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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Ist Signal Brigade
(USA STRATCOM)

Operational report for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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For OT (continued on page 2)
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST SIGNAL BRIGADE (USA STRATCOM)
APO San Francisco 96307

SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

In compliance with AR 1-19, the following report is submitted:

SECTION I

Significant Organization or Unit Activities

(U) The Brigade Headquarters became fully operational early in the period as officer and enlisted men coming from CONUS filled most of the existing TO&E vacancies. The strength of the headquarters at the close of the period was 95 Officers, 2 Warrant Officers and 214 Enlisted Men; of an authorized strength of 57 Officers, 1 Warrant Officer and 136 Enlisted Men. The required MTCE strength is 106 Officers, 14 Warrant Officers and 289 Enlisted Men.

l. (C) During the period, the following organizational changes occurred:

a. On 15 August 1966, the 73d Signal Battalion (Support) became operational and assumed command of Company C, 1st Signal Battalion, 278th Signal Company (Support), 228th Signal Company (VHF) and 362d Signal Company (T/UHF) located in the Cam Ranh Bay - Nha Trang complex. These companies were formerly under the command of the 41st Signal Battalion (Combat Area).

b. On 22 August 1966, the 40th Signal Battalion (Cable Construction) arrived in-country from CONUS. Headquarters Company A located at Long Binh, Company B at Cam Ranh Bay and Company D, which arrived later in the quarter, is located at Qui Nhon. The arrival of this unit greatly enhances the cable construction capability of this command.
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c. On 1 September 1966, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 86th Signal Battalion (Support) arrived from CONUS and became operational on 1 October. This battalion assumed command of the 595th Signal Company formerly assigned to the 39th Signal Battalion (Support). The 86th Signal Battalion is located at Cu Chi.

d. On 25 September 1966, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 509th Signal Battalion (Support) arrived in-country and assumed command of the 578th Signal Company (Cable Construction) and the 586th Signal Company (Support) in the An Khe area.

e. On 27 September 1966, USASTRATCOM Signal Group - Thailand, was redesignated the 29th Signal Group (USASTRATCOM).

f. On 5 October 1966, the 379th Signal Battalion (Support) and the 55th Signal Company (Support) were assigned to the 29th Signal Group. This action placed all army area signal units and the strategic communications elements in Thailand under the command and control of one signal headquarters. This is in keeping with the concept under which the 1st Signal Brigade was formed.

g. On 8 October 1966, the 37th Signal Battalion (Modified Support) at Da Nang, the 44th Signal Battalion (Modified Support) at Bien Hoa, and the 52d Signal Battalion (Modified Support) at Can Tho were activated. On 10 October 1966, the 43d Signal Battalion (Modified Support) was activated at Pleiku. These battalions, organized under a modified support battalion TOE, are assigned the mission of providing communications support to MACV advisor elements down to sector level and entry, for these elements, into the theater long lines system. One battalion supports the advisors in each Corps Tactical Zone as follows:

(1) 37th Signal Battalion supports the I CTZ
(2) 43d Signal Battalion supports the II CTZ
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(3) 44th Signal Battalion supports the III CTZ

(4) 52d Signal Battalion supports the IV CTZ

Formed in-country from inactivated signal companies, which formerly provided this support, the battalions provide a more responsive communications support to the Senior US Advisor in each CTZ.

h. On 21 October 1966, the 459th Signal Battalion (Combat Area) arrived in-country and provides signal support in the Nha Trang area.

The arrival of the new battalions, HHD signal battalions and activation of the modified support battalions has allowed the reduction of the span of control of signal units in-country to a manageable level. The organizational structure of the 1st Signal Brigade as of 31 October is shown in Appendix A.

2. (U) During the previous quarter, as a result of a study made for the US Army by the Western Electric Company, the Saigon/Cholon Telephone Management Agency was formed to manage, engineer and supervise the army telephone system in the Saigon/Cholon area. The telephone systems in the Saigon/Cholon area had grown so rapidly that the overall complex far exceeded many commercial telephone systems in the United States. The management practices and operator-procedures were geared for tactical operations, and were not adequate to provide a responsive telephone communications system for the area. The growth of telephone systems throughout Vietnam caused a reevaluation of telephone management procedures. The current number of switchboards and lines operated in Vietnam outside of the Saigon/Cholon area, coupled with the fact that commercial standard dial central offices are being installed in many areas, called for new management techniques. The success of the Saigon/Cholon Telephone Management Agency dictated a similar system throughout Vietnam. As a result, Circular Number 105-1, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) dated 1 October 1966, established the requirement for the organization of a telephone management agency at brigade and group level. These agencies will manage, engineer and coordinate telephone activities in their areas of responsibility. The 2d Signal Group in the III and IV CTZ areas and the 21st Signal Group in the I and II CTZ areas.

3. (U) During the period of this report, the 1st Signal Brigade continued the operations of communication-electronic support of US Forces, Free World Forces and Republic of Vietnam Forces in Vietnam and Thailand and the operation and installation of world wide communications facilities in the brigade area of responsibility. The brigade was operational throughout the period.
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4. (C) In addition to the above-stated actions pertaining to the Brigade Headquarters as a whole, general summaries of significant events that have occurred within each staff section and agency during this period are provided as follows:

a. (U) Personnel Directorate: In August, the Personnel and Training functions were established as separate offices.

During the quarter the following awards were presented to personnel of the command:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Soldiers Medal</th>
<th>Legion of Merit</th>
<th>Bronze Star</th>
<th>Air Medal</th>
<th>Army Commendation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>148</td>
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The Brigade Headquarters' savings program continued on the upswing with the announcement of the new Soldier's Deposit Program during September. Numerous personnel have initiated Class S allotments and cash deposits in the pay line as follows:

<table>
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<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount - Depositors</td>
<td>Amount - Depositors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2565.00</td>
<td>$4855.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
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</table>

A new reporting system for personnel in hospitals was implemented during the latter part of the quarter. The new procedures require that personnel admitted to hospitals be reassigned to the USARV patient holding detachment until they return for duty, thereby removing them from our strength during the period they are not present for duty. Although these procedures have a greater impact on combat troop units with high casualty rates, the brigade receives the benefit of removing approximately 50 personnel from the strength each day, reflecting a truer picture of present for duty totals.
Due to some personnel remaining in the command after DEROS by reason of non-receipt of assignment instructions, administrative procedures were developed and implemented to return personnel to CONUS without assignment instructions. These procedures guarantee each member of the command that he will depart on or before DEROS unless extended for operational reasons and have significantly reduced IG complaints.

b. (U) Intelligence and Security Directorate: The personnel strength has been augmented by the addition of an officer in the grade of 0-4 as Intelligence Officer, and by the addition to the proposed MTOE and the assignment of an administrative supervisor in grade E-6. Changes to the original MTOE were approved to include the administrative supervisor and to change the MOS of the Personnel Security NCO to 96B0.

At the request of this headquarters, Headquarters, USARV assumed final authority in all matters concerning personnel security and information security for elements of this command stationed in Vietnam. This action enabled this office to overcome the administrative problems which previously existed due to inadequate staffing, confusing instructions, and an unrealistic channel extending back to Headquarters USASTRATCOM. Processing of Security Clearances, a most important matter in this type of organization, is now being accomplished in a smooth and timely fashion. The information security program has been developed and is now in consonance with that of all other units in the theater.

