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**AUTHORITY**
31 Oct 1979 per DoDD 5200.10 document marking; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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US Army Weapons Command
II Field Force Vietnam
### SECTION I - Significant Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel, Health, Morale, Safety and Discipline</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and Counterintelligence</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations, Plans, and Training</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics and Transportation</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Development (RD)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SECTION II - Commanders Observations and Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Collection</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs/Civic Action</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1967 (BCS CSPOR-55) (U)

INDEX OF INCLUSIONS

1. II PFORCEV Order of Battle.
2. Sketch of III Corps Tactical Zone with Major Unit CP Locations.
4. Sketch of Major Enemy Locations in III CTZ.
5. Sketch of Major Enemy Locations in IV CTZ.
6. II PFORCEV Troop List.
7. Statistical Summary Tactical Air Support.
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HEADQUARTERS
II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96266

AVFBC-EE-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (W-DHO-TO-A) (U)

TO: See Distribution

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. (7) COMMAND:

a. During the quarter there were four major changes in the staff, II FFORCEV.

   (1) On 7 September 1967, Brigadier General Joseph S. Lekson became the Chief of Staff, II FFORCEV, replacing Brigadier General Robert C. Forbes. General Lekson had previously served as Assistant Division Commander, 9th Infantry Division.

   (2) On 9 August 1967, Colonel Marvin D. Fuller became Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, II FFORCEV, replacing Colonel William W. Cobb. Colonel Fuller had previously served as Commanding Officer, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

   (3) On 1 September Colonel Paul B. Duras became the Provost Marshal, II FFORCEV after an assignment as Provost Marshal OCE, USA, Washington, D.C. He replaced Lieutenant Colonel William R. Morgan Jr.

   (4) On 7 September Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Allen became the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, II FFORCEV. Colonel Allen, before his present assignment, was Assistant Executive Officer, QASA, Washington, D.C. He replaced Colonel Richard W. Clark.

b. The overall assigned/attached strength of II FFORCEV decreased during this quarter. A comparison at the end of the last four reporting periods follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>WARRANT OFFICER</th>
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<tr>
<td>31 Jan 67</td>
<td>346</td>
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</table>

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
c. II FFORCEV Order of Battle, to include location and the control headquarters, is shown in Inclosure 1.

d. A sketch showing the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) with major unit CP locations is shown in Inclosure 2.

2. (FOUD) Personnel, Health, Morale, Safety and Discipline.

a. Section I: Significant Activities:

(1) The personnel situation within units assigned, attached to or under the operational control of II Field Force Vietnam remains satisfactory. Although the MTOE for this headquarters has not been formally approved, it has been recognized as a basis for personnel fill by Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam. Department of the Army has been requested to expedite action on the HQ II FFORCEV MTOE.

(2) A vigorous personnel infusion program to eliminate unit rotational humps was initiated by Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, during the quarter. The goal of this program is to insure that a unit which has been in country for one year will not lose more than 15 percent of its personnel during any month.

(3) The Rest and Recuperation (R&R) policy of this headquarters was modified to insure more effective utilization of quotas. The practice of allocating quotas to subordinate elements of the command has been discontinued and all applications are submitted to the Adjutant General, II FFORCEV. Centralized processing of such applications permits more expeditious transfer of quotas in cases of cancellation. However, this headquarters continues to receive quotas in excess of requirements. Action was taken to request a decrease in allocations for the 3d quarter FY 1968.

(4) This headquarters has encountered difficulty in obtaining replacements in MOS's 13F (Automatic Weapons Crewman) and 31M (Radio Relay and Carrier Attendant). This difficulty has been reported to Department of the Army through HQ, USARV. Information has been received that necessary action will be taken to provide personnel in these MOS's. However, to date, the replacements have not arrived in sufficient numbers to meet requirements.

(5) On 31 August 1967 a recommendation for award of the Meritorious Unit Commendation to HQ & HQ Company, II FFORCEV was forwarded...
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

to HQ, USARV. During the period 1 August - 31 October 1967, the following individual awards were presented:

- Distinguished Service Medal: 1
- Legion of Merit: 8
- Silver Star: 17
- Distinguished Flying Cross: 2
- Soldier's Medal: 11
- Bronze Star: 82
- Air Medal: 110
- Army Commendation Medal: 121
- Purple Heart: 8

TOTAL: 360

(6) In August a series of monthly Adjutant General Newsletters was initiated. The publications contain a variety of information compiled from regulations, directives, periodicals and other media which is of general interest and assistance to members of the command.

(7) Development of the II FORCEV base camp continued satisfactorily. Status of significant projects as of 31 October 1967 follows:

(a) Command Court Room building - completed
(b) Multiple sports courts - completed
(c) EM Club - 90% completed
(d) NCO Club - 20% completed
(e) Tropical construction DQ - 33% completed
(f) Sodding of Football Field - completed
(g) Air conditioning of Post Exchange - completed

(8) The health of the command continues to be excellent.

(9) Morale of the troops continues at a high level. The command hosted the first USARV Volleyball Championship Competition during
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

the period 24-26 August 1967. During the reporting period a total of 8 USO abuses visited the headquarters area.

(10) The reduction of motor vehicle accidents and accidental firearms incidents received continued emphasis throughout the period. A total of 14 motor vehicle accidents were reported during the quarter which resulted in 3 US killed and 9 VN killed. A total of 7 accidental firearms incidents, resulting in 1 US killed, were reported.

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

a. There were no major operations conducted under HQ, II FFORCEV direction during the reporting period. Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II FFORCEV area are discussed in OELL's submitted by units under operational control of this headquarters.

b. Intelligence Collection:

(1) The II FFORCEV Intelligence Collection Plan will remain in effect until new tactical areas of operational interest for OPGOM units are announced. Current boundaries will be affected by the arrival of the 101st Airborne Division in country. In view of the forthcoming changes, the current plan has been found to be lacking in the provision of adequate guidance to the collection assets available in II FFORCEV. For this reason, this headquarters EMH have been revised and assembled as a separate annex to be published with a new collection plan.

(2) The Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation for Attack on VC Infrastructure (C) (ICEX) program in the III CTZ is progressing according to schedule and selected ICEX Advisors have been assigned in the priority provinces. The attack on the infrastructure at the district level has already met with success through the District Operations and Intelligence Coordination Centers (DOICC) which have been established in 31 districts (see below). Files on suspected members of the infrastructure have been compiled in each DOICC and have already resulted in operations aimed at the apprehension of suspects. The success of the DOICC program to date has provided a basis for the establishment of similar centers at both province and corps. The establishment of Province Operations and Intelligence Coordination Centers (POICC) will permit collection, collation, and reaction to intelligence information on targets beyond the scope of individual districts. Joint US/GOV participation in centers at all levels is expected to provide free exchange of information and permit rapid reaction by simplifying coordination procedures. A major problem area in the attack on the infrastructure has been the inadequacy of detention facilities, which often results in the premature release of prisoners. Plans are being prepared for the establishment of prototype facilities in three provinces and a regional detention camp at Bien Hoa. The planned facilities will increase the detention capacity in III CTZ by more than 1000 spaces. A circuit type
court is also planned to permit the trial of prisoners within the detention facility itself. This will further ease the burden on the local facilities by shortening the pretrial confinement, thereby reducing the period of time that prisoners must be held pending release or transfer to national confinement centers.

DOICC's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Binh Tay</td>
<td>Ham Tan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
<td>Xuan Loc, Dinh Quan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phuoc Tay</td>
<td>Dat To</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td>Trang Bang, Cu Chi, Duc Hoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long An</td>
<td>Ben Luc, Thu Thua, Rach Kien, Thanh Duc, Tan Tru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
<td>Go Bau Ha, Khien Hanh, Phuoc Minh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gia Dinh</td>
<td>Hoc Mon, Thu Duc, Nha Be, Binh Chanh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>Chau Thanh, Le Thieu, Phu Hoa, Tri Tan, Ben Cat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phuoc Long</td>
<td>Chon Thanh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phuoc Long</td>
<td>Don Luan, Phuoc Binh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) MACV has informed subordinate headquarters that a marked improvement has been noted in the timely reporting of information obtained from prisoners of war and ralliers, and has solicited opinions regarding further improvement of the reporting system. A new procedure was subsequently directed whereby preliminary interrogation reports are to be submitted by the most expeditious means, preferably via secure Tactical Operations Center (TOC) circuits, with key information gleaned from subsequent interrogations to be reported via electrical Intelligence Summary (INTSUM). At the recommendation of this headquarters, MACV agreed that hard copy PIR's are now superfluous and II FFORCEN OPCON units are no longer required to submit them. This should significantly enhance the present reporting system.
(4) During the period covered by this report, G2 II FFORCEV has developed an Automatic Data Processing (ADP) capability for statistical analysis of incidents occurring throughout the III CTZ. Reports of harassments, ground attacks, mortar attacks, terrorism, Lines of Communication (LOC) interdiction, significant Visual Reconnaissance (VRs) and propaganda are extracted from the daily INTSUM's and entered in the data base. Complete reports are published monthly in two formats: a chronological listing of incidents for the month and a listing of incidents by type, arranged in chronological order within each type. For purposes of analysis or comparison special readouts can be made for specific days, areas, or type of incident. For example, if a person wished to determine on what day of the week most incidents of terrorism occurred, either in a specific area or in the whole III CTZ, the data could be available within a few hours. The ADP system has been very useful in the preparation of special studies. It is being expanded to include more types of incidents, and has already proven to be of invaluable assistance in the development of intelligence analysis.

(5) During the period covered by this report, the 73d Aviation Company (AS), equipped with the Mohawk Surveillance System, was placed under operational control of CG, II FFORCEV, and assigned the mission of General Support to II FFORCEV. This mission assignment has proven to be a most effective method of employment of the unit. Control of the 73d Aviation Company has enabled planning personnel to extract maximum return from the limited assets available. Nightly coverage of the II FFORCEV area of operations in support of all operational units therein, became a reality with the company in the General Support role. The infrared assets of the company have been utilized to the fullest extent possible in providing nightly coverage of areas requested by subordinate units and the II FFORCEV G2. The photographic and visual reconnaissance assets are being utilized to provide rapid reaction coverage to all units subordinate to II FFORCEV.

(6) During the period covered by this report, coordination between the G2 Air and II FFORCEV Artillery was made in an attempt to improve artillery reaction to reports of targets detected by Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) reported inflight to ground units. The 73d Aviation Company was furnished all call signs and frequencies of the Fire Direction Officers as well as the locations of all II FFORCEV heavy artillery units. Both artillery groups and all OPCON units have been provided overlays of the normal aircraft flight paths to include approximate times the aircraft will depart Vung Tau. A time distance factor which gives an indication of the aircraft location along the flight path was also furnished. Previous to this coordination, inflight reports were made directly to DS battalions of the infantry divisions. If the Direct Support (DS) battalions had the capability, they would engage the target with artillery. Otherwise, the target information was passed to a II FFORCEV Artillery unit by the DS battalion. Since many sightings are beyond the range of division artillery units, procedures were established whereby inflight reports are now passed directly to II FFORCEV Artillery units, using established radio frequencies and call signs.
There have been recent indications that the VC are experiencing serious difficulties as a result of Allied operations. In order to replace combat losses and ralliers, the VC are being forced to use more coercive measures against the local populace, or else rely solely upon infiltration. Either course has side effects detrimental to their cause. The coercion alienates them from the people, particularly in areas not under firm VC control, and makes it more difficult to get the necessary additional support. The large number of North Vietnamese personnel in the VC units (estimated to be over 50% in Main Force units) further separates them from the local populace and also causes resentment among the South Vietnamese members of these units.

Captured documents and interrogation of POW's indicate that the VC are having great difficulty in procuring sufficient food. Increased taxation and the acceptance of food in lieu of money are being used to offset their difficulty. Heavier taxation will further alienate the people and the lack of food will increase morale problems.

c. Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle:

(1) Description. The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) is the supreme military and political headquarters for the VC in South Vietnam. The VC divide all territory of both North and South Vietnam into separate Military Regions (MR). All of MR 1, 4, and the Rung Sat Special Zone (Group 10) lie inside the III CTZ. Two provinces of MR 10, one province of MR 6, and one province of MR 2 are also located in III CTZ. Existing boundaries are shown in Inclosure 3.

(a) Military Region 1 includes the VC Provinces of Tay Ninh, Thu Dau Moi, and Ba Bien. Formerly known as Eastern Nambo, MR 1 is also known as T1, Y1, and MR 7.

(b) Military Region 4 includes the Saigon-Gia Dinh area. It is also known as 14, T4, T4, and the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone.

