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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Task Force OREGON, Period Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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TASK FORCE OREGON

OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

FOR PERIOD

18 February 1967 - 30 April 1967

This report received at Hqs, Department of the Army without indorsements. To preclude further delay in benefits gained from the lessons learned herein, this report is published without complete indorsements.

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SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION AND UNIT ACTIVITIES

A. Command.

1. (S) At the MACV staff briefing 17 February, the enemy situation was assessed:

   a. The substantial enemy concentrations aimed north of and west of the DMZ (I Corps Tactical Zone) and the enemy concentrations along the Laos-Cambodia borders in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces and in Quang Ngai Province were noted.

   b. It was pointed out that enemy strategy may be to launch an offensive into the northern part of I CTZ and into the plateau to fragment and divert US forces to facilitate his further buildup in these areas in pursuit of his own objectives.

   c. Noting that III MAF was required to deploy forces over five provinces in the area of responsibility, attention was focused on the difficulty III MAF would encounter in concentrating sufficient force to cope with a major enemy offensive in its area.

   d. This situation was of sufficient concern to warrant development of a contingency plan for reinforcement of III MAF.

   e. General Westmoreland stated that the contingency plan would bear the code name OREGON in deference to the home state of the MACV Chief of Staff, who would be involved intimately in its preparation.
AVDF-C

6 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS-GSFOR-55) (U)

2. (S) Following the CIIC meeting 18 February at MACV Headquarters, General Westmoreland reviewed again his analysis of the situation affecting not only I CTZ but all of SVN.

   a. He restated his conviction that a contingency plan must be prepared to meet the potential requirement for a reinforcement of III MAF by a Provisional Division.

   b. He announced at this point that the commander-designate of the Provisional Division would be MG William B. Rosson, MACV Chief of Staff, who would be responsible for organizing a provisional headquarters and for developing the contingency plan.

   c. In a discussion that followed, it was indicated that I FFV and II FFV each were to designate two Infantry brigades for the Provisional Division.

   d. The lst Bde, 101st-Abn Div was to be one of the brigades designated by I FFV and would serve as the foundation for the Provisional Division headquarters. Additional combat support and combat service support forces would be required to "flesh out" the division. In terms of deployment destinations, two alternatives were specified for planning purposes:

   (1) Deployment to Da Nang-Chu Lai areas to relieve III MAF units therein for employment to the north.

   (2) Deployment to Chu Lai-Quang Ngai Province area. In this case not only would III MAF units be relieved for employment to the north, but the Provisional Division would be prepared to undertake offensive operations in Quang Ngai Province in conjunction with lst Cavalry Div (AM) operations projected northward from Binh Dinh Province.

   e. It was felt that Hq lst Bde, 101st-Abn Div, should be associated with the Provisional Division headquarters in a Headquarters Company role only, i.e., provision of messing, medical, security, chaplain, APO and possibly some transportation support. Logistic support for the Provisional Division could be provided by establishment of a Forward Support Element in the area of deployment.

   f. General Westmoreland concluded the meeting by specifying that a MACV directive enunciating his guidance on contingency plan OREGON would be issued. He went on to indicate that BG Salvo H. Matheson, CG, lst Bde, 101st-Abn Div, would be earmarked tentatively as ADC for the Provisional...
3. (U) At 1430 hours, 19 February, by prearrangement with and concurrence on the part of LTG Engler, MG Rosson met at Hq USARV with BG Richard J. Suits, BG Frank D. Miller, BG Earl F. Cole, BG Robert D. Terry, COL John P. Brown, all of USARV Hq, and BG McGovern, MACV J-1.

a. At this meeting MG Rosson outlined his concept of the tasks to be accomplished commencing as a matter of priority with development of a TD for the Provisional Division Headquarters and the assembly from among the total TD strength a planning nucleus:

b. MG Rosson issued the following tentative outline concerning composition of the planning nucleus:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
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<tr>
<td>Office of Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIO</td>
<td>(To be furnished by 7th AF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCF (Naval Gunfire)</td>
<td>(To be furnished by 7th Flt)</td>
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</table>

*Assistant Chief of Staff to be a field grade officer.
**To include Pay Ops officer and nucleus of TOC.
***To include Transportation Officer. Additional logistics expertise from Forward Support Element.
****Position of G6 to be filled ultimately by CO, Division Signal Battalion.
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(RCS-GSFCR-65) (U)

It was agreed that personnel to man the Provisional Division headquarters and the smaller planning nucleus would be drawn from a combination of HQ MACV, Ho USA RV and USA RV subordinate units.

d. MG Rossom requested the USA RV Deputy Chief of Staff (R&A) and the MACV JI to select and assemble for duty at 0800 hours, 19 February, at the USA RV Command Management Center, the officers to fill the positions of G1 through G6, plus positions of Artillery Officer and Engineer Officer.

e. Acting on the recommendation of BG Seitz and BG Miller, MG Rossom interviewed and accepted for the position of Chief of Staff, COL Edgar R. Poole, USA RV Deputy G3. In the course of their discussion MG Rossom reviewed the material set forth above and requested COL Poole to initiate preparations for the meeting to be conducted on the morning of 19 February.

f. At COL Poole's recommendation, MG Rossom approved inclusion of Maj Harry A. Heath as Historian to attend the 19 February meeting and become part of the planning group.

4. At the meeting in the USA RV Command Management Center on 19 February, MG Rossom gave his policy guidance to the nucleus planning staff.

a. The immediate mission of the staff was to:

(1) Fill out the provisional division headquarters.

(2) Design the provisional division and develop a troop list designated from within-country units.

(3) Develop a contingency plan for deployment in I CTZ or II CTZ to reinforce III MAF. The division must be prepared for deployment in Quang Ngai Province - "the most difficult terrain in Vietnam."

b. The staff must then be prepared to "deploy and fight what will become the best division in the country."

c. This division is being formed because of the increasing threat in I CTZ. It was not considered desirable to "deploy one of the existing divisions in country because of their roles in Revolutionary Development. Moving these divisions would disrupt this program."
The Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

a. The tasks of the nucleus planning staff were:

1. Expand the planning staff to a force of about 50 officers and men.

2. Develop the design of the complete headquarters. Emphasize people who will be available on call for assignment to the staff.

3. Muster the entire division headquarters, perhaps in a CPX.

4. Establish the physical layout at USARV Headquarters. Prepare telephonic directories and rosters.

5. The division Headquarters Commandant will assemble all the needed supplies and equipment. Everything must be packaged for shipment. Each staff section chief is to make a list of supplies and equipment needed.

6. Develop a troop list structured around 2 separate brigades from I FFV and 2 brigades from II FFV. One of the brigades will be the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. Headquarters USARV will determine the other units. In developing the troop list, "Be austere - NO FAT."

7. Develop a logistical support plan. Headquarters USARV and the 1st Logistical Command will assist in this.

8. G4 will develop a movement and deployment plan.

9. An operations planning team will deploy to Da Nang (or possible Chu Lai) to work with the Marines. Arrangements will be made for the division to use Marine facilities. This team will develop our intelligence effort.

10. The division must have an Air Liaison Office and Naval Gunfire Support Liaison (possibly an ANGLICO).

11. Develop the division SOP.

b. Mr. Rosson gave his policy guidance to the staff:

1. It is imperative to maintain harmonious relationships with Headquarters USARV.

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(3) The Chief of Staff runs the staff. While all staff section chiefs have direct access to the Commanding General, the Chief of Staff must be kept informed.

(4) Practice thorough coordination.

(5) Be accurate. If in doubt, admit it.

(6) Be guided by high personal and professional standards.

(7) Do not be without guidance. If in doubt, ask for guidance.

(8) The deadline for all planning is "ASAP."

5. (U) At a meeting between MG Rosson and COL Poole on 19 February it was determined that the expression, Provisional Division OREGON, was classified SECRET. Further, any reference to the true mission of Project OREGON would be classified SECRET. The unclassified reference to the project would be Project OREGON. The unclassified purpose of the planning group was to develop a USARV contingency plan.

6. (U) At a meeting of the Chief of Staff and the Project staff on 19 February, the following schedule was established:

20 February The first draft of the troop lists (all elements) to be completed.

21 February Project OREGON G3 will receive proposed troop lists from Force Development, USARV G3.

21 February Project OREGON staff will compare and adjust troop lists.

22 February Project OREGON staff will brief the USARV staff on Project OREGON.

22-24 February Project OREGON planning team will go to III MAF at Da Nang for coordination. Team members will be:

G1
G2
G3
G4

01
1st Log Cmd Representative
Pay Ops Officer
Signal Officer

25 February Project OREGON staff will brief MG Rosson on troop list and movement plan.

26 February Project OREGON staff will brief USARV DOD and COMUSMACV on troop list and movement plan.
7. (U) At that same meeting of the Chief of Staff and the Project OREGON staff on 19 February, the Chief of Staff approved the following general guidance for planning:

   a. The basic Infantry Division TOE (augmented) to provide four brigades and appropriate support will be used.

   b. Designation of the brigades will not be known during the planning phase.

   c. The proposed troop list will consist of the total requirements without regard to their source.

   d. Concurrently with drawing up the troop list, thought must be given to the most logical sources, e.g., Division Artillery Headquarters from a modified Artillery Group Headquarters.

   e. The rationale for each departure from a division TOE must be recorded.

   f. Straight percentages are not necessarily valid in computing augmentation for a four brigade division. While they will usually apply for combat forces, they will not for support or administrative troops.

   g. After completion of the required troop list, composition of the final organization will be adjusted to consider strengths and composition of elements provided.

   h. It is not presently known whether operational control of the Provisional Division will be with I FFV or III MAF.

8. (U) COMUSMACV formally directed the development of the contingency plan, Project OREGON, in his message, Subject: Operation Plan OREGON (U), DTG: 19123OZ February 1967, LRM 053-1014. This message contained the same guidance reiterated by MG Rosson in his meeting with the planning staff 19 February.


   a. COL Poole discussed the following points:

      (1) Project OREGON was started because of COMUSMACV's concern with the current enemy situation in I CTZ.
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(1) The four brigades that will become part of Provisional Division Oregon must be determined.

(2) The division headquarters must be designed.

(3) The structure of divisional and non-divisional support troops must be determined.

