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AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980

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AGAM-P (M) (15 Aug 67) FOR OT 67X003

23 August 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation Ahina, conducted by the
25th Infantry Division

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for Operation
Ahina. Operation Ahina was conducted by the 25th Infantry Division during
the period 13-18 May 1967. Information contained in this report is pro-
vided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned
during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training
material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

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101st Airborne Division
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

THRU: Commanding General
IIFFORCEV
ATTN: G-3 (D&T)
APO 96227

TO: Commander
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: MACJ 343
APO 96243

1. (C) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation AHINA was a search and destroy operation conducted in the east central portion of War Zone "C", bounded by X06410, X06450, X05450 and X06440. Its purpose was to engage and destroy VC/NVA forces known to be operating in the Area of Operations (AO), and to destroy VC/NVA base camps and facilities throughout the area.


3. (C) LOCATION: East central portion of War Zone "C", TAY NHIN and HINH DUONG Provinces, Republic of Vietnam.

4. (C) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 25th Infantry Division

5. (C) REPORTING OFFICER: MG John C. F. Tillson III

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:
1st Bde, 9th Inf Div
2d Bn, 47th Inf
4th Bn, 9th Inf
2d Bn, 12th Inf (detach from 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div)
Co A, 15th Engr Bn
Co C, 709th Maint Bn

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
2d Bn (Mech), 22d Inf
3d Bn, 22d Inf
2d Bn, 77th Arty (DS)
Co C, 4th Engr Bn (DS)
Btry B, 1st Engr Bn, 11th Arty (OPCON to 2/77 Arty)

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7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Air Support.

(1) Close air support was provided throughout the operation by United States Air Force (USAF) fighters.

(2) Results of close air support were as follows: 2 VC killed by Air Force (KBAF) possible (poss); 16 bunkers destroyed and 10 secondary fires ignited.

(3) There were 31 missions flown in close air support. USAF fighters flew a total of 77 sorties. Fifty-seven and a half tons of bombs and 59i tons of napalm were expended.

b. Army Aviation Support.

(1) Army Aviation support was provided by the 25th Aviation Battalion, by the organic brigade aviation sections, and by the following units under the control of the 25th Aviation Battalion:

(a) 187th Aviation Company (-)
(b) 116th Aviation Company (-)

(2) Army Aviation support flew numerous airmobile assaults, resupply, command and control, evacuation and gunship support missions. The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division Aviation section flew 219 sorties completing 125 missions alone.

c. Artillery Support.

(1) Artillery direct support was provided by 2d Bn, 77th Arty from its position at Fire Support Base (FSB) FANG (KT388624). Second Bn, 77th Arty was reinforced by Btry D, 1st Bn, 11th Arty at FSB FANG and by four M42 guns (self propelled twin 40mm cannon, commonly called "Dusters") from Btry D, 5th Bn, 2d Arty.

(2) Total missions and ammunition expended:

(a) Missions: 136 missions in support and 674 missions in harassment and interdiction (H&I).

(b) Ammunition expended: 4,261 rounds of high explosive (HE) and 154 rounds of white phosphorous (WP) ammunition were expended.
throughout Operation AHINA.

(3) Results of artillery support in causing enemy casualties were unknown.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. General: The area of operation for AHINA was the east central portion of War Zone "C" bounded by the 40 grid line on the west, the 50 grid line of the east, the 64 grid line on the south and 64 grid line on the north. The area west of the NUI ONG mountain complex to the SUOI BA HI stream and north of DAI TIENG City has been a VC base area for an unknown period of time. The area is ideally suited for this purpose because of the natural obstacles formed by the upper SAIGON River and NUI ONG Mountain complex to the east and south and the SUOI BA HI stream to the west and south. Enemy forces believed to have been located within the area of operations prior to AHINA were unidentified elements of the 7th NVA Division vic XT479, elements of the 101st NVA Regt vic XT4365, elements of Group 82, Rear Services (COSVN) vic XT4359, elements of one local force company (unidentified) vic XT4456, and local guerrillas. Analysis by Order of Battle personnel indicated that contacts could be expected with elements of Group 82, Rear Services, the unidentified local force company and local guerrillas. Although a number of VC base camps were located and destroyed during the period 1 - 5 April during Operation JUNCTION CITY I, there existed indications that a number of VC base camps remained unlocated. The region was considered to be a VC supply base area for Group 82, Rear Services' elements of one of the main junctions of north-south and east-west supply infiltration routes. Operation AHINA included a sweep along axis SNAKE to the north by elements of the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div. During the operation there were no large scale contacts with enemy forces. Small unit contacts were made on numerous occasions and captured documents identified elements of L35 Bn, 69th VC Arty Regt as combatants. The VC did not engage in decisive combat actions at any time. A large number of base camps, supply caches and operating facilities were destroyed. Included were over 120 underground fortifications and VC military structures. Significant among material captured or destroyed during the five day operational time frame of AHINA were supply caches totaling over 70 tons of rice and other foodstuffs.

