<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AD NUMBER</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD387285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TO:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FROM:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIMITATION CHANGES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TO:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FROM:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUTHORITY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul 1979, DoDD 5200.10; AGO ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Period Ending 31 July 1967

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6a and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army War College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chemical School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Adjutant General School
US Army Missile and Munitions School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
This report received at Hqs, Department of the Army without indorsements. To preclude further delay in benefits gained from the lessons learned hereon, this report is published without complete indorsements.
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTALION 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

AVBD-Hist

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
(RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

TO: See Distribution

References: AR 1-19 dtd 26 May 1966, USARV Reg 1-19 dtd 8 Feb 1967
and IFFV Reg 1-3 dtd 29 Sep 1966.

SECTION I (C)

Significant unit activities: Elements of the Brigade were involved
in combat operations during the entire reporting period with the excep-
tion of 1-4 May. Training was conducted concurrent with combat
operations and during periods when units were refitting and preparing
for future missions.

A. Combat Operations. A summary of the concept and execution of each
of the Brigade operations is given below:

1. Operation MAURER

a. Dates: 11 May 1967 – continuing at close of reporting
period.
b. Mission: To conduct search and destroy operations against
VC/NVA forces in QUANG NGAI Province.
c. Location: QUANG NGAI Province, RVN.
d. Commander: BG S.H. Huthcson

e. Forces involved:

(1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 1 Platoon
C/34th Armor (OPCON).
(2) Other: CIDG companies from BA TO, MINH LONG, and GIA
VUC SF Camps.

f. Concept of execution:

(1) A Troop, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry estab-
lished observation posts on the highground north and southeast of CASENTAN
Base and provided security for the 1st Logistical Command Forward Support
Area on the beach east of the base camp. Elements of A Company 326 Engi-
neer Battalion (Airborne), conducted daily mine sweeps of the road from the
FS to the western edge of the Brigade base camp area of responsibility.
The military police provided route security, convoy escort and established
traffic control points for logistical convoys moving from the FS to DUC
PHO. These operations were continuous throughout the Brigade's stay at
CASENTAN Base.

(2) The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division commenced
Operation MAURER on 110700H May 67 in QUANG NGAI Province. Operation
MAURER was initiated by the Commanding General, Task Force OREGON, DNI LAI,
Vietnam based on an intelligence picture of VC/NVA strength in the province.

(3) During the first phase of Operation MAURER, the Bri-
gade objective was to clear the highground immediately west of DUC PHO of
VC/NVA forces and installations. It commenced on 11 May 1967 with the 1st
Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d
Infantry conducting airborne assaults into multiple LZs west of DUC PHO.
The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry remained at CASENTAN Base (the

Downgraded at 9 year intervals
Confidential
DOD DIR 5200.10

Declassified after 18 years
Brigade base camp east of DUC PHO) as Brigade reserve until the following day when it conducted an airmobile assault to join the other two battalions in the area of operation. On 30 May, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile extraction to CARENTAN Base and prepared for future operations. The battalion conducted an airmobile assault to exploit a B-52 strike on 3 June into an area north of the other two battalions. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry were extracted on the same day to CARENTAN Base for maintenance and training in preparation for Phase II of the operation. On 7 June a fire base (CHAWS) was established in the AO containing one battery each of 105 and 155 howitzers.

(4) The second phase of Operation VACUEUR commenced on 8 June with the assault of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry into the area north of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. The area of operations was shifted from due west of DUC PHO to an area northwest of DUC PHO. Once again one battalion remained as Brigade reserve at CARENTAN Base for one day. This battalion, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry entered the area of operation by an airmobile assault on 9 June. The objective of this phase of the operation was to clear the highground northwest of DUC PHO of VC/NVA forces and installations, followed by a sweep of the SONG TRA CAU, SONG VE Valleys for the purpose of evacuating civilians to a refugee center at NGHIA HANH. On 16 June, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault to the northern end of the SONG VE Valley, where it acted as a blocking force for the sweep of the valley by the other two battalions, which maneuvered from south to north on the 17th of June. Cordon and search and evacuation operations in the SONG VE Valley continued until 23 June, when all battalions resumed search and destroy operations in the AO.

(5) On 25 June, the 1st and 2d Battalions (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults into multiple LZ's west of their current locations while the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry reoriented in its position at the northern end of the SONG VE Valley and commenced search and destroy operations to the southwest toward the SONG NE Valley. The objective was to clear the highground adjacent to the SONG NE Valley prior to relocating the population of the valley to a GVN controlled area. The area of operation was centered approximately thirty-five kilometers west northwest of DUC PHO. On 29 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into the area southwest of the SONG NE Valley and on 3 July conducted an airmobile extraction to CARENTAN Base, where the battalion prepared for Operation LAKS, which commenced on 6 July (See paragraph 2). The sweep of the SONG NE Valley conducted by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th and 502d Infantry commenced on 3 July and terminated on 9 July. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resumed search and destroy operations in the highground adjacent to the SONG NE Valley on 10 July while the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault to the highground west of DUC PHO, where intelligence indicated stepped up enemy activity. On 12 July, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry terminated Operation LAKS and returned to CARENTAN Base from which it conducted an airmobile assault into an area of operation adjacent to the northern portion of the SONG VE Valley. On 17 July the 2d Battalion (Airborne) 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault, preceded by a B-52 strike, into the area east and north of the SONG VE and SONG TRA Cau Valley complexes, where increased enemy activity had been indicated. On 28 July the 2d Battalions (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 502d Infantry conducted airmobile extractions to CARENTAN Base, where preparations for future combat operations occupied them through the close of the reporting period. CHAMPS Fire Base which had been open at the end of phase one was closed on 31 July. The 105 battery was moved to CARENTAN Base and 155 battery was transported to new firing positions at HA THAHN CIDG Camp in preparation for future operations. At the close of the reporting period the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th
AVBD-Hist
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

4. One individual per Infantry Battalion attended a three day
Psychological Operations Orientation Course conducted at DA NANG, RVN, by
III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters.

5. Due to a high personnel turnover during the reporting period
which reduced the Brigade's strength considerably the Brigade Combat Leaders
Course, normally conducted weekly and the Brigade Sniper School, normally
conducted seminually, were postponed. It is anticipated that these schools
will be reopened during the next reporting period.

C. OPLANS - OPORDS. The following OPLANS and OPORDS were published
during the reporting period. The Brigade was not called upon to execute
any contingency plans.

1. OPLAN 25-67 (OCEON) (U) dated 191800H Apr 67 covering the
deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, reinforced from II
Corps to I Corps and attachment of the Brigade to Task Force OCEON. This
move was necessitated by the Marine reinforcement of the DMZ to counter
increased VC/NVA activity in the northern I Corps Provinces which, in turn,
required U.S. Army forces to move into the southern I Corps Provinces in
order to maintain pressure on the enemy in the areas vacated by Marine Forces.

2. OPORD 26-67 (HILLBIL) (U) dated 092300H May 67 covering the
deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, reinforced into Base
Areas 122 and 124 in the highground west of DUC PHO. The hot, clear weather
and the mountainous, jungle terrain in this area had no unusual adverse
effects on this operation.

3. OPORD 27-67 (HILLBIL II) (U) dated 311200H May 67 covering the
deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, reinforced into Base
Area 122 in the highground northwest of DUC PHO. This operation was con-
ducted as a result of an intelligence buildup in Base Area 122 while
operations were being conducted to the southeast of the area. The hot,
clear weather, and the mountainous, jungle terrain in this area had no
unusual adverse effects on this operation.

4. OPLAN 28-67 (CAENTAI BASE DEFENSE) (U) dated 6 June 1967
covering the defense of the Brigade Base Camp east of DUC PHO. The plan
covered defensive positions assigned to units, fire support, barrier plans,
surveillance plans and counterattacks plans. Weather had no significant
effects on the carrying out of this plan.

5. OPORD 25-67 (HILLBIL II-2) (U) dated 121800H June 67 covering the
deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, reinforced into the
areas west of DUC PHO including the SONG TR: C.U, SONG VE and SONG NE
Valleys for the purpose of conducting search and destroy operations and
of evacuating the civilian population of those areas to areas controlled by
the GVN. These areas represented a major source of VC/NVA foodstuffs in
southern I Corps. The execution operations were followed by defoliation
operations in the valleys. The hot, clear weather, interspersed with occa-
sional afternoon rain required that a few airmobile operations be delayed
a matter of hours. These cases were relatively isolated, however.

6. OPORD 29-67 (IAES) (U) dated 021800H July 67 covering the de-
ployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, reinforced into the
southeastern corner of QUANG NGAI Province. In actuality only one battalion
was deployed, the remainder of the operation being a deception plan.
The purpose of the operation was to provide security for engineer road opening
operations along Route 1 from DIEN TRUONG to SA HUYNH, to conduct cordon
and search operations in the lowlands from CAENTAI Base to SA HUYNH and to con-
duct search and destroy operations in the highground west of SA HUYNH. The
hot, clear weather in this area had no unusual adverse effects on this
operation.
OPORD 31-67 (HOOD RIVER) (U) dated 301200 H Jul 67 covering the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, reinforced to the northwest of Base Area 121 in a joint ARVN, ROK, CIDG operation to exploit intelligence of enemy activity in the area and to maintain pressure on the VC/NVA forces as the RVN National Election approach.

D. Psychological Operations.

1. During the reporting period 12,083,700 leaflets were disseminated in support of Brigade combat operations and 148.25 hours of loudspeaker broadcast was logged. Themes utilized in both the leaflet and loudspeaker mission were:
   a. Instructions to civilians concerning the valley clearing and evacuation operations with a description of the refugee center facilities.
   b. CHU HOI appeals.
   c. Americans are your friends.
   d. Curfew instructions.
   e. VC/NVA demoralization.
   f. Allied power.
   g. B-52 strikes.
   h. VC/NVA atrocities.

2. Equipment: The Brigade received seven portable bull-horns, which have been issued to the battalions. These items of equipment give the battalion commander a quick reaction loudspeaker capability, which increases the effectiveness of the Brigade psyop effort. Additionally, the Brigade 1000 watt loudspeaker set was repaired and will be available for use in serial and vehicular loudspeaker operations further enhancing the Brigade psyop capability. The light mobile printing press and paper cutter have arrived. These pieces of equipment will remain crated, however, until knowledgeable personnel arrive from III MAF Headquarters to instruct selected Brigade personnel in their use.