(4) The division must be ready to move and operate in the shortest possible time.

(5) The division will be filled out by individuals selected by USARV G1.

b. The Project G3 reviewed the proposed troop list.

c. Representatives of I FFV announced that the brigades being considered for this mission by I FFV were 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div.

d. Representatives of II FFV announced that the brigades being considered for this mission by II FFV were the 199th Inf Bde, the 173d Abn Bde and a Brigade from the 25th Inf Div in that order.

e. The following considerations concerning the units to make up the troop list were set forth:

(1) All brigades will come with an adequate slice of combat support and combat service support to enable them to be self-sufficient in the field. This will include artillery, military police, administration, medical, finance and transportation.

(2) Brigade base camps will be left intact. Administration, to include R&R and replacements, will be staged out of the base camp.

(3) Not all of the designated brigades have Staff Judge Advocate support so will need assistance from the division headquarters.

(4) If the division is deployed in the next 15 days (21 February-7 March), it will take an existing Artillery Group Headquarters, modify it and augment it with a fire-support element and an aviation section. If deployed after that, a division artillery headquarters will be tailored with approximately 45 officers and men.
AVDF-6D
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

(5) The division signal battalion will be tailored from scratch.

(6) There will be no attempt to build a TOE division headquarters. The headquarters will be the minimum size required to fight four brigades.

(7) Procedures for evacuation of prisoners of war in III MAF will be determined during the planning team's visit to that headquarters 22-24 February.

(8) Project OREGON has recommended an Aviation Bn of 3-4 light airborne companies and 2 medium companies. Air support will be determined by COMUSMACV.

(9) I FFV and II FFV will confirm the designations of the brigades for the project by message 21 February.

(10) Each designated brigade will send movement plan information to Project OREGON. I FFV representative stated that a brigade could start to move on 24-hour notice. A period of several days was preferred, however. An additional factor in movement time might be disengagement from current operations.

(11) The Task Force will consist of a headquarters and 4 brigades to be designated.

(12) The headquarters will be organized on an austere basis and, after becoming operational, will be satellited to the maximum practical extent on Headquarters 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.

(13) The headquarters may be based at Chu Lai and the area of operations may extend north to Da Nang and south to Quang Ngai.

10. (U) Members of the planning team briefed MG Rosson on their return from III MAF 24 February.

a. Psy Ops Officer.

(1) III MAF will support the Task Force with aerial delivery of leaflets and aerial loudspeaker operations.

(2) III MAF recommended that Project OREGON plan to use leaflets to announce its arrival to let the Vietnamese people know they are not being abandoned.
AVDF-CG
Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

(3) III MAF will make available to the Project its Psychological Exploitation Teams to assist in exploitation of tactical successes.

(4) MG Rosson directed the inclusion of the following points in the Psy Ops Annex to the Oregon Operations Plan:

(a) Use of psychological operations in conjunction with firepower preparations to include B52 strikes.

(b) Use of psychological operations to control refugees and to assist in the Chieu Hoi program.

b. G5

(1) The Civic Action effort in III MAF is decentralized down to Combined Action Companies (CACs) and tactical units on the ground. There is no centralized record of projects kept in III MAF.

(2) The Marines will leave their CACs behind for about 6 weeks to insure that the OREGON troops are oriented as to the projects under way.

(3) MG Rosson directed the determination of exactly what civic action projects are in progress. Project OREGON units must know exactly what to do and where to go as soon as they arrive in the area of operations. This is to insure that no projects are forgotten.

(4) MG Rosson stated that the primary mission of the Project G5 would be support of Revolutionary Development.

(a) G1. There are adequate facilities for the division base at Chu Lai. The area was built as a division headquarters.

11. (U) MG Rosson and representatives of the USARV and Project OREGON staffs briefed LTG Engler, USARV DCG, on the project on 26 February.

a. The briefing covered in detail the following major topics:

(1) Review of guidance and the planning concept.

(2) The troop list.

(3) The organization of the provisional division headquarters.

(4) The deployment plan.
The logistical support plan.

The communications plan.

b. On the recommendation of 1st Logistical Command CG, it was decided to use a Group or Brigade Headquarters from the 1st Logistical Command to provide the divisional support command and staff.

12. MG Rosson and representatives of the USARV and Project OREGON staffs briefed General Westmoreland on the project on 28 February.

b. General Westmoreland approved the type units on the troop list and the sources to provide each of the cited combat and combat support units. The following method of completing the planning process was presented and approved.

(1) The formal plan was to be published about 10 March.

(2) Periodic visits were to be made to major commands to brief on the status of the plan and to meet and brief individuals selected for the provisional division headquarters.

(3) Visits were to be made to the units on the troop list to brief on the plan.

(4) Essential equipment for the headquarters was to be assembled and inspected, possibly by 10 March.

(5) The division SOF was to be completed as soon as practicable.

(6) If the plan was not ordered executed, a phased stand-down of the current full-time planning group would occur and USARV staff would assume the responsibility for keeping the contingency plan current.

c. COMUSMACV's additional guidance incident to the continuing planning being accomplished by and for Project OREGON was as follows:

(1) There has been no marked change in the need for this contingency planning since it was initiated, and current prospects for implementation of the operation tend to favor rather than reduce the possibilities.
The provisional division is envisaged as deploying initially with three brigades, with selection of the three specific brigades to be decided at the time the plan is activated.

The most critical factors to be considered in conjunction with implementing the plan appear now to be, in order of priority, tactical considerations in I and II FFV areas, and the resulting impact on signal and transportation support of other MACV/USARV operations in progress at the time.

Designation of units for Operation OREGON should not detract from accomplishment of currently assigned missions of such units.

The availability of a C-130 capable airfield in the Due Pho area would enhance logistic support of the operation.

OREGON OPLAN I-67 was published 5 March. This was just 15 days after the first meeting of the nucleus staff with MG Rossen.

MG Rossen and the Project OREGON staff gave an information briefing of the project to Deputy COMUSMACV on 6 March.

MG Rossen met with the entire Project OREGON staff on 11 March. The following points were discussed:

- The staff has completed the initial planning phase of Project OREGON. The situation in I CIZ continues to constitute a threat and the chances of implementation of the plan remain at better than 50 per cent.

- COMUSMACV has approved a phasing down of the Project staff - approximately 50 per cent - effective 13 March. Those individuals being returned to their parent units are still members of Project OREGON and will be called if and when the plan is implemented. The remainder of the staff will be phased down approximately 31 March.

At a meeting of the Project OREGON staff with MG Rossen on 1 April, it was announced that a three-brigade task force would be deployed. Commencing 1 May, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, will relieve USNCO units in the Due Pho area. Perhaps by mid-May the remainder of the brigade will deploy in the Ba Tho/Duc Pho area under the operational control of I FFV with the I FFV/III MAF boundary adjusted accordingly. On or about 1 June, Task Force OREGON, consisting of the 173d Abn Bde and a brigade from the 25th Inf Div (or possibly one from the 9th Inf Div) will be committed in the Chu Lai area. Subsequently the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, will join Task Force OREGON in place.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

in the Due Pho/Ba Tho area and the I FFV/III MAF boundary will revert to its original position. Task Force OREGON headquarters and certain base elements will be activated about 15 May and move to Chu Lai during the last week of May. The remainder of the Task Force elements will commence their moves about 1 June and close approximately 15 June.

17. (C) COMUSMACV ordered Contingency Plan North Carolina executed on 6 April. Elements of the 1st Cav Div (AM) were ordered to deploy immediately to Due Pho. The 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, was ordered to deploy to Due Pho to relieve elements of the 1st Cav Div. The 196th Inf Bde was ordered to deploy to Chu Lai. The first battalion task force of the 1st Cav Div arrived at Due Pho 7 April.

18. (U) Task Force OREGON was activated by General Order 1656, Headquarters U.S. Army Vietnam, 12 April 1967. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Task Force OREGON was established the same day. MG Rosson assumed command of Task Force OREGON the same day.

19. (U) The main body of Headquarters, Task Force OREGON, moved from Tan Son Nhut to Chu Lai 18 April.

20. (U) Task Force OREGON became operational at 2000 01 April with operational control of the 196th Inf Bde and Task Force base units.

21. (U) At 221200 April, the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, the 39th Engr Bn and Troop B, 1/9 Cavalry became part of Task Force OREGON.

22. (U) At 221640 April, public announcement was made of Task Force OREGON's existence at Chu Lai.
B. Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline

1. (U) In order to provide the necessary command and control element for Task Force Oregon it was necessary to organize a Headquarters and Headquarters Company. At the initial meeting of the Project Oregon planning staff 19 February, MG Rosson directed the following tasks be accomplished in order:

   a. Augment the nucleus planning staff to the size required for the planning mission - approximately 50 officers and men.

   b. Establish the organization for the headquarters company.

   c. Determine the troop requirements for the task force.

2. (U) Organization of the headquarters was to be guided by the following:

   a. Major troop units of the task force would be in-country separate brigades which would be largely self-sufficient administratively, hence there would be no need to duplicate their staffing at task force level.

   b. The administrative procedures and channels being utilized by the brigades would remain in use and the task force headquarters would enter into these procedures and channels only as necessary to assist the units.

3. (U) The initial Manning Table and Equipment List (MTEL), generally in the format of a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), was published as Appendix 2, Annex X, OPLAN OREGON I-67. The strength recapitulation showed a requirement for 93 officers, 3 warrant officers and 280 enlisted men, for an aggregate of 376. The MTEL provided for the accomplishment of all command and control functions of a typical Infantry Division Headquarters at about half the strength required in a TOE division headquarters. The manpower savings were made possible partly because the brigades' own self-sufficiency and partly because the task force headquarters would not be administratively operational in many functional areas. Other savings were realized through the elimination of company overhead by combining, in effect, the normal TOE Division Headquarters Company (TOE 7-4G), the Division Artillery Headquarters Battery (TOE 12-57E) and the Division Medical Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company (TOE 8-36E).

4. (U) Liaison visits to Task Force X-ray at Chu Lai indicated the desirability of adding a supplement to the MTEL to perform necessary functions peculiar to the Chu Lai area. This
supplement added sections for operation of the Post Exchange and clubs and a Repairs and Utilities Section. The supplement contained a total of 9 officers and 42 enlisted men, an aggregate of 51 spaces, and was approved by USARV G1 7 April.

