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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO 96307

19 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(HCS CSFOR-55) (U)

TO: Commanding Officer
Special Troops, US Army Vietnam
ATTN: S-3
APO 96307

(C) SECTION I: Significant Organization or Unit Activities

1. (C) Battalion Headquarters: (Saigon)

   a. (C) S-1

      (1) (C) During the reporting period the S-1 Section discharged its usual administrative responsibilities. At the present time a critical personnel shortage exists in MOS 04E2w (Vietnamese Linguist) and MOS 52B2w (Generator Repairmen). The personnel to fill the MOS's are on requisition. Presently, all other personnel shortages have been satisfied.

      (2) (U) The Battalion Message Center which is a direct subsection of the S-1 Section made distribution of 64,837 pieces of correspondence. In addition to normal distribution, the Message Center made special distribution of JUSPAO Memos, Guidance, Newspaper, MACPD Newsletters and various booklets throughout Vietnam.

      (3) (U) On 1 April 1967 nine (9) officers were transferred from this battalion to MACPD. These officers were for duty with MACPD as advisors in the MOPIC and RADIO SECTIONS filling MACPD TD positions. This transfer places these officers in TD slots commensurate with their performed duties.
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During the reporting period the Battalion presented 103 awards to include 1 Soldier's Medal, 11 Bronze Stars, 6 Air Medals, 16 Army Commendation Medals, and 69 Aircraft Crewmen's Badges.

b. (U) $2

(1) Section activities showed an increase over those of the previous quarter, due to a combination of improved efficiency, expanded psychological intelligence information files, a greater diversity of information sources, and the increase in psychological operations throughout Vietnam.

(2) Actions accomplished included the development and pretesting of five leaflets; the compilation of three province studies, six psychological intelligence summaries, and nine reports and letters on items of psyop value; five formal briefings were presented on section organization and functions; one leaflet was pretested for another agency.

(3) The Interrogation Team gained access to the III Corps Tactical Zone POW Camp (Bien Hoa). Previously, interrogations/interviews had been confined to civilians, Chieu Hoi returnees, and very limited numbers of POW's. This addition permits a broader base of information, both in number and opinion.

(4) The Research and Analysis Subsection files were reorganized according to an easily expanded topical file system. Intelligence information is currently filed under one of one hundred and thirty-five topics.

(5) As part of the battalion project, a functional SOP (Annex C Intelligence) was developed and produced.

c. (C) $3

(1) (C) During the reporting period the 6th PSYOP Battalion Printing Plant printed 223,700,000 leaflets. New records were established for leaflets printed in one day, impressions made in one week and leaflets printed in one month. 61,500,000 million leaflets were packed in 782 M-129El leaflet bombs for dissemination in North Vietnam. Of the volume printed by the printing plant, 205,730,000 leaflets were shipped to the psyop companies. In addition 27,760 reams of paper were shipped to the psyop companies.

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(2) (U) During the month of February, a requirement was placed upon this headquarters to prepare a series of MTOE's based on the status of all units as of 31 December 1966. A total of six MTOE's were prepared, one each for the battalion headquarters, the 24th Detachment, the 25th Detachment, the 26th Detachment and the 19th PSYOP Company. The remaining units, the 244th, 245th, and 246th PSYOP Companies, were combined into one MTOE as they are identically structured. The MTOE's were prepared and submitted to USARV G-3, O&T Division.

(3) (U) The concept of deployment mentioned in the last report dated 27 February 1967 was forwarded to Department of Army through channels.

(4) (U) As requested by the Commandant, USAFJKWS, this headquarters submitted recommendations for two Programs of Instruction (POI). The four companies submitted recommendations on the POI for the proposed PSYOP Unit Officers Course. The battalion headquarters prepared recommendations for the POI to be used in the proposed PSYOP Staff Officers Course. The recommendations were based on the experience gained by key personnel while serving in Vietnam.

(5) (U) A request for additional area and building space was made to the ARVN Political Warfare Department through MACPD. The request provided the information on present and future requirements of the battalion's printing facility located in the ARVN Political Warfare Directorate compound. While awaiting the reply to the request a letter with the same information included was submitted to C.G. HAC ATTN: Real Estate, for their planning as favorable response was anticipated. The area outlined for the printing facility in the ARVN reply was considered inadequate and a second letter to C.G. HAC was submitted requesting a site for the relocation of the printing facility.

