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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II
Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1967(U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by
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accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and cor-
rective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of re-
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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure
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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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This report received at HqS, Department of the Army without indorsements. To preclude further delay in benefits gained from the lessons learned herein, this report is published without complete indorsements.
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SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) COMMAND:

   a. During the last quarter there were four major changes in
      command and staff, II FFORCEV.

      (1) On 14 May Major General Frederick C. Weyand became
          Acting Commanding General, II FFORCEV. General Weyand
          was previously the Deputy Commanding General of II FFORCEV. He
          replaced Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr. who was made
          Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army, Vietnam. On 1 July
          General Weyand was promoted to the rank of
          Lieutenant General and was appointed Commanding General, II FFORCEV.

      (2) On 1 June Major General George S. Eckhardt became the
          Deputy Commanding General, II FFORCEV. General Eckhardt was
          previously the Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division. He had
          commanded that unit since 28 September 1965.

      (3) On 15 June Mr John Vann assumed the duties of Deputy
          for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) with
          II FFORCEV. Mr Vann previously held the position of Region III Director,
          Office of Civil Operations (OCO).

      (4) On 15 June Mr Thomas S. Jones assumed the duties of
          Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS. His office at the general staff level,
          was redesignated Chief, Joint Planning Group, II FFORCEV on 1 July (Para
          1c, below). Mr Jones had been the Senior Civilian Advisor to the 33d
          Division Tactical Area (ARVN). He had held that position since December
          1966.

   b. During the reported quarter there was a major reorganization
      for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) within
      the III Corps Tactical Zone. By direction of USMACV, the organization

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and functions of HQ II FFORCEV, III Corps Advisory Group and the Office of Civil Operations (OCO), Region III have been revised to provide single manager direction of all US Civil/Military Revolutionary Development (RD) activities in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Under this concept, the Commanding General, II FFORCEV assumed single manager direction of US RD support in the III CTZ. The significant features of this new organization are outlined in a II FFORCEV letter, dated 15 June 1967 (Incl 1).

c. As a result of this reorganization for CORDS, a new section was added to the II FFORCEV General Staff on 1 July 1967. This new section is called the Joint Planning Group (JPG). A II FFORCEV publication, dated 6 July 1967 (Incl 2) explains the staff relationships, organization and functions of this section.

d. The overall assigned/attached strength of II FFORCEV decreased during this quarter. The reduction in the number of officers and enlisted men is a result of some units being over-strength in the previous quarter. A comparison at the end of the last four reporting periods follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>WARRANT OFFICER</th>
<th>ENLISTED MEN</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>31 Oct 66</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1450</td>
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<td>31 Jan 67</td>
<td>346</td>
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<td>30 Apr 67</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul 67</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. II FFORCEV Troop List, to include deployment dates and location, is shown in Inclosure 3.

f. II FFORCEV Order of Battle, to include location and the control headquarters, is shown in Inclosure 4.

g. A sketch showing the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) with major unit CP locations is shown in Inclosure 5. Inclosure 6 is a sketch of the IV CTZ.

2. (FOUO) PERSONNEL, HEALTH, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE:

a. The personnel situation within units assigned, attached or under operational control of II FFORCEV remains satisfactory. The TOE with the headquarters is organized does not provide sufficient personnel necessary to adequately accomplish the mission in a counter-insurgency environment. A MTOE has been submitted; however, until action
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is taken to approve the additional spaces requested, obtaining personnel to man the headquarters will continue to be a major problem.

b. A TAC CP was established on 10 July 1967 for test and evaluation. Inclosure 7 shows a functional TAC CP area and a list of required personnel to operate it.

c. Development of the base camp continued satisfactorily. The headquarters was transferred to commercial electric power from Long Binh Post in July 1967. A Special Services swimming pool was opened on 10 June 1967, and a water storage tank was installed to provide running water in the area. Minor construction and area improvement continued. Initial preparation was made for construction of officer BQ.

d. During the quarter, the following reductions were made in the Local National Labor Force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY OF WORKER</th>
<th>AUTH 30 APR 67</th>
<th>AUTH 31 JUL 67</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Hire</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Hire</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This reduction will reduce piaster expenditures but will impede self-help construction and area improvement.

e. The health of the command continues to be excellent.

f. Troop morale continues to be high. Activities include:

(1) Completion of a softball tournament and initiation of a volleyball league.

(2) A total of 11 USO shows visited the command during the past quarter.

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

a. One major operation was conducted by direction of this headquarters during the reporting period. The intelligence information on which this operation was based and the results have been summarized. Enemy losses listed are total losses as of the close of the operation.

Operation MANHATTAN:

(a) Intelligence aspects. The area of interest for
Operation MANHATTAN was north of the Iron Triangle between Dau Tieng (XT4947) and Ben Suc (XT5833). Operation MANHATTAN was planned as a complementary operation to CEDAR FALLS (Jan 67 – Iron Triangle), since intelligence indicated extensive VC activity in the area after friendly forces departed the CEDAR FALLS operational area. Headquarters Military Region IV, the control HQ for VC activities in and around Saigon, and 2d Gp. 83d Rear Services were active in the area. The mission was to locate and destroy elements of the headquarters of Military Region IV, GP 83, COSVN Rear Services, local units and the VC infrastructure. Prior to the initiation of the operation, intelligence collection increased, resulting in probable location of the Headquarters of Military Region IV in the vicinity bounded by coordinates XT6535, XT6536, XT6635, XT6634, and XT6434. One hundred seventy-nine suspected military installations consisting of base camps and supply caches were located or identified. As was demonstrated during Operation CEDAR FALLS and on all previous operations in the vicinity, the major enemy resistance was expected to be extensive use of mines, booby traps and snipers throughout the area; also, heavily fortified base camps and supply areas with complete tunnel and bunker systems defended intensely by small groups of VC. Deception operations were conducted by all major subordinate units involved to deny the VC forewarning of the operation. This was accomplished by strict control of reconnaissance, B-52 strikes and the pre-positioning of artillery and forward supply bases prior to the conduct of operations.

(b) Vital information was gained during the operation in the form of captured documents and interrogations of PW and ralliers. In several instances, this information led to locations of supply caches and possible headquarters installations. An example of this was 2 large weapons caches containing 369 individual weapons, 3,500 mortar rounds, and 310,000 small arms rounds, located by the 1st Div through information given by a Hoi Chanh.

(c) Results: The most important effect of Operation MANHATTAN was the destruction of one of the largest concentrated VC supply complexes located in the III CTZ. The destruction which was initiated during Operation CEDAR FALLS was continued during Operation MANHATTAN. Together, the operations included both sides of the Saigon River from the southern portion of the Iron Triangle (XT7521) north to Dau Tieng. The assault on Military Region IV Headquarters produced valuable information from captured documents, PW and Hoi Chanh concerning VC future intentions, plans and operations in the Saigon area. The destruction of Go 91 installations, bases and supplies will require the VC to divert manpower resources from combat operations in order to reconstitute logistical bases. Documents captured indicate a new VC policy concerning dispersion of supplies in an attempt to eliminate large bases in the future. This
change in VC logistical storage will increase their manpower requirements. The realization that previously safe base areas are vulnerable to Allied forces will adversely affect VC morale. VC losses as a result of this operation will possibly result in a curtailment of support by the local populace. Total enemy losses, as of 7 June 1967, for Operation MANHATTN follow:


2. Equipment Captured: 440.5 tons rice, 15 canteen covers, 1 starlight scope, 614 SA, 14 crew-served weapons, 4 .50 cal barrels, 1 M79 rd, 652 crimp c'tg, 1 grenade launcher, 3200 blasting caps, 2 civilian radios, 2 unk type radios, 1 civ walkie-talkie, 1 US EES telephone, 1 US 7A312 telephone, 1 CHICOM telephone, 2 radio headsets, 1 tape recorder, 1 lb of radio parts, 250 radio tubes, 3 mic, 1 KT178/ ARG 27 radio, 2 PRC-10 radios, 1 R26/ARN31 radio, 12.5 lb demolition, 60 cases TNT, 922 uniforms, 3 sewing machines, 1'00 time bombs, 22 claymore, 30 RPG-2 rls, 55 rolls sheet metal, 9 booby traps, 44 bicycles, 44.15 lb documents, 45 lb mail, 1 case M16 ammunition, 1 holster, 700 packages transistor. 253 mines, 7 CBU, 1091 grenades, 600 rifle grenade castings, 10 grenade castings, 2 US generators, 1 diary, 10 bottles penicillin, 2 aluminum drill presses, 1 barrel carbide, 9 outboard engines, 4 US protective masks, 6 VC protective masks, 1 soldering torch, 5 lb rivets, 12 ox carts, 3 rice milling machines, 1 blood pressure gauge, 196 lb clothing, 62.5 lb medical supplies, 1 stethoscope, 24 syringes, 3997 artillery and mortar rounds, 1600 mortar primers, 193 rounds 50 ammo, 600 ft electrical wire, 1 typewriter, 1000 plasters, 200 bolts cloth, 1 wristwatch, 3 flags, 1 compass, 637 batteries, 5640 ft communication wire, 1 ice box, 9 sampans, 2 printing presses, 20 tons of salt, 510 sheets tin, 200 ft det cord, 2.5 tons cement, 3000 cans milk, 35 blankets, and 1 rowboat.

3. Equipment Destroyed: 513.9 tons rice, 2057 lb salt, 5.4 tons sheet, 60 bags cement, 117 booby traps, 137 claymores, 1924 grenades, 2027 bunkers, 376 military structures, 111 tunnels, 64 claymore castings, 187 fuses, 14 mortar round castings, 25 grenade castings, 6 rockets, 34 bangalore torpedoes, 314 mines, 224 artillery and mortar rounds, 306 CBU, 37 bombs, 363,006 rounds small arms ammunition, 39 bicycles, 57 M79 rounds, 2369.1 lb clothes, 2780 lb dried fish, 915 ft det cord, 7000 burlap bags, 2 typewriters, 2 outboard engines, 3 anvils, 1 sledge hammer, 30 uniforms, 246 lb explosives, 130 gal POL products, 305 sheets tin, 1 lathe, 1 chalk board, 650 gal cooking oil, 25 canteens, 1 printing set, 1 generator, 7500 lb fertilizer, 500 lb carbonate, 300 lb lime, 1500 lb cement, 32-2 blasting caps, 1500 lb beans, 50 lb peanuts.
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900 cans milk, 47 sampans, 1 rice grinder, 33 RPG-2 rounds, 133 shaped charges, 32 claymore kits, 200 ft claymore wire, 1 barge, 1 ox truck, 1 truck transmission, and 20 gal wine.

b. Intelligence Collection:

(1) The II FFORGEV Intelligence Collection Plan which was published on 28 Jan 67, outlines tasks for subordinate units and the DSA, III Corps. A primary objective of the plan is the bilateral exchange of information at the lowest level. The plan stresses liaison and cooperation between US/FWNAF units (division through battalion) and advisors to corresponding ARVN/GVN organizations. All provinces have formed provincial intelligence coordination centers (PICC) in which GVN, ARVN, National Police, Para-military Forces and US/FWNAF are represented. A revision to the intelligence collection plan was published on 11 June, realigning the unit intelligence collection areas (ICA) to correspond with their tactical area of interest (TAOI). The coordination of intelligence collection efforts with ARVN and ARVN agencies has consisted also of an effort to integrate all such activities and the reaction thereto at the district level in a mechanism known as District Operations and Intelligence Coordinating Centers (DOICC). The agencies involved include the existing S2 and his intelligence and reconnaissance platoon plus the Police Special Branch, Census Grievance Program, the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit, the Revolutionary Development Program and others of the Military Services involved significantly in the particular district. Five pilot efforts are under way, one or two in each division tactical area and one in the Capital Military District. Plans call for all of the districts in the II FFORGEV area to be covered within approximately five months at a rate of about 10 per month.

(2) Coordination of Intelligence Activities: With the move of Headquarters USARV to the Long Binh area in July 1967, it was obvious that additional steps were required to ensure close coordination among intelligence agencies in the Bien Hoa - Long Binh area. The arrival of the USARV intelligence detachment (702d MIJD) brought the number of military intelligence agencies in the area to a total of nine elements reporting to five different headquarters. Since II FFORGEV is responsible for the tactical security of the entire area it was essential that a means be provided to permit the lateral dissemination of intelligence information at the lowest level to ensure its timely reporting. Within the existing command structures a central point for the exchange of information and informal coordination of operational activity is to be established at the 219th MID, II FFORGEV. This center will permit members of both the military and civilian intelligence community to exchange intelligence information and operational data for the conduct of operations with
minimum overlap and duplication. It is expected that the center will also provide a mutual support capability through pooling of assets as the operational need requires. All information developed by any of the participating agencies will be available to HQ, II PFC REV for reaction by tactical elements as appropriate.

c. Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle.