5. (U) Just prior to the deployment of the Task Force, it became apparent that operation of the Chu Lai Defense Command by an Infantry battalion would not be possible due to the urgent need for all maneuver battalions elsewhere in the two TAORs. Manning the perimeter and other defense functions with combat support and combat service support elements would be feasible, but only if a command and control element could be provided. Hence, creation of another organizational entity became necessary. Personnel for Headquarters Chu Lai Defense Command, composed of 6 officers and 12 enlisted men, were requested from USARV G1 on 7 April.

6. (U) The personnel to be applied against the positions on the MTEG and subsequent supplements were to be nominated from units and headquarters within RVN. A machine accounting system was devised to keep rosters current in accordance with criteria stated in Oregon OPLAN I-67.

7. (U) The Task Force Headquarters and Headquarters Company was activated 12 April and assembled at USARV Headquarters, Tan Son Nhut. In general the assembly of individuals was accomplished smoothly. There were some problems occasioned by unknown substitutions of personnel, late arrivals, and lack of qualifications by individuals, but the company deployed on schedule on 18 April and closed, with minor exceptions, on the same date at Chu Lai.

8. (U) On 22 April, Daily Strength Reports from units attached to Task Force Oregon began. From these reports, information pertaining to strength of units is furnished to III MAF and USARV.

9. (U) During the planning stage of Project Oregon, a request was initiated by the USARV Controller to Department of the Army to establish a disbursing symbol number to be used by the Task Force Non-Integrated Finance Office in the event the task force was activated. The request was approved and symbol number 5406 was assigned.

   a. After the symbol number was established, a request for 10,000 blank U.S. Treasury checks was submitted. The checks were received and held in storage at the Central Funding Office, Vietnam, pending activation of the task force.
b. A Non-Integrated Finance Section organizational structure was devised consisting of Section Headquarters, Disbursing Division and Examination Division. A total strength of 3 officers and 20 enlisted men was authorized for the section.

c. The Finance Office has the responsibility for paying all personnel not organic to the brigades; approximately 5,000 personnel.

d. Major Jose A. Vazquez was designated as accountable disbursing officer on 10 April. By 18 April the section was at authorized strength.

e. On 18 April a message was sent to the U.S. Army Finance Center and the U.S. Treasury Department activating the account. A U.S. Treasury check was then drawn for cash in the amount of $2,055, 500.00 to obtain funds in NPC and Piasters.

f. The section arrived in Chu Lai on 18 April. The account opened for disbursing on 19 April.

g. By 30 April a total of 44 unit payrolls comprising 3,521 personnel and 34 travel vouchers had been processed.

h. Operating results for the period 19-30 April were $554,959.18 in cash disbursed, $150,412.20 check payments (primarily allotment checks for dependent's support), $9,532.70 cash collections, $8,115.00 were for soldiers' deposits. In addition, 87 U.S. Treasury checks were sold for a total amount of $21,276.58.

10. (U) USMC units operated an enlisted men's, NCO and an officers' club in the Task Force headquarters area and a beverage warehouse which serviced all club accounts in Chu Lai base camp. A club officer and 10 enlisted men were required to assume these functions. Plans were made initially to continue operating on the same basis as the Marines. After consultation with a representative of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service at Da Nang, it was determined that the operations of the beverage warehouse could be more efficiently handled by the Exchange Sub Depot and the personnel savings could be invested in the exchange warehouse. A joint inventory was conducted and operation of the clubs came under Army control 26 April.

11. (U) Prior to the arrival of Task Force Oregon, the USMC operated a Main Exchange, a warehouse and several branch exchanges in the Chu Lai area. The number of branch exchanges was determined by the locations of units within the base camp complex. Initial plans were for an Exchange Officer and 10 enlisted men for an exchange section under the staff supervision of the Task Force G1. This was approved as an addition to the Task Force TD. A transfer of assets
to Army control was arranged. At the suggestion of the Da Nang Exchange representative, the establishment of an Exchange Sub Depot was approved for the Chu Lai area. Additional personnel for this activity were obtained from resources planned for operations of the clubs, but no longer required.

12. (U) The Chu Lai office of the American National Red Cross provides services to all military units assigned in the area. The staff consists of a Field Director and 5 Assistant Field Directors. There is a sub-station located in the 196th Inf Bde and another sub-station to be located in the 3rd Bde, 25th Inf Div, upon arrival of additional staff about 7 May.

a. During the month of April a total of 802 messages were sent and received by this office; 275 resulted in servicemen returning to CONUS on emergency leaves. A total of 1,349 cases were serviced; 697 cases involved breakdown in communications between the serviceman and his family and birth announcements. The remainder included family problems, personal problems, medical care for dependents, lost or expired dependent ID cards and allotment problems.

b. The office continued to provide comfort items and comfort kits for issue to hospital patients at all medical facilities in the area.

c. During the period this office sponsored one water-safety training course for lifeguards for the recreational beaches in the Chu Lai area. Six lifeguards were qualified and issued Red Cross Senior Life Saving cards.

d. At the close of the reporting period, this office was responsible for furnishing Red Cross support for more than 34,000 personnel of all services in the Chu Lai/Duc Pho area.

13. (U) Military Police. During the period 19 February - 14 April, the Military Police/Provost Marshal planning was accomplished by the Provost Marshal designee. A Provost Marshal section was organized in conformance with TOE 19-27E. Two military police platoons (the 148th MP Platoon located at Tan Son Nhut Air Base and the 544th MP Platoon assigned to the 196th Inf Bde) were selected as the minimum required Military Police force for Task Force Oregon Headquarters.

a. The Provost Marshal moved to Chu Lai 15 April as OIC of the Task Force Advance Party. On 16-17 April liaison was established with the USMC Provost Marshal and the 196th Inf Bde Provost Marshal.
b. The 148th MP Platoon arrived Chu Lai 18 April. The 544th MP Platoon was attached to the 148th MP Platoon on 20 April and closed in the Task Force area 21 April.

c. Permission was given by the Task Force Chief of Staff on 22 April to request Military Police support from the Marines. As a result, 25 Marine MPs were placed under operational control of the Task Force Oregon Provost Marshal. In addition, 3 ROK Marine MPs were assigned for duty and 5 Vietnamese National Police are available for duty each day. With this manning, joint patrols are conducted. Each patrol has one Army and one Marine. Additionally, patrols alternate with ROK MPs and Vietnamese National Police.

d. During the period 23-30 April, coordination was completed with Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces to establish Mobile Resources Control Checkpoints with their subdistricts to begin the first week in May.

14. (U) Staff Judge Advocate.

a. On 19 February detailed planning for the staffing of the Task Force SJA section began. Legal offices in the 1st Cavalry Div, 4th Inf Div, 1 FFV, 15th Support Bde and Hq USARV were selected to furnish personnel for this section. Except for Hq USARV, these offices were not alerted to the contingency plan nor the requirements placed on them.

b. During the period 19 February - 1 April, a file of selected MACV and USARV Regulations was compiled and a combat legal library was assembled. Task Force Oregon Regulations covering military justice and claims were written.

c. On 10 April six Staff Judge Advocate offices located throughout Vietnam were directed to send some of their legally trained personnel to the Task Force. Of the six SJA offices levied for personnel, only three were made aware of the requirements on 10 April. As a result, the section was not filled with personnel until 17 April, one day before deployment.

d. On 15 April a request was received from 4th Inf Div that the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, be retained by the 4th Inf Div for the purpose of administrative support to include military justice activities. USARV approved this request. After approving the request, relief from the requirement to provide a warrant officer as administrative supervisor for the Task Force SJA was also granted the 4th Inf Div. As the SJA Section did not provide for a MSG E8 as Chief Clerk, the section deployed without either an enlisted chief clerk or warrant officer, administrative supervisor.
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(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)
C. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

1. (C) Quang Tin Province.

a. There was a rise in enemy activity in eastern Quang Tin Province in February, chiefly in the number of incidents along Highway One. The greatest concentration of these incidents was from the Quang Nam Province border south to the northern edge of the Chu Lai TAOR. They were primarily designed to interrupt the use of the highway by the destruction of bridges and culverts. Aerial reconnaissance west of the Chu Lai TAOR showed an increase in enemy sightings and activity, indicating a renewed enemy interest in the area when compared to the number of previous reports. The remainder of Quang Tin Province suffered only small-scale harassing attacks directed against the more remote friendly elements located along the lines of communications. Information obtained from three returnees indicated that the 2nd Battalion of the 3d NVA Regiment was operating in the general area northeast of Tam Ky City and west of Highway One. This unit was possibly a replacement for the 21st NVA Regiment. A report early in the month, from a usually reliable source, carried the information that the VC had conducted a propaganda broadcast requesting that the ARVN troops extend the Tet truce to 7 days. This broadcast had a possible connection with the possibility of the VC/NVA using the stand-down to infiltrate small groups of men and supplies into RVN. Evidence of a possible shortage of personnel was the forcible recruiting of 40 youths on 6 February.

b. During March there was a distinct increase in enemy activity in coastal Quang Tin Province including a series of small-scale harassing actions centered approximately five kilometers west of Tam Ky City. Light enemy sightings were reported west of the Chu Lai TAOR. There was a sharp drop in the number of VC-initiated incidents within the Chu Lai TAOR, although several incidents were reported from the ROK Marine area of responsibility.

c. Enemy activity in the vicinity of Nui Loc San during the month of April increased the possibility of future enemy action in the northern portion of Quang Tin Province. Elsewhere in the province, enemy activity was light to moderate and was generally limited to small-scale harassing attacks directed against friendly security elements. Unconfirmed intelligence information indicated a possible redeployment of elements of the 2nd NVA Division from Quang Ngai to Quang Tin as part of the coming summer campaign. There was a slight decrease in the number of VC-initiated incidents within the Chu Lai TAOR. Those reported were generally directed against lines of communication. Counterintelligence reports for the period dealt primarily with the increased use of women in guerrilla roles.
2. (C) Quang Ngai Province.