(6) (U) Two items of equipment were requested using procedures for Expediting Non-Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment (ENSURE). A Modular Audio Visual Unit (MAVU) was requested on a test basis to determine its operational capabilities in Vietnam. The GIH-3 loudspeaker system was also requested. This system is under development and is scheduled to replace the AN/UYH-5, which is on the current TO&E.
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(7) (U) Due to the many changes which have occurred in recent months it was determined the 6th PSYOP Battalion SOP was inadequate. To correct this inadequacy the battalion undertook the task of completely rewriting the SOP. The document upon completion on 20 April 1967 was distributed to those agencies concerned with the operation of this headquarters.

d. (U) 8-4

(1) Considerable difficulties previously encountered with regard to 2d echelon vehicular maintenance support within the 19th PSYOP Co, 245th PSYOP Co and the 2/6th PSYOP Co were alleviated through action taken by CG USARV. On 31 March USARV MSG UICLAS AVINGD-MD 20366 directed CG 1st Log Co to provide this support and to provide technical inspection and classification support of PSYOP peculiar equipment. This message was further clarified 20 April by USARV MSG UICLAS AVINGD-PO 25014. On 15 April a 1st Log Co study team commenced an examination of maintenance problems encountered with the PSYOP peculiar equipment.

(2) The procurement of automotive repair parts for the Kaiser Willys Jeepster was initiated through the Philco Commercial Vehicle Parts Warehouse. Once vehicular support for the A/V Jeepsters has been established by the appropriate support unit, these units will assume this requisition responsibility.

(3) The 14th Inventory Control Center established a requisition objective for paper products (FSC 9310). With this R/O functioning, future in-country paper stockage should be sufficient to preclude emergencies which were frequently encountered during the reporting period. However, it will require approximately 5 months for this system to catch up with current requirements.

2. (C) 19th PSYOP Company (Can Tho)

(1) (U) During the past reporting period 190,196,000 leaflets were disseminated by air and other means. Of this total 3,911,000 were prepared by the company. 419 hours and 25 minutes of aerial loudspeaker
messages were broadcast. All of these figures reflect substantial increases over the previous reporting period. All of the companies resources were made available to support 16 tactical operations in IV CTZ.

(2) (U) Recognizing that within different divisions, sectors or even smaller areas there exist conditions that are peculiar to only that particular area, a program of tailoring psyop appeals to meet the conditions in each area has been implemented. This is in addition to the continued use of great quantities of national leaflets dropped on large area targets.

(3) (U) A concept of co-locating field teams with ARVN PSTWAR companies in each ARVN Division Tactical Zone will be implemented. This will supplement the personalized PSTOP programs and also provide a quick reaction capability to exploit incidents in each DTZ; will provide liaison between the DTZ and the 19th; will provide feedback on effects of propaganda efforts; and identify new vulnerabilities for exploitation.

(4) (C) A number of automatic weapons hits have been received by U-10 and C-47 psyop aircraft in IV CTZ. Flight E, 5th Air Commando Squadron was directed to fly loudspeaker missions no lower than 4,000 feet. This has greatly decreased the effectiveness of tape missions because in order for the message to be heard on the ground atmospheric conditions must be almost perfect. The number of complaints received by this unit from sector psyop advisors attest to the ineffectiveness of 4,000 feet loudspeaker operations. A program is underway to reduce the length of taped messages to a maximum of 25 seconds, enabling the aircraft to employ a straight fly through at 3,000 feet rather than orbiting at 4,000 feet.
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(5) (U) A review of the psyop tape program in the IV CTZ has indicated that only 25-30% of the present tapes are utilized. A program is being conducted to make division and sector psyop personnel aware of what is available and to determine a type standard tape they can utilize. In conjunction with this, tape catalogs are being compiled by this unit and copies are being distributed down to sector level.

(6) (U) Interrogators visited Chieu Hoi Centers at Bac Lieu, Soc Trang, My Tho, Go Cong and CanTho. Information gained from the Hoi Chanh interviews has been used in local psyop campaigns. Interviews show that the Viet Cong fear the government RD and Chieu Hoi programs; also that family hardships are caused by the absence of male members serving in VC units. Chieu Hoi Center visits will be made on a continuing basis.

(7) (C) In February an attitude survey of Dinh Tuong Province was conducted for COMUSMACV. The objective of this survey was to determine the populations attitude toward the 9th US Inf Div. Conditions most feared by the population are inflation, possible civilian casualties caused by US firepower and prostitution. A follow up survey will be conducted in May to determine any attitude changes in the population. A similar study was done of the population along the Bassac River with respect to US Navy PBR operations. The study revealed the PBR's to have been favorably received by the population. The PBR's greatly increased security on the river and have an extensive MEDCAP.

(8) (C) Research and analysis of VC propaganda indicates the following themes are stressed:

(a) US Imperialism
(b) US Atrocities Against the People
(c) VN Nationalism
(d) Appeals for ARVN to defect and turn against the US troops.
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(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

3. (c) 244th PSYOP Company (Danang)

(1) (U) During the reporting period, the company engaged in 10 hours of mandatory training and 89 days of continuous operations. No organizational changes occurred, and this unit has continued operations under its current modified organization as adapted from regular TOE. During this 39 day period 272,090,000 leaflets were disseminated by air with 36,755,000 of these being printed by the company. 495 hours of aerial loudspeaker broadcast operations were conducted.