(c) In 1966 the Rung Sat Special Zone was known as MR 10 or T10. However, when Quang Duc, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long were organized into a new MR 10, it was redesignated as Group 10.

(2) Significant Order of Battle Developments.

(a) A document captured by elements of the 1st US Inf Div contains a memorandum on VC methods of Troop administration. The document states that command echelons must adhere to the regulations concerning their unit's organization. They are not allowed to "challenge the table of organization, or admit or dismiss anyone on their own accord". Further, the document states that "battalion and higher level units should verify the authorized personnel (at the
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personnel section and the assigned personnel (at the Bear Services Section) on a monthly basis, and submit appropriate reports to higher headquarters. The document is dated 26 June 66, and is signed by the Chief of Military Personnel Section, 9th VC Division. (Comment: This document indicates that the VC have relatively sophisticated methods of assigning troops and verifying troop strengths, and that VC units from battalion and higher operate according to a standard table of organization.)

(b) A notebook with entries by an unidentified political cadre of Binh Tan Subregion, MR 4, dated 7-21 May 67, was captured by the 199th Lt Inf Bde in July 1967. The notebook records the main points of the resolution of Binh Tan Subregion Party Committee. A significant entry stated that D6 (6th VC LF Bn/MR 4) was deactivated, not because of unfavorable conditions, but because of reorganizational requirements. The document also discloses that the 6th VC LF Bn/MR 4 suffered "unprecedented casualties" during the first three months of 1967. Approximately 120 men were killed, captured, or lost through defection during this period. This was apparently the result of "poor leadership, unstable ideology, and an incorrect estimate of the enemy." (Comment: Although the 6th Bn/MR 4 has been marginally combat effective for the last six months, and has shown a steady decline in strength, it is improbable that it was deactivated for any reason other than the "reorganizational requirements" mentioned in the notebook. There have been instances in the III CTZ of local force units being dispersed for operations in an effort to reestablish control over the population, and to facilitate proselytizing and recruiting activities. This may be what is meant by the "deactivation" of the 6th Bn. Indications are that the unit has undergone a change of mission which demands the complete dispersion of its elements. However, it is improbable that it has been deactivated altogether. Inasmuch as its headquarters elements probably continue to exist, the battalion could probably be mobilized on short notice. As such, it should still be considered an identifiable unit and a threat to Allied units and installations.)

(c) Because no information has been received concerning the 26th Engineer Company (aka: C26) for more than nine months, the unit has been dropped from II FFORCEN OB holdings.

(d) A notebook captured by elements of the 25th US Inf Div vic KB54936, contained notes taken from a political reorientation course held from 4-8 June 1967, in which resolutions of COSVN, the Gia Dinh Party Committee, and the Military Affairs Party Committee of MR 4 were studied. It noted Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMF) difficulties in the conduct of military operations, pacification programs, personnel replacements, and finance. The document stated that the instability of the GVN is an insurmountable problem for the US, and that the VC have the advantages of political superiority, a large rear area, the support of 13 socialist countries, and twice their former

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military manpower. The document cited a supplemental resolution of the Central Headquarters, Lao Dong Party, which called for a protracted struggle to accomplish a general counteroffensive and uprising in the event that US strength in RVN exceeded 600,000. The document stated that if negotiations took place, they would be used to create favorable conditions in both the military and political fields for implementation of the general counteroffensive and uprising. The negotiations would be used to launch political attacks on the US, and to acquire support from other countries. It stated that the VC would have to fight harder before they could accept negotiations and would fight continuously and on a large-scale basis if negotiations took place.

(e) On 15 September 1967, Navy EOD Officers identified the major portions of a fin assembly belonging to an RPG-7 round which had been recovered from a Mobile Riverine Force Assault craft hit during Operation CORONADO V in the Cam Son Secret Zone (XS1944). This is the first positive identification of an RPG-7 in the Delta, and represents an increased threat to Allied operations in the area, particularly to armored river assault craft.

(f) On 29 October 1967, vicinity XU74088, the US Special Forces (USSF), Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Compound, and the Loc Ninh Subsector Compound received SA, AW, 82mm mortar, 122mm rocket, and reported 120mm mortar fire, followed by a massive ground attack. Captured documents indicated that the major enemy force in contact were elements of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions/273d VC Btg and at least one battalion of the 272d VC Btg, 9th VC Division, as well as unknown sized elements of the 141st and 165th NVA Regts, 7th NVA Division. The use of the 122mm Rocket in the attack indicated the possible presence of elements of the 84A NVA Artillery Btg, 69th VC Arty Command, which is the only unit in the III CTZ with a known rocket capability. This attack marks the first time that rockets have been employed in support of a ground attack in the III CTZ. This type tactic is expected to be employed in future VC operations.

(g) Documents recently captured by elements of the 9th US Inf Div include a personnel strength status report for Long Thanh District, Ba Bien Province, for April 1967. Included in the report are the following armed units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C240</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C245</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C246</td>
<td>21</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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Unit: Engineer Platoon 20
Special Action Squad 7

(Comment: The C245 Nhon Trach Company and the C280 Long Thanh platoon were the local force units for their respective districts in VC Ba Bien Province prior to its reorganization into VC Ba Bien Province, and the subsequent merger of Long Thanh and Nhon Trach Districts in late 1966. The C240 Company was subordinate to the former VC Bien Hoa Province. With the formation of VC Ba Bien Province, the C240 Company was apparently resubordinated to the newly-formed Long Khanh District, as was the C245 Nhon Trach Company. It is probable that the C280 Long Thanh Platoon was redesignated C246 at the same time.)

(iii) Nguyen Van Chau, who rallied to the 18th ARVN Inf Div on 25 August 1967, identified himself as a Platoon Sergeant with the position of Manager of the 2d Bn, 271st VC Regt, 9th VC Division. According to Chau, new areas of operation have been assigned to the 5th, 7th, and 9th Divisions. The 7th NVA Division has been assigned to operate in the western portion of the III CTZ, and the 5th VC Division is to operate in the eastern portion. Because of flagging morale of the VC soldiers caused by successive military failures of the 7th NVA and the 5th VC Divisions, the 9th VC Division has been assigned to operate in the area between the two divisions for the purpose of supporting "the morale and the strength of Worksites 5 and 7 during future operational plans." (Comment: The position of Manager in a VC battalion is equivalent to our S-4, and is usually held by a high ranking NCO or a junior officer. In this position, Chau could possibly have had access to high level information.)

(iv) A VC Directive dated 22 May 1967, and signed by Vo - Dang, the CO of the Ba Bien Province Unit, notifies subordinate districts and units that the Province Command Committee decided to activate an additional provincial battalion. The directive instructs them to furnish cadre for the new battalion. Platoon cadre are to be supplied by the D445 LF Bn, Long Thanh District, Xuan Loc District, Long Dat District, and Chau Dat District - a total of 10 cadre personnel. Additional squad level cadre were to be supplied by these units and the Cau Su units. These men were to be sent to the permanent stations of the Province through T.20 on 10 June 1967. (Comment: This is the first documentary evidence that has been received concerning the formation of a second Local Force battalion in VC Ba Bien Province. There is a possible connection between this entity and recent reports of an NVA battalion (Bac Ninh Bn) operating on a local level in Ba Bien Province, in addition to the D445 LF Battalion.)

(j) Recently captured documents indicate that the Dong Nai Main Force Infantry Battalion of VC MR 1 has been upgraded to
a regiment. The Dong Nai Battalion itself is redesignated K1, and is
the first battalion of the regiment. The second battalion, or K2, may
have been formed from the 309th Infiltration Group which is believed to
have arrived in SVN in May 1967. The Regiment apparently has a third
battalion designated K3, but very little is known about it. The Dong
Nai Regiment is subordinate to MR 1, but will be controlled by COSVN.
Its mission is to increase pressure on the areas surrounding Saigon -
Cholon. (Comment: While the current strength of the Dong Nai Regiment
is not known, it is believed to be considerably understrength, rendering
the unit Not Combat Effective.)

(k) On 27 October 1967, vicinity YU198045, 3/9th
ARVN Inf was attacked by an estimated regimental-size enemy force.
A PW captured in the conflict identified his unit as the 2d Bn, 88th
NVA Inf Regiment. The 88th NVA Regt has been previously reported as
subordinate to the B-3 Front, and located in Pleiku Province in the II
CTZ, vicinity YA7116. According to the PW, his unit infiltrated into
the III Corps TAOI in the latter part of September, and located itself
in the northern portion of Phuoc Long Province in proximity to the
Cambodian border (SADDLE AREA). (Comment: Although the subordination
of the Regiment is not presently known, the unit is probably operating
in an independent status, subordinate to COSVN.)

(3) A VC Secret communique, dated 12 June 1967,
and prepared by Unit 303 Military Affairs Committee, Long An Province,
states that the Postal Transportation and Communications Section of MR 2
would provide guidance on the allocation of new Letter Box Number (LBN)
to the provinces and agencies of Military Region 2. Province LBN would
be five-digit numbers followed by the letters, "PO", and would differ
from each other only by the last number:

Ben Tre Province Unit: 11.165 PO
My Tho Province Unit: 11.167 PO
Long An Province Unit: 11.163 PO
Kien Tuong Province Unit: 11.169 PO
Kien Phong Province Unit: 11.164 PO
An Giang Province Unit: 11.160 PO

The agencies of MR 2 also have five-digit numbers, but they are followed
by the letters "PV". These numbers would be effective beginning 15 June
1967. (Comment: In the past, the VC have assigned a series or block
of LBN to a particular military region, and to each of its subordinate
provinces, agencies and units; for example, the old LBN series for Long
An Province was 6308C through 999/6308C, giving the province a possible
999 specific LBN. The subordinate Districts used the 6380C root, but added a letter prefix to indicate a specific district. In the new system, the first four digits are apparently selected at random, while the fifth digit, and the letter suffix, identify the specific provincial unit and military region. Because the system presents more variables within a specific series, it is expected that identification of a unit through its LBN will become more difficult as the new system goes into general use.

(4) Recapitulation:

(a) The VC provinces in III CTZ control 39 local force companies and 47 local force Platoons.

(b) Within the III CTZ there are six local force battalions subordinate to the six districts of Military Region 4, and six local force battalions subordinate to the provinces of Military Regions 1 and 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Force Battalion</th>
<th>Subordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn</td>
<td>Go Mon District/MR IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn</td>
<td>Di An District/MR IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn</td>
<td>Thu Duc District/MR IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn</td>
<td>Nha Be District/MR IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn</td>
<td>Binh Tan District/MR IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn</td>
<td>Cu Chi District/MR IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B445 Bn</td>
<td>Ba Bien Province/MR I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Independent Bn</td>
<td>Long An Province/MR 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506th Bn</td>
<td>Long An Province/MR 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Guard Bn</td>
<td>Tay Ninh Province/MR 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Bn</td>
<td>Tay Ninh Province/MR 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Loi Bn</td>
<td>Thu Dau Mot Province/MR 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) There are eight VC main force battalions, six VC main force regiments, and one VC command operating in III CTZ.
AVFBC-ES-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC Main Force Unit</th>
<th>Subordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>267th Bn</td>
<td>MR 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>269th Bn</td>
<td>MR 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn</td>
<td>MR 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Artillery</td>
<td>MR 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010 Sapper Bn</td>
<td>MR 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Guard Bn</td>
<td>COSYN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46th Recon Bn</td>
<td>COSYN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn/65th Base Security Regt</td>
<td>COSYN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271st Regt</td>
<td>9th Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272d Regt</td>
<td>9th Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273d Regt</td>
<td>9th Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274th Regt</td>
<td>5th Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275th Regt</td>
<td>5th Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Nai Regt</td>
<td>MR 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69th Arty Command</td>
<td>COSVN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) There are four NVA regiments and one NVA battalion operating in III CTZ:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NVA Unit</th>
<th>Subordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>725th Sniper Bn</td>
<td>COSYN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165th Regt</td>
<td>7th Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141st Regt</td>
<td>7th Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Regt</td>
<td>7th Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th Regt</td>
<td>Unk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) See Inclosure 4 for a sketch map of enemy unit locations in III CTZ as of 31 October 1967.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS COFOR-65) (U)

There are five VC local force battalions and four VC main force battalions operating in Military Region 2 of IV CTZ:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC Unit</th>
<th>Subordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>502d Bn</td>
<td>Kien Phong Province/MR 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>504th Bn</td>
<td>Kien Tuong Province/MR 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>512th Bn</td>
<td>An Giang Province/MR 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>514th Bn</td>
<td>My Tho Province/MR 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>516th Bn</td>
<td>Ben Tre Province/MR 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261st MF Bn</td>
<td>Dong Thap 1 Regt/MR 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263d MF Bn</td>
<td>Dong Thap 1 Regt/MR 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>295th MF Bn</td>
<td>MR 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>518th MF Bn</td>
<td>MR 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Inclosure 5 for a sketch map of enemy unit locations in IV CTZ as of 31 October 1967.

