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| AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980 |

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HEADQUARTERS
5D SQUADRON 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257

26 October 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: NAVJ 3-32)

THRU: Commanding Officer
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
APO San Francisco 96257

TO: Commander
U.S. Military Assistance Command, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96257

References:

a. OPORD 06-66 (Operation HICKORY), Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1 Oct 66.
b. OPORD 03-66 (Operation HICKORY), Headquarters, 3-11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 2 Oct 66.

c. NAMES OR IDENTIFICATION AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION

1. Operation HICKORY
2. Search and Destroy/Route and Area Reconnaissance.

3. DATES OF OPERATION. 070518 October through 152130 October 1966.

4. LOCATION. NECON TRACH District in area designated by Annex B (OPORD Overlay). References: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheets, 6330 I, 6330 II (Series L7014).

5. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

6. REPORTING OFFICER. LTC Palmer A. Peterson.

7. TASK ORGANIZATION. See Annex A.

8. SUPPORTING FORCES.

a. Air Support
   (1) Preplanned air strikes: None.
   (2) Immediate air strikes: One immediate air strike was requested on known VC positions Vic 75077879, but request was refused by the District Chief to proximity of populated area. The objective was a clearly defined hill which could have been identified and easily hit by a low performance aircraft.

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ: 3-52) (Cont)

The FAC was in the air over the Area of Operation by 0800 hours each day of operation.

b. Squadron and Regimental Aviation.
   (1) A total of 102 hours of air time was recorded by helicopter pilots flying in support of the ground action. Of that, 49 hours were flown in UH-1B aircraft and 52 hours flown in OH-23G aircraft.
   (2) A total of 5 strikes from light fire teams were flown. Specific results of the strikes could not be determined, but they contributed in at least two cases in neutralizing VC fire. The following ordnance was expended:
      2.75 Inch Rockets - 140 rds.
      7.62 Linked - 12,000 rds.
   (3) Helicopter support was also used for Forward Observer missions (total of 3 hours) and for aerial resupply. The major item resupplied by air was gasoline. Six-Hundred gallons were brought in by helicopter in barrels and five gallon containers. Other items such as repair parts, radio batteries, artillery ammunition (60 rounds), and mortar ammunition (35 rounds) were also flown in by helicopter.

c. Artillery.
   (1) General: Several artillery units were available to provide fire support for the operation as indicated below. However, the major artillery fires utilized came from the Squadron's Howitzer Battery.
   (2) Units:
      (a) A/O-27 Artillery (8"/175mm) (OS): Provided on call fires in objective area. Fires not employed.
      (b) 1/8/115 Artillery (105mm) (ARVN) (OS): Provided on call fires in objective area. Fires not employed.
      (c) Howitzer Battery 1-11 Armored Cavalry Regiment (GS Rein): provided on call fires in objective area. Fired effective illumination when command post came under attack on 080045 October 1966.
      (d) Howitzer Battery 3-11 Armored Cavalry Regiment (ATCIO): Fired a total of 957 rounds of ammunition during the operation, 637 HE, 146 Illumination, and 174 TP. The battery was used primarily to fire H & I fires on suspected or possible VC base camps, supply pts, etc; to provide illumination for the fighting units; and to give close support, protective, and destructive fire as required. In addition, the location of the Howitzer Battery in the CP complex added greatly to CP security.

Results:
   1. H & I Fires: One secondary explosion resulted from a mission fired on coord TS105860 on the evening of 14 Oct. On this mission HE was fired with fuse delay which would have a mine effect and could explode ordnance either on the surface of the ground or buried slightly beneath. The explosion lasted for 10 seconds. Other results were indeterminate.
   2. Illumination: Illumination missions were fired nightly during the operation. Diamond formations were fired with great success using four howitzers; pentagon formations with five howitzers were also very effective (the sixth howitzer was disabled). The battery found that it was possible to illuminate its own position by using the following data: Chg 1, Fuze time, Time 7.3 - 7.5 sec, GE 3150 - 3350M. In adjusting this fire, it was found to be more effective to give lateral shifts in terms of number ofturns of the handwheel rather than in terms of deflection changes. Also, illumination was used to light the way for Armored Vehicles moving through the jungle and for protection of isolated elements.
3. Close-Support: Close support fire was found to be very effective; however, there were many occasions when it could not be utilized due to the proximity of villages that had been designated as no-fire areas by the District Chief. Air observation was practically the only means for registering or adjusting fire due to the heavily vegetated terrain. Close support was utilized within 100 meters of troops without inflicting any U.S. casualties. The Squadron's Battery responded with exceptional speed, accuracy, and care when notified that close support was required. Despite the nearness of heavily populated areas, only one civilian casualty was reported as result of artillery fire.

4. Ammunition: Low ASR of illumination rounds was the only deficiency in ammunition resupply; however, this had no affect on missions.

5. Surveys: Accurate data was difficult to obtain. The azimuth gyroscope was not used because of the constant vibrations caused by the helicopter traffic in and out of the OP. Sun shots were not particularly useful, as the movement of the sun hour the equator is not conducive to good survey.

6. Mortar Battery (Provisional) 3-11 Arm Cav Regt (ATCCH):

For this operation fires of the Troop mortar sections were under control of the Squadron FSCC, which was headed by the How Btry Commander. In addition, when the situation and terrain made it advantageous, at least two troop mortar sections were combined into one battery known as Mortar Battery (Provisional). More details on the functioning, advantages, and disadvantages of this system are discussed in paragraph 14c under "Special Equipment and Techniques". During the operation the provisional battery fired 371 rounds of ammunition: 9 Illumination, 28 WP, and 252 HE. The battery was particularly effective in illuminating the OP area, isolated positions, etc. It fired several H & I missions but had few missions in a close support role.

6. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to Operation: Information on the enemy and the area of operations was obtained from the following sources. US advisors from the LONG THI NH and NHOW TRAC sub-sectors and the BIEN HQ Sector, HQ III Corps (ARVN), Regional Force units in the area to include Recondo Teams, and current INTRINS and area studies from II Field Force V. Detailed information on routes, bridges, etc., was furnished by the 517th Engr. Bn. The information gathered indicated that the 3rd Sqn, 11th Arm Cav Regt would be opposed by one local force company, consisting of four identified local force platoons and by several other guerrilla platoons and squads. Information from Recondo Teams further indicated that the main VC strong points were in the PHU HOI area (YS080878) which led the Squadron to concentrate its power in that sector of the Area of Operations. The VC would also have a reinforcing capability from the 4th Bn, 165 A Regt (Capital District) loco Vic YS9895 and the 0240 local force company loco Vic Y-1789. The VC further reported that the VC controlled LZ Route 23 from Vic YS10985 to YS04987 and Provincial Route 519 from Vic YS14890 to YS08798. The VC control all villages between the coordinates of the routes mentioned above. In addition intelligence indicated a major VC supply route from the area to the north of the Area of Operation, then south along the routes listed above, and then east to the BAT DIKH area Vic YS3086. VC activity in the past 30 days had been limited to harassing attacks on small outposts. Tunnelling and building of trenches and fortifications had been reported increasing in the area, with the brunt of the work being levied on the non-combatants in the area.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-52) (Cont)

Reports of enemy capabilities did not list any mortar or AT strength. It was
surmised that the enemy would attempt to flee the area or go into hiding when
the Squadron and RF forces arrived.

b. Value of Prior Intelligence: The intelligence prior to the opera-
tion was both accurate and valuable. The following describes what was generally
encountered. The VC encountered in the Area of Operations operated primarily in
squad size units. The main weapons employed by the VC were rifles, AN, grenades,
claymore mines, and booby traps. In no case did the VC employ mortars, AT weapons,
or large command detonated mines. The VC employment of the claymore mine was
quite effective and inflicted casualties on some key personnel. The VC engaged
US forces only from ambush, secure sniper positions, or when surprised. In all
cases, the VC chose the tactical withdrawal in preference to staying and fighting.
His favorite technique was to plan his escape into a populated area where fires
could not be placed. In no case did the VC intentionally engage (other than by
sniper fire or claymore mines) a mounted armored force. He rather chose to attack
dismounted patrols, CP's and OP's. As the accuracy of the previous intelligence
became apparent, the Squadron was able to adjust its tactics to moving more
rapidly and into some heavily wooded terrain. With the possibility of a major
ambush somewhat remote, the Squadron was able to risk moving through the close
terrain. The report of the roads in the area being part of a major supply route
proved to be quite accurate when a patrol located over 200 tons of rice in the
village of BEN SAN (Y3115000).

9. MISSION: TF 3-11 Armored Cavalry conducts search and destroy Ops Vic
PHU HOI (Y5006000) and secure 5176. Engineer area and route recon teams 070518
October 1966.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Maneuver: Opn conducted in 3 phases:

(1) Phase I (4-6 Oct): TP employs RVN Recondo Trns in AO to
isolate enemy activity.

(2) Phase II (7-Oct):

a. TP conducts night-march from Staging Area to PHUC
THIBN (Y512867).

b. Upon release at EP, TP deploys to seal areas DAKOTA
and VIRGINIA from South. Tim N closes ROUTE RED to PHU HOI. RF-units attack from
North to secure PHU HOI. Tim D initiates route and area recon of ROUTE GOLD and
areas J 03.

(3) Phase III:

(a) Upon completion of Phase II, TP secures areas BRAVO,
YANKEE, and TANGO in that order.

(b) Tn O conducts area recon as areas are secured. One Tn secures Tn O route recon element during route recon of ROUTE RED and GREY.

Fires:
(1) Artillery and TAC Air: Pri init Tn L.
(2) Lt fire Tn: Pri init Tn N. Seal mount North from area TEXAS.

(3) No fires auth in restricted areas unless in contact with enemy.

a. Tasks:
(1) Tn I: Seal sector of area DAKOTA. Prep to atk West to link-up with Tn J. Spt Tn L on order.
(2) Tn K: Seal South and West sector of area VIRGINIA. Prep to link-up with Tn N. Spt Tn L on order.
(3) Tn L: Seal West then South of area DAKOTA. Link-up with Tn N. Prop to spt Tn K, I or M on order.
(4) Tn M: Clear ROUTE RED to PHU HOI. Prep to clear ROUTE RED to YOH34872.
(5) Tn O: On order initiated route and area recon of ROUTE GOLD and areas J. Conducts area recons as areas are secured.
(6) How Btry:
(7) Lyn Soc:
(a) Phase I: Spt drop and pick up of RVN Recondo Tns.
(b) Phase II: Seal mount North from area TEXAS.
(c) Phase III: CS.

b. Coordinating Instructions:
(1) No recon flights of AC after 021200 Oct 66.
(2) Troops restricted to staging area 03 and 6 Oct 66.
(4) Route of March: ROUTE GREEN.
(5) Rate of March: 40 KPH (25 MPH).
(7) RF: YOH8288.
(8) National Police on employed on all search missions in aug-

lated areas.
(9) Crews for ACAV's that have not been processed remain in staging area. Upon arrival of vehicles, ACAV's processed and moved to LO on order.
(10) Any questions on identification or location of RF/FP Forces refer to TOC (just prior to the operation all RF Forces secured a piece of white cloth on breast pocket).

11. EXECUTION.
General: Headquarters 11th Arm Cav Regt issued OPORD 06-66 (Operation HICKORY) on 2 Oct 66 assigning 3-11 Arm Cav Regt the mission as stated in para-

graph 9 above. 3-11 Arm Cav Regt then issued OPORD 03-66 (Operation HICKORY) on 3 Oct 66 and conducted a briefing on 4 Oct 66 for all US Forces to be in-

volved. On 5 Oct 66 the 3-11 Arm Cav Regt briefed the RF Commanders and the US advisors who would be involved in the operation.

At the time of the operation the units of the 3-11 Arm Cav Regt were not completely equipped, 22 ACAV's (M113 Modified) not having arrived in country. This being the first operation, extensive time had been spent in prior weeks preparing equipment, testing and servicing of weapons, and conducting patrols outside the perimeter. During the operation, the Squadron continued to man its share of the Regimental perimeter in the staging area at LONG BINH.

The rear detachment was commanded by the 81 and consisted of 270 personnel from the Squadron. The figure 270 consisted of 55 non from Troops I, K, and L, and 105 non which came primarily from Bn. troop with small numbers from Co M and How Btry. The availability of personnel in the line units was due to the non-arrival of approximately 30 NCW's. It is significant that the first casualty (One KIJI sniper fire) in the Staging Area occurred during the Squadron’s absence. This may be due to the curtailment of active patrolling outside the perimeter which gave VC snipers greater opportunity to approach the perimeter. It also points out the necessity to train personnel who normally perform administrative work to conduct patrols. Such a program will be initiated during the later part of October 1966.

6 October 1966

Phase I of the operation was initiated by dropping three ARVN Recondo teams of four non each in the AO. Purpose was to gain definitive intelligence on the enemy before moving into the area and to check out a report that 1000 VC had moved from the KIJI-DICH area to NHON TRAC District.