3. Support: The Psyop leaflet and loudspeaker support provided the Brigade by Task Force OREGON and the 244th Psyop Company has been excellent. Reaction time on leaflets printing has not been excessive. Loudspeaker missions flown by O-2 aircraft have arrived within three hours from the time the request was made. The development of a capability to make loudspeaker tapes from FM radio broadcasts should reduce this reaction time to as little as an hour in the future. The 244th Psyop Company has provided the Brigade with a loudspeaker operations team of two non-commissioned officers. This support was supplemented during the SONG NE Valley clearing operation by the addition of three Province Loudspeaker teams each composed of three HOI CHAM's, one National policeman and one interpreter. These teams were attached to the battalions conducting evacuation operations and assisted the battalions' Psyop efforts during that time.

4. Training: Each Infantry Battalion has sent a member of either the S-3 or S-5 section to one of the monthly three day Psyops Orientation Classes conducted by III MAF Headquarters and the 244th Psyop Company further enhancing the battalions understanding and appreciation of the role of psyops.
AVBD-Hist
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

5. Special Operations:
a. A leaflet was developed and disseminated exploiting the liberation of 22 Vietnamese, who had been held captive by the VC in a concentration camp for periods ranging from several months to two years.
b. A leaflet has been developed exploiting the payment of 121,000 piasters to an NVA Hoi Chanh, who led elements of the Brigade to a weapons cache which contained a 60mm mortar and a 30 caliber machine gun, plus other miscellaneous equipment and ammunition.
c. Following the explosion of the FSA Ammunition Supply Point, an extensive loudspeaker campaign was conducted around the Base Camp area explaining the Brigade's Weapons Reward Program. As a result of this intensive campaign 655 assorted artillery rounds were turned over to the Brigade by local civilians seeking the rewards which had been offered.

E. Organization: See Inclosure 1 for Brigade Organization.

F. Intelligence.

1. During the reporting period the Brigade S2 Section maintained close liaison with all intelligence collection agencies in and adjacent to the area of operations. Prior to commencing Operation MAIEUR, liaison visits produced a comprehensive picture of the enemy situation, civilian attitudes, and terrain. Continuous updating of this information has continued. Reliability of information received from field agent reports was unpredictable, ranging from totally false to very accurate. To keep subordinate units informed, one intelligence estimate with five updating supplements were published.

2. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
<th>MAIEUR I</th>
<th>MAIEUR II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (KC)</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA (EST)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA FW</td>
<td>10/2</td>
<td>0/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL DEFENDENTS</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RALLIERS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREW SERVED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREW SERVED (C)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3. Intelligence Problem Areas:
   a. Problem area:
      (1) Shortage of Interpreters:

(c) Discussion: Although there are numerous personnel assigned and hired as interpreters, experience has shown most to be lacking in English proficiency. The bulk of the interpreter support rests on the three assigned to the IFW Section of the 181 MI Detachment. These three are excellent but alone they cannot handle the volume of detainees and documents.
AVBD-Hist

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

(3) Recommendation: It is recommended that more careful
screening be accomplished to insure capable interpreters are available to
maneuver units. Interrogation of PW's will be speeded-up, enabling the
capturing unit to make use of information obtained without undue delay.

b. Problem Area:

(1) Montagnard Interpreters:

(2) Discussion: There is no language capability in the
Brigade for Montagnard dialect. PW's and other detainees who speak only
Montagnard cannot be interrogated, resulting in a loss of intelligence
information.

(3) Recommendation: In each area of operation where
Montagnard are likely to be encountered, at least one interpreter should be
located and made available on a stand-by basis.

c. Problem Area:

(1) Red Haze:

(2) Discussion: Red Haze support during the reporting
period was not adequate. Reports were very scarce and rarely timely.

(3) Recommendation: Red Haze should be made available at
least three times each week in order that patterns can be developed and to
correlate with other information.

4. Analysis: During the reporting period several incidents oc-
curred which had apparent adverse effects on enemy morale.

a. During the reporting period 232.3 tons of rice and 133.1
tons of salt were captured. The rice represents enough food to supply two
full battalions for one year. In addition the rice producing area of the
SONG VE Valley was destroyed, depriving the enemy his major source of food
in this area. Thus he will be forced to make greater demands on the local
people. Prisoners and ralliers all tell of severe food shortages and
lowering morale. Enemy operations on a large scale will be curtailed until
he can rebuild his supply of food.

b. The number of ralliers in QUANG NAI Province has risen
sharply as continuing pressure is placed on the enemy. The damage inflicted
on enemy logistics and medical facilities has influenced increasing
numbers to turn themselves over to allied troops.

c. Several large hospital complexes and large quantities of medi-
cal supplies have been captured. The loss of these facilities has further
weakened the enemy's willingness to fight and has lowered his morale.

G. (G) Personnel.

1. Unif. Strength:

a. Brigade personnel strength at the end of the reporting
period, minus attached units, was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Augmented (NTRD)</th>
<th>4128</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>4018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>4473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
b. The assigned strength was 119 percent of the authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 108 percent of the authorized strength.

c. Ist Brigade unit assigned strengths as of 31 July 1967.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn (Abn), 327th Inf</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn (Abn), 327th Inf</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn (Abn), 502d Inf</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn (Abn), 320th Arty</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Ist Brigade</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt Bn (Incl Repl Det)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co A, 326th Engr Bn</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trp A, 2/17th Cav</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4641</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Of the 'Not Present for Duty' strength, 20 were in the hospital, 72 were in-transit, 109 were on R&R, 27 were on TDY/SD, 4 were AWOL, 12 were detached, 8 were in confinement, and 149 were on leave.

e. The Brigade is over strength is assigned and present for duty personnel, but continues to remain short in infantry noncommissioned officer personnel in grades E5 and E6. At the end of the reporting period, we were authorized 577 personnel in grades E3 through E7 in MOS 11B4P, 11D4P, 11F4P, and 11L4P; however only 361 or 65 percent were assigned.

2. Attached Strength:

a. Personnel strengths of units attached to the Ist Brigade, 101st Airborne Division at the conclusion of the reporting period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Present for Duty</th>
<th>NAIHEUR AO</th>
<th>Base Camp - Phan Rang</th>
<th>Not Present for Duty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The assigned strength was 141 percent of the authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 131 percent of the authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 92 percent of the assigned strength.

c. Of the present for duty strength, three were on R&R, two on TDY/SD, twelve on leave, and one man was AWOL.

d. Assigned strengths of attached units as of 31 July 1967 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101 HP Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>406 RRD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46th APU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42d Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th P.I. Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d Military History Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st Civil Affairs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBD-Hist
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period-Ending 31 July 1967

501st Sig Det  1  0  103  104
181st MI Det  3  0  17  20
20th Chemical Det  1  0  5  6
TOTAL  12  1  278  291

3. Casualties:

*a. Casualties, as a result of hostile action, for the period (1 May thru 31 Jul 67) were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>MAIHEUR I</th>
<th>MAIHEUR II</th>
<th>IAES</th>
<th>MAIHEUR II-2</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KHA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHAF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHA</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KHAF - Killed Hostile Action Friendly Fires

*b. Total casualties, as a result of hostile action from 29 July 66 to date are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>MHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>461</td>
<td>2606</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*c. Total casualties, as a result of non-hostile actions, for the period (1 May thru 31 Jul 67) were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KILLED</th>
<th>INJURED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4. Personnel Program: The following programs were initiated or continued during this period:

a. Construction at Hawthorne Recreational Area continues. The metal roofing on all buildings, except the NCO Club, has been replaced and painted a combination of bright colors to improve the appearance of the area. Two large picnic pavilions of sturdy wooden structure were constructed with concrete flooring and corrugated roofing. These are available for unit or group parties; each is equipped with individual barbecue stands. New concrete walks have been constructed from the snack bar to the pavilions.

b. Awards and Decorations:

(1) Suspense rosters for each battalion and separate company are prepared NLT the 15th day of each month. All personnel scheduled to rotate during the second subsequent month are included. Rosters are forwarded to unit commanders to release them of their responsibility to initiate recommendations for meritorious awards for deserving personnel and to allow sufficient time for processing so the individual can be presented his award prior to departure.

(2) The following awards and decorations were approved during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DSC</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>IAW</th>
<th>DFC</th>
<th>SH</th>
<th>BM(U)</th>
<th>BM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
c. New Morning Reports (DA Form 1) and DA Form 1-1 (1 Jul 67):
Classes on the new report were given to the Brigade by the Adjutant General
to all morning reports clerks, 1st Sergeants and Company Executive Officers
prior to 1 Jul 67. With the new report, AG Records Branch assumed control
and submission of all supplemental data pertaining to morning report entries
(DA Form 1-1).

d. USARV Personnel and Management Team: The USARV Personnel
Management Team visited the Brigade on 21 June 1967 to 26 June 1967. Principle
items of interest were records maintenance and functional files.
Parting comments of the team chief indicate that the command is accomplishing
all USARV goals in these areas.

e. Improved Mail Services: The 46th APU acquired a mail van
and M151 vehicle TOE authorized, enabling the APU to run a daily convoy to
Cam Ranh Bay, deliver outgoing and pick up incoming mail. This operation
daily insures that mail is moved rapidly and is not delayed.

f. Personal Inquiry Forms: To provide for and expedite re-
quests for information from units, the AG initiated an action form whereby
the units can submit their questions directly to the AG Section. The form
when completed and submitted by the unit is given a control number by the
Adjutant General Forward and sent to the base camp at Phan Rang. Upon
receipt by the Adjutant General at the base camp it is logged and given a
twenty-four hour suspense. Logs are closely monitored by the AG Executive
Officer, and AG to ensure suspense dates are met and that answers are factual
and clarify the question or request.

g. Orders Issued in Forward Area: The capability to issue
intra-battalion reassignment orders was given to the AG Forward area.

h. Personnel Arriving in Forward Area Without Orders: To in-
sure that replacements arrive in the forward area with copies of their
reassignment orders and to eliminate the necessity of morning report person-
nel having to pick them up as attached; at the last formation in Replacement
Company each replacement is given a cover letter and ten copies of his orders,
which he is to give to either the First Sergeant or Unit Commander.

i. Statistical Summary: The Brigade Adjutant General Section
initiated a monthly Statistical Summary. The summary provides information
on items considered of major importance to the Brigade Staff and Battalion
Commanders. Contents include:

(1) Awards and Decorations.
(2) Casualty Statistics.
(3) Congressional Inquiries.
(4) Foreign Service Tour Extensions.
(5) Hospital Statistics.
(6) DEROS Loss Statistics.
(7) DEROS Losses and Personnel Requisitions Comparison.
(8) Promotion Statistics.
AVBD-Hist

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
(RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

(9) Replacement Statistics.
(10) Rest and Recuperation Statistics.
(11) Strength, Enlisted totals.
(12) Strength, Enlisted totals by Grade.

