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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1967(U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

C. A. STANFIELD
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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1st Battalion, 40th Artillery
1st Battalion, 82d Artillery
AVFA-AT-1/40 9 November 1967


(CS CS FOR - 65)(U)

TO: See Distribution

1. (C) General

a. The battalion remains under the operational control (OPCON) of the 12th Marine Regiment of the 3d Marine Division, III Marine Amphibious Force. Only one of the firing batteries is normally in the battalion base camp in the DONG HA COMBAT BASE (YD 236599). All batteries have displaced from base camp at various times for direct support or reinforcing missions. One firing battery is habitually at the ROCK FILE (AD 982542) with the mission of direct support of the infantry battalion with which it is colocated. One battery is habitually at the GIO LINH outpost (YD 214734) with the mission of direct support of the Provisional Artillery Battalion (consisting of the USA battery, two USMC 155mm (SP) weapons, one USMC 8-inch howitzer (SP), one USMC tank platoon, one USMC rifle company, and a combined USMC/USA/Headquarters and tactical FDC), at that location. The battery located at the base camp has the mission of general support of the 3d Marine Division and direct support of small unit operations near the base camp for short periods. The battalion has supported the 1st, 3d, 9th, and 26th Marine Regiments, and the 3d Force Reconnaissance of the 3d Marine Division, the 1st Marine Regiment of the 1st Marine Division, the 1st and 2d LAVN Regiments of the 1st LAVN Division, 1st, 6th, and 8th LAVN Battalions (Airborne), USMC Combined Action Companies, and many resupply convoys.

b. Large numbers of North Vietnamese Army (regular) troops are being located in QUANG TRI PROVINCE and the Demilitarized Zone. Viet Cong activities have also continued. The Marines and LAVN continue to mount operations of up to multi-battalion size. Forward observers from the battalion have accompanied infantry units during the conduct of many of these operations, and are currently operating with three LAVN Airborne Battalions in QUANG TRI PROVINCE. The battalion air observers have obtained little flight time in the past quarter.

c. During the last three months the DONG HA COMBAT BASE has received enemy rocket, artillery, and mortar fire on numerous occasions.

(1) On 28 August the base received 25 to 30 incoming rockets, caliber 122mm and 140mm. Battery C fired counter rocket fires. Later in the day, USMC's found 50 unfired rockets near the grid of the suspected rocket locations at which Battery C had fired. Still later in the day the base received approximately 100 rds of 100mm to 152mm artillery fire. Battery C again fired at suspected artillery locations, but with no surveillance. In the evening, about 17 more rounds were received and Battery C again delivered counter fire on the suspected location. Throughout the day the battalion suffered no casualties, but had one vehicle and trailer slightly damaged.
(2) During the morning of 3 September the base camp received 20 rounds of hostile artillery, estimated to be 152mm, which destroyed the USMC 3SP, 2 POL dumps, and several aircraft. This battalion suffered no casualties, but two of its one-quarter ton trucks and one three-quarter ton truck received light damage.

(3) Three 152mm rounds fell in the base about noon on 12 September without causing damage or casualties to the battalion. On 13 September the battalion suffered one slight casualty and damage to one bunker when twelve rounds of unknown caliber fell in the base camp.

(4) On 21 September the base received 8 rounds of unknown caliber, which did no damage and caused no casualties in the battalion.

(5) The base received incoming artillery fire on five different occasions on 22 October resulting in no casualties or damage to the battalion, and on six occasions 29-30 October with no casualties or damage to the battalion.

d. On 15 October, the recently arrived commander of the 108th FAG fired a round from the Base Piece of Battery B located at the ROCK PILE. This was a ceremony to commemorate the firing of the 250,000th round by the battalion since its arrival in SVN on 26 October 1966. By 31 October the battalion had fired 285,375 rounds in the Republic of Viet Nam.

e. Heavy emphasis has been placed on construction of fortifications for troops and ammunition, office areas, and billets which will withstand the coming monsoon season. Building materials were received in October which allowed construction of tin roofs for nearly all offices, messes and supply rooms.

f. Staff visits to all batteries and frequent command inspections and visits by the Battalion Commander continue to insure a high state of unit readiness and adherence to overall doctrinal guidance provided by DA Field and Technical Manuals, with particular emphasis on the gunnery techniques outlined in FM 6-40.

g. The battalion continues to utilize the high burst method of registration for all of its registrations. In those areas where observation post and target area survey are not available the high burst technique has been used in conjunction with the AN/MPQ-4A Counter Mortar Radar. Registrations are conducted to the north and south when clearance to fire can be obtained. Wind cards are used to compute GFT settings in other directions. Registrations are conducted concurrently with metrological soundings, and subsequent metro messages, received three times daily, are used for computing up-to-date met plus Ve, GFT settings.

h. The battalion will become a part of 108th Field Artillery Group on 1 November 1967.