b. Terrain: The terrain varied from low flat terrain with scrub brush or elephant grass along the waterways to forested areas with double and triple canopy within the central portion of the area of operations. The jungle canopy greatly limited aerial observation and provided excellent concealment for the VC. Fields of fire for both direct and indirect fire weapons were limited in the heavy forested areas. Avenues of approach for tracked vehicles were generally limited to trails and cleared areas which were more prevalent in the eastern portion of the area of operations. Mechanized forces experienced difficulty in traversing the central portion of the area of operations.
which was heavily forested. Movement of foot troops was hampered only in the densely forested jungle areas since much of the terrain was dry during this period of the year. Obstacles included streams characterized by steep banks, silt bottoms, and in some areas, heavy mud. Only one all-weather road (LTL 13) existed in the area of operations, running east-west and serving as a northern entry into the area of operations.

c. Weather Summary: The weather during AHINA was mostly cloudy during the day and partly cloudy during the night. Ceilings were reported below 1000 feet on the morning of 14 May and patchy low clouds were reported on 16 and 18 May. Visibility was 3 - 6 miles in haze and ground fog during the morning hours but good for the remainder of the day. Surface winds were light and variable with a few gusts to 15 - 20 knots near the shower areas. Light precipitation occurred in the area in the form of widely scattered showers on 15 - 18 May. Temperature maxima were in the low 90's and the minima were in the mid 70's.

9. (C) MISSION: The 25th Infantry Division conducts offensive operations to the northwest of DAU TIEI NG (XT4946) to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: On 13 May 1967, 25th Infantry Division crosses the SAIGON River in zone with one brigade (3d Bde, 4th Inf Div) and on order conducts search and destroy operations to the northwest to exploit ARCLIGHT and destroy VC/NVA forces, and installations. Another brigade (1st Bde, 9th Inf Div), on order, establishes blocking positions south of Route 13 to deny VC/NVA exfiltration routes to the north.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. On D-Day, 13 May, 3d Bn, 22d Inf and Co C, 4th Engr Bn, of the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div were airlifted to XT459562 and emplaced a bridge there over the SAIGON River. The 21 Bn (Mech), 22d Inf moved by land and crossed its elements over the bridge by 1820 hours. There was no enemy contact at the crossing site. Meanwhile 1st Bde, 9th Inf Div moved Task Force (TF) 2-47, its major maneuver element in Operation AHINA, to blocking position JAGUAR vicinity XT425615 to prevent VC exfiltration from the AO. From there they moved to FSB FANG (vic XT384624). A sweep was made of Route 13 through the AO. The only enemy contact occurred when a TF 2-47 APC detonated an AT mine vic XT384626 resulting in 3 US WIA.

b. On 14 May, Co's A & B of 2d Bn, 22d Inf conducted search and destroy (S&D) operations. A base camp was located at XT463571, contained 10 bunkers and 100 meters of trenches. Sniper fire was received there without any effect. Fourteen huts contained documents and two bicycles were located at XT465567. The huts were destroyed. At 1440 hours, 3 trucks were located, one of which had been destroyed by an airstrike. Nearby six bunkers, seven huts and a mess hall were located at XT458575. All were destroyed. TF 2-47 destroyed 3 - AT
mines vic XT398663 and two CHI COM booby traps. An unknown VC force detonated a claymore and fired small arms weapons at XT397663. Fire was returned without results. Later an APC struck an AT mine at XT-588628, sustaining one WIA.

c. On 15 May, S & D operations continued. Co A, 2/22 Inf found extensive rice, foodstuffs, documents, clothing, a classroom and 6A ammo at XT450580 and more foodstuffs at XT454584. More foodstuffs and structures were found at XT455502 by Co C, 2/22 Inf. Co A, 3/22d Inf made contact with 4 VC at XT425573, resulting in 1 VC KIA (DC). TF 2-47 continued S & D operations in zone. Ten bunkers were destroyed at XT401625, 18 more at XT423606. Two AT mines were destroyed at XT397682.

d. On 16 May, S & D operations continued. While there was no contact throughout the day, 2d Bn, 22d Inf found extensive enemy fortified positions, weapons equipment and foodstuffs vic XT450590 (See Tab "A" COAAR 3d Bde, 4th Div for full details). TF 2-47 moved from FSB FANB to blocking position JAGUAR. There was no enemy contact in this area.

e. On 17 May, 2d Bn, 22d Inf made contact with a VC squad at XT454637 at 1610 hours. Results were 6 US KHA, 11 US WHA. Six more US were WHA when an APC detonated an AT mine at XT456636. 3d Bn, 22d Inf destroyed bunkers at XT419611 and XT415627. Contact with a VC squad was made at 1545 hours. Results were 5 VC KIA (BC), and 3 US WHA. Four VC weapons were captured. TF 2-47 continued blocking from position JAGUAR. The only contact there occurred when a 5 ton truck detonated an AT mine at XT305540 resulting in 1 US WHA.

f. Operation AHINA concluded on 18 May 1967. Second Bn, 22d Inf detonated an AT mine at XT422634 resulting in moderate damage to an APC. Contact with an unknown VC force at XT413633 resulted in 1 US KHA and 2 US WHA. The VC were driven off by two immediate airstrikes and gunships. VC casualties were unknown. Second Bn, 22d Inf returned to FSB FANB. Third Bn, 22d Inf was airlifted to PREK KLOK (XT277787) minus Co A, 3/22 and the Recon Platoon which moved to secure an FSB at XT232771. TF 2-47 closed at SUOI DA at XT344577, and prepared to return to BEAR GAT, to their own TAOR.

