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<td>31 Jul 1979 DoDD 5200.10 gp-4; AGO ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980</td>
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADCUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGA 7701.1M (15 Jan 64) FOR IN 8D-670671 18 January 1964

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 173rd
Battalion Brigade (Sep), Period Ending 30 April 1964 (c)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure
appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current
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Major General, USA
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CG, 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep)
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HEADQUARTERS, 1750 AIR FORCE BUILDING (SEPARATE)
SAN FRANCISCO 94125

AV50-DC

1 July 1947

SUBJECT: Operational Report: Lessons Learned (1 February - 30 April 1947)

THRU: RM 85-246

ATTN: AV50C

Re: 06266

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff
For Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

The enclosed Operational Report: Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with USARV Regulation 1-19 and AR 1-19.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

E. B. HUGHES

CPT, AG

Asst AG

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FOR OD RD
670471
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1 JUly 1967

I. Significant Organizational and Unit Activities
   1. Introduction
   2. Organization
   3. Intelligence
   4. Combat Operations
   5. Training
   6. Psychological Operations and Civil Action
   7. Logistics
   8. Personnel Administration
   9. Chemical Operations

II. Commander's Observations - Lessons Learned

III. Man of Combat Operations
   - Operation 648-649:315, Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

IV. Appendices
   1. Overview of Army Personnel Withdrawn, Hqs, DA
   2. Organization Chart
   3. 648-649:315 Withdrawn, Hqs, DA
   4. Supply and Combat Service Activities

     Published separately as FDR GT RD 67300, dated 11 August 1967

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1 July 1967

I. SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL AND UNIT ACTIVITY

1. Introduction

This Operational Report Lessons Learned covers the period 1 February to 30 April 1967. The Brigade has continued to conduct operations to locate and destroy the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Armed Forces, support lines of communication and installations. Operations were continued within the Brigade's Area of Responsibility. The Brigade has also continued to carry out the vital phase of Civic Action and Civil Affairs in the Revolutionary Development Program, which has contributed to the overall counter insurgency effort in VIETNAM.

As during the last reporting period, to best accomplish its mission, the Brigade again conducted four (4) battalion size or larger operations in addition to its Civic Action and Civil Affairs program. Operations conducted during this period were Operation PIG SPRING, JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE Phase I (Parachute Assault), JUNCTION CITY II and Operation ROYALE. Each of these operations were characterized by an aggressive assault on enemy areas and in every operation, the Brigade distinguished itself completing every mission in a vigorous and extremely professional manner. During this period, the Brigade became the holder of still another first in VIETNAM with the first parachute assault in the Republic and the first such operation in fifteen years, as the spearhead of the largest ground operation of the war to date.

2. Organization

The internal structure of the Brigade has remained essentially the same during the reporting period, with the exception of the attachment of one new unit. The 64th Public Information Detachment was released on 9 December 1966. After training for overseas deployment, the unit was assigned to USAV from San Francisco on 2 March 1967. Upon arrival at VIETNAM, the detachment was further assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) by General Order Number 124, HQ USAV, dated 26 March 1967.

The detachment with a TO & E strength of two officers and three enlisted men has the mission of augmenting the Information Section in command units one, or constituting the Information Section of command units four.

Since attachment to the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 64th Public Information Detachment has aided the Brigade Information Office in numerous ways. Its personnel have made valuable armed field coverage of Brigade combat activities, open extensive liaison with the accredited civilian press corps and a greater potential for handling internal information publications.

3. Intelligence

a. The enemy's order of battle in the TACR has not changed since the last two Operational Reports Lessons Learned. The following units have continued to conduct operations harassing and small unit tactics in and around the Brigade's TACR against AVN and US Forces:

   (1) 570th Guerilla Platoon
   (2) 50th Local Platoon
   (3) Probable reinforcements continue to include elements from the 800th Dong Hai Battalion and the 3d Battalion, 10th "A" Regiment.

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b. The enemy location remains the same since the last reporting period.

c. The enemy situation before and during each operation conducted by the
Brigade during this reporting period is as follows:

1) Operation BIG SPRING (1 - 16 February 1967)

(a) Enemy Situation Before Operation: Prior to the commencement
of the operation, recent reports indicated the possibility of the 29th VC Regiment
being located in our area of operation. The following units operated in the AO:
2d ARVN Special Service Unit, C301, C105, and 9th Security Companies of CP 91, the
COM Local Force (LF) Battalion, C302 and C303 LF Battalions which were subordinate to
MMEC SVN Province and have always operated in area. The enemy was attributed with
the following capabilities:

1. Initiating harassing attacks within the AO.

2. Reinforcing guerrilla elements with Local Force units of
the 29th Main Force Battalion, the 3d Battalion, 16th "A" Main Force Regiment and
the 2d LOI LF Battalion.