(2) (U) The most significant and important unit activity during the period was the TET (Lunar New Year) Psychological Operations Campaign which was conducted from 1 Jan 67 to 28 Feb 67. All psyop resources in ICTZ were mobilized to make it the largest single psyop campaign to date. Constant liaison and coordination were conducted among psyop elements of III MAF, MACV Advisor Group, Special Forces and this unit. Although direct results are difficult to measure accurately, the number of ralliers jumped to 647 this quarter as compared to 522 last quarter (Oct-Dec 1966). These results indicate the effectiveness of a combined, concentrated effort aimed at neutral and enemy targets for a specific purpose (rally, return home).

(3) (G) Intelligence and propaganda production continue to use Psychological Operations Exploitation Teams (POET) with increasing success. In addition to seeking and gathering propaganda materials (incidents, ralliers, prisoners, etc.), POETs also gather valuable feedback information. Feedback from a prisoner and a rallier at Thaong Duc district headquarters revealed the effectiveness of VC propaganda concerning Allied defoliation operations. VC propaganda has caused villagers in the area to believe that the spray will cause illness and spitting of blood if inhaled. The VC further convinced the populace that a face mask of nylon would offer protection against the spray; they then made possession of the masks mandatory and sold them to villagers for 15 to 20 piasters each. Another example of helpful feedback information came from a source who had heard night aerial broadcasts and suggested that between 2200 and 2300 hours is the best time to broadcast. At this time, the source said, families are gathered together and have the opportunity to discuss what they hear. Generally, psyop feedback continues to emphasize the advisability (from sources' suggestions) that a face-to-face program directed...
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at relatives of VC is among the better means of obtaining ralliers. Acting on this suggestion, Audio-Visual activity in this unit has increased many times over during the reporting period by conducting more face-to-face and direct appeal operations.

(4) (U) To support the company's rapidly expanding Audio-Visual mission, 14 USMC personnel have been attached for duty from Headquarters and Service Company, III MAF. Thirteen Marines were assigned to form a nucleus of HB (combat loudspeaker) Teams as well as to participate in other A/V operations. One Marine intelligence NCO was assigned to the company Intelligence Section. The Marines have rapidly learned Psychological Operations - this, combined with their infantry training, makes them an effective, valuable asset to this unit. The concept of training and employing selected members of supported units may also prove helpful to psyop units in other areas, especially when requests for psyop support far exceed the supporting unit's capability.

(5) (U) Movie Festivals have proven to be an effective means of establishing better relationships with rural populations.

(6) (U) To orient BN and Regiment psyop personnel on psyop in I CTZ, a monthly three-day III MAF Psyop Orientation Course was established at the beginning of the quarter. The III MAF psyop course provides commanders with properly oriented psyop personnel to provide advice, prepare psyop plans, employ equipment, and be aware of psyop support available from the company. Three classes have been conducted. Comments from personnel attending have been favorable. To date more than 65 personnel have attended.

(7) (U) During the reporting period the company received its Annual General Inspection. The company received a satisfactory rating; however a significant problem was noted. An organic maintenance capability is not authorized by present TOE. With 24 vehicles, 3 generators and a great deal of electronic equipment, proper maintenance has been conducted at the expense of this unit's primary mission. Five personnel out of 60 authorized have been re-assigned from their primary jobs to that of full-time maintenance at the unit echelon. This accounts for 12% of the authorized strength. A modified TOE, submitted last quarter, has made provisions for an increased maintenance capability in psyop units. However, the MTOE has not been implemented at this time and maintenance continues to be a significant problem.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

4. (C) 265th PSYOP Company (Nha Trang)

(1) (U) In II CTZ Operations, 370,112,200 leaflets were dissem- 
inated of which 42,006,000 were printed by this company. A total of 
300,086,200 leaflets were disseminated in II CTZ from the 6th PSYOP Bat-
talion and 7th PSYOP Group. In addition, 1,430:10 hours of aerial loud-
speaker time was directed against/toward targets in enemy areas.

(2) (U) Leaflets and loudspeaker operations were in support of tactical and Revolutionary Development operations: Byrd, Farragut, Thayer II, Dallas, Gatling, Sun Houston, Adams, Francis Marion, Summerville, Forshting, Moeng-No 8, Back-Mei, Ma-Doo 1, Bi Ma 3, and Oh Jack Kyo in II 
CTZ; and Lejeune and Oregon in I CTZ.