2. (U) Intelligence.

a. Due to the large turnover of personnel in September and
October, many clearances and clearance validations were required. The following was accomplished:

- Secret Crypto authorized — 5
- Secret Clearances granted — 10
- Secret Clearances validated — 36
- Confidential Clearances granted — 3

b. A recent change in USAIW regulations allows the Battalion Commander to grant Secret security clearances. Individuals with a favorable local file check and whose records contain evidence of a favorably completed National Agency Check (NAC) or Entrance National Agency Check (ENTNAC) are eligible for receipt of this clearance. However, personnel continue to arrive at the battalion without the Number 1 copy of DA Form 3027 or DD Form 1584 authenticated by DODNCC. This lack of documentation causes an unnecessary delay in granting a clearance and additional administration to locate the proper documents.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities

a. Plans. Current plans for the battalion are:

1. To provide artillery support in defense of the DONG HA COMBAT BASE.
2. To be prepared to move firing batteries to any location in QUANG TAL PROVINCE, to provide artillery fire support.
3. To provide one firing battery in direct support of the Provisional Artillery Battalion located at GIO LINH for an indefinite period.
4. To provide one firing battery in direct support of the infantry battalion located at the DONG PILB.
5. To conduct training as outlined by USAIW training directives, and conduct sufficient section training to insure that all units and individuals are capable of performing their missions.
6. To continue camp construction with heavy emphasis on personnel shelters.
7. To maintain administrative control of 235th and 238th Counter Mortar Radar Detachments which provide counter mortar surveillance for the Provisional Artillery Battalion at GIO LINH and the 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines at X. TOT BONG (YD 134646).

b. Operations.

1. The battalion has continued to provide direct, reinforcing, and general artillery support. It has participated in operations KINGFISH, HIGH TSI, SNI.TOR, and MEDINA.
2. Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters Battery and Service Battery have remained in the battalion base camp at the DONG HA COMBAT Base. The firing batteries have continued to rotate between positions in the base camp, the DONG PILB, and GIO LINH. Thus, any one battery is not required to remain at GIO LINH, in an environment where maintenance of equipment is extremely difficult and incoming hostile artillery occurs on a daily basis, for a period longer than one month.
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(3) Battery A began the reporting period in the base camp in the DONG HA COMBAT B.S., with the mission of General Support of 3d Marine Division under the OPCON of 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery. It displaced to the ROCK PILI on 5 August, assuming the mission of Direct Support of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division. The battery returned to DONG HA on 6 September, preparatory to displacement to GIO LINH on 8 September. At GIO LINH the mission was Direct Support of the Provisional Artillery Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division under OPCON of that headquarters. On 1 October the battery returned to DONG HA with a mission of General Support of the 3d Marine Division and under the OPCON of 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery. On 7 October Battery A (-) displaced to a position near QUANG TIl (YD 318544) to reinforce the fires of 1st Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division under the OPCON of that battalion. The battery minus provided fire support for units engaged in operation MLINH until sufficient artillery of the 11th Marines displaced from D. NANG to support the operation. On 11 October the battery minus moved to a new position near QUANG TIl (YD 312551), retaining the mission and control relationships. The battery minus returned to DONG HA on 19 October where they remained until the end of the reporting period.

(4) Battery B began the reporting period at the ROCK PILI firing position with the mission of Direct Support of 3d Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division under the OPCON of the 1st Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division. The battery displaced to DONG HA on 5 August preparatory to occupation of GIO LINH. Occupation of GIO LINH was accomplished on 7 August and the battery assumed the mission of Direct Support of the Provisional Artillery Battalion under OPCON of the Provisional Artillery Battalion. On 8 September the battery returned to DONG HA and assumed the mission of General Support of the 3d Marine Division under the OPCON of the 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery. On 29 September the battery returned to the ROCK PILI to resume the mission and control relationships described above. During this period the infantry battalion was changed and the battery supported the 3d Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division, with OPCON unchanged, until the end of the reporting period.