3. Withdrawal from or avoid contact with US Forces.

(b) During Operation BIG SPRING, the Brigade elements and ele-
ments of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division maintained daily contact with the
enemy to include contact during the Yen Holiday period. Contacts during the Yen
period were always VC initiated. The enemy activity was normally initiated by
friendly forces and resulted in VC withdrawal. The largest contact was in an
estimated VC Company with C/2/503d Infantry on 1 February 1967. Numerous VC base
areas were found which included fortifications, weapons, foodstuff and documents.
The size ranged from Platoon to Regimental. The majority of the documents captured/}
found were from the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 273d VC Regiment. Also captured
were files of the Tan Uyen District HQ, administrative Staff Section (Political
Section) which include the yearly reports from 1966, the Political Struggle Commis-
sion, Current Affairs Committee, Women's Association and the finance and economy
committee.

(c) Terrain: The area of operation was located on a lowland plain
which sloped gently upward to the east. The highest point of elevation within the
area was an 87 meter hill located at PT 15040P. The Son Khe River and the Song Ke
River formed the major drainage patterns in the area. These rivers created major
obstacles for foot movement. The primary form of vegetation within the area was
dense forest, bamboo thickets, cultivated fields and grass lands. Extensive rice
fields bordered the banks of the lower Song Khe River. There were large open areas
interspersed throughout the area of operation which provided excellent L/C. Inter-
provincial HIGHWAY 16 and Commercial Road 106 provided routes of ground entrance
into the area. There were populated areas along the large rivers, but the center
area was not inhabited. The enemy used the dense vegetation to conceal his activities
from aerial and ground observation. On occasion, the VC successfully broke con-
tact with US Forces due to the dense vegetation.

(d) The following chart represents the enemy's order of battle
during Operation BIG SPRING.
1. Operational Report Lessons Learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>LOCATION</th>
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<th>SUB-DIVISION</th>
<th>WME</th>
<th>HWRAF</th>
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<td>271st</td>
<td>072700</td>
<td>30 Jun 67</td>
<td>747, 7</td>
<td>6-25mm Wire</td>
<td>1-10 cal MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>747, 7</td>
<td>6-25mm Wire</td>
<td>1-10 cal MG</td>
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"Twin of the 277th are well entrenched. Most rear areas are out of range in eastern Province. A few of the officers are MIA.

277th

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<td>30 Jun 67</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>2-0.38 Wire</td>
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<tr>
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CLOD

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(b) Order of Battle - Operation JUNCTION CITY I


3. Confidential

3rd Pl

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### Table: "Operational Report"  
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<td>4 Feb 67</td>
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<td>7 Jan 67</td>
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<td>24 Dec 50</td>
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### Notes:
- 4.40mm Rg M, 12.7mm with a sub to the 9th div
- 16.8cm M and 21.8cm M with 24.0cm M
- 12.7mm M and 27.8cm M
- 2.6cm RFL and 2.6cm RFL

### (3) Operation Faction City III

A

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1 July 1967


(b) Togue - Operation JUTLUM CITY II

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<th>Date/Time</th>
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<td>27-29 May</td>
<td>Ta Linn</td>
<td>20 KIA, 12 WIA</td>
<td>2554 &amp; 2132</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 May</td>
<td>Ta Linn</td>
<td>10 KIA, 8 WIA</td>
<td>2554 &amp; 2132</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-4 June</td>
<td>Ta Linn</td>
<td>15 KIA, 10 WIA</td>
<td>2554 &amp; 2132</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 June</td>
<td>Ta Linn</td>
<td>20 KIA, 15 WIA</td>
<td>2554 &amp; 2132</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

17th VC Div. 612752 Mortar Site 9

1-7 July 1967

(c) Operation WYATT

(1) Enemy Situation Prior to the Operation: Prior to the beginning of the operation, the following enemy units were believed to be in the area of operations: IIIA LP Battalion, IIIA LP Company, IIIA LP Company. The 1st IIIA Battalion and the 1st IIIA Battalion were believed to be located in southern WARD 04. The enemy had the capability to:

1. Attack with a force up to platoon size and to harass employing local forces and marines.

2. To defend with above mentioned forces.

3. To reinforce his attack with elements of the IIIA Battalion and possibly elements of the 17th VC Regiment.

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1. To withdraw from contact or avoid contact at the time and place of his choosing.

