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IN ACCORDANCE WITH
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6a and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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C. A. STANFIELD
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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196th Light Infantry Brigade
4th Brigade, 6th Infantry Division
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96256

(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION!

Operational Report for Quarterly Period (RCS CSFOR-65)
Location: Vicinity, Chu Lai (RT550015), RVN
Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Frank H. Linnell
Prepared by: Lt Patrick A. Di Napoli, Brigade Staff Historian

1. Significant Organizational Activities:
   a. Personnel and Administration:
      (1) Personnel General:
         (a) Infusion and Rotation Program:

         1. To reduce the rotational hump which would have occurred in July 1968, an infusion program was devised accordingly. This plan provided for the infusion on 429 EM and 21 officers with the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. Briefly stated, the plan provided for this Brigade to ship personnel in approximate numbers to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade and to receive a similar number of replacements from the pipeline. Major problems encountered were mainly air transportation problems and non-receipt of some replacements from the pipeline in KOS's and quantities required.

         2. As a result of a change in October 1967 in USARV's policy for the computation of rotational humps, new rotational humps were encountered. The previous method of computing humps was based on assigned strengths; however, in October the method of computation was changed and required humps were to be computed based on authorized strengths. Since the Brigade had been operating with an over-strength, new humps were incurred for some months. Further, the policy required separate computation for officers (including warrant officers) and enlisted men. Since the Brigade had never implemented an effective infusion plan for officers, when humps were computed, almost every unit came up with a hump for June and July. Where possible, these hump problems will be solved within the Brigade and with other Brigades of the Americal Division. Where hump problems can't be resolved in this manner, they will be reported to USARV for solution in accordance with applicable USARV directives.

      (b) Personnel Records: The problem of replacements arriving
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without records has been greatly reduced. This has been caused mainly by the change in Department of the Army policy which now permits all personnel to hand carry their records. Actions are still being taken to obtain records which were previously not received. Also, actions are being taken to dispose of records of individuals who were scheduled for assignment to this command, but were apparently diverted to some other unit in RVN.

(c) Assignment Instructions: Although the Brigade has experienced an increase in the timely receipt of assignment instructions, some difficulties are still encountered in this area. USAV has been most helpful and cooperative and has taken prompt action to obtain missing assignment instructions when so notified. This is an area that is kept under continuous surveillance.

(d) MOS Shortages: This command is experiencing an MOS shortage in the senior grade 11 series: 61 Auth, 164 Asg. We have also had shortages in experienced senior grade replacements in the supply and maintenance field (MOS series: 76 10 Auth, 3 Asg, 7 E6's on Sect.11 req; MOS series: 63 2 Auth, 0 Asg, 2 on Sect. 1 requisition). We have requisitioned the appropriate senior grades, but have been receiving grade substitutions one grade lower than the required grade. In the 8th Sect., there are two positions, 63E50, for which replacements were requisitioned for July 67. To date we have not received fill action.

(e) Eligibility for Promotion: For the months of September, October, and (projected) November, we have not been able to promote any personnel from grade E3 to grade E4, due to an excess of personnel in higher grades. This problem was compounded somewhat by a special M4 allocation in October 67 to 28 E4 promotions, to be used without regard to position vacancy. We have no problem in the E5 and E6 areas, and are receiving cancelled Section 11 requisitions on senior grades, for which promotions are made as quotas are received. On May 68 requisitions, 18 positions have not been cancelled: (6-11F50, 1-11F30, 1-13F0, 1-13H0, 1-31M0, 171H0, 2-76H0, 1-76H0, 1-76Z0, and 1-95D20). For June 68 requisitions, 1-11F50, 1-31M0, 3-76H0 have not been cancelled.

(2) Personnel:

(a) Strength as of last day of report period:

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<td>3733</td>
<td>4011</td>
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<td>Asg</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>4428</td>
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<td>249</td>
<td>25</td>
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(b) Losses and Gains:

1. Losses for the period:

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2. Gains for the period:

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<th>AGG</th>
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<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>1019</td>
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(c) Key personnel gains:

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<tr>
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<th>POSITION</th>
<th>DATE ASSUMED</th>
<th>DATE REIGNED</th>
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<tr>
<td>COL GINING, Louis</td>
<td>Bde 06</td>
<td>31 Oct 67</td>
<td>12 Jun 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC THOMAS, Jack D.</td>
<td>Bde XO</td>
<td>1 Aug 67</td>
<td>16 Sep 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJJ BOWE, John O.</td>
<td>Bde S-1</td>
<td>1 Oct 67</td>
<td>13 Jul 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJJ LOGCH, Laddie N.</td>
<td>Bde S-2</td>
<td>8 Sep 67</td>
<td>2 Aug 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJJ KLE DONALD, Bruce S.</td>
<td>Bde Surg</td>
<td>4 Aug 67</td>
<td>11 Jul 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJJ LITE, Frederic N.</td>
<td>Avn Staff 0</td>
<td>7 Sep 67</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC REASE, Grady G.</td>
<td>CO, 8th Spt</td>
<td>10 Oct 67</td>
<td>4 Jul 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJJ FORSETH, Frank R, Jr.</td>
<td>XO, 8th Spt</td>
<td>11 Oct 67</td>
<td>18 Jun 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>MJJ OATIS, John N.</td>
<td>Bde AG</td>
<td>19 Aug 67</td>
<td>18 Aug 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC LAMBERT, Lynn N., Jr.</td>
<td>CO, 2/1st</td>
<td>11 Oct 67</td>
<td>9 Jul 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJJ WILLET, Frank Jr.</td>
<td>S-3, 2/1st</td>
<td>1 Aug 67</td>
<td>28 Jun 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>MJJ DEVEREY, Davis M., Jr.</td>
<td>CO, 569th MID</td>
<td>11 Sep 67</td>
<td>9 Sep 67</td>
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(d) Awards and decorations approved: DFC 2, SS 19, LCH 12, SH 8, SS 103, AU 57, LCH 206, PM 196

(3) Administrative Services:

(a) Staff Judge Advocate:

1. During the subject period, 17 August 1967 to 31 October 1967, the scope of the Staff Judge Advocate activities expanded in terms of heavier volumes of legal assistance cases, supervision of courts and boards activities, and general administration.

2. There were approximately 230 legal assistance cases processed.

3. There were five (5) General courts processed, thirty-eight (38) Special courts, and four (4) Summary courts processed.

4. Foreign national claims and solatium diminished in volume slightly, reflecting greater care on the part of Brigade units, and an increased emphasis on safety. During the subject period, approximately thirty-five (35) solatium payments were processed. Incidents of service claims increased markedly over the preceding period, twelve (12) such claims were processed.

(4) Financial:

(a) General:
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1. Financial operations during the period have remained unchanged. The extreme work levels experienced during the buildings in June and July leveled off during August and September, with an increase in October due to the infusion with the 199th Brigade. No major problems were encountered. However, the high turnover of Finance clerks in November was solved by the early assignment of replacements.

2. Total payments made on Military Pay Vouchers for the period was 16,000.

3. Formal record of pay complaints has not been maintained since it is felt that no major problems exist in this area. Pay complaints are dealt with on an individual basis, and corrective action taken immediately. This section has had one case of IO interest, and that was caused by an error outside this command. The problem was resolved to the satisfaction of both the member and IO.

4. Total travel vouchers processed during the period including POS, Dep TVL, and MW was 1587.

5. Chaplain activities:

   (a) General comments on activities.

   1. Religious coverage continued to be the primary concern of the Brigade Chaplain Section.

   2. The arrangement of having an assistant brigade Chaplain attached to each of the line battalions and the 8th Support Battalion has proved to be highly effective. There has been little difficulty encountered in providing adequate religious services for the Brigade.

   3. Jewish personnel were provided with the opportunity of attending the observance of the High Holy Days in Da Nang. About 50% of them took advantage of the opportunity. Weekly Jewish services are held at American headquarters Chapel.

   4. Hospital visitation was carried out by all the Brigade Chaplains.

   5. The Character Audience Program was carried out by means of distributing handouts on the monthly topic down to the company level.

   6. Area coverage was provided by the Brigade Catholic Chaplains for units that do not have a Catholic Chaplain. In the 3 month reporting period 40 services were provided for these units.

   (b) Total services conducted and attendance:

   1. Protestant - 206 services with 1,156 attending.

   2. Catholic - 335 services with 6,103 attending.

   3. Jewish - No record since services are held by American Division on an area basis. Twelve Jewish personnel from the Brigade attended High Holy Days in Da Nang.
(6) Disciplinary, Law and Order:

(a) Base camp operations:

1. Daily Military Police commitments for the 196th Lt Inf Bde include, but are not limited to, security of the Bde Tactical Operations Center and the HQ, flag detail, manning entrance gates, motor patrols, traffic control points, CHECKPONTs and Vietnamese Nationals, escorting VIP'S and tactical convoys, securing and controlling traffic over bridge areas, and swift boat river patrols. Controlling speed violators, enforcing uniform regulations and conducting criminal investigations within the 196th Bde area of operations.

2. Indigenous personnel are processed through the Main Gate entering and leaving the 196th Bde area and are spot checked, (baggage, parcels, etc.,) by the Military Policeman on-duty. Approximately 11,520 indigenous personnel have been processed to work in the 196th Lt Inf Bde area through joint effort of S-1 and the Provost Marshal Office.

3. The Military Police Platoon does not have a HF collections point as such, however 2 MP's assigned to each of the Bde battalions are responsible for transporting HF's to the division HF collection point from the battalion concerned. Exact amount from August 1 1967 to October 1967 is 1 HD.

4. 56 convoy escorts were conducted by the 196th MP platoon. Also the platoon is involved for TCP's, escort duty and brigade security for all tactical operations in the brigade area of operations.

5. The MP Platoon assists customs and company commanders in ensuring that all privately owned firearms are properly registered by enforcing HMV Directive 210-5 with Change 1.

6. Law and order. 118 non traffic violations, 83 traffic violations, 30 CDF cases and 20 motor vehicle accidents were investigated. There were 7 motor vehicle connected fatalities during the period.

(b) Tactical support:

1. The 196th MP Platoon was involved in 5 operations, Hood River, Benton, Golden Fleece, Wheeler and Walla-walla.

2. The exact number of detainees processed is unknown, see paragraph (f) # above.

(7) Postal Services:

(a) General - During this period plans and coordination was made with staff sections for Operation Silver Star (Christmas and New Year Season) commencing on 1 October and terminating on 31 December 1967.

(b) Mail processed (pounds):

1. Received - 152,799

2. Dispatched - 70,474
(c) Total amount of money Orders sold was $1,008,601.27.

(b) Total amount of stamps sold was $1,630.00.

(8) Post Exchange Services:

(a) During the quarter, a mobile PX Barber shop was introduced to the troops of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. It has most of the stateside luxuries and has five chairs. A Laundry pick-up point was opened beside the Brigade PX and a tailor shop was added near the end of the quarter, the tailor shop does mending, sewing, etc.

(b) Total sales for the quarter were $1,926,80. This is lower than previous quarters due to limited merchandise and beverages available from the Da Nang area.

(c) Plans are now being made to move the PX to the rear area on our future move via daily truck service to the forward areas until a PX can be built, this may again produce a low quarter in sales.

(9) Special Services Activities:

(a) Since last quarter we have received from the 3rd Division, and distributed to units of this Brigade 20 Athletic and Recreation kits, 10 Televisions, 10 Radios, and 3 Tape Recorders.

(b) There have been six (6) USO shows:

1. Robert Stack visit Aug 1967, Attendance: 400
2. William Paleyson visit 20 Aug 1967, Attendence: 400
5. Roll & Soul Show, 5 Sept 1967, Attendance: 500
6. Americana's Children, 26 Sept 1967, Attendance: 500

(c) Number of R & R:

1. In Country:
   a. Yung Tan (Aug - Oct): 60

2. Out of Country:
   a. via Cam Rahn Bay (Sept): 187
   b. via Da Nang (Aug - Oct): 1776

(d) There have been 526 film showings.
b. Operations:

(1) General: The Brigade is assigned the mission of securing the Chu Lai airfield and administrative complex, of providing a shield for Revolutionary Development within the TaO and without it as directed. During the period 1 August to 31 October 1967 there was one major operation and 1,223 small unit operations, the major operation and 47 small unit operations resulted in enemy contact.

(2) Operation E-TOCA

(a) Inclusive dates: 110020 August to 010000 Sept 67.