Nine signal sites in RVN and ten in Thailand were given initial physical security surveys and four sites in RVN were reinspected by personnel of this section. In addition, a program of inspections conducted by Security/Operations/Intelligence personnel of subordinate groups and battalions has been initiated. These inspections have provided valuable guidance to site commanders and have resulted in action to resolve problems concerning personnel shortages (guards), delays in filling requisitions for barrier and defense materials, and coordination with outside reaction forces. The security posture of the brigade has shown marked improvement.

The proposed MTOE for the security company was disapproved by USARPAC because the mission was in conflict with that of an infantry unit. By 1 September this MTOE had been re-written as MTOE 19-97F based on a military police security company. The makeup of the recommended organization still retains a sufficient number of infantry personnel to adequately meet the required tactical defensive capability. This organization met with speedy approval of Headquarters, USARV.
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It was also shown to the DCS Intelligence and Security, USASTRATCOM who has added his support in attempting to gain speedy approval at DA level. In addition to the foregoing, the following events have taken place regarding the security force:

(1) An infantry captain has been assigned as a full time Company Commander and a fully qualified full time First Sergeant and Supply Sergeant have been assigned.

(2) The security forces formerly assigned to subordinate commands have been consolidated into the US Army Signal Security Force bringing its total strength to 235 and placing all security forces under the command of one officer under operational control of the Intelligence and Security Officer. This action has permitted the redistribution of assets so as to provide more security where it is needed and will eventually permit a realistic distribution of security guards throughout the brigade.

During the week of 15 September 1966, Colonel Vern E. Johnston, DCS for Intelligence and Security, Headquarters, USASTRATCOM, visited this headquarters and units of this command in Vietnam and Thailand. This visit was of great value as it afforded Colonel Johnston a first-hand opportunity to observe and become acquainted with the many problems of an administrative nature which have arisen due to personnel and equipment shortages, conflicting directives issued by USASTRATCOM and USARV, and necessary variations in procedures and channels arising from the fact that this element of STRATCOM is located in an active theater of operations.

Enemy activity, harassing in nature, directed against brigade installations increased during the period. The most significant increase occurred in the Dalat area where elements of the 362d Signal Company Headquarters, Detachment 13 (Pr'Line), and Page Company employees have been the object of seven Viet Cong incidents during the past two months. These included reconnaissance by fire of the Pr'Line site (2), roadblocks (2), ambushes (2), and the detonation of an explosive charge at a dwelling.

C. (C) G-5 Operations Directorate: The Operations Directorate became fully operational in September relieving the USARV Signal Office of the operations functions of the brigade it had been performing during the formative period of the Brigade Headquarters. On 27 July, the Operations Directorate had assumed responsibility from the USARV Signal Office for the monitoring of two LOI’s. On 7 August, responsibility for 15 additional LOI’s was accepted and on 14 August, the directorate became responsible for the preparation of all future LOI’s, based on requirements and policy guidance letters from USARV.
On 22 August, daily operations briefing for the Commanding General, the Deputy Commander and the Chief of Staff were started. The briefing informs the commander of events occurring during the past twenty-four hours. Subjects covered are: enemy activities, serious incidents, systems status, circuit status and aircraft status.

On 1 September, the 23rd Military History Detachment arrived from CONUS and was attached to the brigade. Operating under the staff supervision of the Operations Directorate, it assists the brigade in maintaining a flexible and responsive historical program.

On 15 September, with the activation of a teletype circuit between Headquarters USARV and Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade, the 1st Signal Brigade Communications Center became fully operational. Currently, the communications center is being operated on an interim basis from an AN/MDC-22 positioned adjacent to the 1st Signal Brigade Headquarters building. Circuits are installed to the following units and activities:

1. USARV Communications Center (provides access into the DCS)
2. MACV J-6: DCA-SAM, and USARV Signal (multi-point circuit)
3. Regional Communications Group (also provides access to the STSO circuit)
4. 2d Signal Group
5. 21st Signal Group
6. CCCGA

The activation of the communications center and its associated teletype-writer network provides the CG, 1st Signal Brigade with a Command and Control Communications system.

The publication of 1st Signal Brigade regulations 335-7, "Operational Status Report" and 335-9, "Communication Facilities Reporting" established procedures to keep the operations directorate informed of the status of communications. Regulation 335-3 requires a report on the status of major items of signal equipment and includes equipment density and location. Regulation 335-9 requires a report that will furnish complete information on all communication facilities operated by the brigade less fixed communication facilities such as the Phu Lam Facility. Data to be provided includes all physical and technical characteristics of the installations. Information obtained from these reports is used in the supervision of operations and in planning for future requirements.
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(U) AN/TRC-90, tropospheric scatter teams and equipment were deployed to Vietnam on a TDY basis during late August and early September. These teams are being employed to upgrade the long lines systems pending completion of the Integrated Wideband Communication System (IWCS). Two complete teams and eight composite teams were deployed from Fort Lewis Washington by airlift. These teams established systems between the following locations:

- Pleiku - Vung Chua Mountain
- Pleiku - Lang Bian Mountain
- Da Nang - Chu Lai
- Nha Trang - Ban Me Thout (East)
- Cam Ranh Bay - Qui Nhon

(U) The technical control facilities and capabilities were improved with the arrival of Technical Control Vans AN/MSQ-73. Special classes on installation of this equipment were organized and are being conducted at the 2d Signal Group utilizing the first two vans to arrive. On 24 August, the decision was made to install the vans at the following locations: Cam Ranh Bay, Vung Chua Mountain, Lang Bian Mountain, Can Tho, Chu Lai, Bien Hoa, Soc Trang, Phang Rang, Pr'Line and Qui Nhon. These locations were selected based on areas where existing control facilities were overextended and where circuit expansion is planned. On 26 October, the MSQ-73 on Vung Chua Mountain was cut over to become the first operational MSQ-73 in-country. Installation of the remaining vans continues and plans are prepared for those scheduled to arrive in November.

(C) The buildup of signal units should be commensurate with the buildup of major tactical units. When a major tactical unit deploys to Vietnam, there is an immediate requirement for an increase in communications personnel and equipment. Not only is there a requirement for area communication support for the new unit but also the necessity to establish base camp communications. A corresponding increase in signal personnel and equipment will insure that necessary area and base camp communications are established in a timely manner and preclude degradation of the existing communications system. Ideally, signal support units to provide this support should precede or accompany the first increment of the major unit in order to be in position to support the force buildup.
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(C) The nature of tactical operations in Vietnam requires the establishment of communications between base camps located throughout the country. The wide dispersion of both logistical and combat forces has increased the need for interconnecting communications facilities over multiple routes to insure timely response. The base camp concept requires the establishment of fixed plant communications facilities for each camp area. These requirements coupled with the fact that civil telecommunications systems are virtually non-existent, has resulted in the development of an extensive tactical long lines telecommunications system. Experience has proven that although the tactical communications equipment operating in a fixed plant role is satisfying essential requirements, it should be replaced with fixed plant equipment as soon as possible to improve reliability, increase system and circuit quality, and release tactical equipment for its intended use. The IWCS and Class IV projects will provide many of the fixed plant facilities and release some tactical communications equipment being used in a fixed configuration. Recognizing that in areas such as Vietnam where rapid troop buildup occurs and considering the time involved in funding, procuring, assembling and shipping Class IV project materials, consideration should be given to the development of an interim communications contingency packet. This packet should have the quality and stability characteristics of fixed plant communications equipment and be capable of deployment and installation in 30 days.