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Enemy Losses:

(1) Personnel:

VC Killed in Action (KIA) Body Count (BC) = 9
VC Killed by Air Force (KBAF) possible (poss) = 2

(2) Equipment losses: See para 12b of COAAR AHINA of 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div. Enemy equipment losses reported by the 1st Bde, 9th
Inf Div were negligible, and were reported as part of their totals of Operation JUNCTION CITY.

b. US Losses:

(1) Personnel:

Killed by Hostile Action (KHA) - 14
Wounded in Hostile Action (WHA) - 38
Died of Wounds (DOW) - 1

(2) Equipment Losses: 2 - Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) destroyed; 4 APCs, 1 - 5 ton truck, and one Armored Vehicle Launch Bridge (AVLB) damaged.

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: Logistical support for this operation was provided by the 1st Logistical Command directly to the units through supply facilities at DAU TIENG base camp. Extensive use was made of aerial resupply for units participating in Operation AHINA.

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: A light tactical raft (LTR) was emplaced on an unprepared site across the SAIGON River on 13 May 1967. After securing the raft infantry was airlifted into the area. The far side of the river (no LZ) was secured by infantry troops crossing with rubber boats. The bridging and engineer personnel were lifted into the site by CH-47. The bridge was emplaced with no difficulty and an entire mechanized infantry battalion was across the river in less than eight hours from the landing of the bridging platoon. The only reconnaissance made of the area was made by air. The detailed and accurate analysis of the terrain and careful preloading of the bridging elements proved to be the best methods of quickly emplacing a bridge. The bridge was then extracted by CH-47 making it unnecessary to secure the area of crossing. All troops then participated in the attack into enemy areas.

15. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: Operation AHINA was successful because of the vast quantities of enemy material and equipment captured and destroyed. Intelligence had indicated that the area had long been an area of VC supply for units in War Zone "C". By disrupting the means of transport (sampans and trucks) and capturing much of the stores future VC operations will be hindered. The large quantities of good CHIQM weapons and munitions found indicates that the VC continued to be well supplied in this respect, probably from northern War Zone "C" and Cambodia. All evidence indicated that only rice and foodstuffs, as opposed to weapons and munitions, are being transported from the SAIGON River and adjacent areas.
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Report (ROS: MACV J3-32)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

F. M. CROCETTI
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

NOTE:

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of their COAAR JUNCTITY CITY. This report has already been
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APO San Francisco 96268

AVDDC-G 4 June 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AHIHA.

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AC of S, G3
APO US Forces 96225

1. (U) NAME OF OPERATION: AHIHA
3. (U) LOCATION: Western Binh Duong and Eastern Tay Ninh Provinces.
4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 25th Infantry Division.
5. (C) COMMANDERS:
   3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
   2d Bn, 22d Inf (M)
   3d Bn, 22d Inf
   2d Bn, 77th Arty
   3d Support Bn (Prov)
   Co C, 4th Engr Bn
   44th IPSD
   COL KENNETH E. HUELL
   LTC RALPH W. JULIAN
   LTC JAMES E. HILMAR
   LTC FRED J. MURRIT
   MAJ RICHARD W. HOOVER
   CAPT CARL B. SCHEPKE
   LT ROBERT T. FERNER

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:
   2/22 Inf (M)
   3 Tns 44th IPSD
   3 Tns, Co C, 4th Engr Bn

   3/22 Inf
   3 Tns 44th IPSD
   3 Tns Co C, 4th Engr Bn

   Bde Control
   2d Bn, 77th Arty
   Co C, 4th Engr Bn

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:
   a. Artillery:
      (1) The 2d Bn, 77th Arty supported the 3d Bde for the
          duration of the operation.
      (2) Positions Occupied:

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<th>COORD</th>
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<td>N/A - N/A</td>
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<td>CH4/7</td>
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<td>15 May - 19 May 67</td>
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Incl 1.
(3) Artillery Statistical Data:

(a) 105 mm 

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(b) Preplanned Missions:

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(c) Missions by type

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<td>2</td>
<td>Support</td>
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</table>

(b) USAF:

(1) Tactical air was used in support of immediate requests and preplanned missions. Standard air request channels were used.