Summary of Recent Activities:

(a) During most of this reporting period, the VC/NVA units subordinate to COSVN in the III CTZ were occupied in the traditional "standdown" period following the end of the VC "Monsoon Offensive," and the beginning of the VC Winter-Spring Offensive, which is believed to have begun on or about 29 October. Analysis of captured documents, and FW and ralliers reports indicate that the period was spent in reorganization, reconnaissance, resupply, maneuvering and repositioning of forces, and general preparation of the battlefields for future operations. During this reporting period, the Dong Nai MF Inf Regiment, subordinate to VC Military Region 1, was formed, and the 88th NVA Inf Regt displaced from the II CTZ to Northern Phuoc Long Province in VC Military Region 10 for the purpose of conducting military operations.

(b) The forces of the 5th VC Division remained split with HQ elements and the 1st Bn, 275th VC Regt located in the vicinity of the May Tao Area of Phuoc Tuy Province. The 274th VC Regt returned to the CHI DICH area in early August, and has remained there in a dispersed posture throughout the reporting period. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 273rd VC Regt, which moved into War Zone "D" last June, have since moved.
into the northern Phuoc Long Province area. With its present disposition, the 5th VC Division poses a continued threat to US/GVN installations in southern Long Khanh Province, eastern Bien Hoa Province, and Phuoc Tuy Province, as well as a reinforcing capability to elements of the 9th VC Division and the 88th NVA Regt with the 275th VC Regt in the MR 10 area.

(c) The units of the 7th NVA Division have remained in a relatively static disposition throughout this reporting period, with the 101st and the 141st NVA Regiments located in base areas in War Zone "C", and HQ elements and the 165th NVA Regiments located in the vicinity of the Fish Hook area of eastern War Zone "C" and western Binh Long Province. The 165th NVA Regt attempted to overrun the USSF Camp at Tong Le Chon in western Binh Long Province on 7 August, and was forced to withdraw after sustaining over 150 KIA. The Regiment has continued to harass the camp with mortar and SA attacks through September and October. Unknown size elements of the 165th and the 141st NVA Regiment were tentatively identified in contact in the Loc Ninh area at the end of this reporting period. It is not known to what extent the two regiments participated in the actions.

(d) The 9th VC Division is in a position from which it may launch at least regimental size operations with reinforcements from the other two main force divisions in the III CTZ, as well as with the fire support of elements of the 69th VC Artillery Command. It is believed that the 9th VC Division is the primary COSVN maneuver force in the Corps area, and has probably been assigned major targets in the northern and central portions of the CTZ in connection with VC dry season activities. In late September and early October, the 271st VC Regiment, and possibly the 1st Bn, 272d VC Regt, moved into the Long Nguyen Secret Zone along the Binh Long - Binh Duong Province border because of a shortage of food at their previous location in southwestern Phuoc Long Province. The regiment was forced to withdraw into War Zone "C" after sustaining heavy losses as a result of the aggressive action of the 1st US Inf Div conducting Operation SHENANDOAH II in the vicinity of the Secret Zone. The 1st Bn, 272d VC Regt was apparently reassigned to operate with the 273d VC Regt, which had relocated to northern Binh Long Province. On 29 October, the 273d VC Regt began a series of attacks against friendly installations and troops concentrations in the vicinity of Loc Binh, with the apparent mission of the complete destruction of the facility and annihilation of its defenders. As a result of combat losses sustained in the Loc Binh area, the 273d VC Regt was rendered Not Combat Effective as a regiment. It is felt, however, that after a period of time, the Regiment will be able to participate in multi-regimental size operations, at least in a reinforcement or security role.

(e) During this reporting period, the battalions of MR 4 have remained in a dispersed and relatively defensive posture. The eight battalions subordinate to the Region possess the capability for
only limited offensive operations against FMAF installations and troop concentration due to combat losses, the destruction of safe havens and base areas, the effectiveness of continuous Allied operations and pressure in the area, and recruitment difficulties caused by increasing GVN rural pacification.

(6) Tactics:

(a) An enemy document captured during Operation JUNCTION CITY stated that larger scale attacks would be conducted during 1967 than in the previous year. Heavy losses sustained by VC main force units during Operations JUNCTION CITY and ATTLEBORO limited their activities to refitting and training during June and July; however, attacks conducted in August, September and October by elements of the 7th NVA Div and 9th VC Div in Binh Long, Phuoc Long and Tay Ninh Provinces indicate that the VC still intend to mount regimental and possibly multi-regimental sized attacks. Attacks at Tong Le Chon, Song Be, and especially at Loc Ninh, give credence to the VC statement that 1967 is the year of "The Grand Offensive."

(b) An attack conducted by elements of the 9th VC Division against Loc Ninh on 29 October 1967 featured a 122mm Rocket preparation prior to the large-scale ground attack. Although this tactic has been used in II CTZ, this is the first instance of rocket preparation being used in III CTZ. Another characteristic of this attack was that attacking elements apparently moved from large base areas vicinity the Cambodian border to make the attack, returning to them after the action. It is possible that the VC in III CTZ will depend more on Cambodia as a sanctuary from which they can launch their regimental and multi-regimental size attacks, and to which they can return for accelerated replacement and resupply activities when the attacks are completed. However, the main advantage accruing to the enemy by conducting operations in proximity to the Cambodian border lies in the shortened supply lines from his supply sources and logistical bases in and near Cambodia. Conversely, the enemy probably sees the advantage of lengthening Allied LOC by forcing the Allied forces to react to operations as far as possible from our rear bases.

(c) A few days prior to the attack a 122mm rocket launcher was captured. This tube is 2.5 meters in length and weighs 22 kilograms. The outside diameter of the tube is 126,5mm with a wall thickness of 2,05mm. The inside diameter is 122,4mm.

d. VC Battle Losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC KIA</th>
<th>RETURN-</th>
<th>HEAVY</th>
<th>MIL STRUC</th>
<th>Bunkers</th>
<th>SAM-</th>
<th>TONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(BC)</td>
<td>FW</td>
<td>DEG</td>
<td>DEG</td>
<td>DEST</td>
<td>DEST</td>
<td>FANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1647</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>1456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1456</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

Sep 67

VC KIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BC</th>
<th>FW</th>
<th>SES</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>MIL STRUC</th>
<th>BUNKERS</th>
<th>SAM-</th>
<th>TONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4019</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>1849</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Oct 67

2,289

2,644

2,423

1,617

222

558

2735

50

218.6

Total 4955

1170

1303

3126

317

1504

6040

234

451.8

The actual strength of main force units cannot be equated to battlefield losses because of three variables. Normally, supporting and local force units accompany main force units into battle, and the dead cannot be sorted according to unit. Secondly, it is almost impossible to accurately assess the number of enemy casualties which accrue from artillery and air strikes, particularly when the battlefield belongs to the enemy and he can evacuate his casualties before Allied units can make a body count. Thirdly, there is a variation in the time required for a unit to recoup its losses and this time is steadily decreasing. Trained infiltrators from North Vietnam are providing a high percentage of the replacement pool; therefore, the time required for a unit to become combat effective after suffering severe losses and receiving replacements is decreased. VC losses merely reflect a loss in manpower assets. They are not an accurate measure of unit strength for a given unit at a specific time.

e. Enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities and relative probability of adoption at the end of the quarter:

(1) Capabilities:

(a) Attack:

1. The enemy is capable of attacking installations and LOC's in Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces with elements of the 7th NVA Division supported by local force units.

2. The enemy is capable of attacking installations and LOC's in Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces with elements of the 9th VC Division and the 88th NVA Regt, supported by local force units, and possibly the 275th VC Regt (-).

3. In addition to 1 and 2 above the enemy is capable of launching multi-regimental size attacks in Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Phuoc Long Province by either combining elements of the 7th and 9th VC/NVA Divisions into a single force or by employing elements of one division in support of the other.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RGUSFOR-63) (U)

4. The enemy is capable of attacking in Binh Tuy, Phuoc Tuy and southern Long Khanh Provinces with elements of the 5th VC Division.

5. The 84A NVA Arty Regt, which possesses a rocket capability, can be employed against lucrative targets within the III CTZ.

6. The eight battalions of MR 4, which are dispersed into company, platoon and squad sized elements are capable of conducting limited attacks against Allied units, outposts, LOC's, and installations with their respective areas of operations.

7. The VC are capable of attacking in Long An Province with elements of the 267th and 269th MP Battalions, 2d Independent Bn, the 506th LF Bn, and five local force companies.

8. The VC are capable of attacking Binh Dinh Province with the 267th and 269th MP Bns, the 274 LF Bn, and elements of the 1st, 6th, 7th and 8th Bns of MR 4.

(b) Defend:

1. The VC can defend in Tay Ninh, and Binh Long Provinces with the 7th NVA Div and local elements.

2. The VC can defend in War Zone "D" with elements of the probable Dong Nai Regt (Phu Loi II Bn and 5600 Bn) and possibly the 275th VC Regt (-).

3. The VC can defend in VC Ba Binh Province with elements of the 5th VC Div.

4. The enemy can defend in MR 10 with elements of the 7th NVA Division, 9th VC Div and 88th NVA Regt.

5. In face of a superior force the enemy is capable of breaking contact, dispersing into small groups and withdrawing to alternate safe positions.

(c) Reinforce: The enemy can reinforce his attack or defense in the northern III CTZ with 3 battalions from the II CTZ. In southern III CTZ he can reinforce with two battalions from IV CTZ. It is estimated that reinforcements could reach their destinations within 3 to 10 days after commencing movement.
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCs CSFOR-65) (U)

(2) Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses:

(a) The enemy control over the populace is vulnerable to revolutionary development and psychological warfare activities, especially in areas where the infiltrated NVA troops have given rise to apprehension among the people. As the GVN continues to gain the confidence and support of the population, the enemy’s influence weakens and the identity of his infrastructure becomes vulnerable to compromise and ultimate disintegration.

(b) Low morale in the enemy’s ranks is vulnerable to exploitation by Allied psychological warfare operations.

(c) The enemy’s extended and insecure LOC are becoming more vulnerable to Allied interdiction, except for those LOC in neutral countries. The interdiction of enemy LOC has restricted his movement and ability to establish tax collection stations throughout the III CTZ.

(d) The neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas in III CTZ and the loss of caches has reduced the enemy’s ability to resupply adequately his forces from within the III CTZ. This has forced the enemy to tax his supply system. An inability to resupply quickly has weakened his capability to maintain any extended offensive or defensive postures.

(e) The enemy is vulnerable to search and destroy missions of Allied mobile forces which are supported by artillery and close air support.

(f) There are increasing indications that the enemy’s ability to obtain sound tactical intelligence is declining. This is possibly due to the forced dispersion of his units caused by aggressive Allied operations and in-turn has resulted in his loss of LF and irregular support.

(g) The enemy’s infiltration mechanism is vulnerable to Allied operations as indicated by his inability to maintain his established infiltration rate of 1250 per month.

(h) Recent enemy operations are indicative of his inability to coordinate multi-regimental sized forces in an attack.

(3) Relative probability of adoption at the end of the quarter:

(a) Considering the importance the enemy has placed on Loc Ninh he may again attempt to seize this objective provided he can regroup and strengthen his units to offset losses. Failing this, the
enemy will withdraw his Main Force elements from the Loc Ninh area, into base camps in Binh Long/Phuoc Long Provinces for regrouping and reinforcement, to possibly reinitiate attacks at a more favorable time and place. However, continued attacks by fire and small, limited-objective ground attacks should be expected against Allied installations in the NR 10 area.

(b) In the remainder of the Corps Zone, the trend toward increased harassment of lightly defended OP's and installations, sabotage and LOC interdictions can be expected to continue. Additionally, in southeastern VC Tay Ninh Province and VC Long An Province increased attacks by larger - sized enemy forces (to possibly include multi-company size) can be expected.

(c) To continue to readjust his Main Force units.

(d) Possibly conduct reprisals against Boi Chanh and Revolutionary Development (RD) cadre.

(e) The 84A NVA Arty Regt retains its rocket capability and therefore the possibility of rocket attack on primary targets within the III CTZ remains unchanged.
4. (C) OPERATIONS, PLANS AND TRAINING

a. Major II FFORCEV objectives during August, September and October were to strengthen security in the countryside, to defeat the enemy effort to sabotage the national elections, to deny the enemy resources and base areas and to defeat and destroy enemy forces.