(5) Battery C began the reporting period at GIO LINH in Direct Support, and under the OPCON, of the Provisional Artillery Battalion. The battery returned to DONG HA on 7 August and assumed the normal mission for the base camp firing battery: General Support of 3d Marine Division with OPCON exercised by 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery. From 25 to 28 August, Battery C sent one platoon to the ROCK PILI to reinforce the fires of Battery A, with the OPCON of the platoon being exercised by Battery A. On 6 September the battery displaced to the ROCK PILI, in Direct Support of 3d Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division under the OPCON of 1st Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division. The Battery remained at the ROCK PILI until 1 October when it displaced to GIO LINH to be the Direct Support battalion for, and under the OPCON of, the Provisional Artillery Battalion. The battery remained at the GIO LINH outpost until the end of the reporting period.

(6) The general scheme of operations for the battalion and types of missions fired have remained the same as previously reported. The battery at GIO LINH continues to get the most action, and the most
surveillance and damage on targets. It shoots at a large variety of targets which include NVA and VC in the open, camps, fortified villages, suspected enemy locations, active artillery, rocket, mortar, and anti-aircraft gun positions, bunkers, and boats being used for resupply.

(7) The firing batteries at the ROCK PILK and DONG HA have had lucrative targets on certain occasions. Battery A, then at the ROCK PILK, was credited with 26 confirmed and 30 probable enemy KIA in one mission which they fired on 23 August. Battery A and one howitzer from Battery B, firing from DONG HA, received full credit from a reconnaissance patrol for saving their lives on 22-23 October. This mission, which began at 1905 in the evening and continued until 0210 the next morning, involved the expenditure of 400 rounds against an estimated 2 companies of NVA/VC enemy. After the initial adjustments (approximately 30-minutes) all the rounds were fired within 50 meters of the trapped patrol. During the extraction of the patrol by helicopter the artillery fires were coordinated by radio with FA airstrikes, helicopter gun ships, and flare ships. This mission resulted in the successful extraction of the patrol with only one minor casualty.

(8) To insure close support for reconnaissance patrols, one of the battalion fire direction officers conducted informal classes for 3d Force reconnaissance at the DONG HA base camp of that organization. He explained range dispersion, terminal effects of various fuze-projectile combinations, methods of adjusting fires in special situations (with emphasis on the necessity to announce "ANNEX CLOSE") and the various techniques used by the artilleryman to provide close and continuous fire support.

(9) The method of application of the countermortar radar detachments, which are attached to the battalion, changed from that previously reported. The 235th CMR Detachment remained at GIO LINH and was employed under the OPCON of the Provisional Artillery Battalion located there. The 238th CMR Detachment was displaced to I. TOT. BONG on 22 September to provide coverage of the CON THIEN outpost (YD 117698) under the OPCON of 1st Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division. The first afternoon that the radar was absent the enemy fired mortars at the dock area, something which he had not done since the countermortar radar had been placed at the base camp. Later the NVA compound at DONG HA and the hamlet of CAM LO (YD 128595), 9 kilometers west of DONG HA, were attacked by mortars. The Commander of the 12th Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division directed that the maintenance float radar, which had no generator or operators, be emplaced for tactical deception purposes and that the antenna be moved by hand occasionally. Mortar attacks in the area have stopped since this radar was emplaced.

(10) The battalion survey section has rechecked survey control at the ROCK PILK, provided control for this battalion's participation in operation MANDINA, and has established declination stations in each firing battery position.

(11) As of 31 October 1967 the battalion was credited with 552 confirmed and 703 probable enemy KIA since beginning operations in SVN.

c. Training

(1) Training is conducted on a daily basis, and on the job training is being conducted by all sections. Four soldiers from the battalion survey section are used in the PDC as chart operators, two per
12-hour shift. This system allows 24-hour operations on a sustained basis and provides personnel backup in the event casualties are incurred. The men are rotated back to the survey section every 30 days to insure they maintain proficiency in their primary MOS.

(2) Familiarization firing of all types of small arms takes place on a monthly basis, insuring that incoming personnel are familiar with their individual weapons.