(2) Statistical Data:

(a) Missions:

- Preplanned missions requested: 30
- Preplanned missions flown: 25
- Preplanned sorties: 63
- Immediate missions requested: 1
- Immediate missions flown: 1
- Immediate sorties: 3
- Combat proof missions requested: 2
- Combat proof missions flown: 2
- Combat proof sorties flown: 3

(b) Results of Tactical Air:

- VC KBA (EST): 2
- Structures destroyed: 4
- Bunkers destroyed: 27
- Trench destroyed (motors): 75
- Secondary fires: 9

(c) Engineer Support:

(1) Three engineer teams and one senior NEC were attached to each of the 3d Brigade's infantry battalions. On D-Day, the 3/22 Inf air assaulted an area west of the Saigon River. The 3/22 Inf secured a bridgehead (X749552) across the river. At 1100H a CH-47 took off from Dau Tieng and initiated the air delivery of engineer troops (1 sortie) and LTR bridging (6 sorties). These sorties were completed by 1130H. After site reconnaissance and bank preparation (this stretch of the river had never been bridged), construction was initiated (1330H). The bridge required 10 pontoons and the gap was 125 feet. The first vehicle, an M-113 from the 2/22 Inf (H), to reach the bridge crossed it at 1617H. The bridge was extracted the next morning. Between 1050 and 1100H the engineers and bridge were flown out of the bridgehead.
(2) The Ist Bde, 9th Div planned to place 2 AVLB's across the Raoh Sanh Del (XT390628) and Suoi May Tau (XT397632). They were unable to accomplish this due to high water and enemy mines encountered. On D+1 the LTR used by C/4th Engs was flown in for 4/15 Engrs reinforced by 1 platoon of C/4th Engs. The LTR was placed across the Raoh Sanh Del on the evening of D+1. On D+2 a trestle and 2 dry spans, airlifted to D+1, were used to cross Suoi May Tau. The LTR and the trestle and dry spans were extracted by 1st platoon, 6/4th Engs and 4/15 Engrs on 18 May, and were flown by CH-47 (12 sorties) back to Camp Rainier.

d. Army Aviation:

(1) Initially on 13 May the 3/22 Inf was airlifted to XT4666 using 4 sorties from the 187th CAH Co and Co A, 25th Aviation Bn. A total of 499 personnel, combat loaded, were lifted in less than two hours.

(2) The second lift was conducted on 13 May by two CH-47's from the 213th CAH Co. In seven sorties (one of personnel, six of bridge) they lifted an LTR (Light Tactical Raft) and one platoon of engineers to XT499562.

(3) On 14 May the LTR was extracted. The 152d CAH Co lifted the bridge out and carried it to a crossing site being used by the Ist Bde, 9th Div. The 3/22 Inf used the same CH-47 with hoist to extract wounded from an area where there was no landing zone for a UHLD. The battalion was resupplied by dropping C-rations from a UHLD.

(4) On 15 May the 213th CAH Co lifted one battery of artillery from Dau Tiong (XT492473). Ten sorties were used for the lift and an additional seven sorties were used for supply.

(5) On 16 May 2 UHLD's were used to resupply the 3/22 Inf and six sorties by CH-47 were used to resupply the 2/22 Inf (H). On the backhaul from 2/22 Inf (H) 270 bags of rice and seven men were evacuated to Camp Rainier (Dau Tiong).

(6) On 17 May routine resupply was conducted for the 3/22 Inf by UHLD.

(7) The 2d Bde Aviation Sections supported Operation AHINA flying 219 sorties to complete 125 missions and carried 167 passengers. There are 13 medical evacuation missions using 33 sorties in the above totals.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence concerning the Brigade TAOR for Operation AHINA was obtained from 25th Division, 52, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, 52, 4th MI Detachment, Tay Ninh Sub-sector, VR sightings and past operations.

b. Information received indicated that there were a number of base camps unlocated during Operation JUNCTION CITY, and this area is considered to be one of the main junctions of north-south and east-west supply infiltration routes in War Zone C. Enemy units believed to be operating within the area were some unidentified elements of the 7th NVA Division (XT2465), unidentified elements of one local force company (XT4456) and a local guerrilla unit securing the supply routes and caches.

c. As the operation began forces were unopposed as they started their search and destroy mission. Large amounts of foodstuff, particularly rice, were located along with livestock. Also located were a great number of well constructed bunkers, trench systems and many huts, all of which were destroyed. The polished rice was evacuated. Captured documents confirmed elements of Group 42 Rear Service operated in the area.
There were many modes of transportation discovered during
the operation. One sampan with USAID motor, Briggs and Straton was
located via XT45595. Three trucks were discovered, one burned
by a previous airstrike, the other two were evacuated to base camp.
The truck demolished by a previous airstrike is considered to have been
in use recently, the remaining two probably were in use 6 to 8 months
ago. Also located were four bicycles and 20 lbs of parts; two of the
bicycles were rigged for heavy loads.

On 16 May 1967 forces located a weapons factory at
XT45595. Munitions found were 16,000 mine parts, 48 rifle grenades,
38 hand grenades and equipment to manufacture small arms. Documents
dated 1967 indicated that the site was subordinate to military region IV.

