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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 73rd Signal Battalion (SPT) (U).

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 Oct 66.

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 73rd Signal Battalion (SPT) (U) for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraphs 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

By: G. W. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 73RD SIGNAL BATTALION (SPT)
APO, US Forces, 96312

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966,
Reports Control Symbol CSK-R-65

TO: Addresses Indicated in Reference c by Separate Letters of Transmittal

References: a. Department of the Army Regulation 1-19, dated 26 May 1966, Subject: Administration, Operational Reports–Lessons Learned, RCS CSK-R-65

b. United States Army Vietnam Regulation 870-2, dated 19 July 1966, Subject: Historical Activities, Operational Reports–Lessons Learned, RCS CSK-R-65
c. 1st Signal Brigade (USARTRACOM) Regulation 870-2, dated 5 October 1966, Subject: Operational Report–Lessons Learned, RCS CSK-R-65
d. 21st Signal Group Regulation 870-2, dated 20 October 1966, Subject: Operational Report–Lessons Learned, RCS CSK-R-65

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION AND UNIT ACTIVITIES

Preface

This report encompasses the period from initial notification of deployment through deployment and operational commitment. The unit received formal notification to Prepare for Overseas Movement on 16 March 1966 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The battalion at that time was a Third US Army unit assigned to the 21st Signal Group in support of XVIII Airborne Corps. The unit had been unofficially alerted the previous November when the Group Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Sharp, informed Lieutenant Colonel Dixon and Major Boutilier they probably would deploy the unit as Commander and Executive Officer. At this time they were Commander and Executive Officer, respectively, of the 36th Signal Battalion (Combat Area) also assigned to the 21st Signal Group at Fort Bragg.

Major Boutilier assumed command of the 73rd Signal Battalion in late December 1965, whereas Lieutenant Colonel Dixon retained his command until 10 June 1966. During the early part of the period the battalion had been nearly at full strength. Receipt of Deployment Orders by the 21st Signal
SUATI: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966, Reports Control Symbol CSPOR-65

Group, however, made it necessary to transfer personnel to that unit because it was to be in-country earlier than the battalion. As filler personnel arrived, individual training was conducted by placing 3-2/3 staff personnel in operational and security positions in the 36th Signal Battalion. Administrative and logistical personnel operated in their assigned positions preparing the unit for overseas movement. Unit training was conducted with assistance of the 36th and 40th Signal Battalions, as well as the Special Warfare Center and 7th Special Forces Group.

Equipment, personnel and publication shortages were requisitioned, equipment was repaired as required, and initial and final POM inspections were completed by late May 1966. Col French, Third Army Inspector General, made the final Readiness Inspection on or about 3 June 1966, and recommended the unit to Lt General Truman for deployment on schedule. Equipment Readiness date was met on 1 June, and the battalion's equipment moved by rail to Savannah, Georgia. It departed that port aboard the "Remson Heights" on 17 June with Sergeants E-5 Gibbs and Tart as equipment guards. (Captain Beck of the Export-Isbrandtsen Lines proved to be an excellent host to the men.)

The initial Personnel Readiness date of 15 June was delayed to 5 July for reasons unknown, causing a problem for personnel on leave as well as a "let-down" from the previous months pressures. On 7 July, at 2100H hours, the Main body of 9 Officers and 32 Enlisted men departed Pope Air Force base aboard the first United Airlines Charter flight Boeing 707 to carry troops from a CONUS base to POF for deployment. (Stewardesses Sally, Joan, and Patricia made a lasting impression for their attention.) The main body boarded the USNS General Gordon at 080230U July 66, and sailed from Oakland Army Terminal at 081130U July.

The advance party, consisting of LTC Dixon, Maj Boutilier and WO Sjogren departed Travis Air Force Base aboard Northwest Airlines charter flight Boeing 707 at approximately 150430U July. They arrived in Saigon, SVN, at 161615H July, were greeted by Major Willis, 1st Signal Brigade Staff, and driven to Brigade Headquarters. Saturday and Sunday were spent meeting the staff and being briefed. After a short meeting with the Brigade Commanding General, the Battalion Commander departed with the 21st Signal Group Commander for Nha Trang. After briefings at Group Headquarters and a quick orientation tour of Quin Nhon to visit the 41st Signal Battalion, LTC Dixon and Maj Boutilier arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on 22 July 1966.

The advance party made arrangements for reception, accommodation and employment of Battalion personnel and equipment. The "Remson Heights" arrived in the Inner Harbor at Cam Ranh Bay on 26 July 1966 and unloading commenced on 30 July 1966. The USNS General Gordon arrived on 31 July 1966 and troops were paid, received their mail, and were brought ashore. They were moved to the cantonement area on Hill 184, where "G" Company, 41st Signal Battalion had erected four General Purpose Medium Tents. Equipment unloading was completed on 3 August 1966. The Hill 184 site is still occupied, although it has grown substantially.
SCCVMG-SS-

13 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966,
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After an orientation tour by the commander and his staff of the area
to be assigned for communications responsibility, plans and preparations
for assuming command or operational control of signal units operating in
the provinces of Dak-lac, Quang-Duc, Lam-Dong, Binh-Thuan, Ninh-Thuan,
Tuyen-Duc (to include the Autonomous City of Da Lat), and Khanh-Hoa (to
include the Autonomous City of Cam Ranh) were completed. The Area
Communications System serves U.S. and ROK Army units, U.S. Air Force and
Navy units at over twenty installations, and MACV Advisor Compounds.

Area communications responsibility for the aforementioned provinces
was assigned to the Commanding Officer, 73rd Signal Battalion, on 15 August
1966 per Special Order 87, Headquarters, 21st Signal Group.

Concurrent with the area responsibility assignment, General Order
No. 12, Hqs 21st Signal Group, dated 15 August attached Company C, 41st
Signal Battalion, 228th Signal Company, 362nd Signal Company, 224th Signal
Detachment, 213th Signal Detachment to the battalion for operational Control.