(3) Incoming personnel receive a special training period which familiarizes them with the history of the unit, operational aspects of the battalion mission, the battalion SOP, regulations pertinent to their living in SVN, and a general orientation to their new environment with emphasis on the enemy tactics and health hazards.

(4) All personnel receive periodic refresher training on perimeter defense procedures and the emplacement of Claymore mines, trip flares, barbed wire, tanglefoot, and the location of the protective minefields.

d. Chemical. The battalion chemical noncommissioned officer inspects CBR protective equipment and teaches classes concerning operations in a CBR environment even though the battalion has not yet encountered or employed chemical weapons. The presence of CS dispensers and canisters on the firing positions and the high probability of receiving incoming artillery require the constant presence of operational protective masks.

e. Organization. In addition to the three organic firing batteries, headquarters battery, and service battery, the battalion has attached to it, for administrative and logistical control, the 235th and 238th countermortar radar detachments. No additional units were assigned to or under the OPCON of the battalion during this quarter.

4. (C) Logistics

a. Logistical support of the battalion has continued to improve throughout the quarter.

b. The delay in the establishment of a direct exchange facility for repair parts at Task Force DONG HA (a forward element of the 1st Logistical Command) has impaired the maintenance program and requires the requisition of parts which could be more efficiently exchanged locally by the artillery units serviced by the Task Force.

c. A general shortage of repair parts has also impaired the maintenance program. Zero balance of tank-automotive PLL has fluctuated between 2% and 32% per cent during the past quarter. Red Ball Express requisitions, designed to remove equipment from deadline for lack of parts, take 30-90 days between submission of requisition and receipt of parts.

d. During the last quarter, 6 vehicles have been combat losses. One 5-ton truck (M54A2), one 2½-ton truck (M35A2) and one Command Post Carrier (M577A1) have been destroyed by landmines. One three-quarter ton truck (M37B1) was destroyed by hostile A.R.T. fire. Two howitzers (M108) were destroyed by enemy artillery fire.

5. (U) Civil Affairs. The battalion has continued its civil affairs program at DONG HA HAMLET (YD 223610). The Battalion surgeon visits
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the hamlet once each week with a medical team and an interpreter. Treatment has improved in effectiveness as the Vietnamese people gain more confidence in the doctor, drugs, and instructions given to them. Also encouraging is the return of people on a regular basis so effective followup treatment can be given. An immunization program is being planned and a native resident of the hamlet who has received basic medical training is very active in aiding the battalion surgeon during the visits. A very simple building has been constructed to serve as a hamlet dispensary. On each of the visits approximately 100 people are treated by the surgeon. Food and clothing, obtained by donations from the United States, are periodically distributed in the hamlet. Care is taken to give the goods to the hamlet chief and to let him make proper disposition of all gifts.

6. (C) Personnel

a. The battalion suffered 31 casualties during this reporting period. All casualties were a direct result of hostile enemy action. They are categorized as: None KIA; 7 WIA seriously enough to require hospitalization; and 24 WIA, but treated locally and returned to duty.

b. The battalion is having difficulty obtaining Turret Artillery Mechanics, MOSC 45G20. Of the six authorized the battalion, only two are present. This problem has been presented to 108th FA Group, which has had the requirements transmitted by courier to Headquarters USAHW and this problem is expected to be solved in the near future.

c. An enlisted infusion program, to limit individual rotations to the CONUS to less than 25 per cent in any one month, proved very successful. However, no officer infusion program was approved and the officer turnover during the first two months of this quarter was 62 per cent, with 43 per cent of the authorized officer strength rotating during the month of September. The voluntary extensions of their tours by 5 key officers was the saving factor which prevented the loss of 28 officers within a 57 day period.

7. (U) Artillery. The battalion is equipped with the M108 Self-Propelled 105mm howitzer. The M577A1 Command Post vehicle is available for the FDC of each firing battery and two are available for the Operations/FDC/Intelligence complex at battalion headquarters. The absence of hydraulic malfunctions, rapid 6400 mil traverse capability, crew protection, fine mobility, and rapid fire capability of the M108 make it ideal for operations in the DMZ where combat is characterized by battles of short duration with requirements for immediate and intense volumes of firepower. The armor protection afforded by both the M108 and the M577A1 is of great value in the DMZ where the frequency of incoming artillery is high. Counterfire can be delivered immediately with minimal danger to gun and FDC crews.

