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**THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED**
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, Pleiku Sub Area Command

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Pleiku Sub Area Command for quarter ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

C. A. STANFIELD
Colonel AG
Acting The Adjutant General

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Office, Chief of Staff (DWSA)
CO, Pleiku Sub Area Command
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 January 1967

TO: Commanding Officer
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
ATTN: AVCA-QN-GO
APO 96238

The Operational Report of this headquarters for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1967 is forwarded in compliance with USARV Regulation Number 870-2, dated 19 July 1966.

TEL: Calvert 101

STANLEY GROSH
COL, QMC
Commanding

2 Incl
1. Operational Report
2. List of Assigned Units to HQ, PKSAG

Declassified when removed from classified inclosure.

"This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., Sections 793 and 794. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

FOR OT RD
670203
SECTION I Significant Organizational Activities

1. (C) Significant events of the command for the period ending 31 January 1967.

a. The strength of the Pleiku Sub Area Command (PISAC) has grown from 1423 on 31 October to an assigned and attached strength of 2148. During the reporting period, the following units joined the command:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE ATTACHED</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 45th GS Gp</td>
<td>26 Nov 66</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 62nd Maint Bn</td>
<td>7 Jan 67</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>628th Main Spt Co</td>
<td>7 Jan 67</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Prev Med Det</td>
<td>1 Dec 66</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243d Fld Svc Co</td>
<td>15 Dec 66</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>484th Sig Det</td>
<td>7 Jan 67</td>
<td>5</td>
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b. The Pleiku Sub Area Command was reorganized on 1 December 1966 with the arrival of HHC, 45th GS Gp. The group headquarters, with an authorized strength of 24 Officers, 1 WO, and 78 EM combined with Headquarters, PISAC and provides the command and staff structure for the Pleiku Sub Area Command.

(1) HHC, 45th GS Gp deployed from CONUS on 9 Nov 66 with a total compliment of 16 Officers, 1 WO, and 70 EM; the advance party of 4 Officers and 4 EM departed via air on 20 Nov 66. The main body arrived in Vietnam on 26 Nov 66 and was subsequently air lifted to Pleiku on 27 Nov 66.

(2) Equipment for the unit arrived in-country at Cam Rahn Bay in mid-January, however, due to difficulties in obtaining transportation, equipment has not arrived in Pleiku as of the close of the reporting period.

(3) Prior to deployment, this unit advised Department of Army that shortages in equipment and personnel would adversely affect mission capability; however, due to a change in mission, these shortages will not have any affect on unit capability.

c. On 6 December 1966, Headquarters Co, 45th GS Gp, became the carrier unit for all personnel assigned or attached to Hq, PISAC and the company commander assumed the functions of the headquarters commandant.

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d. On 23 January 1967, the cantonment area occupied by Hq, PKSAC and other 1st Logistical Command units was officially dedicated as Camp Schmidt. The installation was named after Major Richard H. Schmidt, Ordnance Corps, Civil Affairs Officer QNSC, who was killed on 17 May 1966 while on a mission of delivering urgently needed supplies to Vietnamese refugees in the Qui Nhon area.

2. (C) Personnel and Administration

a. On 10 December 1966, Hq, PKSAC relocated from Camp Holloway to an area adjacent to Hq II Corps MACV, five miles north of Pleiku City. In this area, recently prepared for occupancy, three units, totaling over four hundred troops, are billeted. Twenty three wooden troop billets have been completed or are near completion. The Pleiku Sub Area Command headquarters is currently housed in four 100 ft quonsets.

b. To some extent the arrival of the HHC, 45th GS Op helped alleviate an acute personnel shortage, however, there are still insufficient personnel spaces available to properly support the overall missions of the headquarters; subordinate units are still being levied for personnel support. To provide command and control of 1st Logistic units, accomplish the missions of Installation Coordinator and to perform the assigned logistical mission, this headquarters is preparing a request for a TD augmentation consisting of 29 Officers, 2 WO, 176 EM, and 3 Civilians.

