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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USAGDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

G. A. STANFIELD
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl as

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1st Battalion, 82d Artillery
2nd Battalion, 94th Artillery
TO: Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
APO 96375

SENIOR TO:

SIGNIFICANT UNIT ACTIVITIES (U)

1. (U) General: a. During the reporting period this unit continued improvement of its base camp. More personnel bunkers have been constructed, the majority above ground to eliminate cave-ins caused by torrential rains. Sand-bags are being replaced as they deteriorate with powder consisters filled with dirt, a less expensive, more permanent, and more effective proposition. All position areas (Camp J.J. Carroll, Dong Ha and the "Rockpile") have been subjected to enemy attacks during this quarter. A Post Exchange was built by the battalion and opened for business on 15 September. Serving more than 2000 men (including Marines), the exchange sold $27,000 worth of merchandise in its first three weeks of operations, and has since experienced one day sales in excess of $4,000. New mess halls have been constructed in all batteries and day-rooms are under construction. Tents deteriorate rapidly in this area. Consequently, galvanized roofing and building materials have been ordered in order to winterize all hardstands in preparation for the Northeast monsoon and the approaching winter season. Gun pads, made of wood and installed in March 1967, have completely rotted to the point of uselessness. One such pad has been replaced with concrete on an experimental basis. Its suitability will be discussed in the next quarterly report.

b. During the reporting period this battalion has been visited by General Johnson, Army Chief of Staff (30 July); General Wallace Greene, Commandant of the Marine Corps (9 August); G3 18 Mr. Browning, Naval Ordnance (14 August); Major General Brown, Commandant USAFAC (18 September); General Westmoreland, CO NSA/CV (22 September); and Brigadier General Lindell, Commanding General, 196th Light Infantry Brigade (16 October).

2. (U) Intelligence: a. Intelligence functions for this battalion have been normal since the last reporting period.

b. Meteorological conditions during the quarter ending 31 October, overall, were favorable for military operations. The exception was during the latter part of September when approximately twenty (20) inches of rain fell in a short period of time (five days) causing extensive erosion and flooding.

damage to bunkers and similar type emplacements. Other rainfall during the quarter was of the afternoon thunderstorm variety.

1. The mean high temperature was 84 degrees F, with mean low of 76 degrees F.

2. Relative humidity ranged from 70% to 100%.

3. Average wind for the period was from the Northwest at 06 knots.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Average Temp Low</th>
<th>Average Temp High</th>
<th>Average Wind Direction</th>
<th>Average Wind Speed, Knots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>81 F</td>
<td>91 F</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>75 F</td>
<td>82 F</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>74 F</td>
<td>78 F</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qtrly Average</td>
<td>76 F</td>
<td>81 F</td>
<td>54 (N.W.)</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Ground observation continued to be a major problem limited by the heavy vegetation.

d. Aerial observers continued to be the best method of observation. Weather conditions have been very favorable for flying throughout the period.

e. The Metro Section continued to operate satisfactorily, providing three 10-line NATO met messages and three 10-line computer met messages daily.

f. During the reporting period positions occupied by the battalion were subjected to attacks by enemy 82mm mortars, 102mm, 122mm & 140mm rockets, and 122mm and 152mm artillery. The following list summarizes the number of incoming rounds by month which fell within unit areas:

1. Dong Ha - Svc Btry

   Aug 0 Attacks
   Sep 1 Attack 4 Rds All types
   Oct 0 Attacks

2. Camp J.J. Carroll - Hq, A, B, C Btry

   Aug 1 Attack 40 Rds 102mm rockets
   Sep 17 Attacks 71 Rds 102mm rockets & 152mm Arty
   Oct 0 Attacks

3. (C) Operation and Training Activities:

   a. Operations:

   (1) Mission:

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(a) General Support, 3d Marine Division

(b) Direct Support, patrols of the 3d Force Recon Battalion as directed by the 12th Marine Regiment.

(c) On call fires for the Khe Sanh area.

(2) Operations Supported: The unit fired continuously throughout the period in support of the following 3d Marine Division Operations.