The following are the VC contacts made during Operation
AHINAT: On 14 May 1967 the 3/22 Inf via XT43567 made contact with
VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (SO), 1 WIA (Foss) and 1 light machinegun
captured. On 15 May 1967 3/22 Inf via XT425573 made contact with
a small VC force employing SA and B-40's resulting in 1 VC KIA
and 1 AK-47 captured. Later the same day 1/22 Inf (M) via
XT4543568 made contact with an estimated squad employing SA and
claymore mines, with unknown results. On 17 May 1967 contact was made
by both 3/22 Inf and 2/22 Inf (M). Initial contact was made by 3/22
Inf via XT417682 with an unknown number of VC resulting in 5 VC KIA
(VC), 3 AK-47 rifles and 1 B-40 AT weapon. 2/22 Inf (M) via XT4543568
encountered an estimated reinforced squad in well fortified trenches
employing SA and B-40's resulting in destruction of 2 APC's, VC
losses were unknown. In all of the engagements no unit identification
could be determined.

9. (C) MISSION: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division in conjunction
1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was to conduct offensive operations
to destroy VC/HVA forces and installations in War Zone C.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

The 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div was to conduct offensive operations
employing two battalions in conjunction with 1st Bde, 9th Inf Div.
The operation was to be conducted in five phases:

a. Phase I: D-3, One battery 2/77 Arty moves overland to My
  Minh.

b. Phase II: D-Day, H-Hour (120630H May 67), 2/22 Inf (M) was
to attack along AXIS SNAKE to engineer bridge site, cross Saigon River
and relieve 3/22 Inf of security of bridge site. 3/22 Inf was to conduct
airmobile assault from Camp Rainier to LZ HOOD (XT6555), secure the 12
and engineer crossing site. 2/4th Engr was to airlift one platoon and LTR
into position, remove the bridge upon completion of 2/22 Inf (M) crossing.

c. Phase III: D+1, 2/22 Inf (M) and 3/22 Inf were to conduct
S&D operations in zone toward PL BUSHMASTER. One btry 2/77 Arty was to
move by air to FSB FANG (See overlay).

d. Phase IV: D+2, 2/22 Inf (M) and 3/22 Inf were to continue
S&D operations in zone toward PL BUSHMASTER. One btry 2/77 Arty was to
be airlifted from Camp Rainier to FSB FANG.

e. Phase V: 2/22 Inf (M) and 3/22 Inf were to cross PL
  BUSHMASTER continue S&D in zone toward PL RATTLES, link up with elements
of 1st Bde, 9th Inf Div south of Hwy 13.

f. Fire Support: Tapical air was on call. Direct support
artillery was provided by 2/77 Arty.

References:
COPORD 7-67, Hq 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div, dtd 10 May 1967.
FRAGO 1 to COPORD 7-67, dtd 12 May 1967.
FRAGO 2 to COPORD 7-67, dtd 15 May 1967.

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11. (0) Execution: CONFIDENTIAL

Chronological Summary:

a. D-Day, 13 May 1967: 2/22 Inf (M) moved overland to crossing site of Saigon River. 3/22 Inf and G/W Engr airlifted to crossing site, employed LTR and all elements of the 3/22 Inf (M) crossed the Saigon River by 1800. There was no enemy contact, however 3/22 Inf found 300 lbs cordite and one sampan with tools, gasoline, and motor in the vicinity of crossing site.

b. D+1, 14 May 1967:

(1) 2/22 Inf (M): Companies A&B conducted S&D operations in zone and Company C along with Recon Platoon provided OP security. At 0800 Co A found a base camp at XTB5371 containing 20 bunkers and 300 meters of trench. At 0900 at XTL5567 Co A received 3A fire from the west from an estimated one VC. Fire was returned with no results. At 1200 Co B found a small base camp with five bunkers 0418 at XTL63571. At 1230 the BN OP displaced to a new site via XTL7577. At 1345 BN OP closed XTL7577. At 1400 Co B found a hut with bunkers under them, two bicycles and a few documents at XTL6567. The huts and bunkers were destroyed. At 1445 Co A found 3 VC trucks, one of which had been destroyed by an airstrick. The other two trucks were evacuated. At 1500 Co C found 2/22 Inf (M) destroyed the area.

(2) 3/22 Inf (M): Continued S&D operations in assigned zone and at 1100 Co C made contact with 1 VC, with following results: 1 VC KIA, 1 AK-47 captured via XTL2573. At 1430 the BN established a night defensive perimeter via XTL2573.

(3) 2/77 Arty: A/2/77 moved by convoy to PEB FANO.

b. D+2, 15 May 1967:

(1) 2/22 Inf (M): Units conducted S&D operations in zone and Co C along with Recon Platoon provided OP security. At 0800 Co A found three graves which appeared to be one month old at XTL5390. At 1100 at XTL5050 Co A found 3,000 lbs of bagged rice, 300 lbs bagged beans, two quarts and one empty 55 gal drum. At 1200 Co A at XTL5050 found documents, two bicycles, one classroom, one rifle grenade, nine clothing, 300 rds 7.62 ammo, one box of plasma and 50 lbs of polished rice. At 1300 Co B at XTL5258 found 12 five g bottles of coconut oil, 30 two and one-half gallon cans of beans and 20 lbs of polished rice. The rice was mildewed and one bottle of oil was discarded. At 1400 Co B at XTL6567 Co B found a VC body in a grave which was estimated to be 3-4 months old. At 1500 Co C had a training patrol depart the perimeter. At 1700 Co C at XTL5050 found one mass hall 14X140, five huts 8X10, 600 lbs of polished rice, one AT mine, booby traps throughout the area. All items were destroyed except the rice which was evacuated.