3. (U) Special Services

a. This section was formed when PKSAC headquarters moved to the Camp Schmidt area. An active program to support all units within the area has begun.

b. Two volleyball courts and a touch football field were constructed at Camp Schmidt.

c. During the reporting period, two USO shows were sponsored by PKSAC Special Service Section; the initial efforts by this section were highly successful.

d. At Camp Schmidt, an outdoor stage has been erected at the base of a hillside to provide ample room with sufficient view for all of the audience.

e. Current plans include development of a combined basketball-tennis court, a craft shop, and library for Camp Schmidt. Long range planning is underway for operation of an in-country R & R recreation center at Lake Bien Ho, a picturesque lake located 2 km North of Camp Schmidt. Over $17,000 in expendable supplies are currently on requisition to support the Pleiku Area Special Services program.
4. (U) S-4

a. Due to the arrival of the 15th General Support Group, the functions of the S-4 were realigned during the past quarter. The S-4 assumed staff responsibility for all internal supply activities of the Pleiku Sub Area Command.

b. Staff responsibility for transportation, to include the operation of a Transportation Motor Pool and the operation of a Hold Baggage Section, was transferred to the S-4. The Pleiku Sub Area Command Hold Baggage Section was opened on 3 January 1967. This facility serves all Army troops in the Pleiku Sub Area, including divisional units, MACV, Special Forces, Aviation, Artillery, and Engineer units. During the month of January, 371 shipment were made, totaling 514 pieces and 38,000 pounds.

c. The staff responsibility for the AIK Fund was transferred from the S-4 to the S-1 and Food Service responsibility was assumed by the Supply, Service and Maintenance Section.

5. (U) Civil Affairs

The Civil Affairs Section, PK3AC, was organized on 10 December 1966 with one officer and one E3 assigned. Civil Action projects sponsored by company size units began 23 December 1966. As of 31 January 1967, 35 percent of the command was active in civic action projects.

6. (C) Engineer

a. A shortage of lumber and cement coupled with a lack of adequate supervisory personnel has caused construction of the Camp Schmidt cantonment area to progress at a slow rate. The programmed completion of all buildings in the cantonment area prior to the monsoon season will not be realized.

b. Construction in the depot area is continuing. All access roads in the operational area are ready for final preparation for hard surfacing. Vertical construction has progressed at a rapid pace with thirteen buildings in the maintenance and Engineer R&U areas in various stages of completion.

c. Work on the new ASP area has not begun since a survey of the area has not been completed. Work was halted after an ambush attack that inflicted heavy casualties upon an engineer survey team. Currently, logistical troops are being trained in the rudiments of infantry tactics in order to provide a modicum of security for personnel engaged in the surveying operation.
7. (U) Chaplain

a. On 10 December 1966, the Chaplain's Section officially moved to the Camp Schmidt area; however, previous steps were taken to secure space and equipment to provide religious guidance to the soldiers occupying the new area. A general purpose tent was located in the cantonment area for the temporary chapel. During December, an altar, pulpit facilities, and a confessional were constructed. During this period, the Chaplain Section ascertained that adequate religious guidance was available for all of the Pleiku Sub Area Command to include those serving at the forward activities.

b. Two noteworthy civic action programs were initiated during this period: the first, of benefit to both the military and local civilian population, is counseling and assisting military personnel in their efforts to adopt Vietnamese Orphans; the second, a community action program to assist local Christian Missionaries in their efforts to spread the doctrines of Christianity.

c. A site for the permanent Camp Schmidt Chapel was selected and construction is programmed to begin during the following quarter.

8. (C) Logistical Operations Center (LOC)

a. The Logistical Operations Center (LOC) was reorganized on 1 Dec 66 with the arrival of the 45th General Support Group. The reorganization, utilizing the officers and enlisted men of the new 45th group, has greatly facilitated the operation of the Logistical Operations Center. The Logistical Operations Center is now organized with a Command Section, three Forward Support Activity (FSA) Teams, and a Transportation Section augmentation from Qui Nhon. The LOC is operational 24 hours a day. The LOC coordinates directly with the Operation Section, 88th S & S Bn on FSA requirements.

b. The LOC was engaged in support of Tactical Operations during the entire reporting period.

c. The LOC moved from vicinity Camp Holloway to Camp Schmidt in December. The biggest problem encountered during this move was communications.

d. During the reporting period, a minimum of two and maximum of four FSA's were supported.
9. (C) Security Plans and Operations

a. Operations

(1) On 7 January 1967, enemy elements launched a combined mortar and ground attack against Camp Holloway. Camp Holloway is occupied primarily by supply and service units of the 1st Logistical Command and elements of the 52nd Combat Aviation Bn. The ground attack was concentrated on the Logistical Activities while the mortar attack was directed primarily at the airfield. Moderate damage was sustained by both activities. 1st Logistical Command units sustained the following casualties: 2 KIA, 1 DOW, 8 WIA. Total US casualties were 3 KIA, 3 DOW, 61 WIA. Total cost of 1st Logistical supplies and equipment destroyed exceeded $800,000, primarily in Class II & IV supplies.