a. The number of enemy activities in Quang Ngai Province was on the rise in February and there were several substantial attacks. Two of these were actions near the Duc Pho TAOR in which two outposts (one manned by ARVN and the other by Popular Force elements) were attacked and temporarily overrun by sizeable VC forces. Friendly casualties were heavy at both locations. In the attack against the ARVN outpost, a captured document provided initial identification of the 93rd Battalion, 2nd Regiment, 3rd NVA Division as the attacking unit. Aerial photography indicated increased trail activity by the enemy in the eastern portion of the Duc Pho District. The lack of incidents during the month is possibly explained by the statements of 11 VC who defected during latter January and early February. They indicated a gradually increasing dissatisfaction and resentment concerning VC methods and actions. In early February, the populace of Vihn Loc Hamlet was ordered by the VC to gather bamboo and leaves for a propaganda show which was to include the exhibition of Korean PWs and the public confessions of alleged injustices to the Vietnamese people. An intelligence report states that the VC appealed to the families in Phuoc Lam Village to persuade sons and brothers in the military forces of RVN to return to VC-controlled areas. A demonstration was also planned to force Premier Ky to respect the New Year cease-fire. Both VC actions substantiate the possibility of a shortage of personnel and a desire for a cease-fire which would provide an opportunity to infiltrate men and supplies from the north.

b. There was a slight decrease during March in enemy activity in the Duc Pho/Mo Duc area and action was generally limited to probing attacks against friendly patrols and security elements. There was significant contact in the vicinity of the He Than CIDG Camp when a friendly patrol gained contact with an estimated enemy battalion. The Sa Huynh RF/PF Outpost was overrun by an estimated battalion on 18 March. There was no significant enemy movement during the period, possibly due to the increased enemy attention given to the construction of ground fortifications. A three-man RF reconnaissance patrol discovered two bamboo rafts, each floating a case of explosives, in the vicinity of Quang Ngai City. Apparently the demolitions were intended for use on a nearby railway or highway bridge. Counterintelligence reports for the period show a number of abductions and assassinations carried out for purposes of terrorism.

c. The decrease in enemy activity in eastern Quang Ngai Province was quite noticeable in April, and there was a moderate decrease in coastal Quang Ngai. Ground reconnaissance elsewhere in
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the Province reported light sightings of the enemy. No significant
enemy movements were reported during the period. Incidents for the
period consisted of several minings along Highway One, and isolated
assassinations of low-level targets.
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1. G3 Section.

a. (U) The Task Force G3 Section was given overall responsibility for organizing and assembling the operations plan for deployment and subsequent operations in the objective area, as well as formulating the Task Force troop list.

b. (U) Four guidelines were used in the development of the troop list.

   1. Keep the division base austere.

   2. The Infantry brigades assigned to the Task Force will be self-sufficient.

   3. The present administrative procedures of the brigades will remain unchanged, i.e., pay, replacement requisitioning, training and R&R allocations.

   4. Logistic support of the brigades is to be direct from the 1st Logistical Command/III MAF supporting units and monitored by the Task Force headquarters.

c. (U) In essence, the provisional division was to be tailored to have basically the same configuration as a TOE Infantry division possessing the same capabilities. Whenever possible, in-being units, such as Infantry brigades, were adopted intact. In a few cases, such as the Cavalry Squadron, and Engineer, Aviation and Signal Battalions, there were no identical nondivisional units available. In those instances, similar type units, modified slightly to perform the required mission, were combined and added to the Task Force. As an example, the Task Force Cavalry Squadron was tailored using a squadron of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment augmented with an Air Cavalry Troop from the 1st Cavalry Division. In some cases, such as the Task Force Headquarters and Headquarters Company, individuals had to be designated to fill required spaces. The Task Force had to be built from personnel resources within USA RV.

d. (FORU) During a coordination visit to III MAF, it was learned that Task Force Oregon forces would report directly to the III MAF Commander. Further discussions established that the assignments of missions and tasks to be outlined by III MAF would be general with a broad latitude left to the Commanding General, Task Force Oregon, as to when, where and how to implement.
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e. (U) The troop list was approved by COMUSMACV on 28 February with the understanding that modifications and substitutions would be necessary from time to time. At that time I FFV and II FFV designated specific units for the Task Force. These units were:

1. 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.
2. 199th Inf Bde.
3. 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div.
4. 173d Abn Bde.

f. (U) On receiving approval of the proposed plan and troop structure by COMUSMACV, plans and preparations continued and on 5 March OPLAN ORI GON 1-67 was published. This plan contained detailed instructions on the deployment of units and individuals to the objective area, as well as the concept of operations once deployed.

g. (U) The major task of preparing the operations plan was concluded on 13 March and the planning staff of the Task Force was reduced to approximately 50 per cent.

h. (U) During the period 16–20 March, planning staff members of the Task Force conducted background briefings for personnel of I FFV, II FFV and III MAF. The purpose of these briefings was to present background, mission, organization and other pertinent information relative to the Task Force.

i. (U) On 1 April, MG Rosson assembled the officers remaining with the planning staff to bring them up to date on recent developments concerning the prospects of deployment of Task Force Oregon. MG Rosson announced that a three-brigade Task Force would be deployed in the configuration and time-frame discussed in the Command Section of this report. Work began immediately to make final preparations for the deployment of the Task Force Headquarters elements. Plans were also made to assume responsibility for the defense of the Chu Lai area including existing Marine facilities.

j. (U) MG Rosson called a meeting on 3 April to discuss the suitability of the C-130 landing strip site in the Duc Pho area selected by III MAF. Attending the meeting were the Director of Construction, MACV; Deputy Director of Construction, MACV; and the Task Force Oregon G3. The salient points brought out at this meeting were the advantages and disadvantages of the site selected by III MAF and those of an alternate site near the town of Duc Pho. MG Rosson
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k. (U) Major commands designated to furnish units for Task Force Oregon were notified 6 April by COMUSMACV to begin implementation of OPLAN OREGON effective 12 April. COMUSMACV decided to deploy only two brigades initially. Due to changes in unit commitments, the 196th Inf Bde was designated by II FFV in place of the 199th Inf Bde. II FFV furnished the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div. Personnel to complete the authorized TD of the Task Force headquarters assembled at Hq USARP to complete preparations for deployment to the Chu Lai area.

l. (U) The Task Force G3 was advised on 11 April that close air support for Task Force Oregon would be provided by 7th Air Force supported by the 1st Marine Air Wing as required.

m. (U) The Task Force Field SOP was submitted to the Task Force Adjutant General on 12 April for publication.

n. (U) An advance party moved to Chu Lai on 13 April. This included those personnel whose jobs required extensive on-the-ground orientation with their Task Force X-ray (USMC) counterparts.

o. (U) On 13 April the 196th Inf Bde main body closed in the Chu Lai area and prepared to begin extensive local patrolling and subsequent search and destroy operations.


q. (U) The main body of Task Force Oregon headquarters arrived in Chu Lai on 18 April.

r. (U) CG, III MAF, gave the Task Force Oregon G3 the following guidance on 19 April:

(1) Task Force Oregon assumes operational control of all Army units in the Chu Lai area at 200001H April.

(2) Task Force Oregon assumes operational control of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, at 220001H April.
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(3) Task Force Oregon assumes operational control of the Chu Lai Defense Command and relieves the 3d Bn, 5th Marine Regiment, at 261200H April.

(4) Task Force Oregon assumes total responsibility for coordination of Revolutionary Development activities in its area of operations.

s. (U) Task Force Oregon was fully operational at 200001H April and became OPCON to III MAF at that time.

w. (U) OPLAN III-67 was published on 20 April. This plan provides for the reinforcement/relief of six CIDG camps in close proximity to the Task Force Oregon TAOR. Each major subordinate unit was assigned responsibilities for reinforcing certain CIDG camps under attack.

x. (U) OPLAN III-67 was published on 23 April. This plan directed the 1st Bn, 14th Inf, under operational control of the 196th Inf Bde, to assume the responsibility for the area previously assigned to the 3d Bn, 5th Marine Regiment effective 261200 April. It further directed that the Chu Lai Defense Command be placed under operational control of Task Force Oregon that same date.

y. (U) Task Force Oregon assumed complete control of the Tactical Operations Center on 26 April as personnel from Task Force X-ray departed.

z. (U) The first B-52 strike in support of Task Force Oregon was conducted 27 April. The strike was on time and on target.

1. (U) On 29 April the Task Force Oregon CG met with the III MAF CG to discuss future operations. Attending the meeting were III MAF G3 and Task Force Oregon G3. Pertinent items discussed were:

(1) Task Force Oregon CG reported that the Task Force could relieve the 1st Bn, 5th Marines of their sector to enable their deployment elsewhere.
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(RGS-CSPOR-05) (U)

(2) Task Force Oregon CO outlined proposals for the deployment of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, stating his intention to deploy it in the Duc Pho area. It was agreed that deployment by sea would be the preferred method.

aa. (U) Task Force Oregon assumed responsibility for the 5th Marine Regiment THOR effective 301200h April.

ab. (U) As of 30 April, the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, was operating in the Duc Pho area and the 196th Inf Bde was operating in the Chu Lai area.

2. (U) Psychological Operations.

a. The Pay Ops officer was assigned as a member of the original planning group. During the period 19 February-13 April Pay Ops plans were prepared to insure that there was no break in this effort during the phase-over from the Marines to the Army.

b. The Pay Ops officer and part of the section moved to Chu Lai on 13 April. All personnel of the section were in Chu Lai by 23 April.

c. Coordination was effected with Task Force X-ray to transfer the Army Pay Ops Liaison Team to Task Force Oregon. Combat Loudspeaker Teams were also transferred from Task Force X-ray. These teams were part of the 244th Pay Ops Company which supports Task Force Oregon.

d. Upon arrival in the Chu Lai area, a special leaflet was prepared to announce the arrival of Task Force Oregon. The leaflet was printed by the 244th Pay Ops Company and is illustrated. This leaflet was designed to let the Vietnamese people know that they were not being abandoned as a result of the move of the Marine units.

e. The Pay Ops Section, under the supervision of the Task Force CO, consist of three officers and five enlisted men. Attached are a Liaison Team (one officer and one NCO) and two HB Teams (Loudspeakers) from the 244th Pay Ops Company. The HB teams are retained under Task Force X-ray to allow rapid response to Pay Ops opportunities throughout the THOR. The teams are used to support the Task Force brigades during their tactical operations.

f. The Task Force Pay Ops effort is supported by the 244th Pay Ops Company with printed matter, leaflets and posters. The company can print up to 4 million leaflets a week. The Task Force maintains
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A stock of over 8 million leaflets with approximately 100 different standard themes that can be employed in rapid response to exploitable situations.