TM 1. Debarked helicopter at YS095867 and moved to YS106857 where they heard voices (40 VC). The TN then moved West and saw 3 VC guards at YS095857. TM continued West to a rubber plantation where it spotted 3 more VC guards at YS087663. TN moved on to YS081667 where it spotted 100 armed VC taking shelter in the people's houses at YS000653. TN then started East when it received radio and rifle fire from (1) VC patrol at YS089667. TN was picked up by helicopter at YS105670 at 1800 hrs.

TM 2. After landing at YS144900, the TN moved NW where it was chased by (1) VC squad at YS136665. TN ran North and spotted 60 VC armed mostly with M-1 rifles relaxing at 139834. The TN moved West where it met one (1) VC patrol at YS138824. Due to heavy VC fire the Recondo Team had to withdraw to PHOUC THO outpost (YS142828) at 1230 hrs.

TM 3. After landing at YS144900, the TN moved South where it encountered (4) VC who gave the alarm at YS142790. TN then moved on and crossed a road at AP BL TRUNG. There the TN received heavy fire from three machine guns and one (1) mortar (60 VC sited) from a VC company via YS142780. TN withdrew and then moved West to YS123786. At this point the TN spotted (6) VC coming from YS121785; TN then took shelter at a forest hedge via YS107792. There the TN spotted (3) VC (1 woman) moving West along the road. The TN was forced to open fire and killed 1 VC and wounded another. TN moved on and encountered (1) VC patrol at YS095787. TN received heavy fire from this patrol. TN then withdrew into VONG C.M outpost (YS088795) at 1300 hrs the same day.

Results: From the Recondo TN's observations it was determined that there was at least (1) VC Battalion in the PHOUC-TRU, PHOUC IA areas, and (2) VC Companies in the PHU 311 area. Although the VC were not encountered in this strength during the operation, it was apparent that there had been a large size VC force in the area shortly before the operation was executed.

7 October 1966:

At 0510 hrs the Squadron moved from the staging area to begin
 execution of Phase II of the operation, which envisioned a sealing of the areas
 indicated in the concept. The plan was not to physically occupy all the terrain
 along the area boundaries, but to seal the areas by use of strong points and
 patrols while a search and destroy operation was being conducted by Tn N in
 PHU HOI.

Tn L led the march and after passing the RC experienced some problems
 in finding its turn off. Although the route was clearly apparent from the air,
 the point of entrance into the route was grown over with vegetation and not
 visible on the ground. To correct the situation smoke was thrown from a
 helicopter to direct Tn L to the point where it should turn. With tanks in
 the lead Tn L moved through the jungle creating a road as it moved.

Once Tn L was redirected, the Squadron sealed the areas as planned
 at 0715 hrs. Air observers at about 0900 hrs reported large numbers of personnel
 moving S/4 from the direction of the sealed area. Some of those personnel
 were later reported as woodcutters; however, there is no doubt that many of
 them were VC who had escaped the trap. A request to engage was directed to
 the District Chief, but it was refused.

While the Squadron teams were marching to the RC, Tn N (two RF companies)
 moved by assault boats from C.I.T. L.I (YS950995) up the DONG HAI River and down
 a tributary where it disembarked at YS075893. Tn N as well as the Squadron
 Tn's from the South encountered sporadic sniper fire while moving into the area.
 While moving across the rice paddies toward PHU HOI, the RF companies had
 to stay on the paddy dikes. The paddy itself was bottomless an fast movement
 was impossible. This seemed to be true of the rice paddies on river banks.
 No enemy was reported escaping to the North by the Lt fire team flying over
 the area. Tn N occupied a portion of the PHU HOI area at 0932 hrs, but due
 to a misunderstanding of instructions did not conduct any sizeable search and
 destroy missions the rest of the day. Throughout the rest of the day Squadron
 Tn's attempted to constrain their sectors toward PHU HOI. Tn K and Tn I
 found unoccupied tunnel complexes which they destroyed with demolitions.

Tn M: Tn M was engaged in a route clearance mission Via BEN GJM
 (YS099593) and encountered a section of road which was nothing but quagmire.
 Since there was no by-pass available, Tn M attempted to repair the route by
 using tank dozers to fill an approach and subsequently use an AVL3 to gap the
 worst part. This failed when the AVL3 (Modified M48C1 chassis) continually
 got stuck in the mud. It is felt that an AVL3 with a more powerful chassis
 (M60) could have successfully brought the bridge into place. At 1455, elements
 of Tn M requested a dustoff for one man wounded by a sniper. The wounded man
 had been conducting mine sweeping operations near PHU HOI. Dustoff arrived
 20 minutes later. At 2335 hours the Squadron CP came under attack by the VC
 who emplaced command detonated claymore mines around the CP. The best estimate
 of what occurred is that approximately four VC, infiltrated to within fifty
 meters of the CP perimeter (Y3114923) and emplaced four claymore mines 25 meters
 apart. The intended direction of the blast would carry fragments between
 the outer perimeter elements into the command and control vehicles. However,
 one VC tripped a flare illuminating his position and alerting the perimeter.
 The VC fired one claymore after being brought under fire by the perimeter.
 One US casualty was sustained from the blast of the claymore, while one VC
 was believed hit by perimeter fire. The following morning revealed three
 remaining claymores in position but incomplete for detonation.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: M.LCV 3-32) (Cont)

Major problems encountered during the first day were difficulties in land navigation; lack of adequate road nets in the area; and impassable terrain. Some of the problems with the terrain resulted from inexperience with the area and inability to adequately judge the trafficability of the ground. In soft terrain, drivers must be cautioned not to follow in the tracks of another vehicle. Also, many tanks got stuck because they were sent into areas which could not support a tank. Problems also arose when Tn N failed to understand that it was to push South into area TEXAS. Occasional thunder showers during the day added to the problems of extracting mirot vehicles. The Squadron began making its own roads with bulldozers, tanks and AGLV's to increase its access to certain areas.

At 2200 hrs FRM C 9-66 was issued giving missions for the following day.
8 October 1966:

No major change to task organization. Tn’s move to execute FRAG ‘O’ 9-66 which ordered continuation of search and destroy operations in sector, recons of areas Y, Z and J and ROUTE GOLD. Tn I supported the recon of area Y by searching the area with elements from one platoon. Tn K supported the recon of ROUTE GOLD and areas Z & J by detaching one platoon to Tn O. The rest of Tn K blockaded in sector. Tn O moved to recon ROUTE GOLD and areas Z & J. Tn N began a search of area TEXAS. Tn M assumed security of portions of area VIRGIL and blocked in sector. The light fire team conducted air recon missions Vio YS0686 - YS1479 - YS1486 - YS0680. Howitzer Battery/CP moved location to YS125895.