(a) High Rise (25 Feb – Present)

(b) Kingfisher (16 July – Present)

(c) Ardmore (16 July – Present)

(d) Cumberland (1 August – 11 September)

(3) Organization:

(a) On 1 August the organization was as follows: Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, B Battery and C Battery were located at Camp J.J. Carroll (YD063546); A Battery, 2d Battalion 94th Artillery and B Battery, 6th Battalion 27th Artillery (attached) were located at the Phu Bai Fire Support Base (YD620095) under the Operational control of the 1st Field Artillery Group (Marine). Service Battery was located at Dong Ha Combat Base (YD240610) during the entire period.

(b) On 11 August, A Battery joined the battalion at Camp J.J. Carroll and on 12 September, B Battery, 6th Battalion 27th Artillery departed the I Corps Tactical Zone and reverted to the control of their parent organization. The battalion has maintained one firing platoon (2 guns) at the "Rockpile" (YD923242) since 18 August.

(4) Capabilities: From its primary position at Camp J.J. Carroll, the battalion can support Khe Sanh to the west and fire across the DMZ from the Gulf of Tonkin on the east to Coordinate YD777561 in the west. The battalion can also provide fire support for operations in the Hai Lang National Forest Reserve to the south and Quang Tri City to the southeast. The platoon at the "Rockpile" provides an additional 8,000 meters range to the west which includes the western portion of the DMZ with the exception of 2 km.

(5) Displacements:

(a) B Battery, 6th Battalion 27th Artillery displaced from Camp J.J. Carroll to the Phu Bai Fire Support Base on 1 August. The displacement was conducted by motor march from Camp Carroll to Dong Ha, by LCU from Dong Ha to Hue, and then by motor march from Hue to the Fire Support Base. Both of the land movements were organized in the standard manner with the M107s and
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(RCS CSFOR-65) Unit Identification Code: WDNKA (U)

M113s leading followed by heavy to light wheeled vehicles. In addition to organic weapons, three M113s were provided and spaced throughout the convoy. From Hue to the Fire Support Base two M18 tanks and a reinforced infantry platoon were added. The tanks were placed at the head of the convoy and the infantry platoon was positioned immediately behind the M107s. The move was completed without incident.

(b) On 8 August, A Battery was released from Operation Cumberland. On 9 August, at 0900 hours, A Battery moved from the Cumberland Fire Support Base (YD620095) to the LOU ramp at Hue, SVN. Security for the move consisted of two (2) M48 tanks, a reinforced Marine Rifle Platoon, and two Marine HU-1D gunships, all from the 3d Marine Division. The battery commander was convoy commander and maintained communications with the gunships, tanks, and rifle platoon, as well as organic unit personnel in the convoy. Organization of the convoy for security was as follows: the two tanks led the column and were followed by the convoy commander. Next came two squads of infantry in a 2½ ton truck. They were followed by the four M107s, then the M77 and the remaining two squads of infantry in a second 2½ ton truck. The last element of the convoy were battery mess, maintenance, ammo, and ammunition sections. The battery executive officer had been sent to Phu Bai on 8 August to organize the supply and rear detachment of the battery and to coordinate the move by LOU from Hue to Dong Ha. All arrangements were made through the 3d Marine Division G-4. Ample LOU space was made available. With the 11 cases that the battery brought in addition to sand bags and other engineer equipment, 5 LOUs were required to move the battery. The battery moved without incident onto the LOUs and sailed for Dong Ha at 1600 hours, 9 August. The battery arrived at Dong Ha LOU ramp at 1100 hours the following day, off-loaded and moved to Camp J.J. Carroll, arriving at 1300 hours. There was no enemy contact during the move.

(c) B Battery, 6th Battalion 27th Artillery displaced from Phu Bai Support Base to rejoin its parent unit on 13 September. Details of this move are not known.

(6) (a) Expenditures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>TOT R/O</th>
<th>TOT M/SN</th>
<th>TOT SUP</th>
<th>TOT M/S</th>
<th>TOT A</th>
<th>TOT P</th>
<th>TOT M</th>
<th>TOT R</th>
<th>TOT A</th>
<th>TOT P</th>
<th>TOT M</th>
<th>TOT R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HUGHES</td>
<td>12,134</td>
<td>1,131</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KINNISF</td>
<td>1,774</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LADMORE</td>
<td>16,66</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUMBERL</td>
<td>1,169</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUGHES</td>
<td>11,376</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KINNISF</td>
<td>3,186</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LADMORE</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS CSFQ-65) Unit Identification Code: "MDM" (U)

| UNIT | TOT INPS | TOT MNP | KDS | KMS 
|------|----------|---------|-----|-----
| HICKERSE | 7,183 | 905 | 81% | 61%
| KINGSFISHER | 864 | 290 | 10% | 22%
| LINDOR | 318 | 277 | 9% | 19%