(b) Task Organization:

1. 1st Battalion 14th Infantry (-)
2. 2d Battalion 1st Infantry (-)
3. 3d Battalion 82d Artillery (-)

(c) Task Force Oregon directed the 196th Inf Bde to conduct operations in zone to locate, fix, and destroy VC/NLA forces and resources.

(d) Location: Quang Tin Provence RVN.

(e) Operation E-TOCA was a search and destroy operation. Troops moved to the area of operations by foot and by helicopter.

(f) Results:

1. Friendly Losses:
   a. KIA 1
   b. WIA 40
   c. ARVN Interpreter WIA

2. Enemy Losses:
   a. VC KIA (C) 87
   b. VC KIA (F) 89
   c. Detainees 104
   d. VC POW 4
   e. Returnees 1
   f. Weapons 25
   g. AT mines 1
   h. AP mines 51
   j. Small arms ammo 810 rds
   k. Shotgun shells 2525 rds
   l. Hand grenades 12
   m. Arty rds 2
   n. 250 lb bombs 5

7.
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- Booby traps 145
- Bankeys 173
- Tunnels 140
- Fox Holes 3
- Trenches 10
- Caves 2
- Structures 151
- Punji stakes 153
- Punji pits 9
- Rice 1505 lbs
- AA positions 4

(3) Artillery:

(a) Rounds fired: 53,819

(b) Results:

1. VC KIA (C) 12
2. VC KIA (P) 109
3. Structures destroyed 4
4. Bankeys destroyed 0
5. Secondary fires & explosions 1
6. Sampan's destroyed 0

(4) Air Support:

(a) Number of Tactical Sorties flown: 1124

1. VC KIA (C) 73
2. VC KIA (P) 81
3. Structures destroyed 606
4. Bankeys destroyed 174
5. Secondary fires & explosions 36
6. Sampan's destroyed 0

(3) Training and Organization:

(a) General: The overall training status of the Bde. remains excellent. Upon reporting to the Brigade each enlisted man attended a six day and each officer a three day orientation course at the Charger Academy.

(b) 81 officers and 1,229 enlisted men processed through the Charger Academy during the reporting period.

(c) The 196th Lt Inf Bde submitted a number of recommended changes to the organization during the reporting period. These almost, without exception, apply to HQ and administrative units which require augmentation in order to adequately accomplish their support mission.

1. MTOE's were submitted on the following units.

2. Hq & Hq Co 196th Lt Inf Bde MTOE 77-102T.
2. An HTOE was also submitted on F Troop 17th Cav. This HTOE 17-57G was an attempt to place the IRAP in the command structure of the cavalry troop. It was subsequently disapproved at USARV where a separate HTOE action is proceeding to create it as a separate divisional unit.

3. Incomplete TOE action is currently taking place at USARV, creating a communication company from organic resources within the separate brigades. This action combines the organic communication platoon of the Hq & Hq Co and the attached signal platoon of the brigade under a single company command structure. This action is not yet completed, although the company is currently functionally reorganized.

6. Scout Dog Platoon and Activities:

   a. Scout Dog Team Strength: 12

   b. Number of Operations: 181
   1. Combat patrols: 32
   2. SED: 61
   3. SOC: 10
   4. Ambush: 37
   5. Outpost: 9
   6. Recon: 9
   7. Village search: 23

   c. Results: 2 VC dunnics, 3,130 lbs rice, 1 rifle, 1 fuse plug (155mm), 67 tunnels and spider holes, 1 bunker, 2 Ls, 2 ammo clips, 2 punji pits, 2 grenades, 2 booby-traps, 1 mortar round, 3 shirts, 6 used 105mm and mortar rounds, 2 huts, and unknown amount of documents, paper, food, clothing, wire, batteries, and tools.

   d. Training status: Continuous training daily.

   e. Casualties:
   1. Handlers: 1 KL, 1 WKL
   2. Dogs: 1 KL, 1 WKL
   3. VC: 3 KL, 1 PD
(7) Chemical Activities

(a) Reporting period: 1 August 1967 to 31 October 1967.

(b) The Chemical Detachment during the reporting period had initiated several important new developments in Chemical Corps warfare and expanded on accepted areas of interest. The Chemical Corps is responsible for the following areas of activity in Vietnam: (1) Personnel Detection, (2) Riot Control agent employment, (3) Defoliation, and (4) Flame Field expedients. Because of the mission and the situation of the Brigade, the 27th Chemical Detachment has engaged in the first three of these areas listed. The Personnel detection-Sniffer program was launched by the Detachment in August and has continued to the present. This program has proved itself to be an invaluable source of intelligence both for Brigade operations and the validation of intelligence information. In the field of riot control agents, the Detachment has "seeded" tunnels (to deny enemy reentry), employed CS grenades in a tactical role by aerial delivery assisting maneuvering troops, and terrain denial using CS-1 and the plant detecting fuse, 147/1473, which we devised. The Detachment also has participated in defoliation, by assisting the Brigade 3-3 air in Ranch Hand requests (Air Force defoliation program) and by doing base camp and security defoliation. This defoliation is done in both the ground and aerial mode, for the various units of the Brigade. The basic natures of these activities will not change but will vary only as the mission of the Brigade varies.

(c) Listed below are the significant activities of the 27th Chemical Detachment for the reporting period, Aug 67 to 31 Oct 67. Extracted from the detachment operations log.

1. 07 Aug 67 - The Detachment conducted a sixteen (16) drum CS-1 drop via B54/0974 to B54/0974 with all drums falling on target. No dust.

2. 10 Aug 67 - The Detachment conducted an aerial defoliation exercise using a gravity fed 55 gallon drum apparatus filled with diesel fuel. The target was a ridgeline west of the Brigade base camp and a proposed bunker site via B54/1013. Results very poor because of the strong vitality of the foliage.

3. 11 Aug 67 - LT Campbell visited the 3d Brigade, 4th Inf Division and 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to obtain ideas concerning Chemical activities in Vietnam. Valuable information on the employment of CS-1 was obtained.

4. 16 Aug 67 - LT Campbell instructed 1/31 on the employment of CS-1 to deny tunnels and spider holes to returning enemy. The Battalion was favorably impressed and decided to try it.

5. 17 Aug 67 - LT Campbell and SFC Jenkins went to the field with 1/31 to instruct the unit in actual employment of CS-1 in tunnel denial.

6. 18 Aug 67- LT Campbell and SFC Jenkins instructed 1/14 at their field location on tunnel clearing, flushing and denial.
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7. 22 Aug 67 - The Detachment conducted a twenty-five (25) drum CS-1 drop via B/309006 to B/309006 for 3/21. Area was completely covered with desired heights of burst covering the target area. Drop was within two hundred (200) meters of friendly troops and no hazards were incurred. One drum was destroyed by following artillery.

8. 25-28 Aug 67 - LT Campbell visited B/393 and procured twelve (12) drums of 2,4,5T herbicides. Also coordinated with H/IF in an attempt to locate fifteen (15) MPDs and some ENSURE items.

9. 30 Aug 67 - The Detachment defoliated ridge-line via B/309013 using 2,4,5T herbicide. A UH-1 with a .50 gallon drum gravity feed was used giving complete kill within two weeks. (One part defoliant to four parts water used.)

10. 30 Aug 67 - The Detachment conducted a fifty (50) drum CS-1 drop via B/309006 to B/309002 for 2/1. Eight drums resulted from faulty fuse lighters and were destroyed by artillery and airstrikes. Target was an enemy H/IF.

11. 15 Sep 67 - The Detachment defoliated H/IF bunker line around the base camp perimeter using H/IF and a 250A from 90th S/S. Mixture was 1:1 and kill resulted in two days.

12. 15 Sep-20 Sep 67 - LT Campbell visited 1st Infantry Division at Mm, 9th Infantry Division at Bareat and USARV Headquarters. Valuable information concerning Chemical employment and H/IF usage was obtained. Seven "sniffer" missions were flown with the 1st Division. H/IF machines and parts were obtained from General Electric Chemical Representatives at USARV Headquarters. USARV Chemical officer, LC idea, promised to include the 196th LIFK in more ENSURE item allocations.

13. 22 Sep 67 - The Detachment defoliated the base camp perimeter of 2/1 via Hill 69 and Fancon bridge. Kill occurred within twenty-four (24) hours using 1:1 ratio and H/IFs and a 250A.

14. 22 Sep 67 - Sniffer mission was flown west of 3/21 AO resulting in nineteen (19) hotspots. One VG Li (2) was obtained by escorting gunships when he fired on sniffer ship. Weather was good and artillery fired on hotspots for next two days.

15. 25 Sep 67 - Sniffer mission was flown in valley west of 2/1 AO via B/3393 and B/3307. Seventy-one (71) hotspots were recorded and received fifty (50) rounds 50 cal fire plus unknown rounds 30 caliber fire. Light gunship team engaged and artillery plus airstrikes were called on position via B/3002 for four days. Weather was a Battalion of 21st Infantry regiment. Weather good.

16. 26 Sep 67 - Sniffer mission flown west of 3/21 AO. Area consisted of valleys and ridgelines out as far as B/3393 but not returned. Located enemy IEF north of Tri Song. This was 1st mission using a H/IF and his thorough knowledge of area and on call fire-support offered accuracy not previously possible. Team for sniffer missions.

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Consists of ETO, UNO, rescue ship, UNO sniffer ship and light gun team. Located eighty-five (85) hotspots, weather good.

17. 29 Sep 67 - Sniffer mission flown west of 2/1 and ridgeline west of 40 Leopard. This mission was flown twenty (20) kilometers west of 40 Leopard. Located 120 hotspots revealing ISRs and enemy base camp location. Area too far away to be fired on by artillery.

18. 30 Sep 67 - The Detachment conducted a twenty (20) drum CS-1 drop vic 15L265029 to 15L265041 on a sniffer enemy location. A secondary explosion occurred at 15L265041 and two (2) duds resulted.

19. 01 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission flown on ridgeline west of 40 Leopard producing forty-six (46) hotspots. Revealed many ISRs which had been followed for two weeks. Mission followed by artillery fire. Weather good.

20. 01 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission flown in 2/1 40 and ridgeline west of 40 Leopard. Gusting winds to twenty (20) knots prevented accurate readings. Received a few rounds small arms fire vic 15L265044 but was too close to village to return fire.

21. 01 Oct 67 - The Detachment conducted a twenty (20) drum CS-1 drop vic 15L265044 to 15L265074 on a known enemy base camp location in 3/21 AO. Four duds resulted but area was covered.

22. 02 Oct 67 - 52 Campbell instructed NJ Day, CO of GIP and CID units in Chu Lai (Marine) on the use of 53 Launchers.

23. 10 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission flown west of 40 Leopard with few significant hotspots. Artillery fired on hotspot locations. Weather good.

24. 10 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission flown west of 40 Leopard in late evening to determine validity of intelligence report of mortar threat. Ten hotspots recorded and received ten (10) rounds small arms fire that was returned by gunships. Threat proved inconsequential.

25. 13 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission flown in 40 of 2/1 and west of 40 Leopard. Fifteen (15) hotspots received just outside 2/1 AO. Artillery fired on hotspot and ground troops in area received small arms fire from area of readings. Weather good.

26. 13 Oct 67 - Two drums of CS-1 were dropped from a UNO to test our point detonating fuse. The fuse activated in both cases but in one drum the demolitions were improperly placed and did not explode. A fuse lighter was also used as a back up to insure proper detonation.
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27. 16 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission flown west of 2/1 and 3/21 10s. Due to winds of twenty (20) knots no accurate results could be obtained.

28. 17 Oct - Capt. Campbell and 3/21 Jenkins visited 2/1, 3/21 at their field location to instruct them on proper seeding of tunnels for terrain denial. 33-1 usage in 3/21 has proved extremely effective and 3/21 desired to learn the technique.

29. 19 Oct 67 - The Detachment conducted second in a series of tests on the point detonating fuse. Ten drums of 33-1 were dropped with 100% detonation. This fuse has proved perfect and solved a large problem of ineffective 33-1 coverage.

30. 21 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission flown on ridge-line west of 2/1 Leonard inside EFL. Automatic weapons fire was received via 33960838 and three (3) hot spots in area. 19 functioning of IEDs checked out the mission. Winds strong but three readings valid. Gunships and artillery placed fire on the area and a IED was inserted.

31. 21 Oct 67 - The Detachment conducted a 33-1 grenade drop in conjunction with a village sweep via 33961115. Four hundred grenades were dropped on the upwind side of the village while troops swept the area. 406 troops, 3 Co, 2/1, were masked and the US covered the area.