During the succeeding weeks the arrival and/or formation of other signal
units (battalions, companies, detachments) necessitated higher headquarters
to realign and readjust the responsibilities of the respective area commanders.
This was reflected in a series of orders attaching, detaching or assigning
signal units to the 73rd Signal Battalion to meet the constant increase in
communication requirements. The principal actions were assignment of the
278th Signal Company upon arrival with duty station at Phang Rang on 23
August; transfer of area communications responsibility for the Dar Loo
province to the 43rd Signal Bn vice 73rd Signal Bn, on 26 Sept 1966; re-
assignment of the 228th Signal Company to 459 Signal Battalion, effective
28 Oct 1966, assignment of Company D and Company E, 43rd Signal Bn to the
73rd Signal Battalion effective 20 October 1966; and transfer of area
communications responsibility for that portion of Khanh-Hoa province north
of line drawn from CP 0040 east to the Khon-Hoa, Ninh Thuan District borders
to the 459th Signal Battalion effective 4 November 1966. During this period
battalion personnel participated in 77 days of intensive POM training; 36
days of reduced POM training and POM leaves; 25 days of troop movement; 14
days of orientation, unloading and site preparation; and 77 days of area
communications operations. As of 31 October 1966, the 73rd Signal Battalion
organization and personnel strengths were as shown below.

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**OCTC-SS**

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966, Reports Control Symbol CSNOR-65

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* Modified

1. **PERSONNEL**

a. Unit organization and strengths as of 31 October are indicated in the Preface, as is the sequence of unit and area assignment actions. Personnel actions and administration benefitted by the Personnel Officer being in the Advance Party. The 15 days he spent in-country provided opportunity for orientation with appropriate servicing units and local regulations, policies and procedures.
b. The TOE provides for a Personnel Section of Pers Tech (MOS 711A), 1 SFU 87 (MOS 71E40), and 1 pers MDT SP5E5 (MOS 71K20). This is inadequate. The unit may at any time be expected to assume administrative responsibility for 2 to 7 Signal Companies and various Signal Detachments. In order to form an effective Battalion Personnel Section it has been necessary to utilize other than administrative personnel. This necessitates prolonged and intensive training programs. Proper replacements cannot be requisitioned as the additional personnel are not authorized by current TOE. It would have been more appropriate to augment the battalion during PCM.

c. Prior to departure from CONUS appropriate action was taken under procedures of Par 20 g. 45, 220-10, to have morning report files transferred. Since arrival in country, however, strength accountability documents necessary for accurate strength accounting have not been furnished. IPU rosters have been received irregularly from other than the servicing IPU.

d. The current rate of non-receipt of assignment instructions is approximately 75%. The absence of such instructions delays returnees and may cause unnecessary personal expense.

e. The Battalion Crest was requested on 18 April 1966 in accordance with AR 670-5. The Department of the Army Institute of Heraldry designed a distinctive unit insignia. The design was received and returned approved. It consists of a silver color metal and enamel insignia 1 1/8 inches in height, 1 1/2 inches across bottom consisting of a blue colored diamond charged with a silver heraldic sea lion holding a sword, on each rounded segment colored orange, there are two stylized electrical radio waves. The sea lion is taken from the Philippine coat of arms, which was in use at the time the unit received the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation. The blue background represents the Pacific Ocean. The four electrical radio flashes represent the four capabilities of a Signal unit, while the silver and orange are the colors of Signal Battalions.

f. The following critical MDS's severely effect the Battalion's operational capabilities. Extensive cross training has enabled continued operations; however, the strain on personnel is becoming more obvious. Rotation continues to reduce assigned strength despite the expansion of installations and required communications services. The supporting medical dispensary doctor has indicated several recent illnesses can be attributed to physical exhaustion of key men.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966,
Reports Control Symbol CSKD-65

2. OPERATIONS:

a. A Battalion Control was established to monitor communications
    systems and circuit efficiency, and to establish coordination with Regional
    Communications Group Technical Control Facilities on system/circuit outages,
    reporting and restoration. Plans were made for realignment of resources
    to meet the needs of expanding military commitments in the area. The relo-
    cation of USA Cam Ranh Bay Support Command Headquarters from Nha Trang to
    Cam Ranh concurrently with the arrival of the battalion created an immedi-
    ate problem of reorienting communications in support of this major logis-
    tical headquarters. The absence of a Signal Officer on the CRBSC Staff
    made it necessary to act in an advisory capacity to that command. This
    situation has since been remedied.

b. HF, VHF, and carrier commitments have steadily increased.
    The Battalion is presently supplying HF Radio-Teletype stations in the USARV
    Administrative Net, a station in the "ARIC/GLO" Net, stations in the newly
    established HF SSB Group Net, stations in support of the Fourth Infantry
    Division and 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and stations in support
    of Republic of Korea Field Forces V. Additional HF SSB Radio Sets are
    operated for MACV Advisory Teams. The Battalion is presently operating 25
    VHF radio systems and 11 Cable Carrier systems. One VHF system (77UHC9)
    spans a distance of 85 kilometers, apparently bending (diffusing) over
    common obstacle mountain at exact mid point. Multi-pair cable projects
    now in progress, however, will free considerable carrier equipments.
    VHF Carrier systems also are being extended to Republic of Korea Field
    Forces V at four different locations. The growing VHF commitments have
    depleted backup resources for present systems. Additional VHF and Carrier
    equipment is on requisition to fill back-up requirements.

c. Switchboard facilities are rapidly being expanded to meet the
    needs of the continuing influx of units. A 600-line, nine-position central
    office (modified for idle-line termination and plug supervision) was
    installed at Nha Trang to provide long distance trunking and relieve an
    overly congested three-position central office. An additional SB-86 Manual
    switchboard was installed at Dalat, bringing the total line capacity up to
    120. Plans are presently being engineered by 1st Signal Brigade to furt-
    her upgrade telephone facilities in the Dalat area. The inside plant
    portion of the 2400-line Dial Central Office Installation project programmed
    for Cam Ranh Bay has been completed within limitations of available
    materials. Completion is now dependent on receipt of additional materials
    (primarily the third selector bank) and outside plant cable construction.
    When completed this installation will relieve the increasing telephone
    traffic congestion in Cam Ranh Bay area. A three-position Central Office
    with 200-line capacity was installed in the Phan Rang area in support of
    the 101st Airborne Division, 1st Brigade Base Camp and other Army elements
    at that location. Numerous "Hot-Line" Security/Alert Systems have been
    installed.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
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1. Communications Center traffic is increasing significantly. A new, secure, full-duplex Communications Center facility has been added in the Phan Rang area, a temporary expansion has been completed for Cam Ranh Bay, a communications center facility has been requested for Dalat, and one for Dong Ba Thin is programmed. Traffic volumes and handling times are still a problem, and efforts are being made to coordinate with local commands to improve message handling procedures. The Battalion does not have air courier capability, however; three armed motor messenger runs are made weekly from Phan Rang to Nha Trang, with pickups at Bagol MACV, Cam Ranh, and Dong Ba Thin. The 213th Signal Detachment, which became operational on 12 March 1966, has provided cryptological distribution and general maintenance support for all crypto accounts in the I and II Corps areas. The number of Crypto accounts during this period has steadily increased. The 213th Signal Detachment has advised personnel on necessary procedures for establishing, maintaining, and closing crypto accounts. It has also provided coordination and guidance in cryptologic matters.