5. The 5th Air Commando Squadron supports the Task Force by furnishing U-10 and C-47 aircraft for leaflet drops and airborne loudspeaker appeals. The C-47 can drop over 2.5 million leaflets in one lift and the U-10 can drop up to 200,000 leaflets in one lift and fly an hour of loudspeaker broadcasts after the leaflet drop.

6. During the period 20-30 April, the Task Force has dropped 3,063,200 leaflets and presented 22 hours and 15 minutes of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts, 21 hours of ground loudspeaker broadcasts and 9 hours of waterborne loudspeaker broadcasts. In addition, the Task Force has distributed JUSPAO newspapers, magazines and other literature in support of OVNI activities.

3. Artillery.

a. (U) The Artillery Officer was appointed to the initial planning group of the Task Force. During the period 18 February-2 March, the organizational concept of the Task Force Artillery was formulated.

b. (U) Task Force Oregon Artillery Headquarters was created as an integral part of the Task Force headquarters and divided into the following elements:

1. Fire Support Element (FSE). The FSE is designed to function as the fire coordination element within the Task Force. It is composed of 9 officers and 12 enlisted men. In addition, the G2 Air, G3 Air, US Air Force Air Liaison Officer, Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer, and their sections work in the FSE to provide control of all fire support agencies capable of delivering fire on ground targets. The Artillery officer or his senior representative present acts as Fire Support Coordinator.

2. Aviation. The aviation section was organized to provide command and control visual reconnaissance and artillery adjustment capability. It initially consisted of 9 officers and 12 enlisted men with 9 light observation helicopters and 2 OH-1 helicopters. Added to this was an 0-1 platoon consisting of 9 officers and 15 enlisted men with 9 0-1 aircraft to provide long-range visual reconnaissance and adjustment of fires for the medium and heavy artillery.

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(3) Headquarters. The headquarters section, consisting of 7 officers and 28 enlisted men was designed to provide a supporting staff for the commander.

c. (U) The overall artillery requirement to support the Task Force, in addition to the artillery headquarters was determined to be:

(1) One direct support battalion, consisting of three 105mm batteries, organic to each brigade.

(2) One 155mm howitzer battalion (towed) to reinforce the fires of the DS artillery. The towed battalion was selected for its air mobile capability.

(3) One heavy battalion (8" howitzer/175mm gun) (composite) to provide long-range general support throughout the assigned T/AOR.

d. (U) During the period 18 February-9 March, planning was begun to determine the equipment requirements of the artillery headquarters concurrently with the development of a basic artillery concept for the Task Force. Also during this period the 2d Bn, 11th Artillery (155mm)(T) was designated for the Task Force as was the 3d Bn, 18th Artillery (8"/175mm)(SP) (Minus Battery A). Battery A, 2d Bn, 94th Artillery (175mm)(SP) already located in the area of the ROK Marine Brigade was designated to be the third battery of the battalion.

e. (U) During the period 9 March-12 April the Task Force Artillery SOP was published. The aviation concept as originally specified was altered and the aviation section was reduced to 9 officers and 16 enlisted men with 8 light observation helicopters. This was based on the availability of LOHs and the decision that two UH-1s would be provided to Task Force Artillery daily on a mission basis. 0-1 support was to be provided on a mission basis by the 220th Aviation Company. However, at the request of III MAF, eight 0-1 aircraft with pilots were added to that company for the support of the Task Force.

f. (U) On 9 March, the Fire Support Element was assembled at Headquarters II FFW Artillery with all personnel and equipment. This element was inspected 11 March by the Task Force CG and the Artillery officer.

g. (U) Upon arriving at Chu Lai, the FSE was collocated with Task Force X-ray FSCC because elements of both forces were operating in the area. By the end of the reporting period, Task Force
X-ray had phased out and Task Force Oregon FSE had assumed responsibility for fire support coordination in the Chu Lai area.

4. Aviation.

a. (U) The Aviation officer was a member of the initial planning group. On 19 February the aviation requirements for the Task Force were given to the Task Force G3. These requirements consisted of three assault helicopter companies, one medium support helicopter company, one air cavalry troop, an artillery aviation section, aircraft organic to the assigned brigades and one aircraft maintenance company.

b. (U) On 20 February, 34th Group (Aircraft Maintenance) recommended the assignment of one general support aircraft maintenance company to support the aviation elements of the Task Force provided there was an organic maintenance company (direct support) within the Task Force.

c. (C) The S3, 1st Aviation Bde, agreed with the proposed aviation requirements on 20 February. It was not felt that these requirements could be met by present in-country assets due to the shortage of aviation units. The priorities would have to be set by COMUSMACV.

d. (U) On 20 February, the USARV aviation maintenance officer informed the Task Force aviation officer that the Infantry brigades did not have direct support maintenance capabilities. They receive support on an area basis depending on their operational location.

e. (C) The Task Force aviation officer briefed the Deputy USARV aviation officer 21 February on the aviation requirements to support the Task Force. The general agreement was that the requirements were valid but there were insufficient aviation assets in RVN to provide them all.

f. (U) An analysis of in-country aviation assets was submitted to USARV DCS on 26 February. The results of this analysis showed adequate aviation to support the Task Force with in-country assets.

g. (U) On 9 April the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion was notified that they would come under the operational control of Task Force Oregon effective 20 April. The advance party of the battalion arrived at Chu Lai on 14 April and made arrangements for one assault helicopter company to park temporarily at Ky Ha Heliport. Of the two remaining assault helicopter companies, one would deploy to English Airfield in support of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div; this company could
not fully deploy to Duc Pho due to the lack of maintenance facilities
and local security. The other assault helicopter company would move
temporarly to the cross-wind runway at Chu Lai Airfield until ade-
quate parking facilities could be constructed.

h. (U) The 161st Assault Helicopter Company arrived 13
April to assume the general aviation support of the Task Force and the
71st Assault Helicopter Company arrived as the direct aviation support
of the 196th Inf Bde.

i. (U) The medium support helicopter company arrived at Chu
Lai on 21 April.

j. (U) When aviation units arrived in the Task Force TAOR,
many problems involving the aviation unit's locations had to be re-
solved. The insecure and unprepared area at Duc Pho prevented the
174th Assault Helicopter Company from basing all their aircraft at
this position and prevented their direct support maintenance detach-
ment from moving with them. Due to a late change in plans when USMC
aviation units were not able to vacate the Chu Lai area, the home base
operating room of the 161st and the 71st Assault Helicopter Companies
was restricted.

5. Chemical.

a. (U) The Task Force Chemical Section, consisting of 2
officers and 2 enlisted men, was at authorized strength by 16 April.
The section with its equipment arrived at Chu Lai on 18 April and
became operational that day.

b. (C) Riot Control Agent (RCA) munitions availability
was an immediate problem area in the operational area. The CS hand
grenade was the only RCA munition available. A device was designed
to dispense these on 27 April. This device was unsuccessfully tested
on 28 April by 1st Bn, 35th Inf. The Task Force AIO was contacted
in reference to providing Air Force RCA support with air delivered
CBU-19A RCA bombs. This delivery capability is expected to become
available during the next reporting period and offers distinct ad-
vantages over Army-air delivered RCA munitions.

c. (C) As of 30 April there were no E-8 CS launchers nor
E-159 and E-158 tactical CS munitions available to Task Force elements.
The Task Force ammunition officer has been unable to obtain them as of
the end of the reporting period. An XD-3 smoke landing device was
borrowed from the 1st Cav Div and issued to 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, on
29 April as a substitute means to deliver RCA.
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(RCS-OSFOR-65) (U)
6. Engineer.

a. (U) During the planning phase of Task Force Oregon it was established that the Task Force would be composed of separate brigades, each with its own organic engineer company. The decision was then to provide a light but balanced direct support engineer battalion for the Task Force. The battalion chosen for the mission was the 39th Engineer Bn (C) composed of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, two line companies (A & D), and the 554th Engineer Co (Panel Bridge). In addition, this basic structure was augmented by additional earth-moving equipment from the 577th Engineer Bn (Const) and the 572nd Engineer Co (LE), as well as an asphalt distributor from the 35th Engineer Bn (C).

b. (U) During the period 18 February-11 March the Engineer Annex for the Task Force Field SOP was written as was the Engineer Annex to OPLAN I-67. During this same period the decision was made to use a TOE Assistant Division Engineer section as a part of the Task Force staff. Equipment and personnel for this section were drawn from units throughout the U.S. Army Engineer Command Vietnam (Provisional).

c. (U) On 10 April, an advance party of the 39th Engineer Bn (C), accompanied by the Assistant Task Force Engineer, moved to Duc Pho. The ATFE moved to Chu Lai on 19 April.

d. (U) The remainder of the section moved to Chu Lai 18 April and was confronted immediately with requirements for engineer support; the 14th Aviation Bn maintenance and parking facilities and 1st Logistical Command General Support Group storage and maintenance facilities. Since the 39th Engineer Bn was already fully committed to the construction of the C-130 airfield and the beach road near Duc Pho, the Task Force was virtually without Army Engineer support in the Chu Lai area. Only the 175th Engineer Co was in the area and it was committed in direct support of the 196th Inf Bde. However, the 9th USMC Engineer Bn and two Mobile Construction Battalions are located in the Chu Lai area, and a request for engineer support by these units was forwarded to III MAF. Within hours, engineer support was provided by units within III MAF.

e. (U) The Engineer Section became involved in two major problems: shortage of water and shortage of electrical power for the Task Force headquarters. The basic cause of these problems was the withdrawal of the existing equipment by the Marine units moving out.
f. (U) The major engineering projects being constructed for Task Force operational requirements during the reporting period were:

(1) 39th Engr Bn and Co D, 65th Engr Bn at Duc Pho:
   a) A C-130 capable airfield, 3,500 feet long, to include MX-19 runway and M9A1 taxiways and parking apron.
   b) A class 35, 6,000 meter, two-lane road from the beach east of Duc Pho to the airfield installation at Duc Pho.
   c) Helicopter facilities for two airmobile companies.
   d) FSA facilities for surrounding tactical forces.