8. (U) Other. During the reporting period (92 days), the battalion trained on 92 days, displaced on 13 days, and performed tactical combat operations on 92 days.
Section 2 (U) Commander's Observations and Recommendations

Part I Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (U) Personnel: None

2. (U) Operations:

   a. **Item:** Computing Deflection Correction as sum of drift and cursor correction.

      **Discussion:** When deflection corrections are written in the blocks of the drift scale on the GFT, repeated erasure from frequent updating of the GFT setting soon wears off the paper and the scale becomes unreadable. The solution used by this battalion is to compute deflection corrections for low angle in exactly the same way as for high angle fire, except the deflection correction is computed for the initial round only and thereafter is carried as a constant through the mission, as usual in low angle fire.

      **Example:** The deflection correction obtained from a registration is LbFT (+) 13. The drift corresponding to the adjusted elevation of the registration is found to be LbFT (+) 6. The difference, LbFT (+) 7, is written on the cursor and the usual GFT setting gage lines drawn. To compute data for the initial round of a subsequent mission, the manufacturer's hairline is set to chart range, the elevation read from the elevation gage line, and the drift is read, also from the elevation gage line, (for this example LbFT (+) 8). The deflection correction is the sum of this drift and the cursor correction: LbFT (+) 8 PLUS LbFT (+) 7 = LbFT (+) 15. The deflection correction is LbFT (+) 15.

      A subsequent metro yields a deflection correction of LbIGHT (-) 3, with an elevation having a drift of LbFT (+) 5. The cursor correction is deflection correction minus drift: LbIGHT (-) 3 MINUS LbFT (+) 5 = LbIGHT (-) 8. The updated GFT setting is drawn and -8 is written on the cursor. The same subsequent mission would have a deflection correction of LbFT (+) 8 PLUS LbIGHT (-) 8 = 0.

      This method is fundamentally the same as that described by paragraph 335, C2, FM 6-40 for construction of the deflection correction scale and gives identical results.

      **Observation:** By writing on and erasing from the cursor instead of the paper scales the life of the GFT is greatly extended. As many as four GFT settings (for different directions) have been carried satisfactorily on one charge. For multiple settings both gage lines and corrections are labeled. Also, the computer has but one place to look for firing data—the GFT.

   b. **Item:** Rapid wear of breech and firing mechanism parts.

      **Discussion:** Due to large amounts of firing being done near the DMZ, many parts are wearing rapidly, disclosing weaknesses in material and design. All the following improvements have been recently submitted as EIR's.
(1) Several parts of the breech operating handle assembly require improvement. The handle itself bends easily, causing excessive wear on other components and eventual failure of the assembly. A harder, more durable handle is recommended. Latch pins are also too weak, and require replacement at a rate of about five per week at the present time. The operating handle plunger has been bending at the latch pin end, causing the plunger to bind inside the operating handle. Again, harder components seem called for.

(2) Difficulty has been experienced with the firing mechanism failing to cock when the breech opens. This is caused by wear to the tip of the cocking lever, where it rides against the breech ring. A hardened tip, or harder metal for the entire lever, is recommended. Latch pins are also too weak, and require replacement at a rate of about five per week at the present time.

(3) Breechblock closing springs frequently break during heavy firing, although breechblocks are kept closed whenever possible to take the strain off the springs. Redesign of the springs is recommended.

(4) The inner and outer retainer and spring require complete redesign. The spring between the inner and outer retainers, being flexible, permits the two to move on separate axes, causing them to bind. This frequently results in the tube failing to return to battery because of faulty operating cam performance. A scaled down version of the M-109 system, which has a bolt inside of a spring to provide a fixed axis of movement, is recommended.

(5) The firing pin on the firing mechanism wears rapidly, causing frequent pauses for adjustment. A harder pin is recommended.

(6) The four bolts that fit into the breech beneath the breechring work loose easily and require constant tightening, which requires partial disassembly of the breech. A soft lock washer of some type is recommended.

(7) The threads tapped into the hole for the closing spring adjustor detent are easily stripped, especially since the detent must be kept tight for proper operation of the breech. The tip of the detent also wears quickly, lessening the effectiveness of the detent and causing the detent to require even more tightening. Harder metal for the detent and larger threads are recommended.

Observation: Many of the parts of the breech assembly and firing mechanism do not appear to be designed and manufactured in a manner which allows sustained firing of large amounts of ammunition.