32. 22 Oct 67 - The Detachment tunnel instruction and clearing voen cleared ten (10) tunnels via 33961115 for 3 Co, 2/1. Instruction was also given as to tunnel destruction and denial.

33. 22 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission was flown west of 2/1 10 in valleys there. Sixty-two (62) hot spots were recorded even with winds up to fifteen knots. Winds prevented accurate location of hot spots. Artillery fixed on results.

34. 23 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission was airborne but just as it started, the F was called away to a unit in contact.

35. 25 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission was flown west of 3/21 10 over suspected enemy links. Twenty (20) hot spots were recorded and automatic weapons fire was received via 33967368 and was returned by gunships resulting in four (4) VC K.I. (F).

36. 30 Oct 67 - Capt. Campbell went to USAF Chemical Conference as representative of the 196th L & Inf XE. The conference was an exchange of ideas among all the units present in K1. The 196th L & Inf XE presentation dealt with the point detonating fuse and was well received.

(c) During the reporting period Lt. Dury L. Campbell served as Detachment commander and Brigade Chemical Officer. The Detachment was minus three (3) T08 slots, one (1) 25, 54E10 and two (2) 25s, 54E10.

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a. Intelligence:

(1) General:

(a) Throughout the reporting period enemy forces which are located in the Brigade AO and immediate adjacent areas generally avoided large scale contacts with the 196th Inf Bde except on the 26th and 28th of September when the 2/11 ACR to the north, gained contact with company size units of the 3rd Regiment, 2nd NVA Division and caused heavy losses to the North Vietnamese Companies. Contacts with squads and reinforced squads were common place during the past ninety days. There were four mortar attacks conducted against Brigade units, one against the Chu Lai Defense Command, and four small mortar attacks conducted on Binh Son District Hq and FQ in the vicinity of Binh Son. In response to the Government of Vietnam National Elections, the Viet Cong intensified their propaganda and terrorist activities during the last five days of August, and the first five days of September. Despite the Viet Cong efforts 85 - 90% of the population in the Brigade AO turned out to vote on the 31st of September. Operation Benton, the Brigade's most successful operation since arriving in Chu Lai, resulted in 87 VC KIA (EC), 4 FOIs and 25 individual weapons captured.

(b) Enemy activities were generally confined to guerrilla type activities including harassing, firing, emplacement of mines and booby traps along roads, trails, and other likely avenues of approach. During the reporting period there were a total of 415 VC initiated incidents, including 274 incidents of harassing fire, and 117 incidents of aircraft receiving small arms or automatic weapons fire. A total of 30 incidents occurred where enemy emplaced mines resulted in US casualties or damage/destruction of equipment. Approximately 117 mines were recovered. There were 20 incidents of booby traps causing casualties to Brigade personnel, and a total of 20 booby trap devices were recovered. The number of mines and booby traps found during this period rose significantly, continuing a trend which began during the month of June. Freer persons were injured by mines and booby traps in September than in any other month.

(c) Viet Cong personnel and equipment losses for the period were:

| VC KIA (EC) | 274 VC KIA (EC) = 274 |
| VC KIA (P) | 280 VC KIA (P) = 280 |
| VC POI | 19 VC POI = 19 |
| Individual & Crew Served Weapons | 76 |
| Grain and Rice | 11,590 tons |
| Returns | 5 |
| VC Base Camps Destroyed | 1 |
| Discovered | 1 |

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(2) Significant Viet Cong Initiated Incidents:

(a) On 051235 August, the 1st Platoon, 1 2/1 Inf observed 1 VC standing at the mouth of a cave at vic BS32595. 1 US soldier maneuvered to the mouth of the cave and was suddenly grabbed and pulled into the cave. During the hand to hand combat that ensued, 1 of 2 VC who were sleeping in the cave, became startled and fled from the cave and subsequently was killed by the patrol outside. The US soldier threw the Viet Cong to the ground, moved out of the cave and threw a grenade into the cave resulting in 2 VC KIA (X). 1 US carbine was also captured during the encounter.

(b) On 060105 August, an unidentified VC platoon attacked a Revolutionary Development team at My Van New Life Hamlet at BS599217 from the southwest with SA, AW and hand grenades. RD team returned fire and the VC fled east northeast. Artillery fired illumination and HE in support. 1 RD KIA, 1 RD WIA, 10 VI civilians killed and 18 civilians wounded, resulted from the engagement. VC casualties were unknown.

(c) On 080145 August, an estimated 40 VC entered Huoc New Hamlet at BS779170 and burned all the buildings that US troops frequent. The Viet Con Guerrillas carried SA’s, carbines and hand grenades. The VC had set up an estimated 3-5 lb charge of C4 with blasting cap along side the road at BS779170. (Possible ambush site for reaction force). 5 civilians were killed, 6 wounded and 4 KIA were also wounded. 1 VC was killed during the incident.

(d) On 080150 August, Platoon leader, 1st Platoon, 1 1/4 Inf went outside perimeter of BS296134 to relieve himself and was approached by 2 VC, 1 armed with a SA, the other a knife. The Viet Con attempted to take the platoon leader’s map and weapon. During this hand to hand fight, he was stabbed in the arm and leg. The VC fled south as the platoon leader fired at them. His platoon pursued the VC and found the blood stained knife, but nothing further.

(e) On 100945 August, at BS43918 G Troop, 2/11 ACR received 350 rds of SA and 20 rds M-79 from 200 meters north and south from estimated reinforced VC platoon. Fire was returned with heavy SA and M-79 fire and the area was checked with negative findings. At 1020 hrs, while returning to the Troop CP the unit received 10 rds of SA and 10 rds M-79 at BS564918. Fire was returned and the area was checked with negative findings.

(f) On 111415 August, 2nd Platoon, C 1/4 Inf located at BS77117 received SA fire from 100 meters southeast. Returned fire, swept area and found 3 VC KIA (X), 1 AK R7, 1 M14, and carbine. Several blood trails led to a hootch where 1 VC was seen running. The platoon engaged him resulting in 1 VC KIA (X). Then the unit fired into the hootch causing a secondary explosion which wounded 3 US (Evac), 2 VC KIA (X) were found in the hootch. 8 heavy blood trails were found in the area for 8 VC KIA (P).
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(g) On 1916475 August, a CH-47 helicopter received a hit in the oil line from enemy ground fire at 274672, which caused the aircraft to make a forced landing. 1 US exited to secure the copter and at approximately the same time 2 unknown type rounds exploded beside the aircraft. The pilot immediately took off, unknowingly leaving 1 US on the ground. The pilot circled the area and received heavy ground fire resulting in 1 door gunner UWI. The copter landed at Doc Ho and gunships went to extract the 1 soldiers. A ROXYMC FAC directed air strikes while a USMC helicopter extracted 3 of the soldiers. 196th RDA helicopter, Charger 911, fired suppressive fire along with a Marine helicopter during the extraction, 3/21 Inf sent a reaction force to extract the US WIU at 1810 hrs. Assault aircraft received ground fire as they flew into the LZ. The WIU was extracted and the reaction force lifted out with no casualties. Gunships and swift boats fired suppressive fires during the extraction.

(h) On 201205 August, C 1/14 Inf found an H-23 helicopter in river via BT269123. The aircraft was pointed out by a returnee. The copter was the 196th Inf Bde AVH H-23 that went down at an unknown location on 18 June 67, with 2 officers and 1 1st Sgt aboard. Co C roared SA and A-1 fire as they attempted to approach the aircraft in the river. Later in the afternoon a UH-1D, Charger 911, roared AH fire from BT269122. Gunships assaulted the enemy location and roared ground fire from BT262-125. An airstrike was directed into the area, during which one fighter roared an unknown number of rounds from an enemy location via BT231123. Results of the friendly fire were 9 VC KIA (3G), and 10 VC KIA (F). The H-23 was lifted from the location, and investigation showed numerous holes in the underside of the aircraft. The copter appeared to have made a safe landing. The three persons on the chopper were listed as missing in action.

(i) On 211000 August, B 1/14 Inf roared heavy Mi fire from BT275078 and BT272073. Fire was returned, gunships and Mi air supported in the engagement. Area check revealed the following items: 2 huts at BT275077 contained 2 model 1911 shotguns, 1 US Carbine, 2 SKS, 3 Soviet carbines, 2 shotgun barrels, 400 rounds Soviet 7.62 mm. AP mines, 10 M-79 rds, miscellaneous equipment and misc weapons parts. 2 VC KIA (3G) were found in the area. No unit identification.

(j) On 251845 August, C 1/14 Inf located 3 huts and a cave at BT260115 and engaged 12 armed VC in the base area resulting in 7 VC KIA (2G), and 4 weapons captured. Co C moved to the cave, heard movement and noises inside the cave, and threw a grenade in resulting in 4 VC KIA (2G). The unit destroyed the cave. The following items were captured by the unit: 1 MI rifle, 2 KS 36, 1 Messor 57mm sniper rifle w/scope, 3 rds 5.5 Cal ammo, 2 pouches 1 US survival kit, 1 pair of Air Force sunglasses with black K-Lenses (missing pilot of H-23 found by C 1/14 Inf), 3 red scarves, 1 radio part, 1 pistol belt with ammo, documents, 1 VC gas mask, 7 haversacks, and 6 small shoulder patches with KIQT Hoang 9 on them. No unit identification was made.

(k) On 300010 August, approximately 60 rds of 60 and 82 mm mortar rds landed at BT271033 in the 1st AVH area. 1st rds...
landed near fuel bladders damaging 2, then the rounds were shifted in a
ewestly direction, then a southerly direction to B575029 vicinity
bombed. An APC from 2/11 AR received a direct hit resulting in 1
US KIA and 1 US WIA. - 1 tank APC and Tower 62 engaged mortar firing
position vicinity B574023 and B577023. Casualties were evacuated
at 0215 hours. Counter-mortar program was affected at 0305 hours. 1
soldier from 11th AR was also slightly wounded. C 3/21 Inf found
tracks leading south into Thang An (2). Numerous VC flags, w/red top,
blue bottom and yellow star in the middle were found in vicinity of
B507013. 150 mm mortar rd was found at ET571018 and 1 dud 82mm rd
was found at B571021. - day later 15 more 60mm rds were located at B571021.

(1) On 02/15 September, the CP 1/1h Inf received
30-35 rds 60mm mortar vic B5321h2, 100 meters south of their perimeter.
3/16 Arty observed mortar flashes 1500 meters south and engaged with
50 cal 192, 81mm mortar and arty fired sweeping counter-mortar into grids
B T395125, B395132, south to B3 92125. No casualties and area checked
by D 1/1h Inf revealed 19 craters 100-400 meters south of hill 54.
Exact mortar positions were not located.

(2) On 15/04/5 September, the 1st Plt, 4th/31 Inf en-
route to Phu Long sent 2 point men across the road to check woodline at
B367005. Both men were engaged by Viet Cong hiding in underbrush
resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA and the loss of 1 Hh+ v/jeep and 1
H26. 1st Plt engaged 1 VC v/J599 fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (X). Another VC
body trapped the body v/J grenade prior to their withdrawal.
Bodytrap destroyed. Search of area revealed 1 hand grenade, 2 amm
pouches, batteries, flashlight, wire v/c, expended HE and HE cartridges,
documents and camera w/film. No information of significant value was
extracted from the document.

(3) On 22/015 September, F 2/11 AR received 15-20
rounds 82mm mortar from 200 meters west vic MA16132 resulting in 17
USKIA, 1 sailor WIA, 1 soldier from 2/11 AR KIA, 2 dump trucks, 2
H38 jeeps, 1 front and loader, 1 lube trailer, and 1 jeep radio were
partially damaged. 35 rounds 81mm mortar and 28 rounds 155mm artillery
fired in return. 82mm fins were found inside the perimeter. 1 base
plate impressions, aining sticks, and 16 freshly dug foxholes were
found at the above mentioned location.