(U) Traffic loads for teletype and voice circuits in Vietnam are such that the present criteria for engineering surveys does not apply. Record traffic loads show an overall average increase of 10% to 12% per month. The percentage of high precedence traffic, immediate and flash, is much higher than normal, running between 15% and 30% for fixed station major relays and 30% to 35% for the minor relays and area communications centers serving major tactical headquarters. The traffic flow to and from tactical units fluctuates widely depending on tactical operations.

(U) The rapid buildup of voice traffic has been such that the present criteria for performance of engineering surveys is not wholly applicable. During busy hours, trunk group experience as much as 50% of all calls meeting an all trunks busy condition. Rather than basing engineering estimates solely on busy hour figures, an hourly average of periods extending beyond the busy hours is used on the assumption that the majority of calls meeting an all trunks busy are completed later in the day. As a by-product of the high percentage of busy calls, users resort to excessive use of high priorities based primarily on the desire or need to talk rather than on the message content.
SECVP

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(II) The overloading of telecommunications facilities has given rise to abnormally high requirements for sole user circuits. An adequate common user system meeting the needs of the user would reduce the requirement for sole user circuits; however, the need to communicate rapidly with widely dispersed elements has required the installation of many sole user point to point circuits. This further reduces the channels available for common user use which gives rise to degraded service and further increases in sole user requests.

(U) During the period, contingency teams for restoral of communications or extension of communications service to meet tactical requirements were organized in the 3rd Signal Group and the 21st Signal Group. Utilizing TDC-24 equipment, these teams are prepared to move on short notice to restore present communication systems or to extend the system to tactical headquarters as operations dictate. Except for secure areas in the immediate vicinity of these teams, airlift must be depended on for transportation. The TDC-24 equipment is too bulky for helicopter lift. In order to meet all possible missions, lighter weight equipment, transportable by helicopter or army fixed wing aircraft, is desirable.

d. (U) Logistics Directorate: Authority to take "Installation Commander" action on reports for losses occurring outside the combat zone, has been granted the CG, 1st Signal Brigade, effective immediately and will be published in next change to Appendix C, AR 735-11. A waiver of Report of Survey is granted the Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade, for losses occurring in the combat zone in accordance with deviation authority Number 536-65 issued under procedure in paragraph 4, AR 735-9, based on paragraph 35, AR 735-5. This deviation is an extension of the same authority given to STRATCOM units in Vietnam by USARPAC and is extended to 1 June 1967.

(U) Documents of authorization continue to be a problem. All TDA's MTOE's and MTOI's have been submitted to Department of the Army for approval. Some units have approved MTOE's. Pending approval by Department of the Army of all such documents, USARV Form 477 must be used for interim authorization. This creates an excessive amount of administrative work load. Forms must be submitted through normal correspondence channels with cover letters, justifications and Form 477's. Each intermediate headquarters must process and make comments or recommendations on the request. In addition to the paper work load, there is considerable time involved between requesting and approving headquarters, then back through the same channels to the requestor. In many cases, Form 477's must be returned without action for administrative corrections. Command emphasis must be maintained at originator level and each intermediate headquarters to assure an absolute minimum of incorrect requests for equipment.
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(U) Resupply and maintenance requirements for isolated communications
sites in Vietnam are often dependent on aviation for transportation of
these services. Signal Groups and Battalion Headquarters Detachments or
Companies are deployed to the theater without their aviation augmentation.
Lacking this organic aviation complement, these units are forced to compete
with all other services for aviation support. This has only served to
complicate resupply and maintenance problems.

(U) The arrival of equipment new to the army inventory or civilian type
equipment, results in maintenance problems. Available maintenance personnel
in-country are not knowledgeable in some of the equipment and the lack of
accompanying training and technical manuals complicates the training of
these technicians in RVN. In some instances, repair parts are difficult
to obtain. The lack of federal stock numbers makes identification of parts
difficult, and in most cases, a plan to position repair parts at support
echelon does not accompany the arrival of the new equipment. From past
experience it will be five to six months from the date of arrival of new
equipment until ASL's and PLL's are adequately stocked based on demands
created in theater. The same problems occur for off shore procured equip-
ment and for newly developed equipment. As a case in point, the MSQ-73,
a Philco product, arrived in Vietnam without maintenance publications.
Philco manuals accompanying the equipment proved inadequate for military
use.

e. (U) Plans and Program Directorate: Throughout this quarter,
the processing of MTOE's and MTDA's has continued. The principle problems
encountered were the preparation of the large number of MTOE/MTDA's, the
justification of new requirements and the correction of format errors.
On 26 August 1966, 1st Signal Brigade received advance copies of the MTOE's
of four Signal Support Battalions (the 37th, 43rd, 44th and 52d). Continuous
coordination is effected between Headquarters, USARV, Headquarters,
USA STRATCOM and this headquarters to resolve problems of justification
and error correction.

(U) In September, the problems of processing MTOE/MTDA's was further
complicated with the publication of a change to USARV Regulation 310-31.
The affected documents had to be realigned to comply with the changed
regulation. This problem was further complicated when Headquarters,
USA STRATCOM notified the brigade that MTOE's submitted in compliance
with USARV Regulations had to be changed to the format prescribed in
AR 310-31. This was necessary to provide for machine records processing
at DA and resulted in a considerable increase in processing time at
Headquarters, USA STRATCOM. To resolve these problems, LTC Earl E. Eidecker,
Chief of Plans Division, went to Headquarters, USA STRATCOM, Washington DC
during the period 6 October through 21 October 1966. As a result of this
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visit the following information was obtained. The MTOE for the 69th Signal Battalion has been approved by DA, the HHD MTOE, Army Signal Group has been forwarded to DA for review and the TDA's for the Saigon/Cholon Telephone Management Agency, CCCA, CEEIA (RVN) are at STRATCOM ADPU. The status of MTOE's at the close of the period are as shown in Appendix B.

(U) A formal plan for the implementation of a "Buddy System" between units of the 1st Signal Brigade and ARVN forces was published. The objectives of this program are three fold:

(1) Assist in improving the training level of ARVN Signal units.

(2) Foster closer relationships in areas where missions are

(3) Create an environment for civic action.

The program is progressing well with major emphasis in the areas of OJT programs, repair parts assistance, photo support and a sports program. Future plans are to expand the present programs and to initiate tours of US and ARVN communications facilities.

f. (U) CEETIA: The period from 1 August to 31 October 1966 continued as a formulative and growth phase for this agency. The concept of forming a separate agency to manage Class IV projects proved to be sound. Significant progress has been achieved in gaining control over and direction of the development of fixed plant communications projects in Vietnam:

The agency is currently engaged in the following activities:

(1) Deployment and maintenance of consolidated listings of current fixed plant telecommunications projects for Vietnam. This does not include the IMCS and AUTODIN programs, which will continue under the control of the IMCS Coordinating Group.

(2) Serving as the program manager for Class IV projects. To accomplish this supervisory function, this agency maintains the status of all current telecommunications projects, establishes specific objectives and milestones for each program, and monitors the development of each program to determine if required progress is being achieved.
(3) Identification of Project Officers for each project at the GCEIA, Signal Group and on-site levels and publishing guidance for the supervision of projects at each of those levels of control.

(4) Coordinating building construction required to support known and planned projects and establishing engineering requirements.

(5) Establishing and maintaining logistical identification, stockage, control, procurement and disposition procedures of equipment and supplies for fixed plant telecommunication projects.