J. Quonset Huts: The ten Quonset Huts purchased for Special Services arrived and plans are being proposed and sites located for their installment at Phan Rang.

k. Records Check: A 100% records audit was performed by the Adjutant General’s Records Branch on the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry during their recent stand-down from combat operations.

l. Assignment Orders: A major step was initiated whereby assignment orders would direct assignment of personnel to battalions; the battalions would direct further assignment to company level.

m. Enlisted Promotion: During the reporting period, the Brigade used the following enlisted promotion allocations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>E4</th>
<th>E5</th>
<th>E6</th>
<th>E7</th>
<th>E8</th>
<th>E9</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1364</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n. Postal Activities:

(1) Mail Service: During this period the postal section handled a daily average of one ton of mail. Average time for first class letter mailed from CONUS to the Brigade was seven days; space available mail (SAM) averaged 25 days.

(2) Money orders and Stamp Sales: Money order sales averaged $882,336.36 daily during the reporting period. Monthly stamp sales averaged $20,466.00.

o. Special Services:

(1) During the months of May and June there were two USO shows performed at the Brigade Base Camp, Phan Rang, RVN.

(2) A commercial show, The Jesters, played two performances on 29 July 1967 at Duc Pho to stand-down units.

(3) Two additional boats with motors are to be obtained from Special Services, Cam Ranh Bay.

p. Red Cross:

(1) The Red Cross made a total of 3 clubmobile visits to the forward deployed units at Duc Pho during the period 30-31 July 1967.

(2) Average attendance at Red Cross activities was 17,400 monthly.

(3) During the reported period, the Red Cross Staff made 3 visits to Qui Nhon; 1 to Nha Trang; and 1 to Cam Ranh to visit members of the Brigade who were hospitalized.
The Red Cross provided outstanding service in the area of personal problems.

5. Personnel Planning: A monthly meeting of Personnel Staff NCO's is to be held in the base camp area of Phan Rang. Personnel Staff NCO's can discuss problem area, and during their two day stay, will be given "top priority" by Adjutant General and Finance Section chiefs in any administrative problems they require assistance.

6. Morale: Morale remained "Excellent" throughout the period.

7. Medical:

a. Organic medical support continued to be provided by Company D, 326th Medical Battalion (Airborne). A clearing station with minor surgery section, emergency treatment section, dental section, evacuation section and 40 bed holding section was established in the area of operations.

b. Nonorganic support was supplied by elements of the 55th Medical Group, i.e., 67th and 85th Evacuation Hospitals (Qui Nhon), 2d Surgical Hospital (Chu Lai), and the 563d Medical Company (Chu Lai and Due Pho), and by Aeromedical evacuation helicopters from the 498th Medical Company (Air Ambulance).

c. Significant Diseases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrub Typhus</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastroenteritis</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hepatitis</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP Disease</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUO</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respiratory Infections</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin Disease</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot Problems</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Health of the Command:

(1) The command has been confronted with quantitatively serious malarial disease during this three month period. Reduction of malaria rests primarily on individual protective measure, i.e., if one does not get bitten one does not get malaria. This is not compatible with night movement and multiple ambushes. The increased casualties and probable decrease in tactical effectiveness generated by abandoning night movement, multiple ambushes, and 5 to 7 day resupply cycles does not appear justified in order to improve malaria statistics.

(2) In spite of the high malaria the health of the command remained satisfactory. During the 90 days covered by this report, individual troops spent not less than 75 days in the mountains, on C rations, sleeping on the ground or in ambush positions without benefit of bath or laundry facilities. Numerous superficial skin infections have appeared; these generally respond to topical antibiotics and are not disabling. The health of the command is best enhanced by more frequent returns from enemy contact and mountain operations. Present operational techniques, however, afford an acceptable balance between health and tactical effectiveness.

(3) Gastrointestinal diseases remained low due to operations in the mountains.
AVBD-Hist
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

a. Environmental Sanitation:

(1) The airhead area has been sprayed once during this 3 month period by C-123 aircraft from MACV. These insecticide spray missions are extremely effective for 2 to 3 weeks. Missions were scheduled for May and July but were not flown. While it is appreciated that demands probably exceed the operational capability of this preventive medicine service, its effectiveness may warrant consideration of expansion of insecticide spray resources.

(2) RAE contract vector control support has not existed in this area. Unit vector control teams have taken field expedient measures including spraying and rat bait box construction. Thus far results have been satisfactory; however, this is a function of area support, and maneuver units should not be saddled with the sole responsibility of providing their own vector control.

f. Army Level Medical Support:

(1) Air Ambulance Support continues to be provided by the 498th Medical Company (Air Ambulance). Winner availability has increased and has been extensively used in the mountainous areas of operation. The Brigade has enjoyed a higher degree of Air Ambulance availability than it has in former periods, however, it is still not consistently quantitatively adequate. This intermittent inadequacy has been met by diversion of command aviation resources for medical evacuation.

(2) Aeromedical evacuation helicopters respond quickly to requests for patient evacuation. Although actually commanded by the 44th Medical Brigade and governed by policies dictated well away from the operational areas supported, this posture must not go unchallenged. Air ambulance resources are, and have been, extremely limited; however, prospects are for improvement.

(3) The importance of maneuver unit commanders having operational control of all military resources within their tactical area of operations during contact with the enemy cannot be sufficiently emphasized. When increased air ambulance support is available, maneuver unit commanders should have operational control of at least part of these increased resources.

8. Commanders and Principal Staff:

a. Brigade Headquarters:

BG Salve H. Matheson Bde G0
C. Oscar E. Davis DCO
... Robert G. Yerks XO
LTC Howard H. Danford S-3
MAJ Richard A. Kupau S-1
MAJ Richard H. Horton S-2
MAJ Robert M. Elton S-4
MAJ Wayne J. Prokup S-5

b. Battalion Commanders:

LTC Harold P. Austin CO, 1st Bn, 327th Abn Inf
LTC Edmond P. Abod CO, 2d Bn, 327th Abn Inf
COL Harry A. Buckley CO, 2d Bn, 502d Abn Inf
LTC Andrew S. Bolcar CO, 2d Bn, 320th Abn Arty
LTC Quinton F. Sunday CO, Spt Bn
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
(RCS GSFCR-65) (U)

c. Separate Companies:

CPT James R. Harding CO, 2d Sqdn, 17th Cav Abn
MAJ Benjamin R. Schlapak CO, Co A, 326th Engr Bn Abn
CPT Leroy G. Stevens CO, HHC, 1st Bde

H. Logistics.

1. General. No major changes occurred in the concept of logistical support during the reporting period. Throughout most of the period the Brigade continued to drain the bulk of its supplies through a forward support area. Class II and IV items continued to be supplied by Phan Rang Sub Area Command and US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay.


a. Support Battalion. A Forward Support Element (FSE) was provided by Support Battalion. When lines of communication became too long, Support Battalion established a Forward Supply Point (FSP). The Forward Supply Point was used to support operations during Operation MA-IUUR 11-2 when an FSP was established at Minh Long Special Forces Camp and in preparation for Operation Hood River when an FSP was established on 31 July 1967 at Quang Ngai Airfield.

(1) FSE Organization.

(a) Headquarters Detachment provided command and control and was separated into command, operations, movement control and food service elements.

(b) Supply Detachment received, stored and issued all classes of supply and provided a limited rigging capability.

(c) Administrative Detachment provided Adjutant General Personnel, APO and Finance Services.

(d) Maintenance Detachment provided a repair capability for automotive, engineer, ordnance, quartermaster and signal items. Of particular interest is the addition of an instrument repair capability which was brought forward from Phan Rang in early June. To further enhance the unit instrument repair capability Task Force Oregon provided a school trained instrument repairman to aid in maintaining H133 Panoramic Telescopes.

(e) Company D, 326 Medical Bn (Abn) provided clearing station facilities including surgical, dental, holding and emergency treatment sections.

(2) Forward Supply Point (FSP) Organization.

(a) Generally the Forward Supply Point provided a limited forward point of distribution from which the maneuver units could draw their high turn-over items in all classes of supply. The FSP's FSP Team controlled the issue of supplies and the movement of supplies from the Brigade Distribution Points to the FSP. Each maneuver element being serviced by the FSP provided a Bn liaison element which was in direct contact with the supported elements' Tac CP and colocated with the FSP Team. The Bn liaison elements controlled the issue and movement of supplies from the FSP to their maneuver elements.

b. FSP Minh Long supported three Infantry Battalions and was resupplied by C7A and CH-47 aircraft with the following items:
AVBD-Hist
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

1. Class I (MKI & LRMP Rations).
2. Class II & IV (Barrier materials, insect repellant, heat tablets, water cans and other high turn over items).
4. Class V (Except 105mm Arty Ammo).
5. Class VA (40mm linked, 7.62 MLB 4-1, 2.75" Rockets).
6. Water Point (1500 gal per hour erdlator).
7. Engineer Equipment (6 chain saws and Demo for Emergency LZ clearing operations).

b. Direct Support Services:

(1) Bath and Laundry Services were provided from 1st Log Command through Qui Nhon Area Command's FSA, Task Force Gallagher.

(2) Graves Registration Service was provided by Graves Registration Team from the 19th STS Company, Graves Registration, US Army Support Command Qui Nhon.

(3) Water. Potable water was supplied initially by the 39th Engineer Bn (GS) and the organic A/326 Engineer Company. On 15 May 1967 A/326 Engr gained the total water supply missions for the Brigade and began operating a 1500 and a 600 gal per hour erdlator. The 1500 gallon per hour erdlator was moved to the FSP at Minh Long to provide water for the maneuver elements of 3 Infantry Battalions and one Artillery Battalion. Palatable, potable water was available throughout the period except during the period 4 July to 8 July when a noticeable increase in the salt content of water sources available to Carentan Base made the water almost unpalatable. Shifting the water points from "fresh" water to paddy water sources reduced the salinity but did not improve the taste appreciably. On 12 July 1967 the water point was again relocated. Palatable water has been available since that time.

3. Material and Services:

a. Supply.

(1) Class I: "C" Rations (Meal Combat Individual) formed the bulk of all Class I consumed during the period. "A" Ration supplements were served whenever possible. Fresh fruit, limited types of fresh vegetables, potable ice and limited amounts of ice cream were available throughout the period. No significant Class I shortages were noted except fresh lettuce and tomatoes.

(2) Class II and IV: The majority of items were drawn through the Phan Rang Sub Area Command of US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay. Barrier materials were drawn through the FSA as were other items that could not be readily obtained through Phan Rang. On two occasions Combat Essential airlifts were required to bring forward sizeable backlogs of Class II and IV items. The backlogs were created on one occasion by requirements to move 2 D6B bulldozers and one roadgrader from Phan Rang to Duc Pho.

(3) Class III: All types of Class III were drawn through the FSA. No shortages were noted. JP-4 constituted the majority of the Class III consumed.