(4) On 23/1/15 September, while checking area vic
BM67377 for possible enemy location F 2/11 AR received AW and RP 0-2 f.
fires from the west resulting in a direct hit by 105-2 on 1 APC causing
2 KIA and 6 WIA (3 evac). 1125 hrs gunships fired on area. G & F Troop
maneuvered toward the enemy location. By 1700 hrs, the unit has sus-
tained another US KIA and 7 more WIA. 2015 hrs, units from 2/11 AR
surrounded in estimated 75 VC dug in. Artillery called in location
and heavy contact continued until 2305hrs v/J3 Artillery fired from the area.
Results were 45 v/Js, 8 IT, 300 rds various rd, and 1 105. The 1st Plt
was a company from the 3rd BN Regt.
(p) On 021943 October, at BS65935h D 1/31 Inf at-y behind Plt obs 5-6 VC around 1 corps fire 200 meters west. As the unit approached the enemy position the VC scattered and 1 VC ran into the position and was captured. The suspect stated that Viet Cong was located at Thong Hoa and Phu Long. (3) Hamlets, 2nd Plat 3 1/31 Inf sustained 2 US KI at Thong Hoa Hamlet. At 030905 hours, when a hand grenade was thrown from a spider hole, the platoon engaged the VC in the spider hole with SF fire resulting in 3 VC KI (B) and 1-30 Smith and Mason pistol captured, D 1/31 Inf went to Phu Long Hamlet (3) at 031045 hrs found a tunnel containing 1 ton of rice, Ricqys evacuated and tunnel destroyed.

(q) On 050245 October, at BS59493h 2 4CLV's from G 1/1 CLV and 2 sqs of Inf from 3/21 Inf received 4 mortar rds, 75 meters from their perimeter to southwest CLF L-6 and L-8 obs flashes at BS594922. At 0305 hrs, unit received 200 rds SF fire from 200 meters southwest, at 0315 hrs, received 20 rds SF from the same area. In both cases fire was returned w/S and SJ fire. At 0500 hrs 4CLV's on Western side of bridge received 300 rds SF from 300 meters south. Fire was returned after which the CLV unit moved to the Minh Son bridge to support the PF's who were in contact there. 3 VC were engaged resulting in 3 VC KI (B) and 2 .50 rds and 1 .50 min were found and destroyed.

(r) On 070805 October, E,F and H Troops 2/11 CLV received 40-50 rounds SF from the south resulting in 2 US W's (evac). Fire was returned with SA, at 0900 hrs vic BS262010 E Troop observed 5 VC with weapons 500 meters east and engaged them with SA WW fire, 1 KI in the area received enemy ground fire from H-37410. At 1000 hrs, gunships engaged 10-12 VC at BS260441 resulting in 2 VC KI (B), 1 VC KIA (P) and 1 wounded VC, captured. At 1025 hrs F 2/11 APC received 5/5 rounds SA and returned the fire w/S and WW. At 1120 hrs F Troop sustained 1 US 50 from a hostile booby trap (evac). At 1220 hrs vic BS21325 F Troop observed 1 VC dragging a body east along a trail where F Troop had initially engaged the Viet Cong. Result: 1 VC KI (B). No unit identification.

(s) On 170815 October, at BS63795h the 3d Plat, D 1/31 Inf observed and engaged 7 VC at 500 meters west with SA fire, resulting in 3 VC KI (B) and 3 wounded VC females captured with the following weapons: 1 US carbine, and 2 Hossin Nagans. Wounded VC evacuated to 2/1 sung. 1 VC KI was wearing a holster. Checked area revealed heavy blood trail resulting in 1 VC KI (B).

(t) On 210800 October, at BS 58091h 3rd Plat 3/21 Inf while conducting a sweep, received 1 HG from 1 VC resulting in 2 US W's (evac). 3 VC, 2 of which were females were captured, and 1 VC was engaged with SA, resulting in 1 VC KI (B). The unit captured 1 M1 rifle, 1 M1 carbine and 1 SMG, 53 rounds SL, 1 homemade 100 and 2 magazines; 2 were over to 32 196th Div., 1st Tractor team and 1st Plat No. at BS58913 found 2 homemade satchel charges and 1 VC female in the area. Satchel charges destroyed and the 1 VC were evacuated to RC1 area.
(u) On 21/9/31 October, at BS 10019 a BP security platoon engaged an estimated 12 VC trying to infiltrate perimeters. A fire fight ensued resulting in 7 VC KIA (59). Captured: 1st K9, 2 SMG, 1 Carbine, 2 AK 47 magazines, 2 pistol belts, 59M and a khaki military jacket and 1 RF! from Hung Kiong village was sent to Ly Tin. 3 PF were wounded during the engagement.

(v) On 30/31 October 3/1 C.W. Kaoport via BR 506190 received 50-50 rounds 60mm mortar rounds, ground assault was simultaneous with 81, 37 and 155. Satchel charges were placed under 25 huts resulting in 4 helicopters destroyed and 11 damaged. 7 US from 3/1 C.W. were wounded. 1 RG-2 round, 1 Chicom 92 and 15 satchel charges were found and destroyed. VC withdrew west toward GIP K-1 position. PF from K-1 engaged VC who were fleecing past their positions via BR 189139, resulting in 4 VC KIA, and 1 RF! captured. 2 PF were KIA. PF also captured 1 AK 47, 1 rifle, 1 Chicom 92, and an assortment of web equipment, 1 holster and a bipod for a 60mm mortar were also captured during a search of the area. VC KI stated that 10 VC landed at Fish Island via BR 192138, and reconnoitered until 2200 hrs. 6 boats landed at Ly Hao Island via BR 182138, and set up mortar positions at BR 500159 and 1 other position at BR 501159. PF was a member of 7th mortar company 70th RH, 1st Regt. His statement as to the circumstances of attack were confirmed by the units on the ground search.

(3) Weather generally favored friendly operations throughout the period even though the monsoon season was approaching. Temperatures generally ranged from 70 degrees to 92 degrees. Several heavy thunderstorms were experienced during the period. One electrical storm caused heavy damage to two BP OP areas and temporarily knocked out communications in the Brigade TOC. Another three day storm caused most of the waterways to overflow and flood substantial portions of the T.O.R. Cloud cover, enemy occasions, limited air support and the collection of intelligence information by airborne sensors. Ground fog and haze became increasingly heavy in the mountains during the night and early morning hours.

(k) Terrain in the area consists of coastal plains and isolated hills. Further west of the T.O.R. are the heavily mountainous area, which contains double and triple canopy jungle. The road network in the area is adequate; however, the numerous streams and paddy lands restrict cross-country travel throughout the T.O.R. Except in the isolated areas in the extreme western portion of the T.O.R., where the isolated hills and mountains begin, aerial observation is excellent. In those areas of dense vegetation, aerial observation is limited due to the natural concealment. Ground observation and fields of fire vary from excellent to unsatisfactory depending on terrain contours, hedgerows, the small hillocks and many gullies which are characteristic of the area.

(5) The Long Range Reconnaissance Detachment maintained two OP sites (Hill 213 and Hill 707) provided two six-man saboteurs for a period of three days, and undertook 27 ground reconnaissance missions from 1 August 1967 to 31 October 1967. For a full discussion of ERP employment and tactics in the 196 Infantry Brigade (Light) (Separate) see IRAF after Combat Interview published by the office of the Brigade Historian 7 August 1967. Ground recon mission reports summarized to show specifics of each patrol are as follows:

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(a) DATE: 3-5 Aug 67
LOCATION: BM308/4210
RESULT: Five boys and one girl (woodcutters) walked into IRRP's position on third day. D stars checked out okay. Team compromised. S-2 had been extracted.

(b) DATE: 3-6 Aug 67
LOCATION: BM3597/2399
RESULT: Found old VC harbor site vic BM358773. Moved to BM359711 and heard voices. Called arty but were out of 155 range. Moved into arty range on a 30° line. Observed airstrike on same line. IRRP found trail that lead into valley at cord 15 358773. Observed along trail bundles made up of sticks 1-3 inches in diameter and 10-12 feet long. Moved to harbor site and heard noises from valley. No observations. 6 Aug 67 IRRP got 6° arty to shoot in valley. Had poor cover but noises ceased. Moving to IZ site, IRRP received 1 round of heavy caliber fire. No friendly casualties.

(c) DATE: 7-10 Aug 67
LOCATION: BM4590/4792
RESULT: Observed lights at BM4586 on 60° and 227° thirty meters away. Heard movement in our vicinity from 0721hrs. Aug 0800 hrs Aug 67. Observed 4-5 trails and 2 old cache sites between BM45893 and BM45892. 9 Aug 67 observed 3 civilians taking water buffalo to palo to grass. No friendly casualties.

(d) DATE: 9-12 Aug 67
LOCATION: BM1787/1506
RESULT: 10 Aug 67 observed 77 firing into woodline at grid BM1786. Observed airstrike at grid BM3816 and another at BM3867 on 5 VC in open. Had no KIIs or WIs. Friendly forces in AO talked to villagers. Intown village was stopped at grid BM183 by 30 lha or possibly VC wearing gray uniforms armed with M-1. Confiscated 15 (16) cards. 11 Aug 67 observed VPA directing gunships out of grid BM1863. Observed fire mission ES20610, 5 VC in open, 1 KI confirmed. Observed fire mission at BM7761. Told to CIDG site Phong of Truong Valley and got report of many VC in area and said being mined from grid BM1639 to BM20821. Received sniper fire upon extraction. No friendly casualties.

(e) DATE: 14-17 Aug 67
LOCATION: BM1201/1306
RESULT: 152814 Aug 67 observed 1 VC running into grass hut or cave from BM22014 on 70°. VC left with weapon. 15315-2 more VC entered and armed with what appeared to be carbines. VC calledarty and left where 1 VC had run. 1 possible VC KI. BM1200 - observed 2 VC carrying 1 rifle and 1 mortar tube. Requested fire mission but was denied because of IPs in the area. IRRP unable to observe further. 1900 hrs, observedarty, troopers and heard rifle fire at BM38050. 10 Aug directed 3 tanks to location where 8 persons were hidden in woodline at BM4005. 17 Aug, heard voices and movement near harbor site. Called arty and adjusted it within 100 meters of harbor site. Heard light fire at BM38050. 171310 contact with estimated VC squad. Received 423 tow. 1-79, and heard fragmentation grenades from IRRP position. 423 of 60° and range approx. 10 meters. Returned fire with approx. 800 rds 1-79, 20 rds 1-79. 22 fragmentation hand grenades. 1 VP grenade, and 2 claymore mines. Heard movement to rear and threw 3 fragmentation grenades on
20. Called arty in a location of attack with good coverage for 100 meters. 125 moved out to area where fire had come from to look for bodies. Found 2 drag trails and smelled odor of subdued smoke just beyond claymore site. Called for extraction and request was granted. One man went to take in the one remaining claymore and found it had been turned to the direction of our OP. No friendly casualties.

(e) DATE: 18-21 Aug 67
LOCATION: BM205/439
RESULTS: Observed activities of friendly, air, and arty strikes. 3 cited VC but arty impossible because of nearby civilians. 20205...mg, saw lights with definite pattern at 290° and distance of 2500 meters. Called arty (battery 3 rds), observed large secondary explosion and lights went out. No friendly casualties.

(f) DATE: 22-25 Aug
LOCATION: Vic of BM206937
RESULTS: 22 Aug, BM2039, found IED stuck at BM2037 LRP found apron 20 foxholes, homemade bomb, marijuana butts, & LOC405, LRP found 6 rows of punji stakes and 1 cleaning rod. Observed airstrike at BM2037, 24 Aug, BM2016, observed another airstrike. No friendly casualties.

(g) DATE: 26-30 Aug 67
LOCATION: 32606/14394
RESULTS: Had poor camo, losing it completely several times. 29 Aug used F1C as a relay, Heard movement but no sightings. Lushes and especially thick jungle made movement rougher and slower than usual. No friendly casualties.

(i) DATE: 28-31 Aug 67
LOCATION: BM2037/4203
RESULTS: Most of march was in knee-deep mud, when LRP reached canopy, vegetation was so thick knives were used to cut the way. A scout dog from the scout dog platoon which had dropped LRP off was good at picking out the easier routes of travel which made the march easier. One LRP member was evacuated because of an injured eye on 29 Aug 67. LRP observed in valley BM203000-32012 15 lights of an estimated force of 30 people. The closest light came within 50 meters of LRP but team was undetected. A try was not called because team leader figured that it would compromise his position. 30 Aug 67 set up concentrations and observed 3 VC with weapon at BM205105 called for arty but cancelled mission when movement occurred near LRP position. Checked out the area and found movement had been made by an animal. Meanwhile, VC disappeared. No friendly casualties.