e. The 3rd Platoon, 578th Signal Company (Cable Construction), has been attached to C Company, 41st Signal Battalion, with the assigned mission of installation, operation and maintenance of outside plant wire and cable facilities. This unit has performed in the finest tradition of Signal Corps linemen, working tirelessly to install over 700 miles of tactical wire and 37,600 feet of multi-pair cable in the Battalion's area of responsibility. The enormous Engineer Corps construction effort in the Cam Ranh area results in a constant struggle to repair broken lines and cable. New requirements for expanded telephone plant as well as multi-pair interconnect cables were accomplished despite the manhours of effort involved in repair. Cable splicing was accomplished with inadequate splicing materials. In one case, with the assistance of personnel from the 54th Signal Battalion and Republic of Korea Army, a cable trench was dug by hand through the city of Nha Trang. Arrival of B Company, 40th Signal Battalion, has relieved this platoon of responsibility for installation of the outside cable projects at Cam Ranh and Dong Ba Thin and the interconnect cables between Cam Ranh Bay Army and the Air Base and Navy Base located on the Cam Ranh Peninsula.

f. Upon completion of programmed tactical communications facilities on Pr"Line site, efforts were concentrated on improving defenses and living accommodations. Six new troop billets were constructed and individual fighting positions were completed. A helipad was built adjacent to the entrance.
An extensive site renovation is in the process at Lang-Bian Mountain by Detachment #2, 362nd Signal Company. Overcrowded conditions and limited space, along with receipt of additional communications requirements, necessitated the renovation. Detachment personnel supported by the 62nd Engineer Battalion cleared, leveled and graded a large portion of the mountain top. Local Special Forces personnel assisted in the demolition of large boulders on site which could not be removed by bulldozers. Concrete pads were laid for antenna tower structures, while quarters and messing facilities were erected on newly cleared land. When completed, the new systems will provide 72 more channels to Pleiku, forty-eight of these will be strapped through to Saigon. Work has been hampered by bad weather, huge boulders and a lack of proper equipment.

At the Saigon Octopus tropo site a 700-pair cable system and MDF was installed to improve trouble-shooting and reduce outages. Four 100-KW generators have been approved by Pacific Architects and Engineers for the site. Plans call for a $27,000 air conditioned building. A change of equipment layout was necessary to make room for new vans. All communications shelters were moved onto new reinforced concrete pads with less than five minutes outage time cumulative for all systems.

The 362nd Signal Company operates its tactical Tropospheric Scatter Systems with AN/TRC-129, AN/TRC-90 and AN/TRC-132. Radio Equipment. The company has 16 systems in operation. Five additional systems presently are being installed. Tropo teams assigned or attached increased to 44 with arrival of ten teams (2 Officers and 80 EM) on six months TDY from the 11th Signal Group. Eight teams arrived in country between 25 August and 14 September 1966. The remaining two were on site by 2 October 1966. A vigorous site preparation program was required to have sites ready for equipment. The Pleiku-Quin Nhon system was established at 1915H, 3 September, followed by the Danang-Chu Lai system at 2330H 15 September, and the Cam Ranh Bay-Quin Nhon system at 0700H, 2 October 1966. Two more systems will activate soon. One will connect Nha Trang to Ban Me Thuot; the other will increase channels between Lang Bian Mountain and Pleiku.

Responsibilities of the 362nd Signal Co. (73rd Signal Battalion) and the 518th Signal Company, (39th Signal Battalion) are being redistributed. Tropospheric Scatter being assigned to the 362nd and Microwave being assigned to the 518th. Personnel reassignments have been effected and equipment transfer is in process. Company and battalion organizations are undergoing changes to meet existing requirements and achieve increased communications efficiency. MTO&E's have been submitted to realign existing communications facilities and meet anticipated future requirements.
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As of 1 May 1966 the 362nd Signal Company had relinquished control of many of its operating elements to various signal units throughout the country. The 362nd left the 41st Signal Battalion (UA) and came under the administrative control of the 73rd on 15 August 1966. Operational control was assigned to the 73rd on 24 August 1966. The 224th and 506th Signal Detachments were attached to the 362nd effective 23 August 1966 as were the 206th, 220th, 221st, and 235th Signal Detachments effective 24 September 1966.

1. The saturation of Cam Ranh Bay Local Switchboard with over 400 local lines has resulted in deterioration of service during peak traffic periods, which have extended from 0830 to 1730 hours on some days. Major commanders have been contacted and a program coordinated and tentatively approved by Commanding General, CRBSC to have each unit take the actions described below. Cooperation at this time has been excellent. It is realized this program must be implemented with common sense and will not solve the entire problem.

   (1) Each command, battalion, and separate company will appoint a Telephone Control/Communications Coordination Officer.

   (2) These Officers will review requirements for all installed telephones and recommend to their commander which are essential. The criteria for review determining what offices must absolutely have access to common user local and long distance circuits. Revised directory listings will be submitted by each unit through CRB Support Command Signal Officer and any telephones not listed by the unit will be removed. (The CRB Depot has already accomplished this, relieving over 50 drops, pending completion of the CRB DCO and outside plant. An SD-66, property of the Depot, has been installed for warehouse communications and will be operated by Depot personnel.)

   (3) Battalions will be allocated 2 private subscriber lines and two local common user lines for a unit switchboard. Companies will be allocated two circuits from the local board for use at their discretion, and internal company switchboards will be encouraged where available. (Many units have already installed their boards.)