(2) Immediately after the attack a reevaluation was made of the defensive structure of the area resulting in an increase in all phases of defense, to include early warning devices, wire barriers, antipersonnel mines, perimeter lighting, bunkers, and numbers of sentinels posted.

b. Training. Training during the period consisted primarily of on-the-job training, classes in safety, driver training, first aid, ammunition and explosive ordnance reconnaissance/explosive safety.

c. Security

(1) On 14 December 1966, Hq, PKSAC was authorized to validate SECRET and TOP SECRET clearances for personnel within the command. This authority was previously delegated to USASC, Qui Nhon, Vietnam.

(2) During the reporting period personnel security actions were completed as follows:

   (a) Number of clearances validated 30
   (b) CONFIDENTIAL clearances granted 32
   (c) Local file checks completed 69

10. (C) Supply, Services and Maintenance

a. Supply

Supply activities, while primarily directed toward support of forward supply activities, assumed an increasing workload as local logistical and non-logistical troop strength continues to climb. There were no significant occurrences in Class II and IV or III areas. In the Class I area, it was found that strict adherence to prepublished menus at FSA decreased resupply problems and insured the regular maintenance of the rations to the troops.
b. Services

The Sub Area continued to provide services to the FSA and local troops. These services, Laundry, bath, transportation were further augmented with the addition of a Field Bakery which started in operation 27 January 1967. The bakery is currently providing the daily bread component for approximately 30,000 rations.

c. Maintenance

(1) On 7 January 1967, the 62nd Maintenance Battalion arrived in Pleiku and was assigned the mission of maintenance support for non-divisional units in the Pleiku Sub Area. The battalion consisting of a headquarters detachment, the 110th Maintenance Co and the 628th Main Support Co, has temporarily moved all activities into the depot area. These units will be billeted in the cantonment area upon completion of construction there.

(2) With the arrival of these units and utilizing the maintenance capability of the 15th GS Gp, a vigorous maintenance program has been instigated within PKSAC.

11. (C) Communications

a. On 27 December 1966, the communications section of Hq, PKSAC was augmented with an additional 25 men from HHC, 15th GS Gp.

b. During the first ten days of December, it was necessary to establish a communications system for Camp Schmidt area, to include wire and radio. This required locating and preparing the switchboard for operation, laying wire, installing forty telephones, and coordinating with supporting communications elements. The radio teletype equipment was relocated without a break in contact with forward support activities.

c. Due to the age of the radio teletype equipment, this section has experienced great difficulty in maintaining continuous contact with FSA's. It has been necessary to keep a repairman traveling daily to the various forward locations.
SECTION II Observations and Recommendations

1. (C) Observations

a. Item: Valid requisitions for TOE items of equipment.

Discussion: Prior to departure from CONUS, units deploying to MVN report TOE shortages which are subsequently placed on POM requisitions. Those requisitions not filled immediately upon arrival in country are cancelled. This time frame is normally 60 days. Units are required to re-requisition existing TOE shortages through in-country supply sources.

Observation: Unit commanders are not aware that their CONUS POM requisitions are cancelled. Units are reporting due-outs that are not valid on the supply system.

b. Item: Unqualified laundry and bath equipment operators.

Discussion: Utilizing unqualified or inadequately trained laundry and bath equipment operators has resulted in misuse, abuse and improper maintenance of the equipment. Much of this can be attributed to a lack of proper training of operators prior to deployment. Operators do not maintain equipment because of a lack of knowledge on the proper procedures for operator maintenance.

Observation: The high deadline rate and extended downtime is directly attributable to this training deficiency. An abnormal consumption rate for repair parts is another byproduct of poorly trained operators.

c. Item: Signal equipment maintenance and repair.

Discussion: During the quarter, it has been necessary to keep RTT repairmen moving from FSA to FSA to repair old equipment. This equipment has been forced to operate continuously with a shutdown only for maintenance. When the equipment becomes inoperative, the FSA commander cannot communicate his requirements to the supporting supply point.

Observation: New equipment is highly desirable, but would soon suffer the same fate with constant usage. A float for RTT equipment would solve many of the repair problems as items could be rotated into the repair facility, given a complete technical inspection and repaired. This would generate a savings in man hours and insure the constant availability of communications required for combat support.
d. Item: Organizational maintenance and material readiness.

Discussion: High deadline rates, shortages of PLLs and inoperative equipment are the direct result of inadequate command supervision and a general lack of interest in the preventive maintenance program. Unit commanders tend to give a low priority to equipment maintenance while the unit is performing its basic mission. They fail to realize the adverse affect that inadequate maintenance has on their mission.

