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<tr>
<td>DoD Controlling Organization: Department of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Nov 79 per DoDD 5200.10 document marking; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980</td>
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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (14 Feb 68) FOR OT RD-674185 20 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6o and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

C. A. STANFIELD
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 17TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
APO San Francisco 96240

AVGD-3C

17 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
UIC WDCIAA C5FOR-65 (U)

TO: See Distribution

Section 1: Significant Organizational Activities.

1. (C) General

   a. Mission: The 17th Combat Aviation Group provides command and control of all non-divisional Army aviation assets in I and II Corps Tactical Zones and aviation support to CO, IFFORV and CO, III MAF in support of counterinsurgency efforts in the Republic of Vietnam.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HHC 10TH CAB</th>
<th>HHC 14TH CAB</th>
<th>HHC 52D CAB</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>117th AHC</td>
<td>71st AHC</td>
<td>57th AHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>245d ASHC</td>
<td>161st AHC</td>
<td>119th AHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221st AHC</td>
<td>174th AHC</td>
<td>155th AHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150th ASHC</td>
<td>176th AHC</td>
<td>176th AHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178th AHC</td>
<td>178th AHC</td>
<td>189th AHC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HHC 21ST CSAB</th>
<th>HHC 223D CSAB</th>
<th>HHC 688TH CAB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>111st SAC</td>
<td>165th UAC</td>
<td>45th AHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220th RAC</td>
<td>163d RAC</td>
<td>129th AHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>245th SAC</td>
<td>185th RAC</td>
<td>156th ASHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>282d AHC</td>
<td>219th RAC</td>
<td>192d AHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203d RAC</td>
<td>225th SAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/17 ACS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Troop Air Cav</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Troop Air Cav</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Troop Air Cav</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Troop Cavalry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201st CAC</td>
<td>(Attached for Adm &amp; Logistics)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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AVG-SC

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UIC WD01AA CSOR-65 (U)

ACS = Air Cavalry Squadron
CAC = Aviation Company (Corps)
CAG = Combat Aviation Group
CAB = Combat Aviation Battalion
CSAB = Combat Support Aviation Battalion
RAC = Reconnaissance Airplane Company (O-1)
UAC = Utility Airplane Company (U-1A)
SAC = Surveillance Airplane Company (OV-1)
AHC = Assault Helicopter Company (UA-1)
ASHC = Assault Helicopter Company (CH-47)

c. Organizational Changes.

1) During this reporting quarter, the 212th CSAB and 268th CAB became operational. Operational companies within the 17th CAG were reassigned as follows:

- 48th AHC FROM 10th CAB to 268th CAB
- 129th AHC FROM 10th CAB to 268th CAB
- 196th AHC FROM 17th CAG to 268th CAB
- 131st SAC FROM 223d CSAB to 212th CSAB
- 220th RAC FROM 223d CSAB to 212th CSAB
- 282d AHC FROM 223d CSAB to 212th CSAB

2) The following units arrived in country from CONUS during the month of October 1967 and will become operational during the month of November 1967. Units were assigned as follows:

- 57th AHC Assigned to 52d CAB
- 132d AHC Assigned to 268th CAB
- 203d RAC Assigned to 223d CSAB
- 243d ASHC Assigned to 10th CAB
- 245th SAC Assigned to 212th CSAB
- 7/17 ACS Assigned to 17th CAG

#20lst CAC Attached to 17th CAG

Assigned to IFFORCEW

d. Station List. (Inclosure 1)

2. (c) Intelligence:

a. Escape and Evasion: School quotas for E & E Survival School totaled 62 for the period. This is considered to be the minimum required to train those aviators for whom such training is absolutely essential. Request for an increased quota was submitted to 1st Aviation Brigade during the period and was favorably considered. However, due to priority requirements elsewhere, 1st Aviation Brigade was unable to increase the number of allocations to 17th CAG.