4. Enemy Situation During the Operations: From 18 - 30 April 1967, the unit maintained systematic contact with the enemy. These contacts were usually meters on the same with small groups of VC harassing friendly troops. Approximately 5% of these contacts were friendly-initiated. Although no large engagements occurred, enemy base camps were found.

6. Terrain: The area of operation was to the north of the 40 Grid lines and west of the DONG PHU HAI within the boundaries of DON Duong Province located in WARD 124. The area is a lowland plain that slopes gently toward the east. The SONG PHU HAI and DON Duong River form the major drainage pattern in the area. These streams are interlaced between these major waterways. The primary form of vegetation in the area is dense forest. "Secondary forms of vegetation consist of bamboo thickets, cultivated fields and grass lands. Extensive rice fields border the banks of the lower SONG PHU HAI. Interprovincial Highway 16 and Commercial Road 71A provide the routes of supply and entrance into the area.

f. VC losses for the period 1 February to 30 April are as follows:

**Enemy Personnel**

- KIA (RC) ........................................... 406

- KIA (Police) ...................................... 94

- KIA (Killed by Air) .............................. 38

- Wounded (Wounded) ............................. 5

- Detained ................................. 36

- Wounded .............................. 0

**Equipment/Supplies - Operation BIG SPRING**

- Weapons .................................

  - Chicom Carbines ............................... 10

  - German Masare .............................. 2

  - AK-47's ........................................ 2

  - SKS Rifles ..................................... 2

  - Mauser Nagant Rifles ........................... 3

  - Springfield Rifle ............................. 1

- US Carbines ..................................... 3

CONFIDENTIAL
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<td>US M-79 Grenade Launcher</td>
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<td>Shotgun (homemade)</td>
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<td>.38 Caliber Pistol</td>
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<td><strong>Ammunition</strong></td>
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<td>62mm Rounds</td>
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<td>Stockanks</td>
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<tr>
<td>VC Patches</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Steel Helmets</td>
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</table>
Operational Report Lessons Learned

1 July 1967

Retrenching Tools .......................... 11

Munitions .................................... 7

Miscellaneous Clothing .................... 55 lbs

Rounds, Mines, Grenades & Demolitions

500 lb Bombs .................................. 2

15 lb Bombs .................................. 5

CMU Bombs .................................. 435

Chem Grenades ................................ 45

VC Grenades .................................. 6

Grenades (Misc) .............................. 20

US Grenades .................................. 7

Rifle Grenades ................................ 4

Claymore Mines ............................... 3

VC Claymores ................................. 9

DM-9 Claymores .............................. 1

DM-10 Claymores ............................. 5

AP Mines ..................................... 7

AP Mine ....................................... 1

Dynamite ...................................... 2 sticks

Explosives ................................... 43 pounds

CS ............................................. 55 gallons

Demolition Kits ............................. 6

TNT ........................................... 10 grams

Blasting Caps ................................. 3

Installations

Base Camps .................................. 26

Note .......................................... 78

Panthocos .......................... 112

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<td>English Landrover</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4-ton International Truck</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seneca</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Miscellaneous: 1047 ft electric wire, 8-9 volt batteries, 3 flashlight batteries, 3 gallons of gasoline, 4 motor oil, 2 gallons cream, 170 gallons heroin, 4 cyanide, 550 cases of sugar, 120 cases of tobacco, 4 medical books, 1 barber kit, 500 pounds of medical supplies, 1 7.62mm Amm Paces, 1 wrist watch, 1 coding machine, 1 US flakw blanket, 13 flares, 3 WC pellets, surgical equipment (assorted), 1 stethoscope, 6 inner tubes, 3 drive shafts, piston rings, 1 battery booster, 1 German tire, 3 – 55-gallon drums, 1 – 30 gallon drum, 1 tire, 3 wheel rims, 1 750 round blank casing, 2 cinemascope, 1 .50 caliber ammunition triced, 12 .50-67 magazines, 50 K-16 magazines.
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1 July 1967

I. Equipment/Supplies - Operation MUNITION CITY
   See attached Combat Report after Action Report (Tab A), paragraph 1A, pages 33.

II. Equipment/Supplies - Operation MUNITION CITY II
   See attached Combat Report after Action Report (Tab A), paragraph 1A, page 1A.