Observation: Maintenance spot checks reveal that operator and unit maintenance is unsatisfactory. Much of this can be attributed to young, inexperienced unit commanders who have not yet developed an appreciation for an aggressive preventive maintenance program.

e. Item: PLLs

Discussion: Units are arriving in Vietnam without PLL's for their equipment. This has contributed to a high rate of deadline equipment. Units within the country are not maintaining their PLLs, resulting in excessive waiting time to make even the smallest repairs. These maintenance deficiencies have resulted in an unusual demand on the supply system and have incurred additional costs to expedite repair parts.

Observation: Unit commanders, supply and maintenance personnel are not well informed on the use and necessity for PLLs. Accordingly, equipment stands idle for lack of parts that should be on hand at the unit level. The adverse effect which this has on mission capability is obvious.

f. Item: Perimeter security.

Discussion: During the Camp Holloway attack, enemy forces initially infiltrated through the barbed wire fence to accomplish their mission. Examination of the area indicated previous entry into the perimeter.

Observation: Defensive perimeters must be inspected daily to include early warning devices, wire barriers, and mines. Daily inspections should also be made of those areas which provide cover and/or concealment for enemy forces.

g. Item: Proper spacing between perimeter defense bunkers.

Discussion: Entry into the defensive perimeter at Camp Holloway was made in an unlighted area between two bunkers spaced over two hundred meters apart.

Observation: Bunkers should be spaced so as to be able to detect movement between them during the hours of darkness.
h. Item: Perimeter defense communication.

Discussion: After hostile forces entered the Camp Holloway perimeter, they cut the telephone wires, thus eliminating all means of communication between bunkers and the Battalion CP. While the installation was under mortar and ground attack, the perimeter bunkers were entirely out of contact and could not provide any information to the CP or call for any assistance.

Observation: Wire communication is inadequate for defensive communication and should be supplemented or paralleled with radio.

2. (C) Recommendations

a. That advance individual training and basic unit training courses for laundry and bath equipment operators be modified to increase the time authorized for the maintenance phase of the training.

b. That communications equipment float be established at supporting supply points for RTT or other communication equipment used to communicate with supported FSA's.

c. That installations in CONUS responsible for preparing units for overseas movement insure that an aggressive maintenance training program is included in the unit's POM training. Special emphasis should be given to insuring that unit officers are made aware of the basic rudiments of maintaining the unit equipment.

d. That basic unit orientations in CONUS and overseas emphasize the necessity for close command attention to the status of POM requisitions.
SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (ROS GSFOR-65)

The following units are assigned to HQ, PKSAC:

MiC, 45th GS Gp
526th Engr Det
5...a APU
192nd Fin Det
5...th Fin Det

HHC, 88th S & S Bn
86th Trans Co
90th GS Co
188th Ord Co
213d Fld Svc Co
561st GS Co
573d S & S Co
3d QM Det
233d QM Det
385th QM Det
603d Engr Det

HHC, 62nd Maint Bn
149th Maint Co
628th Maint Co
484th Sig Det
510th Engr Plt
861st Sig Det

Inclosure 2
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 January 1967

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON, APO SAN FRANCISCO 96238

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-O

Deputy Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96307

Headquarters, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

(C) The actions taken by this command to correct the deficiencies noted are as follows:

a. Reference 1a, Section II.

To make commanders aware of their responsibilities in all areas of supply, the following procedures are employed by this command:

(1) Supply orientations for newly arrived commanders.

(2) Periodic notices in the daily bulletin emphasizing PCM requisitions.

(3) Units are required to reconcile quarterly, all supply requisitions with the supporting supply points.

b. Reference 1b, Section II.

To offset the lack of adequate training, this command has conducted equipment operation and maintenance classes; additionally, individuals with inadequate training are teamed with experienced operators and are closely supervised by qualified non-commissioned officers.

c. Reference 1d, Section II.

This command has an aggressive preventive maintenance program in operation; this program is two-fold. First, there is a maintenance element within the Supply, Service and Maintenance Section of the headquarters which has a team that has daily direct contact with subordinate units. This team evaluates the status of maintenance within the unit and makes recommendations accordingly. Follow-up action includes coordination with the maintenance battalion of the command to render assistance where needed. Additionally, the maintenance battalion has a customer liaison officer whose primary mission is to ferret out unit problem areas and take corrective action to include assistance through battalion maintenance contact teams. Preventive maintenance is stressed throughout the command.
AVCA-QN-60 (14 Feb 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarter Ending 31 January 1967

d. Reference 2b, Section II.