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b. Of 419,544 sorties scheduled during this period, 2761 were delayed and 1043 were cancelled because of low ceilings and restrictions to visibility, i.e., rain and fog. Weather was a major factor in planning operations and individual missions.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities.

   a. Plans: 17th CAG Headquarters and 17th CAG subordinate units provided aviation support for 10 multi-aviation unit sustained operations and for daily company sized and smaller operations in the I and II Corps Tactical Zones. Headquarters, 17th CAG conducted the overall Army aviation planning for the conduct of the major operations and programmed the stationing of its aviation assets to meet the changing tactical situation.

   b. Operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Avn Units</th>
<th>Operation Dates</th>
<th>Major Unit(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRANCIS MARION</td>
<td>119th AHC, 170th AHC, 179th ASHC</td>
<td>6 Apr - 11 Oct 67</td>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>180th AHC, 196th ASHC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACARTHUR</td>
<td>All Above Units</td>
<td>12 Oct - 31 Oct 67</td>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOILING</td>
<td>48th AHC, 128th AHC, 139th ASHC</td>
<td>19 Sept - 31 Oct 67</td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>315th AHC (ATCHD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONG KIL DONG</td>
<td>48th AHC, 128th AHC, 139th ASHC</td>
<td>9 Jul - 30 Aug 67</td>
<td>CRID WKRID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>180th AHC (ATCHD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BI HO IO</td>
<td>129th AHC</td>
<td>1 Sep - 27 Sep 67</td>
<td>CRID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAE PUNG</td>
<td>129th AHC</td>
<td>17 Sep - 31 Oct 67</td>
<td>CRID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OREGON</td>
<td>14th CAB, 74th AHC, 174th AHC, 176th AHC, 178th ASHC</td>
<td>18 Apr - 15 Oct 67</td>
<td>TF Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMERICAN</td>
<td>14th CAB</td>
<td>15 Oct - 31 Oct 67</td>
<td>Americal Div</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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UIC WDCIAA CSFOR-65 (U)

71st AHC
161st AHC
174th AHC
176th AHC
178th ASHC

OMEGA
189th AHC
Recurring
5th SFG

PRAIRIE FIRE
189th AHC
Recurring
MACV

161st AHC
174th AHC
176th AHC
178th ASHC

189th AHC
Recurring
5th SFG

189th AHC
Recurring
MACV

174th AHC
282d AHC

C. Training:

(1) During the reporting period the number of persons attending RVN AAMTAP Schools were:

**UH-1 Airframe:**
- UH-1B - 12
- UH-1C - 9
- UH-1D - 20

**CH-47 Airframe:**
- T-53 Engine: 11
- T-53-(L-13) Engine: 16
- T-55 Engine: 17
- Avionics & Aircraft Supply: 18

(2) In the AHC's there was a reduction in the average experience level of both aviator and maintenance personnel as more younger, inexperienced aviators and mechanics came into the group directly from aviation training centers. In addition, a few CH-47 qualified WO's W-I have been received in the ASHC's. This latter trend is welcomed since it may eventually provide enough junior personnel in the ASHC's to permit assignment of some more experienced second tour Warrant Officers in the AHC's. Because they are normally CH-47 qualified, most experienced Warrant Officers are of necessity assigned to ASHC's at this time.

4. (C) Logistics.

a. The average aircraft availability rate for 17th CAG was 81.4%; average EDP was 5.3%, and EDM made up the remaining 13.3% of downtime.

b. During the quarter, 196 aircraft transfer transactions took place. These transactions were the result of gains or losses due to combat or crash damage, modernization programs, or turn-ins resulting from heavy maintenance requirements. These figures are significant in that they indicate a considerable manhour expenditure. (See Incl 2).
5. (U) CIVIC ACTION

a. Medical Service

(1) An active Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) throughout 17th Aviation Group spent $8,400.00 during last quarter.

(2) The Group Headquarters dentist treats 10-15 Vietnamese orphans per week.

(3) MEDCAP includes treatment of acute and chronic illness and immunization against common diseases as well as instruction in the use of soap and water and proper disposal of wastes.

b. Religious Activities.