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

(4) Class V: During the period the Available Supply Rate, particularly for 105mm HE ammunition and pyrotechnics, was regularly exceeded due to operational requirements. No significant problem areas were encountered in maintaining an availability often doubling the existing available supply rate for USARV. Problem areas were anticipated as a result of the loss of 4,000 pounds of Class V in the Task Force Gallagher fire but none materialized. Emergency resupply action prevented any reduction of the Brigade’s combat capabilities.

(5) Maintenance: The barrel exchange and technical inspection program of all M16A1’s was completed prior to departing Khanh Duong. PLL’s and ASL’s for aircraft and avionics equipment were reviewed by DA’s Project Counter. Maintenance stand downs at every opportunity allowed the units to receive technical inspections and assistance in maintaining their equipment. Emphasis during stand down periods was placed on ordnance and signal maintenance. In spite of almost ceaseless combat operations and adverse weather conditions, the overall deadline rate remained low. The following job orders originated during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>COMPLETED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>1398</td>
<td>1294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Transportation:

(1) Vehicular: One major convoy move was made during this period. The entire Brigade, minus the advance parties, was moved by truck from Khanh Duong to Nha Trang for sea move to Duc Pho. The artillery moved one battery on organic vehicles from Duc Pho to Quang Ngai in preparation for Operation Hood River.

(2) Air: USAF C-7A, C-123, C-130, US Army CH-47 and Marine CH-53 aircraft provided airlift support for the reporting period. C-130 aircraft moved the majority of the airlift cargo from Phan Rang to Duc Pho to include passengers, mail and limited amounts of all classes of supplies. C-130 aircraft were also used to move the FSP teams, quartering parties and the medical clearing team from Duc Pho to Quang Ngai for Operation Hood River. C-123 aircraft supplemented the C-130 airlift. C-7A and CH-47 and CH-53 aircraft were used exclusively to resupply the FSP at Minh Long for the period 26 June to 31 July 1967.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Cargo Short Tons</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>257,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>355,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>238,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>851,639</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Sea: The NSTS service in conjunction with the Alaskan Barge and Tug Co provided sealift support required to move the entire Brigade except advance parties, from Nha Trang to Duc Pho. Seven LST’s were used to move the Brigade Main Body. One additional LST moved Class II and IV and limited Class V items, personnel and backlog boat mail from Phan Rang to Duc Pho. One LST was used to move Brigade vehicles over "B" Configuration from Duc Pho to Phan Rang via Cam Ranh Bay.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

I. Civil Affairs.

1. General: During this reporting period, elements of the Brigade operated primarily in two Provinces; Quang Ngai, and Ninh Thuan. The Brigade's Civil Affairs/Civic Action activities were performed primarily in Quang Ngai Province, with the Support Battalion rear operating in Ninh Thuan Province. The Brigade was located and operated briefly in Darlac Province, however, no significant Civil Affairs/Civic Action projects were conducted.

2. Civil Affairs: Civil Affairs activities during this reporting period were centered on mass refugee movement, MEDCAPS, captured livestock and food cache extraction. In performing these functions a great deal of coordination with then OCO, now CORDS, and local civilian agencies, as well as MACV/Special Forces Advisory Teams, took place in the districts in which we operated. The necessity of working with all these sources, as well as other U.S. agencies in accomplishing the Brigade's Civil Affairs/Civic Action missions, was obvious.

3. Civic Action:

a. Civic Action Projects reported:

(1) Health and Sanitation.

(a) A total of 25 MEDCAPS were conducted by US treating 3,017 patients and 34 sick calls were conducted by US/GVN treating 2,766 patients.

(b) 23 classes on personal hygiene were given to 1,901 people.

(c) 18,600 gallons of potable water was supplied to an ARVN dependent housing area during the reporting period.

(d) 482 persons were treated medically by tactical units in the AO and Carentan Base.

(e) 28 seriously wounded or injured refugees received aid in the AO and were evacuated to aid stations in Carentan Base, of which 4 were later transferred to the 8th Medical Hospital in Qui Nhon, RVN.

(f) Local VN nurses and midwives of the Phan Ngang area were trained by working with MEDCAP teams.

(g) A total of 232 Domestic Animals received Medical treatment by US.

(2) Public Works: Construction of, or repairs to the following have been completed:

- Playground 1
- Concrete Pad 6 x 10 ft.
- Recreation Center
- Landscaping 1
- Bridge rebuilt 1-R
- Sidewalk 300 ft.
- Stage w/Movie Screen 1
- Road repair 4.83km
- Water container 600 gal

(3) Transportation: The Brigade provided transportation for evacuating and resettling 8,895 refugees, returning 289 innocent civilians to their homes, and extracting 118.5 tons of rice and 27.5 tons of salt which were captured from the Viet Cong. Vehicles transported the daily hire laborers twice daily, except Sundays, between Duc Pho Villlage and Carentan Base.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS GSFCR-65) (U)

(4) Labor: The forward Brigade hired 6,569 temporary day laborers. The payroll was $526,795 VN for an average of $80 VN per laborer, per day.

(5) Education and training:

(a) Daily English classes were taught by a Brigade member to 250 students, for an average of 35 teaching hrs per week.

(b) Vietnamese language classes were taught by GVN to 54 students, 9 hours per week.

(6) Distribution of Commodities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>19,319 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td>1,474 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>8,950 bd ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire</td>
<td>13,800 ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barb Wire Stakes</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen</td>
<td>100 ft.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Recovered Goods Returned to GVN:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>237,000 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>55,000 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>1,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Buffalo</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgical Tools</td>
<td>Variety</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) Voluntary Contributions:

(a) 62,000 piasters were donated by the Brigade for construction of a school.

(b) 4,500 piasters were donated by the Brigade to buy books for Duy Tan School, Phan Rang.

(c) A $150.00 donation was received from a Church Organization in the U.S. and given to the Duc Pho Catholic Orphanage.

(d) A total of 3,000 piasters were given out for solatium payments.

(9) Efforts not otherwise mentioned above:

(a) Mass games were taught to a total of 396 Vietnamese children.

(b) Eight soccer games and fourteen volleyball games were played with local Vietnamese teams in Ninh Thuan Province.

(c) In conjunction with AID pay activities, a singing group from Support Battalion provided entertainment to 1,300 spectators at the new recreation center in Phan Rang.

(d) American movies were shown twice during the quarter to over 2,000 VN children in Phan Rang.

(e) 28 VN POW’s were liberated from the VC by US, evacuated to 563d Medical Platoon for treatment and observation and later evacuated to Quang Ngai Province Hospital.
b. Our major efforts during this reporting period were equally divided between our four main areas of accomplishment. The first of the four significant areas we were involved in was refugee movement.

(1) Problem areas: We expected to encounter approximately 10,000 refugees during the process of our tactical operations. The questions which were brought up were: how would the people be moved, where would they be moved to, who would take responsibility for these people, and how would these people be taken care of?

(2) Discussion: The Province Chief, Dr. Hoanh, had expressed desires to have the people of the Song Ve Valley moved from their homes to government control. It was decided that the refugees would be moved to Nghia Hanh, where a refugee camp would be set up in two settlements; one for VIETNAMESE, and one for MONTAGNARDS. It was decided that the tactical units would assemble the people, conduct tactical field screening, and then evacuate them to a refugee camp. Although Nghia Hanh Refugee Center was the prime acceptor, Duc Pho, No Duc, Minh Long, and Ba To were secondary acceptors. The people from Ba To Refugee Camp would eventually be moved to Nghia Hanh, when the tactical situation allowed. It was decided that CORDS, in coordination with the MACV Sub-Sector Advisory Team, would be responsible for the Nghia Hanh Refugee Camp. Through the coordination of Mr. James A. Hay, SPA, CORDS, the needed materials and food supplies were procured.

(3) Action taken: When the operations finally got underway, the individual ground units initiated the refugee evacuation. The people were first screened by the ground units with help of National Police Forces. From this screening a total of 862 detainees were apprehended. In addition to the detainees a total of 9,819 refugees were evacuated to various refugee camps. The preponderance of refugees were moved to Nghia Hanh. At Nghia Hanh, MACV personnel, along with local officials from the Province, accepted the refugees, processed them, and generally controlled them. Although this could have been a serious problem area, because of the coordination which took place, these potential trouble areas were bypassed.

c. The second area where considerable time and effort were expended was in the fields of MEDCAP. A total of 25 MEDCAPs were conducted during this quarter, and 2,766 patients were treated. An example of MEDCAP problem, discussion, and actions taken can best be seen by the two MEDCAP operations during Operation LAKE.

(1) Civil Affairs actions during Operation LAKE was limited to MEDCAP activities. There were two MEDCAPs held during this operation, one on 7 July 1967 with 432 persons treated and the other on 10 July 1967 with 283 persons treated. Both MEDCAPs were held in SA NUTH Village, Duc Pho District, by the 51 Section of the 1/327 Infantry Battalion. These two MEDCAPs were successful in being beneficial to both the Vietnamese and our Brigade. We were able to give the Vietnamese the needed medical treatment, and in return we received limited intelligence information. During the 10 July MEDCAP there were 78 persons treated dentally. Also during the second MEDCAP the intelligence team was able to get information which led to the discovery of a mine. The MEDCAPs were organized utilizing the facilities of the village as best as possible. A central location was found which would allow the actual treatment to be given away from the crowds. This also enabled the intelligence team to operate in a more efficient manner. The help in these MEDCAPs the Village Chief and other village officials were used in assuring the people that this was for their own benefit. Also some of the village officials were used in assisting the National Police in maintaining orderly procedures. The general area was secured by one platoon of the 1/327 Infantry Battalion, on the 7th of July MEDCAPs, and by Vietnamese para-military forces for the 10 July MEDCAP. This latter consisted of one RF company, and one PF platoon.
Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

In total there were 1015 persons treated by both MEDCAPS. This figure includes 78 persons treated dentally. There were also 77 animals treated. An interesting note is that we were able to obtain intelligence information (the mine) only after we had gained the people’s confidence with the first MEDCAP operation.

The last two areas in which a main effort was expended was in livestock evacuation and food cache extraction. The livestock consisted of 1273 head of cattle and 217 water buffalo. These livestock were uncovered in our AO. They belonged mainly to personnel who were evacuated from the Song Ve Valley to Nghia Hanh Refugee Camp. The cattle were driven through the AO, in the Song Ve Valley, and turned over to GVN officials, who completed the drive to Nghia Hanh Refugee Camp. In respect to the food caches which were found during our tactical operation. A total of 277,000 pounds of unhusked rice, and 55,000 lbs of salt was returned to GVN control. Both these caches were handled in the same manner. When a cache was discovered, the US unit would secure the area where the cache was found. The District Chief would provide workers to be airlifted, by US aircraft, to the cache site, bag the cache, and again the bagged food stuff and the laborers would be airlifted back to District Headquarters. The essential problem in this phase was communications and coordination.