(2) 9th USMC Engineer Bn at Chu Lai:
   a) One 13-pad ASP, complete with necessary berming and access roads, for the 15th Support Brigade.
   b) Hardstand facilities and access roads for the 8th Support Bn, 196th Inf Bde.
   c) Hardstand facilities and access roads for a Class I, and II and IV yard for the 221st S&S Co, 94th S&S Bn.
   d) Maintenance and supply hardstands for the 188th Maintenance Bn.
   e) A helipad for the Task Force PW compound.
   f) Wiring and fixture renovation for the 563rd Med Co, 1st Logistical Command hospital area.
   g) Construction of an office building for the Assistant Task Force Commander and his staff.

(3) Mobile Construction Battalion 71 (Seabee) at Chu Lai:
   a) Expansion of facilities at the Chu Lai Airfield to accommodate the 71st Airmobile Co (Lt) and the 178th Airmobile Co (Med).
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(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

(b) A heliport for the 161st Airmobile Co (Lt).

7. Signal.

a. (U) The Signal officer was part of the original planning staff for the Task Force. Initially the staff consisted of two officers and three enlisted men. Subsequently, a Crypto Warrant Officer and a Crypto Clerk were added to the group.

b. (U) The Communications-Electronics element for the Task Force was tailored after a division signal battalion. The tailoring of the unit eliminated the headquarters of the Forward Area Signal Company as the brigades of the Task Force were required to deploy with attached Forward Area Signal Center Platoons.

c. (U) Units designated as elements of the Task Force Signal Battalion did not conform exactly to the organization of a division signal battalion, and tailoring prior to their being committed with the Task Force was impractical due to their operational commitments. Units designated and their operational roles were:

1. HHD 509th Sig Bn: Provide HHD of the Task Force Signal Bn.


5. 69th Signal Bn AM Radio Section: Provide HF capability to Co, 36th Sig Bn, and Co C, 459th Sig Bn.

d. (U) During the entire planning period the Signal section continued work on the SSI, SOI and crypto-distribution plans. The writing of the SOI was hampered by the changes of units designated as elements of the Task Force.

e. (U) The advance signal element, consisting of three officers and seven enlisted men, moved to Chu Lai on 14 April. Equipment accompanying the advance party consisted of 2 AN/KRC-112, SB-22, 12 TA-312 and 4 AN/PRC-25 radios. The AN/PRC-25 radios were put into use immediately establishing a movement-control net for incoming units.
The remainder of the Signal Bn arrived in Chu Lai by 20 April and much of the equipment was put into operation immediately upon arrival.

f. (U) Original planning called for the Marines to evacuate the Chu Lai area as relieved by Army elements. However, many Marine units remained in the area and their requirements for frequencies plus the change in the designation of one of the Task Force brigades completely invalidated the SI. In order to overcome this situation, a number of clear frequencies were assigned to each major unit and a new SI was written which did not conflict with Marine elements in the area.

g. (U) Due to the fact that the companies designated for the Signal Bn were not structured to fit a division signal battalion organization, numerous shifts in personnel and equipment were required to satisfy operational requirements. Personnel shortages existed especially in the message center section of Co C, 459th Signal Bn.

h. (U) Unprogrammed requirements which were placed upon the battalion caused delays in the installation of some communications. Task Force Artillery had only organic radio equipment, so land-line communications to their GS battalions had to be installed. The Chu Lai Defense Command (ZDC) required an extensive communications network.
E. Logistics

1. (U) The office of the G4 was established 19 February as part of the initial planning group for Task Force Oregon. By 21 February, the office was manned by four officers and four enlisted men.

2. (U) Guidance was received to structure the combat service support element of the Task Force base austere, with only essential functions covered. The base support was to contain only those elements which were needed and not available either within the designated brigades or the 1st Logistical Command support. No divisional support command type units were available. Based upon this guidance, and the availability of units, it was planned to use a modified Supply and Services Battalion to perform the support command functions. Such a unit would require a major upgrading to meet the requirements.

3. (U) The overall force structure was presented to the USARV Deputy Commanding General on 26 February. MG Eifler, 1st Logistical Command CG who was present, stated that the support command structure was insufficient. He recommended that the command and staff element of the support command should be based on a modified Support Brigade headquarters with subordinate battalion headquarters to control company-sized service and support elements.

4. (U) As a result of the conference of 26 February, the Task Force Support Command was developed to consist of a Support Brigade Headquarters; Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Supply and Services Battalion; and Headquarters and Main Support Company with appropriate companies.

5. (U) A list of equipment required for the Task Force Oregon headquarters was prepared and forwarded to USARV and 1st Logistical Command on 28 February. The message requested that the equipment be collected in one location and segregated by section, since the headquarters had not received all the personnel required to maintain the equipment. It was later determined that the equipment would have to be collected in three locations; Saigon, Can Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon until called for by Task Force Oregon. This was the only way that sufficient depot storage space could be provided, and it would also prevent double handling of the equipment.

6. (U) As a result of a visit to observe the logistics operations of the 1st Inf Div, it became apparent that a Logistical Operations Control Center (LOCC) was needed for the Task Force. It was decided that the interests of the Task Force could be best served if the LOCC were a Support Command function. The Task Force, G4 would establish a Logistical Information Center (LIC) to assemble, evaluate and present
7. (U) Deployment planning began on 20 February. This planning was complicated by the fact that many units in Vietnam are operating with M16s and the latest M16s were not available to USAV. By 8 March it was determined that refined movement data were required from the designated units and a message was sent to all units requesting data for movement by sea and airlift. A small movement control center was established to prepare the data received and formulate movement control tables.

8. (U) Determination of Medical Support units was another problem during this period. There were no non-divisional units available that could act as a Task Force base medical facility. The USAV Surgeon recommended that a divisional medical company be selected. Company C, 25th Medical Battalion, was assigned as the Task Force medical support.

9. (U) On 13 March, 1st Logistical Command notified the Task Force G4 that there was no authority to go out of country for equipment not in stock to fill the Task Force requirements. The decision was made to pull items from stock as they came in country until the demands were filled. During the following week it became obvious that equipment requirements could not be filled by waiting for the items to come in from out of country. On 27 March USAV G4 requested that certain items be earmarked to come from units in Vietnam upon deployment of Task Force Oregon.

10. (U) With the announcement of the activation of Task Force Oregon, equipment and supplies for the Task Force were assembled at the 1st Logistical Command motor pool. They were then issued to the staff sections of the Task Force.

11. (U) The G4 Section moved to Chu Lai and became operational on 18 April.
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F. Civil Affairs/Civic Action

1. (U) The office of the G5 was established 19 February as part of the initial planning group. It was manned by one officer, the G5.

2. (U) During the period 22-24 February, a staff visit was made to Hq III MAF and Task Force X-ray. It was determined during this visit that records of Military Civil Affairs/Civic Action were not kept by either headquarters. Areas of responsibility were assigned to organizational commanders and area tasks were developed for the two U.S. Army Civil Affairs Platoons which were under operational control of Task Force X-ray from the 29th Civil Affairs Company (U.S. Army). Each organizational commander in Task Force X-ray determined the tasks to be accomplished in his area of responsibility. At the request of the Task Force Oregon G5, the Task Force X-ray G5 developed an inventory of projects planned, in progress, and completed.

3. (U) On 27-28 February, the Task Force Oregon G5 again visited Headquarters III MAF and Task Force X-ray to obtain information on the status of Revolutionary Development (RD) in the proposed areas of operation for Task Force Oregon. There was only one 1967 RD Program National Priority Area in the areas—immediately around Da Nang City. Province priorities are established in the province capitals of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin. The Task Force X-ray G5 provided a roster of Office of Civil Operations (OCO) and GVN officials concerned with civil affairs and Revolutionary Development.

4. (U) The Task Force Oregon G5 Section became fully manned with two officers and three enlisted men on 8 April. This austere organization was considered adequate when augmented with the two Civil Affairs Platoons that been attached to Task Force X-ray.

5. (U) The G5 and assistant G5 moved to Chu Lai on 13 April. The enlisted men of the section arrived at Chu Lai 18 April and the section became operational that same day.

6. (U) Task Force Oregon assumed operational control of the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) on 20 April. At that time emphasis was placed on insuring that all high-impact projects under-way were taken over by Army units in the area. This was considered necessary to insure that the benefits of those projects did not cease and that the Vietnamese people did not have an additional hardship placed on them by interruption in civic action, particularly in the MEDCAP program.

7. (U) The 6th CA Platoon came under the operational control of Task Force Oregon 28 April by VCO 29th Civil Affairs Company. The other Civil Affairs Platoon attached to Task Force X-ray will come under the operational control of the Task Force Oregon in early May.
S. (U) Below is a recapitulation of Task Force Oregon MEDCAP activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>No. of MEDCAPS</th>
<th>Patients Treated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>196th Inf Bn</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>5,611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn, 25th Inf Div</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF Oregon, Arty</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>85</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,334</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. (U) In support of the GVN Program of Revolutionary Development, liaison visits have been made to the Province Headquarters at Quang Ngai and Quang Tin as well as to the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) in each province. These visits will continue and will include district, village and hamlet officials and Vietnamese and U.S. Advisory personnel.

10. (U) The military civic program in the Task Force is carried out by local commanders who determine the needs of the villages and hamlets in their areas of operations. After weighing these needs against his ability to furnish manpower, the programs are coordinated with the Task Force G5. Units are being encouraged to engage in high-impact projects because of their immediate effect.
The Task Force Inspector General's office is organized with an Inspector General, Assistant Inspector General, Chief Clerk, and a clerk. This enables, augmented with the assistance of Acting Inspector General at subordinate commands, to provide Inspector General services for the entire Task Force. As is normal, the section will be further augmented with inspection-team members to conduct Annual General Inspections.

2. (U) The personnel and equipment of the IG section moved from Saigon on 18 April and that same day became operational at Headquarters, Task Force Oregon, Chulai.