(1) Description. The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) is the supreme military/political headquarters for the VC in South Vietnam. The VC divide the territory of both North and South Vietnam into military regions. All of Military Region I, IV and the Rung Sat Special Zone (Group 10) lie inside the III CTZ. Two provinces of Military Region I, one province of Military Region VI and one province of Military Region II are also located in III CTZ. Existing boundaries are shown in Inclosure 8.

(a) Military Region I includes the VC Provinces of Tay Ninh, Thu Dau Mot and Ba Bien. Formerly known as Eastern Nambo, it is also known as T1, T1 and MR 7.

(b) Military Region IV includes the Saigon-Gia Dinh area and is also known as I4, T4, T4 and the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone.

(c) In 1966 the Rung Sat Zone was known as Military Region X or T10. However, when Quang Duc, Phuoc Long and Binh Long were organized into a new Military Region X, it was redesignated as Group 10.

(d) In October 1966, Rear Service Group 84 was reported to have organized a ceremony in Xuyen Moc District (GVN Phuoc Tuy Province) to celebrate the formation of Ba Bien Province. Ba Bien is believed to include U1, Bien Hoa, Ba Ria, Long Khanh and a portion of War Zone "D".

(2) Significant Order of Battle Developments.

(a) It appears that the 84A NVA Artillery Regiment has been subordinated to the 69th Artillery Regiment, thus upgrading the 69th to an artillery command. The 69th Artillery Command is the artillery command for COSVN; therefore, it coordinates the artillery fire support to the VC/NVA infantry elements subordinate to COSVN. A letter captured on 6 April 1967 (via P-54650) by elements of the 25th US Infantry Division contained a request for assistance in locating a VC deserter. The letter was from the CO of Unit 724 (Infiltration number of 84A Artillery Regiment). The heading of the letter indicates that this unit is subordinate to the 69th Artillery Regiment.
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(b) Documents captured during Operation JUNCTION CITY indicate the existence of a 48th Transportation Battalion subordinate to COSVN. It is operating in Tay Ninh Province. The battalion consists of 235 men and is equipped with oxcarts, pack bicycles and has access to trucks. An expenditure estimate for 1967 cited expenditures in both SVN Piasters and Cambodian Riels which indicates that the unit conducts transportation across the border from Cambodia to South Vietnam.

(c) A personal notebook that belonged to an unidentified cadre member was captured in Phuoc Long Province by an ARVN unit. The notebook contained entries during the period 22 October to 7 December 1966 concerning VC efforts and techniques to be employed in gaining control of the population in contested areas primarily in Binh Long, Phuoc Long and Quang Duc Provinces. To accomplish this mission, Military Region T-10 was formed. It consisted of Binh Long, Phuoc Long and Quang Duc Provinces. The 7th NVA Division was assigned to this military region. The mission of Military Region 10 is to establish the largest and safest base area for the SVN Revolution, safeguard communication routes between SVN and NVN by insuring security in the Vietnamese and Cambodian border areas and to expand guerrilla warfare in the GVN Land Development Areas. The new military region is also known as the Southwestern Highlands Military Region.

(d) The existence of the 50th Training Battalion of the 5th VC Division has been confirmed in the III CTZ. According to rallier Nguyen Son Hai, Group 50 Training School (50th Training Battalion) was first formed around February 1964, and has been in operation sporadically since then. The mission of the school is to train squad leaders to become platoon leaders or assistant platoon leaders. The students of the school are made up entirely of personnel from the 5th VC Division and cadre of Ba Bien Province. The course is three months in duration and is designed to improve the students' ability to apply combat techniques to certain situations such as attacks upon a stronghold, ambushes and raids. The battalion is believed to be presently located in the May Tao Mountain area of Phuoc Tuy Province.

(e) The 24th VC AA Battalion of the 9th VC Division was formerly carried as a possible unit and subsequently dropped by OB holdings because of the confirmation of a 24th VC AA Battalion in the 5th VC Division; however, it has since been picked up again as a probable unit in the III CTZ. Detailed analysis of captured documents indicates that there are probably two units in existence with the designation 24th AA Battalion in this Corps area.

(f) Based on rallier reports, PW reports and numerous agent reports, it is believed that the 5th VC Division may possibly be
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forming a third regiment composed almost entirely of NVA personnel. The
unit designation and location are unknown. One report places the regiment
in War Zone *D* and another places the unit, at least in part, in north-
eastern Phuoc Tuy Province. It may be that advance elements of the
regiment are in Phuoc Tuy preparing for the arrival of the main body.
The combat effectiveness of the new unit is unknown. At present, the
ralliers claim that the new regiment is non-operational, and the possibility
exists that the personnel of the new unit will be absorbed by the other
two regiments of the 5th Division as replacements.

(g) Three company-sized units of Military Region IV have
been dropped from order of battle holdings for lack of evidence of their
continued existence. The units are the G-600 Company of Thu Duc District,
the C21 Company of Cu Chi District and the C22 Company of Binh Tan District.
The combined strength of the units was estimated to be 230 men. None of
the units have been identified in contact since II FFORCERV Headquarters
has been in Vietnam.

(h) Various sources indicate that a simplification of
the command structure may have taken place in Military Region II. A
document captured on 17 May 1967 by the 25th US Infantry Division in
Hau Nghia Province, published by Military Region II Headquarters, was
addressed to the 261st Battalion, 263d Battalion, 269th Battalion and to
Doc Chien I (aka Dong Thap I). There was no reference to Dong Thap II
Regiment which was considered to be the parent organization of the 267th
and 268th Battalions. Analysis of the movements of these battalions reflects
an independence with respect to one another and reveals no particular co-
ordination between them as might be expected if they were actually grouped
into regimental formations. Reports and correspondence apparently flow
directly from battalion to military region with no intervening head-
quarters. It is doubtful that the Dong Thap II Regiment now exists as
an identifiable unit.

(3) Recapitulation.

(a) The VC provinces in III CTZ control 37 local force
companies and 26 local force platoons.

(b) Within the III CTZ there are six local force
battalions subordinate to the six districts of Military Region IV and
six confirmed local force battalions subordinate to the provinces of
Military Regions I and II:
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**Local Force Bn**

<table>
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<th>2d Bn</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Go Mon District/MR IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn</td>
<td>Di An District/MR IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn</td>
<td>Thu Duc District/MR IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn</td>
<td>Nha Be District/MR IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn</td>
<td>Binh Tan District/MR IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn</td>
<td>Cu Chi District/MR IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D445 Bn</td>
<td>Ba Bien Province/MR I (GVN Phuoc Tuy Province)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Independent Bn</td>
<td>Long An Province/MR II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506th Bn</td>
<td>Long An Province/MR II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Guard Bn</td>
<td>Tay Ninh Province/MR I</td>
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<tr>
<td>14th Bn</td>
<td>Tay Ninh Province/MR I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phu Loi Bn</td>
<td>Thu Dau Mot Province/MR I (GVN Binh Duong Province)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(c) There are nine VC main force battalions, five VC main force regiments and one VC command operating in the III CTZ:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC Main Force Unit</th>
<th>Subordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dong Nai Bn</td>
<td>MR I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267th Bn</td>
<td>MR II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>269th Bn</td>
<td>MR II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn</td>
<td>MR IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Artillery Bn</td>
<td>MR IV</td>
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<tr>
<td>010 Sapper Bn</td>
<td>MR IV</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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1st Guard Bn
46th Recon Bn
1st Bn/66th Base Security Regt
271st Regt
272d Regt
273d Regt
274th Regt
275th Regt
69th Artillery Command

(d) There is one NVA battalion and three NVA regiments operating in the III CTZ:

NVA Unit                  Subordination
725th Sniper Bn            COSVN
165th Regt                 7th Div
141st Regt                 7th Div
101st Regt                 7th Div

(e) See Inclosure 9 for a sketch map of enemy unit locations in III CTZ as of 31 July.

(f) There are seven VC local force battalions and four VC main force battalions in the 9th US Infantry Division's current area of operations in the IV CTZ:

VC Unit                  Subordination
501st LF Bn               Vinh Binh Province/NR III
502d LF Bn                 Kien Phong Province/NR II
504th LF Bn                Kien Tuong Province/NR II

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September 1967

VC Unit

D509th LF Bn
514th LF Bn
516th LF Bn
D857th LF Bn
261st MF Bn
263d MF Bn
306th MF Bn
518th MF Bn

Vinh Binh Province/MR III
Dinh Tuong Province/MR II
Kien Hoa Province/MR II
Vinh Long Province/MR III
Dong Thap 1 Regt/MR II
Dong Thap 1 Regt/MR II
MR II
MR II

(g) See Inclosure 10 for a sketch map of enemy unit locations in IV CTZ as of 31 July.

(4) Summary of Recent Activities:

(a) During this reporting period, the VC/NVA units subordinate to COSVN in the III CTZ began their "Monsoon Offensive" against FWMAF installations and troop concentrations. The offensive was delayed because of increased friendly patrolling, H and I fires and air strikes.

(b) The 5th VC Div has split its forces. It has sent the 2d and 3d Bn of the 275th Regt to War Zone "D" for reindoctrination and refitting. The 1st Bn of the 275th Regt has been left with the Div HQ elements but is under the operational control of the 274th Regt in the Phuoc Tuy Province. The two battalions of the 275th Regt have been delayed from rejoining the rest of the division by recent combat losses in War Zone "D" and by the presence of a concentration of Allied forces conducting Operation PADDINGTON in eastern Phuoc Tuy Province. Operation FAIRFAX has effectively eliminated the division's traditional base area in the Hat Dinh area. With its present disposition the 5th VC Div poses a threat to US/GVN installations in southern Long Khanh Province, eastern Bien Hoa Province and Phuoc Tuy Province.

(c) The exact disposition of the 7th NVA Div is unknown at the present time. The division moved into War Zone "C" in May, and continued to secure the area through June and July. This allowed the
9th VC Div to move its area of operation to Binh Long, Thu Dau Mot and Bien Hoa Provinces. However, on 11 July, the 141st Regt, supported by the 52d VC Arty Bn, attacked the 2d Bde, 9th Div (ARVN) in Binh Long Province (XT793888). The attack was poorly conceived and conducted. This was probably the result of relative inexperience of the regiment, and it proved to be quite costly. The VC losses were 144 KIA, and 10 VCC. The operation indicates that the 7th NVA Div may be shifting some of its maneuver forces into the Binh Long Province area. The 101st Regt and the 165th Regt have continued to secure War Zone "C", and by their presence pose a threat to Special Forces and CIDG elements in the area.

(d) The 9th VC Div is in an offensive posture to launch multi-regimental operations with 122mm rocket support from the 84A Arty Regt, 69th VC Arty Command. On 12 May, the 273d Regt used its organic mortars and recoilless rifles to provide security for elements of the 84A Arty Regt while they attacked the Bien Hoa Airbase. On 27 and 29 July, the 9th VC Div conducted six rocket and mortar attacks against US/GVN installations in Thu Dau Mot Province. Rocket attacks occurred at Phu Loi and Phuoc Vinh. The elements of the division believed to have been involved are the 271st and 273d Regiments. It is probable that the prime target of the 9th VC Div was the Bien Hoa - Long Binh Complex with secondary targets of Phu Loi, Phuoc Vinh, Lai Khe, Tan Uyen and the 4/fth ARVN Compound (XT805191) in Thu Dau Mot Province. When the imminence of the attack became apparent in the latter part of July and friendly defensive measures were taken, the VC division concentrated on its secondary targets. All of the attacks conducted by the 9th VC Div and coordinated with the 84A Arty Regt were characterized by a high degree of coordination and reconnaissance in depth. The 9th VC Div is the oldest in the Corps area, and its regiments have had more combat experience than the other main force units in the III CTZ. With the addition of the rocket capability provided by the 84A Arty Regt, the 9th VC Div is possibly the most potent COSVN maneuver force.

(e) During this reporting period, the battalions of Military Region IV have remained in a relatively defensive posture. The nine battalions subordinate to that military region now possess the capability for only limited offensive operations against FWHAF installations and troop concentrations due to increased combat losses and the lack of available local recruitment caused by increasing GVN rural pacification.

(f) Tactics:

(a) An enemy document captured during Operation JUNCTION CITY stated that larger scale attacks would be conducted during 1967 than
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in the previous year. Heavy losses sustained by VC main force units during
operations JUNCTION CITY and ATTLEBORO limited their activities to refitting
and training during most of June and early July. However, recent attacks
conducted by elements of the 5th VC Div, 7th NVA Div and 9th VC Div in Binh
Long, Thu Dau Mot and Ba Bien indicate that the VC still intend to mount
regimental-sized attacks in the coming months.

(b) A document dated 10 Apr 67, states that the enemy
intends to implement "The Four-Front Attack" plan in the III CTZ. This
plan consists of political attack, using the enemy to destroy the enemy,
increasing proselytizing activities among enemy troops and civil servants
and intensifying military attacks. This gives credence to the belief that
the VC regard 1967 as the year of "The Grand Offensive."