(3) (C) The objective of leaflets used before tactical and Revolutionary Development support operations were generally:

(a) Population control
(b) Cause population to deny support to VC/NVA elements
(c) Describe to VC/NVA and local populace the terms of the Chuoi Ho Program
(d) Cause populace of VC/NVA controlled areas to expose VC/NVA personnel
(e) Cause populace in contested areas to accept and support the cause of the SVN

(4) (C) The objectives of leaflets and loudspeaker operations during tactical operations were:

(a) Demoralize VC/NVA troops
(b) Cause defections in VC/NVA ranks
(c) Assure potential FFWs' and Ho Chi Chunks of fair treat-
ment
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

(a) Exploit Hoi Chanhs and FW's to effect desertion

(b) Alienate the VC/NVA forces from the populace

(c) Create a fear of impending doom in VC/NVA personnel, should they continue to fight

(d) Reinforce the Republic of Vietnam TET Campaign with priority emphasis upon the Chieu Hoi appeal

(e) Convince the VC/NVA and people under their control that the TET period is a good time to rally to the SVN

(f) Erode the confidence of VC/NVA forces in ultimate victory

(g) Leaflets used prior to an operation gave safety instructions to the populace and rally instructions to VC/NVA sympathizers and troops.

(h) Results of psychological operations show 3,298 Hoi Chanhs for the period 1 Feb to 21 Apr, 1967. The returnee total since 1 Jan 66 is 13,198 in II CTZ.

(i) Aerial loudspeaker missions were flown in conjunction with, and support of separate operations down to, and including platoon sized units. A total of 857 aerial loudspeaker sorties were flown by US Air Force aircraft and 116 loudspeaker sorties were flown by US Army aircraft in II CTZ.

(j) Seven two-man loudspeaker teams (HB) and one Audio-Visual team (HE) were attached to US OPCON units and 9th ROK Division for major operations in II CTZ. In addition, one two-man HB team was attached to Task Force Oregon in I CTZ.

(k) Psyop annexes of contingency plans for five proposed operations in II CTZ have been prepared with maximum emphasis being placed on the use of accurate, timely intelligence to develop meaningful propaganda materials rather than the use of standard, nationwide materials.
(10) (C) Analysis of the enemy propaganda shows an increasing indication that VC propaganda is directed mainly toward countering American propaganda and the national Chieu Hoi program rather than creating new themes for their own use.

(11) (U) The TET Campaign was completed on 28 Feb 67. The campaign was conducted in four (4) phases as follows:

(a) Phase I: 1 Jan - 4 Feb 67
(b) Phase II: 5 Feb - 9 Feb 67
(c) Phase III: 10 Feb - 13 Feb 67
(d) Phase IV: 14 Feb - 28 Feb 67

During the last three phases a total of 38,000,000 leaflets were disseminated and a total of 137,445 hours loudspeaker time conducted.

(12) (U) A total of 1,298,000 Spring Reunion leaflets were disseminated to follow up the TET Campaign.

(13) (U) Leaflet printing requests from tactical units frequently arrive with a rush priority requested, which is not warranted by an analysis of text. Requestors should evaluate their requests for a valid suspense date and take cognizance of the capability of the 245th PSYOP Company to react. The priority ASAP is not valid and will not provide a quick reaction from the 245th printing assets.

d. (C) 246th PSYOP Company (Bien Hoa)

(1) (U) From 1 Feb 67 to 30 Apr 67, Psychological Operations were conducted by FWMAF and GVN in the III CTZ supported by the 246th PSYOP Co in Bien Hoa, the 5th Air Commando Squadron (ACS), the 6th PSYOP Bn in Saigon, the 7th PSYOP Gp in Okinawa, the Advisory Groups throughout the III CTZ and the Capital Military District.

(2) (U) In operations conducted during this period the 246th PSYOP disseminated 212,257,140 leaflets of which 50,215,000 were
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SUBJECT: Operational Request for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

19 May 1967

(UCS CSPOR. 65) (U)

printed by this unit's printing section. A total of 162,042,140 leaflets were disseminated during this period from stock leaflets which were printed by the 6th FSTOF BN, 7th FSTOF GP and this unit's printing facilities. In addition, 1,056 hours and 30 minutes of aerial loudspeaker time was directed against/toward targets in enemy areas.

(3) (U) Leaflet and loudspeaker operations were in support of the following tactical and Revolutionary Development Operations: Gadson, Junction City, Tucson, Fairfax, Enterprise, Lamson, Portsie, Waialua, Makalapa and Lanakai.

(4) (U) The objective of leaflets used before tactical and revolutionary development support operations were the same as those mentioned in paragraph 2,c,(3) of this report.

(5) (C) The objectives of leaflets and loudspeaker operations during the TET Campaign were:

(a) Reinforce the Republic of Vietnam TET Campaign with priority emphasis upon the Chieu Hoi appeal.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

(b) Convince the VC/NVA and people under their control that the TET period is a good time to rally to the GVN.

