

8. **ITEM: ASSAULT ON LINE**
   a. **Discussion**: At one point Tm I, Tm K and Tm L came on line to assault a wide area that contained enemy positions. With the help of an aerial observer 79 armored vehicles easily formed on line and advanced, all weapons trained on the enemy positions.
   b. **Observation**: Armor can be employed successfully in mass formations in certain areas of Vietnam.

9. **ITEM: CONTROL OF COMMAND NET.**
   a. **Discussion**: During the operation there were times when valuable transmissions had to compete for the opportunity to use the command net. Requests for dustoff were being cut out by spot reports which competed with commanders controlling air strikes. It was resolved to shift all airborne transmission to the admin/log net.
   b. **Observation**: Airmobile communications may remain on the admin/log net to lessen transmissions on command net. Other suggestions include training people to listen before transmitting and fairly establishing their own priorities should important traffic be on the net.

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ANNEX C (Entrapments Encountered on OPERATION ALEXANDRIA) to Combat Operations After action Report to OPERATION ALEXANDRIA

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WIRE

FUNJII STAKES

OUTSIDE (UNDERGROUND) ENTRANCE

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ANNEX D

ROSTER OF COMMANDERS

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - COL William W. Cobb

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regt - CPT Marvin L. Doerr

1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - LTC Martin D. Howell

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron - CPT Richard H. Fanning (20 Oct - 23 Nov) 1LT Franklin J. Wing (24 Nov - 8 Dec)

Troop A, 1st Squadron - CPT John E. Bailey
Troop B, 1st Squadron - CPT John L. Landry
Company D, 1st Squadron - CPT Bill Fawley
Headquarters Battery, 1st Squadron - CPT William K. Fraase

2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - LTC Kibbee H. Horne

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 2nd Squadron - CPT Bob E. Shamberger
Troop K, 2nd Squadron - CPT Richard H. Miller
Troop L, 2nd Squadron - CPT Howard C. Bagg
Troop M, 2nd Squadron - CPT John G. Russell
Headquarters Battery, 2nd Squadron - CPT William R. Perry

3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - LTC Palmer A. Peterson

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3rd Squadron - CPT Calvin J. Rees (20 Oct - 6 Dec)
CPT Ted R. Welsh (6 Dec - 8 Dec)
Troop K, 3rd Squadron - CPT Peter P. Horoshak (20 Oct - 9 Nov)
Troop L, 3rd Squadron - CPT John R. Parker (10 Nov - 8 Dec)
Troop M, 3rd Squadron - CPT Wayne F. Halstead
Company H, 3rd Squadron - CPT John B. Russell
Headquarters Battery, 3rd Squadron - CPT Leonard Deere

37th Medical Company - CPT Danie J. Blais

919th Engineer Company (Armored) - CPT Donald J. Crocker

509th Radio Research Detachment - CPT Lee Gentry

58th Military Intelligence Detachment - CPT Alfred J. Dina (20 Oct - 18 Nov)
MAJ Cornelius L. Gray (19 Nov - 8 Dec)

53rd Chemical Detachment - 1LT James T. Price

17th Public Information Detachment - MAJ Paul Blackwell (20 Oct - 7 Dec)
CPT Owenitchfield (8 Dec)

28th Military History Detachment - MAJ Bruce R. Milson
ANNEX F

VIET CONG INCIDENT REPORTS

26 MAY 1964 - 3 OCTOBER 1966
# Annex 7 to Combat Operations After Action Report to Operation ATLANTA

## INCIDENTS: BEN HOA to XUAN LOC on/near National Highway One.

### DATE
- 26 May 61
- 6 Jul 61
- 30 Jun 61
- 2 Jul 66
- 13 Jun 66
- 1 Jul 66
- 7 Jul 66
- 11 Jul 66
- 12 Jul 66
- 16 Aug 66
- 19 Aug 66
- 6 Sep 66
- 6 Sep 66
- 13 Sep 66