III. Equipment/Supplies - Operation NHWATE

   a. Weapons
      12 Gauge Shotgun
      Ammunition/Mines etc
      AP Mine
      CBU Bomb
      Claymore
      Glass Rounds
      CS Grenade
      Frag Grenade

   b. Installations
      Barriers
      Huts

   c. Other
      1 shell casing, 1 section seat, 1 parachute, 5 tons of rice, 50' coaxial wire, 3 containers, 15 documents, 5 notebooks, 9 vials medicine, 2 shirts.

IV. Combat Operations

   General: The Brigade continued to conduct combat and Revolutionary Development (Civil Affairs and Civic Action) operations designed to locate and destroy Viet Cong forces, logistical installations and to further reduce his hold on the Vietnamese people.

   Concept

   During the month of February, the Brigade continued to conduct normal security operations in and around the RFVN NDA area, terminated one operation and initiated one operation during the month.

   The Brigade initiated Operation PTO SPRING on 1 February 1967, conducting offensive operations in the western portion of WAR ZONE 10 and south with the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division OPLAN 1011 to the Brigade. Prior to the operation, scout reports indicated the possibility of the 273rd VC Regiment being located in the area. During the operation, the 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate) and the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division maintained daily contact with the enemy to include contact during the TET
Holiday, which were all VC initiated. Contact was usually initiated by friendly forces and terminated by VC withdrawal. Numerous VC base camps were found which included fortifications, foodstuffs, weapons and documents. Operation AT-7, TIGER terminated at 14:00 hours on 16 February with Prong elements closing back into PAVN HOA.

The Prong had already begun planning for a parachute, and on 17 February, a deception plan was published. On 20 February, the Prong under the control of the 1st Infantry Division, deployed the 1/40th Infantry, 6/509th Infantry and the 1/514th Artillery (-) by C-130 aircraft from PAVN HOA Airbase to GVN LOI in preparation for Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE. In addition, on 20 February, 6/17th Cavalry, D/ 10th Armored (-), the 17th Engineer Company (-), Prong HHC (-), and elements of the 173rd Support Battalion were deployed by road convoy to the staging area at GVN 701. On 22 February at 0900 hours, the 24th Battalion, 509th Infantry, Alpha Battery 3/19th Artillery and selected personnel of the Prong HHC (-) parachuted into Drop Zone "GABLE" (PT 30907). Approximately 700 troopers were dropped completing the initial assault at 0910 hours. A heavy drop followed at 0927 hours and the CDS drop at 0930 hours. This marked the first combat parachute jump in 15 years and the first in the Republic of VIETNAM. The purpose of the parachute assault was to place the maximum number of combat troops into the operational area in the shortest period of time. The 1/40th Infantry and 6/509th Infantry conducted helicopter assaults south and north of the LZ at 11:00 hours and 11:20 hours on this day respectively, Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE was aimed at the COSTA (Central Office of South Vietnam) and the 9th NVA Division in WAR ZONE "C". The operation continued into the month of March. Operations during the month were supported by 266 FAC sorties and 51 FAC sorties dropping a total of 333,676 tons of ordnance. Artillery supported the Prong firing a total of 88,989 rounds. The Prong Aviation Platoons (Cruzer Platoons) supported all operations with the following sorties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Sortie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recon</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command &amp; Control</td>
<td>1253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medevac</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery adjustment</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1,457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operations during the month of February resulted in the following VC and friendly VC and friendly losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC Loose</th>
<th>US Loose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (SG)</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA (wounded)</td>
<td>WIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>WIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>WIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>WIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>WIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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CONFIDENTIAL
March

During the month of March 1967, the Prriage continued to conduct normal security operations, initiated Operation (JUNCTION CITY II) and initiated participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II at the vicinity of MINH THARH.

The Prriage continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE in TAT XANH Province. In March, the Prriage CP (-) dislocated from the vicinity of PHAphin and moved south to 2071 DA. On 6 March 1967, the Prriage initiated numerous airfields and ground assault north of MINH THARH. At this time, Troop "A", 174th Cavalry was under the Operational Control of the 3rd Prriage, 1st Infantry Division. Throughout the operation, the Prriage maintained daily contact with the enemy, inflicting significant losses in personnel and supplies/instalations on the Viet Cong. A total of 266 kills were inflicted by the Prriage in addition to centing over 90 weapons. On 25 March, the 173rd returned to MINH HOB Base Camp and immediately upon return, assumed responsibility of the Tactical Area of Responsability. On 29 March, the Prriage, under the Operational Control of the 1st Infantry Division, commenced deployment to MINH THARH for participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II, aimed in VAR KON "CP" by C-130 aircraft and road convoy. Throughout the month of March, infantry elements of the Prriage continued to conduct heli- and airdrops missions, search and destroy missions and night ambushes, meeting with heavy enemy contact. This operation continued into the month of April. During March, 319 FAC sorties and 89 FAC sorties were flown in support of the Prriage dropping a total of 77.5 tons of ordnance. Supporting artillery (5/113th artillery), fired 1,551 missions expending a total of 55,534 rounds. The Prriage aviation fleet continued to provide support on all operations, a statistical report of their activities follows:

Mission | Sorties
--------|--------
Re-supply | 15
Command and Control | 749
Medevac | 5
Reconnaissance | 63
Artillery Adjustment | 29
Miscellaneous | 57
TOTAL | 806

Maintenance & Training | 77

Total Passengers Transferred | 1,243
Total Cargo (tons) | 11.0
Total Hours Flown | 1,247

Operations during the month of March 1967 resulted in the following VC and Friendly losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC Losses</th>
<th>US Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (RC)</td>
<td>30A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA (pwc)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12

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The Brigade continued normal security operations, terminated participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II, and initiated and terminated Operation NWMARK.

The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division continued participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY II, which was initiated on 20 March 1967. The Brigade conducted search and destroy operations, perimeter defense and road security. During the operation, the 173d maintained daily contact with the enemy, inflicting 69 kills by body count and similar losses in supplies and installations. The Brigade terminated Operation JUNCTION CITY II on 13 April with all elements closing into BETER HOA. Upon their return, Brigade elements immediately assumed responsibility of the Brigade’s TANG. On 14 April, Operation NWMARK was initiated with the 1/49th Infantry deploying by helicopter assault into WAR ZONE “D” west of the SONTR PE RIVER within the boundaries of PHUOC THANH Province. The Brigade also assumed participation in Operation UNCONTAINED, a security mission in the LONG BINH Sub-Area, CHAD CHAN Mountain and a ridge site between BETER HOA and SAI Gon. Throughout Operation NWMARK, Infantry, Infantry Battalions were rotated between Operation NWMARK and Operation UNCONTAINED. During Operation NWMARK, the Brigade elements maintained normal contact with the enemy. These contacts were usually engagements with small groups of VC. Operation NWMARK was terminated on 30 April, and served as a valuable training vehicle in preparing new arrivals for forthcoming operations. Enemy resistance was light, thus the men received practical training with a minimal loss in casualties. Operations during the month were supported by 205 TAC sorties and 53 FAC sorties. A total of 256 tons of ordnance was dropped. Supporting artillery (3/319th) fired 149 missions amounting to a total of 34,422 rounds of ammunition. The Aviation Platoon (Cannon Platoon) supported all operations, a statistical summary of their activities follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Service</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medevac</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Adjust</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Combat Service</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance &amp; Training</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cargo Transported</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Airborne</strong></td>
<td>1,295</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VC and friendly losses during the month of April are as follows:

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5. Training

On the 26th of February 1967, the 177th Airborne Brigade Jungle School was organised by Captain Jack E. Tar and SGT Gerald W. Gentry. Instructors were sent by different units within the Brigade for an interview and selected from their experience in combat and instruction abilities. A total of 10 personnel personnel were assigned to the school. The selected ones set out to build a school, working days, pitching tents, building ranges, setting up classes, and leaving studying reference materials, making lesson plans and rehearsing classes. New instructors were still registering in with only two days before the first class was scheduled to start. On 6 March 1967, the first student body reported to the Paradise jungle school. They were unsure that they were the first class until the last day of instruction. This was as much a surprise to the students as it was to the cadre, only the murderer came to the cadre in the form of the comments received from the students on the critiques sheets they filled out at the end of the cycle. On 11 June 1967, the school was authorised a new housing structure which raised the strength from 10 to 24 cadre. With this increase, the school is able to train 210 new replacements each week and with minor changes, could train an entire Rifle battalion in 9 days. New instructing cadre number 18, the school is still providing the Paradise with replacements that are not cold, but have a need knowledge of what they will be doing and how to perform during their tour with the Parades.

The objective of the school is to provide all replacements in grades B-1 through O-3 with the best possible preparation prior to participation in combat operations in VIETNAM. Initial priority is given to training replacements for the infantry battalions. The training is designed to complement the training each soldier has received in CONUS. Emphasis is on common mistakes, lessons learned, immediate reaction, enemy tactics and procedures unique to operations in VIETNAM. The training curriculum will consist of five and one half (5½) days of combat subjects taught by instructors with combat experience in VIETNAM. A breakdown of the day by day curriculum is as follows:

Monday: On Monday, the school starts off with the history and examination of the 177th Airborne Brigade followed by airmobile operations, characteristics of the enemy, handling captives and documents, rewiring EKIs, and security, commo and map reading, especially relating to the problem of jungle navigation, techniques of jungle operations, first aid and personal hygiene (with a demonstration by a Dust-off medical evacuation helicopter on the use of the forest penetrator and "stokes" litter), a class on communications to include field excellent means, fire support, and a class on patrolling followed by the movie "The Green Man" which gives an insight into some of the reasons why we are here.