The missions assigned for the day were all successfully completed. In general the area recons were accomplished by securing the area and then flying in the Engineer elements. At this time the necessary photographs, soil samples, and probe readings were made by the Engineers for further analysis later on.

No major enemy activity was encountered throughout the day. Tn N encountered sniper fire at 1050 hrs while searching houses in area TEXAS. Fire came from a small hill Vio YS078878. When fire continued a lt fire team was called, and it saturated the hill with rockets and MG fire. Results of the helicopter attack could not be determined due to the dense foliage on the hill. The RF companies, in the meantime, had been ordered by their commander to stay where they were. Finally in the afternoon, the Squadron Liaison Officer with the two companies was able to get an order from the RF command for them to attack the hill which was probably heavily entrenched and booby trapped. The order was obtained through the other liaison Officer who was with the RF CP group and the US advisors. The problem here was getting the RF forces to execute our missions as quickly as possible; however, there is no pat solution except to be completely familiar with their command structure. The attack was made by moving generally NW to YS072878 and then following the road to the hill. When the two RF companies reached coord YS077879 they were taken under AW fire. The fire was returned, the VC fled (2 or 3), and the RF forces left the area. The hill was never attacked, and probably still contains many VC positions.

Squadron teams encountered sniper fire and continued to find tunnels and booby traps. Particular discomfort during the day was the mining of 3 M48’s, 1 VNB, and several ACAV’s mostly in Tn I. This occurred as Tn I was attempting to link up with blocking positions established by Tn M in Vio of BEN CEN. Tn I had successfully moved through dense jungle terrain never before traversed, winding NW down a ridge line from YS091861 to YS090886 where it joined LIL 25. However, after moving a short distance last along this route it encountered a thin crusted, bottomless section of road at YS096990 which engulfed the 3 M48’s, the M88 and several ACAV’s.

CIVIL AFFAIRS: One M48/1 team was flown into PHU NOI during the day and treated 200 people for various illnesses. The people had never experienced this service and seemed quite grateful.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVQ: NAGY/N) (Cont)

2 October 1966

Squadron issued FRAG 0 10-66 which ordered continuation of search and destroy operations in the PHU HOI area and blocking of VC escape routes to the South. Instructions in the FRAG 0 specifically mentioned using the National Policemen in the questioning of VC suspects. There were two major changes to the task organization. The RF CO's reverted to RF control 0900 October 66 for Opn Vio YS082917 for suspected VC locations. Tm K detached one platoon for convoy escort and CP security. The CP was not moved. Resupply was to be effected at 1030 hours at YS110895. Units would move in total to the resupply point as ordered, while an adjacent Tm would screen their sector. Assigned tasks for the day were accomplished.

There was one major enemy encounter during the day's operation which occurred at the resupply point. Located near the supply point (Vio of BEN CAM) was the Provisional Mortar Battery consisting of Tm I and Tm L's mortars. While vehicles were refueling in the area, the VC apparently were laying an ambush. At 1155 hours PFC PIERCE from I Troop moved toward an OP located outside the perimeter. This may have caused the VC to believe they were about to be detected, so they opened fire. PFC PIERCE was shot in the chest and later died of his wounds. The tanks attached to I Troop immediately returned the fire with cannonister volleys. In the meantime, M Co who was on route to refuel, arrived in the area and also took the VC under heavy cannonister fire.

Tm M had an Armored Cavalry Platoon (3 Platoon, K Troop) attached to it and committed it here to make a dismounted swoop of BEN CAM. At the same time Provisional Mortar Battery, as an armored force, moved to block from the East. The cannonister fire from the tanks and the dismounted element accounted for 5 VC KIA (SD) and one house destroyed with secondary explosions. These were the first VC KIA's by the Regiment.

There were no major problems on 9 October except in learning how to set up resupply points on firm ground to facilitate rapid resupply. It is significant to note here that the Squadron effected its first resupply on the third day out.

CIVIL AFFAIRS: One MEDCAP mission was accomplished in the PHU HOI Village which treated 70 civilians. It is noteworthy that PHU HOI has been a VC dominated village for several years.
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10 October 1966:

Squadron issued FRAG 0 11-66 which directed further search and destroy operations for 1000 hours in PHU HOI with Tm I & L. Tm N would rejoin the Squadron at 1000 hours and would link up with Tm L to the West of PHU HOI. In addition, Tm N & K would attack BEN GAN (YS103087) at 1000 hours. Upon completion of those missions, Tms would lagor and marry up with Tm N for an attack on area BRAVO the next day. The FRAG 0 was implemented with the exception that Tm N did not marry up with the other Tms and BEN GAN was not subjected to attack. This was due to the time required by the Squadron to recover vehicles for Tm N which were mired in the mud. Additionally, resupply was late which post-poned the time of the attack to late in the day, which was unacceptable.

Enemy activity was very light with sniper fire being the primary VC activity. Several vacant tunnels and trench systems were discovered in the search and destroy mission in the PHU HOI area (YS091889).

An attempt to employ AVLB (YS091889) failed when the vehicle got badly stuck approaching a gap that was to be bridged. Spike bridging could not be used due to nonavailability of bolts and stringers used in its assembly.

CIVIL AFFAIRS:

One MBDCAP mission was employed in the village of LONG THEEJ (YSI25895), 140 people were treated.

11 October 1966:

No major change in task organization except that 1 platoon from Tm K still assumed the CP and all three RF companies reported to Tm N control. Squadron issued FRAG 0 12-66 which corrected Tn's I and L to continue securing the PHU HOI area to block VC movement South. Tn's K & M were to conduct recon of ROUTE GREY and areas TANGO and BRAVO. Tm N was to conduct operations to the North (YS082917) in pursuit of VC political cadre.

As Tn's M and K moved down ROUTE GREY to the South they began to encounter several cuts in the road dug by the VC. Finally, when the TF reached coordinates (YS148846) it could move no further. The road was badly cut with no apparent by-pass. At about 1000 hours the S3 flew into the area by helicopter to check out the situation. After surveying the situation the S3 organized a recon party to check out the condition of the road further South. The recon party moved down the road with security to the flanks, front and rear to protect itself from ambush. Nonetheless, a VC in hiding detonated a claymore mine which had not been detected by the security elements. Five men were wounded by the blast, but thanks to their armored vests no one was killed. The Tm N Commander quickly organized a defense around the wounded and had them evacuated. The mission of reconnoitering ROUTE GREY had to be abandoned for the rest of the operation, and a different route found to area BRAVO. The Engineers decided that the recon of area TANGO could be permanently abandoned.