3. (U) The Inspector General visited all major subordinate commands of the Task Force during the period 19-30 April to establish liaison, identify personnel to be appointed as Acting Inspector General, identify problem areas peculiar to the command, and obtain a general terrain and organizational orientation. Problem areas identified during these visits included:

a. Conditions in base camp areas are crowded because of Army units being partially superimposed over Marine Corps units. This is the result of the operational necessity of maintaining adequate forces in the area during the transition from Marine control to Army control. No immediate action is considered warranted since the condition will correct itself with the departure of the Marines.

b. A general lack of morale and comfort items such as dayroom equipment and facilities was noted. Equipment for these facilities is on order and adequate facilities will be established with its arrival. These items have been released for shipment to the Task Force units but have not arrived.

c. Establishment or re-establishment of unit clubs and/or Open Messes appeared to be a potential problem area. The IG gave assistance and advice on establishing funds for the operation of these facilities. Units were cautioned to maintain close supervision over the funds during the period of movement and organization to ensure compliance with appropriate regulations and protection of the funds from loss. This problem is inherent in movement of troops and transfer of responsibility, but is being controlled.

d. Morale and esprit appear to be high at present throughout the Task Force but many individuals are faced with excessive guard and KP duties. Indigenous personnel are being hired as KPs,
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and guard requirements are being reviewed with a view toward relief in these areas.

2. (U) A total of one complaint and 10 requests for assistance were processed by the IG office during the period 19-20 April. The majority of the requests involved EOR applications, miscalculation of personnel, and non-delivery of mail.

   a. EOR requests were submitted by some individuals at their parent units immediately prior to their departure for duty with Task Force Oregon. EOR quotes must come from these parent units since all personnel of Headquarters Task Force Oregon are in TDY status. Because of the classified nature of the operation during the reporting period, units were uncertain of lines of communication and did not notify personnel of approval or disapproval and of specific dates for EOR. Each case is being handled individually and units are being contacted through IG channels to get needed information for the individuals concerned.

   b. Three individuals requested assistance in obtaining reassignment from Task Force Oregon. Two requests were based on medical reasons and the other was based on personal reasons. One reassignment was effected based on a medical recommendation obtained by the IG. Medical treatment available within the command alleviated the second request. In the third case it was determined that the reasons set forth in the request did not merit special handling.

   c. The many requests for assistance in speeding up mail forwarding service resulted in a series of informal inquiries and checks into the mail system. Errors which could be corrected locally were corrected as they were identified. Several visits were made to the postal facility servicing Task Force units resulting in a determination that the personnel and equipment available for mail handling at Chu Lai are inadequate for the number of troops serviced. The primary cause of this was the failure to anticipate the large initial influx of mail brought about by the temporary hold placed on individual mail at units furnishing personnel to the Task Force and subsequent release of this mail when a forwarding address was obtained. There was also an indication that change-of-address cards were not forwarded as expeditiously as possible. Rerouted mail was arriving in large amounts as of 30 April. A few cases of misplaced mail are being inquired into and the problems solved on an individual basis. This situation serves to point up again the important morale factor represented by timely delivery of mail.

3. (U) The IG office is developing a schedule of Annual General Inspections for Task Force Oregon units.
6. August 1967

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H. Information.

1. (U) The Task Force Information Office became operational 10 April at Tan Son Nhut, RVN, with an Information Officer and one Information Supervisor.

2. (U) During the period 10-14 April, appropriate regulations and the Task Force Information Office SOP were completed. Three information specialists reported for duty to bring the section to a strength of one officer and four enlisted men. The section reached its authorized strength of two officers and six enlisted men on 18 April.

3. (U) The advance party of one officer and one enlisted man arrived at Chu Lai 15 April to establish working facilities and prepare for the arrival of the main body. The Task Force Information Office became operational at Chu Lai with the arrival of these personnel on 18 April.

4. (U) The first edition of the "OREGON NEWS SHEET" was published and distributed 20 April to the Task Force Headquarters elements as the sole source of national, international and local news. Material for the news sheet was obtained by taping the hourly AFRTS news broadcasts. Initial printing was by "Ditto" process since the Information Office had not been issued a mimeograph machine. Since that date a mimeograph machine has been received and 500 copies of the news sheet are published daily.

5. (U) On 22 April at 1630 hours, per approval of MACV and III MAF, the following initial announcement of Task Force Oregon was made in Saigon and Da Nang:

"The U.S. Army Task Force Oregon has joined the units of III MAF in I Corps Tactical Zone to support the Government of Vietnam Forces."

"The U.S. Army Task Force is commanded by Maj Gen William B. Rossen, USA, and will be under OPCON of CG III MAF."

6. (U) A request was dispatched to Headquarters USAFRV on 23 April for distribution of the Stars and Stripes. USAFRV replied that distribution would start with the 2 May edition in 4,500 copies for the Task Force and all subordinate units.
I. Headquarters Support

1. The Headquarters Commandant office was established 19 February with the assignment of a Headquarters Commandant, Operations Sergeant and a clerk. The first mission of the Headquarters Commandant was to obtain office space and equipment for the planning group that was to develop the Task Force organization and the initial operations plan.

2. During the period 21-27 February equipment requirements to support a 90-day operation were determined and submitted to USARV G4. These requirements included normal TO&E-type equipment, station type equipment and expendable supplies. USARV G4 was requested to gather this material in such a configuration as to permit inspection by the Task Force Commander on 10 March. The equipment was then to be held pending the order to activate the Task Force, at which time it was to be delivered to the objective area.

3. Visits by members of the planning staff to Chu Lai led to a revision of the equipment needed. It was determined that a considerable amount of station-type equipment would be needed to operate the Task Force headquarters at that location.

4. The equipment and material that was available in depot stocks was assembled. A request was submitted to USARV G3 to levy units within USARV for those items that were not available in depots. This request was approved and requirements were placed on units for the equipment to be available on an on-call basis.

5. The final assembly of the Task Force equipment was accomplished by ordering that present in the Saigon area to be delivered to the Headquarters Commandant at Saigon 12 April. All other equipment was delivered to the Headquarters Commandant at Chu Lai from 16-18 April. Equipment was issued to staff sections of the Task Force as soon as it was received. Equipment received in the Saigon area was shipped to Chu Lai by sea and air from 15-18 April. All equipment arrived in the Chu Lai area prior to 19 April.

6. The initial planning for the organization of the Task Force Headquarters base camp provided for the complete take-over of Marine Task Force X-ray base camp in Chu Lai. Plans had to be revised when it was learned that the Marines would not vacate the area as quickly as previously planned and would permanently retain a portion of the billeting area. This resulted in placing the Task Force Signal Battalion in tents initially. The Signal Battalion will be moved to the Task Force headquarters area during the month of May.
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7. Police and sanitation appeared to be a problem throughout much of the area. Garbage and trash pickup was sporadic. Latrines were inadequate in numbers, location and maintenance. Screening on billets, offices and mess halls was in a bad state of repair upon arrival of Army units. Garbage and trash pickup have been established on a regular basis. Materials have been received to re-screen and repair buildings. The work is being done by the Task Force Repairs and Utilities Detachment with assistance from the Task Force Engineers. Indigenous personnel have been hired on a daily and permanent hire basis to pick up trash, clean latrines and burn waste from latrines. Latrines in the base camp are of two types; those from which the waste must be burned and those with water-borne sewage systems. At the present time, the water supply is insufficient to operate the water-borne sewage system. As soon as the water system is expanded, the burn type latrines will be closed.

8. Existing personnel protective bunkers in the base camp were inadequate primarily because of insufficient numbers and lack of overhead cover. A simple-to-construct design was developed by the Assistant Task Force Engineer and an active program of bunker construction is underway with an expected completion date of 15 May.
Section 2, Part 2, Observations-Lessons Learned.

A. Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline

ITEM: (U) Strength Reports.

DISCUSSION: (U) The subordinate units of Task Force Oregon were gathered from several commands, each of which has its own method of strength reporting designated to meet the needs of the specific command. Information desired by the Task Force Oregon CO included the number of personnel present for duty of each unit in the TAOR. This required a modification of the reporting format for most units.

OBSERVATION: (U) USARV AG Statistical Branch provided a team to assist the Task Force in the submission of these reports. A standardized reporting system has been instituted within the Task Force.

ITEM: (U) Unqualified Personnel

DISCUSSION: (U) Several personnel selected for assignment to Task Force Oregon were found to be unqualified in their MOS. Due to the austere organization of the headquarters, it was imperative that all personnel be qualified to perform the duties for which requisitioned. The Task Force did not have the time nor the resources with which to offer on-the-job training.

OBSERVATION: (U) Those personnel found to be unqualified were returned to the furnishing units and replacements were requested. Whenever a headquarters such as Task Force Oregon is formed from existing resources, commanders furnishing personnel must give particular attention to the quality and qualifications of those personnel.

ITEM: (U) Organization of the Task Force Headquarters

DISCUSSION: (U) The original planning group of the Task Force kept foremost in mind the requirement to keep the headquarters staffing to the minimum. Accordingly, organizational structuring followed closely that of the various TOEs, but reducing much of the strength provided for in those documents. Even at full strength, however, TOEs do not provide the staffing required for field operations in all organizational elements. Elements, which in a combat environment are required to operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis or in two locations, do not have the requisite personnel authorizations on a TOE basis. This is borne out by the overstrengths encountered in other division-level headquarters currently operating in Vietnam. The sparse approach to personnel staffing also contains another pitfall for a major operating headquarters. The tendency is to make reductions in the numbers of low-ranking officers and enlisted men, and it is these personnel who
must perform many of the mundane, but essential, duties such as guard and fatigue. The result is that the sections which were slim to begin with become even slimmer as the necessary tasks associated with being in the field are accomplished.

**OBSERVATION:** (U) When faced with such restrictions, it becomes imperative to subject all requirements to thorough analysis and to be highly selective in manning of staff sections.

**ITEM:** (U) Casualty Reporting

**DISCUSSION:** (U) The Task Force casualty-reporting system was implemented quickly as a result of liaison visits with reporting units. Some of the units submitting casualty reports through this headquarters have their personnel records with their parent units. This has, at times, caused delay in the verification of certain reportable information.

**OBSERVATION:** (U) The prompt reporting of casualty information is essential. The reporting of casualty information would be speeded if all units carried their personnel records whenever they are detached from their parent units.