(1) One Sunday each month donation from the Chapel offering is given to the Christian Servicemen's Center, which serves all military personnel in the Nha Trang area.

(2) A donation of 30,000 piastres ($250) was presented to the Evangelical Clinic (VNCS - sponsored) for construction of a kitchen to be utilized by families of clinic patients. At present the roof for the kitchen is nearing completion.

6. (C) Personnel.

a. Command Relationship;

(1) Colonel Bill G. Smith, Infantry, commanded the 17th CAB throughout this reporting period.

(2) Changes of command.

(a) On 7 Aug 67, LTC Carroll C. Issacs assumed command of the 7th CAB vice LTC William C. Ponder.

(b) On 6 September 1967 LTC Edward P. Lukert assumed command of the 52d CAB vice LTC Paul G. Smithey.

(c) On 20 August 1967 LTC Harry W. Townsend assumed command of the 268th CAB vice LTC Frederick D. Whiting III.

(d) On 1 October 1967 LTC Leslie H. Gilbert assumed command of 225th CAB vice LTC John H. Richardson.

b. 17th CAB personnel strength as of 31 October 1967
AVIATION STRENGTHS: MANNING LEVEL AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commissioned</th>
<th>Warrant Officer</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 17th CAG</td>
<td>20/38</td>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>196/196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th CAB</td>
<td>71/67</td>
<td>135/120</td>
<td>892/794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th CAB</td>
<td>99/79</td>
<td>246/135</td>
<td>1513/1150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d CAB</td>
<td>128/109</td>
<td>295/250</td>
<td>1569/1543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212th CSAB</td>
<td>154/120</td>
<td>63/61</td>
<td>1032/994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>246th CAB</td>
<td>72/61</td>
<td>154/120</td>
<td>798/824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223d CSAB</td>
<td>155/123</td>
<td>62/56</td>
<td>637/736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/17th AC Regt</td>
<td>78/50</td>
<td>96/83</td>
<td>604/859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201st Corps Avn Co</td>
<td>8/15</td>
<td>18/10</td>
<td>89/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>764/690</td>
<td>1070/891</td>
<td>7517/6559</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. The 17th CAG is authorized 90% manning level of aviators.

7. (C) Signal

a. Planned expansion of HF communication has begun with the issue of the new family of Single Side Band radios, AN/VSC-2 Radio Teletype. Other HF radio equipment is scheduled for the 17th Combat Aviation Group at a later date. (See Inclosure 5)

b. Presently there are 12 each AN/VSC-2 HF radios in 17th Combat Aviation Group. They are distributed as follows:

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Unit
17th Aviation Group 2
Aviation Battalions 7
7/17th Air Cav Squadron 2
225th SAC 1

8. (C) Aviation Safety. (See Incl 6)

9. (U) Public Information Office.

Support to the Press, Period 1 August - 31 October 1967

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>17th Avn Op</th>
<th>All Bns</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Printed releases</td>
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<td>143</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pictorial releases</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hometown printed releases</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hometown pictorial releases</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taped interview releases</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major projects planned</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal press interviews</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsmen and media</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>representatives supported</td>
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Section II: Commander's Observations and Recommendations

Part 1: Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (C) Personnel.
   a. ITEM: Personnel Shortages.

   Discussion: A continuing shortage of enlisted personnel with selected MOS's existed throughout the reporting period. As of 31 October 1967, this command was short 106 personnel in infantry MOS's and 320 aircraft maintenance personnel. The shortage of maintenance personnel is further aggravated by the fact that few experienced maintenance specialists and NCO's have been received as replacements. As a result, E-5 and E-6 slots are being filled by E-3 and E-4's.

   Observation: Security Forces are being re-evaluated by the command. Schedule X's have been submitted to establish necessary security forces as TD units.

   b. Commissioned Officer/Warrant Officer Ratio.