(1) Operations conducted in support of these objectives during the month of August included extensive road and jungle clearing, penetrations into known or suspected base camps and staging areas, search and destroy operations aimed at preventing VC infiltration of populated areas and extensive night operations to interdict VC movements. Particular emphasis was placed on road and bridge repair and jungle clearing operations along major routes and near population centers. These operations destroyed the VC sanctuary in the Ong Dong Jungle and greatly facilitated the flow of traffic along Highways 1 and 20 in Long Khanh Province and Highway 13 in Binh Duong Province.

(2) During the month of September the success of defeating enemy efforts to sabotage the national elections was dramatically demonstrated when approximately 80% of the electorate participated in the election. Large areas, previously inaccessible to friendly forces were opened by jungle clearing and Mobile Riverine Force operations. These operations denied the enemy cover, concealment, security and resources in key populated areas. Friendly operations were highlighted during the month by the adoption of two new operational concepts:

(a) A concept of massing available Army aviation assets (5-7 assault helicopter companies) in support of a single division for a one-half day period was initiated. This concept permits the simultaneous tactical deployment of much larger forces in order to fix the enemy, achieve surprise and increase the probability of containing and destroying enemy forces.

(b) The Rapid Fire concept was also initiated. This concept involves the tactical deployment of combined reconnaissance teams (3 US and 3 CIDG personnel per team) in order to locate VC forces followed by the commitment of platoon sized teams to capture prisoners and to fix the identified enemy force and finally the commitment of a larger mobile reaction force to disrupt or destroy the enemy force. The first of these operations terminated on 21 September and resulted in 36 VC KIA, 6 PW and quantities of captured weapons and materiel. Rapid Fire has added a valuable intelligence-gathering capability to II FFORCEV.

(3) On 22 September the main body of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR) completed its deployment to BEARCAT where it is under operational control of the 9th Infantry Division. This unit is expected to contribute materially to the accomplishment of the US objective of broadening the base of free world support.
During October emphasis was again placed on the objective of securing allied base areas and supporting the pacification of key populated areas. In support of the 22 October election, US units provided distant security for polling places and secured the main lines of communication. Severe losses were inflicted on enemy main force units in the LOC NINH area. A continuation of such losses will ultimately accomplish the objective of neutralizing the enemy main force offensive capability.

b. Specific Operations. The 25th Infantry Division continued its monsoon campaign with three major operations in Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia and Binh Duong Provinces. The monsoon campaign which started on 15 May 1967 continued to achieve significant advances in all areas including tactical operations as well as pacification and revolutionary development aspects. The revolutionary development program continued to receive emphasis. Numerous civic action programs were conducted and roads were improved for civilian as well as military use. Combined operations were conducted with ARVN, CIDG, RF and PF units to improve mutual confidence, understanding and effectiveness of both US Forces and RVNAF as a combined combat team. Distant security was provided for polling places during the Vietnamese elections and inauguration ceremonies.

(1) Operation BARKING SANDS, conducted by the 1st Brigade in Hau Nghia, southern Tay Ninh and southwestern Binh Duong Provinces, denied the enemy free use of base areas that he once considered safe havens. Numerous small unit actions to include Bushmaster, cordon and search, road runner and Checkmate operations reduced Viet Cong capabilities to move freely day or night. Multi-battalion search and destroy operations conducted in the Iron Triangle in August continued to keep the enemy off balance. Operations in early September denied the enemy access to most of the civilian population during the national election. Jungle clearing operations were initiated in the Ho Bo Woods on 17 September and continued through October. The major objective of the operation was to deny the enemy use of the Ho Bo Woods as a sanctuary. The operation started in the northern and western parts of the Ho Bo area and moved east and south during October. At the end of October 9,645 acres of jungle had been cleared by Rome Plows. Hand tools and Bangalore torpedoes were used in areas inaccessible to the Rome Plows. Operation BARKING SANDS continues.

(2) Operation KOLEKOLE conducted in Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces by the 2d Brigade caused extensive destruction to enemy supplies and installations in long used base areas. Search and destroy, cordon and search and numerous air mobile operations maintained steady pressure on the enemy. Increased ARVN operations in the Brigade TAOI assisted in maintaining pressure on the enemy. A significant action occurred during August when the Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon, consisting of the Recon Platoon, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry and the Hau Nghia Province Intelligence Platoon (RF), engaged Viet Cong
reconnaissance elements from Long An Province. The result was 27 Viet Cong killed and 1 US wounded. During October the 2d Brigade's operations were characterized by rapid response to intelligence reports in widely scattered areas of the division TAO. Contact during the month was mostly with small Viet Cong units. On 21 October several armed Viet Cong were observed from the air moving away from a base camp south of Tay Ninh. These Viet Cong were engaged by gunships until A and B Companies, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry could be airlifted to the area. This rapid response resulted in 18 Viet Cong killed, and the capture of 18 weapons. On 31 October, the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry conducted air mobile combat assaults north of the Rach Tra stream south of Phu Cuong on the Saigon River and made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 22 VC KIA. Cumulative enemy losses to date include 612 killed, 1189 detainees and 278 weapons captured. Operation KOLEKOLE continues.

(3) Operation DIAMOND HEAD was continued by the 3d Brigade in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces. Most operations conducted were battalion size and smaller. Numerous small unit actions were conducted during the first several days of September in conjunction with election security operations. In September the first phase of an extensive resettlement project was initiated by US and GVN forces to prevent enemy use of the Michelin Plantation. This was accomplished by displacing the population from an area southeast of the plantation to a refugee center at Lai Thieu, thus eliminating a source of support to the enemy. Seventy-four families with their belongings were relocated using CH-47 aircraft. Michelin workers from populated areas within the plantation and inhabitants from the area south of the Michelin Plantation will be relocated as a follow up action. During October, operations of the 3d Brigade were in great part conducted in the Michelin Plantation, on the north, east and south of the Michelin Plantation and in the western Boi Loi Woods. The operations were characterized by extensive day and night patrolling. Cumulative losses to date include 158 enemy killed, 354 detainees and 76 weapons captured.

(4) The Coronado series of operations continued during the reporting period as the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division (Mobile Riverine Force) continued to develop and refine techniques of riverine warfare.

(a) Operation Coronado III, a battalion size search and destroy operation, conducted between 5 and 17 August in the Rung Sat Special Zone did not result in significant enemy contact.

(b) Operation Coronado IV, a phased operation, was initiated on 18 August in western Ben Luc District of Long An Province by the Mobile Riverine Force in coordination and cooperation with the An Dan Brigade (ARVN). Initially a reconnaissance in force, the operation was conducted in response to intelligence indicating an enemy buildup of elements of the Viet Cong 506th Battalion. The objective was to locate and destroy enemy forces in the area. The maneuver units used during
Phase I include the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry; the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry; the 3d Battalion, 50th Infantry (ARVN); the 4th Battalion, 50th Infantry (ARVN) and the 684th, 726th, 761st and 825th RF companies. During this phase, helicopters from the 334th Aviation Company engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 45 Viet Cong killed. Reconnaissance and extensive air mobile raids were conducted throughout the area. Numerous small units totalling approximately 150 Viet Cong were contacted and killed or dispersed. The second phase of Coronado IV was initiated on 23 August by the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry in the Rung Sat Special Zone and the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry in eastern Long An Province. Extensive search and destroy operations were conducted in both areas without contact. The third phase was initiated on 25 August with elements of the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry, 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) and elements of the 46th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) in response to intelligence of continued enemy operations in Eastern Long An Province. Small contacts were made, but the desired confrontation with large enemy forces did not occur. On 1 September the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry and the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in northern Go Cong Province. There were sporadic contacts and both units were extracted the following day. This was followed by search and destroy operations in Long An Province. There was light contact during this two day phase of the operation. On 7 September the final phase of Operation Coronado IV began in the northeastern portion of the Rung Sat Special Zone. The 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry and the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry participated in this phase. Large amounts of arms and equipment were captured, including 105 weapons. The final results of Operation Coronado IV, which terminated on 9 September, included 101 enemy killed in action, 148 detainees and 180 weapons captured or destroyed. Friendly losses were 3 killed and 27 wounded in action. Some items worthy of note in this successful operation are:

1 In the early and most successful stages of the operation the Mobile Riverine Force operated in close coordination and cooperation with a Vietnamese Brigade Task Force commanded by the Long An Province Chief. The ARVN and RF Forces, operating harmoniously and effectively under an ARVN headquarters, scored the first kills and captured the first weapons.

2 Friendly forces achieved complete surprise.

3 After the initial contact the enemy dispersed rapidly into widely separated locations.

(c) Operation Coronado V was conducted in response to intelligence indicating the presence of the 263d Main Force Battalion in western Dinh Tuong Province. The Mobile Riverine Force acted in coordination and cooperation with the 10th Infantry Regiment (ARVN). The operation was initiated on 12 September with riverine assaults in the Cam Son area and the establishment of a Fire Support Patrol Base near Cai Lay.

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ARVN forces established blocking positions to the north and west of the area of operations. Heavy fighting occurred on the second day of the operation when the 3d and 5th Battalions, 60th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations east of the Cam Son landing site. Supported by air strikes and artillery, the infantrymen aggressively pressed the attack. The day long fight resulted in 128 Viet Cong killed and 21 captured. On 15 September the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry and the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry moved to riverine assault objectives in the Ba Ria River against strong opposition. Fighting through enemy strongpoints the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry moved overland to blocking positions 4 kilometers south of Cai Lay. At the same time the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry was inserted by helicopter to establish blocking positions southeast of Cai Lay. Supported by artillery and air strikes, the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry then drove against these blocks to an objective area southwest of Cai Lay. The results of this engagement were 5 US killed and 101 wounded in action. The enemy suffered 53 killed. On 16 September, 26 additional enemy dead were located. During the five day battle US forces killed 213 Viet Cong while friendly losses were 15 killed and 128 wounded. Operation Coronado V was continued in Kien Hoa Province. Air mobile and riverine operations were conducted in Ham Long, Ciong Trom and Huong My Districts in close coordination and cooperation with the 10th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) and a composite RF Battalion. Sporadic contacts were made until the operation terminated on 8 October. Significant cumulative friendly losses included 35 KIA (6 Navy), 175 WIA (65 Navy) (2 USMC). Significant cumulative enemy losses included 330 VC KIA, 235 detainees and 1 raider.

(d) Operation Coronado VI was initiated by the 2d Brigade on 11 October as a riverine search and destroy operation in the Rung Sat Special Zone. The objective of the operation was to locate and destroy Viet Cong units, installations and material in order to assist in the protection of allied shipping channels in the Rung Sat Special Zone. Little contact was encountered during the operation and on 20 October the operation was terminated.

(e) Operation Coronado VII was initiated on 21 October as a riverine search and destroy operation in southeastern Can Giuoc District, Long An Province. Although few personnel and material losses were inflicted on the enemy, much was accomplished by providing security to the local populace from Viet Cong raids and acts of terrorism during the Lower House elections of the Republic of Vietnam. Viet Cong actions in the area were reduced to two minor contacts during the period of the elections. The presence of US troops in the area was largely responsible for the large turn out of voters. On 24 October the 2d Brigade shifted its area of operations to southern Bien Hoa Province in an effort to locate and destroy supply caches reported to be located on or near the upper tributaries of the Thi Vai River. Sporadic contacts with the enemy were made throughout the remainder of the reporting period and the operation terminated on 1 November. Enemy losses included 4 KIA and 11 detainees. Friendly losses included 8 WIA.
Subject: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

(5) Tong Le Chon: Shortly after midnight on 7 August the Tong Le Chon Special Forces CIDG Camp came under heavy mortar and ground attack. At approximately 0145 hours enemy forces penetrated the south side of the camp perimeter but were repulsed by the defending troops within 25 minutes. Despite friendly air strikes and artillery support, the enemy again assaulted the south and east wall of the camp at 0311 hours. Heavy automatic weapons fire by the camp defenders and several effective air strikes stopped the assault in less than an hour. At 0411 hours the enemy again attacked the east walls, with one squad penetrating the perimeter. This squad was eliminated by 0535 hours. The camp continued to receive sporadic fire until 0830 hours. An estimated 450 mortar rounds were fired at the camp and the assault was made by an estimated 2000 enemy from the 165th NVA Regiment. The defense was supported by countermortar and counterartillery fire from Tong Le Chon, 175mm artillery from Quan Loi, 48 tactical air sorties, 2 light fire teams, 2 AC-47 flare ships and B-52 air strikes. During the day the camp was reinforced by four Mobile Strike Force Companies, the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry. The reinforcing units made only sporadic contacts. Friendly losses during the Tong Le Chon defense were 3 US wounded, 25 CIDG killed, 14 CIDG missing and 90 CIDG wounded in action. Enemy losses included 152 killed in action, 1 prisoner and 50 weapons captured.

c. Operations in Support of Revolutionary Development:

(1) Military operations in support of revolutionary development continued to receive increased emphasis during the reporting period. The principal objective of these operations was to provide a secure environment in the areas surrounding the area undergoing revolutionary development. ARVN forces continued to provide close in security for the revolutionary development effort. Particular emphasis was placed on road and bridge repair and jungle clearing operations along major routes and near population centers. Examples of major revolutionary development operations that continued to have a significant impact on operations in the III CTZ were Lam Son 67, Enterprise and Fairfax.