QUARTER TOTAL:

| UNIT | TOT INPS | TOT MNP | KDS | KMS
|------|----------|---------|-----|-----
| HICKERSE | 50,699 | 3,142 | 79% | 55%
| KINGSFISHER | 5,751 | 1,928 | 15% | 27%
| ARMAND | 1,106 | 752 | 11% | 13%
| CUMBERLAND | 1,769 | 285 | 5% | 28%

(b) Class V:

(1) Class V support has shown improvement and is adequate. Ammunition resupply is initiated by a daily report to Da Nang Sub-Area Command by Task Forces. When a prescribed stockage level is reached resupply is initiated by Da Nang Sub-Area Command.

(2) As of 31 October, it was determined by physical inventory that a total of thirty-six (36) lots of propellent were on hand in three firing battery positions. B Battery had 28 various lots of propellent. C Battery's inventory consisted of 21 lots of propellent. On approximately 1 September, the Ammunition Supply Point located at Dong Ha was destroyed as a result of an artillery/rocket attack. Distribution of ammunition has been confused and critical since that time. Ammunition vehicles from various units were directed to report to the docks and received pallets of ammunition and propellent right from the Navy vessels that docked in the river. Ammunition and propellants were loaded at Da Nang to be shipped without regard of lot number.

(7) Gun Tubes Expended: Gun tubes have been expended as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Expended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IN COUNTRY TOTAL: 213 (Since 15 Oct 66)

c. Training:

(1) Training for the battalion incorporated three phases:

(a) Individual replacement indoctrination

(b) Formal unit instruction

(c) Integrated training

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS CSPOR-65) Unit Identification Code: VNNA (U)

(2) Class room instruction for the 3d quarter 1967 stressed the following subjects:

(a) Command Information
(b) Character Guidance
(c) Sentry Duty
(d) Defense against Subversion and Espionage
(e) ESC Training
(f) Material Readiness
(g) Supply Economy
(h) First Aid and Emergency Medical Care
(i) Field Sanitation

(3) Integrated subjects were incorporated into day by day operations as deemed necessary by the commanders in such areas as:

(a) Use of sign and countersign
(b) Light Discipline
(c) Recognition of enemy uniforms and weapons
(d) Communications security
(e) Map reading

(4) Cannoners hop and FDC team drill were also stressed during this period.

(5) During the month of October the battalion conducted a three day school for six enlisted personnel in forward observer procedures. This instruction was conducted to provide trained personnel to man the OP towers at Camp J.J. Carroll and Gia Linh.

(6) Individual and crew served weapons firing is scheduled once a week. The batteries are required to send 22% of their personnel each week to insure all personnel fire all weapons once a month. All personnel are required to fire the M60 MG, M79 grenade launcher and their individual weapons within one week after reporting to their unit.

(7) A class was conducted during October on TMERS and ESC for all officers and drivers of the battalion.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS CSPOR-65) Unit Identification Code: WDNM. (U)

(8) A four hour class was conducted during October on installation and handling of the Claymore mine to include actual detonation of the mine.

(9) A one week course was conducted for personnel of this battalion during the month of August by IFPOGCSV arty on the Gun Direction Computer M18 (F.D.C.).

(10) Chemical, Biological, Radiological: Refresher training was given to include care and fitting of the individual protective mask.

(11) No training in psychological warfare was conducted.

4. (C) Logistics:

a. Support Structure:

(1) Class I and II no change.

(2) Class II and IV no change.

(3) Class V no change at the end of the reporting period.

During the period, the Marine ASP at Dong Ha was not operational following its destruction by an enemy artillery/rocket attack. Consequently, ammunition was drawn directly off carriers (LCUs and C-130 aircraft). The ASP again became operational near the end of the quarter.