J. Chemical.

1. Concept of Operation: The Brigade Cal O is the special-staff advisor to the S-3 on all chemical support operations. He plans for and supervises these operations to ensure they are accomplished in an efficient and timely manner. To facilitate a “quick response” capability, the Brigade Cal Section maintains representation in the TOC between 0700-2000 hours. The TOC representative effects the coordination necessary to accomplish the chemical strike and forwards the requirement to the 20th Cal Detachment for execution. The 20th Cal Detachment maintain personnel on 15 minute standby for employment within the Brigade AO on a daily basis.

2. Training:

a. Portable Flamethrower Training: During the month of July two individuals from each company within the Infantry battalions and 10 individuals from 1/2-17 Cav, 326th Engr, and the Security Platoon were trained in the employment of the portable flamethrower. Personnel trained had six month retainability in the command.

b. Pilot bombadier training for CS/smoke mission: During the reporting period helicopter crews from the 176th Aviation Co were trained in the technique of dropping CS and smoke grenades on target areas to support ground troops. Pilots quickly developed a skill in executing these missions.

c. Protective mask training for supporting aviation company: During the reporting period protective mask training was conducted for the 176th Avn Co. Personnel were instructed on the proper functioning and wear of the protective mask, and were subjected to a high concentration of CS to inspire confidence in the mask.

3. Operations: Chemical operations were conducted in diversified areas during the reporting period. A brief summary of these activities are as follows:

a. CS Grenade Drops: A total of 7,762 CS grenades were dropped on nine targets within ZON AO. Targets consisted of enemy sniper positions, fortified defensive positions, and villages and hamlets within SONG NE, SONG VB, and NO DUC Valleys. Purpose of these missions was to flush and inco-
AVBD-Hist
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
(RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

Pacificate personnel for rapid exploitation and search. A total of 562 CS
grenades were dropped in conjunction with the PSYOPS program on VC dominated
villages and hamlets to harass and demoralize personnel to exploit the
CHIEU HOI program.

b. CS persistent bag drops: 4,625 pounds of persistent CS-1
was dropped on enemy fortified defensive positions, base camps, hospital
sites, and egress routes within ZON AO. The primary purposes of these
missions were to deny the enemy use of these areas and restrict his movements.

c. Flamethrowers: Flamethrowers were maintained in a ready
condition at CARENTAN Base, available on an on-call basis to Brigade maneuver
elements.

d. Tunnel Denial/Flushing Operations: During the first two
weeks of May the 20th Cal Detachment conducted seven tunnel flushing opera-
tions within the CARENTAN Base Area. Upon completion of these flushing
operations all tunnels were closed. 550 pounds of CS-1 powder was utilized
in tunnel denial operations in ZON AO. Each tunnel seeded with CS-1 was
subsequently closed by A/326th Engr En.

e. Rice/Salt Destruction: In July the Brigade Chemical Section
initiated a procedure for destruction of VC/NVA Rice/Salt caches. This
consisted of seeding the caches with bulk CS-1 powder and exposing them to
weather. 23 tons of rice and 80 tons of salt were destroyed.

f. A reconnaissance was made of the SONG NE and SONG VE
Valleys to select targets for herbicide operations. These targets were
forwarded to Cal 0, Task Force OREGON. Targets selected in SONG VE Valley
were approved; they were sprayed on 12 July.
Commanders Observation and Recommendations

Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned)

A. General: During the reporting period, the Brigade was engaged in search and destroy operations in QUANG NGAI Province in areas which had not been previously penetrated by friendly forces. Initially, the Brigade made frequent contact with enemy units of at least company size. These contacts resulted in firefights from which the enemy did not rapidly withdraw. Over a period of several weeks however, contacts of this nature declined. Contacts with a large enemy force led to his hasty retreat. Contact with large sized enemy units became a rarity. The enemy splintered his forces into small groups which resulted in contacts with squad sized elements or smaller; an indication of the effectiveness of the Brigade's operation was the enemy's desire to avoid contact. In addition to defeating the enemy militarily he was hurt economically. The Brigade captured 232.2 tons of rice and 133.1 tons of salt which is enough to supply two enemy battalion for a year. Brigade operations resulted in the denial of the SONG VE Valley, a large rice producing area, to the enemy. Several hospital complexes and quantities of medical supplies were destroyed or captured. The number of HoI Chanhs in QUANG NGAI Province for the reporting period was 478% over the same period last year. A total of 8,895 refugees were returned to the control of the GVN. The Brigade's operation damaged the enemy and reduced his effectiveness as a fighting force. These operations have also caused a weakening of the VC infrastructure. Intelligence reports indicate that the enemy is confronted with food shortages which contribute to lowering his morale.

B. Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Item: Enemy Base Areas and Fortifications.
   a. Discussion: A study was undertaken by the Brigade S-2 to determine if a pattern existed for the establishment of enemy base camps and defensive fortifications.
   b. Observation: It was found during early operations that the enemy invariably established his bases in draws where water was available and dense foliage precluded aerial observations. Fortifications were found on the "fingers" overlooking the base camps and were mutually supporting. Information obtained from CIGV, photos, Red Haze, VR's, and SPAR was placed on overlays and the density of activity plotted. This activity generally fell into terrain favored by the enemy for his camps. Thus probable base camp locations could be determined and a map study revealed likely defensive fortifications.

2. Item: Mutually Reinforcing Units.
   a. Discussion: In areas primarily occupied by NVA forces extensive efforts have been made by the enemy to establish well constructed defensive positions offering him all the advantages of a good defensive position.
   b. Observation: In conducting search operations our forces operate in at least platoon sized elements in order to thoroughly saturate an area of operations. This procedure, unless carefully controlled, can lead to disastrous results. No great problem exists in reinforcing units which make contact with a sizable enemy force where adequate landing zones are present throughout the area. However, in the absence of landing zones in sufficient quantity and nearness to the operating units, care must be taken to insure that friendly elements remain close enough together to reinforce each other overland should a contact with a large sized enemy force be made by only one
search element. An excessive delay in the arrival of a reinforcing unit forced to move overland for lack of adequate pickup and landing zones in the area is an eventuality which must be guarded against constantly.

3. Item: Maneuver Techniques.
   a. Discussion: The VC and NVA habitually located their defensive positions on the slopes of ridges overlooking ravines containing small streams. Their defensive positions invariably included well concealed bunkers with overhead cover and were located in such a manner as to be mutually supporting.
   b. Observation: Units attempting to search terrain from low to highground were at a disadvantage when contact with an enemy force in positions as described above, was made. Experience proved that when possible search operations should be conducted from high to lowground. In such case the tactical advantages accrue to friendly elements.

4. Item: Cordon and Search Operations.
   a. Discussion: During the cordon phase of the operation, rifle companies are normally well spread thereby causing the one interpreter, normally attached to a company, to be useful to only one element of the company.
   b. Observation: Each platoon should have an interpreter assigned Interpreters of attached indigenous units can be utilized if they speak the same dialect as the refugees.

5. Item: Search Operations.
   a. Discussion: The enemy often employs excellent camouflage techniques to preclude discovery of his installations, particularly his food, weapon and supply caches. Additionally, the VC/NVA habitually excel in the camouflage of their defensive positions and bunkers.
   b. Observation: Search operations must be conducted slowly and methodically both to insure that all caches are discovered and by reason of insuring security for the searching force. Time limitations should not be placed on a force engaged in search operations as such limitations will work to preclude as extensive and detailed a search as is required to thoroughly clear an area.

6. Item: Use of Artillery and Tactical Air.
   a. Discussion: While conducting search and destroy operations in thickly jungled, mountainous terrain, several problems can be experienced which proper use of artillery and Tac Air will circumvent. The thick vegetation favors the enemy in launching an ambush or of the friendly force entering an area covered by enemy defensive fires without warning. Additionally, the thick vegetation hinders accurate land navigation. Should a contact be made and personnel wounded, helicopter evacuation becomes a problem and can be very time consuming depending upon the availability of helicopters with winch and engineer LZ clearing teams.
   b. Observation: By preceding advancing troops with artillery fire the probability of being ambushed or inadvertently entering an enemy defensive position is greatly reduced. The artillery fire on known locations aids also in maintaining direction and orientation. Pre-planned air strikes and Combat Skyspot can be utilized for LZ construction in advance of troops to insure the availability of an emergency LZ.
   a. Discussion: During the past quarter, the Brigade conducted assaults following B-52 strikes on two occasions. On both occasions, intelligence indicated the existence of sizable enemy forces in the strike area. However, upon conducting the assaults, the units involved found no evidence of the enemy having been in the strike area during the strike.
   b. Observation: Indications, based on the above and past experience, are that B-52 strikes used in a tactical support role are of questionable value. The time required to obtain approval for a strike and the lengthy channel through which approval must be obtained pose problems both in the aspects of security and timeliness. Consideration should be given to the use of tactical fighter-bomber aircraft in formation, precision, high altitude bombing which would be much more responsive to the desires of the ground commander, could be requested and approved through Tac Air channel and be available on much shorter notice.

8. Item: Reduced Helicopter ACL's.
   a. Discussion: In conducting airmobile operations in the central highlands during the hot summer weather helicopters frequently are unable to lift their rated allowable cargo load in mountainous areas due to lack of air density. This situation is most pronounced from mid-morning until late afternoon when the ACL is frequently under 50%.
   b. Observation: Careful consideration must be given to the time of launching airmobile assaults and to the order of employment of the assaulting elements. Helicopter assaults maximizing each aircraft's ACL can be achieved by programming those units assaulting the highest terrain first with succeeding lifts moving to ever lower landing zones. Artillery normally can be moved only during the early morning or late evening hours. In conducting subsequent airmobile assaults for later phases of an operation the commander may be faced with the alternative of positioning his artillery supporting the assault a day in advance (which may have the effect of alerting the enemy to the proposed assault).

9. Item: Use of Smoke and CS in Fortified Areas.
   a. Discussion: In contact with a relatively large enemy force in fortified positions the enemy normally has the initial advantage particularly by virtue of occupying fortified defensive positions. In this case indirect supporting fires, when brought into play, have the effect only of keeping the enemy in his positions. Meanwhile friendly forces are being moved, either overland or by air, to reinforce the unit engaged.
   b. Observation: As long as the enemy force is allowed to remain in their fortified positions the advantage we possess by virtue of our superior firepower is virtually cancelled. The employment of CS smoke, either by air or artillery, on the enemy positions, however, will often drive him from the protection of his bunkers and expose him to the direct effects of our massive fires. CS smoke, being non-persistent, will dissipate in a matter of minutes causing little, if any, inconvenience to our forces as they sweep over the enemy positions. Similarly, smoke properly placed, affords both the engaged and reinforcing friendly forces the concealment necessary to maneuver and close with the enemy.

    a. Discussion: In conducting search and destroy operations, while the enemy may frequent particular locals, i.e., valleys, ridges, or
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

points midway between, he is liable to be anywhere.

b. Observation: Small units must maintain all around security, all the time. An old lesson to be sure, but one worth constant emphasis.


a. Discussion: On two occasions the Brigade Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol was utilized to conduct airmobile raids in the Song Ve Valley. Their mission was to secure individuals knowledgeable of conditions in the valley.

b. Observation: These raids should be conducted in areas where the enemy feels secure and the element of surprise is achieved. The target area must be small enough for the raiding force to cordon off and sweep rapidly. Well briefed interpreters are essential to direct detainees. These highly successful raids netted a VC Political Officer and several cooperative detainees.

