SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Operation Attleboro, 2D Brigade 25th Infantry Division 1-25 November 1966

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for Operation Attleboro. Operation Attleboro was conducted by the 2D Brigade 25th Infantry Division during the period 1-25 November 1966. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
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The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D INFANTRY DIVISION AND US FORCES 96225

AVGOSF-4

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (RCS/414/32)

TO: Commanding General
2D Infantry Division
ATTN: AVGOSF
APD US FORCES 96225

1. Operation ATLETODCI (OPORD AO-66)

2. 2D Inf BN, 2D Inf Div.


4. 2D Inf BN, 2D Inf Div.

5. Reporting Officer: Colonel Thomas N. Tarpley.

6. Task Organization and Commanders

2/5 Oo (1CO VICTOR P. YAKO, Oo)

2/5 (1)

Helicopter

1/27 Inf (Capt. DAVENPORT, CO 2D Inf BN, 2D Inf Div.

1/27 Inf

Helicopter

2/27 Inf (1CO WILLIAM R. BARMAN, 1CO/2D Inf BN, 2D Inf Div.

2/27 Inf

Helicopter

2/14 Inf (1CO WILLIAM R. DAVIS, Oo)

2/14 Inf

Helicopter

2/26 Oo (1CO Richard W. CLARK, Oo)

2/26 (1)

Helicopter

1/9 Arty (1CO James H. CRIMAN, Oo)

1/9 Arty

2/9 Arty

2/9 Arty

2/9 Arty

Helicopter

ASSIGNED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
END DEC 2002, 10

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7. Supporting

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a. Air Support:

(1) General: Both tactical fighter bombers and heavy bombers were used to support the operation. A total of 209 preplanned missions were used throughout the area of operation, fire of these being flown by VNAF. Twenty-four immediate strikes were delivered with an average reaction time of 20 minutes after the requests were submitted. Preplanned, as well as immediate strikes, were accurate and effective.

(2) All airstrikes were controlled by FAC's assigned to the 25th Infantry Division.

(3) Results: 3 KIA (Ed), 62 KIA (Foes), 33 structures destroyed, 9 structures damaged, 12 bunkers destroyed, 4 secondary explosions, 7 secondary fires, 4 tunnels destroyed, 1 cache destroyed, 1 bridge damaged.

b. Army Aviation:

(1) Supporting Aviation Units

a. 29th Avn Bn
   1 Co
   2 Co

b. 11th Avn Bn
   116th Avn Co (Lt)
   147th Avn Co (Med)
   179th Avn Co (Med)

c. 12th Avn Bn
   129th Avn Co (Lt)

d. 53d Avn Bn
   117th Avn Co (Lt)

(2) Airtactical support included resupply, gunships, airmobile combat assaults, and airlift of artillery vehicles, and heavy equipment. 523 CH-47 sorties and 3,660 HH-53 sorties were flown in support of 2d Bde.

(3) The 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division, provided CH-20 helicopters for command and control, daily reconnaissance, artillery fire adjustment, and liaison.

c. Artillery Support:

(1) General: The extensive area of operation necessitated wide dispersal of firing batteries and frequent relocation of fire support bases to provide artillery support to the maneuver elements. Fire support bases were mutually supporting. An extensive II and I program was executed and a counter-mortar plan established for each fire support base.

(2) Organisation for Combat

(a) 1/3 Arty 08 2nd Bde
(b) 3d Arty, 2/3 Arty attached 1/3 Arty (15 Nov-23Nov)
(c) 3d Arty, 2/3 Arty attached 1/3 Arty (22 Nov-26Nov)
(d) 3d Arty, 3/3 Arty attached 1/3 Arty (5 Nov)

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(a) Battery A, 1st Bn, 8th Artillery moved to DAU TEMD (X299564) on 1 November with the mission to reinforce the fire of 3rd Bn, 62nd Artillery. On 6 November it became attached to the 3rd Bn, 62nd Artillery and on 5 November was further attached to the 1st Infantry Div Art firing in operation ATTLEBORO. Battery A rejoined the 1st Bn, 8th Art on 12 November when it was airlifted from DAU TEMD to TRAX 36 (X211576). When the 2nd Brigade operation commenced on 12 November, Battery A was positioned at (X227785) and remained in that location until 24 November when it was airlifted to TAY NINH. On 25 November, Battery A returned to base camp with the 1st Bn, 8th Artillery.

(b) Battery B, 1st Bn, 8th Artillery moved to BAC TAN (X227768) on 16 November to support the operation. That afternoon it was airlifted to (X260866) and remained in that location until 23 November 1966. On 25 November Battery B was airlifted to TAY NINH and was attached to the 3rd Bn, 62nd Artillery.

(c) Battery C, 1st Bn, 8th Artillery began the operation at (X2977780) located in Brigade Fire Support Base 1. It remained there until 27 November. Battery C was extracted to TAY NINH and returned to GY CHI base camp on 25 November 66.