**ITEM:** (U) Chaplain Coverage for Task Force Artillery Battalions

**DISCUSSION:** (U) Artillery battalions which deployed with Task Force Oregon did not have assigned Chaplains. Consequently, Chaplain coverage for these units had to be obtained from other sources. The interim solution was to assign this coverage as an additional duty for the Chaplain of the U.S. Army General Support Group (Provisional) and to gain assistance from Marine Chaplains on an area-coverage basis. This arrangement provides minimum Chaplain coverage to the units in the area and will continue to do so provided neither the Artillery battalions nor the General Support Group are physically moved from the area.

**OBSERVATION:** (U) The USARV Chaplain has been informed of this situation through technical channels.

**ITEM:** (U) Finance Support of Task Force Oregon

**DISCUSSION:** (U) A non-integrated disbursing activity was activated to support Task Force Oregon. The establishment of a disbursing activity requires:

1. Approval by Department of the Army in accordance with the Treasurer of the United States.

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(2) Requisitioning of blank checks from the Treasury of the United States.

(3) Accounting and reporting of funds and transactions.

(4) Requisitioning of specialized office machines and blank forms.

Once activated, accounting and reporting for funds and transactions become a major task for the disbursing officer. A Class B agent, on the other hand, is a commissioned or warrant officer who receives and disburses funds as an agent of a Finance Officer. Procedures to establish a Class B agent office are not intricate. Approval is local. In addition, reporting and accounting procedures for Class B agents are relatively simple; the reporting and accounting is the responsibility of the parent finance office. Further, as an agent of a Finance Officer, normally the Class B agent is insured of continued administrative and logistical support.

OBSERVATION: (U) In the formation of a Task Force type organization, consideration should be given to the establishment of a Class B agent finance activity as opposed to a non-integrated disbursing activity in the interests of both speed of establishment and adequacy of financial support.

ITEM: (U) Joint Military Police Patrols

DISCUSSION: (U) With the arrival of Task Force Oregon at the Marine base of Chu Lai, the problem of enforcement of regulations and maintenance of order and discipline among approximately 25,000 Army and Marine personnel arose. Included were the tasks of both on-base and off-base highway patrols, accident investigation, and control of off-duty Army and Marine personnel in the surrounding communities and within the Chu Lai Base area.

OBSERVATION: (U) A joint US Army-Marine-ROK MP force was established. Marine personnel were placed under the operational control of the Task Force Oregon Provost Marshal. All areas of mutual interest are policed by these joint MP patrols. Further, in areas with a high density of civilians, Vietnamese National Police are included in the patrols.

ITEM: (U) General Court-Martial Jurisdiction

DISCUSSION: (U) Task Force Oregon personnel were drawn from 8 General Court Martial jurisdictions within RVN. It was the apparent intention to place all of the units under Task Force Oregon for administration of military justice. At the end of the reporting period,
the units are only OPD to the Task Force. Therefore, the command is
organizing the units for the proper functioning of the
military justice system. An appropriate general order was needed at
the time of deployment.

OBSERVATION: (U) USARV is preparing a general order attaching
the units to Task Force Oregon for General Court Martial jurisdiction.

B. Operations

ITEM: (U) Aerial CS Delivery Method.

DISCUSSION: (U) The CS M-7A3 grenade shipping box was made into
a means of bulk grenade delivery by nailing the bottom half of the
ovary fiber shipping containers to the shipping box bottom and placing
the grenade with the safety pin removed back into the open oval fiber
shipping container. The box was turned upside down from a UN-1
Helicopter over a target area and the grenades fell out of the con-
tainers. This released the safety handle activating the grenades
on their descent.

OBSERVATION: (U) On testing, two grenades were blown back into
the helicopter and the system proved too hazardous for use. An XM-3
smoke-laying device, made by the Limited Warfare Laboratory was
borrowed from the 1st Cav Div to dispense CS grenades. The device
is designated to dispense CS and smoke grenades from Army helicopters
and is not hazardous to crew members.

C. Training and Organization.

ITEM: (U) Organization of the Assistant Task Force Engineer
Section.

DISCUSSION: (U) In the initial deployment of tactical forces of
the Task Force to Chu Lai and Duc Pho, it was necessary to geographic-
ally separate the engineer battalion headquarters from the Task Force
headquarters. This required the augmentation of the Assistant Task
Force Engineer section in order to accomplish the normal engineer mis-
sions of design, reconnaissance, material requisitioning and coordina-
tion of engineer effort that normally would have been accomplished
by the battalion staff.

OBSERVATION: (U) Augmentation of the staff consisted of an
additional officer, a supply NCO and a clerk-typist.

D. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

ITEM: (U) Interim Clearances.
August 1967

From the activation of Task Force Oregon there was an immediate need to grant interim confidential and secret clearances to personnel who were to be working with classified information, but who had no previous clearance or an insufficient clearance, i.e., a confidential clearance when a secret clearance was required.

Personnel requiring interim clearances were granted such clearances on the basis of favorable files checks. Those personnel who did not have records available in Chu Lai could not be granted clearances.

Requisitions for maps for the Task Force were submitted in March. Taken into consideration were the size of the Task Force and the number of units that would comprise the Task Force. The requirements had not been filled by 18 April when the Task Force headquarters arrived at Chu Lai. Units began requesting maps immediately upon their arrival in the area of operations, but there was not an adequate supply to meet the demands.

Requisitions were met insofar as possible with existing supplies. An interim supply source was established with U.S. Marine Corps G4.

E. Logistics.

Receipt of Supplies and Equipment

During the planning stage of Project Oregon, equipment requirements were prepared and submitted to USARV G4 with the proposal that all the equipment be pooled in one location. This procedure was recommended in lieu of drawing the equipment since none of the staff sections, to include the Headquarters Company, had received their full complement of personnel. A further consideration was that Task Force Oregon had not been activated. All items available in depots were located in three locations; Saigon, Qui Nhon and Can Remi Rv. In view of the uncertainty that the Task Force would be activated and the shipping problem of moving all items to Saigon, it was agreed that segregation and storage of these items would take place at each depot and, if the Task Force were activated, the items would be shipped to Chu Lai. Items that were not available in depots in-country were reported to the Task Force G4 and action was taken through USARV G3 and G4 to levy units for the remaining requirements. When the Task Force was activated, difficulties were encountered in receiving all items from depots due to shipping priorities and procedures, all of which resulted in non-receipt of a large amount of supplies at the Chu Lai location in a timely manner. To date, there
are still a number of items that have not been received.

OBSERVATION: (U) This procedure did not allow each element of the headquarters to insure that they had their authorized equipment and the extended delay or non-receipt of supplies hampered or created problems in many operations. All items should have been received by the Task Force Headquarters Commandant prior to movement from Saigon.
AVDF-OG

6 August 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(PCS-CSFOR-65) (U)
Section 2, Part II, Recommendations: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
EDGAR R. POOLE
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

Inclosures:
1. Project Oregon Personnel Reoster, 19 Feb 67
2. Task Force Oregon Organizational Structure
3. Task Force Oregon Distinguished Visitors
4. Psy Ops Leaflet - Arrival of Task Force Oregon (Copies 1-10 only)
5. Chief Hot-Leadlet - (Copies 1-10 only)
6. Task Force Oregon Poster, 4-19-67 (Copies 1-10 only)
7. Task Force Oregon Officer-Hostel - 30 April 1967

Withdrawn,
Hqs, DA
CONFIDENTIAL

TASK FORCE OREGON ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Task Force Troops

HHC, Task Force Oregon (Prov)
Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (Air)
Co C, 2d Bn, 34th Armor
2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
148th Military Police Platoon
HHD, 509th Signal Bn
Co C, 459th Signal Bn (Cnd Op)
Co A, 36th Signal Bn (Spt Op)
Platoon (+), 167th Radio Relay Co
39th Engineer Bn (C) (-)
3d Military History Detachment
HHC, 14th Aviation Bn
174th Aviation Co (AML)
161st Aviation Co (AML)
71st Aviation Co (AML)
178th Aviation Co (AML)
Task Force Oregon Military Intelligence Det (Prov)
Task Force Oregon Radio Research Co (Prov)

Task Force Artillery (Prov)

HHC, Task Force Artillery (Prov)
2d Bn, 11th Artillery (155mm) (T)
3d Bn (-), 18th Artillery (8"/175mm) (SP)
Battery A, 2d Bn, 94th Artillery (175mm) (SP)

Task Force Support Command (Prov)

HHC, 15th Support Bde (GS) (-)
HHC, 94th Sup & Svc Bn (DS) (-)
221st Sup & Svc Co
163d Trans Co (Lt Trk)
Platoon, 10th Trans Co (Med Trk)
Hq & Main Spt Co, 156th Maint Bn
335th Trans Co (DS) (Acft Maint)
Co C, 25th Medical Bn

3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

HHC, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
1st Bn, 14th Infantry
1st Bn, 35th Infantry
2d Bn, 35th Infantry

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2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division continued

2d Bn, 9th Artillery (105mm) (T)
Troop C, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry
Co D, 65th Engineer Bn (C)
Co B (-), 129th Signal Bn
40th Infantry Platoon, Scout Dog
Platoon, 25th MP Co
Team, 25th MI Det
Detachment, 374th Radio Research Co
3d Support Bn (Prov)
  Det, 25th SRT Bn
  Co D, 725th Maint Bn
  Co E, 25th Medical Bn
Det, 25th Admin Co (Ad)
Team C, 41st CA Co

196th Infantry Brigade (Lt) 4

HHC, 196th Infantry Bde
2d Bn, 1st Infantry
3d Bn, 21st Infantry
4th Bn, 31st Infantry
Troop F, 17th Cavalry
3d Bn, 62d Artillery (105mm) (T)
173rd Engineer Co (S)
156th Signal Plt. (Pwr Area)
48th Infantry Plt, Scout Dog
27th Chemical Det (CER)
395th MI Det
408th Radio Research Det
544th MP Platoon
8th Combat Service Support Bn
8th CA Platoon, 2d CA Co
10th Public Information Det

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**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Task Force Oregon**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 18 Feb - 30 Apr, 1967**

**CG, Task Force Oregon**

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