A float of RTT equipment has been made available to allow shutdown for maintenance and to insure uninterrupted communication with FSA's.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: QNL 167/142

F. J. LEWIS
CTR, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl

13
2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND, APO 96307 22 APR 1967

TO: Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN:
AVHGC-DH, APO 96307

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by the Pleiku Sub Area Command for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1967 is forwarded herewith.

2. (U) Reference paragraph la, page 7, and 2d page 9:

   a. Paragraph 19b (7) (b), AR 220-10, clearly points out that requisitions for funded items will be cancelled 60 days after the unit departs home station. AR 220-10 is one of the basic regulations that the unit commander must comply with to prepare his unit for overseas movement.

   b. It is believed that commanders are oriented before departing CONUS, since a final departure date must be established with the home station commander, to determine the limit of the 60 day period. In any event, it should remain the responsibility of the receiving parent organization's G4 or G4 section to advise the unit of POM requisition time limits.

3. (U) Reference paragraph 1b, page 7: 1st Indorsement from Qui Nhơn Support Command indicates they are conducting maintenance classes and exercising close supervision over the operators. This action should help solve the problem if carried through. Personnel from this headquarters make periodic liaison trips to the field and are available to assist when needed. This headquarters has prepared and forwarded to the field a check list for laundry and bath equipment. In addition to visits and the check lists, a listing of all appropriate publications for maintenance and operation of bath and bath equipment was compiled and forwarded to operating units. Instructions were given to requisition missing publications.

4. (C) Reference paragraph 1d and 1e, page 8 and 2c page 9: Concur with comments and corrective actions outlined in referenced portions of the report. Additionally, several command letters from the Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam and the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command directing that an effective preventive maintenance program be implemented have recently been published. Also, a preventive maintenance project officer has been appointed at this headquarters and charged with the responsibility of monitoring the preventive maintenance program within this command.

5. (U) The Pleiku Sub Area Command engaged in combat support operations for 92 days during the reporting period.

CONFIDENTIAL
6. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by the comments contained in the preceding indersement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: Lynx 782/430

Carlos R. Noe
CARLOS R. NOE
ZLT, INF
Acting Asst. AG
AVHGC-DH (14 Feb 67) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, Pleiku
Subarea Command - 45th General Support Group as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Paragraph 1a, Page 7; Paragraph 2d, Page 9;
Paragraph a, 1st Indorsement; and Paragraph 2, 2d Indorsement, concerning
requisitions for TOE items: Concur with comments of 1st Logistical
Command in 2d Indorsement. CONARC Logistics Instructions for Deploy-
ment to USARPAC states that unfunded requisitions will not be cancelled.
The home station commander will cancel funded requisitions in accordance
with AR 725-50. Copies of cancellations will be furnished appropriate
USAMC LOO (LCO-P, Fort Mason). Recommend that CONARC instructions be
amended to specifically state that the unit will be furnished copies of
all cancellation actions.

b. Reference Paragraph 1b, Page 7; Paragraph 2a, Page 9;
Paragraph b, 1st Indorsement; and Paragraph 3, 2d Indorsement, concerning
additional maintenance training for laundry and bath equipment operators:
Scheduled deployment of TOE laundry units, personnel, and equipment
through December 1967 should assist substantially in overcoming the lack
of qualified personnel. Insufficient time allotted the maintenance phase
of training could be a contributing cause of equipment failure but the
primary cause is the lack of trained/experienced personnel. This can be
corrected by extensive on-the-job training.

c. Reference Paragraph 1c, Page 7; Paragraph 2b, Page 9; and
Paragraph d, 1st Indorsement, concerning the requirement for a main-
tenance float of communications equipment: Concur with action taken by
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, as indicated in 1st Indorsement.
AVHGC-DH

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

3d Ind

3 MAY 1967

d. Reference Paragraph 1d, Page 8; Paragraph 2c, Page 9; Paragraph c, 1st Indorsement; and Paragraph 4, 2d Indorsement, concerning preventive maintenance. Concur with comments and corrective actions of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JERRY VAN HORN
2LT, AGC

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JERRY VAN HORN
2LT, AGC

2 Incl

no
GPOP-OT (14 Feb 67) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ Pleiku Sub-Area Comd

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 19 MAY 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

2. Reference paragraph 2a, 3d Indorsement. In response to a
query from US Army Material Command, this headquarters, by message
GPLO-MM 6713, DTG 1601529 March 1967, recommended a procedural change
to AR 220-10 which, if adopted, should satisfy the requirements of
concerned agencies and units.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

G. R. ROBALY
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

2 Inc1
nc