(j) DATE: 1-4 Sep 67
LOCATION: BM2097/5095
RESULTS: 2 Sep 67 observed F1C firing rockets at grid BM20526 and airstrike at BM20526. Heard movement that night and called illumination. Saw nothing. 3 Sep 67 found a non-American scattered, canvas-topped boot at BM20526 and 1 .45 pistol, BM210255 at grid BM20526. 4 Sep 67 received sniper fire upon extraction. After LRP was clear of area, escorting gunships raked entire area with heavy volume of fire.
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(k) DATE: 4 Sep 67
LOCATION: 3130h/1302
RESULTS: 1 St. 67 at grid coord 313023 IRP found 34 rifle cartridges .30-66 with markings LC 31, match in a herring
amo pouch. Heard heavy fire for 20 minutes at 1930/2003 on 12, 225
2000 meters west. Consisted of 30 and 50 caliber MG fire along with M-
60 fire. IRP team leader wound (IBI) while clearing LZ and evacuated
to 2nd Surg Hospital. Team was extracted as scheduled with no further
injuries.

(l) DATE: 4 Sep 67
LOCATION: 283055/B605
RESULTS: IRP failed to establish comms and was
extracted same day as insertion.

(m) DATE: 7 Sep 67
LOCATION: 3130h/4002
RESULTS: Strong unidentified Vietnamese station
was on IRP frequency. IRP tried every way possible to get comms with
base but failed and was extracted same day as insertion.

(n) DATE: 9-10 Sep 67
LOCATION: 3130h/5301
RESULTS: IRP had poor comms and no observations.
Requested extraction because only place IRP had comms was in an exposed
position. IRP denied extraction because of difficulty two times. After
explaining situation to S-2, team was extracted. No friendly casualties.

(o) DATE: 10-13 Sep 67
LOCATION: 3130h/5302
RESULTS: IRP had no comms after insertion.
The usual M2 fire heard. No enemy movement observed night or day. Extracted
with no friendly casualties.

(p) DATE: 13-14 Sep 67
LOCATION: 3130h/6956
RESULTS: IRP found 4 booby-traps and a firing
mechanism of an M-2 grenade. Three of the booby-traps consisted of Chicom
grenades with tripwire set-ups. The 4th was in a group of boulders
with a special arrangement of small rocks piled over them. To cause them to
detonate them. All the booby-traps seemed to be marked by a combination
of three rocks near each trip release. In Sep, one team member bitten
by reptile that left small marks. Dust-off comms for injured, leaving a
four-ten team. Team was extracted immediately after dust-off left.
As slicks went in to get IRP, a gunship opened up. As IRP was lifted
off, door gunners of slick opened up. One had spotted three VC coming
up slope near IRP's former position.

(q) DATE: 16 Sep 67
LOCATION: 3130h/6956
RESULTS: IRP had no comms after insertion at
3130h/6956. Moved 400 meters and tried again with negative results. EAC
was used. IRP put up a field expedient antenna and tried getting comms
with Hill 707 (relay). IARP could not receive, but transmissions, to include breaking of squelch were not received by the relay team on Hill 707: IARP extracted same day with no friendly casualties.

(r) DATE: 18-21 Sep 67  
LOCATION: BT4902/5100  
RESULTS: IARP found 1 campfire site at BT506015.  
20 Sep, IARP heard small-arms fire and automatic fire on 4s. of 135° and called a fire mission at 51h003. No friendly casualties.

(s) DATE: 22-25 Sep 67  
LOCATION: BT4906/4994  
RESULTS: No enemy sightings. Good LZ. No findings. No problems with comms.

(t) DATE: 23-25 Sep 67  
LOCATION: BT5405/3603  
RESULTS: No observations or findings. No friendly casualties.

(u) DATE: 27-30 Sep 67  
LOCATION: BT4702/4900  
RESULTS: IARP found a natural cave at coord. BT18005. Cave was 6' high, 3' wide, and 15' long in one section and 6' high, 3' wide, and 25' long in the other section. Cave had 2 exits. IARP searched in and around cave but no signs of VC were discovered. At BT18006 IARP found an anti-personnel mine (mine was taken back to base camp). IARP arrived at BT43013 and were told to pull back because of a 2/1st ambush being set up nearby. IARP moved to BT483009 a safe distance from ambush. Extraction took place at BT4905016. No friendly casualties.

(v) DATE: 5-8 Oct 67  
LOCATION: BT5603/4901  
RESULTS: IARP moved from LZ approximately 150 meters, heard noises from the west, and made a security stop. Unknown number of personnel were moving down trail 25 ft. from location of IARP. Later more movement discovered in same area. IARP investigated and found a well camouflaged rest area and complex of trails. IARP stayed at BT4705 all night. 6 Oct, IARP set up ambush on trail junction but got negative results. Moved out at BT4750105, IARP observed 20 VC moving east at BT475005 wearing black 3s and green uniforms. Observed 2 rifles and 2 carbines. Calledarty when they stopped, arty was off. VC left. Called same fire mission again using same corrections. This time guns were on target but no VC KIA or WIA resulted. Weather was zero-zero. IARP requested permission to move to 2/1st area by foot on extraction date. Permission granted. No friendly casualties.

(w) DATE: 9-12 Oct 67  
LOCATION: BT5003/4205  
RESULTS: IARP observed numerous fresh footprints (VC size). 2/1st had air and artillery strikes going into IARP's area. 40 followed by an infantry sweep. Hasty (2/1st) had IARP moving with

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disregard to safety precautions. The artillery strike was cancelled but the air strike was brought in anyway with bomb shrapnel hitting trees in IRRP's position and almost hitting the AT6. After the bombs IRRP was ordered to move out through the brush, again paying no heed to patrol security and risking running into booby-traps. Gunships were coming in to strafe the area and IRRP had 15 minutes to clear the area. After troops landed, TL called in and gave sitrep, direction of travel and proposed destination. Also checked to see if IAI fire would be in IRRP AO. No IAI fire scheduled but IRRP began receiving 7.62mm rounds above and around their position. IRRP was told that check fire had been called but rounds continued to come. Rammer 9 1/4s contacted by 65 and firing ceased. Timber 6 (P/17 Cav Co) was notified by IRRP and promised a thorough investigation. 11 Oct, IRRP extracted after consulting medic about one ill team member. Morphine syrette was lost during airstrike. Medics were notified. Extraction completed with no friendly casualties.

(x) DATE: 16-19 Oct 67
LOCATION: BS401/BS599
RESULTS: Gunships received fire before insertion. Gunships sprayed area and team was inserted with no further incident. IRRP observed 3/21 elements making a haliborne assault on second day. No further observations. Extracted with no friendly casualties.

(y) DATE: 22-25 Oct 67
LOCATION: BT596/3003
RESULTS: IRRP found a man-made hole at BT3606
6ft X 10ft X 10ft deep with 2 logs across each end. Locked unused and only leaves were inside. IRRP heard 15 shots spaced about 20 minutes apart about 1200 meters away on an AZ of 40°. At extraction point IRRP found one set of foot tracks (size six). IRRP extracted with no further observations and no friendly casualties.

(z) DATE: 22-25 Oct 67
LOCATION: BS6301/BS596
RESULTS: IRRP found main trail near BS6999 to be well used. Trail ran east to west. IRRP had trouble pinpointing location because of map not conforming to terrain and difficulty to seeing through triple canopy. FAC was called after IRRP called several fire missions for Nav. rounds. After FAC found IRRP it took pilot 18 minutes to plot IRRP position because of non-conforming map. IRRP heard 50 cal. machine gun and automatic weapons firing 320° Az, at 1200 meters on 24 Oct 67. Extracted 25 Oct 67 with no friendly casualties.

(aa) DATE: 27-30 Oct 67
LOCATION: BS6401/BS699
RESULTS: Inserted at BS569995 and found 5 spider holes, a trail with booby-traps, and fresh foot marks at same location. Heard approx. 50 gong sounds such as a man beating on an emral. Called arty at BS55995 and received secondary explosion. 28 Oct, heard branches breaking but when patrol stopped noises ceased. Found numerous streams, several well used trails, a small base camp at BS55997. Team found six homemade shovels and a marine hat in an enclosed portion of base camp.
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LRRP destroyed smalls. LRRP asked for AO extension but was denied it because of friendly elements operating in proposed extension area. LRRP found numerous trails and recent VC signs (fetuses) at extraction point. 30 Oct 67, LRRP received heavy volume of automatic weapons fire. Gunships engaged VC on ground in a firefight. Had 1 VC confirmed KIA. Firefight lasted 12 minutes with 3 LRRP personnel still on ground. Chopper finally came in and lifted off remaining team members. No friendly casualties.
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d. Logistics:

(1) Reports on Brigade's logistical status for the months of August, September, and October.

(a) This quarter marked a period of intensive construction and preparation for the monsoon season. Over 3/4's of a million board feet of lumber was received and issued. For control purposes it was required that units go through the Brigade Engineer's Office to insure all materials were accurate and complete. It was found however, that the lag time between ordering and receipt greatly hampered construction objectives. For this reason, the Engineer's now are maintaining a stockage of building materials. They are to do all the ordering for construction materials and control its issue. Since they hold the responsibility for construction they are the best suited to insure proper utilization of supplies for critical projects. This has proven to be a successful way of operation.

(b) The improved flow of supplies experienced in the previous quarter continued this quarter. Major items including Engineer Equipment, Ice Boxes, .50-60 machine guns, etc., greatly improved our Logistic Status.

(c) Preparation and a study of possible problem areas is now being conducted to prepare for anticipated operations. Barrier materials, clothing, and all 50-90/902 stockage levels are being researched. Communication is the important ingredient in preparation. Visits to supported units and company meetings with 8-4's have proven to be very helpful in the determining problem areas and the alleviating of said problems.

(2) Supply

(a) Class I:

1. 1,399,690 "A" Rations issued during August, September and October.

2. 236,483 "Combat Meals" issued during August.

3. 660,661 Pounds of Potable Ice issued during August, September and October.

4. 125,216 Pounds of Vegetables issued during August, September and October.

5. 18,700 Pounds of Fruits issued during August, September and October.

6. 6,579 Gallons of Ice Cream issued during August, September and October.

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(b) Class II & IV

1. The list of II & IV items received for this quarter is very extensive. The most notable are the issuing of construction material, Starlight scopes, new trucks, and 11,511 ton trucks.

2. The items in critical demand are as follows:

- H-130/U kits
- Major end items e.g.: ROSE: D.R., 577
- CABLE WARRIOR, A.MOSSET, P.DY'G XRN, and CAMELE B thép.

3. During this period both the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry and the 2nd Battalion, 11th Cav were detached from our support.

(c) Class III

1. Starting in October Class III took over the responsibility for the Brigade's Gas Station.

2. Total issues:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMODITY</th>
<th>DAILY AVERAGE</th>
<th>PERIOD TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>115.5</td>
<td>12,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logs</td>
<td>191.7</td>
<td>16,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97-b</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>H/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>H/A</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(d) Class V

Total issues:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>112: 5,560:</th>
<th>PERIOD TOTAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>162, 1,200 Bulk</td>
<td>1,005,304</td>
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<tr>
<td>402, 7,628:</td>
<td>285,760</td>
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<td>520, 601.55</td>
<td>98,499</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>701, 605.81</td>
<td>94,820</td>
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<tr>
<td>811, 28,32</td>
<td>28,320</td>
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<tr>
<td>105, 556.7</td>
<td>53,467</td>
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<tr>
<td>106, 6,211</td>
<td>6,211</td>
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<tr>
<td>110, 1,422</td>
<td>1,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152, 15,511</td>
<td>15,511</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Service Maintenance:

(a) During the period 1 Oct 57 - 30 Oct 57 the maintenance shops received and completed the following jobs:

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(b) This was an increase of 216 jobs received and 211 completed over the previous 30 days. This brought the quarterly total to 2362 jobs received and 2193 completed. The heavy rains early in the month of October are considered as the principal cause of the heavy maintenance load. 3/4 Ton Truck engines, 10X1 generators, engines, batteries for 70- and 80-Ton Trucks, tires and tubes continue to be the major problem areas. The demand is so great that our Tech Supply is never able to keep a stockage. To alleviate part of the problem the 166th Supply has increased their stockage level. Our back up, support, the 166th Field Unit, is doing the same.

(c) Observation: Continuing heavy rains will place a heavy maintenance and supply burden on the maintenance shop and Tech Supply.

(b) Signal Activities:

(a) General: During the period 1 August 1967 thru 31 October, the 196th Infantry Brigade communications personnel supported from 3 to 6 maneuver battalions. With the majority of the reporting period supporting 5 battalions, maximum effort was required for the maintenance of the base camp facilities and to support Operation Canton for assigned and attached units. Facilities available for the 196th Brigade Communication included:

(b) Radio:

1. Hi. Primary Hi note included within the brigade consisted of command, intelligence, liaison, and air medical evacuation (Dustoff). The brig CC is also entered in the tactical command, msg and secure msg. During operation Canton Hi notes continued to be used at the base camp only. In addition, radios were provided to the TCC Operations Center for use in the brigade command and intelligence note. Due to limited mess interference on Hi note had to be established in order for all stations to maintain Hi communications. At one time during the reporting period, 6-17 September, the communications platoon had the responsibility to support a rifle company task force with 1 Hi radio team.