(2) 3/22 Inf: BN continued S&D operations in assigned zone and at 1400 Co A made contact with 1 VC, with following results: 1 VC KIA, and 1 AK-47 captured via XTL2573. At 1630 the BN established a night defensive perimeter via XTL2573.

(3) 2/77 Arty: Hq 2/77 and B/2/77 airlifted to PEB FANO.

c. D+3, 16 May 1967:

(1) 2/22 Inf (M): Units conducted S&D in zone. At 0730 at XTL5390 Co A found seven cows which were evacuated to the 55. At 0950 Co A at XTL5390 found 9 huts, 1 US hand grenade, and 1 US set of fatigue, 1-1.16mm MTR rd that was booby trapped, 2 bicycles, 20 lbs of clothing, 5 lbs of documents, 15 lbs of batteries, 50 lbs of peanuts, 9 lbs of rice and 200 lbs of rice. At 1100 Co A found two bicycles rigged for carrying equipment at XTL5390. At 1300 Co B at XTL5390 found 7 bags of rice, some rifle grenades and one empty box of plasma. At 0950 Co B found 30 lbs of clothing, 150 M-16 rds, 180-30 cal rds, one grenade and various bicycle parts. At 1200 Co C found a booby trapped trench system, 8 cases (500 rds ea.) of 5.56 ammunition at XTL5390. At 1400 Co C at XTL6567 found a large base camp area. Items found were three RPG II rds, 15 rifle stocks, 7 AK-47 magazines, one 12 gauge shotgun, 8l rifle grenades, 18 lbs gunpowder, 1 40 mm rifle barrel, 30 frag grenades.

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3 Claymore hand grenades, 1 M-79 grenade (US), one trip flare (US), one claymore mine, one IED spreader, SKF manufactured gear, one metal lathe (table size), misc machine parts, weapons parts molds, 20 lbs of clothing, 10 lbs of documents, 10 lbs dried fish, 10 lbs of polished rice, 6000 mine adaptors, 200 pistol barrels, 200 rds .30 ammo, 100 ft electrical cord, 50 ft steel cables, 20 coiled springs and one single cylinder engine.

(2) 3/22 Inf: Bn continued S&D operations until 1613H when a bn night defensive perimeter was established via coord X132303.

   a. D+1, 17 May 1967:

   (1) 2/22 Inf (M): Units conducted S&D in zone. At 1610H a second platoon of Co B at X1324847 made contact with an estimated VC reinforced squad. The enemy was well dug in and employed RPG II small arms and automatic weapons fire. Action resulted in 2 APCs destroyed, 1 APC damaged, 8 US KIA and 1 US WIA. At 1720H at X1324847 Co A's maintenance APC detonated an AT mine resulting in 6 US WIA.

   (2) 3/22 Inf: Bn continued S&D operations and at 0915H Co A found 12 old bunkers via coord X1324511. At 1230H Co B had two heat casualties. Casualties were sling-loaded from 12 at 1130H by helicopter. Co A located and destroyed 1 bunker with overhead cover via coord X1324517 at 1230H. At 1314H the bn was halted when Co B made contact with an approaching squad of VC. Contact was broken at 1710H with following results: 5 VC KIA (BC), 1 RPG rocket launcher, 3 rifles captured, 3 US WIA (walking wounded). The bn swept north and reached LTL 13 at 1730H, then moved west along LTL 13 and established a night defensive perimeter via coord X1324526.

   b. D+5, 18 May 1967:

   (1) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0758H Co C departed perimeter to start clearing route to FSB FANG via coord X1328827. At 1013H at coord X1324634 an APC from Co A detonated an AT mine causing moderate damage to the APC and 2 US casualties. At 1112H Co B started receiving RPG II rds and SA fire at X1324503. Two immediate airstrikes, and a light fire team were employed and contact was broken. Action resulted in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. At 1315H all elements of the bn had closed FSB FANG at X1324527 and had assumed security for the entire base.

   (2) 3/22 Inf: At 0601H the bn moved by foot to FSB FANG via coord X1324523 and was helicoptered from FSB FANG to Prek 13o via coord X1327779. The last lift began at 0730H and the 13th (final lift) was completed at 0930H. Upon landing, Co A and the Reconn platoon moved to via coord X1327771 to secure a possible FSB. Companies B and C remained via coord X1327787.