(4) Medical supplies were drawn from Marine medical facilities at Dong Ha until 1 October 1967. Since that time supplies have been drawn from the 32d Medical Depot at Quin Nhon. Supply of drugs, bandages, etc., from Marine sources proved inefficient with delays between requisition and receipt averaging eight weeks and extending up to as much as six months.

b. Adequacy of Support:

(1) Class I support has been excellent. The only shortage has been in flour. What has been received has frequently been full of worms and has been destroyed.

(2) Class III supplied by Fleet Logistical Support Unit at Dong Ha has been adequate except that there has been excessive water in both diesel and mogas. Action has been taken by the Marine Supply Point (bulk issue) at Camp J.J. Carroll to siphon water out of bulk issue bladders. More than 400 gallons of water were siphoned from the mogas bladders alone.

(3) Class II and IV support has, for the most part, been more than adequate. DSAC has responded readily to requisitions for TA50-901 and end items. There has been an inordinate delay in processing of requisitions for items such as building materials. Several work order requests involving gun and end items were submitted by this battalion using an incorrect administrative format. A delay of five weeks was caused before the request were returned for resubmission in the correct format. No action was
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS CSFOG-65) Unit Identification Code: WDNNA (U)

taken in the interim because this unit had been led to believe that the materials were pending transportation. Such administrative delays are harmful because of the race against the monsoon.

(4) Class V support has been outstanding.

(5) Maintenance Support and Supply:

(a) Third echelon support has been outstanding during the last quarter, within the capability of Task Force Pike (TFP). Most repair parts for guns have been readily available even though Task Force Pike has no ASL. Average down time for third echelon maintenance has been one day. Some of the echelon workload, such as changing of all tubes and some instances of installation of head gaskets has been accomplished by battalion maintenance with permission from Task Force Pike because of the limited manpower capability of the latter.

(b) Second echelon repair parts have not been readily available. Average down time for second echelon parts has been 10.8 days for artillery; 11.4 days for Automotive; 54.3 days for engineer. Red Ball Express has not been effective. The average time lapse from presentation of requisitions to Task Force Pike to receipt of parts has been 20 days. Lack of an ASL at Task Force Pike has been partially responsible for the excessive down time awaiting parts.

(c) Concerning PLL, this battalion was guilty of failure to place demands on the supply system for many months following its arrival in-country. The unit used excess parts brought in connex containers from the United States. Consequently, a team called "Project Counter" deleted 1600 line items from the PLL based on lack of demands. In order to rectify the situation, many items are being systematically added to the PLL as initial non-recurring demands. The large percent of line items at zero balance in the following table constitutes a condition which will be partially rectified as requisitioned items start to come in. The table is based on data as of 31 October.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE</th>
<th>TOTAL # OF LINE ITEMS</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL AT 100% FILL</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL AT PARTIAL FILL</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL AT 0 BALANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Artillery</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Auto &amp; Eng</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Signal</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. QM &amp; Chem</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Total</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Items Requisitioned - 1388
Total Items Received - 268
% of Total Items Received - 19%
Total Items Cancelled - None
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(d) A serious problem exists in the lack of a local capability for recharging CO₂ type fire extinguishers. Extinguishers have been hand-carried to Da Nang for recharging. On or about 15 October, the Shipping and Receiving Department, 560th Support Company, Da Nang Sub-Area Command, to which this unit was directed by Task Force Pike, would not accept CO₂ extinguishers for recharging because they didn't know what to do with them. The battalion personnel then tried to get the extinguishers charged at the Naval Hospital Fire Station and the Camp Tien Cha Fire Station, neither of which had the capability to recharge CO₂ extinguishers. The remedy offered by Task Force Pike of turning in extinguishers and requisitioning new ones is not acceptable because of the excessive lag time involved and the obvious disregard of supply economy.

(e) Task Force Pike has no capability for cutting safety glass except with a simple glass cutter such as the one on hand in batteries. Consequently, cracked windshields which required replacement glass must remain cracked until glass becomes available. Then the unit must cut the glass to the correct size. Because of a lack of skill and equipment much of the glass is ruined in attempting to cut it to size.

c. Transportation:

(1) Destruction of the Dong Ha ASP and the subsequent requirement to drastically increase on-site stockage of Class V has placed a tremendous burden on 5 ton trucks. Overloads of up to 100% have been normal on a daily basis out of necessity. Road conditions and overwork have caused rapid deterioration of tires, tubes and other component parts. A shortage of 5 ton tires and tubes has been a chronic condition for the past 60 days. Arrival of M548 cargo carriers has partially improved the situation. This vehicle is not designed, however, to carry heavy ammunition loads over long distances.