   (4) Commanders will designate critical personnel authorized access to ID trunk during duty-hours. If properly implemented this should balance long-distance trunk users with the limited number of long-distance trunks available and reduce the calling rate.

m. The Battalion Command/Control FM Net has been modified for Radio-Wire integration and all outlying stations relying on vulnerable communications nets have been provided access, (i.e., CRB Navy - Spiral-4 cable carrier system; Corpus Christi Army Helicopter Maintenance Ship - subject to loss of VHF due to change of antenna orientation with tide;
SCCVMG-SS

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Hon Mot Island VHF radio relay - isolated and dependent on generators; MACV Advisory Team at Bangoi - AN/TRA-1 VHF system; 71st ADA - isolated on hilltop, etc., MACV Advisor has used the net to call Army gunships and Tactical Air Support. The new family FM radio series has been extremely effective. Vehicular communication is excellent between Cam Ranh to Nha Trang and Phan Rang. A TR-5/TT-4 FM radio teletype system has been tested successfully with the 278th Signal Company for emergencies. Local Senior Commanders have been advised of the RWI and encouraged to request entrance, although few have done so. RWI was used extensively to expedite actions from GRB Air Base on the day of the Presidential visit.

n. The importance of the MACV Advisor and US AID activities at Bangoi was discovered by a liaison visit by the Battalion Commander. (See paragraph 6D(3), Civic Actions, for a brief description of the AID program.) The absence of any reliable communications other than AN/TRA-1 VHF to Nha Trang was noted. A project has been initiated to install a Spiral-4 cable under Cam Ranh Bay deep water channel. The Spiral-4 underwater portion has been prepared by tightening all hocks with a wrench and painting them; the cable has been placed on a large cable reel for movement by LARC for installation. Large, heavy washers (approximately 20 lbs each) will be tied to the cable upon submersion. The 35th Engineer Group is installing pilings in deep water on both sides of the channel where low tide exposes a sand pit on the east side and a coral-reef on the west side of the Bay. Poles are being installed on these low-water areas. Mayor Bang's ARVN troops are installing their portion under 73rd Signal Battalion supervision. Coordination with port construction units and the Harbor Master indicates there should be no dredging through the channel at this location. Successful completion of this project will be a significant contribution to local security, coordination of daily movement of Vietnamese Nationals employed on the Peninsula, as well as city administration of the Mayor's widespread population.

o. The Battalion coordinates and supports Page Communication Company Integrated Wide-band Communications System (IWCS) Tropospheric and Microwave Radio Projects at eight sites as well as two Coaxial Undersea Cable Projects.

p. The integration of "Fixed-Plant" equipment and procedures of Defense Communications Agency and Strategic Army Communications Command are essential to effective interface between the "Tactical" and Fixed Plant systems. Existing control and restoration procedures are felt to be excellent for high quality communications required to sustain operations. Existing procedures, except for prerogatives provided Area Communication Commanders by 1st Signal Brigade Regulation 10-10, can delay response to tactical area system requirements. The time lag involved in requesting
communications requirements through command channels has proven intolerable to combat commanders. Constant liaison between tactical and area signal staffs is required to insure planning is concurrent within each communications system and that each others capabilities and resources are known.

3. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION:

a. The Battalion was organized under TOE 11-116D, 5 February 1966, and was directed to deploy at reduced strength (10 Officers, 2 Warrant Officers, and 34 Enlistedmen). The reduction deleted the Battalion Executive Officer, Telephone and Teletype Officer, and Unit Supply Technician Spaces, and made it necessary for the S-3 and the Radio Officer to carry dual functions. The reduced strength TOE has proven inadequate. Personnel to fill the Battalion to full strength (12 Officers, 3 Warrant Officers and 38 Enlistedmen) were requisitioned on or about 20 September 1966 and have been received. CONUS training would have benefitted these personnel and expedited their integration into the staff.

b. In addition to Weapons Qualification and Familiarization Firing, a 16 hour block of mandatory instruction was required by Headquarters XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, prior to departing CONUS. This instruction consisted of classes in Area Orientation (Vietnam), Malaria Control, First Aid and General Health, Field Sanitation, Perimeter Defense, Sentry Duty, Code of Conduct, Geneva Convention and participation in night training to include night vision. Instruction was conducted jointly with the 40th Signal Battalion. Area orientation instruction was supplemented by an outstanding five-hour briefing and a field trip through a replica of a Viet Cong Village conducted by B Company, Seventh Special Forces Warfare Center, Fort Bragg. Night training was conducted during a two-week field exercise (SIX) with the 36th Signal Battalion. Training was conducted in all aspects of area Communications. An in-country training program is presently being implemented in accordance with 1st Signal Brigade training regulations.

c. Due to increased commitments an accelerated telephone operator OJT program was developed. Training of operator personnel in all signal specialties is a continuing program. Objectives of this program are to achieve immediate reporting of trouble or outages to command and control channels, expedite trouble shooting and circuit/system restoration through improved procedures, prevent equipment failure through improved operator maintenance, and convince every man in the Battalion of the need for a "Sense of Urgency" in his efforts to provide reliable, quality communications.
Personnel replacements have not kept pace with additional equipment and increased communication commitments. It has been imperative for each site commander to aggressively cross-train all personnel in the different types of equipment operated and maintained on the site.

Due to the constant exposure to enemy activity at many battalion sites, individual tactical training is essential. Throughout the period Battalion road movements have been subject to ambushes and/or sniper fire in the Da Lat area and on the roads between Phan Rang, Cam Ranh, Nha Trang, Minh Hoa and Duc My. Convoy procedures developed at Fort Bragg have been rehearsed and results to date have been favorable. Fire discipline has been well controlled on the occasions of probing attacks on Pr'Line Mountain. All personnel receive training in individual and crew-served weapons, to include the M-16 machine gun, the M-79 grenade launcher and the 81mm mortar where appropriate.

The Command Information and Character Guidance Programs have been emphasized down to site level. Both programs have proven significant in maintenance of health, welfare, morale, and discipline, especially at isolated sites. Special lectures by the Chaplain and Medical personnel have stressed the moral and medical problems of social diseases. The CID has been asked to give similar lectures on the effects of narcotics.