(2) Op Lam Son 67, initiated on 8 February 1967, continued through the reporting period. The 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division in close coordination with elements of the 5th and 18th Infantry Divisions (ARVN) continued actions to improve the secure environment of the heavily populated Binh Duong Province. Operations conducted in the Ong Dong Jungle from 20 July until 13 August resulted in the clearing of over 7,000 acres of jungle thus neutralizing a major Viet Cong sanctuary and denying the enemy the use of one of his most frequently used routes to and from War Zone D. In addition to the military benefits, the local population benefited from the additional cleared land which is now available for agricultural use. On 16 August the Lam Son 67 operation was moved to Highway 13. Clearing operations then commenced between Phu Guong and Ben Cat, terminating on 10 September. Over 24,000 acres of...
jungle were cleared resulting in improved security on the highway and adjacent areas and a corresponding increase in the volume of civilian traffic indicating that more goods are reaching civilian markets. Operation Lam Son 67 continues.

(3) Operation Enterprise, initiated on 13 February 1967, by the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued in Long An Province. Search and destroy, cordon and search, saturation patrolling and eagle flight operations maintained constant pressure on the Viet Cong. Night operations, including night air mobile insertions, received increased emphasis. Contacts with Viet Cong units of company size have been reduced significantly indicating a continuing reluctance by the enemy to engage US forces.

(4) Significant indications of progress of the revolutionary development effort in the area included an increase in commercial activity and a general resurgence of normal life by the residents of the area. Commercial activity was enhanced by the repair of bridges and the subsequent reopening of roads in the area thus facilitating access to the major markets. The constant presence of the troops in the area has provided the inhabitants with actual as well as psychological security thus allowing a resurgence of normal life. In Rach Kien District, Long An Province, the scope of US military pacification operations was reduced with ARVN forces assuming increased responsibilities.

(5) Operation Fairfax, initiated on 1 December 1966 continued with the 199th Infantry Brigade (Seperate) (Light) and the 5th Ranger Group (ARVN) conducting operations in Gia Dinh Province and the border districts of neighboring provinces. Combined operations in support of revolutionary development were conducted throughout most of the reporting period until 25 September. On that day the US and ARVN units began conducting unilateral operations. This precedes the future planned relocation of American units from Gia Dinh to areas outside the National Priority Area. Enemy movement and resupply activities throughout the area of operations have been restricted and reduced by the extensive use of search and destroy, cordon and search operations, night ambushes and road and water checkpoints. The construction of two fortified patrol bases in the Ly Van Manh area and Thu Duc District has denied the Viet Cong the use of two base camps and interdicted known enemy resupply routes and lines of communication. Operation Fairfax continues.

d. Operations in Support of National Elections: A major accomplishment was planning for and conducting operations in support of the Vietnamese National elections held on 3 September. Actions taken were within the scope of current missions and available resources. They were oriented toward providing massive assistance and support in response to specific requests made by CG III CTZ and ARVN Province and District chiefs. In some cases, units were relocated to areas which differed from their normal area of operations. For example, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry
Division was displaced west of the Oriental River approximately 10 kilometers south of Tay Ninh at the request of the Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division (ARVN). It conducted search and destroy operations near Ap Chuoi Nuoc, a district town seldom secured by government forces. Other operations involved positioning forces for reinforcing and supporting ARVN and other agencies. Major efforts were directed at keeping principal land routes open, operating in populated areas against local forces and Viet Cong infrastructure, and continuing military action against VC/NVA forces and installations. In all operations the US presence was as inconspicuous as possible, with ARVN forces working close to and around the polling places and US forces providing distant security. The success of these operations is evidenced by the relatively low rate of incidents and the participation of eligible voters in the National elections. Maintaining free access to the polling places was considered the most important contribution US forces could make to successful national elections.

e. Jungle Clearing Operations.

(1) With the arrival of Rome Plow equipped jungle clearing teams in July, a new phase of VC base area denial started in III Corps Tactical Zone. Using these teams in conjunction with combat operations, large areas of jungle and forest have been destroyed. Extensive jungle clearing was conducted during operations such as Lam Son 67, Ainslie, Barking Sands, the Akron series and the Emporia series. Jungle clearing has improved base security by denying covered and concealed avenues of approach into base camp areas. Fields of fire have been cleared, thus improving the combat effectiveness of weapons on the outer perimeter. It has also extended observation capabilities of security personnel and facilitated patrolling. These operations are a vital adjunct to the continuing program to improve base camp defense from rocket and mortar attack.

(2) In the 1st Infantry Division area jungle clearing operations along Highway 13 from Phu Cuong to Ben Cat and from Di An to Phu Cuong have been a major factor in upgrading the security condition of this primary north-south route to green status and permitting travel with minimum security during daylight hours. Selected jungle clearing from Lai Khe to An Loc - Quan Loi and from Ben Cat to Phuoc Vinh has facilitated the opening of these routes. The Emporia series of jungle clearing operations conducted by the 9th Infantry Division along Highways 1, 2, 15 and 20 has facilitated the rapid movement of reaction forces to threatened areas and has made the routes more secure for logistical convoys. Within the cleared areas road runner operations have been conducted without incident. The clearing operations conducted in the Filbol Plantation and Ho Bo Woods by the 25th Infantry Division and in the Ong Dong Jungle by the 1st Infantry Division have denied previously secure base areas to the Viet Cong and required them to abandon established lines of communication for less desirable routes.
Jungle and forest areas are cleared 100 to 300 meters back from each side of the road to destroy possible ambush sites. Local forces are then positioned to prevent enemy interdiction. This land clearing effort in conjunction with search and destroy operations has resulted in expanded Government of Vietnam control, elimination or significant reduction of Viet Cong tax collection efforts, improved resources control, reestablishment of commercial activities, and further restriction of enemy movement.

f. OPERATION SHENANDOAH.

(1) On 29 September the 1st Infantry Division launched Operation SHENANDOAH II, a two-pronged operation by the Division's 1st and 3d Brigades combining search and destroy missions with road clearing and improvement. SHENANDOAH II initially covered an area from slightly south of Lai Khe, north approximately 18 miles and west to the edge of the Michelin Rubber Plantation, with the 3d Brigade's operational area being in the lower half of this area and the 1st Brigade operating in the upper half. The area of operation was expanded later to include the Loc Ninh area. The operation began with the 1st Brigade's 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry (M) conducting search and destroy missions approximately 12 miles north of Lai Khe. The 3d Brigade entered the operation with the mission of securing, clearing and pushing back the jungle for 100 yards along Highway 240, which runs from the village of Ben Cat, just south of Lai Khe, to the edge of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. Rome Plows from the 27th Land Clearing Platoon of the 168th Engineer Battalion began the jungle clearing task. The road was to be cleared and improved for use by US traffic and the jungle pushed back to reduce the hazard of snipers and provide an area for helicopters to land an assault force anywhere along the highway. Initially, enemy forces in the area avoided a major engagement. Then, at 0735 hours on 4 October the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry (M) was attacked by an unknown size enemy force approximately 10 kilometers southwest of Chon Thanh. Friendly forces were supported by air strikes and artillery until contact was broken at 1100 hours. During the 3½ hour battle the enemy lost 12 killed. Friendly losses were 4 killed and 27 wounded. In reaction to the attack the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry moved to Chon Thanh and then conducted an air assault approximately 11 kilometers southwest of Chon Thanh. West of the landing zone, the battalion found a base camp which contained a large number of bunkers. Air strikes were placed on the area resulting in 19 enemy killed in action. In the same general area a Light Fire Team engaged and killed 12 enemy. By the end of the day's operations, the enemy had lost 43 killed in action.

(2) At 1435 hours on 6 October, the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry while operating in the vicinity of the 4 October contact began receiving mortar fire. Sporadic mortar fire, small arms fire and automatic weapons fire continued until 1954 hours. At 2317 hours the battalion received mortar fire followed by a ground attack from an unknown
size enemy force. The attack was repulsed at 2334 hours. The enemy left 1 of his dead on the battlefield; however, a search of the area the fol-lowing day revealed an additional 24 enemy dead. On 27 October a rallier received by the battalion stated that he was with the unit that made the attack and that 59 members of his unit were killed. Friendly losses were 2 killed and 8 wounded.

(3) The next major engagement occurred at 1008 hours 11 October when Company B, 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry engaged an estimated 100-150 enemy approximately 31 kilometers west of Highway 13. The enemy fired from both ground and tree positions. When the enemy broke contact at 1045 hours, he left behind 21 of his dead. Friendly losses were 1 killed and 4 wounded.

(4) At 0952 hours on 17 October A Company, 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry, while conducting search and destroy operations 14 kilo-meters southwest of Chon Thanh received a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated enemy regiment. Friendly forces were suppo-*** by artillery, mortars and air strikes. Sporadic enemy fire continue- throughout the afternoon. Final results of the contact were 106 enemy killed. Friendly losses were 57 killed and 75 wounded.

(5) Operation SHENANDOAH II was highlighted during the reporting period by battles that occurred in and around the Loc Ninh area during the period 29-31 Oct. Prior to the attack on 29 October 1967, the defenders at the District town of Loc Ninh (XU732108) consisted of elements of 2 South Vietnamese RF companies and 1 RF platoon and two American NCO advisors; additionally, one kilometer south was a South Vietnamese Special Forces camp (XU731081) with three companies (350 men) and six US Special Forces advisors. At 0115 hours the 273d Main Force Regiment (estimated strength of 1500) commenced a mortar and RPG-2 rocket attack on the district headquarters compound (XU733088) along with heavy ground fire into the defenders position. Some 100 rounds of mortar fire and intense ground fires were also directed into the Special Forces camp as two battalions of the main force regiment made a ground attack at both locations. At 0220 hours this numerically superior force penetrated the northern half of the district compound perimeter and engaged the Regional Force positions in bunker to bunker fighting.

(6) The District Chief stayed at his command post along with one of his US NCO advisors and one squad. The Regional Force units were forced to make a fighting withdrawal to firing positions in the southern half of the compound area, leaving the District Command bunker exposed. The District Chief continued to direct artillery fire and air strikes on the attackers and called for artillery fire on his own position. With such tactics, the enemy was held at bay until day-light when reinforcements arrived.
The 5th ARVN Division responded to the enemy attack immediately. Within a few minutes the 5th Division Reconnaissance Company and the 5th Division 52 Recondo Company from Phu Loi had been alerted to deploy to the battle area at first light. Arriving by 0900 hours, these two units along with two CIDG companies from the Special Forces camp who had been in contact since 0700 hours quickly organized and executed a counterattack to regain the northern part of the subsector compound.

Directing this successful counterattack was the Province Chief who had arrived from Hon Quan, the province capital. He was accompanied by the Province Senior Military Advisor and by the 5th Division G3 Advisor. The battle in the compound raged until 1100 hours before the enemy was finally beaten. The compound was totally cleared of enemy elements by 1305 hours.