(c) For other tactical trends of the enemy see Inclosure 11.

d. VC Battle Losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>May 67</th>
<th>VC KIA</th>
<th>VC KIA</th>
<th>DETAIL-</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>HV</th>
<th>WPNS</th>
<th>TD AMMO</th>
<th>MD</th>
<th>DEST</th>
<th>RICE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(BO)</td>
<td>(POS)</td>
<td>PW</td>
<td>DEERE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>551,395</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>655.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 67</td>
<td>1,660</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1,397</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43,706</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>168.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 67</td>
<td>1,333</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>3,232</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39,542</td>
<td>561</td>
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<tr>
<td>4,215</td>
<td>1,722</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>5,284</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>58</td>
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<td>1,815</td>
<td>2,960</td>
<td>261.20</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The actual strength of main force units cannot be equated to battle-field
losses because of two variables. Normally, supporting and local force
units accompany main force units into battle, and the dead cannot be
sorted according to unit. Secondly, there is a variation in the time re-
quired for a unit to recoup its losses, and this time is steadily decreasing.
Previously, replacements were locally recruited and untrained. Recently,
trained infiltrators are providing an increasing percentage of the
replacement pool. Therefore, the time required for a unit to become combat
effective after suffering severe losses and receiving replacements is
steadily decreasing. VC losses merely reflect a loss in manpower assets,
but they are not an accurate measure of unit strength for a given unit at a specific time.

e. Enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities and relative probability of adoption at the end of the quarter.

(1) Capabilities:

(a) Attack:

1. The enemy is capable of attacking in Tay Ninh Province with elements of the 101st and 165th NVA Regiments, the 267th and 269th VC Battalions supported by elements of the 69th VC Artillery Command and local forces.

2. The enemy is capable of attacking in Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces with elements of the 272d VC Regiment and the 141st NVA Regiment.

3. The enemy is capable of attacking in Ba Rịa Province with elements of the 5th VC Division supported by the Dong Nai Battalion and local forces.

4. The enemy is capable of attacking in Thu Dau Mot Province with the 271st and 273d VC Regiments, elements of Military Region IV and the Phu Loi Battalion. They can be supported by elements of the 69th VC Artillery Command.

5. The enemy is capable of attacking in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area with three main force and six local force battalions subordinate to Military Region IV and provincial districts respectively.

6. The enemy is capable of attacking in Long An Province with the 267th and 269th Battalions, two local force battalions and elements of Military Region IV.

7. The enemy is capable of attacking in the 9th US Infantry Division's area of operations in IV CTZ with elements of the Dong Thap I Regiment, two main force and seven local force battalions.

(b) Defend:

1. The enemy can defend in the Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Thu Dau Mot Provinces with the 7th NVA and 9th VC Divisions, elements of the 69th VC Artillery Command and guard units subordinate to COSVN.
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2. The enemy can defend in War Zone "D" with elements of the 9th VC Division, elements of the 275th VC Regiment and elements of the 69th Artillery Command.

(a) Reinforce: The enemy can reinforce with three main force battalions from II CTZ and three main force battalions from IV CTZ. Additional reinforcements are available from B525 Training and Replacement Division located to the north of War Zone "C" in Cambodia.

(2) Relative Probability of Adoption:

(a) 5th VC Division:

1. Attack friendly units and installations in Ba Bien Province.

2. Defend safe areas in the May Tao area of Ba Bien and Binh Thuan Provinces.

3. Reinforce with the Dong Nai Battalion and local force units.

4. Interdict National Highways 1 and 20, and Interprovincial Highway 2.

5. Relocate elements of the 275th Regiment from War Zone "D" to Ba Bien Province.

(b) 7th NVA Division:


2. Defend base areas in War Zone "C" and the "Fish Hook" area.

3. Reinforce with elements of the 9th VC Division, local force units and possibly the B525 Replacement and Training Division.

4. Interdict National Highway 13, Interprovincial Highway 13 and possibly Interprovincial Highway 1A.

5. Relocate on a permanent basis from War Zone "C" to Binh Long Province and possibly to Phuoc Long Province.
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(c) 9th VC Division:


2. Defend base areas in northeastern Thu Dau Mot Province and throughout western War Zone "D".

3. Reinforce with elements of the 69th VC Artillery Command, local force units and possibly with elements of the 5th Division. Reinforce the 272d Regiment with elements of the 7th NVA Division.


5. Relocate the 272d Regiment to Phuoc Long Province and possibly south into War Zone "D".

(d) Local Force and Guerrillas:

1. Attack any weakly or ineptly defended hamlet, village or post at any time.

2. Harass ARVN, PF/RP and US units and installations with small arms and mortar fire at any time.

3. Interdict all National and Interprovincial Highways in their respective provinces and military regions throughout III CTZ.

4. Terrorize Rural Development cadre, hamlet and district officials and civilians in contested and friendly areas.

5. Defend base areas and caches in their respective areas of operation.

6. Disperse in the face of friendly operations.

7. Withdraw by assuming the cover of a legitimate citizen.

8. Reinforce by conscription of civilian labor.

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4. (C) OPERATIONS, PLANS AND TRAINING:

a. During the quarter, 43 military operations (battalion size or larger) were conducted against the Viet Cong in the II FFORCEV zone of operations by units under the control of this headquarters. The zone is defined as the III CTZ, Gia Dinh Province, Rung Sat Special Zone and operational areas in the IV CTZ as directed by COMUSMACV.

b. Analysis and Evaluation:

(1) During the past three months significant losses were inflicted on the enemy in terms of weapons, food and supplies captured and destroyed. In addition, extensive jungle clearing operations such as those conducted during Operations MANHATTAN, EMPORIA and LAM SON 67 will assist friendly elements in denying the Viet Cong his accustomed sanctuaries close to sources of food and supplies. The clearing of trails through the jungle and the opening of long closed highways will facilitate the conduct of future operations. A number of Viet Cong base areas were neutralized to the extent that they are no longer safe for the enemy.

(2) Pressure was maintained against the Viet Cong south of Saigon as the 9th Infantry Division in conjunction with the US Navy and RVNAF deployed the Mobile Riverine Force in its first major counter-insurgency operation, CORONADO. This operation resulted in significant enemy losses and served to increase GVN control and influence.

(3) Increased emphasis was placed on military support of the Revolutionary Development program. Greater cooperation and coordination between US/FWMA forces with ARVN, CIDG, Regional and Popular forces led to an increase in the number of successful BUDDY type operations.

(4) The enemy continues to mount sporadic mortar and rocket attacks on friendly bases and installations. This capability has necessitated careful evaluation of base camp security measures, intensification of intelligence collection efforts, improvement of early warning systems and general streamlining of reaction procedures.

(5) Development of Tactical Areas of Interest (TAOI).

(a) The VC/NVA current tactics reflect an increasing trend of attacks on Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF) camps, Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) camps and Revolutionary Development (RD) areas as a means of achieving both tactical and psychological victories. The willingness of the VC/NVA to attack small outposts regardless of proximity of available US/FWMA resources underlined their
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recognition of the delay involved in accomplishing coordination between
US/FWMAF and Vietnamese elements.

(b) It was imperative that a plan be developed to counter-
act these attacks. CG, II FFORCEN directed that a concept be developed
assigning areas of interest to subordinate tactical units. The concept was
established and boundaries were developed.

(c) Under this concept, the III CTZ has been divided into
TAOI and each area has been assigned to the senior US/FWMAF commander in
that area. A TAOI is defined as the area, including but not necessarily
limited to the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR), in which the design-
nated US/FWMAF commander is knowledgeable of the location, activities and
operation of all GVN forces and installations, CIDC camps and RD teams in
order to achieve by mutual cooperation and coordination the maximum effect
of the combined friendly forces and fire power. The TAOI differs from
the TAOR in that the US/FWMAF commander is not charged with primary tacti-
cal responsibility nor is he expected to conduct tactical operations on a
continuing basis in this area.

(d) The intent of this plan is to encourge maximum co-
operation and mutual support in order to counter any VC/NVA exploitation
of a lack of communications and coordination between GVN and US/FWMAF forces.

(e) Operation MANHATTAN, a multidivision search and destroy opera-
tion initiated by II FFORCEN in Binh Duong and Tay Ninh Provinces on 23
April, continued into this quarter. The area of operations included the
Boi Loi Woods and the area east of the Saigon River between Dau Tieng and
Ben Cuc. The operation started with a coordinated airmobile and ground assau-
lt by the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions. The 1st Division attacked with
its 3rd Brigade and the 13th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) which was under
operational control of the division. The 25th Infantry Division task organ-
ization consisted of its 1st and 2d Brigades and 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division attached. The US forces were supported by the 34th ARVN Ranger
Battalion and the 30th River Assault Group (RAG) (VNN). The 25th Infan-
try Division attached from the west into the Boi Loi Woods toward the
western approaches to the Saigon River. Concurrently, the 1st Infantry
Division attacked from the east toward the eastern approaches of the
river. During the following days, both units conducted numerous search
and destroy operations. Contacts with the Viet Cong were sporadic and
usually involved only small groups of the enemy. As expected, the enemy
made extensive use of mines and booby traps, causing several friendly
casualties. Both divisions searched meticulously, uncovering increasingly
large amounts of supplies. During one of these search operations the
2d Battalion, 16th Infantry discovered the largest weapons cache found
in III CTZ to date. Located inside a concrete lined warehouse, guarded by a double ring of claymore mines, the unit found 369 individual weapons, 3,500 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition and over 300,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. Numerous bunkers and tunnels were located and destroyed; some of them exceptionally well constructed with 16 inch reinforced concrete walls and roofs supported by steel beams. The II FFORCEV units continued their drive toward the Saigon River locating and destroying small groups of the enemy. The 25th Infantry Division pushed steadily toward the northeast bank of the Saigon River while the 1st Infantry Division and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) closed in from the opposite side in an effort to make the Viet Cong stand and fight. In the third week of MANHATTAN, elements of the 25th Infantry Division boarded the boats of the 30th RAG (VNN) and conducted sweeps up and down the Saigon River as the enemy was forced towards its banks by the pincer movements of the two divisions. The river was a prime enemy supply route through the Bo Loi and Ho Bo Woods into Saigon. The RAG force landed and conducted thorough searches of those areas that had signs of Viet Cong activity. Equipped with weapons that ranged from .30 caliber machineguns to 40mm cannon, the RAG boats proved to be effective for this type of operation. As the operation progressed, the number of participating units was reduced gradually until on 12 May control of MANHATTAN was passed to the 25th Infantry Division. Engineer elements continued extensive land clearing projects and the destruction of hundreds of bunkers, tunnels and Viet Cong installations that had been located. In essence, MANHATTAN became a security operation for the engineer projects being conducted. This operation terminated on 7 June.

d. Other Special Operations:

(1) Phase III of Operation JUNCTION CITY terminated on 14 May 1967 bringing to a close the largest military offensive operation, to date, of the Vietnamese war. During the reporting period the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division, operated as a mobile brigade force throughout the lower half of War Zone C. The presence of this force afforded a degree of protection for the completion of the CIDG Camp at Prek Klok. The camp, however, has been subjected to mortar attacks. There was no major engagement during the reporting period as contact with the enemy remained very light and sporadic. Upon the termination of the operation significant enemy losses included 2728 VC KIA, 34 PW, 137 ralliers, the capture and evacuation of 491 individual weapons and 95 crew served weapons.

(2) Operation BILLINGS was initiated by the 1st Infantry Division on 12 June 1967 as the result of intelligence received which indicated the presence of the 271st Viet Cong Regiment in an area of heavy jungle approximately 64 kilometers northeast of Saigon. This search and destroy
operation had a twofold purpose: to locate and destroy the 271st Viet Cong Regiment and to search the area north of Phuoc Vinh to destroy enemy forces and installations threatening the security of Phuoc Vinh. The general area of operations extended from Phuoc Vinh north to Don Luan and from three kilometers west of the Song Be River east to the Rach Rat and Suoi Hur Rivers. During the operation, the 1st Infantry Division employed two brigade headquarters, eight infantry battalions and one cavalry squadron. BILLINGS was highlighted by the battle of Kom Bo. Shortly after noon on 17 June, A and B Companies, 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry and B Company, 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry were attacked by an unknown size enemy force approximately five kilometers southwest of Chi Linh. Friendly elements were supported by air strikes and artillery throughout the afternoon. The enemy was able to concentrate maximum fire on only two points of the perimeter and did not penetrate the US defense. Contact was broken at 1710 hours after which a search of the battlefield revealed a total of 196 enemy dead plus another 26 bodies found in the surrounding jungle. Upon termination of Operation BILLINGS on 26 June 1967, significant enemy losses included 347 killed in action, two detainees, four individual and four crew served weapons and the destruction of 338 bunkers. Landing zones in the area were improved, Interprovincial Highway 1A north of Phuoc Vinh was upgraded and construction was begun to upgrade the airfields at Dong Xoai and Chi Linh from C-130 (Type I) to C-130 (Type II) capability. Cumulative US losses were 45 killed and 201 wounded in action.