Several factors are considered relevant in "tailoring" the battalion resources to fit commitments. The mission is definitely derived from the area communications concept modified due to dispersion of U.S. Tactical Units ( Brigades and Battalions operating at great distances from parent organizations). Often Tactical Unit Command Communication resources are inadequate to provide multi-channel communications due to distance and terrain factors. The counterpart of the normal US Corps, (Field Forces, Vietnam), seem to exercise greater influence over Brigade and Battalion operations than in previous U.S. combat operations. The dispersion of MACV Advisory Detachments, and small unit deployment of Army of Vietnam units and other Allied Forces, requires the area communications system to be capable of tactical combat as well as combat support and combat service support responsiveness. The time frame for such response calls for "Instant Communications". This requires a thoroughly planned area communications system in being, and highly transportable, rapid reaction communication teams. A battalion level DS maintenance capability is also required to assure an adequate preventative maintenance program and quick response to equipment failure.

The battalion, being co-located at Can Ranh Jptt, Can Ranh Air Force Base and Can Ranh Depot, is called upon to assist other Signal Units in reception and shipment of equipment and personnel. The wide dispersion of battalion sites complicates movement of personnel and materials. Transportation, Engineer and Ordnance equipment is being borrowed continuously to move heavy equipment, including fuel and water, and accomplish site development. The Battalion organization requires
modification to provide aviation transport, heavy duty vehicle transport, heavy equipment handling devices, earth moving equipment, and a water tanker.

4. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY:

a. Authority to grant Confidential Security Clearances, Crypto Access up to and including Secret, and Validation of Security Clearances up to and including Top Secret was sub-delegated to the battalion. This delegation of authority accelerated processing of clearance requests and eliminated an administrative backlog.

b. Security inspections during this period were conducted at Phan Rang (by 21st Signal Group), Lang-Bian Mountain (21st Sig Gp), Hills 184 and 182 (by 1st Signal Brigade STRATCOM), and Dalat (by 21st Sig Gp and Mobile Training Team, I Field Forces V).

c. The battalion is responsible for the tactical defense of Pr'Line and Lang Bian Mountain Sites. This mission necessitates continuous liaison with MACV Advisors to assure up-to-date intelligence. Intelligence has been provided. Briefings and current plans for the mountain sites are on file.

d. Convoying of Page Communications Co personnel from Dalat to Pr'Line Mountain Site has diverted many man-hours from site preparation and subjects personnel to possible enemy activity (See paragraph 4h). Higher headquarters has been advised and is taking action to resolve this problem.

e. Other 73rd Signal Battalion sites are integrated into defense plans of Senior Area Commanders. At Cam Ranh Bay, however, the CO, 73rd Signal Battalion, has been designated responsible for defense of Hills 184 and 182 within the Cam Ranh Bay area defense plan. 1st Sig Bde Security Detachment #39, as well as on site Signal personnel, have been rehearsed periodically on defense of these sites. The Battalion Commander has supervised an alert on Hill 184, to include patrols of the natural approach into the site. At all other sites Company and Detachment defense assignments and positions have been inspected and discussed with Senior Area Commanders to assure proper understanding of assigned tasks and maximum protection of Signal personnel and equipment.

f. Detachment 13 at Pr'Line came under sniper and automatic weapons fire on 10 September. Positions were rapidly manned and communications were established with company operations and sector. Friendly fire discipline was excellent. A less serious probe was conducted on 20 October 1966. There were no casualties in either case and damage was minor.
On the night of 2 October 1966, a 362nd Signal Company truck was ambushed in the city of Dalat while carrying Vietnamese cooks and KP's to their homes. SP4 Ulaster McDaniel, Co. A, 41st Signal Battalion was wounded in the leg. SP4 Raymond R Lindsey, Jr. and PFC Dennis L. Moore laid down covering fire while SP4 McDaniel crawled to safety, leading the Vietnamese Nationals. One VC was seriously wounded at close range and is presumed to be dead.

The VC continued to harass the road from Company Headquarters in Dalat to the Signal Site at Pr'Line. Fifteen trees were cut across the road on the night of 24-25 September. Reaction Forces from Headquarters and Detachment 13 cleared the road. The Detachments' convoy was ambushed on 10 October. There were no friendly casualties. Page Communications personnel were fired upon on 25 October but suffered no casualties.

The site at Vinh Long and Sec Trang were mortared on 28 August and 14 October respectively but there was no damage done to signal personnel or equipment.

Due to the closing of the Cam Li (Dalat) airfield to C-130 Aircraft for approximately three weeks, it was necessary to convoy supplies and equipment form Nha Trang, Cam Ranh and Phan Rang to Dalat on three occasions. This was done in conjunction with other US Units having operations in the Dalat area and coordinated with MACV Advisor Teams, who provided air cover and ARVN Road Security Forces. There were no incidents.

5. LOGISTICS:

Technical inspections of prescribed load lists (PLL), supply procedures and records, the Army Equipment Records System (TAERS), and maintenance of organizational equipment conducted by the Battalion 3-4 and his staff indicated deficiencies in units which had been operating at relatively isolated sites. Corrective actions have been programmed in detail and implemented through continuing detailed inspections and on-site assistance and training. Assigned supply and maintenance personnel have been accompanied on inspections by specialists of supporting Ordnance and Engineer maintenance units. The large deadline rate on wheeled vehicles has been halved by a concentrated effort to repair or evacuate M-211 trucks. Support maintenance facilities have given excellent cooperation, in some cases accepting vehicles with defective major assemblies without requiring replacement of other defective parts. Location of the Battalion at Cam Ranh Bay, with the support command's associated Depot and Port Command, has greatly facilitated logistics operations for the Battalion. Through cooperation with the depot and port the unit has been encouraged to conduct frequent inspections of storage areas to ascertain proper maintenance and intended destination of electronic equipment received without proper documentation.
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b. A system of tagging deadlined equipment by placing a card on the windshield or on the item to be repaired has increased maintenance production. The card indicates repairs to be performed, Federal Stock Number (FSN) of required repair parts on order, and document number of the requisition. The system minimizes mechanics workload in getting newly received repair parts to the right job and completing repairs without repeated reference to equipment log books.

c. The S-4 has been assigned staff supervision over all transportation functions, to include unloading of equipments and personnel newly arrived in country and transshipment by air, sea, road, and rail to destination. The Battalion's organic equipment was received without loss or significant damage. Personnel and equipment of the 278th Signal Company was received and transshipped to three widespread locations (Phan Rang, Tuy Hoa and Pleiku) within a ten day period. At this time personnel of the 459th Signal Battalion (combat area) have been received in country and arrangements are being made to expedite the unloading of the President Taylor which contains their equipment. Transshipment to Qui Nhon of equipment of two companies will be required, the remaining will be driven to Nha Trang by unit personnel.

d. Considerable construction effort is required on many of the Battalion's communications sites, such as earth moving, road maintenance, demolition of rock, lifting of heavy equipment, mixing and pouring concrete, as well as carpentry. Procurement of manpower, materials and equipment has been a major function of this staff section. Recently (on the same day) two major supply transactions of this nature were accomplished, both involving controlled items. Twenty tents (Gp medium and large) were obtained to house personnel of the 459th Signal Battalion and 900,000 sand bags were obtained for revetment of Pr'Line and Long Bion mountain sites.