(c) Erode the confidence of VC/NVA forces in ultimate victory.

(7) (U) Results of PSYOP show 2,820 Hoi Chanshs for this period in the III CTZ.

(8) (U) Field Teams: Ten two man teams were attached to US OPCON units and the 1st ATF (R&R) throughout this period.

(9) (U) This unit used a U1-A (otter) obtained through II FForce for bulk delivery of 32,274,400 leaflets to tactical units throughout the III CTZ.

(10) (U) During the follow up of the TET Campaign, 18,304,800 Spring Reunion leaflets were disseminated.

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19 May 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS OSPUR-65) (U)

(C) SECTION II: Part I - Observations (Lessons Learned)

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION (U)

(U) Item: Intelligence Production

Discussion:

a. The standard report of the section has been the CONFIDENTIAL "Psychological Intelligence Summary (U)", produced on a Corps Tactical Zone basis (i.e., one report for I & II CTZ, one for III & IV CTZ) and with each report covering approximately a fifteen day period.

b. Each report has been the responsibility of one analyst and an assistant who covered all topics included in the report.

c. Production of the report involved a considerable amount of effort and as other research and analysis activities increased, became a burden to the analysts, reducing their availability for other projects.

d. A study of the report - organization and production - was initiated and as a result, a new report format was established and it was decided to produce the report on a country-wide basis (i.e., both North and South Vietnam) once every thirty days. Analysts were assigned specific portions of the report.

Observations:

The assignment of topics, rather than all psychological factors existing within a geographic area, is a more realistic and efficient approach to a production and coverage of PSYOP intelligence required of this he., in view of personnel available and current workload requirements.

PRINTING SUPPORT (U)

(U) Item: Printing Support

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS GSPAR-65) (U)

Discussion:

a. One of the primary missions of the 6th PSYOP Bn Headquarters is to provide backup printing support to the PSYOP companies. In the past the PSYOP Companies have had requests submitted to them for large volumes of leaflets which require a quick reaction printing time to permit exploitation of an enemy vulnerability. Since the companies are unable to meet this request, the responsibility falls upon the battalion printing plant.

b. On 9 March a leaflet request was received from I FForce Vietnam (IFFV) at 1600 hours. The request included the completed artwork and was hand-carried by an individual who was familiar with the requirements of the request. By 0700 the morning of 10 March, 1 million leaflets were printed, cut, packed for shipment and delivered to Tan Son Nhut for loading on a special mission aircraft which had been scheduled by IFFV. The leaflets were scheduled to be dropped at 1300 hours that same day, less than 24 hours after the receipt of the request.

Observations:

a. The request must be accompanied by the final artwork.

b. The leaflet requested must be one color.

c. An individual who is familiar with the request should accompany it and be prepared to discuss any questions that may arise.

d. The major obstacle to the success of this type operation is the availability of an aircraft for shipment of the finished product. Every effort must be made to schedule special mission aircraft for pickup and dissemination on the return leg of the mission.

PSYOP PERSONNEL (U)

(U) Item: Physical appearance of psyop personnel.

Discussion: When an American soldier with physical defects appears as a military representative during MEDCAF, DENTCAF, or other Audio Visual operations, his appearance may cause Vietnamese nationals...
to doubt the validity of medicine and assist VC propaganda claims that Allied medicine is harmful.

Observation: A healthy personal appearance should be required as part of the criteria for selecting psyop personnel, especially those intended for duty in Audio-Visual and Intelligence work.

(U) Item: Time lost on OJT.

Discussion: Officers and enlisted men assigned to psyop units often require considerable OJT before they can effectively assume the job responsibilities. This results in a reduction of the operational efficiency of the unit.

Observation: Officer personnel who will be assigned as technical supervisors should receive technical training in their field (e.g., a reproduction officer should be trained in operation and maintenance of presses and allied equipment, in addition to regular psyop training). Enlisted personnel should be generally trained in MOS and then schooled in particular operation and equipment to which they will be assigned.

COORDINATION (U)

(U) Item: Coordination.

Discussion: Close coordination and communication between III MAF PSC, Flight "A" 9th ACS and USAF FACS is imperative if pre-air strike warning missions are to be successful.

Observation: All efforts must be made to insure close coordination and communications between all parties.

LIAISON (U)

(U) Item: Liaison with I Corps PCC. (Propaganda Control Center)

Discussion: Liaison between I Corps Propaganda Control Center and III MAF Propaganda Support Center is necessary to insure adequate dissemination of information.
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(RCS CSPKR-65) (U)

Observation: A weekly meeting was established to insure coordination between the two offices. In addition, a daily liaison has also been established.