(3) Operation ENTERPRISE, begun in February of this year, was continued by the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division in eastern Long An province. Constant pressure was maintained on Viet Cong forces through numerous BUDDY operations with ARVN, Provincial Reconnaissance Units and RF/PF elements. Night activity was increased during the quarter and night airmobile insertions were conducted with a view towards further limiting enemy activities in the period when the Viet Cong has been most active. Although enemy forces in the area avoided major engagement with friendly troops during the reporting period, there were frequent small contacts. Viet Cong attempts to attack RF/PF outposts were thwarted by the use of rapid reaction forces and supporting artillery. Increasing cooperation from the local population was indicative of the acceptance of government influence and progress in the Revolutionary Development Program. Significant cumulative enemy losses to date include 1158 killed in action, 177 detainees and 32 ralliers. Cumulative US losses are 151 killed in action and 627 wounded. Operation ENTERPRISE continues.

(4) Operation CORONADO was initiated by the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, as part of the Mobile Riverine Force, on 1 June 1967. Counterinsurgency operations were conducted on Thoi Son Island (in the My
Tho River opposite Dong Tam) and in the Cam Son Secret Zone (approximately 20 kilometers west of Dong Tam). Although initial operations produced only minor contacts, the Mobile Riverine Force further developed techniques of riverine warfare and melded operational procedures of the 2d Brigade and US Navy Combined Task Force 117 into a highly maneuverable and potent fighting force. A phase of riverine operations beginning on 19 June marked the first major action involving the entire assets of the Mobile Riverine Force. In response to intelligence of continuous enemy presence in Long An Province, the Mobile Riverine Force, in conjunction with elements of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, conducted a riverine assault into eastern Long An Province. The Mobile Riverine Force landed two infantry battalions while the 3d Brigade provided blocking forces. On the first day of the action, a strong enemy force was engaged. Employing all available fire power, friendly forces killed 256 Viet Cong. Intelligence from the battle area indicated that the 5th Viet Cong Battalion (Nha Be District) was conducting training activities at the time of the engagement. The Mobile Riverine Force promised to revolutionize Mekong Delta warfare with its ability to strike at will against Viet Cong sanctuaries in waterways which were previously untouched. Mobile Riverine Force actions designed to destroy Viet Cong forces, installations and equipment were initiated in coordination and cooperation with the 3d VNMC Battalion, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 46th Infantry (ARVN) and the US Navy Combined Task Force 117. Throughout July Viet Cong elements appeared reluctant to move in large groups during daylight hours. Viet Cong operations were reduced sharply in number in northern Co Cong and eastern Long An Provinces. Although frequent throughout the month, contacts usually involved only small groups of enemy. Constant pursuit by the Mobile Riverine Force appeared to wear down the enemy and further lower his morale as evidenced by the 75 ralliers to allied forces. Upon termination of Operation CORONADO on 25 July, significant cumulative enemy losses included 478 killed, 75 ralliers, 52 individual and 5 crew served weapons.

(5) Operation CORONADO II was initiated on 27 July as a result of hard intelligence indicating an enemy build up west of My Tho in Dinh Tuong Province, IV CTZ. During the period 20-26 July 1967, Route 4 west of My Tho was interdicted by the Viet Cong at eleven separate points. The road was repaired quickly by the 9th Infantry Division; however, on 21 July, intelligence information indicated that this extensive enemy activity was not only in furtherance of psychological and economic objectives but was related to an enemy force build-up in the area as a prelude to battalion or regimental size operations to be conducted in August. Elements of the ARVN 7th Division, IV CTZ, began search and destroy operations on 26 July in a wide area north of Route 4 and approximately 12 kilometers northwest of My Tho. The decision was made to conduct a
coordinated operation into the area south of Route 4 using the 9th Infantry Division (two battalions of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF)) and the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry (Mechanized) to verify the suspected enemy deployments. Concurrently, plans were made to react with mass and speed to any confirmed enemy presence of a battalion size or larger forces. The Commanding General, III CTZ provided a Marine Task Force of two battalions with artillery. The 1st Brigade (-), 25th Division with accompanying artillery was alerted as was the necessary helicopter lift. On 28 July, the MRF and 5th Battalion 60th Infantry (Mechanized) began search operations. Initial contact was made with a battalion size element in the Cam Son Secret Zone approximately 29 kilometers west of My Tho late on 29 July and subsequent intelligence indicated the main enemy force had exfiltrated east. Early on 30 July, the VN Marine Task Force was committed approximately 23 kilometers west of My Tho in accordance with the VN Marine Commander's estimate of where the Viet Cong would locate. The 3d VNNC Battalion established contact in their landing zone and remained heavily engaged for the next 48 hours. The 1st Brigade (-), 25th Infantry Division was committed to blocking positions approximately six kilometers east of the VNNC Task Force. The VN Marines were opposed by the Viet Cong 263 Battalion located in prepared defensive positions. This was the heaviest contact in CORONADO II and accounted for the majority of the enemy losses. The deputy commander of the Viet Cong 263 Battalion was captured trying to escape from the area by MRF elements and reported that his commander was killed. Significant cumulative enemy losses were 641 killed in action, 177 captured, 111 rallier and 603 detainees. US losses were 10 killed in action and 65 wounded (includes 31 USN wounded). RVNAF losses were 61 killed in action and 220 wounded. Operation CORONADO II terminates on 3 August.

(6) Operation PADDINGTON was initiated on 10 July in Phuoc Tuy Province to open a jungle area used by the enemy as a location for logistical and other bases. This was a combined operation which employed the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division; the 1st Australian Task Force; the 2d and 3d VNNC Battalions and the 2d Battalion, 43d Infantry (ARVN). The forces participating in the operation succeeded in finding and destroying extensive Viet Cong base complexes including base camps varying from company to regimental size, training facilities, one large hospital and assorted stores. The Viet Cong tended to avoid decisive contact and normally withdrew at the approach of allied forces. There was one major engagement during the operation in which the 3d VNNC Battalion made contact with one battalion of the 274th Viet Cong Regiment approximately 13 kilometers northeast of Xuyen Moa. The battle lasted approximately six hours during which the marines, supported by air strikes, artillery and gunships, advanced against the well emplaced enemy. The marines, in the face of automatic weapons,
small arms, recoilless rifles and grenades, inflicted losses of 40 Viet Cong killed before the enemy withdrew. Total enemy losses for the operation, which terminated on 16 July, were 92 killed in action and 13 individual weapons captured. A series of new, mutually supporting fire support patrol bases and helicopter landing zones were opened which will facilitate future operations. Extensive bridging, road repair and jungle clearing along Routes 23, 327, 328 and 329 and a six-week follow-up program of air, artillery and nontoxic chemical strikes will continue to deny the Viet Cong forward bases which he has had under development for some time and on which much of his offensive capability is based.

(7) Operation FAIRFAX is a continuing operation of combined US/ARVN units to counter Viet Cong efforts to reestablish his influence in the areas surrounding Saigon. Conducted by the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) in conjunction with elements of the 5th Ranger Group (ARVN), the operation has disrupted Viet Cong activity in Gia Dinh Province and the Capital Military District. The constant and routine use of combined ARVN and US forces to conduct operations highlights the quarter's activities. Each infantry battalion of the brigade has been teamed with a Ranger battalion. Through numerous BUDDY cordon and search, search and destroy operations, aggressive small unit patrols and ambushes, the combined units have restricted Viet Cong movement in the area. This area, a prime supply route, with its many canals and trails, had been used without fear by the enemy. During the reporting period the brigade has been increasing steadily the number of night ambushes with an average of 77.6 ambushes per night by the end of the quarter. This has resulted in a cumulative of 891 Viet Cong killed, 39 ralliers and 2,078 detained.

e. Force Structure and Training. The following significant activities occurred during the period:

(1) Force Structure.

(a) The 173d Airborne Brigade deployed on 25 May to II CTZ and is now under operational control of I FFORCEV.

(b) The following additional forces deployed to II FFORCEV during the period:

1. The 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery (105T) and the 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery (105T) were attached to the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, respectively, in May.
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2. The 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery (8/175SP) was attached to the 54th Artillery Group in June.

(2) Training.

(a) Regional Force Company Training Team (REFCOTT): The 1st Infantry Division began training of the newly formed 969th RF Company on 10 July 1967. The REFCOTT will conduct 17 weeks of basic and advanced training at the 5th ARVN Division training center (Phu Vam). Upon completion of formal training the REFCOTT will return with the RF Company to its home station (Xoc Xiem) near Quan Lio for additional in-place training. Completion date is 1st Quarter, FY 68 or as soon as the company is able to operate alone.

(b) Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT): CG requested 53 advisory teams for RF/PF in support of RD. As a stop-gap measure pending arrival of additional advisors, US Divisions/199th Infantry Brigade fielded 10 Mobile Advisory Teams to eight provinces considered critical to the RD effort. Teams are composed of two officers and three NCO’s with one ARVN interpreter. Teams are OPCON to province advisors and are assisting RF/PF and RD cadre in operations and security missions.

(c) 199th Infantry Brigade Training of the 55th Regional Force Battalion: The 199th Infantry Brigade is providing a four week training program to each of the four RF Companies (some training conducted concurrently). Training began 10 July and should be completed by 1 September. Each company receives one week of basic training, two weeks of buddy operations, and one week of indoctrination and review.

(3) RECONDO School: II FFORCEV continues to send 32 students every two weeks to the three week training course at Nha Trang.

f. Communications Activities:

(1) Communications activities were routine for the period except the Corps tactical systems continued to provide a number of circuits that would normally be provided by the army area communications systems.

(2) A TOC Communications Center was established at the II FFORCEV TOC with secure TTY circuits to each division. These secure circuits provide the operational and intelligence personnel with a rapid, reliable, secure communications system to coordinate combat operations.
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A simple method of handling messages for this system was developed to provide rapid service. A standard DA TELECON form was utilized and reproduced which allows minimal administrative processing of TOC messages. This system has already caused a reduction in the number of security violations by TOC personnel.

5. (C) TRANSPORTATION:

a. During the reported quarter, resupply movements were conducted primarily by highway transportation. A notable exception to this method was the continuous air LOC to 1st Div and II FFORCEV Arty units located at Quan Loi and Phuoc Vinh. Five sorties a day were used to supply the units at both locations.

b. An additional 80 sorties were flown to supply 1st Div units at Chi Linh and Dong Xai while these units were engaged in Operation BILLINGS.

c. Status of Primary Land LOC's as of 31 July.

(1) For the purpose of this report, the following terms on condition of land LOC's are defined.

(a) Condition I: The route is capable of carrying up to Class 50 loads (all division loads).

(b) Condition II: Up to Class 35 loads (the majority of logistical transport e.g., 5000 gallon POL tankers).

(c) Condition III: Up to Class 16 loads (Armored Personnel Carriers and 21 ton trucks).

(d) Condition IV: Can carry only light civilian traffic; therefore, it is open only to light reconnaissance vehicles.

(e) Condition V: Closed to all traffic.

(2) Route QL-1.

(a) Cambodian Border (XT242244) to Go Dau Ha (XT382250), lowest bridge capacity, Class 12, route condition III.

(b) Go Dau Ha (XT382250) to Cu Chi (XT628126), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.
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(c) Cu Chi (XT628126) to Saigon (XT793942), lowest bridge capacity, Class 60, route condition I.

(d) Saigon (XT793942) to RJ 316 (YT072130), lowest bridge capacity, Class 40, route condition II.

(e) RJ 316 (YT072130) to (YT697026), lowest bridge capacity, Class 45, route condition II.

(f) YT697026 to III CTZ Boundary (ZT180014), bridge destroyed, route condition V.

(3) Route QL-4.

(a) RJ QL-1 (XS845914) to (XS423490), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(b) XS423490 to Tien Giang River (XS935357), lowest bridge capacity, Class 15, route condition III.

(i) Route QL-13.

(a) RJ QL-1 (XS879971) to Hon Quan (XT755885), lowest bridge capacity, Class 40, route condition I.

(b) Hon Quan (XT755885) to Cambodian Border (XS693233), lowest bridge capacity, Class 15, route condition III.

(j) Route QL-14.

(a) Dong Xoai (YT079759) to blown bridge at (YT165820) repair easy w/fill, lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition II. Condition will continue until the road is opened by tactical forces and repairs can be made.

(b) Route condition II continues to the damaged bridge at YU303010. From YU303010 to the II - III CTZ Boundary (YU590176) the road is accessible from II CTZ, lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition II.

(6) Route QL-15.

(a) Bien Hoa (YT02114) to Ba Ria (YT390607), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.
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(b) Ba Ria (YS380607) to Vung Tau (YS274444), lowest bridge capacity, Class 12, route condition IV.

(7) Route QL-20.

(a) RJ QL-1 (YT343101) to bridge at YT537356, lowest bridge capacity, Class 37, route condition II.

(b) Bridge at (YT537356) to III CTZ Boundary (YT763572), lowest bridge capacity, Class 25, route condition III.