While the above activities were taking place Tm N began operations further North where ARVN intelligence indicated political cadre were hiding. Departing CAT LAI (YS960895) by boat at 0400 hours the Tm moved up the DONG NAI River. Approximately four miles up the river from CAT L01 Tm N shot and killed one VC who fell into the river after he was shot. Recovered on the bank were two full magazines (banana type), a small amount of AK56 Czech rounds, a gas mask, an oil lamp, and some medical supplies. Tm N then continued its move up the river and later disembarked at 0700 hours at YS077918. At 0830 hrs Tm N launched an assault toward LONG Dien (YS079914) on two axes.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVN: M.C.WJ 3-52) (Cont)

During the assault there were two light encounters with no VC confirmed kills. Also, during the assault the Tn found a glycerine mine factory which had been in full production until the Tn's arrival. Several mines and tools were recovered. About 1200 hours on the 11th, a patrol, 34 platoon, K Troop, reported that it found a large cache of rice in the village of BEN SAN (YS115900). Tremendous stores of rice were located in every hut for no apparent reason except that it was to be used by the VC. One old man in the village had whispered to MI personnel, who later checked out the report, that the rice belonged to the VC. The rice was estimated to be 150 tons or more. The next problem arose when a decision could not be made within US channels on what to do with the rice. A meeting between the Regimental S5 and the NUN TRACK District Chief was planned for tomorrow to solve the problem. In the meantime, Squadron issued FRAG 0 13-66 which was designed to block any VC attempts to extract the rice. A flare ship was called in to assist in this operation. The task organization changed by assigning K Troop (with two platoons) to lagar under TF Con and perform CO security and attaching the remaining platoon of K Troop to Tn N.

Other activity during the day included the following: An ambush patrol from L Troop took a VC squad under fire Via YS086880 at approximately 0330 hours. L Troop reported shooting two VC located on a pagoda. The CP moved to YS114907 toward dusk.

12 October 1966:
Squadron continued to secure PHU HOI and the rice cache. Regimental S5 and an MI team checked out the amount of rice (confirmed 150 to 200 tons) and coordinated with the NUN TRACK district Chief, Captain TROUNG, for removal of the rice. Results were that the rice would be moved the next morning to government warehouses. US trucks would be made available if required. A flare ship was used to illuminate the area. The CP was not moved.

13 October 1966:
Squadron continued to secure PHU HOI area and the rice cache. The Vietnamese have bagged most of the rice for transport to government warehouses.

Enemy activity was light. M Company was hit by AW fire at approximately 1600 hours. Heavy cannon and AW fire was returned with no known VC casualties. There were no US casualties, but at least two civilians were injured in the fire fight and had to be evacuated.
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVQs M.CVJ-3-32) (Cont)

14 October 1966:
Squadron continued security of the .35 km SW area and the rice cache. By end of the day all rice should be removed. I Troop which had several vehicles mired in the mud was mobile again, which meant that the Squadron would be able to complete the mission by reconnoitering Area BRN:VO tomorrow.
At 1900 the CIC arrived at its new location which was in I Troop's area (YS106887). K Troop was still under TF control, but was left in place to secure extraction of the rice.

At 1600 a dismounted patrol from 1 Troop which consisted primarily of the 2d Platoon of K Troop attached to 1 Troop was ambushed. The patrol had used the same route of return in patrolling the SHN GMt area (YS099873), and at least a squad of VC was waiting when the patrol approached. The attack was made with claymore mines and a hail of hand grenades. Four men were immediately wounded and members of the patrol moved up to cover them and aid in their extrication. TFO J. R. D. D. S. E., who had come from the rear of the patrol, to cover the wounded, was killed by a grenade. While the fire fight was going on the XO from 1 Troop and the Squadron Interpreters rushed to aid the patrol. Both received fragmentation wounds in the leg. In addition, Sgt Cortin, Platoon Sgt from 2d Platoon, K Troop which was securing the rice in the area took 12 men to help cover the wounded. The fire fight lasted no more than ten minutes with the following US casualties: 1 KIA, 9 wounded (plus one SVN Interpreter). Seven VC were killed (SC). From examination of armored vests and steel helmets, it was apparent that several lives had been saved by this equipment. The VC again chose their escape into the village of BEN CAK where pursuit was not possible, nor where fires could be placed.

15 October 1966:
HUG 0 14-66 which was issued on the 14th but which was to be implemented on the 15th changed the task organization to the following:

EN 1
1/3-11 (-)
Soc/M/3-11
1/3/919 Engr
Mort Btry (Prov)

EN L
1/3-11 (-)
Soc/M/3-11
2/3/919 Engr
1 M132A1
1 HF Co.

EN R
1/3-11 (-)
1 M132A1
1/3-11 (-)
How Btry 3-11

The mission was to search one cleared area WEL IVO and to secure the area for Engineer reconnaissance. The concept was to move over multiple routes to secure areas 300, GMI, and DUV (See Overlay Annex B). Upon securing those areas the attached HP Companies would conduct a more thorough search of the area and secure it for the Engineer teams which would come in by helicopter. Once the Engineers had made their necessary soil studies, etc., the TF would withdraw along ROUTE NED with heavy artillery preparations all along the route.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: HICKORY 3-32) (Cont)

At 0800 hours the TF consisting of Tn L and Tn M moved out to accomplish the assigned mission. Tn L moved on a route through the rubber between ROUTE BLACK and ROUTE GREEN while Tn M moved along ROUTE GREEN. The other routes were abandoned since they had been interdicted by the VC in several places. Moving generally South along the directions of attack indicated, the task force moved with little difficulty toward area BRAVO. At times it was able to move on line through the rubber plantation in the area. Area BRAVO was then secured as planned with no enemy resistance and the required reconnaissance accomplished.

Due to the late hour, 1600 hours, (some time had been spent extracting a stuck M48), the plan to come back on ROUTE RED was abandoned. ROUTE RED passes through some very dense terrain which would be extremely prone to ambush when darkness fell. Withdrawal was made along the direction of attack.

After issuing a movement order over the radio, the Squadron began a return march to the Staging Area (1730 hours). At 2000 hours all elements had returned to the Staging Area, ending OPERATION HICKORY.