(2) Transportation to Dong Ha from the South has continued to be by air and sea. Opening of Highway 1 from Da Nang to Dong Ha has not yet benefited Army units in this area. Sea transport has been adequate because of good weather conditions. Onset of the monsoon and high running seas will strongly affect this mode of transportation.

5. (U) Civil Affairs: a. The assigned area of responsibility for Civil Affairs remained the same. Since the last reporting period the following have been distributed to indigenous personnel:

1. Wood Working Kits - 8
2. Mid Wife Kits - 7
3. Mid Wife Replacement Kits - 2
4. Volley Ball & Kick Ball Kit - 1
5. Coloring Books & Crayons - 8
6. Soap, Hand - 1 Box (Approx 300 small bars)
7. Soap, Lye - 1 Box (24 bars)
b. MEDCAP continued to be administered by the battalion medical section. Patients treated by month are as shown below:

1. August - 0
2. September - 120
3. October - 190

NOTE: During the month of August no MEDCAP was performed because this unit had no doctor and the interpreter was on leave. The majority of effort was devoted to two of the six hamlets assigned to this unit. The remaining four hamlets are located in close proximity to the Can Lo dispensary and the people were in good health. The doctor and his team average two MEDCAP visits per week.

6. (U) Personnel/Administration: a. Organization: During the majority of the reporting period there was no change in ACON. The only change in ACON were the reassignment of A Battery on 1 August and the detachment of B Battery, 6th Battalion 27th Artillery on 13 September. The remainder of the battalion remained the same with Headquarters, A, B, and C Batteries located at Camp J.J. Carroll and Service Battery located at Dong Ha (minus battalion maintenance and battalion personnel sections, which were attached to and located with Headquarters Battery.

b. Strength:

1. As of the end of the reporting period, the battalion's assigned strength was as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Warrant Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized:</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned:</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. During the reporting period the following gains and losses were incurred as shown by months:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Off</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Off</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Casualties were sustained during the reporting period as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA (not evacuated)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA (evacuated)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10
c. Personnel Management: The event of greatest significance in the personnel field during the reporting period was the lack of any planned infusion program for officers and NCOs. This problem is discussed in detail in Section II.

d. Decorations:

(1) During the three month reporting period the following recommendations for decoration were submitted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Decoration</th>
<th>Number Submitted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The following decorations were approved during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Decoration</th>
<th>Number Approved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Discipline, Law and Order: Judicial and non-judicial punishment which occurred during the reporting period are as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 15</th>
<th>Court Martial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bk Ex 67</td>
<td>Rm 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Morale: Morale of the unit personnel, already high, has improved constantly because of increased bunker protection, regular movies, better living conditions, and excellent weather.

g. Promotions: The following enlisted promotions to grade E4 and above were made during the reporting period:

E4 - 126, E5 - 25, E6 - 8, E7 - 0, E8 - 0, E9 - 1

h. Medical: The Battalion Aid Station processed patients as shown below during the period:
A VALID REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODE: 7236A (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patient Visits</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patient on Quarters</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispensary Admissions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consults to Dong Ha</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria Cases</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION II

COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (U)

PART I: (D) Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (U) Personnel: a. ITEM: Lack of infusion program for officers and senior NCOs.