(8) Route QL-22.

(a) Go Dau Ha (XT387251) to (XT097764), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(b) XT097764 to Cambodian Border (XT074896) with AVLB abutments prepared at XT097764, route condition V; with AVLB, route condition I.

(9) Route LTL 16.

Bien Hoa (YT002114) to RJ LTL 1A (XT887373), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(10) Route LTL 1A.

(a) RJ LTL 16 (XT887373) to XT995588, lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(b) XT995588 to RJ 311 (YU133062), bridge destroyed, route condition V.

(11) Route LTL 2.

RJ (YT437045) to Ba Ria (YS380607), lowest bridge capacity, Class 60, route condition I.

(12) Route LTL 5A.

Saigon (XS815890) to Can Duoc bridge, (XS760613), lowest bridge capacity, Class 16, route condition III. (Bridge out at that point.)
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13. Route LTL 23.

Ba Ria (TS380607) to Xuyen Moc (YS657697), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.


Saigon (XS790090) to Bao Trai (XT526044), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

15. Route 333 - 334 - 335.

RJ QL 1 (YT630085) to Tan Linh (YT935262), lowest bridge capacity, Class 25, route condition III.

16. Route LTL 26 & 239.

Tay Ninh (XT259500) to Dau Tieng (XT04060), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

d. Maintenance and Repair Programmed.

1. Surface maintenance, drainage repair and reconstruction are in progress on the following routes; QL 1, QL 2, QL 15, QL 22, QL 13, LTL 16, TL 8A, LTL 26, 243, 317. Repair consists of reworking rutted surfaces, filling holes, patching pavements and where necessary complete rehabilitation. US Engineers have taken over increased responsibility for repair work during this quarter as heavy traffic caused additional sections of road to deteriorate beyond the Ministry of Public Works capacity to repair.

2. During this quarter and throughout the year ARVN engineer effort will consist primarily of constructing new bridges to replace inadequate existing structures. Materials are being provided by USAECV (P). Bridges to be repaired are on QL 22, QL 1, and 231.

3. In addition to opening and improving land LOC's in support of tactical operations, an increasing amount of engineer effort is being placed on the major land LOC's permanent rehabilitation.

6. (FOOU) REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD):

a. During the reporting period there has been steady progress in the Revolutionary Development program in the III CTZ. Security has improved as is evidenced by increased commercial traffic and the freedom with which smaller size FWMAF units can move throughout the zone.
Statistically, there has been improvement in the Revolutionary Development field. A total of 17 Real New Life Hamlets, 2 Pacification Hamlets and 1 Consolidated Hamlet were completed as of 31 July. A total of 27,828 persons reside in these hamlets. In addition, 49 Real New Life Hamlets, 7 Pacification Hamlets and 23 Consolidated Hamlets are undergoing development.

b. Enemy reaction to the program remains rather consistent, averaging almost 200 incidents per month. The most common incident is harassing fire. A recently captured document states that RD achievements and the cooperative manner in which the people have received the RD program have caused considerable anxiety within VC circles. Realizing that continued GVN advances in the program will isolate and destroy the infrastructure, the VC leaders has directed that units or soldiers involved in successful anti-RD operations be awarded honorific titles.

c. The Hamlet Elections which were held during the reporting period have given a further degree of legitimacy to local government. Administrative training of village and hamlet officials continue in a generally satisfactory manner in all of the provinces. However, province, district and village administration remains inefficient even though the GVN has attempted some corrective measures. At provincial level, interest in secondary education is on the upswing; however, the overall education program suffers from a lack of funding, lethargy of provincial officials, underemployment of existing facilities and failure to provide additional incentives to teachers to encourage voluntary double shift teaching.

d. The Public Health situation with current operational assistance is physically better (e.g., capability to treat patients). However, GVN capability to administer and implement its health programs has shown no significant progress. Agricultural programs are being implemented satisfactorily as GVN agricultural officials continue to accelerate contacts and support to the hamlets. Public Works projects are moving very slowly, troubled by personnel shortages, contract red tape, non-functional equipment and a continued lack of maintenance capability. Community Development, through self-help, has reached about 25% of its 1967 funded project goal and is accelerating in performance. Some increased GVN interest is noted in improvement of Social Welfare progress; however, this along with youth, sports and small industry development continues to show little evidence of progress due to GVN efforts. Logistics support has been satisfactory. Problems still exist in the poor maintenance of provincial trucks and the failure of transportation contractors to deliver commodities.

e. The Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi has reestablished its
support of provincial newspapers. In addition, there is evidence that pressure is being exerted on provincial VIS Chiefs, and in turn, on district VIS Chiefs, for the reestablishment of weekly district newsletters. Phuoc Tuy Province distributes a bi-weekly RD Cadre newsletter. The recent Joint TV Policy Statement issued by MICH/JUSPAO, coupled with the current requirement for modification of most TV sets (adding amplifiers and external loudspeakers), has for the first time given the Assistant Provincial Representatives for PSYOPS the necessary lever for proper placement of TV sets at public sites and for relocation of those sets which earlier went astray into unproductive channels. Numerous public viewing boxes have been constructed; and for the first time, there is general, regionwide agreement on such requirements as the presence of a TV set/generator custodian and adequate electric power where these sets are installed.

f. Refugee generation remained at a low level during the reporting period. The Resettlement Budget has been approved and funds distributed to the provinces. Most of the Refugee Chiefs are making payments as rapidly as possible. Operation CEDAR FALLS refugees have been relocated in the Lai Thieu resettlement center and are now living in their own houses. There still remains a problem in the training of teachers for refugee schools. The situation is acute in Bien Hoa province, where some fifty teachers are needed and only nine have been scheduled for training. The Hau Nghia Refugee Service is hindered by the fact that it has no vehicles available.

g. The Chieu Hoi program continues to demonstrate significant progress. A total of 2,102 enemy rallied to GVN during the reporting period. This figure is 470 less than the previous reporting period, which produced a record number of ralliers. That high number of ralliers was in part due to the TET season. Long An Province continues to produce a steady and large number of Hoi Chanhs. The enemy has reacted to the Chieu Hoi program by assassinating several Hoi Chanhs, harassing Chieu Hoi centers and strengthening surveillance over their own forces. In addition, there are indications that the enemy is increasing political indoctrination in their units. In general, Chieu Hoi cadre are adequate. Follow-up on ralliers has improved. Also, the identification card program has shown definite signs of improvement. More employment opportunities are opening to the ralliers. Lack of four wheel vehicles for the Chieu Hoi advisors limits their effectiveness. The present three-wheel vehicles are not adequate for the transportation of materials for center development and for the movement of Armed Propaganda Teams.

h. In order to release National Police who are tied down on static guard duty to field duty, several province chiefs have instituted a recruiting effort to enlist the services of disabled ARVN veterans.
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This fulfills a requirement, rehabilitates veterans, and makes more police available for field duties. It is encouraging to note that there is an increase in the number of National Police being sent to district town level from the province capitals.

1. Seventy-five RD cadre teams have been recruited and sixty-six are operational. In addition, twelve Montagnard teams are operational. In order to enhance the security of the teams, four innovations are currently being employed in III CTZ.

   (1) Greater reliance on artillery to protect teams against attack at night and consideration on a corps-wide basis of artillery support before selecting a new hamlet to pacify.

   (2) Inclusion of RD district representatives in the District Operations and Intelligence Coordinating Center (DOIOC), so that information concerning the security of the RD teams can be handled more rapidly and efficiently. Five pilot DOIOC were operational during the reporting period.

   (3) Deployment of ten mobile advisory teams (MAT) by US combat units to raise the level of training of RF/PF units in areas where security is critical, and the long-term retraining of a RF company by the 1st Infantry Division.

   (4) Attachment of six US NCO's to province advisory teams to assist the RD cadre effort.

7. (U) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS:


   (1) The number of PSYOP air missions increased from 1,392 last quarter to 1,518 this quarter. This increase was a result of increased emphasis on PSYOP activities and an increase in USAF PSTWAR aircraft resources.

   (2) The number of air delivered leaflets increased sharply to 263,612,000 as compared to 194,994,000 last quarter. Of this number, the 216th PSTOP Company produced 66,084,000 leaflets; all others were received from the 6th PSTOP Battalion or off-shore agencies. The number of hours of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts dropped from 844 to 835, a result of restrictions imposed by weather conditions.

   (3) Because of personnel shortages and changes in II FFORCRW

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organization the number of field teams furnished by 246th PSYOP Company has decreased. During this quarter the teams were reduced to six from the previous quarter's ten. The company is normally authorized personnel and equipment for only four teams.

(4) During the quarter, 2,116 Hoi Chanh were reported in III CTZ. This is a slight decrease over the previous quarter's total of 2,577.

b. Significant Civil Affairs Activities.

(1) The 2d Civil Affairs Company was brought up to strength during the quarter. The company is now supporting II FFORCEN units with 21 AA platoons. One platoon is attached to each brigade-size unit and one at each division headquarters.

(2) Military Civic Action projects have increased significantly during the reporting period. The number of patients treated through MEDCAP was 135,684, an increase of 13 per cent over the last reporting period. Major construction and repair projects increased 25 per cent. A total of 270 km of road was constructed or repaired during the quarter, which was an increase of 500 per cent over the last quarter.

(3) Attitude surveys taken during the quarter indicate that the Medical Civic Action Program and improvement of the lines of communication continue to be the most popular programs with the Vietnamese people.

(4) Operation Friendship was initiated by the 2d CA Company during the reporting period. This operation is designed to provide civic action to the immediate area surrounding HQ II FFORCEN and improve the relationship between the US military and the local civilians. The operation has been successful to date and the relations have improved to some degree. This civic action program will continue indefinitely.

8. (U) INFORMATION:

The following is a list of information projects completed during the reported quarter.

(1) 62 news releases.

(2) 271 hometown news releases.

(3) 351 radio tapes produced.

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(4) Four fact sheets produced.

(5) 56 news correspondents assisted.
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(SECTIM II) (U)

SECTION II: COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PERSONNEL

Item: Accidental discharge of firearms.

Discussion: The accidental discharge of firearms continues to be a matter of command concern. The number of incidents are decreasing, but this is still a serious problem. Of the 98 incidents reported during the quarter, 53% were attributed to the M16 rifle, 26% to the caliber 45 pistol and 21% to all other weapons or weapons systems. Considering the ratio of weapons issued to individuals it is apparent that the pistol is the most dangerous weapons issued.

Observation: a. That all personnel receive sufficient instruction on weapons to ensure a thorough knowledge of the functioning and safety principle of any weapon with which they may be armed.

b. That commanders establish and enforce prudent safety measures and take corrective action in cases of failure to comply.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Item: Aerial photography.

Discussion: II FFORCEV OPCON units are continuing to request large area coverage photographic missions during the rainy season. The purpose of these requests is to provide basic area intelligence and for use as map supplement. Low cloud ceilings and poor visibility limit the use of the long focal length large format camera systems capable of accomplishing these missions. These camera systems have focal lengths of 12" to 36". For imagery of a scale of 1:5,000 or smaller, the aircraft must fly between 5,000' and 15,000'.

Observation: Units should plan to obtain large area coverage during the optimum flying times of the dry season. With this photography as basic cover, the short focal length (3" to 6") camera systems could be utilized to fly under the weather and obtain update photography of small areas of interest during the rainy season.

COMMUNICATIONS

Item: Control and assignment of FM frequencies.

Discussion: In the II FFORCEV zone of operations there are about 20,000 FM
radios which are employed in approximately 1300 radio nets. Each infantry division has from 5 to 10 helicopters and fixed aircraft airborne at any one time for the control of tactical operations and fire control. Frequencies used by these airborne platforms interfere with other nets at distances up to 150 miles. In order to avoid chaos it has been necessary to isolate 95 discreet frequencies and break them out to each division, separate brigade and aviation company to use on their primary command and fire control nets. Of the 920 usable FM frequencies, II FFORCEV is allotted 440. Since 95 of these are made discreet, that leaves 345 frequencies which are available to satisfy 1200 nets. This necessitates several nets having to use the same frequency. Each division is given approximately 200 frequencies for its nets. The II FFORCEV radio officer receives each unit’s SOI and records the assignment of each frequency to a specific net. This information is made available to each unit radio officer so he can assign his frequencies in such a way as to cause a minimum of interference.

Observation: This technique has solved most of the interference problems experienced. With the advent of the helicopter it is necessary to isolate frequencies in order to avoid interference.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

Item: Quick reaction in dealing with emergency refugee problems.

Discussion: A study of refugee problems has pointed out the need for immediate reaction capability especially in the shelter and food fields. CORDS logistic channels have not been able to provide these necessities rapidly enough.

Observation: CORDS is submitting a request to USARV for logistical assistance in forming and storing commodity kits at selected locations in order to reduce the reaction time in dealing with emergency refugee problems.

Item: Delay in providing adequate shelter at Chieu Hoi Centers.