12. Item: Booby Traps.

a. Discussion: The VC and NVA in the area of operations used booby traps and mines to a greater extent than experienced in the recent past by the Brigade. Initially we suffered a marked increase in casualties due to these enemy devices.

b. Observation: Upon the trend of increased booby trap casualties being recognized, added emphasis was given to mine and booby trap instruction both in the forward area and at PHAN RANG in Replacement Training. Following the training it was recognized that the troops were more cautious in moving through areas believed to be booby trapped by the enemy. Casualties from booby traps also declined.

13. Item: Gravel Mines:

a. Discussion: Several US agencies had requested that certain areas within the Brigade Area of Operations be seeded with the self-decomposing Gravel Mines. While these mines had been dropped as much as four months prior to the Brigade arrival many were still active and friendly casualties resulted. Additionally, these mines had been collected by the VC-NVA and were discovered in containers in several caches. No gravel mines were discovered as part of any VC booby traps, however. It is possible that some had been physically relocated and used in the conventional manner by the VC.

b. Observation: Because the mine was classified, the majority of our troops had heard of it but were not familiar enough with it to recognize one when they saw it. Since the time lapse between seeding and our arrival in the area was far greater than the life expectancy of the mine no information was initially provided to the Brigade concerning the locations in which the mines were employed. Several friendly casualties resulted from the mines. Detailed instruction concerning the gravel mine was promptly given to our troops and the locations of seeded areas procured. Following receipt of information and the instruction the troopers were observed to be more cautious in their movement in seeded areas and frequently sighted and marked gravel mines they discovered which were later destroyed by accompanying engineer personnel.


a. Discussion: As with past operations numerous occasions occurred when the enemy presented a fleeting target at very close range.
b. Observation: A greater percentage of these targets were engaged than in past operations resulting in several enemy casualties. The Brigade has emphasized the techniques instinctive firing based on lessons learned by previous experience. These techniques and the training given to date appear to be paying the dividends expected. The concept and training will continue to be emphasized within the Brigade.

15. Item: Planning Civil Affairs.

a. Discussion: Planning in the area of Civil Affairs is essential particularly in order to preclude civilians and refugees from interfering with the tactical operation. However, premature coordination with GVN and outside US agencies prior to the launching of tactical operations will invariably compromise the impending operation.

b. Observation: A detailed estimate of the tactical situation and proposed scheme of maneuver must therefore be made and objectives and problems areas identified in advance. Solutions to problems of refugee control, curfews, etc. must be formulated. Immediately upon the launching of the operation the coordination necessary to implement these solutions must be made with the appropriate agencies and the results disseminated to all units. Handling the planning of Civil Affairs in this manner precludes the compromise of an operation while insuring that the necessary arrangements have been made to cope with the anticipated problem areas and the information disseminated to all interested parties.


a. Discussion: During the evacuation of refugees, all resources of indigenous personnel should be utilized to maintain effective control over refugees. The following personnel were attached to each battalion: 1 3-man ARVN Psych Team, 1 National Policeman, 1 3-man Province Recon Unit (ARVN), 2 interpreters, and either an assistant village chief or hamlet chief.

b. Observation: These personnel were invaluable in an effort to explain the evacuation to the people and to arrest their natural fears.

17. Item: Processing Detainees.

a. Discussion: Several detainees apprehended by elements of the Brigade and classified as innocent civilians were later identified by province officials as hard-core VC.

b. Observation: Because of the nature of the war, the language barrier and the relative unfamiliarity of the Brigade with the people and area in which operations are conducted, VC and NIP cadre have a relatively good chance of evading identification as such, solely by US personnel. Arrangements should be made during each operation to obtain the exclusive services of one or more province official, knowledgeable concerning the local VC and NVA units in the area, to assist in the classification of detainees.


a. Discussion: During operations in the Song Ve Valley, the Brigade conducted a cattle drive to return the refugees' cattle to them at the District Headquarters.

b. Observation: The most effective means of accomplishing this mission was to utilize US forces.
AVBD-Hist
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS GFON-65) (U)

19. Item: Counter propaganda.
   a. Discussion: During cordon, search, and evacuation opera-
tions in Song Ve Valley, villagers were told by the VC/NVA that US forces
would commit atrocities. One group of refugees were terrified because the
VC/NVA had said the allies would dump them into the ocean.
   b. Observation: The psyops campaign must be intensified to
inform the people of the "ground rules" for their evacuation and the reasons
 evacuation is necessary.

20. Item: Loss of supporting logistical assets.
   a. Discussion: Problems were anticipated as a result of 4,000
rounds of Class V being destroyed by fire.
   b. Observation: Existing practices of maintaining basic loads
of supporting logistical assets showed the Brigade can continue to operate
without any significant change in activity for a period in excess of 48
hours despite any unanticipated logistical loss.
CONFLICTIAL

(U)

Part II: Recommendations:

1. Province and district agencies should maintain interpreters familiar with languages indigenous to their area of responsibility. These interpreters should be capable of being attached to US forces, who operate in the province or district for the duration of their stay.

2. Consideration should be given to the use of fighter bombers precision bombing as an alternate to the B-52 strike.

3. The techniques of instinctive firing be taught to all troops bound for Vietnam; preferably as an integral part of their initial marksmanship instruction.

4. Province and district personnel intimately familiar with the VC in the area of operation be available to the Brigade to work exclusively with the S-2 section in processing detainees.

5. Consideration be given to the reintroduction of the "Daisy Cutter" for landing zone construction.

S. H. MATHESON

Brigadier General, USA

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - CG, 1 FFORCEV, APO 96350 ATTN: AVTA-CG OCT
2 - Asst CofS for Force Development, DA, Washington DC 20310 (thru channels)
3 - CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-MI APO 96558
3 - DCG USARV, ATTN: AVC-HIST APO 96337
1 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
20 - CO, 22d Mil Hist Det APO 96347
TO: assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the army (ACSFOR, JA), Washington, D.C. 20315

1. (U) Forwarded herewith are two copies of subject report of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

2. (C) Reference Section I, para F., 3., a.: The shortage of qualified interpreters and US personnel with Vietnamese language training is a problem throughout this command. It is recommended that increased efforts be made to obtain Vietnamese interpreters and that Vietnamese language training, especially for interrogators and counterintelligence personnel deploying to RVN, be expanded in COMUS.

3. (C) Reference Section I, para F., 3., b.: Units operating in the Task Force Oregon TAOR have encountered few Montagnards to date. Montagnard interpreters have been obtained through the Office of Civil Operations in Quang Ngai on an as needed basis for interrogating detainees. Increased operations in western Quang Ngai or Quang Tin Provinces would require additional Montagnard interpreters.

4. (C) Reference Section 2, Part 1, para B., 1.: The observations concerning probable locations of enemy base camps and fortifications appear valid for the area in southern Quang Ngai Province where Operation VALUAR was conducted. However, preliminary indications are that the base camps in Quang Tin Province in the vicinity of Base Area 117 (center of mass BT 2107) are built on higher ground. Studies are continuing to determine patterns of locations of enemy base camps for the entire Task Force Oregon TAOR.

5. (C) Reference Section 2, Part 1., para B., 17.: The classification of detainees is a continuing problem throughout the Task Force. The use of personnel from Vietnamese agencies such as the national Police, Military Security Service or Provincial Reconnaissance Units is of great assistance during screening operations. Marine units of the III Marine Amphibious Force have had excellent success using Kit Carson Scouts to assist in identifying Viet Cong infrastructure. The practice of releasing innocent civilians to district officials rather than setting them free has proven effective since many of the innocent civilians are later identified as Viet Cong by National Police or other GVN officials and are retained in custody.

Downgraded at 3 year Intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 3200.10
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS-GSPOR-65X (U)

6. (C) Reference Section 2, Part II, para 1.: This headquarters concurs in the recommendation that province and district agencies maintain interpreters familiar with language indigenous to the area. It is felt, however, that most of the interpreters should be retained at province level. More effective control can be maintained at that level and interpreters can be used by the Provisional Interrogation Centers and other agencies when not required by tactical units.

7. (C) Reference Section 2, Part II, para 2.: This headquarters does not concur with the recommendation that consideration be given to using fighter bombers for precision bombing, as an alternate to B-52 strikes. It would require a great number of fighter bombers to equal the amount of ordnance placed on a target by a normal flight of B-52's. Action of this nature would deplete, by approximately one-fourth, the number of fighter bombers available for close air support missions.

8. (U) Reference Section 2, Part II, para 3.: This headquarters concurs with the recommendation as stated. A request has been submitted to Headquarters, USARV, for an instruction team to train a cadre in the techniques of "Quick Kill" combat marksmanship.

9. (C) Reference Section 2, Part II, para 4.: This headquarters concurs with the recommendation that province and district personnel familiar with Viet Cong in the area of operations be made available to tactical units operating in the area. Possible methods of this are: expansion of the National Police Field Force Program; forming special units of HOI CHANHS; and increasing the utilization of Kit Carson Scouts.

10. (U) Reference Section 2, Part II, para 5.: "Daisy Cutter" ordnance is excellent for both landing zone construction and preparation in areas of sparsely vegetated terrain, as it is very effective in neutralizing booby traps and, to some extent, land mines. Recommend "Daisy Cutter" ordnance be adopted as a permanent portion of the inventory.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CPT, VG.
Asst Adj Gen

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Infantry is continuing Phase II of MAIHEUR in the northern portion of MINH LONG District.

(6) A Complete After Action Report will be included in the next Quarterly Operational Report.

2. Operation LAKE


b. Mission: To conduct search and destroy operations in south-eastern QUANG NGAI Province and to provide security for engineer operations on Route 1 between DIEN TRUONG and SA NUTHI.

c. Location: QUANG NGAI Province.

d. Commander: BG S.H. Matheson.

e. Forces Involved: 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus), Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry (OPCON), 1 Platoon, C Company, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor (OPCON).

f. Concept and execution:

(1) Operation LAKE commenced on 6 July 1967 with the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (-) conducting an airmobile assault with two companies into the highground west of Route 1. The Reconnaissance Platoon moved into blocking positions on routes of egress in the western portion of the AO. A Troop, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry reinforced by one tank platoon of the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division conducted an overland move into the AO, established check points and provided security along Route 1 for engineer work parties and conducted cordon and search operations in the eastern portion of the AO. On 11 July, A Troop conducted an overland move back to CARENTAN Base near DUONG PO and was released from OPCON to the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile extractions to CARENTAN Base and Operation LAKE closed at 1200 hours on 12 July, 1967.