DISCUSSION: This battalion arrived in South Vietnam in October 1966, thus setting the rotation date for most personnel in September 1967. Realizing what the effect of a mass rotation of personnel would be upon the battalion, and in accordance with the provisions of USAFRG Reg 614-9, an infusion program for enlisted personnel in the grades 2-4 and below was conducted between the months of January and May 1967. The results of this program can be considered successful, as with few exceptions there was no crisis in the lower grades when the unit completed its first year in country. However, no such infusion program was planned for the officers or NCOs of the battalion. Thus, with the exception of the battalion commander who arrived in July, one captain who extended for two months, one captain who arrived in late July and two lieutenants who voluntarily extended their tour for six months, the entire original officer strength departed within a period of three and one-half weeks. In fact, 21 officers departed the battalion during the eight day period 22-30 September. Four junior officers were transferred into the battalion from the 5th Battalion 1st Artillery in August, but these officers were newly arrived in country at the time and could contribute little to an orderly transition. Replacement personnel did not arrive in time to allow an overlap of tours and in many cases, positions were vacant for a period of several weeks before replacement personnel arrived. Nearly as serious was the lack of infusion of NCOs. During the five week period 14 August to 20 September, the Sergeant Major, four First Sergeants, the Operations Sergeant, the Intelligence Sergeant, the Company Chief, the Battalion Fire Direction Chief, and numerous E-6 section chiefs left the battalion. Again, replacements often arrived after their predecessors had departed. The effect of this lack of planning can be easily surmised. Instead of a smooth continuation of battalion operations, there was a period of confusion due to a lack of local experience. Although all newly arrived personnel quickly accepted the responsibilities placed on them and readily adapted themselves to the complications of their environment, there was a definite adverse effect on the combat efficiency of this battalion due to the lack of a planned infusion program for officers and NCOs.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) Unit Identification Code: 'IDNNA (U)

OBSERVATION: The failure to plan and execute a thorough infusion program for personnel of all grades so as to avoid a rotational hump can have extremely adverse effects on the combat efficiency of an organization.

b. ITEM: Malassignment of Personnel

DISCUSSION: The inadequacy of present TOE's to support 24-hour operations for extended periods of time requires malassignment of personnel in order to accomplish the battalion's mission. Additional requirements demand that personnel be taken from their assigned sections (and trained MOS) and placed in other sections with higher priority. The result is that some sections must work shorthanded or become non-operational. A modification to the TOE is being prepared to alleviate this condition by adding needed personnel and deleting some who are presently used very little except where siphoned off for work outside their MOS. The modifications are only valid in a situation such as the one in which this unit presently finds itself. For example, with the APO located at Dong Ha and the bulk of the battalion at Camp J.J. Carroll, two mail clerks are required rather than one. Two FDC crews are an absolute necessity, requiring 14 EM instead of the nine authorized. TARPS clerks in each battery and at battalion level are a must, although none are authorized by TOE. It is understood that this report is not a working document to obtain modifications to the TOE. The requirements are enumerated herein as planning guidance for units yet to deploy to this area.

1. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery.
   a. Two mail clerks rather than one
   b. Fourteen men FDC rather than nine
   c. Two additional men in S2, one as a clerk-typist and a second as an RTO-Driver.

2. Firing Battery
   a. TARPS Clerk
   b. Two recorders rather than one
   c. Two additional RTO-chart operators
   d. One additional chief computer
   e. One additional assistant gunner per section
   f. Four additional cannoneers per section
   g. Additional battery armorers
   h. Two wheeled vehicle mechanics
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS GSFOR-65) Unit Identification Code: WJXNA (U)

(3.) Service Battery

(a.) Two PLL clerks needed and not now authorized

(b.) One additional personnel clerk is needed for finance records

OBSERVATION: Modifications to the TOE are required for sustained operations in this area.

c. ITEM: Artillery Mechanics

DISCUSSION: This unit has had no school trained artillery mechanics in the past 12 months. This individual is a vital link in the maintenance chain. A possible reason for the present shortage of school-trained artillery mechanics is the unattractive grade structure authorized (E4). The amount and importance of the work involved justifies an authorized grade of E5.

OBSERVATION: Artillery units need trained artillery mechanics; especially when firing continuously. Efforts to improve the career attractiveness of this position need to be made.

2. (c) Operations:

a. ITEM: FM Radio Frequencies

DISCUSSION: Current assignment of frequencies is made by I FFORCEV. The battalion is assigned radio frequencies for the Command/Fire Direction, F-1, F-2, F-3, and Survey Radio Nets. Only one of the assigned frequencies is consistently usable without interference. Two of the frequencies are assigned to other units in close proximity. Currently the battalion is employed at one general location, and it does not need all of its frequencies. If this unit was committed at various locations, good reliable FM communications would not be possible.