12. RESULTS:

   a. US Losses:

   (1) Personnel: 21 WIA, 7 KIA, 1 DOW

   (2) Equipment: 2 APCs destroyed, 2 APCs damaged.

   b. Enemy Losses:

   (1) Personnel: 7 KIAF (BC), 2 KIA (Poss), In addition 6 graves were located in three separate locations. These were dug up and appeared to have been one to four months old or badly burned from an airstrike, probably napalm.

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(2) Enemy Equipment Evacuated:

**WEAPONS & AMMUNITION**

- 3 AK-47
- 1 SKS carbine
- 1 RPG II rocket launcher
- 1 Gideon IMG, type 56 w/magazine and 100 rds ammunition
- 1 M-1 rifle barrel, receiver group
- 8000 brass mine adapters
- 8000 detonator components
- 100 feet electrical cord
- 200 smooth steel cylinders, believed to be pistol barrels

**FOODSTUFFS**

- 7650 lbs polished rice
- 330 bags unpolished rice
- 7 cans

**MEDICINE**

- 1 roll gauze
- 6 btls toothache pills
- 1 bottle aspirin
- 3 btls misc pills & medicine, type unknown

**OTHER**

- 1 truck, Willys panel
- 1 truck, Landrover type
- 70 lbs clothing
- Misc machine parts, weapons molds
- 1 fire extinguisher w/IDT spray
- 1 single cylinder gas engine
- 20 springs, 3" in diameter 10" long
- 1 outboard engine, 9 HP Briggs & Stratton, w/misc tools and spare parts

**STRUCTURES**

- 12 huts (includes 4 kitchens & 4 classrooms)
- 12 bunkers w/overhead cover
- 1200 meters trench w/foxholes

**FOODSTUFFS**

- Bin unpolished rice 5x5x5'
- Bin unpolished rice 10x5x5'
- Bin unpolished rice 12x6x12'
- 2300 lbs polished rice
- 9 lbs peas
- 50 lbs peanuts
- 1 hog (killed by airstrike)
- 3 quarts cooking oil
- 12 cans (5 gal ea) coconut oil
- 30 cans (2 gal ea) beans

**OTHER**

- 1 truck 3/4 ton dodge, WII type
- Numerous pots and pans, cooking utensils
- 2 fish nets
- 9 bicycles w/misc repair parts
- 2 sampans
- 1 winch w/30' cable
- 2 hammocks
- 2 gal gasoline
- 1 gal kerosene

**ORDNANCE & MUNITIONS**

- 90 rifle grenades
- 63 frag grenades
- 11 anti-tank mines
- 1 RPG II rd w/2 fuzes
- 18 howitzer rds, believed to be Japanese pack-howitzer rds
- 1 81mm rd
- 100 rds .30 cal
- 150 rds 5.56mm
- 4500 7.62 rds (short) for AK-47
- 1400 7.62 rds misc size
- 15 rifle stocks
- 16 magazines, 30 rd "banana" clip for AK-47
- 1 shotgun
- 8 lbs black powder
- 4 M-79 rds
- 1 trip flare (US)
- 1 anti-personnel mine 8" diameter
- 6 CBU bomblets
- 300 lbs cordite
- 5 casings for shape charge
- 9 60mm mtr rds
- 1 shape charge, 10 lb
- 15 lbs batteries
- 1 metal lathe
- 1 drum, 55 gal

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13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Personnel: The SI Section operated from Camp Rainier with reports being sent directly to Camp Rainier.

b. Supply: Operation AHINA was supported from Dau Tiang without any significant difficulties encountered. Aerial resupply was the primary method used and continues to be suitable for operations of this nature.

c. Maintenance: There were no serious maintenance problems during this operation.

d. Status of Each Class of Supply:

(1) A ten day stockage of C Rations and one day of A Rations were maintained at the FSB (3rd Bn).

(2) Class III:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MG Cal.</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JR-44</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVG-32</td>
<td>10 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Class V: Battalions and separate units maintain their basic load plus A1R items in accordance with current directives.

e. Medical: Casualties were evacuated by helicopter to Dau Tiang or Tay Ninh.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT & TECHNIQUES:

A light tactical raft (LTR) was emplaced on an unprepared site after securing it with infantry airlifted into the area. The far side of the river (no 12) was secured by infantry troops crossing with rubber boats. The bridging and engineer personnel were lifted into the site by CH-47s. The bridge was emplaced with no difficulty and an entire mechanized infantry battalion was across the river in less than eight hours from the landing of the bridging platoon. The only reconnaissance made of the area was made by air. The detailed and accurate analysis of the terrain and careful preloading of the bridging elements proved to the solution quickly emplacing a bridge. The bridge was then dismantled and extracted by CH-47 making it unnecessary to secure the area of crossing. All troops then participated in the attack into enemy areas.

15. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:

a. Operation AHINA is considered a success primarily as a result of the vast quantities of enemy material and equipment captured and destroyed. Intelligence had indicated that the area had long been an area of VC supply activity and a major route of supply for units in War Zone C. By disrupting the means of transport (sampan and trucks) and capturing much of the stores future VC operations will be hindered.