(2) A Complete After Action Report from Operation LAKE will be included in the next Quarterly Operational Report.

B. Training. Most of this period was spent in the conduct of combat operations. During brief periods of refitting and preparing for future combat operations, training was oriented toward areas needing improvement as noted during previous operations. In addition to the emphasis placed on small unit tactics, the following training in the Brigade was conducted:

1. All incoming personnel continued to be processed through the Brigade Replacement Company PHAN RANG, where they received six-days of land navigation, patrolling, enemy mines and booby traps, enemy sniper techniques, first aid and physical conditioning. This training period also served to acclimate personnel to the climate of Vietnam.

2. At CARENTAN Base, live fire ranges were established in order that the Brigade combat units could conduct live fire training during refitting periods. Range training conducted during the reporting period consisted of zero firing, instinctive firing, battle drill, techniques of ambush firing, sniper practice firing, flamethrower firing and LAW familiarization and firing.

3. A total of 9 personnel from the Brigade were sent to the MACV Recondo School conducted at NHA TRANG, RVN.
AVBD-EC

30 July 1967

SUBJECT: Quarterly Operation Report

TO: Commanding General
1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division
ATTN: Historian
APO US Forces 96347

SECTION I (C)

Significant Activities: During the period 1 May 67 to 31 July 67, Support Battalion provided close and continuous combat service support to the Brigade in its counterinsurgency operations against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army. Replacement training continued. Basic Airborne training was completed for non-airborne qualified personnel assigned/attached to the Brigade. Support Battalion continued to operate the Installation Coordination Center for all United States and Free World Military Armed Forces in the Phan Rang area.

A. Operations supported:

1. Operation Malheur I
   b. Location: Quang Ngai Province.
   c. Commanders:
      (1) Support Battalion: LTC Quinton P Sunday.

2. Operation LAIE:
   b. Location: Quang Ngai Province.
   c. Commanders:
      (1) Support Battalion: LTC Quinton P Sunday.
      (2) Forward Support Element: Major John A Chambers.

3. Operation Malheur II
SUBJECT: Quarterly Operation Report

a. Period: 8 June 1967 to present.
b. Location: Quan Ngai Province.

c. Commanders:
   (1) Support Battalion: LTC Quinton P. Sunday.
   (2) Forward Support Element: Major Gary V Pugh, Major John A Chambers.

B. Training:

1. Replacement Training Company (provisional) continued its training activities to include proficiency training.
   a. There were fifty-seven (57) proficiency training classes conducted during this period. One hundred and five (105) officers, four hundred and sixty-eight (468) non-commission officers and two thousand and ninety-four (2094) enlisted personnel received this training.
   b. The combat leaders course was not conducted during this quarter in compliance with Brigade directive to discontinue the course until further notice.
   c. Training facilities were improved. A mock helicopter was constructed to train students in the methods of helicopter operation. A mock VC village was constructed to assist in training students in the proper cordon and search methods. A machine gun bunker was added to facilitate the training in the neutralization of enemy positions. The mines and booby traps class was updated to include the new mines and grenades encountered by the Brigade in the 1st CTZ. The reaction course was modified to include the "Quick Fire" method of engagement.

2. All training by subordinate elements of Support Battalion was designed to increase the unit's capability to provide combat service support strengthen security of the base camp and the Forward Support Element, and weapons proficiency.

3. Support Battalion completed the jump training for selected non-airborne qualified personnel which had started on 24 April 67. Twenty-six (26) students made five (5) qualifying jumps during the first week in May. There were no injuries, malfunctions or significant difficulties. In addition parachute training drops were conducted on 18 June 1967 on Bu Gia map Drop Zone Phan Rang (BN 727890) using one (1) C-47 aircraft provided by the Commander, 35th Tactical Fighter Wing also located at Phan Rang RVN. One hundred and eleven (111) personnel were dropped without injuries or significant difficulties. One malfunction was evidenced. Purpose of the exercise was to provide subject personnel, primarily Rigger personnel, with proficiency jumps.

C. Out Processing: During the period 1 May 1967 to 24 July 1967 the out processing section of the replacement training company processed the following number of personnel.
Confidential

SUBJECT: Quarterly Operation Report

1. DESROS 1,357
2. R&R 973
3. Ordinary leave 187
4. Emergency leave 49
5. Hospital Returnees 1,426
6. Other absences 645
7. Total processed 4,637

D. Logistical Operation:

1. Concept: All combat service support was provided directly to unit field trains located in Carentan Base Camp, Duc Pho, by the Forward Support Element of the Support Battalion. Qui Nhon Area Command and other elements of the 1st Logistical Command provided necessary support for the conduct of all operations during this report period. Those logistical command elements were organized into Task Force Gallagher which operated the FSA at Duc Pho. During Operation Malheur II it became necessary to establish a forward supply point at Minh Long. The FSP was operated by personnel from the FSB and provided all classes of supply to include water.

2. Medical:

a. Organization: During the period 1 May 1967 through 31 July 1967, Company D, 326th Medical Battalion, was operational with all assigned personnel at Duc Pho RVN in support of the 1st Brigade.

   b. Medical Service Support:

      (1) General: During the quarter the company admitted, treated and evacuated the highest number of casualties since arriving in Viet Nam. The company experienced no major difficulties in handling those casualties with its present organization. Most significant in accomplishing the unit's medical mission was the short time it took the newly assigned Medical Corps Officers to adapt to work under the conditions that exist in Viet Nam.

      (2) Patient Treatment and Care: After arriving in the Duc Pho area of operation the company was confronted with a large number of patients with eye problems. During the initial phase of the operation it was necessary to evacuate the more serious patients to Qui Nhon and Phan Rang to receive eye refractions because neither the company nor the 563rd Medical Clearing Company, which was in general support of the brigade, had organic capabilities to perform eye refractions. This problem continued until 18 July, at which time the company was able to obtain the services of an optometrist who is now available in the brigade forward area on a bi-monthly basis and also for unit stand-downs.
SUBJECT: Quarterly Operation Report

With this increased capability, the company has been able to reduce the time the individual soldier is lost from his unit from 5 to 10 days to two to four hours. Also during the months of May and June the company has access to the service of a Social Work Officer attached to Task Force Oregon. This service helped eliminate two potential psychological problems in the brigade.

(3) Patient Evacuation: During the quarter the company’s ambulance platoon maintained responsibility for evacuation coordination of the brigade casualties in the forward area. Approximately 1900 patients were evacuated through the company’s evacuation facilities. This figure includes patients evacuation from the brigade area of operations, forward base camp area and patients subsequently evacuated to supporting medical facilities in Chu Lai and Qui Nhon. The division of labor within the platoon to successfully evacuate the above number of personnel was effected as follows: the RTO’s received and transmitted Med-Evac requests to the Air Ambulance (Dust-Off) crews from the 2nd Platoon 498th Air Ambulance Company supporting the brigade. In addition, when air ambulance capabilities were strained or limited because of tactical situations the RTO’s effected Med-Evac coordination through the brigade evacuation section. Routine evacuation to rear area hospitals was coordinated with the Air Forces Casualty Staging unit personnel located at the Duc Pho air strip.

c. Medical Statistics (through 27 July 67)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MALARIA</th>
<th>FEVER</th>
<th>BONES</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malhuer I</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1226</td>
<td>2044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAKE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malhuer II</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>1505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2116</td>
<td>3553</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Significant Items.

(1) Brigade Medical Supply: Upon moving into the Duc Pho area, the Brigade Medical Supply experienced difficulty in the timely receipt of medical resupply through normal gosupply from the 32nd Medical Det. at Cam Rahn Bay. This problem was created by the long and indirect route of travel. In order to resolve this problem, the Brigade Medical Supply Officer established an account with the Forward Platoon of the 32nd Medical Det. located in Qui Nhon. Also in order to insure that an adequate level of medical supplies are constantly available in the brigade forward area, the Brigade Medical Supply Officer has established a revised requisition system. This system requires all units to request medical resupplies in writing, thusly, providing the Brigade Medical Supply Officer a usage factor for maintaining the aforementioned level of medical supplies.

(2) MEDCAP Operations: During the quarter the company continued to provide personnel in support of the brigade MEDCAP Operations. The most significant results from these operations were in the Dental Services provided by the company’s Dental Officer, who treated 229 Vietnamese and Montagnards. The medical treatment aspect was somewhat

Confidential
sacrificed because of poor advanced planning by the various brigade units participating in MEDCAP Missions.

3. Maintenance:
   
a. General: The Brigade Maintenance company continued its mission of providing direct support maintenance and Class VI repair parts to the 1st Brigade. Due to the tactical employment of the Brigade, a forward support element was established to provide immediate response to the needs of the brigade units.

   b. Organization: B Company remained under the present modified TOE and was divided into two elements; a forward element and the base element. The forward support element consisted of 44 officers and EM and was adapted to the maintenance requirements of the brigade tactical units.

   c. Operations:
      
      (1) Maintenance: During the period 1 May - 24 July 1967, the company performed the following job order requests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BDE ELEMENT</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>REPAIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORWARD ELEMENT</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>REPAIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the end of the reporting period, B Co had the following open maintenance works requests:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Requests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVBD-EC

SUBJECT: Quarterly Operations Report

Signal
Engineer
Aircraft

(2) Tech supply continued its mission of Class VI repair parts requisitioning, stockage and issue to the brigade. Zero balance on the authorized stockage list rose to 42%. The following is the Tech Supply activities for this reporting period:

Total request received 10,606
Total ASL request received 7,484
Total lines on ASL 4,188
Total lines zero balance 1,817
Average demand fill 70%

a. The movement of repair parts request by the forward support element improved with the establishment of fixed daily flights. Parts were shipped forward on a daily basis.

b. The most significant maintenance problem encountered during the reporting period was the shortage of M-113 Pantel Sights for the M-102 Howitzer. A shortage of critical repair parts for the M-113 increased the problem.