Tuesday: On this day the training is run a a "Country Pair" basis. Included are demonstrations and practical exercises on the M60A1 Clamor, M79 Grenade Launcher, M-72 LAW, M-67 Frag Grenade, zero of several weapons, ambush, night, night sounds, starlight scopes and night firing.
CONFIDENTIAL

1 July 1967

SUN.: Operational Report Lessons Learned

Wednesday: This day's training was to ambush and counter ambush techniques, armed tactics, characteristics and defense of operational bases, VC mines and boobytraps, boobytrap detection, demolitions, The Gas, search of VC base camp, and tunnel clearing.

During the first three days of training, time between classes (scheduled at noon) is used to double time them from one area to another.

Thursday & Friday: On Thursday morning, after a class on search and destroy, the students are taken on a 90-hour tactical operation in the Friede Field. Incorporated in this operation are most of the phases of operation and tactics that are taught during the first three days of instruction. School cadre accompany each element and maintain tight control at all times depending upon the size of the class. A tactical base camp is set up and usually two ambush patrols are sent out, each accompanied by TAC MEDs. The following day, after running search and clear patrols, the elements move tactically back to the jungle school base camp in the Friede area.

Saturday: Saturday training continues in the base camp starting with PAS Bag training, which is followed by guidelines to good relations, which includes instructions on the Vietnamese culture and goes in detail to the other side of this war, that pertaining to Civil Affairs and the Chieu Hoi (Civilians Area) Program. Next, a class on the maintenance and operation of Chain Guns, which are used quite frequently by this Friede to clear LTZs in the Operational Area. Then a practical exercise on airborne operations is conducted, followed by a written test covering the week's instruction, a critique of the course by the students, remarks by the Commanding General and after show, a class on communications security followed by movement to the jump school tower for a practical exercise with the PAS bag.

The following is a breakdown of the number of students attending the jungle school during the reporting period.

Attending School

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Psychological Operations and Civic Action

Operations during the period 1 February through 30 April 1967 centered generally on areas where extensive civil affairs operations were not conducted. Emphasis during this time fell on psychological operations and rear area civic action. In the KHEContextHolder Area, a total of 22,228 patients were seen on MEDCAP, 2,259 on DEUTCAP. In the forward operational areas, 160 MEDCAP and 116 DEUTCAP patients were treated. Psychological operations included leaflet drops totaling 4,212,200 and 24 hours of number missions. The 12th AAA Platform, 24 Civil Affairs Company has been invaluable, supplying their skill in the Psychological and Civic Affairs Program.

7. Logistics

During the reporting period, the logistical support has continued to remain excellent. Tactical operations were supported by air, airfields and local lines of supply (for special techniques in airdrop of supplies, see attached Combat
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OPERATIONS 1ST - 30TH APRIL 1967

1. Personnel and Administration

a. Personnel

(1) Brigade Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>DIED</th>
<th>INJURED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Brigade Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorised and Assigned Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auga Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/Attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggave</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gains and Losses by Month

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>AGG</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>AGG</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/ Gains</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/ Losses</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ During the reported period, the attached unit strength of the Brigade increased. The increase was the result of the attachment of the 65th PI (Public Information) Detachment to the Brigade.

2/ Represents all personnel gains to include both in-country and out-country gains.

3/ Represents all personnel losses to include DEATH, TSs, in-country reassigned, and deceased personnel.

b. Discipline, Law and Order

(1) During the period 1 February - 30 April 1967, the discipline has been excellent. There were no stragglers.
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[Page with text]
I. Observations and Recommendations

1. Observations (Lessons Learned)

Throughout this month, several lessons were learned to further aid in the overall countering enemy effort in VIETNAM, the most significant of these follow. Additionally, Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATIVE, the first mass unit assault in VIETNAM, produced several new and unique techniques. These appear in paragraph 10 of the attached After Action Report and in Tab D of the same document.

Item: Use of Light Ordnance Fires and Illumination to Aid Units in Night Navigation

Discussion: On 3 April 1967, Company A/1/509th Infantry was dispatched to conduct a takeaway with the Recon Platoon that was in contact with the Viet Cong. The company moved from the battalion perimeter at 0230 hours and completed the takeaway on 3 April.