Discussion: When large groups of returnees turned themselves into a Chieu Hoi Center, the resources of the Center were strained. Delay in the releasing of regular funds for construction of adequate shelters has adversely affected the Chieu Hoi program because the centers could not provide the promised medical treatment and modest comfort to the large groups.

Observation: A special construction fund has been created which is handled at CORDS Region III. This fund is used to remove unsightly structures and tents at the Chieu Hoi center and replaces them with adequate shelters. Additionally, building material may now be stockpiled for immediate use during emergencies.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Item: Translation of PSYOP messages into the Vietnamese language.

Discussion: In US/FWMAF units, most PSYOP messages are written by US/FWMAF personnel who do not have a Vietnamese language capability. The message is then given to an interpreter/translator who prepares the Vietnamese version. Frequently the translator merely translates the words rather than the idea. This could result in distorting the meaning of the message as originally written.

Observation: In the development of leaflets for psychological operations, extreme care must be exercised to provide accurate Vietnamese versions of PSYOP messages. All translations should be subjected to independent double-checks by qualified linguists to assure that the original meaning has not been distorted in translation.

Item: Viet Cong vulnerability to audio PSYOP messages.

Discussion: Through interrogations of Hoi Chanh, it has been discovered that in the evening between 2000 and 2400 hours the Viet Cong soldier is most vulnerable to PSYOP loudspeaker broadcasts. This is the time when the Viet Cong fighter is most lonely and fearful, misses his family the most and is possibly hungry. The cadre also have a more difficult task of preventing the message from reaching the fighter. The only way of countering the message is by producing more sound, possibly by organized activity such as singing. However, this would jeopardize the security of his unit's location. The fighter also has a better chance at night of slipping away undetected by the cadre.

Observation: Night loudspeaker broadcasts are very effective during the lonely evening hours. The messages used should be very sentimental and remind the Viet Cong fighter of his family. He should be encouraged to slip away and hide until daylight when he can rally.

Item: ARVN PSYWAR Teams operating with US units.

Discussion: ARVN PSYWAR Teams operating with US units have proven very effective in the dissemination of propaganda material and face-to-face communications with the Vietnamese civilian population. They are very useful in receiving intelligence information which the people might wish to give to the US Forces. With their training in psychological operations, they provide a means whereby the US units may effectively communicate with the people.
Observation: ARVN PSYWAR Teams working with US units provide excellent face-to-face propaganda capabilities for communicating with the civilian population. They should be utilized to the maximum extent possible.

Item: Commander's Recommendations.

NONE.

FRED C. WEYAND
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding
AVHGC-DST (18 Sep 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 10 Nov 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, II Field Force (WDII) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comment follows:

Reference item concerning quick reaction in dealing with emergency refugee problems, page 36: Request for logistical assistance was received by this headquarters. Due to certain inconsistencies, report was returned and will be resubmitted.

3. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/C. S. Nakatsukasa
t/C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

CC:
HQ, II Field Force

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Downgraded at 8 year intervals
Declassified after 18 years
DOD Dir 6200.1g
SUBJECT: Reorganization for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) within III Corps Tactical Zone

TO: Commander
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
APO 96222


2. In accordance with the above reference, the organization and functions of Hq, II FFORCEV, III Corps Advisory Group, and OCO, Region III have been revised to provide single manager direction of all US Civil/Military Revolutionary Development (RD) activities in III Corps Tactical Zone. The key features of this reorganization are summarized in Inclosures 1 and 2. Detailed functions are listed in Inclosures 3-9.

3. The required personnel shifts and additional personnel requirements for the reorganization are still being studied. Although it is envisaged that most of these requirements can be satisfied from within the current total resources of Hq, II FFORCEV, III Corps Advisory Group, and Region III, OCO, a need for additional resources from MACV seems clear if the RF/PF advisory effort is to receive the emphasis we all feel essential. This will be the subject of separate correspondence.

4. This proposed integrated reorganization within the III CTZ is only a first step. It is recognized that there will be grey areas of potential functional overlaps. These I accept in the interest of maintaining continuity of our efforts in support of the GVN program. I expect to improve and build on this initial organization as a continuing process.

9 Incl:
1. Org Chart, Hq, II FFORCEV/SA, III CTZ (Rev) Major General, USA
   Acting Commander
2. Key Org and Functional Features of the Reorganization (Rev)
3. Org and Functions, Cmd Gp
4. Org and Functions, ACofS, III CTZ
5. Org and Functions, Adv Gp, III CTZ
6. Org and Functions, Adv Div, Div/Cmp
7. Org and Functions, Div/Cmp
8. Org and Functions, Prov and Dist Sr Adv

FRED C. WELAND
III CTZ REORGANIZATION FOR CORDS

KEY ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL FEATURES

A. ORGANIZATION

II FFORCEV

1. Director, Region III becomes Deputy for CORDS (Dep Dir becomes first Dep for CORDS).
2. Assumes command of 12 Province and 52 District Advisory Teams.
3. RD staff element of ACoS, G5 is eliminated.

Region III, OCO

Becomes Office, CORDS III, under command of CG, II FFORCEV/SA, III CTZ and under direct supervision of Dep for CORDS.

DSA, III Corps

1. Sector/Sub-sector Advisory Teams are transferred to the new Province/District Teams.
2. RD and RF/PF staff elements are transferred to Office, CORDS III.

B. FUNCTIONS

Command Section, II FFORCEV

1. CG assumes single manager direction of US RD support effort in III CTZ.
2. Dep for CORDS supervises formulation and execution of all plans, policies, programs in support of RD program, and supervises the 12 Provincial Advisory Teams.
3. Dep for CORDS continues to represent AID, JUSPAO, OGA in non-RD civil operations.

**II FFORCEV General Staff**

All II FFORCEV functions are retained except RD monitorship function formerly in AGOS, G5.

**CORDS, III**

1. All functions of Director, Region III OCO are retained.
2. Assumes RD advisory responsibilities at corps level.
3. Assists Dep for CORDS in exercising supervision over the Provincial/District Teams.

**DSA**

1. Relinquishes advisory functions at Sector and Sub-sector.
2. Operates under supervision of Dep for CORDS for all RD matters.
3. Serves as single point of contact for CG, III Corps on military advice.
4. Provides administrative and logistical support for all military personnel in CORDS, III and in the Provincial and District Teams.
5. Reacts (through DTA Advisors) to emergency military requirements of the Senior Province Advisors.

**Senior Provincial Advisor**

1. Assumes responsibilities of former OCO Provincial Representative and MACV Sector Advisor.
2. Responds to the military reporting needs of DTA Senior Advisors.
COMMANDER, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM/SENIOR ADVISOR, III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

CG, II FFORCE/VN, III CTR:

DEP CG

DEP CORPS

CHIEF OF STAFF

DEP CHIEF OF STAFF

COMMANDING GENERAL, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM AND SENIOR ADVISOR, III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

a. Commands, Headquarters, II FFORCEV and assigned units and exercises operational control of United States Forces and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) ordered attached or under his operational control by CG, VIETN.

b. Conducts military operations with US Forces and FWMAF in order to assist the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to defeat the enemy and to extend government control.

c. Advises the Commanding General, III Corps Tactical Zone, in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces in the accomplishment of assigned missions.

d. Responsible for the single manager direction of all US Civil, Military Revolutionary Development activities in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL

The Deputy Commanding General, II FFORCEV, assists the Commanding General in the discharge of his duties.
DEPUTY FOR CIVIL OPERATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT

a. Supervises the formulation and execution of all military and civilian plans, policies, and programs which support the Revolutionary Development Program of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

b. Supervises the operations of each of the Senior Provincial Advisers in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

c. Represents USAID, JUSPAO, CCA, and the US Embassy, and deals directly with these agencies, on civil operations which are not in direct support of OP.

CHIEF OF STAFF

The Chief of Staff assists and advises the Commanding General, Deputy Commanding General, and Deputy for CORDS in carrying out their duties. He has specific responsibilities for:

(1) Formulating policy for the general operation of the staff.

(2) Directing, supervising, and integrating the work of the staff.

(3) Insuring that orders and instructions of the commander are executed.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

Assists the Chief of Staff in the discharge of his duties.
a. Advises and assist the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff in matters pertaining to military operations which require psychological operations and civil affairs support.

b. Develops plans, policies, and procedures for the employment of psychological warfare and civil affairs/military civic action in support of tactical operations.

c. Prepares periodic psychological operations and civil affairs military estimates, and the psychological operations and civil affairs annexes for II Field Force Vietnam operations plans and orders.

d. Exercises staff supervision and direction over all psychological warfare and civil affairs activities within units assigned, attached, and under operational control of II Field Force Vietnam. In this capacity, conducts periodic inspections and staff visits to assure the technical adequacy of personnel and equipment.

e. Monitors the security status of critical resources which require the tactical deployment of military forces to assure their protection.
CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION

a. Formulates plans, policies, priorities, and procedures for civil affairs support of II FFORCEN military operations.

b. Supervises and controls operations of the 2d Civil Affairs Company.

c. Prepares civil affairs annexes to II FFORCEN operations plans and orders.

d. Supervises and evaluates civil affairs programs conducted by II FFORCEN OPCON units.

e. Develops civil affairs and military civic action concepts for implementation by II FFORCEN OPCON units in support of tactical operations.

f. Reviews and coordinates military civic action projects which support II FFORCEN Psychological Operations in order to enhance the credibility of these PSYOP efforts.

g. Develops statistical data and technical surveys required to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the II FFORCEN Civil Affairs/Military Civic Action Program in support of tactical operations.

h. Conducts research and prepares required reports, analyses, estimates, and briefings on civil affairs and military civic action as they pertain to tactical operations.

i. Coordinates civil affairs and military civic action matters with appropriate staff sections of MACV, USAHRV, and other military headquarters subordinate to MACV.

j. Monitors the security status of critical resources which require tactical deployment of military forces to assure their protection.

OPERATIONS DIVISION

a. Provides the officer personnel required to man the G5 element of the II FFORCEN Tactical Operations Center.

b. Maintains the G5 operations journal and situation map.

c. Prepares the G5 portion of the II FFORCEN Command briefing based on input furnished by the Civil Affairs Division and the Psychological Operations Division.

d. Edits all reports and correspondence originated in the G5 section to insure technical accuracy and timely coordination with other Staff Sections of II FFORCEN Headquarters.

e. Provides the Security Control Officer for the G5 Section.

f. Maintains classified documents, logs and receipts.
g. Coordinates with the II FFORCEV Information Officer to assure that PSYOP/Civil Affairs matters are given appropriate coverage in the international press.

h. Provides stenographic, clerical, filing, and typing support.

i. Provides drafting support and prepares briefing charts required for the G5 portion of the II FFORCEV Command Briefing.

j. Performs necessary housekeeping and administrative functions (such as transportation and messenger service) to support the G5 Section.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS DIVISION**

a. Formulates plans, policies, and procedures for PSYOP support of II FFORCEV military operations.

b. Supervises and controls operations of the 246th PSYOP Company.

c. Prepares PSYOP annexes to II FFORCEV operations plans and orders.

d. Supervises and evaluates PSYOP programs conducted by II FFORCEV OPCON units.

e. Develops psychological operations themes for the timely exploitation of PSYOP opportunities.

f. Reviews and approves all leaflet requests by II FFORCEV OPCON units to assure suitability of themes and conformance with MACV and II FFORCEV policy.

g. Develops statistical data and technical feedback criteria required to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the II FFORCEV PSYWAR program.

h. Conducts research and prepares required reports, analyses, estimates, and briefings on II FFORCEV PSYOP activities.

i. Coordinates PSYOP activities with appropriate staff sections of the MACV, the US Navy Coastal Surveillance Group, and the US Air Force 5th Air Commando Squadron.

j. Monitors the condition and location of PSYOP equipment assigned to II FFORCEV OPCON units.
ASSISTANT DEPUTY FOR CORDS III CTZ

a. Assists the Deputy for CORDS in the management of the US civil/military support for the GVN's RD program in III CTZ.

b. Within guidelines established by CG, II FFORCE V, develops joint and combined plans and programs for US civil/military support of RD in III CTZ.

c. Supervises the execution of plans and programs for US civil/military support for RD in III CTZ.

d. Provides advice and assistance to the GVN authorities and agencies on US civil/military support for RD.

e. Develops requirements for military and civil assets (US/FM/MF/GVN) to support RD within III CTZ.

f. Serves as a point of contact with US sponsoring agencies for III programs within III CTZ and maintains liaison with these agencies in representing their interests in civil non-RD program activities.

g. Is responsible for program coordination with US sponsoring agencies in the planning and implementation of non-RD activities as they impinge upon or affect RD-related activities within III CTZ.

h. Provides the focal point for economic warfare to include population and resources control within III CTZ.

i. Evaluates all civil/military RD activities within III CTZ including provision of security for RD by US/FM/MF/GVN military forces and reports on progress, status and problems of RD support.

j. Exercises direct supervision of the CORDS staff.