   Discussion: The Commissioned to Warrant Officer ratio continued to align itself with the programmed 40%/60% criteria. At the end of the period, 41% of the assigned aviators were commissioned, as compared with 47% at the end of the last reporting period. There was a reduced number of commissioned officers available. Within the commissioned grades, there was an imbalance of field grade officers with respect to company grade officers. Field grade officers were normally utilized at battalion or higher headquarters, and the result was a loss of command experience at platoon or section level. At the end of the reporting period, this command was authorized 61 aviators in the grade of Major with 167 actually assigned. There were 27 LTC's assigned as opposed to 8 authorized.

   Observation: Any further decline in the commissioned versus WO ratio will adversely affect command and control.

2. (C) Operations
   (None)

3. (C) Training and Organization.
   a. Training
      (None)
   b. ITEM: TOE Deficiencies.

   8 CONFIDENTIAL
Discussions: The personnel authorization for Group Headquarters is inadequate for SE Asia stabilization operations. This also is true of most command and control organizations.

Observation: The Corps front and Corps communications system for which a Group Headquarters was planned does not exist in RVN. It will probably never exist in a Stabilization Program. The capability of the Group Commander and staff to move, observe, and control over the wide expanse of operation required by Stabilization operations does not exist in the Aviation Group TOE. Yet, this requirement can possibly be met by the present TOE in a non-nuclear conventional war with defined fronts.

4. (C) Intelligence
   (None)

5. (C) Logistics
   a. ITEM: Safety of Flight Messages.

Discussion: This Headquarters recognizes that occasionally in aircraft maintenance, situations develop that require immediate attention. Procedures now call for engineering agencies, normally AVCOM, Project Managers, and AMC, to estimate the magnitude and impact of a situation and quickly determine whether the situation warrants the grounding of an entire fleet of a given type of aircraft. However, when a grounding directive is issued, the commander retains authority to continue to operate his aircraft based on the combat or emergency situation.

Observation: There appears to be no middle ground. A situation is either treated as a fleetwide grounding, with an occasional "within ten hours after receipt of this message" perogative to allow for limited mission performance and maintenance scheduling flexibility, or the matter is handled routinely. Further, the title of "Safety of Flight" infers, to the uninitiated, that the entire fleet is going to fall from the sky, and reduces the unit's confidence in its equipment. With the exception of the OH-6, the AH-1G, and the U-21, the entire Army fleet is time-proven. With proper maintenance and inspection at unit level, the fleet will operate. The result of these safety of flight messages is that each level of command in RVN evaluates the situation, based on what is sometimes an incomplete understanding of the engineering problems and the effect of the failure on the part or system in question, and decides whether to fly or to ground the aircraft.

b. ITEM: Order-Ship Time for Aircraft Repair Parts.

Discussion: Information available to this Headquarters indicates that the best possible order-ship time for aircraft repair parts, not available at local DSU's is four to five days. This "best
possible" is reserved for issue of EDP parts. Issue of routine replenishment requisitions would probably average between 20-30 days, again for parts which are not in the local DSU's. Delays are the result of:

(1) Time to transceive from DSU's to Saigon (58th Trans Bn) is, at best, two days. This service is reserved for EDP requisitions. Routine requisitions from 17th CAG DSU's average about six days between the date of the DSU voucher number is assigned and the day the requisition is received in Saigon.

(2) Parts remain on the Tan Son Nhut ramp from one to three days awaiting transportation, after they have been palletized to meet USAF requirements for C-130 shipment. Though every effort is made to expedite the palletizing process there are often not enough parts for a particular DSU to meet the requirements placed on the 53th by USAF. For example: This might result in five small EDP parts being placed in a "consolidated parts crate" today, another five tomorrow, or two or three additional ones on the next day to complete the crating process even after other parts, ordered on routine requisitions, are used to fill the crate on all three days.

(3) Outsized cargo containers, such as main rotor blades, helicopter transmissions, etc., are not moved rapidly due to apparent USAF reluctance to handle these bulky items.