During the clearing of the subsector compound, it was found that the Viet Cong had barricaded themselves in the bunkers on the north end and it was necessary to blast them out. Not knowing which of these might contain friendly holdouts or wounded and to insure the safety of his own men, the Commanding General, 5th ARVN Division, who had arrived at the compound shortly after daylight, ordered three men teams to cover each other and check each bunker, placing a makeshift white flag in the ports of those which were empty or contained friendly troops. Utilizing 90mm recoilless rifle teams borrowed from a US 1st Infantry Division Company, other teams destroyed four to five bunkers in which VC were firmly entrenched. This feat was accomplished without loss of a man and attests to the resourcefulness of the division commander. It is noteworthy that the GVN flag, atop a tower in the south end of the compound, was never struck during the battle of Loc Ninh, contrary to some reports that the VC had replaced it with one of their own. After the district compound was cleared, the clearing of close in surrounding areas was initiated by predominantly ARVN forces. By 1515 hours ARVN forces were in control of the surrounding area; there was no further contact in the village. Other action occurred outside of Loc Ninh. At 0855 hours, a CIDG Company, which had been conducting operations northwest of Loc Ninh since 27 October had a 10 minute contact with enemy forces retreating westward from Loc Ninh. This contact forced an estimated enemy company into blocking positions maintained by the US 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry. At 1206 hours, this battalion engaged the enemy force for approximately one hour. Meanwhile other reinforcements had continued to arrive throughout the day until there were 2 US Infantry Companies and 2 US Artillery Batteries in a fire support patrol base at Loc Ninh airstrip in addition to 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry in blocking positions 4 kilometers to the west of the village. The ARVN 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry closed at 1835 hours and deployed in and around the subsector compound. During the day, 7 tactical air strikes (16 sorties) (center of area UX7115) were flown. There was one B-52 strike (9 aircraft) (center of target box XU662122) and 611 artillery rounds were expended. There were 8 friendly
killed and 52 wounded. Known enemy casualties were 160 killed.

(10) The 30th of October was a comparatively quiet day. There was no reported enemy activity in the village. At 0437 hours, the US 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry made sporadic contact 4 kilometers west of the village. The ARVN, CIDG and RF units continued repairing their damaged fortifications and resumed normal patrol activity. At 1230 hours, Company C, US 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry commenced a 3½ hour contact with an estimated enemy company 4 kilometers west of Loc Ninh. Company A, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry (US) and one CIDG Company reinforced. At 1815 hours, a reconnaissance patrol, 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, (ARVN) contacted an unknown number of enemy 300 meters west of the air strip. After a brief fire fight, artillery and air strikes were called in. Contact was broken and the patrol returned to the subsector compound without casualties. At the same time Loc Ninh compound received 6-8 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. There were no further incidents. Throughout the day there were 12 air strikes (26 sorties) (center of area XU6909), 1 B52 strike (center of target box XU666206) (6 aircraft) and 2326 rounds of artillery were expended. There were 4 friendly KIA, 5 WIA and 85 enemy KIA.

(11) At 0050 hours, on 31 October elements of the 272d and 273d VC Regiments began attacking the subsector and SF compounds with a heavy volume of mortar and small arms fire. By 0057 hours an armed C47 aircraft and a light fire team (LFT) were enroute to support the defenders. Mortar and small arms fire continued to increase in intensity. The C47 arrived on station just as the Special Forces Compound and US 1st Infantry Division fire support base at the south end of the air strip came under attack. At 0220 hours after receiving heavy small arms fire, the artillery employed direct-fire high explosive ammunition down the runway and the advancing enemy. Meanwhile, tactical aircraft arrived on station and engaged the attacking enemy forces. At 0407 hours the DHC Headquarters reported that enemy forces were still attacking across the airfield and that artillery was continuing to fire (direct fire) high explosive ammunition at the enemy. At 0450 hours heavy contact was reported at the district command post at the north end of the air strip. Enemy forces were firing 75mm recoilless rifles and .50 cal machine guns at the defenders. At 0505 hours the enemy forces launched their heaviest ground assault of the day against the District Headquarters from the west, north and south. The main attack came from the north. The subsector compound defenders repulsed the enemy who employed human wave attacks. Withering fire by the defenders either killed or forced the enemy from the compound by 0530 hours after five separate ground attacks. However, the fire fight continued and by 0630 hours the defenders inside the compound were running low on ammunition. A resupply helicopter arrived as the enemy started to break contact and retreat. By 0700 hours the enemy had been cleared from the area around district headquarters and the Special Forces camp. At 1245 hours the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry (US) conducted an air assault vic XU761070 (4 kilometers SE of Loc Ninh). At 1600 hours the Commanding General ARVN 5th Division moved his forward command post to An Loc (XT7688)
and placed his Deputy Division Commander in command of all South Vietnamese forces in the area. In support of this day's operations there were 24 air strikes (53 sorties) (center of area XU7606), 7 combat sky spots (radar controlled bomb strikes) and 1 B52 strike (9 aircraft) (center of target box XT572996). 2220 rounds of artillery ammunition were expended. 9 friendly forces were killed and 56 were wounded. Known enemy casualties were 126 killed. During the first three days of fighting for the town of Loc Ninh (29-31 October) the enemy lost 371 killed. Friendly losses were 21 killed in action and 113 wounded in action. Friendly forces were supported by 3 B52 strikes, 43 air strikes, 7 combat sky spots and 5157 rounds of artillery were expended. The Loc Ninh battle continues.

g. Operation Akron III, initiated on 26 September by the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry under operational control of the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, began as a jungle clearing operation in Phuoc Tuy Province. Major objectives of the operation were to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces and installations located in former Base Area 303 and to clear trails throughout the area of operation thereby providing ready access to and aerial surveillance of the area. The initial operation was commenced by the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry. The task organization was expanded later to include the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry (M), 52d Ranger Battalion (ARVN) and 2/48th Infantry Battalion (ARVN). Contact with the enemy was light and sporadic throughout the operation; however, vast amounts of weapons, ammunition and supplies were discovered. On 8 October while cutting through the thick underbrush and towering trees near the borders of Bien Hoa, Phuoc Tuy and Long Khanh Provinces, Rome Plows uncovered a fresh dirt trail. A patrol from Company B, 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry (M) along with elements of Troop B, 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry was sent to investigate. The investigation disclosed a bunker complex containing 34 individual and crew served weapons. A detailed search of the area revealed additional bunkers. The operation developed into a tunnel-by-tunnel search of the area resulting in additional bunkers found and documents, ammunition and weapons captured. The final result was the largest known weapons cache discovered in the III CTZ to date, including 1022 small arms and 125 crew served weapons captured and over 205,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 3259 rounds of crew served ammunition and 3630 grenades captured or destroyed. Operation Akron III terminated on 21 October.

h. Operation Ainslie, a concurrent resettlement and search and destroy operation was conducted by the 1st Australian Task Force from 31 August to 21 September. Operations Portsea and Paddington, conducted previously, had effectively countered Viet Cong resupply and maintenance systems in the area south of the Chay Tao base area and had kept Viet Cong main forces and provincial units away from the main population base. However, supplies continued to be routed through the area north of Duc Thanh, known as "Stone 30", in ever increasing quantities. The area was under strong Viet Cong influence and was a traditional cross-over point from the Hat Dich to the Tan Bo and Hay Tao base areas. The presence of a hostile
group of civilians in the area also restricted fire support reaction in the area. The operation was conducted in four phases:

(1) Phase I was the construction of the resettlement hamlet 3 kilometers north of Nui Dat.

(2) Phase II was deployment of 1st Australian Task Force units, the establishment of a fire support patrol base west of Binh Gia, commencement of engineer clearance of Route 2 and census taking and evacuation of civilians located within the area of operations.

(3) Phase III was continuation of route clearance and resettlement. As areas were evacuated by the local civilians, houses, crops, and other installations were razed and destroyed.

(4) Phase IV consisted of continued search and destroy operations. Throughout the operation the Viet Cong were unwilling or unable to react in any strength. Contacts were usually with small scattered groups of the enemy attempting to escape. One of the most successful aspects of the operation was the resettlement phase. This was the first major resettlement program undertaken by the 1st Australian Task Force and many valuable lessons were learned.

(5) The most relevant of these were:

(a) It is essential that the preparation of the resettlement hamlet be well advanced (if not complete) by the time the actual evacuation operation commences.

(b) Security of the resettlement hamlet (and the intention to resettle) must be carefully maintained.

(c) An accurate census of all areas in the resettlement zone must be conducted as an initial phase of the operation.

(d) Provision should be made for persons absent during the operation to be resettled in the hamlet.

(e) Special assistance should be afforded those families without males of responsible age. This aspect was much appreciated by the Vietnamese.

The resulting loss of logistic backup from the "Slope 30" area and the mounting pressure by allied forces combined to decrease the value of the Hat Dich as a secure Viet Cong base. An additional advantage of the operation is that Route 2 from Black Horse to Nui Dat is much more secure from significant enemy action. When the operation terminated on 21 September, significant enemy losses included 22 KIA, 10 individual weapons captured, 1 individual weapon and one crew served weapon destroyed.
Friendly losses were 1 KIA and 2 WIA.

i. Force Structure and Training

(1) Force Structure

(a) The 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and Company C, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor deployed to II FFORCEV from I FFORCEV on 24 Oct and 25 Oct respectively.

(b) The following additional forces deployed to II FFORCEV.

1. The 25th Aviation Company (CORPS) was assigned to 1st Aviation Brigade on 24 Oct and attached to the 12th Aviation Group on 25 Oct.

2. The 3d Squadron, 17 Air Cavalry was assigned to 12th Aviation Group on 31 Oct 67.

3. The Royal Thailand Army Volunteer Regiment became OPCON to the 9th Infantry Division on 22 September 1967.

4. The 195th Assault Helicopter Company (AHC) was assigned to the 12th Aviation Group on 31 Oct 67.

5. The 17th AHC was assigned to the 12th Aviation Group on 5 Oct 67.

6. The 135th AHC was assigned to the 12th Aviation Group on 6 Oct 67.

7. The 242d Assault Support Helicopter Company was assigned to 12th Aviation Group on 15 Aug 67.

8. The 190th AHC was assigned to the 12th Aviation Group on 5 Aug 67.

(c) The 2d Battalion, 34th Armor (−) formerly attached to II FFORCEV deployed to Tay Ninh and reverted to operational control of the 25th Infantry Division on 20 Sep 67.

(d) II FFORCEV acquired a long range reconnaissance company in September. The II FFORCEV LRP Co was activated and assigned to II FFORCEV effective 25 Sep 67. The unit designation is Company F, 51st Infantry (Long Range Patrol). The company is organized into a headquarters and four patrol platoons. Training started on 8 Oct to permit each patrol member to receive two weeks training at the M&AV
Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Recondo School in Nha Trang by 2 December. It is expected that the company will be fully operational in December.

(2) Training

(a) Regional Force Company Training Team (REFCOTT): The 1st Infantry Division began training of the newly formed 969th Regional Force Company Training Team on 10 July 1967. The REFCOTT will conduct 17 weeks of basic and advanced training at the 5th ARVN Division training center (PHU VAM). Upon completion of formal training the REFCOTT will return with the RF Company to its home station (Xoc Xiem) near Quan Loi for additional training. Completion date is the 1st Quarter, FY 68 or as soon as the company is ready to conduct independent operations.

(b) RECONDO School: Recondo School training for Division/Separate Brigade LRP candidates has been suspended during the period 8 Oct - 2 Dec to allow for the training of the Field Force LRP Companies.

3. ACTIONS TO IMPROVE ARVN/RF/PF EFFECTIVENESS:

(1) The RVNAF continued its upward trend in training and operational effectiveness. Ineffective officer leadership was a target for corrective action. An example of this was the relief by the III Corps Commander of the Battalion Commander, 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry (ARVN) for failure to assist an RD Cadre team in Phuoc Long Province on 27 August when it came under attack by the enemy. Due to an expanding system of District Operations and Intelligence Coordinating Centers (DOICC) there was a measurable increase in hard intelligence on the Viet Cong civil and military infrastructure. As of the end of October there were 31 operational DOICC in the III CTZ contributing to the identification and destruction of the VC infrastructure.

(2) Fifty-three advisory teams were requested for Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) in support of revolutionary development. As an interim measure pending the arrival of additional advisors, US combat units provided twenty Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) to nine provinces which were considered the most critical areas for revolutionary development effort. MAT are under the operational control of the Senior Province Advisor for the purpose of training RF/PF in the use of weapons and communications equipment, requesting fire support and basic infantry tactics.

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<tr>
<th>Unit Providing Team</th>
<th>Number of Teams</th>
<th>Province</th>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unit Providing Team | Number of Teams | Province
--- | --- | ---
Binh Long | 1 | 1
Gia Dinh | 1 | 1
9th Inf Div | 1 | Bien Hoa
 | 1 | Binh Tuy
 | 2 | Long An
 | 2 | Long Khanh
25th Inf Div | 2 | Hau Nghia
 | 3 | Tay Ninh
199th Inf Bde | 3 | Gia Dinh

The teams are assigned by and come under operational control of the Senior Province Advisor for the purpose of training RF/PF in use of weapons and communication equipment, requesting of fire support and basic infantry tactics.