OBSERVATION: Artillery units should be assigned frequencies on a solo user basis.

b. ITEM: FADAC

DISCUSSION: FADAC equipment was received by this battalion at the end of August. Four operators and one repairman attended a five-day school at Chu In. At the completion of the course, they returned with the FADAC equipment. Since 12 September, three of the four M-18 gun computers have become inoperative. The test set, computer logic unit (AN/GSM-70) has been for repair a major portion of the month. On 9 September, it was learned that the test set was not operating properly and it was turned in for repairs. On 29 September, the test set was returned. The next day it was returned to support maintenance because test tape checks failed to produce the proper results. Due to the lack of test equipment, our computers have been inoperative.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

(OG-8350-65) Unit Identification Code: WDN14 (U)

Observation: All MADAC equipment should be thoroughly checked out before issuance to units.

c. ITEM: Construction of bunkers.

Discussion: Bunkers constructed underground in this area have no chance of surviving the torrential rains unless they are very heavily constructed overhead and on the sides, have a covered waterproof entrance, and a roof to repel water, preferably made of metal. Entrances should be pointed to the southwest since the monsoon in this area comes from the northeast, with a driving wind. Above ground bunkers are equally efficient and can be constructed with less difficulty. Materials other than sand bags should be used for outer walls.

Observation: Above ground bunkers are equally efficient and can be constructed with less difficulty. Materials other than sand bags should be used for outer walls.

d. ITEM: Construction near 175mm guns.

Discussion: Tents, even over hardbacks, will not survive the muzzle blast of the 175mm gun. High winds in this area have a similar effect. Skidch are pulled out and the canvas is ripped wherever it touches the frame. Aluminum roofing is no solution. The blast wave causes the nails to pull through the aluminum. Galvanized roofing with canvas or wooden sides is the ideal solution. The effects of muzzle blast are extraordinary in that normal bracing fails quickly. A rule of thumb could be that if a 1x2 board will normally suffice, one had best use a 2" x 4". The pitch of the roof should be less than normal stateside construction and building sides should be as low as practicable.

Observation: Billet areas should be placed as far from the guns as space permits; hardbacks with galvanized roofing should be used rather than canvas.

e. ITEM: Collimators.

Discussion: In strong point base camps such as Camp J.J. Carroll, space is at a premium. It is impossible in many cases to obtain a far stake location more than 50 meters from the panoramic telescope. With a requirement to lay the guns in all directions the far aiming stake is sometimes, of necessity, as near as 40 meters to the sight. Collimators would eliminate this problem and yield more accurate firing data.

Observation: Collimators are needed to replace aiming stakes for artillery weapons, especially where space limitations exist.

f. ITEM: Chronographs.

Discussion: Registrations are difficult to obtain in this area and are usually observed by aerial observers. The large area covered by the 175mm gun demands many registrations because of transfer limits. These are being shot out (reaching the limit of rounds which may be fired through them) every 10-15 days. The most valid fire available is obtained from registrations.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

When tubes are changed, the data obtained from previous registrations is meaningless. A chronograph (Radar Chronograph Set: M36) would yield accurate VE's for all new tubes, conserve considerable ammunition and valuable tube life. Excellent met messages now available would be enhanced greatly by equally accurate velocity error data to yield many more first round target hits. When one considers the high percentage of unobserved missions now fired by this battalion, the value of accurate data becomes even more desirable.

OBSERVATION: All 175mm units should be issued the Radar Chronograph Set: M36 as a WABTOC item.

ITEM: Replacement of M107 Gun Carriages

DISCUSSION: The end of this reporting period was, approximately, the first in-country anniversary of this battalion. During this year over 120,000 projectiles have been fired & 213 gun tubes changed. It is also interesting to note that of the rounds expended, the majority have been in zone 3 firing. This, I am sure, far exceeds any other 175mm gun battalion in the world. During the past sixty-days we have experienced a marked increase in major and minor component replacement and repair. Examples: gun mounts, hydraulic cylinders, auxiliary fans, elevating and traversing motors, cracked spades and fuel tanks, PTO pumps, hydraulic lines ruptured and electrical failures to name but a few. Additionally, in October a breech block exploded resulting in two personnel injured.

OBSERVATION: It appears that possibly the weapons of this battalion have reached the point where a major rebuild in order, rather than continuous repair and replacement of components. We are presently in the process of preparing a detailed letter on this subject which will be submitted in the near future.

PART II: (U) RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) That a school for artillery mechanics be reinstituted at Fort Bragg and that the authorized grade be set at E5 (SP).

2. (U) That more careful attention be given to radio frequencies assigned to insure that units in close proximity to one another are given the same frequency.