Observations: Neither 17th CAG maintenance detachments nor 54th GS Gp DSU's are allowed to compute order-ship time as authorized in AR 711-16, per USARV Reg 711-2. This affects stockage levels to an appreciable degree and has, on several occasions, resulted in zero balances and resulting EDP requisitions. Transceiving time, though the best possible with present nets and equipment, results in time consuming delays. With the present equipment, in fact, requisitions for parts available in the soon-to-be activated depot at Qui Nhon may take two to six days to be processed by the 58th's ADP equipment, and another one to two days to be transceived or teletyped (with it's inherent "garbling" problem) and received in Qui Nhon. Pending receipt, installation, and development of an operational capability on newer ADP equipment and communications/transceiving equipment, in fact, the establishment of the Qui Nhon depot may well increase, rather than decrease, present order-ship time, except for the 79th Trans Co at Qui Nhon and the 339th Trans Co at Phu Hiap. Reduced USAF capability, comparing flights originating in Saigon and Qui Nhon, may add further increases to order-ship time, particularly for DSU's in Pleiku and Chu Lai. It may be necessary to establish CH-47 pick up runs to the depot on an "as required" or scheduled basis, as is now done to the depot in Saigon.
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UIC WDCIAA CSFOR-85 (U)

6. (C) Signal
   a. ITEM: Communications.
      Discussion:

      (1) The radio teletypewriter set AN/VSC-2 is an excellent piece of equipment. It provides the capability of rapid long range voice and secure teletype traffic to higher Headquarters and subordinate units. The range of this set using the 15 foot whip antenna, greatly exceeds the 50 miles listed in the TM. Experience utilizing the whip antenna has indicated good communication can be maintained between VSC-2's for distances up to 200 miles. The reliability of the AN/VSC-2 at this time, is not satisfactory. The set has had several maintenance problems. The 106 power amplifier has been the source of most problems encountered by the 17th Combat Aviation Group.

      (2) Lack of trained personnel to operate the AN/VCS-2 properly is causing undue down time. Many of the personnel who attended operator training for the AN/VCS-2 have rotated, creating a shortage of qualified personnel. DS and General Support facilities do not have repair parts or repairmen trained for maintenance of the AN/VSC-2. Sets have been down as long as two weeks merely waiting a capacitor.

      Observation: A log of maintenance difficulties is being maintained to pinpoint recurring problems for EIR submission, if required. The problems outlined have been discussed with 1st Aviation Equipment Training Team in the near future.

7. (U) Aviation Medicine.
   a. ITEM: Medical Support - Group Headquarters.
      Discussion: The original Aviation Group organization plan designed the Group Surgeon's office as a staff section. Apparently the Group Headquarters was to receive area medical care. However, at the onset of operations, the Group Surgeon was expected not only to perform the duties of a staff officer but was also to provide medical care to the headquarters as well as to the supporting units in the area.

      Observation: The situation compromised both medical care and group-wide staff responsibilities. The problem was solved by assigning another flight surgeon and several medics to the Group Surgeon's office. This extra flight surgeon is responsible for local aviation medicine and has no staff duties.

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1.1 Combat Medic Badge

Discussion: Within an aviation brigade, flight surgeons, three medical aidmen per medical detachment, and one medical aidman assigned to the office of each group and battalion surgeon are authorized to be on flying status. They may participate in the actual combat assault phase as dictated by mission support requirements in accordance with USARV Regulation 40-23, change 2.

Observation: These medical personnel do, in fact, participate in combat assaults and provide medical assistance both on the ground and in the air as necessary. They are often times subjected to hostile fire as are medics assigned to infantry units. Authorization for these select medics to wear the Combat Medic Badge would be a significant morale boost and would enhance esprit-de-corps.

Part II Recommendations.

1. (U) Personnel.
   (None)

2. (U) Operations.
   (None)

3. (C) Training and Organizations.
   a. Ref: Section II, Part I, para 3b.

   b. Recommend that a concept of cellular augmentation be considered particularly with a view to assist primary staff members and aircraft to enable command and control over extended areas. The cellular concept would preclude the requirement for MTOE's to be submitted each time a new situation presents itself. This is in fact suggesting the Brigade unit concept be carried down to a Headquarters TOE level with the advantage of tailoring a Headquarters to meet a mission.