(d) Battery A, 2nd Bn, 13th Artillery began operation ATTLEBORO under battalion control on 5 November 1966 when it moved to SEZ DA (X745253) from TAY NINH. At 02400 November it was attached to the 1st Inf Div Art. On 15 November Battery A was moved to Fire Support Base 2 (X26686) where it remained until 23 November when it was airlifted to TAY NINH base camp and returned to battalion control.

(e) Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery became attached to the 1st Bn, 8th Artillery on 12 November 1966 when it was extracted into Fire Support Base 1 (X227785). It was detached on 24 November when it was airlifted to SEZ DA.

(f) Battery B, 3rd Bn, 13th Artillery was attached to the battalion for operation ATTLEBORO on 5 November 1966. It was detached from the 1st Bn, 8th Art and attached to the 1st Infantry Div Art at 02400 November.

Artillery fire was used primarily for:

(a) Suppression of sniper fire
(b) Softening areas in front of advancing infantry elements.
(c) Firing false preparations to mislead the Viet Cong as to intended or possible landing zones.
(d) Locating units on the ground during the hours of darkness.
(e) H & I Fire.
(f) Landing zone preparation and suppressive fires during extractions.

Total missions and rounds fired by Type:

(a) Missions, 23 Registrations; 417 Support; 3,660 H & I; for a total of 4,305.
(b) Ammunition Expended: 23,520 HE; 655 WP; 9 ILL; 24,184 total rounds.
(c) Results, 39 KIA (RE), 174 KIA (POW).

Excl 1

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(a) Daily coordination meetings enabled NAC Air, Army Aviation, and artillery to deliver timely and effective fire support throughout the operation.

(b) Closely coordinated flight corridors allowed uninterrupted air, artillery, and armed helicopter fire during airborne operations.

(c) Fire support coordination during this operation was outstanding.

8. INTELLIGENCE

a. Enemy situation prior to the operation.

(1) The capture of large quantities of food supplies via (XTU34) by elements of the 196th Inf Bde during 30-31 Oct 1966 and subsequent heavy contact with VC forces of the 9th VC Division from 3-5 Nov 1966 initiated the pursuit operation by the 1st Inf Div, 2nd Bde, 29th Inf Div.

(2) For the first time in several months, the VC elected to defend against US forces and, results of fierce contact left an estimated 1,000 VC KIA in TAQ NIAH Province.

(3) Intelligence reports from captured and captured VC indicated that contact was made with battalions of the 277th, 278th, and 279th Regts of the 9th VC Division, as well as the 101st NVA Regt, and that the VC would probably withdraw to safe haven areas in WAR ZONE C.

(4) Intelligence sources reported the 271st Regt via (XT070), the 272nd Regt via (XT32777), the 273rd Regt via (XT328).

b. Enemy situation during operation.

(1) During the period 10-23 Nov, VC activity in the 2d Bde area were limited to sporadic fire and mine incidents. On only two occasions the VC indicated an attempt to defend by fire from bunkers and trenches.

(a) On 19 Nov, the 2/22 Inf engaged an estimated VC company via (XT2261), resulting in 4 VC KIA (SC), and the destruction of a tunnel entrance and capture of 1 rifle, a pair of binoculars, 300 lbs of rice and miscellaneous documents which were identified with a medical company of the 271st Regt.

(b) On 19 Nov, via (XT328), the 1/5 Inf engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 11 VC KIA (SC), the capture of 4 automatic weapons, and a 60mm mortar complete with ammunition.

(2) Several caches and base camps were located during the operation. Caches appeared to be unoccupied, and for the most part only sniper fire was received from these sites. Although no resistance was made from the area of the base camps, there was evidence of recent use, such as fresh food and vegetables in the immediate area, signs of recent repairs on bunkers, and the presence of many booby traps.

(a) Cache areas were found in the following locations:

- 11 Nov (XT270755) 1 ton rice, 14 hand grenades, 240 lbs canned foods.
- 12 Nov (XT08777) 30 tons rice in heavily booby trapped area.
- 22 Nov (XT270) 13 tons rice in shed 30 x 20 ft.

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(3) During the course of the operation, numerous documents captured were identified with the 70th Regt, 105th Inf, a medical and transportation company of the 271st Regt, 24th Division.

(a) Trafficability, terrain, and weather report.

See Annex A

9. Mission: 2d Bde conducted reconnaissance in force in northern TAI KHA Province commencing 100600 11 Nov 66 to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps.

10. Concept of operations: 2d Bde Task Force, with two Mech, and 3 Inf Bn's conducted search and destroy, airmobile, and ground assaults, ambush patrols and mechanized reconnaissance in force operations in WAR ZONE C to locate and destroy VC forces, base camps, and supply bases. The penetration of WAR ZONE C was accomplished by use of a series of fire support bases positioned along the axis of advance. These bases were established and "dusted up" as movement north progressed while operational bases were mutually supporting. Operations were characterized by airstrike combat assaults, mechanized thrusts and exclusive foot patrols. Maximum use was made of close air support, 3-52 strikes and artillery fires.

a. 10 Nov-14 Nov: The 2d Bde Task Force established an initial fire support base at the former FRENCH FORT (X32960) on 10 Nov. Extensive search and destroy and airmobile operations were conducted to establish contact with elements of the 9th VC Division.

b. 15-20 Nov: The 2d Bde Task Force conducted reconnaissance in force along axis RJ (X3277171) - B'UAM (X327960) - SJ (X3271960) to locate VC base camps, probe/assist enemy defenses, check crossing sites on the Cambodian border and keep VC forces off balance.