Item: Leaking around commander's cupola and cab top escape hatch of M108 Howitzer.

Discussion: The foam rubber-type cupola seals around the commander's cupola and cab top escape hatch become permanently compressed after the hatches are kept closed for any length of time, resulting in leaks.

Observation: The foam rubber seals around the commander's cupola and cab top escape hatch of the M108 Howitzer should be replaced with hard rubber seals. An EIA has been submitted on this item.

3. (U) Training and Organization: None

4. (U) Intelligence: None

5. (U) Logistics: None
Part II  Recommendations

1. (U) Personnel: That complete infusion programs be mandatory for units arriving in Vietnam.

2. (U) Operations:
   a. That the deflection correction factor be carried on the cursor of the GFT, instead of carrying the deflection on the paper face of the GFT.
   b. That serious consideration be given the redesign of many parts of the breech assembly and firing mechanism of the M108 howitzer as enumerated in Item b. of Observations.
   c. That the foam rubber type seals around the commander's cupola and cab top escape hatch of the M108 howitzer be replaced with hard rubber seals.

3. (U) Training and Organization: None

4. (U) Intelligence: That CONUS Commanders insure the number 1 copy of 3027 or DD Form 1584 is present in the personnel records of soldiers for whom a favorable NAC or ENTNAC has been completed.

5. (U) Logistics:
   a. That repair parts resupply receive continued review and supervision by personnel of the highest quality.
   b. That a direct exchange facility be established by TASK FORCE DONG HA at the DONG HA COMBAT Bz.Sq.

DISTRIBUTION:
11-108 FA Group, APO 96267
1-ea Btry, this Battalion
5-S3, this Battalion
TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350

1. Forwarded herewith is the Operational Report of the 1st Battalion (105mm)(SP), 40th Artillery for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967. This report is being forwarded to your headquarters since the battalion was assigned to I Field Force Vietnam throughout the reporting period.

2. Concur in the recommendations made in Part II of Section II of the report, subject to the following comments:

   a. Paragraph 1 (infusion program). A comprehensive infusion program which includes this battalion is currently underway.

   b. Paragraph 5b (DX facility at Dong Ha). A proposal that a direct exchange facility be established at the Dong Ha Combat Base has been made to the task force which supplies logistic support for Army units in the Dong Ha area, but no such facility has yet been established.
AVFA-61-6 (9 Nov 67)
2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(EGS 61003-6-J) (1st Bn, 40th Arty) (U)

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350, 26 November 1967

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT, APO
96350

1. Concur in observations and recommendations contained in basic
communication and previous endorsement.

2. Reference: Section 2, Part II, paragraph 2a, page 10. This
information will be disseminated in a future I FFORCEV Arty Newsletter.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Donald L. Burton
MAJ, Arty
Adjutant
AVFA-QG-OT (9 Nov 67)  3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1967  RCS CSFOR-65  UIC WDFSA  1st Bn, 40th Arty  (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 1 FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350  8 DEC 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

This headquarters has reviewed the 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 and concurs with the observations and recommendations of the basic document and previous indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

B. L. CHENAULT
2LT. AGC
Asst Adjutant General
AVHCC-DST (9 Nov 67)  
4th Ind (O)  
(RCS CS FOR - 65)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375  
19 JAN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT,  
APO 96552

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons  
Learned for the period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion,  
40th Artillery (DFSA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comment follows: Reference item concerning direct  
exchange facility, page 6, paragraph 4b; page 10, paragraph 5b; and 1st Indorse-  
ment, paragraph 2b: Nonconcur with the recommendation on page 10, paragraph  
5b. The detachment of the 85th Light Maintenance Company is too small to pro-  
vide DX support. An attempt is now being made to assemble an ASL for support  
of the units in the Dong Ha area and be operated as a small technical supply  
facility. This action should improve the support required in the area to a  
satisfactory degree.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting  
unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

D. E. TUMAN  
Major, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

Furn:  
HQ, 1st Bn, 40th Arty  
HQ, I FFORGEV

Downgraded at 8 year Intervals  
Declassified after 13 years  
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 from HQ, 1st Bn, 40th Arty (UIC: WDPSAA) (RC8 C8F0R-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 80 JAN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

HEAVRIN SNYDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967

**CO, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery**

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