CIVIL AFFAIRS:
One MEDCAP mission was employed in the village of BEN SAN (YS115900); 70 persons were treated.
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (KV: KLVJ 3-32) (Cont)

12. RESULTS:
   a. Friendly:
      U.S. - 2 KIA, 20 WIA
      ARVN - 1 WIA
      See Annex C (Casualty List)
   b. Enemy:
      (1) Personnel
         (a) 13 VC KIA (BC)
         (b) 2 VC KIA (POSS)
         (c) 0 VC WIA
         (d) 17 VC Captured
         (e) 0 Detainees
      (2) Fortifications destroyed:
         (a) 2 tunnels at YS076856 and YS086876.
         (b) 1 trench at YS076867.
         (c) 3 bunkers at YS067856.
      (3) Fortifications not destroyed:
         (a) Communication trench from YS1058678 straight line to
             YS095889.
         (b) Trench system along ridge from YS094882 to YS090886.
         (c) Trenches and positions along both sides of the trail from
             YS113883 SW to YS097876.
         (d) Trenches and tunnels South of Phu Hoii at YS075876.
         (e) Trench systems from YS059879 to YS059876, YS125795 to
             YS125794, and YS047947 to YS120792.
         (f) Trench systems from YS067876, and YS065872.
      NOTE: The above tunnels and tunnels (Items (a) thru (f)) would have
            required a major engineering effort to destroy which there was no time
            available.
      (4) Captured:
         210 tons of rice
         1 box of used medical supplies
         6 claymore mines
         11 AP mines
         15 blocks of TNT
         3 - 9mm shells for booby traps.
         75 lbs of assorted tools used to make mines
         1 acetylene torch used to make mines
         2 full banana magazines
         15 rounds Czech 7.50
         1 gas mask
      (5) Equipment destroyed:
         2 claymore mines
      (6) Barriers:
         (a) Highway 319 at YS134783 as of 120945 Oct 66.
         (b) Highway 319 at YS147850 as of 111030 Oct 66.
         (c) Highway 25 at Phu Hoii (YS078876) and BEN C.M. (YS091869).
      (7) Enemy supply caches (Probable)
         (1) Hill tops YS092884 & YS097887.
         (2) Forest and Jungle areas at YS105860.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MAOYJ 3-32) (Cont)

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

a. Supply: Logistical planning for Operation HICKORY was based upon research of after action reports of other armored cavalry units, conversations with other armored cavalry squadron staffs, and a logistical estimate of our own requirements. As a result it was felt the squadron could sustain itself as long as 3 days without resupply. Based on this, it was determined that the squadron would not organize combat and field trains nor have any unit trains elements accompany the combat elements during the operation. Instead resupply convoys would be fed to the squadron as required. Not only would this action decrease the security requirement of the squadron and thus enable it to maximize its combat power, but it would also enable the squadron to move cross-country and free itself of the existing road net.

When Operation HICKORY was initiated, a specific time when the first resupply convoy would be mounted was not planned. Instead the squadron relied on the daily status reports submitted by the troops as a basis for when the first resupply convoy would be mounted. The first resupply convoy went quite well except for a few problems in organization of the resupply area. Instead of establishing separate refueling points (gas station concept), ammunition points, etc., the transportation platoon leader attempted to disperse his elements over a wide area as a security measure. This detracted from the speed required for such an operation. Additionally, it should be noted that for this environment, night resupply, dispersal of resupply elements, and all other factors demanded in conventional or nuclear operations are not required here. Security and speed are the primary prerequisites in Vietnam. Consequently, the demand for gas station type resupply points and dispersed dis- persion for maximum efficiency and security.

One other important factor is that wheeled resupply vehicles were extremely limited in cross-country movement. As a result, resupply was affected from the roads. In some cases this meant that teams had to travel up to 6 KM for resupply since the resupply elements could not traverse the terrain leading to their positions. This was not only wasteful of time, but from a tactical point of view it was quite detrimental to the effectiveness of the squadron because one TM had to cover another TM's area of responsibility during resupply. This should illustrate once again Armor's demand for tracked resupply vehicles.

In the future the squadron intends to resupply every two days. Although it can operate for three days without resupply when necessary, the draw-down on the basic load requires a major resupply effort.

Aerial resupply was used on at least five occasions; three for 105mm Class V and two for Class III when units could not get to the resupply point because of poor trafficability. These missions placed a great strain on the regimental aviation section which does not have the capability to provide on call aerial resupply to one squadron, lot alone three squadrons. Two requests for OH-47 missions were requested, but both were denied due to non-availability of aircraft. Requests for non organic aerial support must be programmed at least 24 hours in advance and for maximum utilization should be included as part of the tactical planning for an operation. Aerial resupply should only be planned for areas and missions for which no other means of resupply exist. The following is a list of items expended during the operation.

(1) Class I
   A Rations - None
   C Rations - 1463 cases
   Water - 30,000 gal.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MCO: MCOV 3-32) (Cont)

(2) Class III:
   MOGUL - 14,200 Gals.
   DIESEL - 12,200 Gals.

(3) Class II & IV - See paragraph 13 b (1) below.

(4) Class V: See annex 2, ammunition expenditure.

b. Maintenance.

(1) Recovery Operations: Recovery of vehicles bogged in the mud constituted a major effort during the operation. In one case it took three days to recover a tank which had sunk up to the turret. The terrain, particularly in the Eastern portion of the PHU HOI area, had a light crust which permitted some trafficability but which prevented tracking. The composition of the terrain caused build-up on sprocket hubs resulting in some thrown tracks on tanks and M-88's. Dense vegetation hampered recovery and made it necessary in some cases to use bulldozers and tanks to cut new roads to stuck vehicles. The major cause of buried vehicles can be attributed to tracking, inexperience of track commanders with the terrain, and the thin crust which was prevalent only in the area noted above. In other areas the terrain was good and problems were not nearly as great.

(2) Repair Parts: With a density of 17 tanks, 64 M113 (M48), 10 M577A1, 9 M106 Mortar Carriers, 5 M46 AVLBs, 4 M578 Recovery Vehicles, and 2 M88 Recovery Vehicles, the Squadron used the following parts during the operation:

Rectifiers (100 A) - 4 ea.
Alternators (100 A) - 1 ea.
Regulators (100 A) - 6 ea.
Distributors (M113) - 1 ea.
Starter (M113) - 1 ea.
Fuel Pumps (M113) - 2 ea.
Alternator Bolts (M113) - 4 sets.
Transfer Case Assy (M113) - 1 ea.
Hub covers (M113) - 2 ea.
Sprocket Bolts (M113) - 16 ea.
Oil Buffer Assy (Cal 50) - 1 ea.
Spark plugs (M113) - 6 ea.
Front Cartridge Stop (Cal 50) - 4 ea.
Centrifugal Pump (M48A3) - 1 ea.