2. Hi. During the reporting period the Brigade operated in the division area—a CID, 5th Ty (R.T.F) and 5th Special Forces 533 Unit (Voice).

(c) Radio Terminal and Carrier (VT): During;
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Operation Center: A total of five channels were provided to a chopper battalion switchboard, one pulsed user circuit from the brigade tactical operations center to the dispatching battalion operations center; two channels were provided to a unit with other user circuits and one channel from the unit to the special operations center. The five channels were used for the brigade's total, consisting of two users and a total of 128 circuits. The dispatching center was used to relay communications between the two centers. During the reporting period, equipment usage fluctuated, with lower than normal use. The reporting period was 120 hours.

(c) Communications Center Service: 24-hour communications service is provided with all military installations within the confines of the division. Telephone service is provided with all military installations through the division's 400, 100, 95, and 225 circuits. Telephone service is available worldwide through the international network.

(f) Special Services: In order to improve the efficiency of the communications personnel, the following changes were made: the 153 signal radio operators (operator/customer) were given sole responsibility for the installation, operation, and maintenance of the special communications system. The 153 signal radio operators were given the responsibility for radio communications, on-the-spot service, and the mission of installing, operating, and maintaining the special communications system. Special services are available for the 153 signal radio operators.

(f) Engineering Activities: A list of the 153 signal radio operators was made in the engineering activities category.

(b) Base Camp Support and Development:

1. Number of permanent buildings completed:
   a. One hundred and twenty-three (123)
   b. One hundred and twenty-eight (128)
   c. One hundred and twenty-nine (129)
   d. One hundred and thirty (130)

2. Number of permanent buildings under construction and anticipated time of completion:

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4. Breakdown of materials used:
   a. Cement: 110 lbs, bags (1,350-74 tons).
   b. Lumber: 116,000 board feet.
   c. Insulation: none.
   d. Plywood: 3,300 sheets.
   e. Tents: 1,950 lbs.
   f. Insulation: none.

5. Roads
   b. One point five (1.5) Kl kootite road for 1/1 acre, 5 September 1967-22 September 1967.
   d. One point five (1.5) Kl kootite road for 8th SP in acre, 23 October 1967-31 October 1967.

6. Total gallons of potable water produced:

590,675 gallons.

6. Brigade Surgeon

(a) General Comment on Activities:

1. The medical support of the base camp remained excellent during this reporting period.
2. Medical operations were adequately supported throughout this period. No continued to carry on duties from the medical company of the support battalion to maintain proper support for the field units. All companies received excellent medical support.

(b) Personnel and Supporting Units:

Medical supplies have been adequate. Proper liaison has existed in facilitating our receiving specific items that became critical from time to time. Our personnel status at the close of this period has been adequate; however, the TO&E slots were never completely filled. Illness or injury during this period, if it had been present, would have definitely curtailed proper medical support.

(c) Nutrition, Food, and Health of the Command:

1. Personal hygiene: remained excellent throughout the command.
2. Physical condition remains excellent.

3. Skin and foot disease showed a slight increase with the onset of rainy weather. All medical officers initiated timely, definitive treatment so that this presents no problem to the command.

4. Statistical analysis of patient hospitalization and evacuation for the period of August to October

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>INSHTD</th>
<th>EVAC.</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMI</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMII</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. The disease rate for this period has not affected the overall fighting strength of the Brigade.

(d) Environmental Sanitation:

1. Supplies for insect and rodent control have been adequate throughout this period.

2. There has been adequate supply of potable water, and it has been consistently up to purification standards.

3. With the use of the 326th Preventive Medicine apparatus, we have facilitated control of insects. Sanitation teams throughout the Brigade operated adequately during this period.

(e) Other Medical Services:

1. Dental Facilities: Dental services by the dentist at Co. 8th Sp.

2. Veterinarian: Not applicable.

(7) Civil Affairs:

(a) General. The reporting period has seen the development of an effective, logical and progressive civil affairs program. Tactical commanders, with few exceptions, have given civil affairs a deserving priority in all unit planning activities. Coordination with GVN officials has been observed to the fullest degree in an attempt to determine the most profitable employment of all resources and to mutually support the purposes of the GVN Revolutionary Development Program. There has been steady, if slow, pacification progress throughout the TAOR. Tangible evidence of improved pacification is difficult to ascertain and personnel making such evaluations are reluctant to be overly optimistic. This is a sound approach, resulting in more realistic and reliable data. In general, civil affairs and military civic action within this unit are productive. However, there are limiting factors which will continue to hamper civic action sponsored by tactical units. The following examples are cited.
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1. Supplies for military civic action projects are made available through the CORPS organization. The level of available supplies is not in keeping with command emphasis in supporting this aspect of US efforts in Vietnam. It is apparent that there is more "Ips Service" than any other commodity. Vertical building material is non-existent. Obtaining necessary supplies is frequently delayed to the point where local national support of a given project ceases. In other examples, work is begun then terminated prior to completion for lack of supplies. This turn of events elicits more antagonism than if no project had been undertaken. Sponsoring units find it necessary to hold until sufficient supplies are accumulated. Directives specifically prohibit the utilization of US military supplies in such projects, yet this is done and accepted.

2. TOE authorizations in both personnel and equipment are inadequate. Tactical commitments take priority, rightfully so over civil affairs activities. The answer is not to "scrounge" S-5 authorizations, but rather to provide greatly increased numbers of specific TOE type civil affairs organizations in support: i.e. the civil affairs platoon and company. Present approaches are ill-suited to accomplish the task in any realistic time frame.

3. In connection with the previous point, frequent changes in location, O's and missions of tactical units work adversely on the long range efforts of civil affairs. Each time is required to develop the confidence and cooperation of GVN officials, and to gain the trust of the general population through association. Again, greater numbers of civil affairs units in general support would be more sound.

(c) Community Relations: At present organic battalion have very workable understandings with commensurate GVN levels of government. Commanders and staffs concerned make every reasonable effort to work closely with GVN officials. A number of units sponsor English classes, support churches, orphanages and other local groups, and support and participate in local customs, ceremonies and celebrations. The following activities and contributions have taken place during the reporting period.

1. Material Contributions:

- 6532 lbs of foodstuffs
- 20 lbs of tea
- 50 gallons of whole milk
- 1000 gallons of cooking oil
- 175 lbs of clothing
- 40 lbs of candy
- 2 rakes, 17 hoes, 4 machetes and 10 baskets
- 182 blankets
745 sheets of tin
10 sheets plywood
852 ton truck loads scrap lumber
5 tons crop fertilizer
7 rice threshing machines
3 brick machines

2. Civic Action Projects:
1000 autumn festival kits
1 dispensary repaired
1 new dispensary
1 new school completed
1 new schools in progress
7 wells dug
2 churches repaired
2 market places in progress
1 new playground completed
1 foot bridge completed

3. Medical Program:
11 100000-class
1600 bars of soap
7100 immunizations given by IIED.
100 heath kits
763 2000 for 41,962 patients
12 hours nurses' instruction for 5 VII nurses

4. Education - Training:
1050 school kits
150 school books
2 cases of chalk
6 hours educational hygiene for 500 persons
200 notebooks
1T34 hours of English for 3900 students

5. Audio Visual Team:
128 hours for 9500 people - 69 showings

6. Other: Under the administration of Headquarters, III NC junks have been made available for the awarding of scholarships to deserving Vietnamese students. Known as the General Kel Vietnamese Scholarship, amounts of 500 piaster per month, September through December 1967, are awarded to each selected student. The big side, through 3-5 channels and in cooperation with GW officials, the awarded eight-a (18) such scholarships. Only three were awarded in the District, due to lack of interest of GW officials. There is to be a continuation of the program for calendar year 1968.

(d) Tactic 1 Operations: Civil Affairs activities during tactic 1 operations have been marked by relatively few requirements during the period covered. The primary considerations have been the safety of innocent civilians, the protection of personal property and crops, and that coordination with the GW to provide the proper hand-
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1. Several hundred refugees were generated as a result of Operation Benton 15-27 September. Prior to the active phase of the operation coordination had been made with the 2nd Ly and Ly Tin Districts and Quang Tin Province. The refugee situation in Quang Tin Province constitutes a problem of some magnitude to the GVN. There are, in fact, many more refugees than the government is capable of adequately providing for. In view of this, only voluntary refugees were evacuated from the tactical area of operations. Tactical units evacuated to appropriate government locations those Vietnese who so requested. While under control of U.S. units, refugees were given medical treatment and food. Once turned over to the GVN the refugees were absorbed into four different refugee camps.

2. Brigade plans are in effect to assist the GVN in denying the present rice crop to the Viet Cong. "Golden Fleeces" operations are currently being conducted.

3. The planning phase of a sizable relocation operation occurred during the reporting period. The active phase was initiated 21 August with the relocation of the inhabitants of Tuyet Dam to Son Tra (1) in Binh Giang Village. Coordination was affected between military units, village, district and province officials concerned. Based on detailed plans to insure the success of the operation, all parties concerned worked diligently in accordance with joint schedules. Particularly noteworthy was the effort of local inhabitants of Son Tra (2) and Tan Ly (1), under the constant, competent supervision of the Binh Giang Village Chief. The security post, presently named jointly by US and RV personnel was constructed in a minimum of time. The area of Son Tra (1) was prepared to accept the relocatees. A perimeter security fence of nearly 2,000 meters was constructed by villagers, as many as 1100 working on a given day. All preparations necessary for a County Fair operation in connection with the relocation operation were planned for, adequately provided and on location 20 August. The initial personnel and materiel support of this operation was as follows:

   a. Personnel - Local villagers up to 1100
      FF - 2 squads
      GVN officials, towns and advisory counterparts - 55 (including one cultural affairs team, one audio-visual team (ground speaker), 15 GVN representatives, medical propaganda train, census and interrogation personnel and US and VN MEDCAP personnel.
      2 military police squads of US 11th (25 Tons) - up to 2 KNP Infantry Companies

   b. Equipment -
      1 bulldozer
      2 IC-15s
      3 ANTHOS
      2 aerial sprayers
      1/4, 3/4 and 2 1/2 ton trucks, as necessary

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2. Commodity:
- Rice, corn, bulgar
- Rationed milk
- Salt
- Cooking oil
- Tin
- Cemnet
- Red Cross gifts

During the period 21-29 August 1967, Vietnamese were relocated to Son Tru (1). The active phase of the operation was discontinued at this time to preclude interference with the SVN national election period. During this period, those VIelit relocations prepared their belongings, improved vector supplies, and resumed normal activities. Fishing was resumed within 24 hours following each increment's move. The relocation was resumed 5 Sep. Between 6 and 13 Sep., an additional 1155 VI were relocated, bringing the total population of the new hamlet to 1,092. As of this date, the operation is considered a success and has accomplished stated objectives. Currently, coordination is being affected to encourage coordinated SVN and U.S. future support of the area. The ultimate success of the operation will be apparent when the VI are capable of further development and providing their own defense capabilities.

2. Requests are currently being processed to provide a new school, dispensary, and hamlet office. With the assistance and advice of the Food and Agriculture Chief, 29th Civil Affairs Company, 5 tons of crop fertilizer has been made available for field belonging to the people of Son Tru (1). The hamlet is developing well, there is no economic problem present. Fishing on farming continue normally. SVN sector payments in excess of 800,000$ VND have been made to the people of Son Tru (1).

(c) Psychological Operations

1. 26,376,000 leaflets dropped
   - RB Jorn - 114 hours ground speaker time
   - Aircraft speaker time - 924 hours
   - TV Jorn - 69 showings for 9500 people, a total of 128 hours
   - 6 special leaflets

2. Effective 23 October the Psychological warfare section came under S-3 staff responsibility, as it appears by MACV. The shift from the 2-5 section was made to permit the Psychological warfare officer to utilize to greatest advantage current tactical and intelligence information in psychological operations. It is the opinion of all concerned that this arrangement is very satisfactory and more responsive to 'ops support to unit missions.