(1) Manoeuvre: Bde TF with two mechanized and three infantry battalions, conducted reconnaissance in force along TL 4 and RL 246. Initially 1/5 (61) secured fire support base FSB 2 (X32961) (13 Nov) for airdropping of 2/51 Inf and two arty bns. 1/5 (61) then conducted extensive reconnaissance operations in AO Red. Upon relief by 2/22 (40), 1/5 (61) secured FSB 3 (X33950) for airdropping of 2/51 Inf and two additional arty bns. Subsequent operations involved reconnaissance/SAD operations in AO White. 2/22 (40) conducted ops in AO Red.

(2) Fire Support Bases:

(a) FRENCH FORT (X32960)
(b) FSB 1 (X32777)
(c) FSB 2 (X32961)
(d) FSB 3 (X33950)
(e) FSB 6 (X21670)

(3) Fires: Maximum use of B-52 strikes, TAC Air, armed helicopter, and arty throughout the operation. Artillery and TAC Air_prep were used on FSBs, towns and key terrain features along routes of advance.

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11. ....... Div OPORD 31-66 were received OPORD Nov 66.

10 Nov 66

2d Bde FP was established at the FRENCH FORT (XT26669).

1st Bn (Mech), 3rd Inf

(Disclosure 3-Overlay for 10 Nov)

On announced movements at 0900 hrs to secure the Bde forward combat base at (XT25066). Local 540 operations were conducted in the base area. Co C located and destroyed four VC structures and three bunkers at (XT24865).

1st Bn, 27th Inf

En continued preparation for airlift to forward combat base commencing 110000 Nov 66.

2nd Bn, 14th Inf

En was airlifted to Bde forward combat base (XT25066). All elements closed 1623 hrs.

11 Nov 66

2nd Bde forward combat base is located at the FRENCH FORT.

1st Bn (Mech), 3rd Inf

En continued reconnaissance in force/540 ops along the road between (XT25066) and (XT25977), commencing at 0900 hrs. Co A located and destroyed 8 ex carts at 0919 hrs at (XT27472). One steel helmet, one poncho, fifteen rice bags, and five bales were destroyed by Co A (XT26973) at 1005 hrs. Two steel containers of acid (Type unknown) and miscellaneous clinching were located at 1200 hrs (XT25073). Five Union grenades, 300 lbs of rice, and 50 containers of acid were located in the same area, all material was destroyed with the exception of a sample of acid. Co A destroyed five bunkers at 1320 hrs (XT27072). At 1320 hrs, one ClaymoreMine was destroyed (XT27172).

Five Union grenades, one concrete bunker, and 360 lbs of canned goods were destroyed at 1320 hrs (XT27072). At 1320 hrs, Co C destroyed one bunker complex (XT26873). Co B had negative contact. Co A established a combat base at (XT25073). At the close of the reporting period Co B and Co C were returning to the Bde Fd combat base.

1st Bn, 27th Inf

En was airlifted to the FRENCH FORT commencing at 1000 hrs. All elements closed at 1200 hrs. Co B commenced 540 operations (XT25069) at 1320 hrs. The company returned at 1536 hrs with negative contact. En prepared defensive positions on the Bde forward combat base perimeter.

2nd Bn, 14th Inf

Br(-) conducted 540 operations between (XT25069) and (XT23568), and established a combat base at (XT23568) at 1320 hrs. Co A arrived at the Bde Fd combat base and continued in the defense.

12 Nov 66

2nd Bde forward combat base is located at the FRENCH FORT.

(6)

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1st En (New), 3rd Infantry

On arrival of an FZ (XT257766) for the 1st En (New), airlift at 1600 hrs.

The mission was to conduct reconnaissance operations commencing at 0900 hrs (XT257766).

By 1700 hrs, Co A located and destroyed 7 bunkers (XT257766) and 2 anti-tank guns (XT257766) at 1900 hrs. Co B destroyed 12 CRV tanks at 1930 hrs (XT257766). Co A returned to the Biz base at 1900 hrs. Co (L) established a full combat base at FP 1.

2nd En, 37th Infantry

On arrival of an FZ (XT257766) at 0900 hrs. Reconnaissance operations resulted in 20 tons of rice destroyed (XT257766). At 1600 hrs, a combat base was established at (XT257766).

3rd En, 37th Infantry

On arrival of an FZ (XT257766) at 0900 hrs. Defensive positions were prepared and preparations made for future operations.