Some 80% of these replacement parts were procured through the 218th CSS by cannibalization, 15% through PLL, 5% through direct support maintenance. Although many of the parts were delivered by air within a few hours after request, units complained that even that short delay caused them to hold up missions for a significant period of time or risk security of vehicles and crews. Units indicated that they would like to carry more high demand type parts in their maintenance elements. In any event, the tremendous reliance which the Squadron had to place on cannibalization for procurement of parts, is an indication of problems ahead when salvage yards are not available. Stockage levels of PLL must improve.

(3) Special Maintenance Items:
   a. Fuel filters must be periodically drained of condensation to prevent water getting into the fuel systems.
(b) Trim vanes were an unexpected maintenance problem. Fourteen (14) trim vanes had to be replaced by cannibalizing unserviceable M113’s at the 218th CSS. The reason for the damage to this item was because it was used in the extended position to increase stop-off distance of HEAT rounds from AT weapons. Movement through heavy brush caused smoking, warping, and breaking of the plywood item. Personnel should be instructed not to use the trim vane except in river crossings for which it was designed.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization: At no time during the operation was it necessary to move the Squadron aid station from the CP to a forward location. Troop medics on the scene were able to handle casualties adequately and prepare them for timely air evacuation. Average time for Dustoff was twenty minutes.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES.

a. ACAV (M113): The ACAV vehicle proved highly maneuverable in very difficult terrain. It’s armored protection suffered minor damage from claymore mines and was not penetrated. There is no doubt that the tremendous fire power and armor protection of the ACAV discouraged major VC ambush.

b. Plane Thrower Carrier: The M132 proved highly manueverable but adequate evaluation could not be made since its main armament was never employed.

c. Mortar Battery (Provisional): When situations permitted (i.e., when troops were all disposed within supporting range) the troop mortar sections were consolidated into a Squadron Mortar Battery. This system effected greater control and more efficient use of fires. All fire requests were channeled over the Howitzer Battery FDC not. The Howitzer Battery Commander, as the Squadron Fire Support Coordinator, then assigned the fire mission as appropriate. Since TOE does not provide personnel for mortar FDC’s, personnel had to be taken from gun crews to run a mortar FDC. Whether the mortars are employed in section or battery, there remains the necessity for an FDC. With all three sections employed in battery one FDC can operate twenty-four hours with less fatigue and strain to personnel, thus decreasing human error. TOE also does not provide any type of vehicle to be used as an FDC. Temporarily a 1 1/2 ton trailer is serving this purpose, but it is totally inadequate. In all cases of employing the mortars, security, control and the ability to provide the fire support required were the prime factors to be considered. In many cases, as with K Troop on this operation, the balance of the advantages will tip in favor of the troops retaining control.

d. Airmobile Contact Teams: A four man airmobile contact team consisting of one senior track mechanic, one turret mechanic, and two track mechanics, was organized for this operation. Their purpose was to fly in and install major components such as transmissions, transfer cases, etc., which could be holl-lifted to disabled vehicles. The one attempt at using this system, which was the installing of a transfer case in an M113, was not successful. The reason for the failure was the inability to get proper sling arrangements to install the part. The idea of bringing in the major component by helicopter is sound. In addition it is necessary to get the skilled personnel to the scene as soon as possible to quickly install the item.

e. Organization for Combat: One of the objectives of the Squadron prior to reaching Vietnam was to organize itself in a full track configuration for combat. The purpose was to eliminate the reduced mobility which would no doubt result with wheeled vehicles in the organization, and to give maximum armor protection and fire power, throughout the Squadron. Another objective of the Squadron was to minimize the “frittering” away of combat power for security of the combat trains and CP. The following results were obtained.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVN: 4LCV-3-32) (Cont)

1. Pull Track Organization: All wheeled vehicles were eliminated from the fighting forces, to include the CP, with no major problems encountered. In addition the mobility and Armor capabilities of the Squadron could be capitalized to the maximum. (See Annex F: Squadron Organization for Combat)

2. CP Security: A Howitzer Battery/CP complex gave the CP an inherent self-protective capability. In certain situations and terrain, however, it was still necessary to use an Armored Cavalry Platoon in night security.

3. Cutting of the Logistical Tail:  As indicated in par 13 b above, the Squadron was not tied down by the security requirements of a long logistical column, but was free to utilize its full mobility and combat power. The major logistical problems occurred when resupply convoys could not go to the user, but had to have using elements come to them.

4. Ground Surveillance Radar: No effective use of GSR was made during the operation due to lack of batteries. Future operations will be needed to determine the full capability of GSR.

5. Basic Load: The basic load as developed and adopted by the Squadron is still being evaluated. There was not enough ammunition expended on this particular operation to obtain any meaningful conclusions.

6. Armored Vest: Wearing of the armored vest proved to be a lifesaver on several occasions. Although it will not stop a direct round, the armored vest does stop shrapnel from grenades and claymore mines. The vest does however, cause some heat sickness problems.

15. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: Overall the operation was a complete success, both in completion of assigned mission and in the mutual cooperation achieved in working with the Regional Force units. As this report indicates there were many lessons learned and a tremendous amount of personal experience gained as a result of the operation. The chance to evaluate our operating techniques and smooth out normal internal problems before operating against a hard core VC Force will no doubt prove invaluable. In addition to these intangible results, the physical damage inflicted upon the enemy, plus the civil action, MEDP missions, etc., which were accomplished have begun to turn the VC out of an important resupply area. Also, the mutual respect and cooperation gained in working with the ARVN forces will open the doors to future successful operations of a joint nature. Although the Squadron spent a great deal of time and effort extracting military vehicles, I do not believe it should reflect adversely on the capabilities of Army in Vietnam. Most of our problems with the terrain were confined to small areas and tend to overshadow the actual cross country mobility that was achieved. Not to be ignored are experience factors which will no doubt cause an improvement in future operations, and the fact that much of the terrain is still soft from the monsoon rains.

The modified TCE which deleted the tanks from the Armored Cavalry Troops did not hamper the operations. Although the tanks were cross attached to Armored Cavalry Troops, in many cases by section, it is not necessary to tie the Troop to the lesser mobility of the tank.