(8) Public Information:

(a) The following activities took place in this unit in July, August, September 1967:

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(b) Brigade Information Office gave full coverage during operation Denton which resulted in wide photo and press coverage in military and civilian news outlets. Extensive coverage was given to the movement of civilians in one of the first moves of its kind during this conflict. This was also covered by national TV outlets and civilian correspondents. Special coverage was given to the 100,000th civilian medical treatment in support of the "Red Cross" program. The 1967 Brigade Year Book, "The Second Year" was completed in September and shipped from Japan to Vietnam for mail out in October.
2. Commanders Observations and Recommendations:

a. Personnel

(1) Item: Emergency leaves

Discussion: Rapid processing of emergency leave request will enable members of various units to quickly depart the unit for transportation to the air terminal.

Observation: All units should establish internal procedures on a step by step basis which enables rapid processing of such leaves. (A Co - 8th Spt)

b. Operations & Training

(1) Item: Utilization of 106 RR or mounted M60 machine guns on 1/4 ton vehicles as security escort for convoys.

Discussion: H/31 Inf utilizes 106RR and M60 machine guns mounted on jeeps as security vehicles for convoy resupply missions and all traffic on the MSR. A majority of the convoys consist of the gun jeep and one or two vehicles being escorted. (H3/3)

Observation: The most effective security order of the vehicles is to have the escorted vehicle first followed approximately 100 meters by the escort vehicle. Should the escorted vehicle be ambushed the gun jeep can maneuver rapidly to counter the ambush. If the 106 RR or M60 M60 vehicles were ambushed it could react quickly to protect itself. (H/31 Inf)

(2) Item: Use of UH-1D Helicopter

Discussion: The use of the UH-1D C&C helicopter is a major factor in the success of any large scale operation in Vietnam. With battalions and companies operating so far from their home base in areas that are inaccessible, it is almost impossible to exercise completely effective tactical and administrative control without the use of the C&C. The use of the C&C varies from the use by the commander for control of tactical operations, reconnaissance for small unit leaders, often to include platoon sergeants, emergency resupply, delivery of orders, visual reconnaissance of enemy positions, detection of enemy communications locations using the homing device, radio relay, pinpointing the location of friendly units in areas of dense forest, CBR drops, and evacuations ranging from urgent to priority.

Observation: The UH-1D is provided for each battalion daily. (H/31 Inf)

(3) Item: Malfunction of M-16 rifle.

Discussion: The malfunction of the M-16 rifle has become a matter of great concern to military personnel in Vietnam, as well as to many civilians and government officials.
Many malfunctions, though, can be eliminated with a little knowledge and sufficient attention to insure that the weapon is properly cleaned daily.

Observation: The small amount of tolerance between the cartridge and chamber walls leaves little room for expansion of shells. Heavy buildup of carbon on the chamber walls and dirt in the chamber causes definite problems. These problems can be reduced by:

(a) Using a .30 cal bore brush attached to a drill to eliminate the carbon in the bore.

(b) Covering the barrel opening with tape.

(c) Checking the extraction spring and replacing it if it becomes weak.

(d) Frequently cleaning ammunition and magazines.

(e) Carrying a cleaning rod to knock out any cartridge that doesn't extract. The cleaning rod can be attached to the barrel of the M-16 by using a link from 7.62mm bolt eXl (2/1, 3/21, 4/31, Inf).

(4) Item: Keeping the M25 dry during the rainy season.

Discussion: Because of the heavy monsoon rains a means was needed to keep the M25 radios functional and dry, but not so well protected that the radio is cumbersome or unusable.

Observation: By using salvage pieces of canvas from shelter halves, installing a zipper and utilizing flexible, clear plastic over the control knobs, a water-tight, compact envelope is achieved for the M25 with control of adjustments being retained. (4/31 Inf) See Incl 2.

(5) Item: Detailed SearCh Techniques.

Discussion: VC snipers normally fire and then withdraw to spider hole type hiding places. These holes are very difficult to detect and can be discovered only after a very thorough search to include probing for the holes. Detection can be enhanced by searching for significant indicators which are normally present in the vicinity of the holes. Those indicators are:

(a) Human feces, generally located within 30 to 60 meters from the hole.

(b) Slight Depression on ground within the bamboo thicket or hedge. May be in the same area as stubble from cut bamboo or camouflaged with grass, leaves, etc. Detection will be possible only after probing with bayonets, shaking bamboo stubbles, etc.

(c) Gene-Trails through hedges into thickets. Those trails are paths that display frequent use. Holes leading through thickets are small and will be detected only upon thorough examination.
(d) Air holes into bunker, constructed with hollow bamboo in and around the thicket.

(e) Patches of different color or texture of soil within the fields in the immediate vicinity.

(f) Isolated Vietnamese, normally an old man, old woman, or young child within the search area. These persons do external camouflage on spider holes after the VC enter their hiding place.

Observation: The detailed search technique is the most effective means of finding the enemy in this environment. (Bde 83)

(6) Item: Point Detonation Fuse for CS drops.

Discussion: Due to the failure of fuse lighters to function 100% of the time and due to inconsistent volumes of CS being dispersed on the ground because of varied heights of burst, a point detonating fuse was adapted to the 55 gal drum to solve these problems. The majority of targets are ISR and base camp locations requiring the total 80 lb. drum to effectively deny the terrain for up to sixty days. The AN/ML73A1 bomb fuse allows for impact detonation and the achievement of desired results.

Observation: Forty drums of CS-1 have been dropped using the ML73 fuse and a fuse lighter as a back up means of detonation. Of these forty, thirty nine have exploded on impact effectively covering the target areas. The burst radius of one drum is approx. 30 meters. The one drum that did not explode was due to improper placement of the demolitions and not due to a faulty ML73 fuse. This is the same fuse used in napalm bombs. (27th Chom)

(7) Item: Effect of weather on aerial HE operations.

Discussion: ORLLs from various units in RVN employing the HE in the aerial mode have been found valid by this unit. The main area of interest was in determining if the different weather conditions in I Corps would vary from patterns found in other areas of Vietnam.

Observation: The main hindrance to HE operations in this area results from gusting winds. Being located on a coastal area subjects us to varying wind directions and speed. If the wind speed exceeds 25 knots accurate readings cannot be obtained. The ideal time for flying in this area has proved to be between 0500 and 1200 hrs. The wind is lowest at these times. During the monsoon season the wind comes predominantly from the north/northwest; and during the dry season from the south/southeast.

(8) Item: Summary of HEH aerial flying techniques.

Discussion: Due to extremely variable and rugged terrain located in southern I Corps new techniques of flying had to be developed. The coastal plain has not lent itself to personnel detection due to the large civilian population that dominates the area.
The mountainous terrain west of the coast presents hazards to low level flying. Ridges have to be flown by following contour lines in order to avoid down drafts. Stream beds running from the tops of the mountains have to be flown downward for the UH-1D cannot climb at a safe speed. Valleys and streams are flown in preference to ridges because of the characteristic placement of enemy troops near water.

Observation: A rescue UH-1D is always employed because of the increased hazard of aerial accident as well as enemy ground fire. A FAC is used as a plotter due to his familiarity with the terrain. On several occasions a sniffer ship was air-lifted due to updrafts and downdrafts on ridgelines, resulting in the flying techniques described above. Peaks also offer generally poor results because the wind is usually 15 knots or higher at those elevations. (27th Chom)

(9) Item: Cordon, Search and Interrogation of Vietnamese Villagers.

Discussion: During Operation Checker, a cordon and search operation, the 650 residents of Hamlet 8, in IX Sahn Village were removed from their homes to an assembly area. The cordon was established during the hours of darkness to enclose any enemy and prevent the villagers from vacating the area early for work details. Previous experience in this particular location dictated that all villagers be removed so that airstrikes could be brought in to set off known mines and booby traps which hampers our planned search. While the airstrike and search were going on a medic was set up and the villagers were screened by national police, an IRF team, and a CT team. Detainees were interrogated and moved to IX Tin District Hq. Food, water, and shelter were provided for the Vietnamese during the day long operation. An Armed Propaganda Team was employed to pass instruction to the people and present pro-government and Chieu Hoi speeches.

Observation: In a cordon and search operation it is essential to keep those persons who have been screened segregated from those who have not yet been processed. One or two strands of wire for control purposes can be utilized. Also since a thorough screening job takes a considerable length of time, tents for shelter and a water source should be provided both in the collection area and the holding area. Provisions should also be made to feed the people in both sections separately. Because of the necessity of passing instructions to the civilians and the opportunity to present propaganda speeches to a large assemblage of persons, an Armed Propaganda Team should be employed. They are extremely cooperative and professional in their conduct. 1P's should be taken to the assembly area to both control the persons waiting processing and to guard the detainees. A maximum number of interpreters should be available in the assembly area. They are needed for interrogation, coordination with participating Vietnamese agencies, and control of the civilians. (2/1 Inf)

(10) Item: Squad Radios

Discussion: During a recent operation where the new squad radios were used, they were found to be an outstanding piece of equipment.
The range was sufficient to accommodate the operation of any platoon except when the radio got wet, which decreased the range significantly. When the radio got wet, the platoon leader in the center of the platoon file could not adequately communicate with his front or rear due to the heavy amount of static and the squealing that was caused by the excess moisture in the radio transmitter.

Discussion: To get the maximum efficiency out of the new squad radio it is imperative that the transmitter be kept free from moisture at all times.

(11) Item: Artillery preparations.

Discussion: Patterns should not be set in firing preparations.

Observation: The sequence of preparations should be varied between air, artillery, and gunships. Diversionsary preparations also have been used to confuse the enemy. (3/82 Arty)

(12) Item: Field Installation of (FADAC) Field Artillery Digital Analytical Computer.

Discussion: Protection of FADAC in field location.

Observation: Build the FADAC into the sand bag wall leaving the back open. A wall 2 or 3 feet away from the rear of the machine will permit proper ventilation. This procedure increases space available in FDC and protects the FADAC from direct small arms and mortar or rocket fragments.

(13) Item: Fuzing of Smoke Rounds.

Discussion: Difficulty experienced in firing, "Shell Smoke, High Streamer."

Observation: Due to dense vegetation in Vietnam, the observers frequently request, "Smoke High Streamers", to facilitate their positive identification of the target location. The smoke rounds usually received at present are pre-fused with a 25 second fuse. When the mission requires a time of flight greater than 25 seconds, it is often impossible to fire shell smoke. Due to the fact that the 25 second fuse is semi-permanently tapped into the fuse well, it is often impossible or at least very time consuming to change fuses. Recommend that shell smoke be packed with an 155h fuse or without fuse. (3/82 Arty)

(14) Item: Area and Road Drainage.

Discussion: During the rainy season, roads and storage areas throughout the Rde area become flooded and/or washed out due to improper or poorly constructed drainage. This loss of road nets causes loss of equipment and hinders operations in general causing many equipment and man hours to be expended unnecessarily. This situation could be helped greatly in many cases if storage areas and road drainage were properly employed.

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Observation: During the recent typhoon, a large quantity of water fell in a very short time and demonstrated a lack of proper drainage and construction of various roads and storage areas. The major problems were: roads cut by water flow, especially around culvert sites, large quantities of soil running off hills, standing pools of water in storage areas, and severe erosion throughout road ditches and camp areas. Therefore, units in and around these trouble areas must take the following precautions:

(a) Road walls of all culvert sites must be sandbagged to prevent erosion of ditch rites and loss of roads.

(b) Steep hills with no foliage cover must be sandbagged and revetted in order to stop the downhill flow of soil.

(c) Check dams of sandbags and steel picket design must be installed in existing roadside ditches to slow the flow of water. See FM 5-15 & FM 5-34.

(d) Pick and shovel work on local drainage must be done. Unless ditches and culverts are clean, unless water is given a flow away from roads and critical areas and unless proper drainage from a high to a low area is planned and emphasized, units will be cut off from supply bases. The road nets must be maintained on a unit level or small faults will develop into major problems.

(15) Item: Wet weather demolition procedures.

Discussion: Wet weather has had the following observed effects on demolition: spattering or inactive fuzes, dud shots, and low grade explosions. The following discussion treats these problems.

Observation: Demolitions procedures also become problems in wet weather. Fuse and detonating cord must be stored above ground level and kept absolutely dry, and the actual demolitions must be kept as dry as possible. Often the weather will be such that only electric detonation can be used. Finally, to ensure first shot results, all charges should be double fused. (175th Eng)

(16) Item: Support Troops awareness of Tactical Situation.

Discussion: Many times support troops, because of the nature of their mission, are not fully aware of the tactical situation of the troops they are supporting.