(6) Providing on-site supervision and monitoring of fixed plant telecommunication projects to ensure that projects are being installed according to specification.

(7) Coordinating the utilization of engineer and installer teams which are in-country on a TDY basis.

(8) Preparing of contractual specifications and taskings to effect procurement of services, supplies or construction required to support implementation of non-tactical Class IV communication projects.

(9) Providing technical or field representation to the contracting officer as required to provide satisfactory installation, test and acceptance to such matters.

(10) Reviewing requirements to update existing projects and assist in identification of new requirements in accordance with approved plans and programs.

(U) During the period, significant achievements were:

(1) The Dial Central Office (DCO) program which provides for the installation of fourteen offices throughout Vietnam has been brought under effective control. Installation has begun at the MACV I, Vung Tau and An Khe areas and start dates programmed for the other offices. The major problem in the DCO program has been the meeting of building occupancy dates. Coordination is being maintained with the 18th Engineer Brigade to keep this program on schedule. The installation effort, which is being done by sub-contract with the Custav Hirsh Organization, is actively being monitored by qualified personnel to ensure that work is being performed according to proper engineering practices. Test and acceptance procedures are being developed which will result in the operating units receiving equipment which has been thoroughly tested before acceptance.
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(2) The outside cable distribution systems associated with each Dial Central Office have been analyzed and action taken in coordination with the 40th Signal Construction Battalion to upgrade and rehabilitate existing cable plant. A critical shortage of outside plant construction materials exists in Vietnam and CEEIA's Logistical Division is operating to control the effective utilization of scarce resources and to expedite the delivery of critically needed material.

(a) The most critical aspects of the Logistics Division's activities have been location of assets, evaluation of requirements, and shipment of assets to construction sites in accordance with command priorities for communications facilities. These "brush-fire" efforts which are separate from planned logistics functions have been required to provide effective utilization of limited in-country resources, and will probably be required for the next eight months.

(b) Some additional resources have been provided by the Logistics Division through special requisitions, procurement, and spot surveys of depot storage facilities. However, the over-all limits of materials in this part of the work have seriously hampered even special efforts.

(3) Long-range logistics planning and programming, which is part of the division's mission includes:

a. Forecast of requirements.

b. Development of related stockage lists.

c. Programming resources to meet requirements.

d. Establishment of effective controls for critical materials.

e. Documented consumption of resources.

f. Coordination with Logistical Commands and supply agencies.

(4) In the Area Communication Center program, several construction and installation problem areas have been identified and action is being taken to resolve these problems through responsible staff agencies. In addition, a major tape relay facility is being constructed at Da Nang.
The delay in start of construction and lack of installation material has impeded this project, these problem areas are being actively monitored to ensure that causes for delay are identified and that effective action is taken to keep this program moving.

(5) An improved data transmission capability will result from the data relay center which is being installed at Nha Trang, and the eight data tributaries which are scheduled to become operational at nodal points throughout Vietnam.

(6) Non-tactical telecommunications requirements (NTTR's) have been developed and documented as required by AR 105-22 to identify the 1st Signal Brigade's DCS requirements for FY-1969. These requirements were developed in accordance with this command's five-year plan and were submitted to STRATCOM WASH for incorporation into the Army's Strategic Communications Mid-Range Plan.

g. (U) Office of the Adjutant General: During this quarter, the Office of the Adjutant General continued to update and increase the volume of holdings in the AG Reference Library. In a headquarters the size of the Signal Brigade, a current and complete facility of this type is essential. The efforts to establish the library have been rewarding but complicated. Requisitions were submitted to appropriate supply/distribution points; however, receipt of requested material has frequently been delayed. Further, many requested issuances were marked "Due Out" and publications frequently arrive without changes.

Numerous additions have been made to the administrative regulations, circulars and memorandums issued by brigade. These have been identified and listed in an index to provide a quick reference for research and guidance. Also, upon completion of the review and analysis of existing blank forms, an Index of Brigade Blank Forms and Form Letters will be promulgated.

h. (U) Aviation Office: Two O-1 aircraft have been transferred from the total brigade assets and replaced by U6-A aircraft. This exchange of aircraft will greatly increase the cargo and passenger capability in the northern area of Vietnam. The U6-A aircraft has proven to be more desirable than the O-1 aircraft for support of brigade operations. Its larger cargo and personnel carrying capacity are more responsive to the needs of this command and the U6-A has been able, with a few exceptions, to operate any place that a O-1 could.
A concerted effort has been made to get the allocated aircraft from USARV. Two of the three U-6's have been issued and the third U-6 is expected shortly. In addition, concurrence was obtained to retain the seventh UH-1B in lieu of the other U-6. The brigade has an additional six UH-1's due in from COMUS in the next 90 to 120 days.

i. (U) Office of the Comptroller: The prior Year Report for FY 1966 was prepared and submitted in compliance with AR 37-15. Total cost and work load for the brigade were as follows:

- Budget Program P2000 - $22,822.00
- Budget Program P2930 - $3,613,959.00
- Workload - $10,120,300.00

The report indicated that costs exceeded estimates by about 33%. This was attributable to the growth in SE Asia and the unprogrammed requirements incident thereto. Another factor for the underestimate was the lack of qualified budget personnel at the group level. More effective budgeting is anticipated in FY 67 as the capability for centralized planning, programming and budgeting develops at group and brigade level. At present this capability is available in the brigade.

The Review and Analysis (R&A) Program was standardized for the brigade. Previous R&A's were not standard in that all units did not report on the same items or were the presentation techniques the same for the same items. During the presentation of the R&A's, the need for a Brigade Command Progress Report was recognized. Appropriate command and staff action has been taken and an effective R&A program and Quarterly Progress Report achieved.

j. (U) Office of the Inspector General: During the month of August, two enlisted men were assigned to this section and as of the close of the period, one officer and two enlisted men were assigned of the two officers and four enlisted men authorized. The schedule for Annual Inspector General inspections of subordinate units was published. During the period 13 September through 15 September, the annual inspection of Headquarters, 2d Signal Group was conducted. The Annual General Inspection of the 9th Signal Group was conducted from 24 to 26 October and Special Inspections of the 379th Signal Battalion and USASTHATCOM Facility, Bangkok were conducted during the period.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS-CSFOR-65)

SECTION II

Commanders Observations and Recommendations

Part I - Observations (Lessons Learned):

a. Personnel:

This headquarters has been activated six months and presently is in the process of an in-depth study of personnel problem areas. Lessons Learned in the personnel area will be included in the next report.

b. Operations:

Deployment of Signal Units

Item: (C) Deployment of Signal Units

Discussion: When a major tactical unit deploys in Vietnam from CONUS there is an immediate need for army signal support to establish base camp communications and entry into the area communications system. Experience shows that the arrival of the major tactical unit is not always accompanied by a commensurate increase in signal support. This results in extending the available communications elements to provide the required support with a resulting degradation in the overall communications system.

Observation: Ideally, signal support units, to provide base camp communication and area signal support, for newly arriving major tactical units, should accompany the first elements of that command when it arrives in-country. Communications would then be established to support the buildup. The time delay experienced between the arrival of a major unit and the commensurate signal supporting units is such as to raise a question on the adequacy of the number of Signal Support Companies and Combat Area Battalions in the Peace Time Force Structure of the US Army.

Contingency Packets

Item: (U) Desirability of an interim communications Contingency Packet in the Force Structure of the Army.