4th En, 14th Infantry

(Enclosure 1, Overleaf for 11-12 Nov)

On arrival of an FZ (XT257766) at 0900 hrs. Co A located and destroyed 2-100 lb bombs (XT257766). A full combat base was established at (XT257766).

13 Nov 44

2nd Biz full combat base is located at FRENCH FORT.

5th En (New), 3rd Infantry

(Enclosure 1, Overleaf for 13 Nov)

On arrival of an FZ (XT257766) commencing 0900 hrs. At 0930 hrs Co B located a roadblock (XT257766) consisting of one large tree. During a search of the area, a Claymore Mine was detonated resulting in one KIA.

Three additional mines were located and destroyed by Co B (XT257766). Co A destroyed 5 VC structures (XT257766). An APC struck an AT mine at 1500 hrs resulting in extensive damage to the APC and 2 KIA.

6th En, 37th Infantry

On conducted "CUBICLE" operations from the Biz combat base (XT257766). At 1000 hrs Co B engaged 3 VC with 3A and arty fire resulting in 2 VC KIA (Posa). All elements were extracted and closed into 1/5 CO forward base (XT257766) at 1200 hrs.

7th En, 37th Infantry

On conducted patrols and defended sector of 2d Biz full combat base.

8th En, 14th Infantry

On conducted night combat patrols from Biz full combat base (XT257766). Extraction of all units to Biz combat base was completed at 1200 hrs.

16 Nov 44

2d Biz full combat base is located at FRENCH FORT.

9th En (New), 3rd Infantry

On conducted reconnaissance patrols of 2d Biz to (XT257766, XT257766, and XT257766). Co A located and destroyed 3-500 lbs of rice, 3 VC structures, and 1 anti-tank gun at 1100 hrs (XT257766). At 0930 hrs Co C located 300 lbs of 60mm mortar (XT257766), twenty tons of polished rice were destroyed at 1040 hrs (XT257766). An APC from the Front Platoon hit an AT Mine resulting in 2 KIA and extensive damage to vehicle.

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1st BN, 27th Infantry

En conducted "CLOVERLEAF" operations east and northeast of FSB 2. At 1600 hrs, Co A engaged 3 VC (XT257801) with 24 and arty resulting in 1 VC KIA (SC) and one SSG captured. All elements closed FSB 2 at 1700 hrs.

24 BN, 27th Infantry

En continued aggressive combat patrolling and defense of 2d Bde FSB combat base.

31 BN, 11th Infantry

En conducted night combat patrols from Bde FSB combat base.

31 BN (Mech), 222nd Infantry

Attached effective 141200 hrs. En completed movement from GO DA 10 to SOUL DA (XT335575) at 1601 hrs.

15 Nov 66

Bde Tac CP was airlifted to FSB 2.

1st BN (Mech), 3rd Infantry

(Inclusion 5-Overlay for 15 Nov)

En moved from FSB 1 to FSB 2 to secure 12 for Bde CP, A btry, 2/13 Arty, B btry, 1/6 Arty, and 2/27 Infantry.

1st BN, 27th Infantry

En remained at FSB 1 to continue reconnaissance patrolling.

24 BN, 27th Infantry

En was airlifted into FSB 2. All elements closed at 1320 hrs.

24 BN, 11th Infantry

En remained at former combat base (XT274665) to conduct reconnaissance patrolling and to secure btry 3/13 Arty.

24 BN (Mech), 224th Infantry

(Inclusion 6-Overlay for 15 Nov)

En conducted road march to FSB 1 commencing at 0745 hrs. At 1000 hrs Co C engaged 2 VC (XT257802) resulting in 1 VC KIA (SC), 1 rocket launcher, and 1 AT round captured. Co A (-), Recon Plt, and the cmd grp closed FSB 1 at 2100 hrs. Co B & Co C remained at (XT254781)

16 Nov 66

2d Bde CP is located at FSB 2. LRRP engaged 2 VC at 1640 hrs (XT274972) and (XT274903) resulting in 2 VC KIA (SC).

1st BN (Mech), 5th Infantry

En conducted reconnaissance patrolling 3,000 meters from FSB 2. At 0900 hrs, Co C destroyed 12 bunkers (XT200884). Recon platoon conducted reconnaissance for route traversability from FSB 2 along probable routes for future operations. All elements closed into FSB 2 at 1600 hrs.

1st BN, 27th Infantry

En conducted patrolling from FSB 1 and secured perimeter of 2/22 (O).

2nd BN, 27th Infantry

En conducted reconnaissance patrolling from FSB 2 with negative contact.

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2nd Bn, 14th Infantry

Br conducted patrolling and secured a btry 3/13 arty at (AT274665). At 1230 hrs Co B engaged an estimated VC squad resulting in 1 VC KIA (EC) (AT28968A).

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

All elements closed FSB 1 at 1225 hrs.