4. (U) Intelligence.
   (None)

5. (C) Logistics.

   (1) Recommend that a category of message be established,
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

AVCD-88

UIC WDCIAA CSPQR-65 (U)

15 November 1967

titled, for example, "Immediate Attention", to be applied to maintenance situation involving engineering shortcomings on a time-proven aircraft fleet which bear abnormal scrutiny.

(2) Recommend that "Safety of Flight" category messages be reserved for absolutely catastrophic engineering deficiencies.

(3) Recommend that both "Immediate Attention" and "Safety of Flight" messages include a discussion, however brief, of the known magnitude and probable result of the problem in question to enable commanders to make more intelligent mission decisions.

(4) Recommend that both categories of messages be distributed through command channels.

b. Ref: Section I, Part I, para 5b:

(1) Recommend that, in addition to USAF Support now furnished, one 5-123 be placed under operational control of the 14th Trans Bn (AM&S) every day.

(2) That above aircraft be committed even though utilization factors, in terms of tons carried, may not be comparative to USAF-desired standards.

(3) That this aircraft service be continued even after establishment of Qui Nhon depot.

(4) That units be authorized stock aircraft repair parts computed against a 15 day order-ship time per AR 711-16, and CINCUSARPAC message Conf OPLO-MM257, dated 22 Jan 67.

G. (C) Signal

a. Ref: Section II, Part I, para 6a and 6b.

b. It is recommended that another operator training program be established, not only for the AN/VSC-2 but also for other new radio equipment scheduled for issue in the near future.

c. DS and General Support facilities should have additional assistance from factory technical representatives for instruction repairmen in the maintenance of the AN/VSC-2. Additional float stock should be on hand to help alleviate extended down time.

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7. (U) Aviation Medicine.
   
   a. Ref: Section II, Part I, para 7a.
      
      (1) It is recommended that consideration be given to the provision of either an organic or an attached medical treatment facility to Group Headquarters that is separate from the staff surgeon's section.

   b. Ref: Section II, Part I, para 7b.
      
      (1) It is recommended that careful consideration be given to modification of the regulation governing the award of the Combat Medic Badge to include medical personnel that participate in aerial combat assault missions as required by USARV Reg 40-23, change 2.

8. (U) Aviation Safety - No Recommendations.

9. (U) Public Information Office - No Recommendations.
AVFA-CC-OT (17 Nov 67)  1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 October 1967  UUG WCGIAA OSFOR-65 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350  5 DEC 1967
TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96307
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

This headquarters has reviewed the 17th Combat Aviation Group
Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31
October 1967 and concurs with observations and recommendations of the
basic document except as follows:

Reference Part II, Section II, Paragraph 5b, Commander's
Recommendations (page 13): Nonconcurs. Since the date of this report,
service has been expanded to where each DSU receives delivery of three
C-130 pallets daily, except at An Khe where two are delivered. Pallets
which are identified as bearing EDP parts are moved ramp-to-ramp within
24 hours. Thus, an EDP part put on a pallet today, will be placed on
the ramp tonight and delivered tomorrow. Similar service can be
arranged when the Qui Nhon Depot becomes operational.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JAMES P. GASTON
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

15
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AVBA-C (17 Nov 67) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
UIC WDCIA CSFOR-65 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96375 DEC 1 1967

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVMG-DSJ, APO 96375
Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GFOR-QT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, (ACSF/DA), Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the subject report of the 17th Combat Aviation Group and concurs with the report as issued except as indicated.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Reference Sect II, Part I, para 7a, pg 11: The requirement for an aeromedical detachment at Nha Trang is recognized as being valid. At this time there are no aeromedical detachments available for assignment to Nha Trang. Presently, the 17th Combat Aviation Group Surgeon's section is performing the aeromedical detachment mission at Nha Trang although it is not staffed or equipped to do so. Three detachments, originally scheduled to arrive in-country during October 1967 have been delayed. One of these detachments may possibly be assigned to Nha Trang upon arrival in RVN.