(3) The ARVN revolutionary development program has now trained 40 to 46 battalions. Seven battalions have completed the combined battalion refresher training program conducted by US Brigades and ten are presently in training. About one-half of all Popular Force platoons have now completed the motivation and indoctrination program training in III CTZ. This program should increase the understanding and the effectiveness of these forces. The effectiveness of ARVN forces was successfully demonstrated on several occasions.

(4) On 27 October the 88th NVA Regiment attacked the 3d Battalion, 9th ARVN Regiment south of Song Be and was repulsed with heavy personnel and equipment losses (the kill ratio exceeded 20:1). Between 29-31 October a series of determined mortar and ground attacks was directed against LOC NINH. A combined force consisting of elements of the 1st Infantry Division, 5th ARVN Division and CIDG reacted to assist the Regional Force personnel in repulsing these attacks. Heavy contact resulted on several occasions and severe losses were inflicted on the enemy. 371 Viet Cong had been killed as of 31 October (the engagement continued into November). RVNAF operational effectiveness in III CTZ continues to increase.
5. (C) LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION

a. Logistics support has been adequate to support the mission. Company F, 31st Infantry (IRF) was activated on short notice. The company received its essential equipment through extraordinary efforts of all concerned in the supply system.

(1) Due to heavy usage in jungle clearing operations, a high deadline rate was encountered with the DYE tractor. This headquarters recommended to USARV that a maintenance float of DYE tractors be made available to the direct support units supporting the land clearing teams. This recommendation was approved by USARV and the maintenance float has been established. Land clearing operations will now be accomplished more expeditiously.

(2) Requirements for USAF Tactical Airlift support continued to increase. This is due to an increase in operations in areas which currently can only be supported by an air line of communication (LOC). Tactical airlift support was adequate to support operations. When planned operations to open road LOC are initiated, this should reduce the USAF tactical airlift requirements.

b. Condition of primary land LOC as of 31 October 1967.

(1) For the purpose of this report, the following terms on condition of land LOC are defined.

(a) Condition I: The route is capable of carrying up to Class 50 loads (all division loads).

(b) Condition II: Up to Class 35 loads (the majority of logistical transport e.g., 5000-gallon POL tankers).

(c) Condition III: Up to Class 16 loads (Armored Personnel Carriers and 2½ ton trucks).

(d) Condition IV: Can carry only light civilian traffic; therefore, it is open only to light reconnaissance vehicles.

(e) Condition V: Closed to all traffic.

(2) Route QL-1.

(a) Cambodian Border (XT284244) to Go Dan Ha (XT382250), lowest bridge capacity, Class 12, route condition III.

(b) Go Dan Ha (XT382250) to Cu Chi (XT628126), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

(c) Cu Chi (XT628126) to Saigon (XT793942), lowest bridge capacity, Class 60, route condition I.

(d) Saigon (XT793942) to RJ 316 (XT072130), lowest bridge capacity, Class 40, route condition II.

(e) RJ 316 (XT072130) to (XT697026), lowest bridge capacity, Class 45, route condition II.

(f) XT697026 to III CTZ Boundary (XT180014), bridge destroyed, route condition V.

(3) Route QL-4.

(a) RJ QL-1 (XS845914) to (XS423490), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(b) XS423490 to Tien Giang River (WS985357), lowest bridge capacity, Class 15, route condition III.

(4) Route QL-13.

(a) RJ QL-1 (XS879971) to Hon Quan (XT755885), lowest bridge capacity, Class 40, route condition II.

(b) Hon Quan (XT755885) to Cambodian Border (XT683233), lowest bridge capacity, Class 15, route condition III.

(5) Route QL-14.

(a) Dong Xoai (XT079759) to blown bridge at (YT165820), repair easy w/fill, lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition II. Condition will continue until the road is opened by tactical forces and repairs can be made.

(b) Route condition II continues to the damaged bridge at YU303010. From YU303010 to the II - III CTZ Boundary (YU590176) the road is accessible from II CTZ, lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition II.

(6) Route QL-15.

(a) Bien Hoa (YT002114) to Baria (YS380607), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(b) Baria (YS380607) to Yung Tau (YS274444), lowest bridge capacity, Class 12, route condition IV.

(7) Route QL-20.
AVFDC-RE-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1967 (4CS GSFOB-65) (U)

(a) RJ QL-1 (IT343101) to bridge at IT537356, lowest bridge capacity, Class 37, route condition II.

(b) Bridge at (IT537356) to III OTZ Boundary (IT763572), lowest bridge capacity, Class 25, route condition III.

(8) Route QL-22.

(a) Go Den Ha (IT387251) to (IT097764), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(b) IT097764 to Cambodian Border (IT748966) with AVLB abutments prepared at IT097764, route condition V; with AVLB, route condition I.

(9) Route LTL 16.

Bien Hoa (IT002114) to RJ LTL 1A (IXB877373), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50 route condition I.

(10) Route LTL 1A.

(a) RJ LTL 16 (IXB877373) to IXB995588, lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(b) IXB995588 to RJ 311 (IUL33062), bridge destroyed, route condition V.

(c) RJ 311 (IUL33062) to RJ QL-1A (IXU960221), bridge destroyed, route condition V.

(11) Route LTL 2.

RJ (IX47045) to Baria (IX380067), lowest bridge capacity, Class 60, route condition I.

(12) Route LTL 5A.

Saigon (IX616890) to Cau Nui Ferry, (IX786568), lowest bridge capacity, Class 16, route condition III.

(13) Route LTL 23.

Baria (IX380067) to Xuyen Moc (IX657687), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(14) Route TL 9A and LTL 10.

Saigon (IX790890) to Bao Trai (IX526044), lowest bridge
AVFBC-RE-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (AGS C508-65) (U)

capacity, Class 50, route classification I.

(15) Route 333 - 334 - 335.

RJ QL 1 (IT630085) to Tan Linh (IT935262), lowest bridge capacity, Class 25, route classification III.

(16) Route LTL 26 and 239.

Tan Hinh (IT259500) to Dan Tieng (IT490460), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route classification I.

c. Maintenance and repair programmed.

(1) Surface maintenance, drainage repair and reconstruction are in progress on the following routes: QL 1, QL 15, QL 22, QL 13, LTL 1A, 240, TL 10, TL 8A, LTL 18. Repair consists of reworking rutted surfaces, filling holes, patching pavement and repairing drainage structures.

(2) In addition to improving land LOC in support of tactical operations, an increasing amount of engineer effort is being placed on permanent stabilization of major LOC to include replacement of tactical bridging by permanent bridges.

6. (C) REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD):

a. During the reporting period there has been slow, but steady progress in the Revolutionary Development program in the III CTZ. During the quarter 39 Real New Life Hamlets, 8 Pacification Hamlets and 12 Consolidated Hamlets with a population of 86,828 were completed. As of 31 October a total of 56 Real New Life Hamlets, 10 Pacification Hamlets and 13 Consolidated Hamlets with a population of 114,589 have been completed. In addition a total of 48 Real New Life Hamlets, 11 Pacification Hamlets and 24 Consolidated Hamlets with a population of 105,706 are undergoing development.

b. Enemy reaction to the program has shown a marked increase in small unit ambushes and harassing fires. In September the number of incidents recorded reached 280, a 50% increase over August and increased to 350 in October. Enemy activity has seriously disrupted the program in Phuoc Long and Minh Long Provinces. A portion of this increase of VC activity may be attributed to attempts to disrupt national elections and the beginning of the dry season campaign may explain the additional increase. It is expected, however, that attacks of this type directed at individuals and small units will continue to increase as the enemy loses his capability for large unit operations.

c. Security precautions were sufficient to prevent enemy disruption of the national elections. In spite of enemy propaganda, threats,
interdiction of roads and shelling of polling places, 82% of those registered voted in the presidential-senatorial elections and 69% voted in the lower house elections in III CTZ less Saigon. Protection of these officials presents a difficult problem only partially alleviated by the issuance of weapons to them.

d. Initiation of rat control programs in two provinces, the training of 81 midwives and 31 rural health workers, the issuance of 25 emergency vehicles and the contracting for the construction of two 100-bed hospitals and the renovation of three others have improved the Public Health Situation. Agricultural progress is noted in the areas of seed multiplication of IR-8 rice, the organization of new cooperatives and the hiring of home economics agents to serve new areas. Public Works projects are hampered for the lack of a provincial maintenance capability resulting in an estimated 50% of the equipment being deadlined. With an immediate requirement for 60 wells, the six well-drilling rigs are each averaging one producing well per month. Community Development, through self-help, has reached 54% of its 1967 funded project goal, with provincial self-help committees functioning in nine of the twelve provinces.

e. Nearly $60,000 worth of VIS equipment has recently been issued to province offices to fill shortages. The public television program has placed 323 sets, at approved locations, of the 620 sets allocated to III CTZ. Circulation of the provincial newspapers averages one per 25 inhabitants and the province-district weekly newsletter circulation has reached one per 21 inhabitants with a goal of 1:10.

f. With an increase in enemy activity during the last month of the period, the movement of refugees within III CTZ increased. As a result of the attack on Loc Ninh, approximately 500 families, totaling 3000 persons, have been temporarily quartered pending return to their homes or movement to a temporary refugee camp if necessary. Pre-planning has commenced and action is now under way for the construction of a refugee resettlement camp of 500 houses in Binh Duong Province. During September, a new refugee camp was opened in Phuoc Tuy Province with 216 families in residence.

g. The Chieu Hoi Program continues to progress with the returnee rate more than doubling the 1966 rate - 511 in August, 369 in September and 423 in October. The annual pattern of decline was reversed somewhat in October partially due to an intensified campaign, Operation Doi Moi, in Hau Nghia and Binh Duong Provinces. To date $VN2,150,000 of a three million piaster emergency construction fund to support this effort has been or is being used.

h. Eighty-six RD cadre teams have been recruited of which 22 are operational and 14 are in training. In addition, 12 Montagnard RD teams are operational. In direct support of these teams are 17 ARVN
AVPDC-RE-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Battalions; 37 Regional Force Companies and 7 RF Platoons; and 64 Popular
Force Platoons and 24 PF Squads. There are now a total of 20 US Mobile
Advisory Teams training RF/PF units in areas in which security is critical,
and a total of 31 District Operations and Intelligence Coordinating Cen-
ters obtaining information with which to attack the enemy infrastructure.

7. (U) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS


(1) The II FFORCEV PSYOP effort in support of tactical
operations increased significantly during this quarter. A total of 2,469
sorties were flown by US/FWMAF Army and Air Force aircraft in support of
PSYOP this quarter compared to 1,518 sorties flown last quarter. The
aerial dissemination of leaflets more than doubled during the quarter with
571,580,000 leaflets dropped this quarter compared to 263,612,000 in the
previous quarter. In addition, the number of hours of aerial loudspeaker
broadcasts increased to 1,063 from 835 last quarter. Of the leaflets drop-
ped, 76,556,000 were produced by 246th PSYOP Company an increase of 101
million over last quarter's production. The remainder of the leaflets
used were produced by 6th PSYOP Battalion off-shore agencies.

(2) Special Operations - Doi Moi.

(a) A special operation was conducted by II FFORCEV
during the reporting period. In an effort to increase the number of Hoi
Chanh, Operation Doi Moi was conducted in Binh Duong and Hau Nghia Pro-
vinces from 25 September to 29 October. II FFORCEV, in conjunction with
III Corps (ARVN), province officials, and ARVN and CORDS Advisors, conduct-
ed intensive combat and psychological operations in the two provinces. The
first two weeks, Phase I, were devoted to combat and psychological opera-
tions designed to set the stage for Phase II. Phase II, initially planned
for one week but extended to two weeks, was called Bonus Week. During
this period increased monetary benefits were offered to individual ral-
liers and special bonuses were offered to unit commanders who brought in
more than 50 percent of their units. In Phase III the intelligence gained
from Hoi Chanh who rallied during the preceding four weeks was exploited.
An exhaustive evaluation of the total campaign is being made at the pre-
sent time.

(b) As each rallier was received he was interrogated
to determine if he could be exploited psychologically. As a result of
these interrogations, 91 special quick reaction leaflets were produced
by the 246th PSYOP Company. The entire operation yielded a total of 169
ralliers in the two provinces, which reversed the downward trend in rall-
ers that had been noted during the preceding two months.

(3) During the quarter 1,303 Hoi Chanh were reported in III
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AVPDC-RE-H
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RGCS GFSOR-67) (U)

CTZ. This is a significant decrease from the 2116 received during the previous quarter. The decrease may be attributed to the lack of contact with enemy forces brought about by the enemy's period of standdown for refitting, retraining and food production activities.

b. Significant Civil Affairs Activities.