6. OTHER SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

a. The most significant event of the period occurred on Wednesday, 26 October 1966, when President of the United States Lyndon B. Johnson, Vietnamese Chief of State Thieu and Prime Minister Ky, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Ambassador to Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge, General Westmoreland and Major US Tactical Commanders in Vietnam, made an unanticipated visit to Cam Ranh Bay Air Force Base (CRBAFB). The Battalion Commander received an immediate telephone call from OIC-JBWL at 261026H October 66 requiring installation of two CRBAFB to Saigon circuits by 1200 hours. BATAIL and Regional Comm Group Tech Control were alerted and two circuits were channeled and tested from CRBAFB Command Post to Pr'Line. A trip was made to Hill 184 NTC Tech Control, and further instructions were given by CCCA to preempt certain voice circuits and seize teletype circuits. DC-27. Circuits also were provided to the 10th Aviation En for coordination of helicopter gunship and tactical air cover. A trip was made to CRBAFB
to check the channels at ALBATROSS UHF, the CRBAFB frame for interconnects, and the Command Post to check with CRBAFB Comsquadron Commander. While there Brigadier General Jones (believed to be the President's Aide) gave additional instructions as to the need for PA systems to be installed at four locations. This was the first indication the President was actually coming. The Chaplain's PA set was the only one in the battalion. An FM radio call was made to the Executive Officer, instructing him to get all PA systems at Cam Ranh Bay, which he did. This included removing the MP, Red Cross, Special Services, and the Chaplain's PA sets. The Air Force provided two sets, the systems were installed with one on the main speakers platform and two in reserve at that site, (all three were on separate power sources and tested). Two sets were installed in Airmen's Dining Hall #1, and two in the CRBAFB Officers mess. During the course of the day the President spoke over all of the installed PA systems (except the reserves) and they operated without failure, tone quality appeared to be excellent.

SFC Rondal Jenkins, Area Communication NCO, 73rd Signal Battalion installed and operated each of the systems, moving from site to site ahead of the President's party. At the location of the main ceremony one incident did occur. The press had attached at least 6 recording mikes to the PA mike stand. One of the speakers requested that the mike and metal podium be raised. A box was placed under it, but the Press recorders did not have long enough cords. A silver suitcase stood nearby, and was placed under the recorders. Then Mr. Thieu was asked to speak, which made the mike too high. A bystander, who later indentified himself as the President's Physician, had a suitcase (his medical kit). He asked if it could be used, and it was placed on the platform for Mr. Thieu, who stood on it to speak. At this moment President Johnson turned and asked his Press Secretary, Mr. Bill Moyers, for his spare eye glasses. Unfortunately, one pair was in the silver suitcase under the press recorders, and the other pair was in the medical kit under Mr. Thieu. Forty personnel of the 73rd Signal Battalion were in the ceremony, as were the Battalion colors. LTC Albright, OIC of the White House Communications Detachment, was provided transportation and FM radio support throughout the visit. Several members of the Battalion were fortunate to shake hands and speak with the President. LTC Albright presented the CC, Executive Officer, and SFC Jenkins with gold pens showing the President's Seal and Signature. Some of the circuits were tested out by a Bell Telephone Representative and found to be in good quality.

b. Cam Ranh Bay installations have a large number of visitors, to include almost all senior Commanders in the chain of command up to the Commander-in-Chief as noted above. Defense Communications Agency Commanding General has been the Senior Communication Officer. Technical assistance has been provided by several civilian and military technical specialists. In no instance has there been evidence of tourism, but it should be noted that such visits do require a significant amount of command and staff effort and time.

c. The Battalion Chaplain has conducted a Civic Actions program to assist the Montangerde Tribes of the Dalat Area by selling crosses, spears, cloths, and books made by the tribal people. Miss Helen Evans, a missionary of fifteen years in-county, acts as the intermediary. Sales have totaled over $244,000 VN, which has been returned to Miss Evans. She returns receipts to the person who made the item. Supplies and money ($2200 VN) also have been donated to a clinic for the Montangerdes. This clinic was closed for three
and a half years while the nurse, Miss Evelyn Holloday was in the United States for medical treatment.

d. Other Civic Actions completed, in process, or being considered are:

(1) Three boys in the village of Cam Ranh were outfitted with filled shoe shine boxes to assist them in supporting themselves. They have been instructed on their use and how to conduct business. Additional boxes are being prepared by the troops.

(2) There are plans for the C/41st Signal Company to have 40 local Vietnamese orphans for Thanksgiving dinner.

(3) The Battalion Commander has discussed with Mayor (Lt Col) Bang of the Autonomous City of Cam Ranh and MACV Advisor Major Simpson the feasibility of having Cam Ranh military personnel solicit "home town" support for an Industrial Arts School. This project would teach technical skills to the large number of unskilled persons being relocated in Cam Ranh from VC controlled or terrorized areas. Personnel have indicated an interest but the extent of personal participation is questionable due to extensive operational commitments. The project, however, could be highly significant to planned development of Cam Ranh as a major port and industrial complex.
PART I Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. PERSONNEL: None

2. OPERATIONS:
   
   **ITEM:** Teletypewriter Motor Life

   **DISCUSSION:** Teletypewriter motors are a critical repair item. The life of teletypewriter motors may be extended considerably by stopping the motor with the "STOP" key when teletypewriter is idle. Teletypewriter may be activated from the distant end by operating the "BREAK" switch.

   **OBSERVATION:** When a teletypewriter is idle the motor should be turned off.

   **ITEM:** Teletypewriter Motor Brushes.

   **DISCUSSION:** Teletype brushes are in critically short supply. In an emergency, usable brushes may be fabricated from the carbon core of BA-30 Batteries.