4. Supply:

a. General: The concept of operation during the period remained substantially the same as the last report period, which was to provide control and operational supervision over all logistical operations in support of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. All classes of supply except II and IV were obtained by the FSE from the 1st Logistical Command FSA Task Force Gallagher. On 25 June 1967 the tactical situation dictated the establishment of a forward supply point at Minh Long (BS 537524). The FSP provided all classes of supply plus water. Maintenance and medical support continued to be provided from the FSE at Duc Pho. The FSP was operated by the Supply Platoon.

d. Statistics. (Short Tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>CLASS I</th>
<th>CLASS II &amp; IV</th>
<th>CLASS III</th>
<th>CLASS V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MALABUR I</td>
<td>369.1</td>
<td>241.5</td>
<td>302.3</td>
<td>754.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALHUR II &amp; LAKE</td>
<td>509.1</td>
<td>152.8</td>
<td>289.3</td>
<td>455.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>578.2</td>
<td>395.3</td>
<td>691.6</td>
<td>1209.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Confidential
AVBD-EC
SUBJECT: Quarterly Operation Report

5. Transportation.

a. During this quarter transportation was entirely by air and sea due to the extreme activity.

b. Tactical Movements: The Brigade moved from Khanh Duong to Duc Pho, by vehicle convoy from Khanh Duong to Nha Trang and by LST from Nha Trang to Duc Pho. Advance parties of the Brigade moved by CH-47 and C7A aircraft from Khanh Duong to Duc Pho. The move was made in three TF size units. On 5 May 1967 one LST departed Phan Rang for Duc Pho. Cargo consisted primarily of Class II & IV, med V, comfort items and the 880 Arm Maint Section. On 15 June 67, one LST departed Duc Pho for Phan Rang. Cargo consisted of 38 wheeled vehicles which were not needed in the Forward area.

c. USAF aircraft logistical support consisted primarily of C-123 aircraft. These aircraft were used primarily to shuttle personnel, consisting mostly of DEROS personnel and replacements, fast moving Class II & IV items, APO and PX items, and equipment between Phan Rang and the area of operations. Significant backlogs of personnel and cargo were experienced during the period 5 May, 13-15 May and again 24-25 May 67. This was due to the non-availability of aircraft which were scheduled daily but were diverted to tactical emergency and combat essential air lifts elsewhere in VI. During this period three hundred twenty (320) sorties moved five thousand four hundred sixty-seven (5467) passengers and six thousand four hundred ninety two (6492) short tons of cargo.

6. Installation Coordination:

1. General: The Brigade's responsibilities for installation coordination were discharged by Support Battalion through the Installation Coordination Center (ICC), weekly meetings with representatives of all free world military force units in the Phan Rang area and monthly friendship council meetings.

2. Security: During the period 1 May to 31 July 1967, three installation wide practice alerts were held to test the installation defense plans. On ten occasions the installation reaction forces were deployed to reinforce the perimeter against enemy attempted penetration and to cordon and search areas containing suspected enemy threats and/or activities. Flare ships were employed six times. Emergency aircraft were dispatched on five occasions to aid units in contact. In addition the ICC coordinated the B-52 activities of the 1st, 20th ROK Artillery Battery. Four Zoron "23" searchlights from Battery B 29th Artillery continued in support of the base complex. On 9-10 June 67 the ICC coordinated recovery operation of a downed B-57 via coordinates EN 875200. Units involved in the recovery were the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div Base Camp Security Company, Rcpn Co, 30th ROK Rgt, and the Air Force rescue personnel from the Phan Rang Air Base. The remains of the pilots were extracted and the ordnance destroyed.

3. Friendship Council: During this report period, two
AVBD-EC

SUBJECT: Quarterly Operation Report

friendship Council Meetings were held, one of which was hosted by the 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division. On 22 June 1967 the local VN populace honored the allied forces with International AID Day. On 9 July 1967 and again on 14 July 1967 the "Strip" was placed off limits for a period of one day on each occasion because of local disturbance among the VN civilians, PF/RF forces and ROKA forces. In addition a total of 14 bars and two ice plants in the area were placed off limits for varying times for violation of established regulations.

F. Civil Affairs:

1. During the period 1 May 67 to 31 July 67, elements of the Support Battalion located at Phan Rang concentrated its civil affairs activities in the following areas:

   a. Language training. Daily English classes were taught by a US soldier from the Support Battalion S-5 Section to the Phan Rang high school, Minh Thuan province Hospital and to the local police force and GVN officials residing in the Phan Rang Area. On post VN classes were taught to US personnel three nights a week.

   b. Hamlet sick calls. Hamlet sick calls were conducted throughout the report period. Local VN nurses and midwives were trained by working with the MEDCAP teams.

   c. Commodity distribution. Needed commodities, primarily food clothing and soap were distributed on a large scale in conjunction with hamlet sick calls. During the quarter a total of 425 pounds of soap, 3825 pounds of clothing, 150 tooth brushes, 40 tubes of tooth paste and 14,970 pounds of canned and boxed food were distributed. Miscellaneous distribution of toys, fencing material and screening material were made.

   d. Sports, coaching and entertainment. An aggressive sports and coaching program was pursued by the Support Battalion. This included the teaching of mass games, playground construction, exhibition and competition ball games and soccer games against local vietnamese personnel. Individual instructions and coaching were given in track and field events. American movies were shown on a periodic basis to over 2000 children in Phan Rang.

   e. Sanitation and hygiene. Classes in personnel sanitation and hygiene continued to receive a considerable amount of response. Twenty-nine classes were conducted for 2098 people.

   f. Construction: In the field of construction, the Support Battalion contributed considerable time, effort and material for needy projects. During the month of May 67 a six hundred gallon water tank was constructed for the 44th ARVN dependent housing area. A complete recreation center was built in Phan Rang by a combined USAF/USAF/US effort and became operational on 10 June 1967. Five pieces of playground equipment, three hundred feet of sidewalk and a large center-stage were constructed. Soldiers from the Support Battalion prepared and poured a 60
AVBD-BC

Confidential 30 July 1967

SUBJECT: Quarterly Operation Report

A square foot concrete pad in June in the Minh Thuan province hospital. The bridge at Cau Dop, Bau Son District was rebuilt as a civic action project on 24 July 1967. The construction included widening, straightening and replacing all the stringers deck and roadway on the 30.5 foot bridge. A total of 1,596 board feet of lumber was used.

2. The effect of the Support Battalion civil affairs program has been substantial. The community relations projects, such as building of recreation areas, US/VN soccer and volleyball games, cultural programs, etc., has increased the friendship and mutual respect of the VN and US soldier. The development and welfare projects, such as MEDCAP, commodity distribution, and school construction, has a high impact on the local people and visible results have been seen. The training and civic action projects are also high impact projects. Medical training along with the MEDCAP's has developed self-sufficiency in that our teams can now expand to other hamlets.

3. The prospects of the impact of continuing operations are excellent. Plans for company school sponsorship projects and a scholarship program are reaching the implementation stage and are expected to be highly beneficial. An expanded construction program to include markets and dispensaries are planned.

G. Base Camp Development.

1. General: Base Development for the 101st Airborne Division Cantonment continues to progress on a self help basis. All vertical and horizontal construction is accomplished by a work force consisting of six men from units of the Support Battalion, five men from Company A, 326 Engineer Battalion and 118 local Vietnamese. Heavy equipment support is provided by the Permanent Support Installation, Pacific Architects and Engineers. Under the supervision of the Base Camp Engineer all base construction is performed from assets, both material and personnel, organic to the rear echelon of the 101st.

2. Training: On-the-job training in carpentry work and concrete laying is given to non-engineer military supervisors and to non-skilled Vietnamese laborers.

3. Construction: During the period 1 May through 31 July 67, self help construction effort accounted for completion of two 120 foot messhalls, a 40 bed hospital, a 1200 square foot officer's club Annex, a 1200 square foot General's mess, placement of a field grade officer's trailer, two ten man 300's, a 1200 square foot Brigade PIO facility complete with water, air conditioning and power, remodeling of the female living quarters, addition of a conference room to the Support Battalion Headquarters, construction of ten troop billets, grading of the soccer field, and construction of a native rock monument in front of Brigade Headquarters. Miscellaneous work included construction of four water towers; oiling roads and dust control, area beautification of Brigade Headquarters, numerous culverts emplaced, bridge bridges painted, Officer's club gameroom constructed, sidewalk and drainage installed, construction of a shade house and eating area for the Vietnamese workers and surveys for the installation of maintenance and AES facilities.
AVD-EC 30

SUBJECT: Quarterly Operation Report

H. Activities of Base Camp Service Company (Company E (Prov) Support Battalion).

1. General. Co E (Prov) continues to generate under Brigade 60 475 with no change in mission. The following officers commanded the unit during this quarter:

   Major Carroll M Hibbs Jr       1-30 May 67
   Capt James R Bothard          31 May-29 June 67
   Major James L Massoy Jr       30 June-Present

During the period 30 June 67 to 5 July 67, Capt Thomas Deputy assumed temporary command in the absence of the Commanding Officer.

2. Security operations:

   a. A security platoon continued to provide security for the base camp and a reaction force for the Phan Rang Installation.

   b. On 22 July 67, the security platoon assumed the mission of providing security for the fresh water well site from the 1st Bn 30th ROKA Regiment.

   c. During this quarter the security platoon conducted twenty five search operations of squad size or greater.

3. Maintenance and Holding Teams:

   a. Maintenance and Holding Teams continued the maintenance and storage of equipment and personnel gear not required in the area of operations, and movement of necessary TOE equipment and supplies to the area of operations.

   b. The Installation Coordinator increased the number of security towers in the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div area of responsibility from six to ten during this period. This required an increase in the number of security personnel required. A staff study has been initiated to increase the size of the Security Platoon.

SECTION 2 (C)

Commander's Observations and Recommendations

A. General.

Support Battalion provided combat service support throughout the period with outstanding support by Qui Nhon Support Commander Forward Support Area. This was accomplished in spite of extended lines of communication between the Brigades permanent base and the area of operation.
B. Training.

During this period all personnel received familiarization firing of individual and crew served weapons. Driver training was conducted throughout the quarter. Normal OJT continued throughout the period to fill shortage MOS's.

C. Problems.

1. The major problem encountered by the Support Battalion during this quarter was in Base Development. The lack of a source of supply for materials severely hampered base development. Items such as electrical wiring and fixtures, screen wire, pipe for water lines and plumbing fixtures cannot be obtained through normal supply channels for new construction. MCA funding approved by USARV for the development of the Phan Rang Base Camp did not include these items.

2. Discussion. The supply problem for construction materials is the result of incompleted work by the Engineer Battalion assigned to build the 101st base camp, and a general cut back of MCA funds throughout RVN. Also contributing to the material shortages was the construction of facilities which were not included in the base development plan. The base development plan as approved in for austere living conditions. The longer a unit stays in camp, the more sophisticated facilities should become. Power lines, water towers, better roads and drainage systems and cooler, dirt free offices require materials to be constructed.

3. Action taken. A change to the present Base Development Plan is being prepared to be submitted to USARV for approval. This change will incorporate all unprogrammed construction projects which have been completed outside the scope of the Development Plan.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

SCOTT A. GRAVES
CPT, Inf
Adjutant
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 July 1967

CG, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

31 July 1967

670577

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310