b. Reference Sect II, Part I, para 7b, pg 12: Interpretation of AR 672-5-1 by Department of Army authorizes award of the Combat Medical Badge only to medical personnel assigned to combat units. Aviation personnel, as combat support elements, do not qualify under this interpretation.

c. Reference Sect II, Part II, para 5a, pg 12: Non-concur. The provisions of AR 95-18 are sufficiently definitive to retain the necessary flexibility without unnecessarily compromising safety. Routing of safety-of-flight messages through command channels would undoubtedly impose greater delays than the existing system. Timely notification is the primary consideration. Para 7 of AR 95-18 provides for non-compliance (i.e. "Unit or major commanders may authorize non-compliance with safety-of-flight messages when combat operations or matters of life or death in civil disasters are of sufficient urgency to override the probable consequences of continued operation").

d. Reference Sect II, Part II, para 6, pg 13: The 1st Signal Brigade is conducting, at Long Binh Post, a school for AN/VSG-2 operators. Subordinate units of this command have been requested to submit their operator training requirements. This headquarters will consolidate training requirements and

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Declassified after 18 years
DOD DIR 5200.20

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AVBA-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
UIC WD51AA CSFU-65 (U)

Schedule attendance to 1st Signal Brigade classes as quotas become available. AN/VSO-2 maintenance problems are well known. This headquarters has prepared a letter detailing all AN/VSC-2 maintenance problems within this command. 1st Logistical Command is attempting to reduce this problem by obtaining better trained repairmen and through expansion of spare parts supply.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[signature]

JAMES M. GOLDBAUGH
1LT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
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AVHGC-DST (17 Nov 67) 3d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
UIC WDCIAC CSFOR-65 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 9 JAN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group (DCIA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning TOE deficiencies, page 8, paragraph 3b. It is recognized that the Aviation Group TOE does not meet all of the requirements peculiar to this environment. An adequately justified request for a personnel augmentation by the unit concerned may correct this problem area.

b. Reference item concerning Medical Support - Group Headquarters, page 11, paragraph 7; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2a: Concur. Consideration will be given to stationing one of the inbound aeromedical detachments at Nha Trang in support of aviation elements in that geographical area.

c. Reference item concerning order ship time for aircraft repair parts, page 13, paragraph 5b; and 1st Indorsement: Concur with 1st Indorsement. In addition, USARV Regulation 711-2, dated 23 December 1967, authorizes DS units a 15 day order and ship time.

d. Reference item concerning AN/VSC-2, page 13, paragraph 6; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2d: Concur with 2d Indorsement. Unit should submit operator training requirements as directed. Action has been taken through supply channels to obtain adequate quantities of repair parts at DS and GS level.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furn:
HQ, 17th Cbt Avn Gp
HQ, 1st Avn Bde

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Downgraded at 3 year intervals
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D DIR 6290.10

1-67
GPOP-DT (17 Nov 67)  4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period
Ending 31 Oct 67 from Hq, 17th Cbt Avn Gp
(UIC: WDCIAA) (RCS CSFOR-66)

Hq, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558  31 Jan 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report
and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report
as indorsed except as indicated below.

2. Reference Part II, Section II, paragraph
7a (page 14): With reference to this paragraph stating
requirement for either an organic or an attached
medical treatment facility to Group Headquarters, the
Office of the Chief Surgeon, USARPAC, has consistently
recommended that a survey be conducted in RVN to determine
proper medical support to the aviation units in terms
of aviation medical service as well as general medical
support.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

G. F. Osbourn
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG
1. (U) Flight Safety

a. Period 1 August 1967 - 31 October 1967:

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b. Aircraft Accidents:

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c. Combat Attrition:

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d. Incidents:

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e. Cumulative accidents rate per 100,000 hours flying time during period: 33.2; Cumulative accident rate FY 68: 29.5
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AVERAGE FLYING HOURS BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

1 August - 31 October 1967

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Inclosure 7
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 17th Combat Aviation Group

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967

CO, 17th Combat Aviation Group

17 November 1967