Two major points are to be gained from the operation. The first is the merit of having an attached Infantry force to perform missions not appropriate to the Armored Cavalry. Such missions include searching dense terrain, pursuit of enemy forces into terrain inaccessible to armor, blocking enemy escape routes which are inaccessible to armor, or driving the enemy into an armored blocking force. In many cases a quick reacting Infantry force,
such as a heliborne company, could have accounted for considerable VC casualties. The second point is the frustration which must be endured when fighting a local VC force. His tactic of using the local population as cover places a definite need for restraint on the part of the unit commander. More thought should be given to immediate evacuation of the population in such VC controlled areas to remove the VC cover.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Evacuate the villages of PHÚ HOI (YS082880) and BEN CLX (YS095890). Both the villages are VC controlled and serve as cover for the VC.
b. Continue US and ARVN operations in the MHON THACH district to destroy the VC supply link to the East.
c. Continue to increase the psycho and MEDCAP activities in the MHON THACH district in conjunction with joint operation.
d. Initiate a study on aerial resupply of Class III and V for the Regiment.
e. Strive for Infantry/Armored Cavalry combined operations, preferably with a heliborne Infantry Force.
f. Replace wheeled resupply vehicles with tracked resupply vehicles.
Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to Op HICKORY

TASK ORGANIZATION (Initially):

TM I
Trp 1/3-11 Armd Cav (-1 Plat)
 1 Sec/H/3-11 Armd Cav
 1 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav
 2 RVN National Policemen (OPCON)

TM L
Trp L/3-11 Armd Cav (-1 Plat)
 1 Plat/H/3-11 Armd Cav
 1 Sqd/3/919 Engr
 1 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav
 1 M132A1
 2 RVN National Policemen (OPCON)

TM M
Co H/3-11 Armd Cav (-2 Plat)
 1 Plt/1 Trp/3-11 Armd Cav
 3/919 Engr (-)
 1 M132A1
 2 RVN National Policemen (OPCON)

TM O
 2 RVN RP Co's (OPCON)
 1 RVN Boat Co (OPCON)
 1 Sqn/Trp H/3-11 Armd Cav
 1 Sqn LNO Trp/3-11 Armd Cav
 2 RVN National Policemen (UNCON)

TF CON
 1 RVN Sec/1-11 Armd Cav
 1 UH-1D/Trans Sqn/11 Armd Cav (OPCON)
 2 lt Fgle Trp/11 Armd Cav (OPCON)
 1 Lt Btry (-)
 1 RVN Recondo Sqn (-) (OPCON)
Annex B (run Overlay) to Combat Operations after Action Report (IN HICKORY)
Reference: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, 6330 I, 6330 II (Series L7014)
Annex B (CMNOverlay) to Combat CPE After Action Report (CQN HISTORY)
Reference: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000 6330 I, 6330 II, (Series L7014)

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Annex C to Combat Operations After Action Report to Op HICKORY.

Casualty List:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAMES</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>DATE &amp; TIME OF INJURY</th>
<th>TYPE AND EXTENT OF WOUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NUNESTER, Roy A</td>
<td>PFC E3</td>
<td>071505 Oct 66</td>
<td>GSW rt shoulder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHNS, Harold E.</td>
<td>SPC E7</td>
<td>072355 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag Wound Left Arm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FERGIE, John R.</td>
<td>PFC E3</td>
<td>091215 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frac Wds of abdomen &amp; chest (DOW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOYLE, David K.</td>
<td>Maj 04</td>
<td>111050 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag butto &amp; rt leg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HILSTEAD, Wayne P.</td>
<td>Capt 03</td>
<td>111050 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag rt leg, arm, scrotum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVANS, Peter H.</td>
<td>1/Lt 02</td>
<td>111050 Oct 66</td>
<td>Superficial wld lower rt leg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITE, Roger D.</td>
<td>PFC E3</td>
<td>111050 Oct 66</td>
<td>Fracs in groin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'HER, John E.</td>
<td>SGT E5</td>
<td>141600 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag rt arm &amp; rt leg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MULLER, Benedict S.K. Jr.</td>
<td>SGT E5</td>
<td>141600 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag rt knee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARRISON, Robert L.</td>
<td>SP/4 E4</td>
<td>141600 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag rt leg &amp; rt arm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JACKSON, Darrell A.</td>
<td>PFC E3</td>
<td>141600 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag face, stomach, chest (XIL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOYCE, Dennis L.</td>
<td>SSG E6</td>
<td>141600 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag, legs, arm, face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDONALD, Gregory C.</td>
<td>PFC E3</td>
<td>141600 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCNEIL, Thomas L.</td>
<td>PFC E3</td>
<td>141600 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag rt leg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILLER, Karl M.</td>
<td>SP/5 E5</td>
<td>141600 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag in butt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FENNINGTON, James E.</td>
<td>SSG E6</td>
<td>141600 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag face, lt arm, lt leg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAPLETON, Jerry L.</td>
<td>1/Lt 02</td>
<td>141600 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag rt leg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOOD, Vance C.</td>
<td>PFC E3</td>
<td>141600 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag arms &amp; legs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FREEDOM, James W.</td>
<td>SSG E6</td>
<td>141600 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag wd, book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURNEY, John D.</td>
<td>PFC E3</td>
<td>110040 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag wd, lt arm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAHN, Nguyen Van</td>
<td>SSG E6</td>
<td>141600 Oct 66</td>
<td>Frag wd, lt calf</td>
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Annex D to Combat Operations After Action Report to Op HICKORY.

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>CTG, 5.56 Ball</td>
<td>5,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>CTG, 7.62 Ball</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>CTG, 7.62 LKD 4 &amp; 1</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>CTG, 0.50 LKD 4 &amp; 1</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>CTG, 40mm HE</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>CTG, 4.2&quot; HE</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>CTG, 4.2&quot; Illum</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>CTG, 4.2&quot; Wi</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>CTG, 105mm HE</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>CTG, 105mm Illum</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>CTG, 105mm WP</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>CTG, 90mm Cannister</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>CTG, 90mm WP</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Gren, Hand Frag</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Gren, Hand CS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Gren, Hand Smokes (Red, Green, Violet)</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Flare, Surface Trip M49</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
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<td>18.</td>
<td>HEI, 2.75&quot;</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Thicker M-1</td>
<td>400 lbs</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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Annex E to Combat Operations After Action Report (MID. TURKEY)
Reference: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000 63301, 63302, (Series 2/70)

[Map with labeled routes and locations: Yellow, Black, Green, Cat, Dog, etc.]

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