AERIAL TAPES (U)

(U) Item: Aerial tapes at 4,000 feet.

Discussion: With the altitude being raised to 4,000 feet for aerial tape broadcasts, it was found that present tapes were not being understood on the ground.

Observation: The altitude for aircraft had to be lowered and the tapes had to be modified for them to be understood.

IMMEDIATE AIR STRIKES (U)

(U) Item: Immediate air strike tapes.

Discussion: A means was needed for psyops to support immediate air strikes.

Observation: To give immediate response for psyop requests a standard pre-air strike tape was developed and placed aboard all 9th ACS aircraft. These tapes are to be used to support immediate air strikes only.

LIAISON OFFICER MEETING (U)

(U) Item: LNO Meeting.

Discussion: A better means of communication was deemed necessary to insure adequate control of transfer of information between elements of the company.

Observation: In order to meet this need a twice-monthly LNO meeting has been established. The meeting is held in the company area, with all section leaders and LNO's attending.
PLATEMAKING (U)

(U) Item: Developing Plates by Hand.

Discussion: Constant usage of platemaker causes frequent motor burnout. While waiting for repairs, plates can still be made.

Observation: By a careful, even rolling of plates through the developer rollers, plates may be developed manually as well as those machine rolled.

HALF-TONE CONTRAST (U)

(U) Item: Extreme Contrast.

Discussion: A photo of normal contrast will often print too dark if the half-tone layout is of the same contrast as the photo.

Observation: Produce a half-tone that is fairly pale or flat and add a little extra ink when printing and all light and shadow areas should reproduce evenly. Also making a dark plate for a light photograph produces much better results than trying to make a light plate for a dark photograph.

ICA AUDIO/VISUAL JEEPSTER (U)

(U) Item: Audio Visual Jeepster Power Source.

Discussion: The self contained power source on the Jeepster after one year of use proves to be highly unreliable.

Observation: To depend on being able to conduct an operation with the Jeepster an additional power source must be provided as a standby.

RETURNES (U)

(C) Item: Use of Returnees (Ex-Viet Cong/NVA).

Discussion: Returnees or Ex-Viet Cong/NVA can be and
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should be used to great advantage in their former areas of operation.

Observation: They can accompany units on sweeps, patrols, search and destroy operations, cut propaganda tapes, pose for leaflet photographs, and supply extremely important facts to the tactical units.

LOCAL OFFICIALS (U)

Item: Local Officials.

Discussion: For planning purposes such as movie festivals and other operations dealing with the local population, the opinion of the local officials should most definitely be taken into consideration.

Observation: These officials know their people and problems better than anyone else.

HB TEAM RECORDERS (U)

Item: Recorder-Reproducer Set, Sound AN/UH-10 Unsuitability.

Discussion: The AN/UH-10 Recorder-Reproducer Set, proves to be totally unsuited for HB operations. It is much too bulky and is not compatible to the present UH-5 loudspeaker system. It is limited to one speed. The reproduction quality is poor and the unit is constantly needing repair.

Observation: An AEK-RE-1561 Tape Recorder was ordered as a replacement on 26 January 1967. It is compatible to the loudspeaker system and has the quality and desired features needed.

AUDIO/VISUAL JEEPSTER (U)

Item: ICA Audio/Visual Jeepster.

Discussion: The ICA Audio/Visual Jeepster proves unsuitable for employment in many areas of Vietnam. The jeepster does not have enough traction and the body is too fragile. The engine is very susceptible to wet weather. The self contained power sources are unreliable in
that the clutch assembly on the alternator system after about one year of use is constantly breaking down; once repaired the system slips and will not hold the full load of the components when operating. The rubber joint connecting the governor and alternator which changes 12 Volts DC to 110 AC was used for approximately one month. It burned out, and has not been further tested. The components are fragile and will not withstand the shock, dampness, and dust they are subjected to. The McMartin tape recorder has the quality desired however, it is more susceptible to the conditions listed above than the other components and has proven to be very un-reliable. The projection screen mount is too weak and will not withstand normal use.

Observation: The Audio/Visual unit could be employed more effectively if it was mounted on a more sturdy frame that has more traction (possibly 3/4 Ton Truck). The clutch assembly on the alternator system would probably prove more reliable if it could be enclosed to withstand the weather, or another solution would be to provide two additional clutch assemblies with each system. The same would apply to the rubber joint connecting the governor and the alternator, only it would take about six of these joints per year of use. The components should be put in water and dust proof cases. The projection screen mount would probably withstand the use if it were made out of more sturdy material.

INTERPRETERS (U)

(C) Item: A/V Interpreter Shortage.

Discussion: Neither HE or HB team has the means of communicating directly with the population unless provided with an interpreter from the unit they are supporting. This at times proves to be a great hindrance in getting the best utilization out of the teams and equipment because quite often the unit cannot spare an interpreter to be used by the team.