Discussion: The nature of operations in Vietnam requires the establishment of a fixed plant communications system in base camp and logistical areas throughout the country. The assemblage of fixed plant equipment in CONUS and shipment to the theater has proven to be time consuming for...
and has resulted in the necessity of meeting communications requirements with tactical equipment. The utilization of tactical equipment in this role has filled the interim need; but does not provide the reliability and quality required to meet DCA standards.

**Observation:** Consideration should be given to the development of an interim communications packet in the Army structure. This packet would be available for restoration of facilities when needed and provide an immediate interim capability in future builds. The packet should have the quality and stability of fixed plant communications and be capable of deployment and installation in a 30 day period.

**Precedence**

**Item:** (U) Misuse of Precedence Priorities.

**Discussion:** The use of high precedence traffic, immediate and flash, is much higher than normal. Both teletype and voice capabilities are, at present, overtaxed. As a result, the user in his desire to obtain or transmit information resorts to the use of higher priorities than the message content deserves. The net effect of the abnormal use of high priorities is to create a demand for more sole user circuits which reduces the effectiveness of the common user system, and an ever increasing use of high priority messages. The total effect of the problem is self defeating to all concerned in that fewer common user circuits are available to provide adequate service and the volume of high precedence messages increases the time of transmission of all messages.

**Observation:** The importance of, the proper use of, and the meaning of, the precedence system should be emphasized in instruction at all service schools so that its total purpose and effect is understood by all personnel. Training exercises should incorporate effective application of this system.

**Contingency Teams**

**Item:** (U) Transportability of Contingency Teams.

**Discussion:** Contingency teams have been organized for emergency restoral missions and to meet unscheduled tactical support requirements. AN/TRC-24 equipment is utilized by these teams. The lack of a secure road net in Vietnam makes the use of air transportation essential to the operation of these teams. In many locations, only helicopter or army fixed wing aircraft can be utilized to move the equipment to its site. The AN/TRC-24 equipment is too bulky and heavy for helicopter lift.
SCCVOP
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

Observation: Expedite the replacement of AN/TRC-2A equipment with the AN/GRC-103 equipment.

Grounding of Carrier and Terminal Equipment

Item: (U) Inadequate grounding of radio/carrier and terminal equipment.

Discussion: Inadequate grounding of radio/carrier and terminating equipment, such as cryptographic and data equipment, causes voltage differences to develop between the radio/carrier and terminal equipment. This tends to cause distortion of the digital signal and results in garbled teletype or data reception.

Observation: Proper grounding can be obtained by:

a. Using a ground rod that is long enough to reach the water table.

b. Where the water table cannot be reached, the problem has been solved by placing 5 ground stakes in the form of a star with a ground stake at the center of the star (ground rods forming the leg of the star must be separated by at least 10 feet). All ground stakes forming the legs of the star are bonded to the center stake. Equipment is then grounded to the center stake. Ground can further be improved by using salt around the ground stakes and watering frequently.

c. Good results may also be obtained in field locations by locating the ground rods in a urinal drainage sump.

Interface of Different Power Sources

Item: (U) Difference in potential between equipment resulting from use of different power sources.

Discussion: Data equipment at An Khe had a difference of potential to ground than the radio carrier system. With proper ground system installed on all equipment, a 40 volt potential still existed between the cable frame and the cable pair from the data equipment.

Observation: A 1:1 ratio repeat coil was inserted between the frame and the data line to physically separate them. This cleared the problem and the data system performed properly.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

Use of Master Oscillator MRC-85

Item: (U) Use of one master oscillator to control an entire tandem radio/carrier system.

Discussion: The wideband MRC-85 tropo system runs from Phu Lam to Nha Trang, where it splits, with one leg going up the coast thru Qui Nhon to Da Nang; the other from Nha Trang thru Pleiku to Da Nang. This split path provides a circuit reroute capability from Nha Trang to Da Nang. However, the Nha Trang MRC-85 produced 96 KC master pilot frequency for both legs of the MRC-85 system to Da Nang; when the master pilot developed problems, both legs of the wideband system to Da Nang were affected. Although circuit reroute thru Pleiku is available via tactical tropo, the only path from Pleiku to Da Nang is the wideband MRC-85.

Observation: Each segment of the MRC-85 system is capable of generating its own pilot frequencies, making each segment independent of the other. The loss of one station then does not affect the entire system, and reroute of circuits around the affected segment is possible. This was accomplished with the MRC-85 wideband system. It cleared the 96 KC problem and also makes reroute of circuits thru Pleiku possible when trouble develops on the Pleiku - Nha Trang leg or on the path Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, Da Nang.

Cutover of MSQ-73

Item: (U) Change of active communication circuits from a tactical SB-675 patch panel to an MSQ-73 technical control van.

Discussion: It became necessary to replace the Vung Chua SB-675 tactical technical control with a larger and more complete MSQ-73 technical control van. This required the transfer of active communication circuits from one technical control to the other with minimum loss of traffic time.

Observation: Cables from the MSQ-73 were wired into a new frame; other cables with 26 pair hocks, for connecting to the radio/carrier equipment, were wired to the other side of the frame. Cross connects were made on the frame so that pin connections on the new 26 pair cable hocks had same pin appearances in the hock as those in use with the SB-675. At the time of cutover it was only necessary to disconnect the SB-675 hocks and connect the hocks coming from the MSQ-73 thru the frame. Traffic time lost to each circuit was approximately 30 seconds.
Tone Package Distortion

Item: (U) Phu Bai - Tan Son Nhut teletype tone packages distorted and taking excessive hits.

Discussion: The teletype tone packages to Phu Bai traverse an AN/TRC-90 tactical tropo system, Da Nang to Hue and a tactical TRC-24 system from Hue to Phu Bai. TTY at Phu Bai received excessive distortion and hits.

Observation: The input levels for TTY tone pack into the MX106 carrier bay of the AN/TRC-90 is -13 DBM. The proper level for a TTY tone pack into an AN/TCC-7 has been determined to be approximately -6 DBM + 1. The AN/TRC-90 MX106 at Hue was supplying teletype tone packs to the AN/TCC-7 Hue to Phu Bai at a level of -13 DBM. This level was adjusted to -60 DBM and the excessive distortion was eliminated. The same problem has been encountered on numerous systems. Experience has proven that one of the most common causes of TTY tone pack distortion is improper levels at locations where different types of equipment with different level requirements are interfaced.

Use of Tactical Equipment in the Fixed Plant Role

Item: (U) Problems encountered in the employment of tactical equipment in a fixed plant role.

Discussion: The use of tactical equipment in a fixed plant role has not been completely satisfactory because of maintenance and reliability problems encountered. When tactical and fixed plant communications equipment are colocated, maintenance personnel for both types of equipment are required as personnel trained in the maintenance of one type of equipment are not generally trained in the other type of equipment. Also the backup maintenance support systems are different for tactical and fixed plant equipment. Most repair parts are not interchangeable between tactical and fixed plant equipment, and stockage of a large number of parts is required. The interface of tactical and fixed plant equipment often requires modification of equipment and in some cases necessitates local procurement or fabrication of materials. Tactical equipment has not provided the reliability desired in fixed plant operations. DCA standards are difficult if not impractical to attain. Over extended periods of operation, generator breakdown has increased the unreliability of tactical equipment.
Observations: Tactical equipment should not be programmed for permanent future use in a fixed plant role. It should be employed only in an emergency and when used in such a role, replaced as soon as possible. Tactical equipment should be designed to operate on a continuous basis and provided with a reliable power source for extended operational periods.

c. Training and Organization:

Item: (U) Telephone Management Agency.