Observation: The reaction time and effort put forth by support troops can be increased considerably if adequate information is disseminated concerning the affect of their support in aiding the combat troops to accomplish their mission, by providing support troops with adequate information on the tactical situation in their immediate area an appreciation is developed for the reasons behind extra training covering the infantryman's skills, which they may have to use in the future. (8th Sept)
Observation: A defense overlay is now prepared for each photo/vision report. Thus, when analyzed by scan flexion over the map area on different dates, eo-résults of the respective overlays will reveal whether there has been a significant increase or decrease in enemy defenses. (D-2-S-2)

(5) Item: The Proper Tagging of Detainees

Discussion: During the month of October 1967, 124 detainees were interrogated and classified by the INT Section of the 369th HET at the GHQ LI Collection Point (CIC). Numerous detainees were interrogated and classified at the Second Surgical Hospital.

Observation: The overwhelming majority of those detainees arrived at CIC without capture data on USAID Form 365 or with incomplete or incorrect capture data. Without complete and accurate capture data, the INT section is at a distinct disadvantage: they attempt to interrogate and classify the detainees sent in by the elements of the 196th Lt Inf Bde in the field. (8-2)

(6) Item: Evacuation of Detainees

Discussion: Experience has proven conclusively that when detainees are evacuated to any other location than the 196th Lt Inf Bde INT Center, the resultant delay in receipt of information, coupled with frequent failure to exploit detainees completely, tends to negate the value of the captive.

Observation: Battalion 8-2's should evacuate all detainees with accompanying tru's, documents and equipment through intelligence channels to the 196th Lt Inf Bde INT Center in order to insure expeditious and thorough exploitation.

(7) Item: Weekly Detainee Disposition Report

Discussion: In the past, battalion 8-2's were learning the disposition of detainees which their units sent in to the INT Center only when the detainee gave information valuable enough to warrant a written report. Detainees that furnished INT with no significant information were accounted for by number only on the daily and weekly Detainee Status Report which is submitted to the 8-2, 196th Bde. As a result, the units could not give an exact account as to the disposition of many of the suspects they detained.

Observation: Effective 11 Nov 67, the INT Section will submit a "Weekly Detainee Disposition Report" to the battalion 8-2's. This report will account for each detainee sent to the INT Center as to new, capture data, classification, and final disposition.

(8) Item: Use of Nightly Flareships and FAE's

Discussion: This battalion utilized flareships and FAE's nightly during the period of the Vietnamese National Elections, 15 August thru 5 September 1967. The flareships activities were used for ho
purposes of deterring enemy activity. The flareships flew throughout the
Battalion AO and occasionally assisting neighboring units, providing
illumination, directing small arms fire, and adjusting artillery. One
Officer from the S-2 and S-3 complex accompanied each flight.

Observation: The enemy action reports for hours of
darkness verified the effect of the flareship. A definite drop in the
number of incidents was noticed for this period. Inquires made of the
Vietnamese Nationals of our AO revealed that the enemy was apprehensive
of movement or activity during hours while flareships were airborne. On
two occasions, a FAC was utilized in conjunction with flareships. The
flareships illuminated the area, while the FAC's would fly underneath
the flareships, thus increasing the visual reconnaissance of the area.
The presence of the FAC's increased the possibility of an immediate air-
strike in case contact was made. (4/31)

d. Logistics.

(1) Item: The PLL for the M1937 Burner.

Discussion: The PLL for subject items was not being
maintained properly throughout the brigade. Five units had no spare parts
of any description on hand for several months. Priority 12 in most c.s.c.s
was being used for requisitions. A contributing factor to this unsatis-
factory condition was that Battalion S-4's were not following up on
requisition which were older than 30 days.

Observation: Battalion S-4's were encouraged by this
office to use a higher priority (05) for requisitioning parts for subject
items and for them to continually check all requisitions. (Sbr S-4)

(2) Item: Airborne Type Helmet Liner for Combat Tracker
Team.

Discussion: During operations, it was found personnel
from the combat tracker team, would have their helmets fall off, while
running with the dogs.

OSERVATION: The team turned in the regular helmet
liner and were issued the airborne type helmet liner, which has a chin
strap. By interlacing the helmet strap through the chin strap of the liner
the liner and helmet becomes secure. (Sbr S-4)

(3) Item: Company grade Officers clear through Brigade S-4.

Discussion: In the past, company grade officers were
not required to clear the Brig. Co S-4 office prior to being transferred
out of the 156th Lt Inf.antry Brigade. In many c.s.c.s, surveying
officers returned to 00.RS for reassignment without completing an
returning the surveys to the Brig Co S-4, this caused many surveys to be lost
or delayed for long periods of time.

Observation: All surveying officers must now clear the
Brig. Co S-4 prior to being released. (Sbr S-4)
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(4) Item: Excess Concrete on the job site.

Discussion: In many cases when ready mix concrete is used there is excess left over that isn't needed for the job. Excess concrete should be dumped "free" in wells of culverts and in areas that have a tendency to wash out in the rainy season, or set on the ground around the job site.

Observation: Careful planning will prevent having excess concrete but a plan should always be made just in case there is some extra, then all concrete will be utilized for the best results. (175th E.)

(5) Item: Signal - Re-Transmission sites.

Discussion: When establishing a re-transmission site which may only be reached by helicopter, there is a requirement for a DC generator and sufficient fuel to operate the generator.

Observation: In the majority of cases two AN/FNE 25's with the re-transmission kit MX-A56 should be used. This will eliminate the generator requirement, POL requirement and reduce the weight of equipment. The reduced weight will increase the capability to transport other supplies. (EoGig)

a. Civil Affairs

(1) Item: The reluctance of the Vietnamese to undertake totally self-help projects.

Discussion: The theme of self help in civic action activity is sound. The need for wide improvements in the basics of health, sanitation and improved methods is well known. The approach is to encourage people to accomplish projects for the good of the general public utilizing local resources. Projects of this nature must be proceeded by local organization and cooperation. There is an inherent resistance to change in the nature of the Vietnamese. This is most difficult obstacle and requires maximum understanding and patience. Even needs which seem very obvious are often not considered propitious by the Vietnamese, mainly due to cultural influences. They are capable and do have resources to accomplish such basics as drainage and waste disposal.

Observation: Educational influence must be exerted to a great degree based on a thorough understanding of the people and proposed through frequent and intensive grass roots association.

(2) Item: The importance of insuring a future means of livelihood prior to sizable involuntary local national relocations.

Discussion: There exist many examples of contrasting success and failure in relocation operations. It must be known, prior to relocation, that the now non-existent group is capable of sustaining life; that the...
area is available; and, that the people concerned are of a workmanlike
to productivity in the area. Too often, relocation occurs with the result
being an "additional burden to the GVN" for which it is not capable of
providing. These circumstances denote to create another area fertile for
VC encroachment and many constitute a problem of greater magnitude than
that which was supposedly eliminated through role shift. Conversely, there
are those operations which have permitted immediate resumption of activi-
ties and the basis for further development.

Observation: Operations objectives must be closely
scrutinized. Planning must be thorough, GVN agencies must be in complete
agreement on\mile willing to properly support the operation. The advantages
of obtaining objectives must be carefully compared to resultant disadvantages.

(3) Item: Encouraging association of the Vietnamese with
U.S. military sponsored civil affairs activities.

Discussion: The underlying theme of U.S. military civic
action is support of GVN Revolutionary Development is the eventual assur-
ance and continuation of programs by the people. Projects such as
provision of necessary items and the sponsorship of
orphans are very worthwhile. However, many such projects terminate with
the withdrawal of U.S. influence. The condition then degenerates to its for-
nor undesirable status, efforts having been for naught.

Observation: Increased use of local inhabitants in all
programs will lead the people to associate with the program. Starting a
small level of responsibility can be increased by degrees to the point
where the people feel, and are in fact, totally responsible. Chances of
sustaining such programs become increasingly better under these conditions.

(4) Item: Lack of Vietnamese boat control in 2-1 area.

Discussion: It is imperative that some means be employed
to enforce some type of curfew of boats in the 2-1 area. The patrol
boats (or ton “helors” have proven inadequate, for maintaining overall
control.

Observation: It has been learned that by supplementing
the patrol boats with adequate loudspeaker broadcasts, the people receive
the curfew enforcement instructions in mass. This is accomplished by the
Loud-Propaganda Team operating at approximate 200 feet altitude in a
Uh-1B helicopter. This flyby mission can be made up with little or no
advance notice, making it an immediate reaction capability. (See- Payops)

(5) Item: Appeals based on hardships of war and life in
the jungles.

Discussion: Information gained from VC & NVA’s indicates
that our appeals to Chieu Hoi based upon the hardships of war and life in
the jungles dying away from their loved ones is lacking in effect-
iveness. The same sources indicate that all of these things have not been
accepted by the V/C Gung as should not influence their behavior to any
degree, example, Chieu Hoi.

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Observation: By placing the Iacyca program on a more personalized basis, greater results can be expected. At present, individuals are being named on broadcasts, and leaflets. VC Units are receiving specific appeals. The result of such appeals, become apparent when Ngo Lo, a 17 year old VC guerilla rallied to 3/21 Inf of the 196th. He indicated that a direct appeal leaflet was responsible for his actions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

THOMAS M. FISHBACH
11th, Inf
Asst Adjutant
DISTRIBUTION:

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D plus
10 EdE Historian
1 Item 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,
27, 49, 41, 43, & 44.

3 AGFS for Force Dev, DA
5 CG, USMC, Adj. AVG-DH
3 HRl, Mcdonald, Dept Historical Hist DA
2 CG, Human Research Unit, Ft Benning, Ga.
3 CG, US Army Inf Sch, Ft Benning, Ga.
3 CG, US Army Armor Sch, Ft Knox, Ky.
3 CG, US Army Artillery & Missile Sch, Ft Sill, Okla.
3 CG, C/GS, Ft Leavenworth, Kan.
3 CG, IFFORCE, APN: AGF, G3
3 CG, 1st Cav Div, APO 96490
3 CG, 199th Inf Bde, APO 96276
3 CG, 173d Abn Bde, APO 96260
3 CG, 1st Inf Div, APO 96345
3 CG, 4th Inf Div, APO 96622
3 CG, 1st Inf, 101st Abn Div, APO 96247
3 CG, 9th Inf Div, APO 96370
5 CG, American Div, ATTN: Historian, APO 96374
3 CG, 198th Inf Bde, APO
3 GCMUSAREC, ATTN: G-3, APO 96557
AVDF-GC (10 Nov 67)  1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFCR-65)(U)

DA, HQ, Americal Division, APO San Francisco 96374  JFB/5 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVGCC-DST,
APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) Forwarded herewith is the subject report of the 196th Light
Infantry Brigade.

2. (U) The following comments are considered pertinent to the
referenced paragraph of the basic communication.

   a. Reference: Paragraphs 1b(7)(b), 1b(7)(c), 2b(6). When
referring to the use of CS-1, the term "restrict" should be used rather
than "deny."

   b. Reference: Paragraph 1d(5), page 29. The term "permanent
building" is improperly used. The type construction referred to is
"temporary."

3. (U) This headquarters concurs with the observations and comments
contained in subject report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

KAZUTO KAWABATA
Capt, ADC
Asst Adjutant General
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AVHCC-DST (10 Nov 67): 2d Ind (C)
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 19 JAN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 196th Light Infantry Brigade (FIEA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning the M-16 rifle, page 37, paragraph 2b(3): Concur. A muzzle cover has been developed and recently requisitioned. Use of a 30 cal. bore brush and electric drill is not required if the weapon is properly cleaned on a daily basis.

   b. Reference item concerning fusing of smoke rounds, page 41, paragraph 2b(13): Nonconcur. The M564 Fuze will not fit in the fuse well of the M84 series smoke rounds. The problem stated stems from TSQ M54 Fuze, with a 25 second delay, which is no longer being procured. The TSQ M501 Series Fuze, with a 75 second delay is the current issue item. The 1st Logistical Command has been requested to issue an equitable mix where the TSQ M54 Fuze is the item issued.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

D. E. TUMAN
Major, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

cy furn:
HQ 196th Lt Inf Bde
HQ, Americal Div

Downgraded at 3 year Intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

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GPOP-DT(10 Nov 67) (U) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 from HQ, 196th Lt Inf Bde (UIC: WFBAAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 30 JAN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

HEAVIN SWIDER
CPT, AG
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 196th Light Infantry Brigade

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations Aug - 31 Oct 1967

CG, 196th Light Infantry Brigade

10 November 1967

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N/A

OACS FOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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