Observation: Each team should be assigned an individual of the host country to act as interpreter and announcer.

AIRBORNE LOUDSPEAKER BROADCAST APPEALS (U)

(C) Item: Airborne Loudspeaker Broadcast Appeals.

Discussion: Rallier feedback indicates that in the major-
ity of cases, the broadcasts were not understood because of the altitude of the plane, windy weather distorting the speech or the speech was too long and portions were missed so that the whole message was not heard and thereby not fully understood.

Observation: Careful attention must be paid to the effect altitude and weather may have. Short, concise sentences should be used with several repetitions of each sentence for complete understanding.

**LEAFLET/POSTER TEXTS AND ILLUSTRATIONS (U)**

(C) Item: Leaflet/Poster texts and illustrations.

Discussion: Pretesting of leaflet/poster texts and illustrations point up many areas where errors may exist not evident to the western manner of thinking. A photo of two elderly men, even though smiling, showed them squatting before a doorway to a house; pretest indicated that persons squatting conveyed the impression of POW's. Texts that seem highly credible in English may sound very false or foolish when expressed in Vietnamese. Illustrations and texts using expressions that convey particular meanings to Americans may have absolutely no meaning whatsoever to a Vietnamese.

Observation: Careful pretest of photos, illustrations and texts for possible errors by the extensive use of available Vietnamese personnel ( Armed Propaganda Platoon members, Chieu Hoi ralliers, Translator/Interpreter personnel) is indispensable in order to retain credibility of propaganda.

**RETURNEE LETTER APPEALS (TESTIMONIALS) (U)**

(C) Item: Returnee Letter Appeals (Testimonials).

Discussion: Returnee feedback indicates that the personal nature of the letter appeals causes them to be highly credible to the target audience.

Observation: Exploitation of returnees to capitalize on this fact will be continued.

**APPEAL TO VC PERSONNEL FROM THEIR RELATIVES (U)**

(C) Item: Appeal to VC personnel from their relatives.
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(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Discussion: Rallier feedback and suggestions from ralliers are that a face-to-face appeal to relatives of VC should increase number of ralliers.

Observation: Institute a program of face contact with the immediate family and persuade them to appeal to their sons and husbands, explaining their right to rally under the Chieu Hoi Program.

REWARDS (U)

(U) Item: Reward Leaflets for ammunition, information on the location of mines and booby traps and information on VC activities in connection with such mines and booby traps.

Discussion: Results obtained have been civilians volunteering information to the USMC and ammunition being turned in to the USMC for the rewards offered.

Observation: The best results have been obtained from leaflet number 264-269-67, promising rewards for information as to location of mines and booby traps.

TREATMENT OF NVA POW'S (U)

(U) Item: Treatment of NVA POW's.

Discussion: Experience with NVA POW's shows that, after being captured, if they are well treated and not harassed they will cooperate and voluntarily allow themselves to be used for psyop exploitation.

Observation: The importance of good treatment of POW's should be emphasized, as this will result in cooperation benefiting the intelligence and psyop effort.

VEHICULAR MAINTENANCE (U)

(U) Item: Vehicle repairs and preventative maintenance in rainy season.

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AVIB-C
19 May 1967
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(RCS GSFOR-67) (U)

Discussion: In Vietnam the rainy season will play havoc with vehicle preventative maintenance. Parts, especially brake shoes, U-joints, and wheel bearings are highly affected.

Observation: Take more care in lubrication. Weekly lubrication is not excessive. Watch for water contamination of any lubricated surface.

GENERATOR MAINTENANCE (U)

(U) Item: Generator maintenance in rainy season.

Discussion: Before the rainy season have generator covered and protected from the elements. Especially affected are relays and all electrical elements. Fuel too becomes easily contaminated.

Observation: Build shelters for generators. Have a fuel tank; not a 55 gallon oil drum. Use the net tank on generators and strain fuel before adding it to the equipment. Use of the auxiliary fuel lines will allow water and rust to enter the equipment and ruin it.

EFFECTIVENESS OF PSYOPS (U)

(C) Item: Effectiveness of psyops in exploiting intelligence and tactical situations.

Discussion: The effectiveness of psychological exploitation of intelligence and tactical situations is inadequate and limited because the best, most accurate and timely sources of information is the Hoi Chanh who surrenders to US/FNAR tactical units. The majority of Hoi Chanhs surrender to Vietnamese government authorities and are not readily available for timely exploitation.

Observation: The lack of Hoi Chanh exploitation is because guidance and encouragement to utilize them has not been forthcoming from the GVII.