   **OBSERVATION:** Emergency teletype brushes may be fabricated from the carbon core of BA-30 batteries.

   **ITEM:** Pick-up and Delivery of Classified Messages

   **DISCUSSION:** Due to increasing teletype traffic volume caused by the influx of new units there is need for increased control of distribution of classified traffic. Handling times for classified messages are steadily increasing. Local Commands must establish Centralized Classified Distribution Centers to decrease the number of subscribers picking up and delivering messages.

   **OBSERVATION:** Classified Distribution Centers should be established at all Major Commands to control the handling and flow of classified messages.

   **ITEM:** AFRS Broadcast Distortion

   **DISCUSSION:** The 50 Watt fixed transmitter used for AFRS AM broadcasts has a fixed signal input level. Due to fade and deterioration of Tropo/VEF laying circuits, the resultant fluctuation of input signal will cause over/under modulation of the broadcast signal.
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OBSERVATION: Due to keying signal fluctuation the 50 Watt AFHS fixed AM transmitter must be frequently checked and aligned to provide adequate service.

Item: VHF Antenna Siting

DISCUSSION: In VHF systems operating between sites of appreciable altitude differential the receive signal level is sometimes less than required. This situation can be corrected by computation and adjustment of antenna rake angles.

OBSERVATION: When planning a VHF system between two points with an appreciable altitude differential the antenna rake angle for each site should be computed and antennas adjusted for maximum signal strength.

3. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION:

Item: Reduction of system outages caused by operator error

DISCUSSION: Three-quarters of radio-relay set AN/TRC-24 equipment failures were proven to be a result of operator error. The following errors are most common:

1. Mis-alignment of power amplifier cathode current on transmitter.
2. Mis-adjustment of high-voltage setting on power-supply.
3. Cathode degeneration of power-supply tubes as a result of not allowing tube filaments to heat up prior to application of plate power.
4. Failure to provide adequate ventilation of components.
5. Rough handling of components.
6. Mis-adjustment of receiver B+ bias by second echelon personnel.

OBSERVATION: Operators receive refresher training in the operation of their equipment. Use of manuals must be emphasized. The manuals should be inspected to be sure they are available and being used.

Item: Consolidated POM Training Program

DISCUSSION: Items to be covered during the Preparation for Overseas Movement Training program while in CONUS should be consolidated and furnished units alerted for overseas movement. A great deal of time and effort was lost trying to locate various regulations and in administering the program at reduced strength.

OBSERVATION: A consolidated package of POM Training requirements should be furnished to units departing CONUS or a POM Training Team furnished to the unit for meeting these requirements.
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4. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY:

ITEM: Convoy and isolated site security

DISCUSSION: Convoy and isolated site security require coordination between all units and activities involved. Local tactical units and MACV Advisors must be included in plans.

OBSERVATION: Convoy and isolated sites must have a single responsible officer to plan and exercise command functions, to include intelligence.

5. LOGISTICS:

ITEM: Loss of parts on vehicles and generators in transit

DISCUSSION: Vehicles and generators in transit have been stripped of "hard-to-get" parts (i.e. fuel pumps, carburetors, DC generators, injectors, etc.)

OBSERVATION: The theft of vehicle and generator parts while in transit can be reduced or eliminated by securing the hood on engine compartments and side doors on generators with steel straps.

ITEM: Offloading Cargo

DISCUSSION: When cargo is received by surface it is advantageous to monitor offloading.

OBSERVATION: A responsible person should be in the hold of the ship and on the beach. An armed guard should be placed with the equipment to prevent pilferage on the docks.

ITEM: Packing of equipment

DISCUSSION: Many items were received unserviceable condition because of water damage (from rain while sitting on the beach) and damage by stevedores during discharge.

OBSERVATION: Breakable equipment should be placed in the center of convoy inserts and surrounded by tarpage. Items that can be damaged by water should be packed in water proof containers or covered with plastic prior to sealing containers.

ITEM: Non-Tactical Multipair Cable Splicing Material.

DISCUSSION: Splicing kits for non-tactical, Multipair Cable are in short supply, and have not been standardised.
Observation: Splicing kits should be assembled and shipped with multi-pair cable reels.

Item: Use of larger generators/communications sites requiring over 45KW of power.

Discussion: On some sites numerous small generators serve where one or two large generators would provide more efficient and reliable power. Wiring and grounding of larger generators is beyond the experience and training level of available personnel.

Observation: Properly prepared and justified requests for larger generators (100KW and up) should be submitted to local area Engineer RAU facilities, to include request for installation, operation and maintenance of such generators.

Item: Incorrect Pin Connections on Power Cables

Discussion: At one site an AN/MCC-6 Carrier Terminal was found during installation to have an incorrectly wired main power input connector. The contact pins had been wired so that the Hot Lead Pin from the power cable mated with the equipment ground lead pin.

Observation: The power input connectors on new items of equipment should be inspected prior to application of power to the equipment.

Item: Shipment of Trucks 2½ Ton M-211 to RVN

Discussion: Support units do not have repair parts for trucks 6 x 6 2½ ton M-211 and evacuate them to CONUS. This leaves the unit without replacements.

Observation: Shipment of M-211 2½ ton trucks to RVN should be discontinued if support units cannot repair them.

Item: High Mortality rate on clutches on 2½ ton trucks driven in deep sand

Discussion: Vehicles will bounce while driving through sand, causing clutch slippage which in some cases wear out with as little as 4000 miles.

Observations: Vehicles that drive continually through sand should have tires deflated to 15 lbs. PSI as stated on data plates. Vehicles will move through sand with little difficulty and will not jump. It has been found that 15 lbs PSI in rear tires and 35 lbs PSI in front tires work very well.
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Item: Rigid Wave Guide

DISCUSSION: Sites utilizing rigid wave guides may show an unexplained and persistent drop in signal level. The cause was found to be dented wave guides.

OBSERVATION: Rigid wave guide be protected during shipment and storage.

Item: Storage of Wave Guide

DISCUSSION: Wave guide stored in a climate of high humidity will corrode internally in an extremely short time. To prevent moisture from entering wave guides during storage the factory supplied protective end caps will form an adequate moisture barrier if sealed with a moisture proof tape.

OBSERVATION: Wave guide may be protected from moisture while in storage by sealing the factory mounted end caps with water-proof non-hygroscopic tape.