Observation: Light ordnance fire was used to assist the unit in moving on their ambush while moving by firing their flanks, providing a continuous reference point to move by. Additionally, further navigational assistance was provided by the initial rounds of illumination rounds in the vicinity of the takeaway point.

Item: Establishing an ambush Site

Discussion: When establishing an ambush, a secondary hill site within the ambush site, in addition to the primary hill site should be established.

Observation: The reason for the actions cited above is that the VC often try probing an ambush site. If an ambush is suspect and in a general location, the Viet Cong will often try to move parallel to the location within approximately 100 - 150 meters. A secondary hillier area on either the flanks or rear allows for a greater possibility of trapping the VC within.

Item: Use of Firefly Teams

Discussion: When the tactical situation warrants, a firefly team consisting of a searchlight ship and a light fire team can provide illumination for emergency night operations. On Operation B2 SPRING, this technique was used to lure security forces by ambush to a downed Vietnam helicopter.

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Observation: When conducting such an operation, LZ conditions are very difficult to determine during the hours of darkness. Security forces are elements already on the ground in the vicinity of the doomed aircraft and must secure the LZ and inspect the area to ensure that it is free of traps and other obstacles that could damage or obstruct the rescue helicopter from landing.

Item: Acoustic Telescope

Discussion: Six Acoustic Telescopes (IME Task 10 P-46) were delivered to this firebase in February 1967. One telescope was issued to each one of our three infantry battalions, one to Troop "E", 17th Cavalry, one to D/16th Armor and one was maintained by Company "D" Maintenance as a float. Each unit issued this item was requested to field test it.

The tests were conducted to determine its feasibility for use in air-mobile search and destroy patrolling operations. The evaluation was based on employment during local patrolling operations and Operations BIG SPRING and JUNCTION CITY I & II.

Observation: The present structure of the instrument and accessories is much too awkward and fragile. The equipment proved to be very difficult to carry in the dense jungle and water obstacles. Additionally, there was no container to carry the telescope for its protection. The maintenance personnel at company and battalion level are not trained sufficiently to maintain required repairs on the instrument. The primary problem encountered in maintenance was with the wiring circuit. Additionally, the 9 volt dry cell battery, which is the main source of power, was not available through supply channels. When replacements were needed, field expedient methods were used.

In conclusion, the field test proved the acoustic telescope to be unsatisfactory in its present configuration. An easy carrying case should be made for the telescope and it should be reduced in bulk and made more steady for field operations.

Item: Road Sweeping for Mines

Discussion: It has been proven that deployment of mine detectors as teams for road clearing is the most effective and fastest means. To clear a single lane for traffic the use of three detectors with two operators per detector and one NCOIC constitutes the most effective method. Each team sweeps a six foot lane with teams in echelon and one foot overlap provides a fifteen foot cleared lane. For a two lane road, an increase in mine detectors to five enables clearing of a twenty-five foot traffic way. Experience has shown that clearing rates of 1000 meters per hour can be maintained, providing the road is not saturated with shrapnel or other metal objects. Rate can be decreased to as little as two hundred meters per hour in areas containing large quantities of shrapnel etc.

Observation: The rate of mine detector teams is dependent upon the deployment of the teams themselves and the amount of extraneous metal encountered along the route.

Item: Emergency Landing Zone Clearing Teams
SPECIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1 July 1967

Discussion: Operation JUNCTION CITY II proved the need for an Engineer team with chain saws to descend and clear an area for one chopper for Medvac or rescue.

Observation: Using a modified SOP from the lst Engineer Battalion, the 1st Engineer Company formed and practiced with the employment of emergency jungle clearing teams.

Item: Location of Water Point

Discussion: Base Camp, Fire Support Base or Forward CP areas should be located in a sound tactical position that provides good communication. In addition the advance party should consider a water source within this perimeter. This would provide the engineer the capability of setting up a water point and at the same time making security of the water point possible within the perimeter defense.

Observation: Availability of water at forward Base Camps, CP locations and Fire Support Bases greatly reduces the logistic problem. Recommendation is made that future FSR, CP and Base Camp selections take into consideration a water source.

Item: Bunker Construction

Discussion: Forward area bunkers constructed with overhead cover should have at least three thicknesses of sandbags for overhead cover if the sand is dry and at least four thicknesses when wet. Overhead cover should not be supported on sandbag walls. If shelter walls are sandbags, the roof should be supported by timber posts and cap construction.