The large quantities of good Chicom weapons and munitions found indicates that the VC continue to be well supplied in this respect, probably from northern War Zone C and Cambodia. All evidence indicated that only rice and foodstuffs, as opposed to weapons and munitions, are being transported from the Saigon River and adjacent areas.

b. Lessons Learned:

1. Item: Dissemination of Intelligence.

Discussion: During the operation a mechanized platoon on a reconnaissance mission was ambushed with RPG II and automatic weapons resulting in 7 US KIA, 22 US WIA, 2 APC's destroyed, and 1 APC damaged. The following day the 32 received an intelligence document dated four days earlier giving enemy unit locations and including an enemy regimental size force located approximately two kilometers north of a proposed landing site. Had this information been received earlier a dismounted rifle Co could have been given the reconnaissance mission, thereby possibly avoiding or reducing the effect of the successful enemy action.
Observation: Immediate dissemination of intelligence information is vital to successful exploitation.

(2) Item: Heat Exhaustion.

Discussion: The combination of rough terrain and steady movement during Operation AHINA caused several cases of heat exhaustion, particularly among men carrying the PRC 25 radio.

Observation: In addition to the usual precautions against heat exhaustion it is advisable to alternate personnel carrying radios and other heavy loads.

(3) Item: Radio Communications.

Discussion: Range of the PRC 25 radio is reduced considerably when used with short antenna under heavy jungle canopy. This is especially critical for artillery forward observers moving with ground units.

Observation: A continuous airborne radio relay is the best way to insure reliable communications with direct support artillery.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GILBERT M. REESE
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

19 - Operation Overlay 16/1

DISTRIBUTION:
1 CG, USARV, ATTN: AVC-DH
2 CG, 25th Inf Div
2 CG, 4th Inf Div
30 CO 16th Mil Hist Det
1 31
1 82
3 33
1 64
1 55
2 CO 2/12 Inf
2 CO 2/22 Inf (M)
2 CO 3/22 Inf
2 CO 2/77 Arty
2 CO 3d Spt En (Prov)
1 CO 3/10 Cav
1 CO 8/12th Engr
1 CO 6/588 Engr
1 Radio Research Unit
1 Bde Signal Officer

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (U)

3. (U) Location: Binh Duong and Tay Ninh provinces.
4. (U) Control or Command Headquarters: 25th Infantry Division.
5. (U) Reporting Officer: LTC William A. Bearden, Commanding Officer
   25th Aviation Battalion
6. (C) Task Organization:
   b. Assigned:
      Co A, 25th Aviation Battalion
      Co B, 25th Aviation Battalion
   c. Other Units Under 25th Aviation Battalion Control for Portions of
      the Operation:
      187th Aviation Company (-) APO 96216
      116th Aviation Company (-) APO 96353
7. (U) Supporting Forces: N/A
8. (U) Intelligence: N/A
9. (U) Mission: The 25th Aviation Battalion (+) provided aviation
   support to the 25th Infantry Division during the conduct of Operation Ahina
   to include airmobile combat assaults, aerial resupply, command and control
   aircraft, aerial reconnaissance, and evac, firefly, and armed helicopter
   support.
10. (C) Concept of Operation: 25th Aviation Battalion with 187th Aviation Company (-) and 116th Aviation Company (-) attached was to conduct airmobile assaults for: 3/22 Infantry Battalion from Dau Tieng air field to LZ Knox (X7468567); A Company, 115th Engineer Battalion from PZ (X7469691) to LZ Fang (X7655620); 36th ARVN Ranger Battalion from PZ (X7469691) to LZ Campbell (X7385618) on 13 May 1967. After completion of airmobile assaults 25th Aviation Battalion was to furnish direct support of Operation Ahina as required. This included resupply, command and control, med evac, firefly, and gunship support. The overall controlling headquarters for the aviation support during Operation Ahina was the 25th Aviation Battalion.

11. (C) Execution:


b. B Company 25th Aviation Battalion provided "Firefly" support for the 3rd Brigade 4th Infantry Division for the duration of Operation Ahina. Firefly operations were planned to interdict enemy LOC's. However due to poor weather all but one mission was aborted. B Company 25th Aviation Battalion also provided one UH-1C Light Fire Team in support of the 1st Brigade 9th Infantry Division throughout Operation Ahina.

12. (C) Results:

a. No friendly aviation personnel were wounded in action.

b. No VC were killed or captured by aviation elements.

13. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. Supply: Adequate

b. Maintenance: Adequate

c. Treatment of casualties and evacuation and hospitalisation: N/A

d. Transportation: N/A

e. Communications: Adequate

f. Medical evacuation: N/A

14. (U) Special Equipment and Techniques: UH-1C Light Fire Team was successfully used to screen an open flank. Although this involved considerable flying time and netted no VC casualties this technique was successful in preventing an enemy attack on one exposed flank.
15. (C) Commanders Analysis and Recommendations:

a. Tactical operation: No difficulty was encountered with any phase of combat air mobile operations during Operation Ahina.

b. Aerial resupply: Adequate

WILLIAM A. BEARDEN
LTC INF
Commanding