PLANS, PROGRAMS, AND REPORTS DIVISION

a. Develops detailed plans and programs for US support of Revolutionary Development and related activities in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Develops CORDS III CTZ positions in respect to Chieu Hoi, Refugees, RD Workers, Public Safety, New Life Development, psychological Operations, RD Advisory, and Support areas; develops a planning base for these activities, and drafts general guidelines for accomplishing CORDS objectives.

c. Coordinates the civil, political, economic, social, psychological, and military aspects of Revolutionary Development and links US military/civil support to the GVN Revolutionary Development effort.

d. Maintains liaison with the Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS, II FFORCE V.
e. Coordinates with US and GVN civil agencies concerned with programming.

f. Recommends program policy guidelines, objectives, and priorities for issuance to CORDS provincial elements and other staff divisions as a basis for their planning and project submissions.

g. Participates with USAID divisions in the developing of guidance for related activities.

h. Reviews new program and project submissions to assure consistency and conformance with approved RD policy, guidelines, objectives, and priorities.

i. Develops and elicits, both periodically and on a continuing basis, project status information and evaluation of project progress from other elements of CORDS and sponsoring agencies. Based on such evaluations, makes recommendations concerning project implementation and, as necessary, recommends shifts of priorities, responsibilities, and funds.

j. Evaluates the extent to which US objectives and program goals are being served by specific projects and programs and the extent to which they are mutually consistent and integrated. Evaluates US and GVN RD strategy, goals, and objectives in light of changing conditions.

k. Prepares the CORDS III CTZ reports based on the provincial Special Joint Reports and all other major reports concerning CORDS activities. (Coordinates with USAID, JSUPAO, OSA, on RD reporting matters to assure integrated and consistent RD reports on a US Mission-wide basis.)

l. Provides the CORDS III CTZ focal point for economic warfare to include population and resources control.

**MANAGEMENT SUPPORT DIVISION**

a. Provides administrative and logistical support for CORDS personnel and field activities, except that provided directly by parent agencies.

b. Develops and recommends policies governing the priority and level of support provided to personnel and field activities as prescribed by CORDS guidelines.

c. Develops and administers a civil support program to supplement the programs of the sponsoring agencies to the extent needed to meet CORDS operational requirements in handling personnel operations for US personnel assigned to CORDS, and in collecting, tabulating, and forecasting civilian requirements by nationality and type.

d. Manages the air support program for CORDS III CTZ.
e. Operates the CORDS III CTZ, maintains water and fuel distribution system.

f. Recommends assignments, transfers and other changes of administrative personnel assigned to CORDS III CTZ.

g. Administers CORDS III CTZ financial reports and executes payroll actions, and handles payments of vendors.

h. Determines requirements and tasks necessary procurement actions for housing, vehicular transportation, and food supply and equipment.

i. Controls receipt, storage, and issue of supplies and equipment for administrative and logistic support.

j. Recommends changes in administrative and logistic support to achieve logistic and administrative economy through centralization and cross-servicing of appropriate support activities.

NEW LIFE DEVELOPMENT DIVISION

a. Develops proposals and technical and planning guidelines for the provinces and coordinates assigned project areas with the provincial GOV, and CORDS agencies which support the Revolutionary Development programs of the GVN. These assigned project areas are of two types: those for which the NLD Division has full technical responsibility (Health, Education, National Priority Areas, Warehouses, Watercrafts, Civil welfare, Highlander Affairs and Handicrafts) and those RD functional programs for which NLD primarily has a coordinating role (e.g., Rural Electrification, Hamlet Schools, Public Health, Village/Malit Admin, Training, Agricultural Affairs, Public Works projects). Other areas in which NLD has responsibility for developing proposals and technical and planning guidelines include development of small industries, and volunteer army and women.

b. Develops and recommends proposals and technical plans for assigned project areas within CORDS III CTZ.

c. Evaluates specific project proposals and plans and makes evaluations of province calling for US support for consistency with NLD program guidelines, priorities, and past performance and for appropriate objectives. Participates with USAID field technical advisors in planning planned activities within CORDS III CTZ for which NLD has coordinating responsibility. Participates in planning, evaluation, and implementation of non-RD programs and activities related to RD to the extent that they are directed programs and activities implemented at the province level.

d. In consultation with NLD field representatives, recommends and prepares a comprehensive plan for assigned project areas, and determines US resources required to support implementation within CORDS III CTZ. Participates with appropriate technical elements of the sponsoring agencies in the development of RD-related programs for which it has coordinating responsibility.
Prepares necessary documentation to implement approved projects in areas for which NLD has full technical responsibility and assists in, or arranges for preparation of such documentation for approved projects within III CTZ for which NLD has coordinating responsibility.

Provides technical and material backstopping to provincial elements conducting activities for which NLD has full technical responsibility, including discussions and negotiations with GVN officials to resolve problems affecting field operations. Coordinates technical and material backstopping with technical offices of USAID on project areas within III CTZ for which NLD has coordinating responsibility.

Acts as advisor to the appropriate functional offices of USAID and MACCORDS to coordinate the MRD-funded and US-supported project areas assigned to III CTZ and to other provincial elements as necessary.

Coordinates with technical and other staff divisions of USAID to resolve technical problems arising in the provinces.

Advises the appropriate USAID division on financial, auditing and budgeting project accelerated development in National Priority Areas.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT WORKERS DIVISION

Plans, implements, provides technical guidance and managerial control of US support to the GVN’s Revolutionary Development Workers, Montagnard Workers and Census Grievance within III CTZ.

Supervises the implementation of the Revolutionary Development Workers, Montagnard Workers and Census Grievance programs within III CTZ.

Monitors and coordinates support to the GVN People’s Self Defense Program within III CTZ.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ADVISORS DIVISION

Provides advice on RD and RF/PP matters to the staff of HQ III Corps Tactical Zone, coordinating as necessary with the III Corps Advisory Group.

Maintains continuing liaison with the Commander and staff of III Corps Tactical Zone and with the III Corps Advisory Group.

Keeps the Deputy for CORDS and the Deputy Senior Advisor informed of all RD and RD-related matters of mutual interest.

Accompanies the Commander and/or staff elements of III Corps Tactical Zone on inspections and visits which are primarily concerned with RD or RF/PP activities.
e. Takes field evaluations of all aspects of the RD and RF/PF programs, to include inspections of the provincial and district advisor teams, for the purpose of determining current status and problem areas.

f. Prepares and submits periodic and special reports related to RD and RF/PF programs and activities.

CHIEU HOI DIVISION

a. Responsible for technical and planning guidance in support of the Chieu Hoi program.

b. Serves as the primary US advisor to the GVN provincial agencies responsible for the Chieu Hoi program within III CTZ.

c. Develops and recommends proposals, goals, objectives, and guidelines for the planning and execution of the US assistance effort supporting the GVN Chieu Hoi program within III CTZ.

d. Prepares necessary programs to obtain resources - men, money and materials - in support of the GVN Chieu Hoi effort and provides liaison with the various CORDS agencies and appropriate military staff elements. Responsible for supporting the Chieu Hoi program in the province within III CTZ.

e. Supervises the implementation of the Chieu Hoi program within the III CTZ.

f. Represents DEP CORDS on matters pertaining to the National Reconciliation program within III CTZ.

g. Prepares weekly and spot Chieu Hoi reports which will be sent through appropriate channels to MACCORDS.

REFUGEE DIVISION

a. Surveys and evaluates existing and developing refugee situations and develops and maintains a comprehensive knowledge of the refugee programs and activities within III CTZ.

b. Assists in preparation of and reviews province programs for refugees and monitors, evaluates and reports on the implementation of approved programs.

c. Recommends refugee program changes in priorities, emphasis or direction.
d. Provides technical guidance to Province Refugee Officers in the
development and implementation of programs, and assists them in resolving
problems.

e. Maintains liaison with the GVN, SCR, and Inspectors and
US and FWMA authorities in III CTZ for effects of their operations on
the refugee program.

f. Maintains current data on the activities of Voluntary Agencies
within the III CTZ and coordinates support for Voluntary Agencies
participating in the Refugee Program and other programs.

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

a. Implements the support to the National Police within III CTZ.

b. Recommends and implements procedures and provides planning
and technical advice to the National Police headquarters in the provinces
of the III CTZ.

c. Develops and recommends proposals, goals, objectives and guide-
lines for the planning of the US Public Safety program in support of the
GVN National Police within III CTZ.

d. Acts as the primary US advisor to each provincial element of
the GVN National Police headquarters within III CTZ and provides technical
support guidance to the Public Safety Field Advisors and the provincial
police within III CTZ.

e. Prepares necessary planning and program documents to implement
US civil activities and to obtain resources - men, money, and materials -
in support of programmed activities within III CTZ.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

a. Provides informational and psychological operations support
to the GVN RD effort and to the programs and activities conducted by
CORDS within III CTZ.

b. Develops and recommends plans, proposals, goals, objectives
and guidelines for planning of the US assistance effort supporting the
GVN information program within III CTZ.

c. Prepares necessary programs to obtain resources - men,
money and materials - in support of the US and GVN RD psychological
operations efforts within III CTZ.

d. Supervises the implementation of the RD psychological operations
program within III CTZ.

e. Simultaneously, in his alternate capacity as regional representative
of JUSPAO, which is charged by JUSPAO/MACV agreement with the responsibility
for developing psvops policy and supervising all psychological operations in Vietnam, the Assistant Director of this Division is the principal US civilian advisor to the II Field Force/V, the III ARVN Corps, and other FNSAF Commanders within III CTZ on matters of public opinion, psychological operations and psywar policy.
a. Provides advice and assistance to the ARVN III Corps Commander and his staff in areas of command, administration, training, field operations, intelligence, security, logistics, and psychological warfare/civil affairs.

b. Commands the MACV Advisory Group, III Corps.

c. Provides liaison between III Corps and major US/FWAF military operations.

d. Establishes and operates US advisory tactical communication networks and provides advisory assistance for the operation of ARVN networks.

e. Determines requirements for and coordinates US tactical air and airlift support for III Corps.

f. Establishes, maintains, operates, and provides advisory functions for a combined TOC/DASC in III Corps in conjunction with III Corps/VNAF.

g. Operates under the supervision of the Deputy for CORDS for all matters relating to RVNAF military support of RD. The following matters are included under this supervision:

(1) Policy guidance with respect to requirements and priorities for military support for RD.

(2) RD program objectives and campaign plans.

(3) RD report requirements placed on ARVN units.

(4) Special requirements for ARVN operations in support of RD.

(5) Special political indoctrination, special training and civic action, and other special requirements in support of RD.
Advisory and logistical support requirements for all military personnel assigned to CORDS.

h. Represents the Deputy for CORDS on all ARVN coordination with the Command General, III CTZ (ARVN) and his staff.

i. Coordinates with the Senior Province Advisor or his designated assistant in performing the following functions:

- (1) Provides planning guidance, support, and coordination for military operations across division and provincial boundaries.
- (2) Allocates fire support under certain emergency situations.
- (3) Supervises US military advisor communications systems.

j. Accompanies the Commander, III CTZ and his staff elements on inspection trips to the provinces. In the event such inspections are primarily of ARVN matters, a CORDS representative will also accompany the Commander or his staff.

G1 ADVISORY AND ADMIN SECTION

a. Advises and informs the Deputy Senior Advisor, III Corps, on all G1 matters.

b. Advises the G1, III Corps (ARVN) on all G1 (personnel/administration) matters.

c. Exercises staff supervision over the AG Advisor, MP and PX Compound Advisor, Administrative Section, Special Services Section, Chaplain Section, and Liaison Section.

d. Provides technical staff supervision for all Division/CMD advisory efforts.

e. Performs all personnel and administrative support functions for Headquarters USAAG, III CTZ and subordinate advisory teams.

f. Provides administrative liaison with Headquarters, MACV, Headquarters II FFORCESV, and USARV units.

g. Collects and compiles statistics and data from ARVN and advisory sources for Senior Advisor/Deputy Senior Advisor.

G2 ADVISORY SECTION

a. Advises and informs the Deputy Senior Advisor, III Corps on intelligence and security matters.

b. Advises the G2, III Corps (ARVN) on intelligence procedures and activities.

c. Provides technical staff supervision for and coordinates subordinate Division/CMD intelligence activities and advisory effort.

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ADVISORY SECTION

a. Advises and informs the Deputy Senior Advisor, III Corps on all matters pertaining to organization, plans, operations, and training, and coordinates with US/PMWAF in these areas.

b. Advises the G3, III Corps (ARVN) on all G3 matters.

c. Exercises staff responsibility over the Chemical Advisor, Signal Advisor, the Scout Dog Advisor, Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer, and the Combined Tactical Operations Center.

d. Provides technical staff supervision for Division/CMD G3 advisory activities.