Observation: If timber or logs are not available, reinforced sand bag walls with metal pickets driven along each side of wall and tied together at the top with commons wire. Metal pickets should be at least 24 inches in separation.

Item: Movement of Heavy Equipment in Hostile Areas

Discussion: When relocating Fire Support Bases or Forward CP locations, engineer ball designs have been utilized to close ramps etc. These tasks should be completed prior to movement and the design should be near the head of the convoy.

Observation: With this equipment at the head part of the convoy, security is provided for the vulnerable vehicles. In addition, if there should be a break down, the equipment is not unrestricted.

Item: Traffic Control and Base Camp Layout During Monsoons

Discussion: During the Monsoon Rains, special consideration should be paid to the layout of the Brigade Base Camp to insure accessibility of supplies etc. to strategic points.

Observation: When monsoon rains cause road failure, traffic control must be implemented. In many cases this calls for the reduction of traffic of all vehicles except those essential to combat units. If there is a good surfaced road in the area, the CP should be arranged to have the Brigade Supply Office (BSO) and unit kitchens as near to the road as possible. Administrative areas require minimum traffic and can be located further away from main traffic routes.

20
SITUATION:

Increased Population of the 173d Abn Rde (Sep) Base Camp

Discussion: Military Police support of the Brigade on Combat Operations in addition to Military Police support in the FIST HDA Base Camp Area reveals that police support be augmented, however, the present strength of the 173d MP's is not adequate to handle both jobs effectively.

Observation: Consideration should be given to increasing the number of military police, both officer and enlisted men, assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) in order to meet the increased police commitments in the base camp during combat operations as the result of additional units occupying within the Brigade Base Area.
Organization 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)
SUPPLY AND COMBAT SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

1. Summary of Class of Supply
   a. Class I: No critical shortages
   b. Class II & IV: The fill of II & IV requisitions remains good, however, shortages as listed in weekly periodic logistics reports do exist.
      c. The Brigade PCL level was maintained at or above stockage objectives.
   d. Class V: These items have been in short supply during February 1967.

2. Maintenance:
   a. Considerable difficulty was encountered with the 50th Detent at SABON in relation to recoil parts requisitions for M2 Fire Units. The requisitions were being rejected as unidentifiable. This problem was solved by the Tech Supply station leader who visited the depot and showed them the parts manual. Requisitions are now accepted and a few parts have started to come in for stockage.
   b. Tech Supply averaged 919 requisitions a week for the month of February. Generally twenty per cent were priority 01, fifteen to nineteen per cent 05, sixty per cent were 12 and the small percentage remain priority 17. This demonstrates that units are beginning to accept the supply system and do not overly abuse the priority system.

MARCH

1. Summary of Class of Supply
   a. Class I: No critical shortages. Periodic discrepancies exist in the issue of ice.
   b. Class II & IV: The fill of requisitions remains good, however, shortages as listed in the bi-monthly PLS do exist.
   c. Class III: The Brigade PCL level was maintained at or above stockage objectives.
   d. Class V: The following items have been in short supply during March 1967:
      - Kit, Dune M/37
      - Grenade, Hand Smoke, Violet
      - Grenade, Hand Smoke, Yellow
      - Grenade, Hand Smoke, Green
      - Flare, Surface Trip

2. Maintenance: In the last three months, January - March, Company "D" (Maintenance) has exchanged 106 handsets M138/0 for the M36/PRC-25 radio. The Brigade has approximately 300 M36/PRC-25 radios on hand. Currently, there are more stocks of these items on hand in SABON. If the rate of exchange continues at this rate, we can expect the communications at unit level to be hampered due to lack of handsets. Company "D" (Maintenance) has a more balance of stockage.

Enclosure A
APRIL

1. Summary of Classes of Supply

   a. Class I: No critical shortfalls. Periodic discrepancies exist in the issue of ice.

   b. Class II & IV: The fill of II & IV requisitions remains good, however, shortfalls as listed in bi-weekly periodic logs are reported to exist.

   c. Class III: The Brigade POL Level was maintained at or above storage objectives.

   d. Class V: The following items have been short in supply during April 1967.

2. Maintenance

   a. Since on or about 20 February, chain saws within the Brigade have been deadlined (total of 14) at a rate of approximately 45%. There are three probable causes which contribute most to the existing condition. They are as follows:

      a. Poorly trained operators.

      b. Poor Organizational Maintenance due to lack of training and a shortage of technical manuals and parts

      c. Shortage of Repair Parts.

      d. The majority of the problems have been with the starters, manifolds, and carburetors.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1967

CG, 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)

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