Discussion: The telephone system in RVN has grown so rapidly that the overall complex is larger than many commercial systems in the United States. The application of tactical management and operator procedures proved unsatisfactory. As a result of a Western Electric Company study conducted for the US Army on the Saigon/Cholon Telephone system, the Saigon/Cholon Telephone Management Agency (TMA), was formed in April 1966 to apply commercial management and engineering techniques to the system. This agency has proven very successful in controlling the telephone system in the area. The fixed plant type operation in Vietnam plus the current installation of dial central offices in RVN caused a reevaluation of overall telephone management policies throughout the Brigade. As a result of the success of the Saigon/Cholon TMA, the decision was made to organize Telephone Management Agencies at Brigade and Group levels to apply the lessons learned from TMA to the overall telephone system.

Observation: The use of fixed plant systems and dial central offices in the telephone system in Vietnam dictates the application of commercial management and control procedures to this system. The establishment of telephone management agencies at Brigade and Group levels will improve management of the telephone system.

Advisor Communications Support

Item: (U) Activation of Modified Signal Battalions (Support).

Discussion: The deployment of US Advisor Detachments to the RVNAF in Vietnam required communications support to these detachments down to sector level. This support was provided by signal companies and detachments down to sector level. This support was provided by signal companies and detachments on an area basis. The command of the signal units did not coincide with area of responsibility of the advisor detachments. In order to obtain a more responsive communication system for the advisor units, four support battalions have been activated in theater. The battalions are organized on a MTOE of a signal battalion (support). One battalion controls
area communications in each Corps area and provides the Corp Advisor with signal support responsive to his needs.

Observation: In counter insurgency operations, where large advisor detachments are employed, area signal support should be provided by a signal element operating in the same geographical area as the senior advisor's area of responsibility and responsive to the senior advisor's needs.

Use of Multipair Polyethylene Cable (PIC)

Item: (U) Installation of multipair polyethylene insulated cable (PIC) in the Republic of Vietnam.

Discussion: Signal construction units presently stationed in RVN are required to install multipair polyethylene cables as part of base development projects. These cables vary in size from twenty-five to nine hundred pairs. The effectiveness of these units to properly install multipair cable systems has been reduced due to lack of proper training and experience in installing PIC. Installed cable distribution systems require maintenance and repair within a short period of time after installation. This is primarily due to a lack of proper installation material and severe rain conditions that are experienced during the monsoon season.

Observation: Action should be taken to implement a training program for enlisted personnel at US Army Southeastern Signal School, Fort Gordon, Georgia on the installation and maintenance of PIC.

d. Intelligence:

Updating of Security Clearances

Item: (U) Updating of Security Clearances.

Discussion: Orders assigning individuals to this command normally indicates that a security clearance is required and instruct the responsible command to take appropriate action in accordance with AR 60h-5. USARV Regulation 60h-5 requires that all security clearances based upon a National Agency Check or Background Investigation which is more than eight years old be updated. This is an additional requirement to those of AR 60h-5. As a result, individuals arrive in-country with a security clearance as required in their orders only to find it requires updating.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

Observation: DA, CONUS Armies and other CONUS Commands should be informed of the security requirements of USARV. This would result in a saving of time and paper work in the CI Division, USARV G2 and of intelligence personnel at subordinate levels.

e. Logistics:

Resupply of Repair Parts

Item: (U) Resupply of Repair Parts for Mission Peculiar Low Density Items of Equipment.

Discussion: Response to the user for initial supply and subsequent maintenance parts for selected, low density, Signal Communications Material is inadequate.

Observation: Ordinary supply channels are not fully responsive to the needs of signal units in RVN for peculiar items of low density signal equipment. A more direct, responsive, and accelerated system must be devised. A single point of supply coordination for this material should be established in CONUS. This supply point would receive requests from Signal Brigade Direct Support Detachment, collect the equipment or parts as required and ship directly to the user. A direct support detachment at each Signal Group would process the request in RVN and Thailand. A direct supply system as described will serve to meet the rapidly moving situation in SEA.

Failure of Transmitter T-368

Item: (U) Failure of Transmitter T-368.

Discussion: Major causes of failure of the AN/GRC-26 are the coupling capacitor in the final amplifier plate circuit and the time constant capacitor in the keying diode circuit of its transmitter T-368. MWO 11-5820-258-35/5, MWO 11-5820-258-35/6 and MWO 11-5820-258-35/3 have been published to alleviate this failure.

Observation: Units are being deployed to Vietnam without the above MWO's installed on the transmitter T-368. All MWO's should be installed prior to units deployment to Vietnam.

Need for Timely and Accurate Shipping Information

Item: (U) Need for Timely and Accurate Shipping Information.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65)

Discussion: The 1st Signal Brigade ships and/or receives an average of 2500 tons of cargo per month. This cargo is destined for signal sites throughout RVN. On numerous occasions, shipping instructions arrive late or are inaccurate, causing a corresponding delay in the expediting of cargo to meet operational dates.

Observation: Timely and accurate shipping information will assist the brigade in meeting operational deadlines by giving the units greater lead time for planning, booking and transshipping.

Coordination Between Shipping and Receiving

Item: (U) Communication and Coordination Between Shipping and Receiving,

Discussion: The 1st Signal Brigade has experienced numerous cases of lost or damaged equipment because of lack of initiative and follow-up by shipping and receiving units. Where cargo placed in transportation channels is not controlled by check and double check, the incidence of lost or damaged cargo will rise appreciably.

Observation: To reduce the amount of lost or damaged cargo, communications and timely advice to receiving units is essential.

Administrative Vehicles Support

Item: (U) Administrative Vehicles Support for Newly Activated/Organized Units,

Discussion: The constant and ever increasing need for transportation of administrative nature for signal type units presents a demanding problem and places an added burden on existing Transportation Support Units.

Observation: Immediate planning for supply of administrative type vehicles should take priority during the planning phase for the activation/organization of signal units. The peculiar nature of the operational commitment of this type unit being, in most cases, spread throughout a wide area, creates a decentralized control and assistance problem. With the headquarters centrally located, a need for transportation to perform necessary personal visit type coordination and assistance is of utmost importance and necessity. If during planning phase for activation/organization, priority be given programming of administrative vehicles and the immediate submission of requests based on anticipated needs and experience factors, would prevent in most cases, the additional burden of sudden demands on existing
logistical channels to provide needed administrative vehicles after the unit becomes operational.

**Maintenance Support Planning**

**Item:** (U) Maintenance Support Planning for Newly Introduced Items of Equipment.

**Discussion:** This command has experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining technical manuals and repair lists for items of equipment which are delivered in-country and are new to the Army Inventory. Repair parts are difficult to identify and are not positioned in support facilities until in-country demand creates PLL's and ASL's. This takes from five to six months to develop. Similarly, the lack of technical manuals makes the instruction of maintenance personnel difficult. For example, the MSQ-73 has been introduced into RVN, the Philco manuals that accompanied this equipment are not adequate to the maintenance needs of the army.

**Observation:** When it is planned to introduce newly developed items of equipment to RVN, the planning should include the positioning of repair parts at unit and support maintenance level at the time the equipment arrives and the provisioning of adequate technical manuals and repair parts lists with correct FSN's.