ADVISORY SECTION

a. Advises and informs the Deputy Senior Advisor, III Corps on all logistical matters, to include material and services.

b. Advises the G4, III Corps (ARVN) on logistical matters.

c. Exercises staff supervision over Repair and Utility Support elements, Food Service Coordinator, and the Medical Advisor.

d. Maintains III Corps Ordering Account.

e. Requests and coordinates airlift as required by G4, III Corps for support of ARVN activities.

f. Provides technical staff supervision for subordinate G4 Advisory activities.

g. Exercises staff supervision and coordination of the logistical support required for subordinate advisory teams.

h. Plans and arranges for logistical support of new advisory teams.

ADVISORY SECTION

a. Advises and informs the Deputy Senior Advisor, III Corps on all G5 matters.

b. Advises the Deputy Chief of Staff for Political Warfare, III Corps on all aspects of Political Warfare, to include Religious Programs, Political Indoctrination, Psychological Warfare, Civil Action, Social Service, Civil Affairs, and Post Exchange-Commissary Affairs.

c. Provides staff liaison with the 246th PSYOPS Battalion (US).

d. Provides technical supervision for subordinate Division/CMD G5 Advisors.
a. Provides advice and assistance to the Commander, ARVN Division/Commander Military District (CMD) and his staff in areas of command, administration, training, field operations, intelligence, security, logistics, and psychological warfare/civil affairs.

b. Commands the MACV Advisory Teams assigned to Division/CMD.

c. Monitors, advises, and informs Deputy Senior Advisor on all military operations in Division Tactical areas/CMD over which the Division/CMD Commander has responsibility.

d. Conducts liaison between Division/CMD and major US/FWNAF military organizations. Coordinates AO's, TAOR, specified strike zones and other operational requirements over which Division/CMD has control.

e. Establishes and operates a Division/CMD TAC/TAC which parallels the ARVN system from III Corps through Division/CMD to sectors.

f. Requires operational/intelligence data necessary to meet requirements of DTA/CMD and higher headquarters, both US and ARVN.

g. Recommends and coordinates rules of engagement for artillery, air, and Army aviation.

h. Assigns and controls SOI.

i. Sub-allocates ALO, FAC and observation aircraft made available.

j. Processes parallel requests for and recommends to the Commander, Division/CMD allocations of tactical support of all types to include air, artillery, Army aviation, airlift, ground transport, engineer, and other means which are controlled by the Division/CMD or higher headquarters.

k. Recommends to the Commander, Division/CMD the assignment and relief of troop units and support elements.
1. Coordinates plans and requirements with sector for large scale, combined operations and provides advisory assistance in the conduct of these operations.

m. Ascertains the need for and recommends allocation of division-controlled critical materials.

n. Provides logistical and administrative support for U.S. military elements of province and district advisor teams.

o. Exchanges information on AD matters with senior provincial advisor.

p. Accompanies the Division-SMM Commander and his staff elements on inspection trips to the province.
SENIOR PROVINCIAL ADVISOR

a. Commands the Provincial Advisory Team and the Senior District Advisors.

b. Selects the Senior District Advisors with the concurrence of the Deputy for CORPS III CTZ.

c. Exercises operational control over advisors of RVNAF Units attached to the province for direct support of RD.

d. Receives operational direction from and reports through the Deputy for CORPS III CTZ to the Commanding General II PFORCE V.

e. Serves as principal United States advisor to the Province Chief.

f. Establishes policy for advice, military or civil, to be given to the Province Chief or his representatives by the Deputy and other members of the Provincial Advisory Team.

g. Supervises the formulation and execution of all US provincial military and civilian plans, policies, programs, and activities which support the GVN provincial program.

h. Develops requirements for military and civil assets (US & GVN) to support revolutionary development.

i. Evaluates all civil/military RD activities including provision of security for RD by US/FWMAF/GVN military forces and reports on progress, status and problems of RD support.

j. Serves as a US member of the Province Committee.

k. Serves as the point of contact with the Province Chief for all US/FWMAF units and agencies.

l. Is accountable for all US owned and/or controlled commodities, funds, and other material support. Direct responsibility may be delegated to a subordinate.

m. Prepares, endorses, or reviews the efficiency reports of all members of the Provincial Advisory Team.

n. As the Senior military officer or civilian official, assumes responsibility for the administrative and logistical support of the military or civilian element of the Provincial Advisory Team, as appropriate.

o. Establishes, advises and participates in the operation of a combined sector TOC/TIC (SOIC if appropriate) which is netted with division/CMD and subsectors/subordinate element by parallel US/ARVN communications, and responds to controls established by division/CMD for the operation of the system.

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DEPUTY SENIOR PROVINCIAL ADVISOR

a. Functions as the "alter ego" Deputy to the Senior Provincial Advisor, and prepares or endorses efficiency reports on all other members of the Provincial Advisory Team.

b. Serves as principal advisor and executant to the Senior Provincial Advisor for either civil operations or military support, as appropriate.

c. Provides advice to the Province Chief for either civil operations or military support in accordance with policies prescribed by the Senior Provincial Advisor.

d. Serves as a US member of the Province Committee.

e. As the senior military officer or civilian official assumes responsibility for the administrative and logistical support of the military or civilian element of the Provincial Advisory Team, as appropriate.

SENIOR DISTRICT ADVISOR

a. Commands the District Advisory Team.

b. Exercises operational control over advisors of RVN/MAF units attached to the district.

c. Serves as principal US advisor to the District Chief.

d. Establishes policy for advice, military or civil, to be given to the District Chief or his representative by the Deputy and other members of the District Advisory Team.

e. Implements all US civil and military support programs at district level.

f. Evaluates all civil/military RD activities including provision of security for RD by US/FWMAF/GVN military forces and reports of progress, status and problems of RD support.

g. Serves as the point of contact with the District Chief for all US/FWMAF units and activities.

h. Is accountable for all US owned and/or controlled commodities, funds, and other material support. Direct responsibility may be delegated to a subordinate.

i. Prepares or endorses the efficiency reports of all members of the District Advisory Team.

j. Establishes, advises and participates in the operation of a combined DOIC which is netted with sector by parallel US/ARVN communications and responds to controls established by sector for the operation of the system.
DEPUTY SENIOR DISTRICT ADVISOR

a. Functions as the "alter ego" Deputy to the Senior District Advisor, and prepares or indorses efficiency reports on all other members of the District Advisory Team.

b. Serves as principal advisor and executant to the Senior District Advisor for either civil operations or military support, as appropriate.

c. Provides advice to the District Chief for either civil operations or military support in accordance with policies prescribed by the Senior District Advisor.
Joint Planning Group

MEMORANDUM

This Hq, AVFB-GS, 18 June 1967, subject: "Manning Requirements for ASCORDS New General Staff Section, II FFORCEV," as amended, rescinded.

Pending publication of a MKVE, the Joint Planning Group was established as a section of the II Field Force General Staff effective 1 July 1967. Staff relationships, organization and functions are as shown in inclosures 1, 2, and 3. Manning requirements are set forth in inclosure 4.

ROBERT C. FORBES
Brigadier General, GS
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

E

CORDS III (30)
DSA (20)

Incl 2
FUNCTIONS, JOINT PLANNING GROUP

1. CHIEF, JOINT PLANNING GROUP

The Chief, Joint Planning Group is the principal staff assistant to the Chief of Staff II FFORCEV in all matters pertaining to broad policy guidance, interface planning and II FFORCEV coordination in areas of joint concern to the Deputy for CORDS, the Deputy Senior Advisor and the II FFORCEV General Staff. He has primary General Staff responsibility in the functional areas and for the activities listed below:

a. Security

(1) Exercises coordinating staff supervision in all matters pertaining to establishment of a secure environment for revolutionary development and related programs.

(2) Provides guidance for determining requirements for military and civilian assets (US, FWMA and GVN) to support revolutionary development.

(3) Recommends priorities for military support of revolutionary development.

(4) Prepares annexes and other pertinent material for II FFORCEV operations plans, orders, and directives pertaining to revolutionary development support.

b. Economic and Social Development

(1) Exercises coordinating staff supervision of US/FWMAF advisory support of economic and social development programs.

(2) Monitors the impact of the US presence in relation to the economic and social environment.

(3) Recommends methods to reduce or eliminate economic and social control by the VC infrastructure.

(4) Reviews requirements for US/FWMAF resources necessary for the support of the civil population during military operations.

c. Political Development

(1) Recommends policy for assisting subordinate field agencies in developing a political administration compatible with the revolutionary development support program.

(2) Monitors the extent and degree of political stability in III CTZ.
d. Reports and Evaluation

(1) Provides policy guidance for the reports system for revolutionary development matters within III CTZ.

(2) Reviews and analyzes progress toward meeting revolutionary development objectives.

(3) Evaluates all revolutionary development activities, including provision of security for revolutionary development by US/FWIA/GVN military forces, and reports on progress, status and problems of revolutionary development support.

2. PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS DIVISION

a. Formulates policy guidance and plans for the integrated military and civil support of revolutionary development.

b. Prepares annexes and other pertinent materials for II FFORCEV operations plans, orders and directives pertaining to revolutionary development.

c. Develops requirements for assets to support revolutionary development.

d. Coordinates with the staffs of MACCORDS, CORDS III, Deputy Senior Advisor and other members of the II FFORCEV Staff on matters related to revolutionary development policies, planning and programming.

e. Develops military/civil plans and policy guidelines for major revolutionary development program support areas to include: New Life Development, Revolutionary Development Workers, Public Safety, Psychological Operations, Refugees and Chieu Hoi.

f. Receives and reviews revolutionary development plans and requirements submissions to assure consistency and conformance with approved revolutionary development policy, guidelines, objectives and priorities.

g. Provides the HQ II FFORCEV focal point for economic warfare to include population and resources control.

h. Reviews, coordinates and integrates as necessary non-revolutionary development and revolutionary development-related planning requirements with revolutionary development concepts and planning activities.
3. RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DIVISION

a. Conducts research to develop a quantitative and qualitative basis for measurement of revolutionary development progress.

b. Maintains liaison with MACCORDES, CORDS III, Deputy Senior Advisor, other II FFORCEV staff sections and other agencies to assure availability of information and studies related to revolutionary development.

c. Recommends procedures, techniques and innovations by which revolutionary development, revolutionary development-related and non-revolutionary development programs can be adapted for civil/military use.

d. Provides the HQ II FFORCEV repository of revolutionary development reference materials, studies and information.

e. Monitors the impact of the US presence in relation to the social and economic environment.

f. Monitors the extent and effectiveness of political stability in the local environment.

4. REPORTS AND EVALUATION DIVISION

a. Provides policy guidance for the management of the reports system for revolutionary development matters within III CTZ.

b. Evaluates all civil/military aspects of the revolutionary development program for purposes of determining current status and problem areas.

c. Provides representation on combined field inspections of the revolutionary development programs in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the support being provided these programs at province/district/village/hamlet levels.

d. Collects, processes and evaluates data on revolutionary development submitted by agencies of CORDS III, the Deputy Senior Advisor, units of II FFORCEV and GVN offices.

e. Prepares, develops and submits periodic and special reports or evaluations relating to the progress and status of the revolutionary development programs as required by higher headquarters.

f. Prepares revolutionary development graphic and visual data charts for display and briefing purposes.
### MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Provided By</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief (FSR 3)</td>
<td>CORDS III</td>
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<td>Planner (LTC or MAJ)</td>
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<td>2 Planners (FSR 3, 4 or 5)</td>
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<td>Clerk-Typist</td>
<td>AG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>HQ CDT</td>
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**NOTE:** Senior Foreign Service officer will be Chief.  
Senior Military officer will be Deputy.
CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONNEL REQUIRED:
CG
Aide
G2 - G3
6 Asst G2/G3 Officers & 8 EM
HQ Comdt & 5 EM
Sig Officer
Sig Opn Officer
3 JF EM
Arty Rep
4 Pilots
4 A/C Crewmen
18 MP's

RECAP:
18 Officers
68 EM
18 Vehicles
### CONFIDENTIAL

#### STATISTICAL SUMMARY

**TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT**

1 May - 31 July 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUB</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>VNAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Total air sorties during period:</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Number sorties flown by US in support of ARVN:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Number sorties flown by VNAF in support of ARVN:</td>
<td>2,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Total sorties flown in support of ARVN:</td>
<td>4,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Number sorties flown by US aircraft in support of US Forces:</td>
<td>7,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Number sorties flown by VNAF aircraft in support of US Forces:</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Total sorties flown in support of US Forces:</td>
<td>7,842</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Number COMBAT SKY SPOT missions flown in support of ARVN:</td>
<td>331</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Number COMBAT SKY SPOT missions flown in support of US:</td>
<td>1,274</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9th Inf Div</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25th Inf Div</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st ATF</td>
<td>121</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>199th Inf Bde</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other (II FFV)</td>
<td>132</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Results of Air Strikes:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>30,010</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>21,233</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CBU</td>
<td>477,051</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NAPALM</td>
<td>10,539</td>
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<td></td>
<td>20mm</td>
<td>2,299,100</td>
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Incl 12
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 July 1967

CG, II Field Force Vietnam

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13. ABSTRACT

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