17 Nov 66

2nd lde CP is located at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

Br (-) conducted route reconnaissance operations northeast of FSB 2 to (AT279672) and (AT278652). Co B conducted local OP operations. 39 VC ID replacements were destroyed by Co C (AT285624). At 1246 hrs, recon plat destroyed 3 VC structures, 3 bunkers, and 1 large classroom (AT285697). At 1305 hrs, 4 KIA were sustained when the unit came under VC mortar fire (AT285697). All elements returned to FSB 2 at 1700 hrs.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

Br conducted reconnaissance patrolling vicinity of FSB 1 with negative contact.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

Br conducted reconnaissance patrolling west of FSB 2 to (AT265654) with negative contact.

2nd Bn, 14th Infantry

Br moved by convoy and airlift to Tay Ninh base camp to remain on standby alert for 2nd Bde.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

Br conducted reconnaissance in force ops to north and west of FSB 1 to (AT279777) and (AT267662). Co B conducted local patrol including a VC mortar attack resulting in 1 VC KIA (EC) and 3 US WIA (AT278508). Co B also found protective mask and 1 first aid packet in the area of contact. In combat for the night at (AT275625).

18 Nov 66

2nd Bde CP is located at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

(Inclusion for 18-22 Nov)

Br commenced an attach at 0700 hrs to seize FSB 3. Co C, at 0545 hrs, found and destroyed a classroom and trench system with fighting positions (AT282693). At 1020 hrs Co B engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (EC) and 3 US WIA (AT278508). Co B also found protective mask and 1 first aid packet in the area of contact. In combat for the night at (AT275625).

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

Br was airlifted to FSB 2 at 0900 hrs. All elements closed FSB 2 at 1140 hrs.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

Br defends FSB 2. Co A remained on a 30 min stand by alert and the Bn on a 1 hr alert.

2nd Bn, 14th Infantry

Br remained at Tay Ninh base camp on stand by alert for 2nd Bde.

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2nd Bn (Mech). 22nd Inf. ARV

Brn continued to conduct reconnaissance patrolling vicinity FSB 1. Co B engaged an estimated 15 VC (AT274963) at 1343 hrs resulting in 2 KIA.

19 Nov 66

2nd Bde CP remained at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech). 5th Infantry

(Inclusion 5-Overlay for 18-22 Nov)

The Bn conducted ops at 0755 hrs, moving with all elements toward obj Vc (AT274962). The move progressed without contact until 1311 hrs. At this time, Co A engaged a VC force of unknown size (AT274955) resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC). 2 BARs and 2 chicom assault rifles were captured. Co A sustained 3 KIA. At 1350 hrs Co A engaged 2 more VC (AT274956) resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 60mm mortar captured. At 1615 hrs the Bn CP was established at (AT274964). Co C captured 2 ICs (AT277964) at 1850 hrs.

2nd Bn. 14th Infantry

The Bn continued an hour alert at Tay Ninh base camp until 1626 hrs when the Bn was airlifted to FSB 1.

2nd Bn (Mech). 22nd Infantry

(Inclusion 5-Overlay for 19-20 Nov)

Brn commenced a search of (AT225815) with Co A and Co C at 0746 hrs. At 1045 hrs Co C located a booby trapped bunker-tunnel complex at (AT225814). At 1245 three KIA were sustained during a search of the tunnel when a booby trap was detonated. Another tunnel was located by Co C containing 15 KIA (AT225904). At 1200 hrs, Co C discovered a cache (AT225814) containing 50 amount hand grenades, one homemade rifle, 300 lbs of rice, one pair of binoculars, and miscellaneous documents. At 1215 Co A and Co C engaged an estimated VC platoon at (AT216601) and (AT223882). As the units deployed against the VC, six air strikes were directed upon the enemy. At 1555 hrs at (AT227813) Co A located 5 ICs and 2 VC bodies. At 1625 hrs Co A found 2 additional VC bodies (AT278613) and destroyed one VC structure. At 1730 hrs Co A located miscellaneous documents (AT278613). All units returned to the combat base camp established at (AT274962).

1st Bn. 27th Infantry

The Bn conducted patrols around FSB 2 at 1125 hrs, a patrol from Co C located and destroyed a bunker and 2 foxholes (AT238954). All elements closed into FSB 2 at 1555 hrs.

2nd Bn. 27th Infantry

The Bn conducted patrolling FSB 2. All patrols reported negative contact throughout the day.

20 Nov 66

2nd Bde CP remained at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech). 5th Infantry

(Inclusion 5-Overlay for 19-22 Nov)

Brn conducted reconnaissance in force to FSB 3 commencing at 0900 hrs. All elements closed FSB 3 by 1450 hrs.

1st Bn. 27th Infantry

Brn continued to defend FSB 2 and improve defensive positions. Brn was on 30 min stand by alert for 2/14 Inf and 2/22 (K) open.

2nd Bn. 27th Infantry

Brn continued to defend FSB 2. Patrol from Co C destroyed a VC structure and French radio transmitter (AT274879) at 1120 hrs.