**f. Other:**

**Authorization of Aircraft**

**Item:** (U) Authorization of Aircraft.

**Discussion:** Two O-1 type aircraft were assigned on the 586th Signal Company TOE. These two aircraft were of no appreciable use for the present mission here in RVN. Both of these aircraft have been transferred and replaced by U6-A type aircraft. The U6-A for all practical purposes can do the same job as the O-1 and in addition carry a much greater cargo and passenger load.

**Observation:** That when developing a TOE or MTOE that the overall mission be more critically studied and aircraft approved that can properly support a given unit.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSPOR-65)

Aircraft Maintenance

Item: (U) Aircraft Maintenance.

Discussion: This subject is a hard lesson to learn for those not directly concerned with the everyday flying business. Aircraft cannot be used in comparison with vehicles. When time for scheduled maintenance is due, it must be strictly complied with for obvious safety reasons. Aircraft work-ordered into field maintenance for repairs is completely out of the owning unit's hands until all repairs are completed including other items of repair found or determined by FM in need of repair or replacement. An exact time factor for aircraft repairs to be completed at field maintenance is an impossibility due to parts availability, maintenance priority and other repairs found to be needed by FM.

Observation: Every effort must be made to cause commanders to understand the maintenance problem involved with aircraft. One solution is as the Brigade Aviation Office is doing by current indoctrination. However, the best solution is in the course of schools that commanders and future commanders attend. These problems should be and are of utmost importance to all commanders and earliest education should be a necessity.

Negotiations With RVNAF

Item: (C) Negotiations With the RVNAF.

Discussion: On occasion, this command has requirements to negotiate through MACV with the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces in order to acquire rights of way, real estate, use of their facilities, etc. Agreements written at the termination of negotiations are taken literally by the RVNAF and changes to these agreements are usually not accepted unless to the advantage of the RVNAF. An example of the above situation is the negotiation by this command to acquire real estate at a remote site for a combined IWCS and tactical tropo site. A letter from MACV J6 to RVNAF J6 culminated this negotiation and included the following stipulations:

- First, that the US would make space available in US buildings for installation of RVNAF equipment;
- Second, that the US would provide all present and future power requirements;
- Third, that the US would share space on antenna towers;
- And lastly, that the US would provide shelter for RVNAF operating personnel.

This agreement was entered into by representatives of this command in all honesty but it was based on certain planning factors that were never consummated or were changed. A planned extension of the IWCS equipment building was never built eliminating RVNAF equipment space; any electrical power excess to the IWCS facility would now be used by US tactical equipment; the IWCS microwave tower does not have sufficient space for RVNAF antennas; and proposed billets for US and RVNAF personnel were not built. Nevertheless the RVNAF require the basic letter to be honored by the US without exception.
Observation: The basic lesson learned is that when dealing with the RVNAF, be extremely careful in the choice of words, the promises indicated or made and the actual capability to meet any commitment made. Furthermore, insure that there is mutual understanding of the exact limits of any agreement; to wit, RVNAF interpretation of "joint use of antenna tower" in the above example means RVNAF use of the planned US towers which should have been engineered to handle the RVNAF antennas. Finally, effort should be made to insure that all operating and planning personnel are aware of the complete stipulation(s) and that these stipulations are included in any present or future plan.

Fund Administration

Item: (U) Fund Administration.

Discussion: As a major subordinate command of USASTRATCOM, this headquarters is required to administratively control the funds allotted to it from USASTRATCOM. The actual mechanics of the funds distribution is for USASTRATCOM-PAC to receive the sub-allotment and for them to issue this brigade obligational authority (OA) on a quarterly basis.

With the increased capability of the comptroller staff, it was determined that greater fund control at brigade level could be achieved for more efficient use of available funds. With the time lag caused by obligation and disbursement documents having to be transferred from Vietnam to Hawaii, a delay of several months has occurred in the reporting of these documents back to this headquarters through allotment reporting channels. Though this delay is not too important at this stage of the fiscal year, it will cause concern in the third and fourth quarters. Thus a system of prerecord obligations and disbursements had to be established so that fund availability can be determined more rapidly than the formal system. This system will provide a method for maximum utilization of funds since obligation adjustments will be available from disbursements.

Acting Inspector General

Item: (U) Appointment of Acting Inspector Generals.

Discussion: Each Group Headquarters and each Battalion Headquarters now has an Acting Inspector General appointed.

Observation: The appointment of Acting Inspector Generals at Group and Battalion levels has expedited the handling of complaints and requests for assistance. Of the total 19 complaints received by the Brigade Inspector General, nine were subsequently investigated by Acting Inspector Generals.
IWCS Management

Item: (U) IWCS Management.

Discussion: The Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS) program for Southeast Asia currently consists of 100 communications stations with a contractual cost exceeding 200 million dollars. The Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade, is the principal manager in SEA with the following responsibilities:

a. Provide in-country system engineering.
b. Provide technical guidance and administrative support.
c. Perform field inspection. Coordinate requirements for civil engineering with appropriate military agencies.
d. Enforce quality control.
e. Support contractors.
g. Develop and furnish schedules for government acceptance of contractor completed link and station facilities.

The adequacy of the management organization is vital to the timely and successful accomplishment of the mission. Minute delays in providing required management resources result in chaotic, costly and unmanageable situations:

Observation: The magnitude of the program and the detailed information required to implement this system is such that the most critical initial area is with management planning and organization. The principle manager must be capable of providing:

a. Definition and establishment of firm operational requirements.
b. Adequate initial engineering.
c. Determination and establishment of realistic target dates.
d. Evaluation of hardware and construction capabilities.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966  
(RCS CSFOR-65)

e. Early designation of transportation priorities.
f. Realistic evaluation of environmental conditions.
g. Funding required to provide for contingency aspects.
h. Responsiveness in satisfying total implementation responsibilities.

Part II - Recommendations:

1. The time lag experienced between the arrival of major tactical units in Vietnam and the arrival of signal support units to establish base camp and area communications is such as to raise a question as to the adequacy of signal units in the peace time structure of the army. This structure should be examined to determine if the number of signal support companies and combat area battalions are sufficient to provide the immediate communications support required for the execution of contingency plans.

2. The correct use of message precedence must be instilled in all officers and non-commissioned officers. This should be done during service schooling, not only should the correct application of use of precedence be stressed, but also the effect on communications to all concerned of the misuse of this system. During manoeuvres, exercises and CPX's the correct use of message precedence should be stressed.

WILLIAM A HIGGINS
COL SIGC
Acting Commander
AVHGC-DH (31 Oct 66) ;st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO 96307

TO: Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade, APO 96307


2. In Section I and Section II, there are problem areas and recommendations which require action by this and higher headquarters. To evaluate these comments and to initiate and/or recommend proper action, additional information is required. Knowledge of the actions initiated at 1st Signal Brigade will facilitate evaluation by this headquarters. A list of the paragraphs meriting additional comment is attached at Inclosure 1 for your consideration.