3. (U) That PALAG's be completely checked out before assignment to units.

4. (U) That collimators be issued as WABTOC items to 175mm artillery units enroute to or already in Vietnam.

5. (U) That the Radar Chronograph Set: M36 be issued as a WABTOC item to all 175mm gun battalions on a basis of one per battalion.
6. (U) That a main support company be established at Dong Ha for support of the four artillery battalions of the Artillery Group in the Dong Ha - Camp Carroll area.

Robert H. Kanstra
LTC, Artillery
Commanding
TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350

1. Forwarded herewith is the Operational Report of the 2d Battalion (175mm)(SP), 94th Artillery for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967. This report is being forwarded to your headquarters since the battalion was assigned to I Field Force Vietnam throughout the reporting period.

2. Concur in the recommendations made in Part II of Section II of the report, subject to the following comments:

   a. **Paragraph 2 (radar frequencies).** This recommendation should be amended to read "... one another are not given the same ...".

   b. **Paragraph 5 (radar chronograph).** The TOE of this headquarters includes one Radar Chronograph Set M36, although the equipment was not available for issue at the time of deployment. When issued, this equipment can satisfy the requirement stated in this report.

[Signature]
DAVID L. JAMES
Colonel, Arty
Commanding
TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT, APO 96350

1. Concur in the observations and recommendations contained in basic communication and previous endorsement.

2. Reference: Section II, Part II, paragraph 1, page 16. Concur with the need for school trained qualified artillery mechanics. Information cannot be determined at this headquarters whether such a course of instruction is in existence.

3. Reference: Section II, Part II, paragraph 2, page 16. Frequencies assigned were allocated by the III Marine Amphibious Force. There is no indication of frequency interference reported to signal officers of III Marine Amphibious Force or I Field Force Vietnam. Although desirable, sufficient Fm frequencies are not available to issue on a sole user basis.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[signature]

DONALD L. BURTON
Major, Artillery Adjutant
AVFA-20-72 (7 Nov 67)  3d Ind.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1967  RG2 CHUR-65  UIC WINHA 2d BN, 94th Arty (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

This headquarters has reviewed the 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery
Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31
October 1967 and concurs with the observations and recommendations of
the basic document as modified by the previous indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

RICHARD J. SETTIMO
AGC
Asst Adjutant General
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery (DNNA) as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning lack of infusion program for officers and NCO's, page 12, paragraph 1a. USARV directives include officers and NCO's in the infusion program. Failure of the unit to include them reflects a lack of command emphasis on this program at that time. Currently, officers are included by the unit in the program.

b. Reference item concerning artillery mechanics, page 14, paragraph 1c; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 1. Replacements for this unit are allocated to Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam for further assignment as the Commanding General may direct. There is a critical shortage of MOS 45F throughout USARV with the command currently having only 27.5 percent of its authorization. No replacements in this MOS were assigned in December. A service school course does exist for this MOS; however, USARV cannot control the source of MOS qualification of individual replacements. Service school training is not a prerequisite for this MOS.

c. Reference item concerning collimators, page 15, paragraph 2e: Concur. This item is authorized as a component on the following field artillery weapons systems: 175mm, M107; SP105mm, M108; SP155mm, M109; SP8", M110; Towed 105mm, M102; Towed 105mm, M101A1; and Towed 155mm, M114A1. CINCUSARPAC message (CONF) GPMASM 44570, 13 December 1967 cites authority for total density.

d. Reference item concerning chronographs, page 15, paragraph 2f; and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2b: Concur. Basis of issue has been established as two per HHB, FA GP and HHB, Div Arty. Chronographs are scheduled for issue in RVN during 3d Quarter FY 68.
AVJackson-5ST (7 Nov 67)  4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(MUC 0621-65) Unit Identification Code: MDMA (U)

3. A copy of this endorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
C. S. Nakatsuoka
Cpt, AGC
Asst AG

cc frum:
HQ, I Field Force Vietnam
HQ, 2d Bn, 94th Arty
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 67 from Hq, 2d Bn, 94th Arty (UIC: WDNMAA) (RCS CSPOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 25 JAN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

HEAVRIN-SPYDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d Battalion 94th Artillery**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967**

CO, 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery

**7 November 1967**

**674187**

**2d Battalion, 94th Artillery**

**24**