1. The 2d Civil Affairs Company continued to support II FFORCEN OPCON units with 22 AA generalist Platoons. Platoons are attached to each brigade size unit, each division headquarters, the 1st Australian Task Force and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment.

2. Military civic action projects increased significantly during the reporting period. The number of patients treated through MEDCAP was 340,200, an increase of 150 percent over the last reporting period. Major construction and repair projects increased 110 percent.

3. Attitude surveys taken during the quarter indicate that the Medical Civic Action Program and improvement of lines of communication continue to be the most popular programs with the Vietnamese people.

4. Operation Friendship, a civic action program conducted in areas in close proximity to HQ II FFORCEN, continued to produce increasing response on the part of the local civilian population and officials. The II FFORCEN Friendship Platoon, a civic action team which operates under the direct supervision of the II FFORCEN G5, concentrated its efforts on developing educational facilities, distribution of commodities and encouragement of local self help projects to improve overall US/Vietnamese relations. Operation Friendship continued to be successful as evidenced by the friendly and willing cooperation of hamlet and village officials.

8. (U) SIGNAL

a. (U) Communications activities generally were routine for the period being reported. Many of the Army area type circuits which had been imposed on the corps tactical systems were removed and placed on new Army area communications systems. When this plan is completed, the corps tactical systems will provide primarily the systems and channels for command and control functions.

b. (U) A tactical operations center switchboard was installed and activated. This facility provides greater flexibility and immediate-response telephone communications in direct support of command operations by having direct access to each DTG & GOC of the tactical units under the OPCON of II FFORCEN, HQ USARV, and MACV GOC.

c. (U) Plans and Operations progressed with regard to the II FFORCEN radio relay sites. Hill 837 (Mai Chua Chan) has been expanded.
to provide a radio retransmission capability for Office of Civilian Operations and to allow more operational space for radio relay equipment of other units under II FFORCEV OPCON. Engineers have begun construction of the site at Hill 986 (Mui Ba Den) for permanent occupancy. Coordination has been affected concerning its operational control and resupply. A plan for development of Hill 722 (Mui Ba Ra) as a relay site was submitted to the 20th Engineer Brigade for implementation.

d. (U) A twelve channel VHF system was established between the III ARVN Corps Headquarters and II FFORCEV. This system provides sole user circuits for the CG's of both II FFORCEV and III ARVN Corps, Deputy for CORDS, the Deputy Senior Advisor and essential common user circuits.

9. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL

a. The following significant activities occurred within the IG area of interest:

(1) Forty-three requests for assistance were processed.

(2) Six complaints were resolved.

(3) One formal investigation of firing by friendly Army aircraft into friendly troop positions was conducted. This resulted in a promulgation of a command SOP by this headquarters.

(4) One inquiry was made into control of aircraft. The result of this inquiry was a recommendation that an investigation under the provisions of AR 15-6 be conducted. The recommendation was approved and implemented.

(5) Annual General Inspections of the 219th Military Intelligence Detachment and the 534 Signal Battalion were conducted.

(6) A courtesy inspection of the 199th Infantry Brigade was conducted.

b. Benefits derived from Annual General Inspections:

(1) Annual general inspections, either through preparation for or corrective action subsequent to, have resulted in the following:

(a) Better internal security procedures and improved physical security throughout Plantation.

(b) Administrative deficiencies in the command have been reduced appreciably.

(c) Unauthorized and illegal sundry funds have been
AVFBC-RE-H
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1967 (RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

brought under control.

(d) Command attention has been directed toward unsatisfactory or marginal conditions.

(2) During the course of and after completion of annual general inspections, professional assistance and guidance for remedial action in all deficient areas has been provided.

10. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

Significant activities for the Staff Judge Advocate Section, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, for the period are as follows:

a. On 15 September 1967 the project to have all eligible alien servicemen under the administrative control of CG, II Field Force Vietnam, granted US citizenship was completed. On that date in the United States District Court of the Territory of Guam two alien servicemen of this command became naturalized citizens. In addition, approximately fifty other alien servicemen were given assistance in preparing necessary forms for submission to appropriate District Courts upon their return to CONUS.

b. The following unit was assigned to II FFORCEV for GCM jurisdiction: Company F, 51st Infantry (Long Range Patrol) per GO 4916, USARV, 26 Sep 67, as amended by GO 5217, USARV, 11 Oct 67 and was further attached to 53d Signal Battalion for administration of military justice.

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AFMSC-RE-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RGSC GSFOR) (U)

SECTION II

COMMANDER OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

ITEM: Recommendations on use of the Aerial Surveillance Company:

DISCUSSION: General support of a corps size force is the ideal mission assignment for the aerial surveillance company. This method of employment has proven to be flexible and efficient. It has provided the maximum amount of support, generally eliminating duplication of aerial reconnaissance efforts of II FFORCE OPCON units.

OBSERVATION: The newer system of reporting directly from SLAR aircraft to II FFORCE artillery units has reduced the time lapse from target detection to target engagement. The full effect of this had not been determined. It is expected that a higher percentage of effectiveness of SLAR detected targets being successfully attacked will be the eventual outcome.

LOGISTICS

ITEM: Supply conditions affecting the operational capability of the command.

DISCUSSION: During this quarter a Long Range Patrol (LRP) Company was formed from in-country assets and an air cavalry squadron arrived from CONUS. The impact of equipping these units did not seriously affect the operational capability of the command; however, it had considerable effect on logistical operations at all levels because a large amount of equipment had to be provided on short notice.

OBSERVATIONS: The supply system is not designed to respond on short notice. Maximum lead time must be allotted to new units formed in-country and units arriving from CONUS for procurement of equipment, otherwise available assets must be redistributed. This results in one or more units being short authorized equipment and adversely affects the accomplishment of assigned missions.

ITEM: Maintenance Float for Rome Plows.

DISCUSSION: During extensive jungle clearing operations a high deadline rate had been encountered with the D7E Tractor which is the standard tractor for the Rome Plow attachment. In addition there have been shortages of tractor assets due to combat losses.

OBSERVATIONS: To sustain maximum operation of the Land Clearing Teams,
a maintenance float of D7E Tractors, complete with Rome Plow attachment, has been made available to the Direct Support Units (DSU's) supporting these teams. This permits immediate replacement of equipment determined to be unsalvageable for excess length of time. Additionally, depot stocks have been earmarked for immediate issue to replace combat losses.

(U) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

ITEM: Exploiting Hoi Chanh with picture leaflets.

DISCUSSION: Experience has shown that leaflets containing pictures of Hoi Chanh and a handwritten appeal are most effective in persuading other Viet Cong to defect. To get high quality leaflets a high quality photograph of the subject is required. This can best be accomplished with a Polaroid camera used at the time the individual rallies. Use of a Polaroid camera permits immediate developing and inspection of the picture which insures availability of a high quality photograph.

OBSERVATION: Polaroid cameras should be available at brigade level to make possible the immediate securing of high quality photographs of ralliers. In this way rapid exploitation of ralliers with high quality leaflets is ensured.

ITEM: PSYOP Coordinating Centers.

DISCUSSION: During Operation Doi Moi PSYOP coordinating centers were established in the two provinces involved. Representatives of US and ARVN combat units, local government, and ARVN and CORDS advisors were included in the centers. All PSYOP activities were coordinated in the center, providing for more effective PSYOP activities and efficient use of resources.

OBSERVATION: PSYOP coordinating centers are very effective in developing comprehensive and cohesive PSYOP programs. The centers should be organized at the lowest level capable of complete coordination of operational requirements.

ITEM: Increased monetary inducements were used as an experiment during Operation Doi Moi. During the third and fourth weeks, increased monetary benefits were offered to the Viet Cong. While some of the ralliers brought with them the leaflets announcing the increased rewards, none of them cited the rewards as the reason for rallying. The desire to be reunited with family and fear of death from bombs and artillery continues as the major reason for rallying.

OBSERVATION: Increased monetary benefits offered to potential ralliers do not appreciably influence Viet Cong or NVA soldiers. The reasons most frequently cited by ralliers are (1) the desire to be reunited with family.
members and (2) the fear of death. These themes should continue to be exploited in propaganda messages directed toward enemy units.

**(F) CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION**

**ITEM:** Operation Friendship - the employment of Military Civic Action/Civil Affairs/Community Relations assets in close proximity to a military base camp to enhance the image of the US FORCES, to promote the friendly and willing cooperation of hamlet and village officials and to assist in civic action projects which meet the most pressing needs of the people.

**DISCUSSION:** The Friendship Platoon, a civic action team operating under the direct supervision of the II FFORCE G5, was set up to provide immediate civic action response to emergencies and incidents that involve US personnel in hamlets and villages immediately adjacent to the area and, through coordination with the Senior District Advisor, determines those projects which best meet the needs of the people. Emphasis has been placed on developing educational facilities, distributing of commodities, and the encouragement of local self-help projects in order to improve overall US/Vietnamese relations. In addition, there has been an intensive application of community relations assets to encourage the development of mutual respect and trust between the local residents and the US Military Forces stationed in the area.

**OBSERVATIONS:** There has been a marked improvement in relations between US Forces and the local Vietnamese people and the GVN officials. The people are willing to work on self-help civic action projects to improve their standard of living. In two cases the villagers have volunteered information of considerable intelligence value.

**COMMUNICATIONS**

**ITEM:** The volume of electrical transmitted message traffic increased from 102,247 messages last quarter to 120,231 messages during this quarter. The volume of immediate precedence messages continues to show a decrease from 35% to 30%.

**DISCUSSION:** The decrease in immediate precedence messages from last quarter has reduced the average handling time for originating messages by 10 minutes.

**OBSERVATIONS:** The reduction of immediate precedence messages was due, primarily, to the effective and aggressive application of realistic precedence as directed by members of the command message review board and cooperation of the Field Force Staff.

**ITEM:** Frequency interference has decreased significantly during the last quarter.
AVFBC-E-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

DISCUSSION: With the closer assignment and control of FM frequencies maintained at this headquarters the frequency interference problem is under control. However, with the expansion of operations to be experienced in III CTZ it is expected that some additional interference will occur.

OBSERVATIONS: With the arrival of the 101st Air Div and the movement of other II FFORCEV OPCON units it is expected that interference will increase. However, frequency changes and command emphasis on the use of low power should limit the problems that will be encountered.

ITEM: Commander's Recommendations.

NONE.

G. S. ECKHARDT
Major General, USA
Acting Commander

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - AGSFOR, DA
1 - CINCUSARPAC
3 - CG, USAFRV
1 - ACofS, G1, II FFORCEV
1 - ACofS, G2, II FFORCEV
10 - ACofS, G3, II FFORCEV
1 - ACofS, G4, II FFORCEV
1 - ACofS, G5, II FFORCEV
1 - Joint Planning Group, II FFORCEV
5 - 7th Mil Hist Det, II FFORCEV
1 - CG, USAIS
1 - CG, USAARMS
1 - CG, USACGSC
1 - CG, USAAMS
1 - CG, USAINFYRU
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam (DHOA).

2. (U) Concur with report and commander's observations. Report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. S. NAVARRO, USA
Captain, USA
Assistant S3 and General

cc: HQ, II FFV
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 from HQ, II Pld Force Vn (UIC: WOHOAA) (RCS CSPOR-65)(U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 28 DEC 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signed]

HEAVRIN SNYDER
CPT, AGG
Asst AG
### CONDROYAL

**II FORCEV ORDER OF BATTLE**

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<th>UNIT</th>
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1 Aug 67 - 31 Oct 67

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<td>BIEU HOA</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d Squadron, 17th Air Cav</td>
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### UNIT DEPLOYED

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### TENANT UNIT

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Incl 6

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DOD DIR 5200.10
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STATISTICAL SUMMARY
TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT
1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967

SUB TOTAL

1. Total FAC controlled Air sorties 12,944

2. Total FAC controlled sorties in support of RVNAF 5,229

3. Total FAC controlled sorties in support of US/FWMAF 7,715

4. Number of Combat Sky Spot missions in support of RVNAF 435

5. Number of Combat Sky Spot missions in support of US/FWMAF
   1st Div 294
   9th Div 40
   25th Div 98
   199th Bde 50
   1st ATF 115
   HQ, II FFORCEV 220
   817

6. Ordnance expended supporting US/FWMAF
   Bombs 30,779
   Rockets 16,993
   Napalm 9,584
   20 MM 1,591,600
   CBU 412,356

7. Results of air strikes supporting US/FWMAF
   KBA (BC) 350
   KBA (EST) 1,003
   Structures destroyed 1,932
   Structures damaged 1,050

8. Number of B-52 strikes 50

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**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 August - 31 October 1967

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**SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

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**ABSTRACT**

64