3. Request return of this correspondence to Headquarters, USARV at the earliest practicable date.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Inc 1

1st Sig Bde

Asst Adjt. Gen.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCG CSPOR-65)

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96307


2. In compliance with 1st Indorsement the following additional information is submitted:

   a. Section I, 2nd paragraph: This problem area was included in more detail in the brigade input to USARV Signal Office for inclusion in reference above.

   b. Deployment of Signal Units. This area was included in the brigade input to reference above.

   c. This item was included in the brigade input to reference above. This headquarters submits the Operational Report Lessons Learned through command channels USASTRATCOM, Washington, D.C. and Operational Control Channels, your headquarters. This item is for evaluation by USASTRATCOM.

   d. Contingency Teams. The AU/GRC-103 equipment is being scheduled into the Army equipment inventory as a replacement for tactical VHF equipment. This new equipment is much lighter and less bulky than THC-2h equipment. The present schedule for this equipment changeover should be expedited. This item was included in reference above.

   e. Use of Tactical Equipment in the Fixed Plant Roll. This item was included in the brigade input to reference above.

   f. Use of Multicore - Polyethylene Cable. This item was included in the brigade input to reference above.

   g. Updating Security Clearances. This item is self explanatory and is included in a report for the first time.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

h. Paragraphs 1 and 2, part II section II. These recommendations are explained in further detail in section I of the report and were included in the brigade input to reference above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

FORREST L. HODGES
CPT, AGC
Aст AG
AVHGC-DH (31 Oct 66) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-
Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters,
1st Signal Brigade as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:
   a. Reference Paragraph 4d, Section I, Pages 10 and 11: This
      is a recognized problem. The following steps have been taken to alle-
viate this problem.
      (1) The ECOM Field Office has moved into the Signal Office
      and can provide maintenance training as requested.
      (2) A six man supply team from Army Materiel Command is
      presently working at 1st Logistical Command to help resolve supply
      problems.
      (3) A permanent Tech Liaison Team from ECOM will be
      available starting in January to assist in resolving technical pro-
      blems in connection with electronics equipment.
   b. Reference Paragraph 4h, Section I, Pages 15 and 16:
      Resources are not currently available in-country to provide the third
      U6A authorized. Request has been made to DA to furnish U6A aircraft
      from CONUS assets. Upon receipt, the third U6A will be issued. The
      UH-1B now issued in lieu of the third U6A will be returned to fill
      other priority requirements. The six U1A type aircraft will be
      issued as they arrive in-country.
   c. Reference Part I, Section II, Item: Contingency Teams,
      Pages 18 and 19: USARV Msg AVHST-PO 25802 DTG 191212Z Sep stated
      USARV requirement for lightweight AN/MRC-115 and AN/CRC-103-Multiplex
      Terminals. When items are received they will be assigned to divisions
      and corps plus the contingency team.
AVHGC-DH (31 Oct 66) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

d. Reference Paragraph b, Part I, Section II, Item: Use of Tactical Equipment in the Fixed Plant Role, Pages 21 and 22:

(1) Concur.

(2) Tactical equipment has not been programmed for fixed plant role.

e. Reference Paragraph d, Part I, Section II, Item: Updating of Security Clearances, Pages 23 and 24:

(1) Nonconcur.

(2) Paragraph 22, AR 604-5 prescribes procedures for validation of security clearances of incoming personnel. They may be validated under the provisions of paragraph 22a which requires a favorable check of local files (DA Form 201 and Medical Records), or under the provisions of paragraph 22b which requires a check of local files and a review of the intelligence dossier concerning the individual.

(3) Due to the increased requirements for security in this command, it is the policy of this headquarters (paragraph 18b, USARV Regulation 604-5) to require 22b validations in the case of an investigation over eight years old. This does not constitute updating of an investigation which would entail further investigative effort to cover the period from the last investigation to the present.

(4) Requesting a check of US Army Investigative Reports Repository has been simplified as much as possible for subordinate commands. USARV Form 235R is submitted in one copy and results are returned thereon. The individual can be granted access to classified information as soon as the request for check is forwarded; therefore, no time is lost awaiting clearance.

(5) This headquarters is responsible for adjudications and processing of clearances for this command. To request other commands to perform these actions would entail levying the responsibilities of this headquarters on other major commands.
f. Reference Paragraph e, Part I, Section II, Page 24: Non-concur. The present supply system MILSTRIP is designed to handle such items as described. Present Department of Army policy prescribes that all units in Vietnam will utilize this system. An exception is the Red Ball Express which was developed to provide expeditious supply and movement of repair parts. Another method which may be used during the initial supply of these parts is the assignment of a project code if justified. This code serves as an excellent control for supply coordination. The present supply system is dependent upon demands placed on the supply activity and follow-up action by the using unit. This action along with utilization of unit PLL's will insure adequate repair parts stockage.

g. Reference Paragraph e, Part I, Section II, Page 24: Concur. All MWO's should be installed prior to the unit's deployment to Vietnam. This headquarters is presently surveying the command to determine how many MWO kits will be required to complete MWO's. USARPAC has been advised of this problem.

h. Reference Paragraph e, Part I, Section II, Pages 24 and 25: Concur in the necessity for having timely and accurate shipping information. MILSTRIP and MILSTAMP required delivery dates (RDD) establish precedence for supply and transportation requirements and should be utilized in the planning for material and equipment availability. Amplifying guidance for intra-Vietnam movements is provided by MACV Directive 55-4 and USARV Directive 55-4. Under these directives, shipping agencies establish dates for actual movements. Units interested in specific shipments should coordinate directly with the responsible supply activity and transportation officer to obtain information as to when shipments can be anticipated.

i. Reference Paragraph 2, Part II, Section II, Page 30: Concur. Current school curriculum stresses communications economy and proper utilization. MACV and USARV are currently putting command emphasis on this subject throughout Vietnam.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. J. THORNTON
Lt. S. AGC
Asst. Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U) - 4th Ind Sig Bde (USA STRATCOM)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

(C) This headquarters concurs with the basic report as indorsed
with the following comments:

a. Reference: Paragraph 2c, 3d Indorsement. USARV states
that cited message to DA, information USARPAC, listed USARV require-
ments for lightweight AN/MRC-115 and AN/GRC-103 Multiplex Terminals.
However, message MACV AVHSI-CS 01649, DTG 1012327 Jan 67, which this
headquarters passed to DA, also lists requirements for AN/MRC-115.
The requirements stated in the two messages are inconsistent;
consequently, this headquarters will query USARV as to apparent
discrepancy.

b. Reference: Basic report, 1st paragraph, page 9, Section I;
paragraph titled "Contingency Packets," page 17, Part I, Section II; and
paragraph 2, page 30, Part II, Section II. This headquarters concurs
with this requirement and within current Program 4 limitations is
currently in the process of reviewing the TOE of the 999th Signal
Company (Spt) stationed in Hawaii with a view toward attaining, through
MTOE actions, some limited capability for contingency restorative actions
within USARPAC. The capability will be minimal due to strength ceiling
limitations.

c. Reference: Paragraph 2g, 3d Indorsement and paragraph e,
Part I, Section II of basic report. The USARV survey of AN/GRC-26
radios has been completed. Sufficient quantities of MWO kits have been
requisitioned and are being supplied to complete required modifications.
USARV estimated date of completion is 1 March 1967. CGUSCONARC has been
requested to ensure that units deploying to RVN have required MWO's installed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

ROBERT L. BURCH
Lt Col, AGC
Asst AG

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
### APPENDIX B STATUS OF MTOE'S, TDA'S 1ST SIGNAL BRIGADE (USASTRATCOM) AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1966

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Problem areas meriting additional comment:

Section I, 2d Paragraph

Section II, Part I

b. Operations

1. Deployment of Signal Units
2. Contingency Packets
3. Contingency Teams
4. Use of Tactical Equipment in the Fixed Plant Role

c. Training and Organization

1. Use of Multipair Polyethylene Cable

d. Intelligence

1. Updating Security Clearances

Section II, Part II, Paragraphs 1 and 2

Inclusion