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2nd Bn. 14th Infantry

Bn conducted an airmobile combat assault into (LT210830) commencing at 0945 hrs. Two VC were engaged with Arty at 1330 hrs resulting in 2 VC KIA (pos). At 1400 hrs Co B engaged an unknown number of VC (LT200812) resulting in 4 US WIA and 1 US KIA. An immediate search of a bunker was conducted resulting in 1 VC KIA (pos) and 2 VC KIA (pos). Extraction to FSB 1 was completed at 1805 hrs.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

(Inclusion 8-Overlay for 18-22 Nov)

Bn commenced an attack on obj (LT209830) at 0745 hrs. At 1700 hrs 3 VC were engaged by Co B resulting in 1 VC KIA (pos) and one automatic rifle captured. All elements returned to FSB 1.

21 Nov 66

2nd Bn CP is located at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

(Inclusion 9-Overlay for 18-22 Nov)

Bn conducted local security and reconnaissance operations via FSB 3 with Co A and Co C. Co B secured FSB 3. At 1318 hrs, Co A located a VC base camp, 2 AT mines, and 2 GRUs (LT299939). At 1430 hrs one APC was hit by an AT rd resulting in 2 WIA (LT299937). At 1539 hrs, Co C located 2 bunkers (LT399029) containing 9 chlorine hand grenades, 300 lbs of rice, 100 lbs of peas, and 100 lbs of salt. All elements closed base camp at 1735 hrs.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn conducted an airmobile combat assault into (LT275957) in response to a special intelligence report. Co A attacked obj (LT263946). Co C secured the BL. No contact was made and the Bn commenced extraction at 1531 hrs to FSB 2 closing at 1630 hrs.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn conducted local patrols via FSB 2 throughout the day with negative contact.

2nd Bn 14th Infantry

Bn conducted an airmobile assault into (LT275955) to secure an arty fire support base for 1/5 (M) opps. Btry C 1/5 Arty was moved into position at 0800 hrs. By 1500 hrs, the Arty Btry had been extracted back to FSB 3. At 1520 hrs, the Bn had completed extraction to FSB 2. By 1800 hrs, the Bn had returned to Tay Ninh base camp where it went on a one hour stand by alert.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

Bn conducted patrols via FSB 1, commencing at 1050 hrs, with negative contact.

22 Nov 66

2nd Bn CP is located at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

(Inclusion 9-Overlay for 18-22 Nov)

Bn commenced reconnaissance in force from FSB 3 southwest to (LT35971) at 0800 hrs. At 1045 hrs, Co C sustained 1 KIA from sniper fire (LT359718). Small arms and arty were returned with unknown results. At 1330 hrs, an IFO from Co A detonated an AT mine resulting in a WIA and moderate vehicle damage. Co C found 3 bunkers (LT359710) with wires leading to 1-60 lb bomb and 1 arty rd in a tree. All elements closed FSB 3 at 1625 hrs.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn secured FSB 2 and conducted security patrolling.

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2nd Bn. 27th Infantry

Bn conducted an air mobile assault into (XT368356) at 0845 hrs. Co C destroyed 900 lbs of rice (XT368965) at 1031 hrs. Recon plat patrolled south of FSB 2 with negative contact. All elements returned to FSB 2 prior to 1800 hrs.

2nd Bn. 11th Infantry

Bn remained on stand by alert at Tay Ninh base camp.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

Bn conducted reconnaissance patrolling wico FSB 1 commencing at 0628 hrs. At 0925 hrs Co A sustained 1 KIA and 5 WIA from 2 Claymore Mines. At 1433 hrs Co B engaged 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (2K) and 1 choc. WAC captured. All units closed into FSB 1 at 1715 hrs.

23 Nov 66

2nd Bde CP remained at FSB 2.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

(Inclusion 10-Overlay for 23 Nov)

At 0733 hrs Bn commenced a recon from FSB 3 to FSB 1. APC from Recon Flat hit an AT mine (XT229952) resulting in moderate damage. At 1505 hrs another Recon Flat APC hit an AT mine resulting in extensive vehicle damage. All elements closed into FSB 1 prior to 1830 hrs.

1st Bn. 27th Infantry

Bn conducted an air mobile combat assault (XT196867) at 0900 hrs. Negative contact was made and all elements were extracted to FSB 2 at 1245 hrs.

2nd Bn. 27th Infantry

Bn resumed FSB 2 and conducted reconnaissance patrolling in sector.

2nd Bn. 11th Infantry

Bn (-) conducted SDD opera (XT226624). Co C was prepositioned at FSB 1 as a reaction force. All elements were extracted back to Tay Ninh base camp at 1545 hrs.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

Bn conducted reconnaissance patrolling to southeast of FSB 1.

24 Nov 66

2nd Bde CP relocated at 196th Bde Base Camp at Tay Ninh.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

Bn moved from FSB 1 to FSB 0. At 0820 hrs 2 APC's hit AT mines (XT187668) and (XT187656) resulting in 3 KIA and 1 APC moderately damaged. At 0830 hrs Co C destroyed 1 AT mine (XT187656). All elements closed into FSB 0 prior to 1800 hrs.

1st Bn. 27th Infantry

Bn conducted an air mobile extraction from FSB 2, closing Tay Ninh base camp at 0905 hrs. Bn then moved by convoy to Cu Chi, closing at 0915 hrs.