### COORDINATES
- TT 177126
- TT 166122
- TT 159128
- TT 245108
- TT 299058
- TT 3110
- TT 391101
- TT 601101
- TT 31101
- TT 109056
- TT 163102
- TT 271101
- TT 247192

### INCIDENT
- Ambush of RVNAP personnel.
- Ambush of Civil Officials.
- Ambush of RP personnel.
- Roadblocks and mines, small arms.
- Mine.
- Roadblock.
- Small arms.
- Small arms.
- Small arms.
- Small arms.
- Small arms.
- Small arms.
- Roadblock, Small arms.
- Roadblock, Small arms.
- Roadblock.
- Roadblock, Small arms.
- Possible extortion point.
- Train mined.
- Possible extortion point.
- Road mined.  
- Small arms.
- AT mine found - destroyed in place over 600 yards long - not clear.
- Roadblock, dirt mounds, cuts.
- Road cut - passable.
- Small arms.
- 3 mines-1 APC-1 APC damaged.
- Road reported mined.
- Rod cut.
- Rod cut.
- Rod cut.
- Road cut.
- Rod cut.
- Road cut.
- Tree over road-blocked up traffic.
- Dirt mound across road, and just off road.
- One dirt mound each side.
- Crater in road.
- Dirt road block.
- Deep trench across road.
- Two trees across road.
- Crater in road.
- 2 brushwood roadblocks-100 yards apart.
- Barbed wire barrier.
- Mine, hit by truck.
- Mine, hit by truck.
- APC, hits mine.
- Jeep, hits mine.
- Numerous but passable cuts.
- APC destroyed by mine.
- Truck hit mine.
- ARVN APC damaged by mine.
- Command activated mine.
- UXO explosion, small arms.
- Mine.
- Small arms.
- Two road cuts.

## INCIDENTS: XUAN LOC to PHUOC LE (BARIA) on Routes 1 and 2.

### DATE
- 9 Jun 61
- 9 Jun 61
- 9 Jun 61
- 4 Jun 66
- 4 Jun 66
- 4 Jun 66
- 4 Jun 66
- 30 Jun 66
- 1 Jul 66
- 1 Jul 66
- 1 Jul 66
- 10 Aug 66
- 13 Aug 66
- 13 Aug 66
- 13 Aug 66
- 13 Aug 66
- 13 Aug 66
- 13 Aug 66
- 13 Aug 66
- 20 Aug 66
- 20 Aug 66
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- 20 Aug 66
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- 20 Aug 66

### COORDINATES
- TS 107838
- TS 107616
- TS 1075839
- TS 1075845
- TS 1075820
- TS 1075817
- TS 1075819
- TS 1075837
- TS 1075811
- TS 1075817
- TS 1075819
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- TS 1075811
- TS 1075819

### INCIDENT
- RF Mill personnel ambush - 6 KIA, 5 WIA.
- RF Mill personnel ambush - 3 KIA
- Small arms.
- AT mine found - destroyed in place over 600 yards long - not clear.
- Roadblock, dirt mounds, cuts.
- Road cut - passable.
- Small arms.
- 3 mines-1 APC-1 APC damaged.
- Road reported mined.
- Road cut.
- Road cut.
- Road cut.
- Road cut.
- Road cut.
- Road cut.
- Dirt mound across road, and just off road.
- One dirt mound each side.
- Crater in road.
- Dirt road block.
- Deep trench across road.
- Two trees across road.
- Crater in road.
- 2 brushwood roadblocks-100 yards apart.
- Barbed wire barrier.
- Mine, hit by truck.
- Mine, hit by truck.
- APC, hits mine.
- Jeep, hits mine.
- Numerous but passable cuts.
- APC destroyed by mine.
- Truck hit mine.
- ARVN APC damaged by mine.
- Command activated mine.
- UXO explosion, small arms.
- Mine.
- Small arms.
- Two road cuts.

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