OTHER: None

PART II - Commanders Recommendation

The 73rd Signal Battalion HHD TOE 11-116R was inadequate for the type and scope of the units in-country mission. Filling to full strength has also proven to be unsatisfactory. A study recommending specific TOE modifications is being prepared for submission through command channels. Certain of the augmentation equipments have been requested and are pending action. The configuration and missions of companies assigned and attached logically dictate modification to fit the situation of an Area Communications System. For this reason the recommended modification is patterned after the HHC of the Combat Area Signal Battalion (TOE 11-87E).

The following modifications are recommended:

(1) An expanded personnel section to handle the large volume of incoming and departing personnel, as well as personnel actions and records for 1,500 men.

(2) A battalion level electronic maintenance capability to provide rapid maintenance reaction when subordinate unit capabilities are
ever extended. This section should include DS level test equipment, PLL and repair skills.

(3) A Battalion mess facility to feed replacements, returnees, and the continuous flow of personnel from outlying sites who conduct administrative, operational and logistical business.

(4) A Signal Operations Platoon to provide the "Reserve" communications resources required for rapid reaction, as well as a tape relay capability for the rapidly expanding Cam Ranh Bay Communications Center.

(5) A Transportation and Engineering Section to provide the logistic capability required to cope with site development and transportation problems. Due to conditions at Cam Ranh, delivery of water also is a major problem. These sections should include several low-boy, or S&P trucks with tractors, a dozer, and a water tanker.

(6) An operational motor maintenance section with gas truck and 5 ton wrecker are essential to conditions encountered in the battalion area. POL distribution is time consuming and a continuous operation. Transfer of signal shelters, handling of telephone poles and other heavy equipment, to include Page Communications project equipment and Class IV and II project materials, is extensive. (See paragraph 6, Logistics)

(7) An Aviation Section of at least one rotary and one fixed wing aircraft. This section is required to provide rapid, reliable movement of the Commander and Staff in control of widely dispersed operations; Air Courier Service to isolated sites not having teletype facilities; and movement of equipment, repair parts, maintenance personnel and inspection and training teams.

LOUIS J. DIXON
LTC, SigC
Commanding
SCCP-OP

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lesson Learned—Quarterly Period Ending:
31 October 1966, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

HEADQUARTERS, 21st Signal Group, APO San Francisco, 96240, 20 November 1966

To: Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade (USAREURCOM!), APO 96307

1. Transmitted herewith is one copy of Headquarters, 73rd Signal Battalion Report, Subject: Same as above.

2. Intelligence and Security Section, Section I: This headquarters has recommended to the 1st Signal Brigade that Pair Communications Company personnel in the Dalat area be required to stay at the appropriate site for a two or three day period. At the end of these three day shifts they could be relieved and return to Dalat. This would decrease the number of convoys traveling the insecure routes between the Signal Sites and the city of Dalat.

[Signature]

RUTHER D. SLIP

COL.

SIO:

CO-HANDING
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST SIGNAL BRIGADE (USA STRATCOM), APO San Francisco 96307

8 DEC 1966

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVC-DH
APO 96307

1. (U) IAW AR 1-19, subject report from the 73d Signal Battalion (Support) is forwarded.

2. (U) Concur in the Commander's Observations with exceptions and comments as follows:

   a. Paragraph 5, Logistics, Item: Packing Equipment. Breakable or highly pilferable items should be placed in CONEX containers. Tentage should not be used as packing material as it has a tendency to slip and slide which could damage the equipment. The proper blocking and bracing materials and prescribed packing procedures should be used.

   b. Paragraph 5, Logistics, Item: Use of larger generators on communications sites requiring over 45 KW of power. The procedure described is the current policy for obtaining generators for fixed sites. The brigade engineer officer has established a program for obtaining R & U power for fixed sites.

   c. Paragraph 5, Logistics, Item: Incorrect pin connections on power cables. This item has not been reported to this headquarters on DA 2407. Action is being taken to have the 2407 submitted as required by TM 38-750.

   d. Paragraph 5, Logistics, Item: Shipment of trucks 2½ ton M-211 to RVN. Brigade sent a message on 26 October 1966, to all groups informing subordinate units that the 1st Logistical Command would replace M-211 trucks with M 3542 trucks for TOE units and directed action be taken to insure requisitions were submitted.

3. (C) Reference paragraph 2, 1st indorsement: The recommendation of 21st Group was "Page personnel be required to stay on the site for a number of days, possibly 2 or 3 days, and rotate at the end of the tour of duty. If this is not feasible, then they travel back and forth with scheduled convoys. It is not recommended that the number of convoys be increased". On 25 October 1966, Page subscribed to an agreement that there would be no unescorted Page vehicles traveling to and from Pr'Line. Since that date, Page employees have traveled with scheduled convoys. Page has now agreed to accept the original proposal of the 362d Signal Company that all personnel be billeted on the site with no rotation. Administrative and logistical details are currently under study.
SCGVP (13 Nov 66) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOS-65)

4. The following comments are submitted on the Commander's Recommendations:

a. (U) Do not concur on the modification of TOE 11-86E as a basis for supporting the requirements listed in sub-paragraphs (1) through (7). TOE 11-116D, the current authorization document should be modified as required. Brigade regulations provide guidance to subordinate units on modification of TOE.

b. (U) Reference paragraphs (1) through (7). No action is presently underway at this headquarters to incorporate the recommended changes into authorization documents. Specific guidance has been disseminated to the 73d Signal Battalion on procedures to modify their TOE.

c. (C) Reference paragraph (7). Aviation assets are presently programmed for the 73d Signal Battalion. An aviation augmentation is presently scheduled to arrive in-country during the first quarter of 1966. The 73d Signal Battalion has a valid requirement for the aviation assets especially since the 362d Signal Company operates and maintains several Troop sites in all four Corps Tactical Zones. On 4 November 1966, this headquarters forwarded a request to USARV that the priority for brigade aviation assets be programmed for June 1967. Until such time as the Signal Battalion aviation detachments are available, aviation support must come from the 21st Signal Group on a mission basis.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
WILLIAM A. HIGGINS
Colonel, SigC
Deputy
AVROG-DH (13 Nov 66)  3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RG3 CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 73d Signal Battalion (Support) as indorsed.

2. Concur with the basic report as modified by the previous indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. J. THORNTON
Lt. Col., AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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CONFIDENTIAL

GFOR-07 (13 Nov 66)  4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558  14 JAN 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs with the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L. L. CHAPPELL
HJ, AG
AG

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