2nd Bn. 27th Infantry

Bn commenced airmobile extraction from FSB 2 at 1245 hrs. Elements were

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first lifted to Tay Ninh and then to Cu Chi, closing at 1742 hrs.

2nd Bn, 14th Infantry

Bn moved to Cu Chi by convoy, closing at 1505 hrs.

2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Infantry

Bn returned to Div control at 0800 hrs.

1st Bn (Mech), 5th Infantry

Bn conducted reconnaissance patrolling via FSB 0, and south to (XT1669). At 1425 hrs, an APC from the heavy mortar platoon hit an AT mine resulting in 3 WIA and extensive vehicle damage. The Bn established a night combat base at (XT146687).

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn assumed responsibility for Cu Chi base camp sector at 1200 hrs.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

Bn assumed responsibility for Cu Chi base camp sector at 1200 hrs.

OPERATION ATLEBORDO TERMINATED

252400 NOVEMBER 66

(Reference Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 62321, II, III, IV for all overlays included in this report.)

(13)
### 12. Results

#### a. Enemy Loses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Weight</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VQ KIA (RC)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>350 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VQ KIA (FOSS)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>33 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VQG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>240 lbs</td>
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<tr>
<td>VQS</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>575 tons</td>
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<td>Small Arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUTS</td>
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<td>100 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbers</td>
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<td>100 lbs</td>
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<tr>
<td>AT Mines</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Claymore</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rifle Grenades</td>
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#### b. Friendly Loses

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dst</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC M 113</td>
<td>COMBAT LOSS 4</td>
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### 13. Administrative Matters

#### a. Supply: All classes of supply were available in sufficient quantities to meet operational demands. Elements of the 1st Logistic Command provided supplies from their facilities at Tay Ninh. The Division Support Command provided a complete staff to meet all logistic requirements of the 2nd Bde. task force.

#### b. Maintenance: Co. C, 725th Maintenance En. provided direct support during the operation. No unusual problems were encountered.

#### c. Services: Laundry service provided by quartermaster facilities was inadequate. Contractual services were provided but were arranged for too late in the operation to be used.

#### d. Transportation: Convoys from Co Chi did not arrive daily in sufficient time to affect resupply of ice and mail to forward units. Although scheduled to arrive at approximately 1900 hours daily, arrival times were later than 2100 and delivery of these items could not be made until the following day.

(2) Troop haul requirements for infantry battalions were met by Support Command upon request.

(3) With the exception of 2 convoys to the Brigade Forward Base on 13 and 14 Nov all resupply was accomplished by helicopter. A total of 1,239 HU 1D sorties and 26 CH 47 sorties were flown in resupplying forward elements of the Brigade during the period 11 thru 24 Nov 66.

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Greater use of chain saws was made to include cutting mask clearance for arty and mortars, bunker material, clearing areas for headquarters and indirect fire weapons, and cutting wood for corduroying roads. For planning purposes, 8 saws/maneuver battalion are required.

15. Commander's Analysis.

a. Alternate LZs must be prepared during the conduct of an airmobile assault. This action provides a certain amount of deception and also insures adequate preparation of alternate LZs if the primary LZ is found to be "Hot".

b. The judicious use of tac air and arty during airmobile combat assaults is the key to the rapid establishment of an infantry force in a combat posture. This support must continue during the actual landings and extraction. Sufficient time must be allocated for detailed coordination between all support agencies involved, i.e., the inf unit making the assault, tac air, army air, and arty.

c. As maneuver battalions are extended from forward supply bases to areas not serviced by roads, the resulting turn around time for helicopter resupply quickly becomes unacceptable. Planning must include positioning of supply bases on usable roads as far forward as possible.

d. Engineer support for Mech elements operating in WAR ZONE C is absolutely essential. Aerial recon does not give an accurate picture of soil trafficability. Many streams require preparation (corduroying) before crossings can be made. Chain saw teams are a necessity and provisions must be made for immediate replacement when saws become non-operational.
a. Mined or disabled vehicles present a major problem to Mech movement. It can be expected that there will be an increased mining in the future operations in WAR ZONE C. Planning must include provisions for security, repair, evacuation and destruction.

b. Mechanized infantry can operate in most heavily wooded areas in WAR ZONE C to a limited degree. Capabilities include provisions for rapid movement to secure forward bases, probing, and reinforcement.

c. All helicopter support must be controlled by the Task Force headquarters. This system permits rapid change of priorities as the tactical situation develops. Planning must include adequate areas in the rear for the brigade trains to include a loading area for helicopters.

d. Planning for extended operations must include provisions for direct exchange of Class III items.

e. Major component replacement for disabled mech vehicles is essential. Planning must include provisions for immediate replacement and maintenance assistance from division forward support bases.

f. It appears that the VC do not desire to engage large US Forces in WAR ZONE C.