M-14 RIFLE (U)

(C) Item: M-14 Rifle.
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Discussion: The M-14 rifle is not suitable for field teams. The weight is an added burden to a man with a backpack speaker. The noise is like that of the M-1 used by the VC and a team leader is in danger of being fired upon by unseen members of his supported unit, who fire at sound. The length of the M-14 is also inconvenient in daily repeated helicopter missions. M-16's are signed out from supported units whenever possible.

Observation: The M-16 rifle will be the basic weapon in the near future.

PART II - RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) Recommend that supported units provide selected personnel to perform OJT with supporting psyop unit. This OJT would be conducted for a sufficient period of time to permit the individuals to develop a psyop capability and then return them to the parent unit. The psyop capability of American units in Vietnam could be greatly increased if this recommendation were adopted. It appears that even strictly combat units are finding it necessary to supplement their activities with psyop civic affairs operations in order to make their achievements more thorough and enduring. The recognized fact that the outcome of the Vietnam conflict depends in large part on the willing support of local populations is the basis for this recommendation. Experience in this unit has revealed that non-psyop personnel can be trained to become effective psychological operators while still retaining their original capabilities. This system yields at least three important results: (1) the psyop unit's capability is correspondingly increased; (2) the capabilities of regular infantry personnel from the supported unit are greatly expanded, thus encompassing the ability to do two important jobs (combat and psychological operations) in one man; and (3) regular and psychological operations maybe conducted with each more effectively supporting the other. To accomplish this, the supported unit should coordinate with the psyop company in its particular CTZ, to determine the feasibility of conducting this type of training.

2. (U) Recommend that personnel be more thoroughly trained in specialized fields of psyop to avoid loss of time and efficiency when they reach the new unit. Although a certain amount of job familiarization is inevitably required, this unit has found that key personnel require extensive OJT before they can effectively assume full job responsibilities.

DAVID W. AFFLECK
LTC, Infantry
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning a critical personnel shortage, paragraph 1a(1), page 1: Concur with the comment that a critical shortage of MOS 04B20, Translator/Interpreter, exists. This shortage applies throughout the entire command, necessitating action by this headquarters to distribute available resources in an equitable manner. Linguist requisition and fill data is monitored on a special program basis at this level. Additionally, Department of the Army action in initiating a 12 week sub-fluency course at DLI, Fort Bliss, Texas is intended to provide some interim relief to the problem of linguist shortages. Concur also in the comment concerning a shortage of MOS 52B20, Power Plant Operator/Mechanic. Requirements in the command exceed the number of available trained personnel. Personnel have been requisitioned, and the problem will decrease in direct relation to Department of the Army’s ability to provide qualified replacements.

b. Reference item concerning maintenance problems encountered with the PSYOP peculiar equipment, paragraph 1d, page 4: Concur. Comments made by the unit are considered adequate and maintenance for PSYOP peculiar items is now provided.

c. Reference item concerning the ineffectiveness of the 4000 foot loudspeaker operations, paragraph 2(4), page 5: Concur with program to reduce length of taped messages to a maximum of 25 seconds, enabling the aircraft to employ a straight fly through at 3000 feet rather than orbiting at 4000 feet.

d. Reference item concerning maintenance problems noted during the AGI, paragraph 3(7), page 8: 1st Logistic Command has been tasked to provide back-up organizational maintenance support until such time as the unit has an organizational maintenance capability.
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

e. Reference item concerning time lost on OJT, page 16, and Part II, Recommendations, paragraphs 1 and 2, page 24: This recommendation is under study at this headquarters and action is deferred until study is completed.

f. Reference item concerning audio visual jeepster, power source, page 18: Support of this non-standard equipment package has been a problem. The battalion now has established requirements with the 1st Logistical Command Commercial Vehicle Parts Warehouse. Requests have been submitted through channels for a different vehicle and equipment.

g. Reference item concerning interpreter shortage, page 20: Concur. The 6th PSYOPS Battalion has submitted requisitions through this headquarters to fill its current interpreter shortage. Requisitions have been submitted for US military personnel as authorized in the unit's TOE, and also for indigenous personnel to fill the unit's authorized requirements. Upon receipt of the requisitioned personnel, the unit's interpreter shortage will be alleviated and the HE and HB teams will not depend on assistance from the unit they are supporting.

h. Reference item concerning the effectiveness of psyops, Section II, Part I, page 23: The unit has presented this problem area to MACV, who has OCON of the 6th PSYOPS Battalion. MACV has initiated action to secure the desired exploitation of Hoa Chanh.

i. Reference item concerning M14 rifles, pages 23 and 24: The M16A1 rifle will replace the M14 rifle. Replacement is dependent upon receipts from COMUS production and the priority of issues will be established by this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:
GPOP-DT(19 May 67)        2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 from HQ, 6th PSYOPS Bn (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 30 AUG 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

MCLAURIN SNYDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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