Where possible, aviation support units should station liaison officers at the brigade trains and the brigade tactical command post. These representatives greatly assist in the initial planning of an operation and provide the commander with detailed information concerning the missions as they are performed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

WHIT L. COATS
Maj. INFANTRY
Adjutant

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(16)
1. General. The terrain exploited by the 2d Bde Task Force in WAR ZONE C was characterized by dense jungle and open marsh marshlands. Elevation ranged between 10 meters (XT2260) and 80 meters (XT1173), with the general average of 35-40 meters in the area of operations. Relatively little land was cultivated; the majority of agricultural efforts were small or individual garden plots.

2. Roads and Trails. Roads through the area reflect lack of care and maintenance. Portions of the major roads have been cratered by bombing and mines and subsequent erosion has occurred. Fallen trees in a few areas have blocked roadways making detours necessary. The major road network from (XT284619) to KATUM (XT333998) to BO TUC (XT380857) were subjected to thorough air reconnaissance. Road use of approximately 46 kilometers proved it to be adequate for tracked vehicles. Major obstacles were found at (XT327893) where steep banks had to be levelled by demolitions to accommodate crossing. Even after levelling had been accomplished, crossing was still reported to be difficult. At (XT325886), craters and muddy conditions made trafficability extremely difficult.

Trails and footpaths were observed throughout the entire area. They appeared to occur at random, leading into dense jungles. (Appendix 1). Due to the vegetation and the limits of advance, none of the trails could be explored completely. LRRP reported that two trails (XT213079) were blocked at irregular intervals by cut trees and foliage. The purpose of these blocks is unknown. The LRRP also reported seeing several observation platforms built high in the trees at irregular intervals. The patrol was unable to pinpoint the locations of these platforms.

3. Bunkers and Fortifications. In the area of operations, elements of the 2d Bde Task Force encountered relatively few bunkers and trenches as compared with other areas, i.e., the RO BO WOODS, the BOI LOI WOODS, other known VC strongholds. Bunkers which were manned and defended by fire were located at (XT227873) and (XT227913). Other bunkers, as depicted in Appendix 1, were deserted, although most of them showed signs of recent repair.

4. Base Camps. There were nine base camp sites reported in the entire area of operations. For the most part, the typical base camp found in WAR ZONE C consisted of several protective bunkers, a few small huts, a small cache of rice, garden plots, and evidence of recent use. Base areas found during the operation are depicted in Appendix 1, and are listed below:

(XT303777) Heavily booby trapped area with 20 tons of rice
(XT243800) Campsite for estimated 100 VC
(XT278828) Campsite apparently used by 25-30 VC
(XT263757) Campsite with 2500 lbs rice and a rice milling machine
(XT344919) A series of cultivated garden plots and small huts
(XT35896) Campsite with shower, latrine, and recently repaired bunkers
(XT224810) Five huts and extensive tunnel system; defended briefly by VC
Cross Country Trafficability. The axis of advance of the mechanised infantry battalions, the 1/5(M) and the 2/22(M), are depicted in Appendix 2.

Although there were nine incidents experienced, the greatest hazards were caused by the terrain, specifically, jungle and lowland marshes. Generally, movement across country was slow, with the daily average advance of 10 kilometers. Lead elements of the mechanised infantry normally required an average of one hour to penetrate 300-500 meters of dense jungle. Difficulties for trail elements were encountered in low spots; at elevations of less than 35 meters the earth cut by lead elements became too muddy and consequently impassable to trail elements, necessitating the cutting of new routes through the jungle.

Marshlands provided the greatest single obstacle to progress of tracked vehicles. Soft mud predominant in open areas at elevations of 35 meters or less continually bogged down vehicles.

Landing Zones. Areas suitable for helicopter landing zones are depicted in Appendix 3.

Weather. Weather facilities were available to the 2d Bde during the period 18-23 Nov. During this period, the following data were compiled:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average maximum temperature</td>
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<tr>
<td>Absolute maximum temperature</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average minimum temperature</td>
<td>74</td>
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<td>Absolute minimum temperature</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total precipitation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum precipitation</td>
<td>32 inches</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Except for occasional early morning fog and evening showers, weather did not materially affect air or ground operations.
Legend

--- Trail wide enough for wheeled vehicles

----------- Trail wide enough for experts

C Base camp
A Bunker
U Underground bunker
T Trench
S Sniper position
P Pochole

Appendix 1 to Annex A
(Part 1)

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Legend
② Impassable
⑦ Cratered and extremely muddy
⑧ Small pond; No crossing difficulty
Legend

1. Log log bridge installed
2. Water level two feet; no difficulty crossing
3. Detour to north was made without difficulty
4. Shallow pond; no difficulty
5. Bridge required for crossing
6. Steep banks necessitated leveling to permit crossing

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Appendix 2 to Annex A
(Foot 4)
Inclosure 1 - Area of Operations Overlay (Part 1)

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Inclousure 7 - Operations Overlay 17 Nov

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Inclusion S - Operations Overlay 19-20 Nov
Incloure 9 - Operations Overlay 18-22 Nov
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Inclusion 10 - Operations Overlay 23 Nov

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